CHAPTER VII.

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.

I. Admitting the credibility of the general doctrine of religion as a matter of fact, there may yet be objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of it. Analogy affords a general answer to such objections, by showing that God’s moral government must be a scheme beyond our comprehension.

II. This appears more clearly from particular analogies. 1st. In the natural government means are used to accomplish ends, and often such means as appear to us unsuitable. 2d. The natural government is carried on by general laws, with which we are unacquainted.

III. Objection answered, viz:—“This is only arguing from our ignorance, which may as well be made use of to invalidate the proof of religion.”

I. HAVING shown the credibility of religion, as a matter of fact, there may yet be objections against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the Divine government implied in the notion of religion, and against the method by which this government is conducted. To these objections analogy can furnish 102 no direct answer. For the credibility or certainty of a matter of fact, which is all that analogy call directly prove, does not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of it. But analogy furnishes a remote answer—it suggests, and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme or system, as distinguished from a number of single, unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness, and a scheme beyond our comprehension.³²³²The ignorance of man is a favorite doctrine with Bishop Butler. It occurs again in the second part of the Analogy; it makes the subject of his 15th Sermon, and we meet with it also in his Charge.

GENERAL ANALOGY. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it credible that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension.—1st. It must be a scheme—for the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears to be so,—to be a scheme or system, whose parts correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and government. And as there is not any action or natural event, with which we are acquainted, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and events, so, possibly, each of them, when it has not an immediate 103 natural relation to other actions and events, may yet have a remote one, beyond the compass of this present world. Things, apparently the most inconsiderable, are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to the most important matters; so that any one thing whatever, for aught we know to the contrary, may be a necessary condition to any other. In short, there is not any one thing of which we can give the whole account, of all its causes, ends, and adjuncts necessary to its existence. Thus it appears that the natural government is a scheme, and a scheme so incomprehensible, that a man must really know nothing at all who is not sensible of his ignorance in it. This immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so too. Indeed, the natural and moral constitution and government are so connected as to make up together but one scheme; and it is highly probable, but more than is necessary to be proved at present, that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the natural and organized bodies for minds. In the same way, then, every act of Divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself and its immediate object; it may have some reference to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral plan: and every circumstance of this government may be adjusted 104 beforehand, with a view to the whole of it; as, for example, the time, degrees, and ways in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its progress; the kinds of rewards and punishments, &c., &c.³³³³There is no manner of absurdity in supposing a veil, on purpose, drawn over some scenes of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the sight of which might, some way or other, strike us too strongly; or that better ends are designed and served by their being concealed than could be by their being exposed to our knowledge. The Almighty may cast clouds and darkness round about Him for reasons and purposes of which we have not the least glimpse or conception.—Butler’s Sermons. And supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which come within our view in the present life, and therefore we are supplied with an answer to all objections to it. For, suppose it were objected, “the origin and continuance of evil might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions, so guarded as to preclude all mischief arising from them. Or, if this were impracticable, that a scheme or system of government is itself an imperfection, since more good might have been produced without it, by continued single, unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness, because these would have occasioned no irregularities.” The answer is obvious. Were these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just and true, 105 notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it might have been better. But, indeed, they are mere arbitrary assertions, no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of things to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability; for though what is asserted may seem to be possible, yet many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, which few would perceive to be such, and perhaps no one, at first sight, suspect. Some unknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is objected against just and good, nay, good in the highest practicable degree.

II. PARTICULAR ANALOGIES: 1st. As in the scheme of the natural world no ends appear to be accomplished without means, so we find that means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends, in such a measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of tie means. Experience also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before experience, we should have thought would have had even a contrary tendency. In the same way, the things objected against in the moral government, may be means by which an overbalance of good, will, in the end, be found produced; and likewise, it appears to be no presumption against this, that we do not see those means to have any 106 such tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one.

In order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any of these observations, it is to be observed, that though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial to the world (i. e., less mischievous than if it had been forcibly prevented by another person), yet it would have been much more beneficial if this evil had never been done. Thus, in the natural world, some disorders bring their own cures—some diseases are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the like has been asserted with regard to the moral world.

2d. The natural government of the world is carried on by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: and that there are such may be concluded from analogy. For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them; now there could not be this foresight were not the government of the world carried on by general laws. Though every single case may be at length found to have been provided for, even by these, yet, by general laws, the prevention of all irregularities may be naturally impossible. 107 Objected. Could not then the necessary defects of general laws be remedied by interpositions? Ans. This were to be wished, if these interpositions would have no other effects; but it is plain they would have some visible and immediate bad effects—for instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general laws. And it is certain they would have distant effects, and very great ones too, by means of the wonderful connections before mentioned: thus, for aught we know, interpositions would produce greater evil than they would prevent, and prevent greater good than they would produce; so that the not interposing, so far from being a ground of complaint, is an instance of goodness.

III. Objected against this whole argument from our ignorance. “We must argue from what we know, not from what we are unacquainted with; or, however, the answers here given to objections against religion might equally be made use of to invalidate its proof.

ANSWER: 1st. Though total ignorance in any matter equally precludes all proof concerning it, and objections against it, yet partial ignorance does not. The proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of God, and consequently that his 108 government is moral We may know this, and yet not know the means for accomplishing it; so that objections against the means actually made use of might be answered by our ignorance—though the proof that such an end was intended might not be at all invalidated by it. 2dly. Admitting that the proof of religion was affected by it, yet it is un deniably true that moral obligations would remain certain; for they arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we can not violate without being self-condemned; and the credibility that the consequences which religion teaches us, may result, would make them certain from considerations of interest.

But, 3dly, the above analogies show that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is delusive, because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness, and even instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it, and therefore can not invalidate that proof, as it does these objections.

4thly. Strictly speaking, as it appears from the last observation, the answers above given are not taken merely from our ignorance, but from somewhat which analogy shows us concerning it.

CONCLUSION.³⁴³⁴A connected view of the preceding Part, similar to that in the conclusion of the original, may be formed by reading in continuation the short summaries prefixed to each chapter. The credibility of religion, from experience and facts here considered, should afford sufficient motives to religion, and ought to make men live in the general practice of virtue and piety. The plea of ungovernable passion, on the side of vice, is no reason, and is but a sorry excuse; for men, in their temporal concerns, are inured and necessitated to govern their passions. But the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature,³⁵³⁵St. Paul commences his Epistle to the Romans with the professed acknowledgment, or rather the authoritative assertion, of the two great evidences of Natural Religion—the one legible in the book of the Creation, the other indigenous in the soul of man This latter is the moral constitution of our souls, which is the transcript, obscured and defaced indeed, but still the transcript of the great law of God: that law which the very Heathen know, and can not avoid knowing, because “they have the work of it written in their hearts,” and their thoughts “ accusing or excusing them” by its dictates. And when St. Paul charges the Gentiles with the knowledge of this law, it is such a knowledge, as in his mind, was sufficient to bring them under the capacity, and consequent obligation, of some obedience; otherwise his whole doctrine and inculcation of that law, as subjecting them to judgment, would be a lifeless argument.—Davison on Primitive Sacrifice. from the presages of conscience, and from our natural apprehension of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge—a nature, conscience, and apprehension 110 given us by Him; and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason given us by life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.

QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VII.

1. What answer can analogy furnish to objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God’s moral government?

2. How does it appear that God’s natural government of the world is a scheme, and one that is incomprehensible?

3. To what extent does Butler assert that the Divine, natural, and moral governments are connected; and what does he suppose to be credible from them?

4. Prove that, from our very ignorance of the universal scheme of Divine government, we are supplied with a reasonable answer to all objections against it.

5. “In the scheme of the natural world no ends are accomplished without means; and good ends are often brought about by means undesirable and apparently unsuitable.” Apply this to the case of the moral world.

6. What good reasons may be given for the fact, that the natural government of the world is carried on by general laws?

7. Answer the following objections:

1st. That we must argue from what we know, not from what we are unacquainted with.

8. 2d Objection. That the answers here given to objections against religion might equally be made use of to invalidate its proof.

9. What conclusion does Butler draw from all that he has advanced in respect of natural religion?