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17. Behold, thou art named a Jew, etc. Some old copies read εἰ δὲ, though indeed; which, were it generally received, would meet my approbation; but as the greater part of the manuscripts is opposed to it, and the sense is not unsuitable, I retain the old reading, especially as it is only a small difference of one letter. ⁷⁷⁷⁷     Griesbach has since found a majority of MSS. in favor of this reading, and has adopted it. But the difficulty is to find a corresponding clause. There is none, except what begins in Romans 2:21; εἰ δὲ and οὖν do not well respond, except we render the first, though indeed, and the other, yes or nevertheless somewhat in the sense of an adversative. It will admit this meaning in some passages. See Matthew 12:12; Matthew 26:64; Romans 10:14. — Ed.

Having now completed what he meant to say of the Gentiles, he returns to the Jews; and that he might, with greater force, beat down their great vanity, he allows them all those privileges, by which they were beyond measure transported and inflated: and then he shows how insufficient they were for the attainment of true glory, yea, how they turned to their reproach. Under the name Jew he includes all the privileges of the nation, which they vainly pretended were derived from the law and the prophets; and so he comprehends all the Israelites, all of whom were then, without any difference, called Jews.

But at what time this name first originated it is uncertain, except that it arose, no doubt, after the dispersion. ⁷⁸⁷⁸     This is not quite correct. They were called Jews even before the captivity, and during the captivity, but most commonly and regularly after it. The words Jews, first occurs in 2 Kings 16:6. See Esther 4:3; Jeremiah 38:19; Daniel 3:8; Ezra 4:12; Nehemiah 2:16. — Ed. Josephus, in the eleventh book of his Antiquities, thinks that it was taken from Judas Maccabæus, under whose auspices the liberty and honor of the people, after having for some time fallen, and been almost buried, revived again. Though I allow this opinion to be probable, yet, if there be some to whom it is not satisfactory, I will offer them a conjecture of my own. It seems, indeed, very likely, that after having been degraded and scattered through so many disasters, they were not able to retain any certain distinction as to their tribes; for a census could not have been made at that time, nor did there exist a regular government, which was necessary to preserve an order of this kind; and they dwelt scattered and in disorder; and having been worn out by adversities, they were no doubt less attentive to the records of their kindred. But though you may not grant these things to me, yet it cannot be denied but that a danger of this kind was connected with such disturbed state of things. Whether, then, they meant to provide for the future, or to remedy an evil already received, they all, I think assumed the name of that tribe, in which the purity of religion remained the longest, and which, by a peculiar privilege, excelled all the rest, as from it the Redeemer was expected to come; for it was their refuge in all extremities, to console themselves with the expectation of the Messiah. However this may be, by the name of Jews they avowed themselves to be the heirs of the covenant which the Lord had made with Abraham and his seed.

And restest in the law, and gloriest in God, etc. He means not that they rested in attending to the law, as though they applied their minds to the keeping of it; but, on the contrary, he reproves them for not observing the end for which the law had been given; for they had no care for its observance, and were inflated on this account only, — because they were persuaded that the oracles of God belonged to them. In the same way they gloried in God, not as the Lord commands by his Prophet, — to humble ourselves, and to seek our glory in him alone, (Jeremiah 9:24,) — but being without any knowledge of God’s goodness, they made him, of whom they were inwardly destitute, peculiarly their own, and assumed to be his people, for the purpose of vain ostentation before men. This, then, was not the glorying of the heart, but the boasting of the tongue.

18. And knowest his will, and approvest things excellent, etc. He now concedes to them the knowledge of the divine will, and the approval of things useful; and this they had attained from the doctrine of the law. But there is a twofold approval, — one of choice, when we embrace the good we approve; the other of judgment, by which indeed we distinguish good from evil, but by no means strive or desire to follow it. Thus the Jews were so learned in the law that they could pass judgment on the conduct of others, but were not careful to regulate their life according to that judgment. But as Paul reproves their hypocrisy, we may, on the other hand, conclude, that excellent things are then only rightly approved (provided our judgment proceeds from sincerity) when God is attended to; for his will, as it is revealed in the law, is here appointed as the guide and teacher of what is to be justly approved. ⁷⁹⁷⁹     There are two expositions of the words, δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφερόντα, which may be sustained according to what the words signify in other places. The first word means to prove, or test, or examine, and also to approve; and the second signifies things which differ, or things which are excellent. “Thou provest, or, distinguishest things which differ,” is the rendering of Beza, Pareus, Doddridge, and Stuart: “Thou approvest things excellent or useful,” is the rendering of Erasmus, Macknight, and others. The first is the most suitable to the context, as knowledge, and not approval, is evidently intended, as proved by the explanatory clause which follows, — “being instructed out of the law.” — Ed.

19. And believest thyself, etc. More is still granted to them; as though they had not only what was sufficient for themselves, but also that by which they could enrich others. He grants, indeed, that they had such abundance of learning, as that others might have been supplied. ⁸⁰⁸⁰     Calvin has passed over here several clauses: they are so plain as to require no remarks, except the two last. “The instructor of the unwise — insipientium,” ἀφρόνων, of such as were foolish from not understanding things rightly. “The teacher of the ignorant — imperitorum,” νηπίων, babes, that is, of such as were ignorant like babes. But these and the foregoing titles, “the guide of the blind,” and, “light to those in darkness,” were such as the Jewish doctors assumed, and are not to be considered as having any great difference in their real meaning. There seems to be no reason to suppose, with Doddridge and some others, that “the blind, foolish, ignorant” were the Gentiles, for the Jews did not assume the office of teaching them. It is to be observed that Paul here takes the case, not of the common people, but of the learned — the teachers.

20. I take what follows, having the form of knowledge, as a reason for the preceding; and it may be thus explained, — “because thou hast the form of knowledge.” For they professed to be the teachers of others, because they seemed to carry in their breasts all the secrets of the law. The word form is put for model (exemplar — pattern); ⁸¹⁸¹     The same word occurs only in 2 Timothy 3:5, “μόρφωσιν εὐσεβείας — the form of godliness.” It is taken here in a good sense, as meaning a sketch, a delineation, an outline, a representation, or a summary. Chalmers renders the words thus, — “The whole summary of knowledge and truth which is in the law.” Some understand by knowledge what refers to morals or outward conduct, and by truth what is to be believed. Others regard them as an instance of Hebrewism, two substantives being put, instead of a substantive and an adjective; the phrase would then be, “true knowledge.” — Ed. for Paul has adopted μόρφωσιν and not τύπον: but he intended, I think, to point out the conspicuous pomp of their teaching, and what is commonly called display; and it certainly appears that they were destitute of that knowledge which they pretended. But Paul, by indirectly ridiculing the perverted use of the law, intimates, on the other hand, that right knowledge must be sought from the law, in order that the truth may have a solid basis.