CHAPTER V.

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.

1. That we are in a state of Probation, in the second sense, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement for another state, appears from Analogy—from the beginning of Life considered as a preparation for mature age.

II. The extent of this Analogy may be determined from the following considerations. 1. In both respects, new Characters must be acquired. 2. We are capable of acquiring these new Characters by our capacities of Knowledge and power of Habit (Habits are either active or passive; Habits either bodily or mental; all virtuous Habits formed by active exertion). 3. The possession of these Capacities implies what experience also proves to us-the necessity of using them. And, 4th, we can show how virtuous Habits can be useful in the preparation for another Life; and Discipline necessary even for Creatures finitely perfect.

III. Objections to such a State answered.

IV. This World is a state of Probation in the third and last sense.

I. FROM considering that we are in a state of probation, the question naturally arises, how came we to be placed in it? But this is a question involved in insuperable difficulties. We may lessen 69these difficulties by observing that all wickedness is voluntary, and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects; but it is plain folly and presumption to pretend to give an account of the whole reason of the matter. Perhaps the discovery or comprehension of it is beyond the reach of our faculties, or, perhaps, the knowledge of it would be prejudicial to us. Religion affords a partial answer to it, but a satisfactory one to a question of real importance to us, namely, What is our business here? And this answer is, we are placed in a state of so much affliction and hazard for our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness.

GENERAL ANALOGY: The beginning of life considered as an education for mature age, in the present world, appears plainly to be analogous to this our trial for a future one: the former being in our temporal capacity what the latter is in our religious capacity. This will more clearly appear from the following:—

II. PARTICULAR ANALOGIES: 1st. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular way of life, to which the nature, the capacities, temper, and qualifications of each species are as necessary as their external circumstances. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it (Eccles., xlii., 24). Our nature 70corresponds to our external condition.²⁰²⁰Bishop Butler has clearly shown, in his sermons, the peculiar correspondence between the inward frame of man and the external conditions and circumstances of his life; that the several passions and affections of the heart, compared with those circumstances, are certain instances of final causes; for example, anger leads us to the immediate resistance of injury, and compassion prompts us to relieve the distressed, &c., &c. So that there must be some determinate capacities—some necessary character and qualifications, without which persons can not but be utterly incapable of a future state of life; in like manner as there must be some without which men would be incapable of their present state of life. 2d. The constitution of human creatures, and, indeed, of all creatures within our observation, is such as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life for which they were once wholly unqualified. We may imagine creatures, but we do not know of any, whose faculties are not made for enlargement by experience and habit. We find ourselves in particular, endued with capacities of acquiring knowledge, namely, apprehension, reason, and memory. And by the power of habits, we can acquire a new facility in any kind of action, and settled alterations in our temper and character. But neither the perception of ideas nor knowledge of any sort are habits, though they are absolutely necessary to the forming of them; but the improvements of our 71 capacities of acquiring knowledge, especially in the case of memory, may, perhaps, be so called. That perceptions come into our minds readily and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems a thing of the same kind as readiness in any particular kind of action proceeding from being accustomed to it; and aptness to recollect practical observations of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, as, for example, our constant and even involuntary readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute, imperceptibly to ourselves, judgment in the room of sensation. And it seems as if all other associations of ideas, not naturally connected, might be called passive habits, as properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight or hearing of words. There are also active habits, as, for example, our readiness in speaking and writing languages. For distinctness, we may consider habits as belonging to the mind or to the body. As habits of the body, i. e., all bodily activities and motions, are produced by exercise; so are habits of the mind—including, under this denomination, general habits of life and conduct, such as those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; and those of attention, industry, self-government, revenge. But there is this difference 72 between them, that bodily habits are produced by repeated external acts—mental habits by the exertion of inward practical principles carried into action, or acted upon. No external course of action can form these habits otherwise than as it proceeds from the inward principles, e. g., of obedience and veracity; because it is only these inward principles exerted which are strictly acts of obedience, veracity, &c. It will contribute toward forming virtuous habits to resolve to do well, and to endeavor to impress on our minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of it which a man really feels himself (for resolutions and endeavors are properly acts). Practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts; not so with passive impressions—they grow weaker by being repeated; so that going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures, in place of forming a habit of virtue, may form a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly. Thus—

(lst.) Being accustomed to danger begets intrepidity, i. e., lessens fear.

(2d.) Being accustomed to distress lessens the passion of pity.

(3d.) Being accustomed to instances of others’ mortality lessens the sensible apprehension of our own.

And these effects of active and passive habits may occur at the same time; active habits may be strengthening while the motives that excite them are less and less sensibly felt; and experience confirms this, for active principles, at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice. Thus, in the three examples of passive habits just mentioned, active habits may be operating at the same time.

(lst.) Active caution may be increasing, while passive fear is growing less.

(2d.) The practical principle of benevolence may be strengthening, while the passive impression of pity, in consequence of frequently witnessing distress, will be less and less sensibly felt.

(3d.) It greatly contributes to strengthen a practical regard to death; i. e., to form a habit of acting with a constant view to it; to behold daily instances of men dying, around us, though these instances give us a less sensible feeling or apprehension of our own mortality.

Thus it appears that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience, and example tend to form active habits, not from our being so affected, but from our being induced to such a course of, action; i. e., it is the acting, and 74 not the affection, that forms them; only it must be always remembered that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous actions. And practical principles grow stronger absolutely in themselves by exercise, as well as relatively with regard to contrary principles, which, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually and of course. Thus a new character, in several respects, may be formed.

3d. We should be totally unqualified for the employments and satisfactions of a mature state of life, unless we exerted the capacities that are given us, and therefore, we may conclude, intended to be made use of. Even maturity of understanding and bodily strength require the continued exercise of our powers of mind and body from our infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly, at first, be as unqualified for the human life of mature age as an idiot. Want of acquired habits would be like want of language—it would destroy society. Children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the scene in which they are to have a future part, and learning something necessary to the performance of it; he, from his ignorance would be distracted with astonishment, apprehension, and suspense. The subordination to which they are accustomed teaches them subjection and obedience; 75 he would be so strangely headstrong and self-willed as to render society insupportable. And there are numberless little rules of action, learned so insensibly as to be mistaken for instinct, which he would be ignorant of, without which we could not live. Thus, by example, instruction and self-government, we are suited to different stations in life, and our conduct in each (which depends upon habits from our youth) determines our character and rank in society. All this is an analogy applicable to the present life, considered as a preparation for a future. Our condition in both respects is uniform, and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature.

4th. But do we know how this world is calculated for such a preparation? If we did not, this would be no objection against it being so. We might, with as much reason, object to the known fact that food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body, because we do not know how they can do it, and, prior to experience, we could not have thought that they would. Children are as ignorant that sports and exercise are useful for their health; and they might as well object to restraints in them, and in other matters necessary for their discipline, because they do not see the reason of them: But taking in the consideration of God’s moral government, and, consequently, that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for a future 76 state, we may distinctly see how and in what respects the present life may be a preparation for it, since we want, and are capable of, improvement in that character by moral and religious habits, and the present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement. Now, first, as regards the state for which we are to prepare, analogy leads us to conclude that it will be a society as Scripture describes it; and it is not at all unreasonable to suppose, though there be no analogy for it, that it will be, according to the representation of Scripture, under the more immediate or sensible government of God. That we are capable of improvement, has been already shown; and that we want it, every one will admit who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind, or even with those imperfections which the best are conscious of. But the necessity for discipline in human creatures is to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions by indulgence and habits of vice. From the very constitution of their nature they are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right, and, therefore, they stand in need of virtuous habits for a security against this danger; for, besides the general principle of moral understanding, they have, in their inward, frame, various affections toward external objects, which the principle of virtue can neither excite nor prevent being excited; and when the object of any affection can not be obtained with the 77 consent of the moral principle, yet may be obtained without it, such affection, though its being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and necessary, tends to incline them to venture upon an unlawful means of indulgence. Now, what is the general security against their actually deviating from what is right? As the danger is from within, so, also, must the security be—from the inward practical principle of virtue;²¹²¹It may be thought that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if, by a sense of interest, is meant a speculative conviction, or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if, by a sense of interest, is meant a practical regard to what is, upon the whole, our happiness, this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature; for we daily see it overmatched not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation—by any thing, even indolence; especially if the interest—the temporal interest suppose—which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance; so greatly are profligate men mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle.—Butler. and the strengthening this principle will lessen the danger or increase the security against it. All this is under the supposition that particular affections remain in a future state. If this supposition 78 be true, acquired habits will probably be necessary to regulate them; if it be not, it amounts to the same thing; for habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improvements in virtue; and improvements in virtue must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the universe be moral. The necessity of moral improvement by discipline will further appear by considering, 1st, how creatures, made upright, may fall; and, 2d, how, by preserving their integrity, they may raise themselves to a more secure state of virtue. The nature of liberty can no more account for the former than the possibility of an event can account for its occurrence. But it seems distinctly conceivable, from the very nature of particular affections or propensions; for, suppose creatures intended for a state of life for which these propensions are necessary, endued with them, together with a moral understanding, having all these principles exactly proportioned to their intended state of life, such creatures would be made upright or finitely perfect. Now, these propensions must be felt, the objects being present; they can be gratified without the consent of the moral principle, and, therefore, possess some tendency to induce persons. to such forbidden gratification; which tendency, in such particular cases, may be increased by a greater frequency of occasions to excite them, by the least voluntary indulgence, even in thought, till, by 79 peculiar conjunctures conspiring, the danger of deviating from right ends in actual deviation—a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, which, on this account, could not have been prevented, though it might have been innocently passed through.²²²²This proves that it was not necessary for our Lord to take upon him our sinful nature in order to be capable of temptation. Vide two Sermons, by Dr. O’Brien, to prove that he might be “tempted like as we are, and yet without sin.” It is impossible to say how far the first act²³²³This may serve as an answer to the common objection, that the consequences of a single crime in our first parents are represented in Scripture as incredibly excessive. of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution, but repetition of irregularity would produce habits, and, in proportion to this repetition, creatures, made upright, would become depraved. But, 2d, by steadily following the moral principle, creatures might have preserved their uprightness, and, consequently, might have been raised to a higher and more secure state of virtue, since the moral principle would gain strength by exercise, and the propensions from habit would more easily submit. Thus, then, vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution, and may improve it to such a degree as that the danger of actually 80 deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened. Thus it appears, that creatures without blemish, even possessed of a moral principle, may be in danger of going wrong, and so stand in need of the higher perfection and security. of virtuous habits formed in a state of discipline. Much more are they in danger, and much do they require such habits, whose natures are corrupted, and whose passions have become excessive from habits of indulgence. They require to be renewed, not merely improved; for them, discipline of the severer sort must be necessary. This world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for this purpose. Such experience as it affords of the frailty of our nature—of the danger and actual event of creatures losing their innocence and happiness—hath a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very different from a speculative knowledge of what we are liable to. But what renders it peculiarly fit, are the snares and temptations to vice, because they render caution, recollection, and self-denial necessary to such as will preserve their integrity. And strong temptations particularly call these into action; and, requiring a stronger effort of virtue, or a continued exercising of it, they confirm a habit of it much more than weak or instantaneous temptations could possibly do. It is, indeed, ridiculous to assert that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety; but it is nearer the truth, though not strictly the truth itself, 81 to say, that it is essential to discipline and improvement; for, though actions materially virtuous may not be an exercise of the virtuous principle, i. e., not virtuous actions at all, but merely done from being agreeable to our own particular inclinations, yet they may be an exercise of that principle, and, when they are, they tend to form and fix the habit of virtue; and this in proportion to the frequency or intensity of the exercise of the virtuous principle; but, as neither our intellectual power nor bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree, and both may be overwrought, possibly there may be some trifling analogy to this in the moral character. Thus it appears, in general (for there may be some other minute exceptions), that this world is peculiarly fit to be a state of trial, in the same sense that some sciences are fit to form to habits of attention the minds of such as will attend to them. These several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue, are applicable to passive submission, or resignation to the Divine will, which is another essential part of a right character, connected with the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to.

III. 1st OBJECTION. “The present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice.”

ANSWER. The viciousness of the world is, in different 82 ways, the great temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end of man being placed in such a state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. It is a discipline to some who attend to and follow the notices of virtue and religion; and if it be not to the generality, this can no more be urged as a proof against its being intended for moral discipline than the decay of the greater part of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals put in a way to improve to maturity and perfection can be urged as an objection against their being intended for that end, to which only one in a million attains to.²⁴²⁴I can not forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, i. e., by vice.—Butler.

2d OBJECTION. As far as a course of behavior materially virtuous proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love.

ANSWER. Doing what God commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear; and a course of such obedience will form habits of it. There is no foundation for this great nicety; for veracity, justice, and charity (regard to which must form habits of self-government), 83respect to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident, but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural principle of action.²⁵²⁵Religion is so far from disowning the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state where reason presides; and there can no access be had to the understanding but by convincing men that the course of life we should persuade them to is not contrary to their interest.—Butler’s Sermons.

3d OBJECTION. How can passive submission and resignation²⁶²⁶Resignation to the will of God is the whole of piety; it includes in it all that is good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure of mind. It may be said to be perfect when our will is lost and resolved into His.—Butler’s Sermons. be in any way necessary to qualify for a state of perfect happiness, since nothing but afflictions can give occasion for, or require this virtue?

ANSWER. Experience contradicts this assertion. Even prosperity begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is as much a source of discontent as any thing in our external condition. It is, indeed, true, that there can be no scope for patience when sorrow shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind which shall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered as an active principle leading us to pursue our real and chief interest, must coincide with the principle of obedience to God’s command (this obedience and the pursuit of our own interest being 84 synonymous), yet it can not be said so certainly to coincide, considered merely as the desire of our own interest, any more than particular affections can, i. e., so as to be incapable of unlawful excitements. So that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures—habits, i. e., what are formed by use. However, in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affections in human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind, and, therefore, require discipline to moderate them. But the proper discipline for resignation is affliction, since a right behavior under that trial will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission, which, with the active principle of obedience, make up the character which belongs to us as dependent creatures.

4th OBJECTION. All the trouble and danger, un avoidably accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us by our being made at once the creatures which we were to be.

ANSWER. This is contrary to the general conduct of nature, which is not to save us trouble or danger, but to furnish us with capacities for going through them, and to oblige us to do so. Acquirements of our own experience and habits are the natural supply to our deficiencies, since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications as the external things which we stand in need of.

IV. There is a third sense of the word probation: a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons’ characters to the creation of God. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, this manifestation of the real character of men may have respect to a future life in ways unknown to us: particularly it may be a means of their being disposed of suitably to their characters, and of its being made known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of.

QUESTIONS—CHAPTER V.

1. What is the only question of real importance to us, that arises from the consideration of our being in a state of probation here? And how may it be answered?

2. State, 1st, the general analogy by which Butler illustrates this subject; and, 2d, the four distinct considerations by which he shows the extent and force of that analogy.

3. How does he explain the passage in Ecclesiasticus, chap. xlii., 24; and what consequence does he deduce from it?

4. State what are our capacities of acquiring knowledge; and by what power we may acquire settled alterations of our character.

5. What comparison may we institute between the habits of the body and those of the mind?

6. Give a summary of the argument showing the momentous difference between practical habits and passive impressions on the mind; noting especially the only way in which the latter can become useful to us.

7. Prove that the possession of capacities implies the necessity also of using them.

8. By what considerations may we distinctly see how, and in what respects, the present life may be a preparation for a future state?

9. Show that, from the very constitution of our nature being deficient, there is a necessity for discipline in human creatures.

10. What meaning does Butler affix to the term “a sense of our interest,” when he proves it is perfectly compatible with moral rectitude? State his argument on this point.

11. How does it seem distinctly conceivable, from the very nature of particular affections implanted in them, that creatures, made upright, may fall?

12. How does it appear that upright creatures, by pursuing their integrity, may raise themselves to a more secure state of virtue? What inference is drawn from the two foregoing positions?

13. By what arguments is it proved that “this world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for the purpose, not merely of improving, but of renewing men?

14. Answer the following objections. 1st. The present state becomes to most men a discipline of vice instead of virtue.

15. 2d. Actions proceeding from hope or fear, though they be materially virtuous, only discipline and strengthen self-love.

16. 3d. How can passive submission and resignation, which are required only in afflictions (and they are occasioned by a state of sin), serve to qualify us for perfect happiness and virtue?

17. 4th. Might not all our trouble and danger in this state of discipline have been saved by God making us at once the creatures which he intends us finally to be?

18. What purpose may be served by the manifestations of the real character of individuals in this life?