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Dorninikus and der Rosenkranz, Munich, 1903; W. Schmitz, Das Rosenkranzgebet im 16. and im Anfange des 18. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg, 1903; K. D. Bests, Rosa mystics; the Mysteries of the Rosary, London, 1904; ABB, Aug., i. 422437; DCB, ii. 1819-20; KL, x. 1275-80. For ethnic rosaries consult: Monier Williams, in Atheneum, Feb. 9, 1878; I. M. Casanowiez, The Collection of Rosaries in the U. S. National Museum (Washington Gov't Pub.), 1909.

ROSCELINUS, res-e-ldi'nus (ROSCELLINUS, ROZELINUS, RUCELINUS), JOHANNES: Nominalist and tritheist of the eleventh century; b. in northern France, probably in the diocese of Soissons. Of his life almost nothing is known, and it is difficult to define his theological and philosophical views. He received his education at Soissons and

Reims, and then taught at Tours and

tany. Shortly before 1092 he was canon at Compi6gne, but since he taught views on the Trinity that seemed heretical, and since he appealed to Lanfranc and Anselm as supporting his position, the latter addressed a letter of complaint to Bishop Fulco of Beauvais immediately before the synod of Soissons (1092). The synod bade Roscelinus to recant, and as not only the members of the synod, but apparently the whole people, had been aroused against him, he obeyed from fear. The form of recantation, which seems to have been merely an abjuration of tritheism, must have enabled him to adhere to his doctrine without directly violating his word, for he was soon once more defending his old opinions. He lost his canonry and sought refuge in England where, as an opponent of Anselm, he expected a favorable reception from William Rufus. He was compelled to leave, however, after the reconciliation of the king with Anselm, especially as he had attacked Anselm's teaching concerning the incarnation. He returned to France and became canon of Tours and Besanpon. While at Locmenach he had been the first teacher of Abelard, but the pupil came to despise his master, and in his De trinitate (1119) Abelard very emphatically defended the unity of God in the trinity of persons, with unmistakable reference to the opinions of Roscelinus which had been condemned at Soissons. Roseelinus determined to charge his pupil with heresy in regard to the Trinity before Bishop Gisbert of Paris, whereupon Abglard addressed a letter to the bishop, defending himself and offering to hold a disputation with Roscelinus, at the same time making a sharp attack on his errors and his private life. The letter in which Roscelinus replied to Abelard is the sole product of his pen which is now extant (ed. J. A. Schmeller, in AMA, philosophisch-philologische Klasse, 5 ser., iii. 189210, 1849; also in Abelard's Opera, ed. V. Cousin, ii. 792-803, Paris, 1859). In this letter he haughtily ignored the attacks upon his character, but referred to Abelard's career, and expressed himself cautiously but clearly on the theological points in controversy. He reveals himself as ready to submit to the authority of both the Bible and the Church, and as fully recognizing the prestige of such a theological opponent as Anselm. After this episode Roscelinus disappears from history.

In considering the doctrine of Roscelinus, his deviation from the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity

may first be discussed, then his nominalism, and finally the connection between the two. He regarded the three persons of the Trinity as "three self-existent beings," who, however, are united by unity of power and will, thus endeavoring to avoid the deductions that in the Son the Father and the Holy Ghost were also incarnate. Anselm, in his

polemic against Roscelinus, asked Trinitarian what he meant by the expression

ferred simply to the relations by which the Father and the Son are distinguished in God, his doctrine would not be in disagreement with the doctrines of the Church which teaches that the Father as Father is not the Son, and the Son as Son is not the Father. This, however, in his judgment, could not be the opinion of Roseelinus, since he says that the three Persons are " three essentially separate beings," which would imply a stronger distinction, the assumption of three different Gods. This was likewise evident, according to Anselm, from Roscelinus' comparison of the Trinity with three angels or three souls, these evidently being three substances, and not merely three relations of one and the same being, whereas the Church teaches that the three persons of the Trinity are not three substances (i.e., three Gods), but one God. Furthermore, if the " three beings " bore the name of God in virtue of one and the same power and will, as three men bear the name of king, God would not be something substantial, but accidental, and the " three beings " would then be three Gods as certainly as three men could not be one king. If Roscelinus divides the whole God into three individuals, he would have to extend the incarnation, according to Anselm, to all three persons if this is to be true and perfect. The doctrine of the Church, however, is not compelled to assume this because it sees in the one being, which is God, three distinct persons, so that it sees the same God in the Father as in the Son, only in another relation, and is, accordingly, not forced to ascribe to the Father everything that belongs to God in the Son, e.g., the incarnation. Anselm derived the error of Roscelinus from his excessive stress on the concept of personality in reference to God. When he states that Rosoelinus " either wished to set up three gods or did not know what he did mean," he was half right and half wrong. Roscelinus posited three gods in so far as he clearly perceived the difficulty of simultaneously conceiving of numerical unity and triple and true personality in the Trinity; but he was no tritheist in the heretical sense of the term, and he thought that tritheism was fully avoided by his union of the persons in power and will. Herein he was wrong, and the rigid dialectics of Anselm clearly proved how inevitably his phraseology led to tritheistie conclusions.

In philosophy Roscelinus was a nominalist, maintaining that universals are not real and selfexistent, but are mere abstract names which exist in and for thought. He, therefore, taught that a whole cannot have parts in the sense that the whole really exists while the parts proceed from it; on the contrary, only the parts are real, their synthesis forming a whole that can be distinguished