CHAPTER VI.

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.

I. The proof of the existence of an Intelligent Author of nature, taken for granted in this Treatise, is not affected by the opinion of Universal Necessity, For, 1st, when a Fatalist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean by an agent, acting necessarily; and, 2d, the necessity by which such an agent is supposed to act does not exclude intelligence and design.

II. Neither does the opinion of Universal Necessity affect the system of there being a Moral Governor, or of our being in a state of religion; for, if that opinion can be reconciled with our condition under the present Moral Government, it can be reconciled with that which religion teaches us to expect; but, in the former case, it is found to be practically false.

III. The opinion of Universal Necessity does not affect the practical proof of religion, derived from the particular final causes of pleasure and pain annexed to actions, combined with the external evidence of Natural Religion.

1. AN objection may be made from universal necessity against the existence of an Intelligent Author of nature, which has been taken for granted throughout this treatise as a thing proved, as it 89 may be supposed that such necessity will account for the origin and preservation of all things. But, in the first place, when it is said by a fatalist that every thing is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to be observed that this necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles and to certain ends, because all this every man may every moment be conscious of. So that the assertion that every thing is by necessity of nature is not an answer to the question whether the world came into being as it is, by an Intelligent Agent forming it thus or not? but to quite another question—whether it came into being in that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call freely? For, suppose farther, that, in a dispute between a fatalist and one who believed himself a free agent, a house was instanced; they would both agree that it was built by an architect; the point of their difference would be, whether he built it necessarily, or freely? We ascribe to God a necessary existence,²⁷²⁷As to the meaning of necessary existence, logicians have long since determined that there are but two modes according to which any Being can be said to exist, or to be what it is; and these are contingency and necessity. Where the non-existence of a Being is possible, that is, where we can, without a contradiction, suppose it not to exist, that Being exists contingently, or contingency is the mode of its existence. But if there is any Being who demonstrably must exist, and whose non-existence is therefore impossible and inconceviable, that Being exists necessarily, or necessity is the mode of its existence. But necessity can in no sense be considered as the cause, or even as the ground or reason of any existence, or of any effect whatever.—Hamilton on the Existence of God. uncaused, 90by any agent: for we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i. e., immensity and eternity, impossible even in imagination to be removed out of being; and from hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude that there is, and can not but be, an Infinite and Immense Eternal Being, answering this idea, existing prior to all design contributing to his existence; and, therefore, from the scantiness of language, we say necessity is the foundation of his existence. But there can not be said to be this kind of necessity for the existence of every thing—a necessity antecedent in nature to design, for many reasons: but chiefly because it is admitted that design in the actions of men contributes to many alterations in nature.

II. The condition of mankind under the present moral government being greatly analogous to our condition under a farther government, which religion teaches us—if any assert, as the fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable with the former, there immediately arises a question, in the way of analogy,²⁸²⁸   “Fatalists are fond of inferring moral necessity from physical, in the way of analogy,” In effect, says Voltaire, it would be very singular that all nature, all the planets, should obey eternal laws, and that there should be a little animal five feet high, who, in contempt of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice. We do too much honor to such reasoning when we reply to it in the bold but sublime words of a great genius:” Know’st thou th’ importance of a soul immortal? Behold this midnight-glory, worlds on worlds! Amazing pomp! Redouble this amaze; Ten thousand add; add twice ten thousand more; Then weigh the whole. One soul outweighs them all, And calls the astonishing magnificence Of unintelligent creation poor.
   BEATTIE. whether he must 91not also own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i. e., with the system of religion itself, and the proof of it. Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate any one from his youth up in his own principles—to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by teaching him that he can not possibly behave otherwise than he does; suppose the child to judge, from this system, what treatment he is to expect from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the world—as the fatalist judges from it what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to a future state. At first lie would have a great degree of conceit and vanity at being freed from the restraints of fear and shame with which his playfellows were fettered; but this is not all; he must evidently, by constant correction, have the want of those natural perceptions of blame and commendation supplied, which this system destroyed, and thus be convinced that, if it be not 92 false, it is misapplied when applied to practice. Or, supposing his temper could remain still formed to the system, upon his coming abroad into the world he would be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of soon committing some act for which he would be delivered over into the hands of civil justice. Any other practical application of this opinion will be found equally fallacious; for instance, that there is no need for taking care to preserve life, for, if we are destined to live, we shall live without it; and, if to die, we can not prevent it. None of these practical absurdities result from reasoning upon the supposition that we are free; and, therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true, yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life. And how can people think themselves so very secure, that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a future one, on which is dependent a more general and more important interest. For religion being a practical subject, and the analogy of nature showing us that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects, whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude that we are free 93 from its obligations, it is plain this conclusion can not be depended upon. Nor does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable—applying our reason to subjects to which experience shows us they are not suited. Farther, we find within ourselves a will, and are conscious of a character, i. e., that frame of mind whereby we act in one manner rather than another. Now, if this in us be reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature (besides natural government and final causes imply a character and a will in the Governor concerning the creatures whom He governs); and it is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in Him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character, since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel—true than faithless—just than unjust—or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said, indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, upon supposition of necessity becomes manifestly unjust; because it is punishment inflicted for doing what persons could not avoid doing. As if the necessity which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the purpose as this objection is in itself, it shows how the notions of justice and injustice 94 force themselves upon the mind, even while we are making suppositions destructive of them.

III. But, though it is most evident that universal necessity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion, yet does it not plainly destroy the proof that He is of that character, and consequently the proof of religion? By no means; for we find that happiness and misery are not our fate in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior, but that they are the consequences of it. But as the doctrine of liberty, though experienced to be true, may be perplexed with difficulties, and as necessity seems to be the basis of infidelity, we shall prove more distinctly and particularly that necessity does not destroy the obligations of religion. The proof, from final causes, of an Intelligent Author of nature, is not affected by it. And it is a matter of fact—and, therefore, there can be no objection against it from necessity—that He governs the world by the method of rewards and punishments, and also that He hath given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between actions virtuous and vicious. This is a rule of such authority, that we can not depart from it without being self-condemned. It is plainly a Divine command, immediately producing a sense of duty, being a direction of the Author of nature to creatures capable of looking upon it as 95such; and his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense²⁹²⁹From hence might easily be deduced the obligation of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and securing our obedience to it; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty.—Butler. of good desert, and to others of ill, surely amounts to declaring upon whom his punishment shall be hereafter inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed.³⁰³⁰The conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn from it appearing to us fit that He should, but from its appearing that He has told us He will. However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though such abstract subjects are rather to be declined, or, at least, treated with caution.—Butler. But besides this, natural religion hath an external evidence which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not effect. 1st. Somewhat of this system has been professed in all ages and countries of which we have any information. This general consent shows the system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind. 2d. It is a certain historical fact, as far as we can trace, that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, and this when it was unadulterated by superstition. The only alternative is, either that it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural and obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former is the conclusion of 96 learned men, rendered more probable by the inaptness of uncultivated minds for speculation, and by the early pretenses to revelation, otherwise not easily accounted for. 3d. There is express historical, or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught mankind by revelation; and why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact against which there is no presumption; and this proof is mentioned here, because it tends to show that religion came into the world by revelation prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain a revelation, and even prior to all consideration whether the revelation itself be purely handed down.

It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected, after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that, as speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended to; this should admonish us not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to mankind for the only moral rule.

The foregoing observations together amount to a practical proof, sufficient to influence the actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary.

OBJECTION. “There are many probabilities which can not be shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false. Now the method of government by rewarding ana punishing good and ill desert, as such, supposes that we are free, and not necessary, agents; and it is incredible that the Author of nature should govern us upon a supposition, as true, which he knows to be false,³¹³¹   Hume goes so far as to affirm, “that, though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.” Who conceals it? Does the Author of nature conceal it, and this writer discover it? To laugh were want of goodness and of grace, And to be grave exceeds all power of face.
   BEATTIE. and, therefore, absurd to think that he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter, especially considered as of good or ill desert.”

ANSWER. The whole analogy of nature shows that the conclusion, from this reasoning, is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom, indeed, clearly shows where—in supposing ourselves necessary, when, in truth, we are free agents. But, upon supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taken for granted that it is incredible 98 that necessary agents should be rewarded and punished. It is matter of fact that men are rewarded and punished for their actions, considered as virtuous and vicious; so that, if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus rewarded and punished, then men are not necessary, but free. But if, on the contrary—which is the supposition we have been arguing upon—it be insisted that men are necessary agents, then there is nothing incredible in the farther supposition of necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt with.

Is, then, the common assertion true, that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion? It is true, 1st, ill a practical sense, that atheists encourage themselves in vice by this notion. 2d. In the strictest sense, that it is contrary to the whole constitution of nature, and so to every thing. But it is not true; as we have seen that necessity, supposed reconcilable with the constitution of things, is not also reconcilable with natural religion; its proof remains unaffected by it, and, therefore, the proof of revealed religion.

QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VI.

1. Show that the proof of the existence of an intelligent Author of nature is not affected by the opinion of universal necessity; and give a familiar illustration of the argument.

2. Explain the meaning of ascribing to God a necessary existence. Why can not any thing similar be predicted of all natural objects?

3. In what manner does Hamilton distinguish between the existence of God and creatures?

4. By what examples does Butler illustrate his assertion, that the opinion of universal necessity, when practically applied to our condition in the present life, is found to be fallacious?

5. How is it proved that, in the application of the above opinions to the things of a future life, it will be found equally fallacious?

6. Show that from the fact of “our finding within ourselves a will, and our being conscious of a certain character belonging to us,” arguments may be deduced against the idea of Universal Necessity affecting the system of a Moral Governor.

7. Prove that the opinion of necessity does not affect the practical proof of religion, derived from the particular final causes of pleasure and pain annexed to actions.

8. State the heads under which it is argued, that natural religion has an external evidence that can not be affected by the doctrine of necessity.

9. Answer upon his own grounds the following objection of a fatalist, viz., “the method of government by rewards and punishments in a future life must go upon the supposition that we are not necessary agents; but the Author of nature knows that we are so; and, therefore, will not reward or punish us for our actions hereafter under the notion that they are of good or ill desert.”

10. In what sense is it true that the doctrine of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion?