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$pinola Spinoza THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG
J. 14. Sehr&clch, Christliche Kirchengeschichte, xxx. 573574, Leipsie, 1802; I. M. Jost, Gesch%chte des Judenthuma and seiner Sekten, iii. 96, ib. 1859, H. Graetz, Geach%chte der Juden, viii. 228-229, ib. 1890, Eng. transl., 5 vo15., Philadelphia, 1891-95; JE, Xi. 510.
SPINOLA, spi-no'ld, CRISTOVAL ROJAS DE: Spanish Roman Catholic advocate of union; b. near Roermond (27 m. n.e. of Maestricht), Holland, 1626; d, at Vienna Mar. 12, 1695. He was edu cated at Cologne and at an early age entered the order of the Observantine Franciscans. He taught philosophy and scholastic theology at Cologne, and rose to be general of his order. In 1661 he was called from Madrid to Vienna to become confes sor of Maria Theresa, wife of Leopold L, and in 1668 was consecrated titular bishop of Tina, while in 1685 he was made bishop of Wiener-Neustadt. Thor oughly versed in diplomacy and irenic in tempera ment, he labored unceasingly to reconcile Protes tantism with the Roman Catholic Church, willing to make certain concessions for the furtherance of a plan which lukewarm Protestantism and notable conversions from its bickerings rendered plausible. In 1671, after gaining the approval of the papal nuncio at Vienna, Spinola began negotiations with German Lutheran and Reformed princes and theo logians, but in nearly every case his advances were met with profound distrust. His most favorable reception was in Brunswick and Liineburg, and especially in Hanover, where he had the sympathy of the converted duke, John Frederick, as well as of Gerhard Walter Molanus and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz (qq.v.). The first conference, in 1676, amounted to little, but in 1683 Spinola made ver bally a number of concessions, such as communion under both kinds, marriage of the clergy, continued possession of secularized estates of the Church, the suspension of the decrees of the Council of Trent, and remission of formal adjuration, the sole require ment being recognition of the supremacy of the pope. At a conference over which Molanus presided the plan proposed by Spinola was practically adopted, but when the proceedings became generally known, they aroused the anger of Protestants, while Roman Catholics regarded them as futile. Nevertheless, Molanus and Leibnitz remained in correspondence with Spinola, and in 1691 the. plan was submitted to Bossuet, who bluntly rejected the entire affair, de manding unconditional submission to the authority of the Church and the Council of Trent, although he was unable finally to break off negotiations until 1694. Meanwhile Spinola had entered into com munication with the Hungarian Protestants, having received, in 1691, an imperial appointment as com missioner general for the promotion of religious union in Austria. Here again his hopes were ill founded, and although a conference was expected to be held in 1693, it never took place. After the death of Spinola a few attempts at Roman Catholic and Protestant union were made by his successor, Graf of Buchheim, and by Leibnitz, only to prove equally abortive. (PAUL, TSCHACKERT.)13LBLIOGRAPHY: J. D. Gruber, Commercii epiatolici Leibnitiani, i. 411 sqq., Hanover, 1722; J. Schmidt, in Grenzbcten, 1860, no%. 44-45; J. X. Kiesl, Der Friedensplan des Leibniz zur Wiedereinioung der oetrennten christlichen %irchen, PaderimFRtr 1994; KL, xi. 82025.
48 SPINOZA, spi-no'zd, BARUCH (BENEDICT DE)Philosopher; b. at Amsterdam Nov. 24, 1632; d at The Hague Feb. 21, 1677. His parents were Jews who had been driven from Portugal by religious persecution. He devoted himself to the study of the Bible and the Talmud; was instructed in Latin by Franz van der Ende, a celebrated physician of naturalistic sympathies; and, turning to free philosophical speculations, was excommunicated by the synagogue. Employing himself with the study of the Cartesian philosophy and the development of his own, he dwelt near Amsterdam, 1656-6O,or 61; at Rhynsburg near Leyden until 1664; at Voorburg near The Hague until 1670; and at The Hague from 1670 until his death, supporting himself by grinding lenses. In 1673 he declined a call to the professorship of philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, so as not to restrict his liberty of thought. His works written at the Hague, 1660-77, were, Reni Descartes prineipiorum phitosophice (2 parts, Amsterdam, 1663); Tractatus theologico-politicos (Hamburg, 1670); and, most important of all, Ethics ordine geometrico demonstrate, which, together with Traetatics politicus, Tractatus de intellectus emt.endatioree, and Epistohe, was published in Opera posthuma (Amsterdam, 1677). His De Deo homine; ejusque felicitate was not known before it appeared in a Dutch translation (Halle, 1352).
For the basis of his method Spinoza depended on Rend Descartes (q.v.) and for his point of view in part upon the influence of Giordano Bruno (q.v.). Aiming to arrive at mathematical certainty, he proceeds by a method of exact demonstration, analogous to the geometry of Euclid, with series of definitions, axioms, propositions, and proofs. His fundamental notion is that of substance, which he defines as " that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, i.e., the conception of which does not need the conception of any other thing in order to be formed." There is but one substance, which is absolute and infinite, and is God. Nothing can be predicated of it, because " all determination is negation." It can be comprehended only by attributes which belong only to the mind. Having neither intellect nor will, it cannot have an ultimate end in view, but is the immanent cause of all things. There being nothing to constrain it, it is absolutely free, acting from an inner self-determination or necessity. This substance has two fundamental attributes cognizable by man; namely, thought and extension, although an infinite number of attributes is possible. There is no extended substance as separate from thinking substance. An attribute is "that which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance." Movement, intellect, and will, on the whole, are infinite modes or affections of substance; all individual things are finite and changing modes. A " mode is that which is in something else, through the aid of which also it is conceived." Modes of the attribute of extension are physical objects; modes of thought are ideas. There is no causal nexus between the attribute and modes of extension on the one hand, and the attribute and modes of thought on the other, inasmuch as they belong to the same substance; although in either attribute there are chains of cause and effect, and between the two
