§ 18, Note 13. [9] HOLL. (600): “Although the first compassion of God, by which He pitied the human race that had fallen into sin, and in fact the appointment of a Mediator, and the administration of the means of salvation, are absolute, yet the merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but relative and limited by justice, because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied.” QUEN. (III, 5): “It is founded in Christ, and is limited to the ends and means by which He is moved.” In regard to the will of God, in general (HUTT., Loc. c., 782): “The will of God, in this mystery, is not considered according to its own most simple essence; it is distinguished only according to our understanding, and access to it does not lie open to our mind; but by reason of His act, with respect to things created, God goes forth beyond His own essence. According to the former method of consideration the will in God is just as indivisible as it is impossible for the essence of God itself to be divided into parts. But, according to the latter method of consideration, namely, as the will of God goes forth beyond its essence to creatures, it is twofold. For, whatever God wills to take place in created things, He wills either simply or with a determined mode or condition. The former will is commonly called, in the schools, absolute, and is joined with the immutable necessity of the event; according to this He calls those things which are not, as though they were, Rom. 4:17. . . . The latter will if fulfilled in no other way than by the fulfilment of the predetermined mode or precise condition; when this is not fulfilled, it likewise comes to pass that that does not occur which God has notwithstanding especially willed should occur. The former is to be altogether separated from this mystery, and to be relegated to the schools of the Stoics and Calvinists . . . but the latter, namely, the modified or limited will of God, enters into the act of the present mystery.” [10] HOLL. (600): “The benevolence of God is ordinate, because God from His most profound counsel established a fixed taxiß or series of means, to which, in the conferring of blessedness upon sinners, He has regard. These means are the Word of God and the Sacraments, by which God seriously intends to call sinners to the kingdom of grace, and convert, regenerate, justify, and save them. By this ordinate will God wishes not only that all men be saved, but also that all men come to the knowledge of the truth. The will is called conditionate, not as though God wills only the end, and does not will the means, or wills the end under a condition which He Himself from His mere purpose is unwilling should be fulfilled in many; but as God, willing that men should be saved, does not will that they should be saved without regard to the fulfilment of any satisfaction or condition, but should be led to salvation under the condition of determined means.” Hence the proposition concerning the universality of grace is more specifically expressed thus: “God wills, through ordinary means, to confer saving faith upon all men.” (Ib.) [11] GRH. (IV, 169): “Moreover this division (into antecedent and consequent will) distinguishes not the will by itself, which in God is one and undivided, just as the essence also is one; but its twofold relation. In the antecedent will, regard is had to the means of salvation, in so far as, on the part of God, they have been appointed and are offered to all. In the consequent will, regard is had to the same means, but in so far as they are accepted or neglected by men.” HUTT. (l. c., 783): “This distinction was introduced into the Church because of those passages of Scripture which bear witness that the will of God is not always done or fulfilled, e.g., Matt. 23:37; 1 Tim. 2:4.” [12] HOLL. (586): “The consequent will is that by which God, from the fallen human race, elects those to eternal life who He foresees will use the ordinary means, and will persevere to the end of life in faith in Christ.” More specific definitions. HOLL. (587): “The will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent. (1) Not with regard to time, as though the antecedent will preceded the consequent in time; for, as God is free from any limitations of time, He does not have any will which anticipates another in time. (2) Neither with regard to the divine will itself, as though two actually distinct wills in God were affirmed; for the divine will is the essence itself of God, and a connoted object, conceived under the mode of an act of volition. (3) But the will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent, from the order of our reason, distinguishing the diverse acts of volition in God, according to a diverse consideration of the objects, and regarding one act before the other, so that it is only indicated that the antecedent will precedes the consequent in that which is the image of the divine reason: because, according to our mode of conception, God’s willing eternal salvation to men, and His providing the means of grace, are anterior to the will of the same to confer in act eternal salvation upon those who would to the end believe in Christ, or to assign eternal condemnation to the impenitent.” QUEN. (III, 2): “The antecedent will relates to man, in so far as he is wretched, no regard being had to circumstances in the object; but the consequent will is occupied with certain circumstances in reference to man, namely, as he is believing or unbelieving.” [HOLL. (588): “Wherefore the antecedent and consequent wills of God are not opposed to each other in a contrary or contradictory manner, but are subordinated to one another. The latter is materially contained in the former, and passes into it when the condition is assumed. This I prove thus: By His antecedent will, God wills that all men be saved if they believe to the end. But those using aright the ordinary means of salvation, are those who finally believe. Therefore the antecedent will of God is not overthrown, abolished, or removed by the consequent, but rather passes into the same when the condition is fulfilled.”] “The antecedent respects the giving, and the consequent, the receiving of salvation on the part of man. The former is universal; the latter, particular. The former precedes. the latter follows, a purified condition. In the former, salvation is regarded with reference to the means, as on the part of God, these have been established and offered equally to all men. In the latter, the same salvation is regarded with respect to the means, but in so far as these are either accepted or neglected by men. The will of God, pertaining to that which is antecedent (antecedanea), defines what men ought to do, viz., to hear the word of God, through its hearing to receive faith, to apply to themselves the merit of Christ, and by means of this faith to be saved. The consequent will considers what men in fact do or do not, whether they obey the antecedent will or not, i.e., it considers who in fact use the means of salvation established by God and who do not, who hear the Word of God and believe in Christ and who do not.” HUTT. (l. c., 794): “In the antecedent will (prohgoumenh) faith is considered as a part of the order which God, so far as it pertains to Himself, desires should be observed. In the consequent will (epomeuh) the same is considered not only in the manner in which God desires His own order to be observed by men, but, in so far as that order either is in fact observed by believing, or is not observed by not believing. Although, indeed, this occurs in time with regard to men; yet, by reason of His prescience, it was especially present to God, inasmuch as, by the nature of eternity, nothing is future to Him, but all things are from eternity especially present to Him in the most simple now (tw nun). By reason of the ultimate difference, the consequent will always attains its end, either for salvation or condemnation; but the antecedent will, not in like manner.” Concerning the necessity of this distinction, HOLL. (587): “This distinction (between the general and special will) is necessary, on account of the wonderful combination of divine justice and mercy, which are to be reconciled with each other. For there are expressions in the Holy Scriptures that show that the mercy of God is inclined towards all sinners, 1 Tim. 2:6; 2 Pet. 3:9. There are other expressions which indicate the justice of God, and exclude from the inheritance of salvation those who resist the divine order, John 3:18; Mark 16:16. Finally, there are biblical passages in which both the mercy and justice of God are declared, Matt. 23:37. Christ, by His antecedent will, as far as it pertained to Himself, willed that the children of Israel be gathered together; but, by His consequent will, because they were unwilling to be gathered, He willed that their house be left to them desolate, cf. Acts 13:46. This distinction is implied in the parables of Christ, Matt. 22:1; Luke 14:16.” [13] QUEN. (III, 14): “From the admitted universal benevolence of God, in the establishment and presenting of means, whereby He has determined to convert, regenerate, justify, and save men, though His own efficacy, there arises a special benevolence conspicuous in the predestination to eternal life.” . . . [14] The Dogmaticians observe that the word ‘predestination’ has been employed in the Church in various senses: sometimes in a wider sense, according to which it denotes the purpose of God, referring equally to the saving of believers and the condemnation of unbelievers; sometimes in a narrower sense, according to which it refers alone to the former. In the latter sense they understand it to be employed in Biblical usage. Rom 8:30; Eph. 1:5. HOLL. (607): “Some Fathers and teachers have employed the word predestination improperly (aknrwß), inappropriately, and in a wider sense than is lawful, to denote the divine purpose both for saving believing men and condemning unbelievers. But in Biblical usage the term predestination is always taken in a good sense, to denote the divine decree concerning the salvation of fallen men.” But, even then, there is still a threefold distinction to be observed in the definition of predestination; and the more the Dogmaticians appropriate at one time the one, and again the other, so much the more is this distinction to be considered, in order that the thought may not hence arise, that the Dogmaticians stood in opposition to each other in regard to the subject itself. Sometimes they understood by predestination, in the most general manner, the purpose of God to establish a scheme of redemption whereby all might be saved. BR. (711): “The decree refers to the entire work of leading man to salvation.” Thus the notion is defined by the Formula Concordiae (Sol. Dec. XI, 14): “Therefore we embrace in mind, at the same time, the entire doctrine of the design, counsel, will, and ordination of God (viz., all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation, cf. sq.),” and, after it, HUTT. and others. HOLL. (609) gives the following definition: “Predestination, taken in a wider sense, can be defined as the eternal, divine decree, by which God, from His immense mercy, determined to give His Son as Mediator, and, through universal preaching, to offer Him for reception to all men who from eternity He foresaw would fall into sin; also through the Word and Sacraments to confer faith upon all who would not resist; to justify all believers, and besides to renew those using the means of grace; to preserve faith in them until the end of life, and, in a word, to save those believing to the end.” Sometimes those are more particularly described in whose case the decree of redemption is really to be accomplished; they are those concerning whom God knows that they will believe. HOLL. (608): “In the special or stricter sense, it signifies the ordination of believers to salvation, combined with proqesiß and prognwsiß. The proqesiß (the divine, general and undefined decree concerning the communicating of eternal salvation to all sinful men who, to the end, will believe in Christ) is therefore more specifically defined through the prognwsiß (the foreknowledge of certain human persons or individuals, who will retain true faith in Christ to the last breath of life).” In the latter case, however, by predestination (taken in the strictest sense) only that decree is understood which was really based upon the general proqesiß in accordance with the antecedent prognwsiß, in so far as it embraces the specific number of men who are to be saved, which decree is called proorismoß. HOLL. (608): “In the most special and strict sense, by which proorismoß is distinguished from proqesiß and prognwsiß, and denotes the eternal purpose of God, determinate or applied to certain men as individuals, whom God from the common mass of corruption elects to eternal life, because He distinctly foresees that they will believe to the end in Christ.” The meaning of the last two distinctions is this: that, when we come to speak very accurately, the conceptions of the proqesiß and prognwsiß, contained in the latter statement, are merely the antecedent factors of the true and actual purpose (the proorismoß), which factors, therefore, are not to be connected with the conception of predestination itself, when that is defined as an act or decree. Whence these two factors, viz., the proqesiß and prognwsiß are also defined as the normative or directive sources from which election proceeds; the proqesiß being regarded as the primary or mediate normative source, and the prognwsiß as the immediate and proximate source. QUEN. (III, 18): “The proqesiß is the primary directing principle of election; yet not immediate, but mediate, for it concurs with the intervening prognwsiß, or the foreseeing for election of individuals who would to the end believe in Christ.” [15] Concerning the relation between predestination and election. QUEN. (III, 16): “Election is a synonym of predestination, yet predestination and election are not logical synonyms, so as to have the relation of genus and species, as the Calvinists state (contending that the divine predestination as a genus contains, within its bounds, two species, viz., election and reprobation; or, as others say, it contains two decrees, the one of election, the other of reprobation).” HUTT. (773): “But, according to the tenor of Scripture, they are grammatical synonyms, and of the same breadth. And, although they differ somewhat with respect to formal signification, yet materially, and in relation to the subject, they are not distinguished; whence in Eph. 1:4 and 5, both terms, election and predestination, are received in the same sense, nor is there an unlike example given in Scripture.” HOLL. (605): “Predestination and election agree with respect to the subject, because no man has been predestined to eternal salvation who has not been elected to the same, nor has nay one been elected who has not been predestinated.” But “they differ with respect to formal signification. Election, according to is formal notion, relates to the objects which are to be elected; and predestination, to the end and order of means, which lead to the end of election, or eternal life. For the particle pre, in the word predestination, connotes the priority and eternity of the divine ordination; but the particle e, in the word election, connotes the common aggregate of men, from which there is a separation of some men, and therefore the divine election is the separation of some men from the common mass of corruption, and their adoption into the inheritance of eternal salvation. Predestination (1) presupposes prognwsiß, the foreknowledge of certain persons believing to the end, Rom. 8:29; (2) it formally denotes the ordination to eternal life of those men who, according to the divine foreknowledge, receive and continue to employ the means of grace. Acts 13:48. But election (1) presupposes the love of God, Eph. 1:6; (2) it formally denotes the separation, from the common mass of perdition, of those men who He foresees will perseveringly believe in Christ, John 15:19.” “Another expression for predestination is, according to Phil. 4:3; Rev. 3:5, the writing in the Book of Life.” [16] (a) Full Definition. HOLL. (604): “Predestination is an act of the consequent divine will, by which God (moved by gratuitous mercy, because of the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith) separated from the fallen human race, and ordained to the obtaining eternal salvation for the praise of His glorious grace, those men alone and individually who He foresaw would believe in Christ to the end.” QUEN. (III, 19): “Predestination is an act of the divine will, by which, before the foundations of the earth were laid, not according to our works, but out of pure mercy, according to His purpose and design, which He purposed in Himself in consideration of the merit of Christ to be apprehended by faith, God ordained to eternal life for the praise of His glorious grace such men as, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the Gospel, would perseveringly and to the end believe in Christ.” QUEN. (III, 14): “The peculiar and chief foundation of this fundamental article is Eph. 1:4-7.” (b) The form of election is then thus described by QUEN. (III, 18): “It consists in the entire taxiß, or order, which God, in ordaining the eternal decree of election, had as His design, and according to which, for the sake of His own mercy, because of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, He elects those believing and persevering in faith to the end of life, or, according to which He fulfils in time the election decreed from eternity.” From the fact that election has its ground in the preceding proqesiß and prognwsiß, which are related as major and minor premises to the conclusion, viz., the proorismoß, the syllogism of Predestination arises: “Every one who will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life. “But Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life. “Therefore, Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life.” (HOLL., 630.) (c) The causes of election are then stated thus: “The efficient cause of election is the will of the Triune God, freely decreeing (Rom. 8:28; Eph. 1:4; John 13:18; 15:16, 19; Acts 13:2; 2 Thess. 2:13); the impulsive or moving internal cause is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 9:15, 16; Eph. 1:5; 2:8, 9; Rom. 11:5, 6); the moving external cause is the merit of Christ, regarded with respect to foreseen final application (Eph. 1:4-7).” As the external less principal cause, some state, “Faith in Christ, and this final.” [17] HUTT. (795): “Concerning the question (whether the eternal election of those who are to be saved is to be assigned to the antecedent or the consequent will), a twofold way presents itself, some turning too much to the right, others too far to the left, and both from the path of truth, although in a diverse mode, relation, and end. For those who follow the side of Calvin affirm that the decree of election should be sought in the antecedent will of God alone, but in such a way, as thence to derive both the absolute and the particular will, and indeed also the absolute election of few men. Huber, on the other hand, likewise placed election in the antecedent will alone; and, although contending aright, against the Calvinists, that this will is universal, yet erroneously and falsely constructed thence, against the orthodox, the opinion that election is universal and entirely unlimited. Therefore, just as Calvin removes and eliminates from the decree of election all reference to faith, so Huber does the very act of faith. Each of these errors, deviating from the analogy of faith, violates it in this, that it altogether substitutes election from every consideration of righteousness, imputed through faith on account of Christ. In this way, indeed, it is lawful to infer no election at all, rather than either the absolute election of a few, or the universal election of all. For in all Scripture the name of the elect is never ascribed except to those alone who actually believe and absolutely persevere in faith. In the second place, even the very sound of the terms, election and elect, and their peculiar relation, intimate and prove a distinction or dissimilarity with respect to men. For the elect are so called in distinction from the non-elect; and yet, in fact, Christian piety and faith forbid us making any distinction among men in the antecedent will. Therefore, the orthodox Church, making a separation from each of these errors, places election not in the sole and merely simple antecedent will of God, but rather in the consequent will.” [18] HOLL. (633): “Those elected by God in Christ are wretched sinful men; yet not all promiscuously, but those whom God from eternity distinctly foresaw as those who would believe in Christ to the end.” THerefore (619), “The election to eternal life of men corrupted by sin was made by the most merciful God, in consideration of faith in Christ remaining steadfast to the end of life.” To guard the expression, in consideration of faith (intuitu fidei), from misunderstanding, it was still farther observed by QUEN. (III, 36): “(a) Faith, and that, too, as persevering or final faith, enters into the sphere of eternal election, not as already afforded, but as foreknown. For we are elected to eternal life from faith divinely foreseen, apprehending, to the end, the merit of Christ; (b) Faith enters into election not by reason of any meritorious worth, but with respect to its correlate, or so far as it is the only means of apprehending the merit of Christ; or, in other words, faith is not a meritorious cause of election, but only a prerequisite condition, or a part of the entire order divinely appointed in election;” others express themselves so as to mark faith as the less principal external cause. Concerning the different expressions through which the relation of faith to predestination is stated, BR. (725): “Some of our theologians, indeed, have said that faith in Christ is the instrumental cause of the decree of election; others, that it is its condition; some that it is the condition on the part of the object of election; others that it is a part of the order of predestination. These all practically agree with each other, and with those who call it the impulsive less principal cause. For all acknowledge that faith is not a mere condition which exercises no causality; but, as it is constituted for the act of saving, so is it for the act of decreeing salvation (virtually causing salvation), as that in consideration of which we have been elected, and yet not as a principal cause, of itself able to influence God to elect us. Whence, when faith is otherwise regarded under the figure of a hand or organ, by which, as a cause of salvation, the grace of God electing and the merit of Christ are apprehended, and, in this manner, is usually called an instrument; yet here the relation of faith to the decree of election itself must be shown: where our theologians do not say that it is of the manner of an instrument, which the efficient principal cause, God, in electing, employs to produce the act of election by a real influx. But those who have spoken of an instrumental moral cause cannot understand anything else than an impulsive less principal cause. . . . Therefore, then, this formula of speaking remains, by which faith is called the impulsive cause or reason, yet not the chief or principal; but with the addition, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, of less principal.” BAIER commends the following from MEISSNER: “It seems more fitting that faith be considered not separately as a peculiar cause of election, distinct from the merit of Christ, but joined with that merit as apprehended, so as to render both united the one impelling cause of election. For neither does faith merit without the application, nor does it itself move God to elect, but both combined in the divine foreknowledge, i.e., the merit apprehended by faith, or faith apprehending the merit.” Concerning the relation of prescience and predestination, HUTT. (Loc. c., 803): “I. The word Prescience is received in this place, not in a general, indefinite, and loose sense, concerning the knowledge of all future things; in which sense the prescience of bad things, as well as of good, belongs to God, and presupposes, at the same time, predestination: but restrictedly and determinatively to a certain matter and subject, namely, to prescience of faith in Christ, which is peculiar to the elect. This determinative distinguishing of prescience always presupposes predestination, according to Rom. 8:29, whom He foreknew, viz., according to the interpretation of Augustine, those who would believe in His Son, He also did predestinate; and He indeed predestinated them to be conformed to the image of His Son. For in this passage the Apostle does not treat of the antecedent will of God, by reason of which He wishes all men to be conformed to the image of His Son, but he treats of those who already, in the very decree of God, are conformed to this image. II. This prescience is not the predestination itself of God, or the decree of election, as Calvin affirms. . . . For the Apostle, in the words just cited, expressly considers prescience and predestination as two distinct things; saying, whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate; otherwise, a most senseless notion, such as this, would appear: ‘Whom He predestinated, He predestinated.’ . . . Therefore, it is decided aright that the word prescience in this passage denotes, according to the Hebrew idiom, not the simple knowledge of God, but that which is joined with approbation and delight, because determined to an object pleasing to God, viz., to Christ apprehended by faith, or, what amounts to the same thing, to faith apprehending the merit of Christ. III. This prescience, which we have said enters into the decree of election, is not regarded as a cause, on account of, or because of, which election takes place, or salvation itself is conferred upon the elect; because it is not an essential part, constituting election itself, but is added to predestination only as an adjunct, and that, too, inseparable. For although prescience, since it is placed in a lower grade, can be sometimes unaccompanied by predestination, as happens in regard to the sins and wicked actions of men, yet, with predestination determined because of a higher grade, it is necessary that the lower should always be included. Hence the Apostle says: ‘The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, “The Lord knoweth them that are His,”’ 2 Tim. 2:19. Moreover, He knew this not only in time, but foreknew it from all eternity. This knowledge or foreknowledge is therefore an eye, as it were, of the eternal election; for he who would destroy this would render our election blind and destroy it.” [19] HOLL. (631): “The decree is relative, because when God predestined certain fallen men to eternal life, and, indeed, some rather than others, He regarded something outside of Himself as an impulsive external cause, viz., the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith.” QUEN. (III, 31): “Predestination to eternal life is not absolute, but is founded upon Christ as Mediator. The antithesis of the Calvinists, who exclude the merit of Christ from the causes of election, and refer to means of accomplishing it furnished in time, and, therefore deny that Christ is the meritorious cause of our election.” The doctrine of Calvin, is accordingly distinguished from that of the Lutheran Church, in that, according to the former, predestination rests upon an absolute decree of God (“by which God absolutely of Himself, without a prerequisite condition or without outward respect to any other cause or intervening reason, wills and does something, according to the manner in which He absolutely willed to create and preserve it.” QUEN.); and hence, likewise, it is not the earnestly intended will of God that all men should be saved unto whom the Gospel is preached, and, accordingly, a distinction is made between the manifest will, or that of the sign, and the secret will, or that of the purpose. [20] HOLL. (631): “God indeed decreed absolutely and unconditionally to save this or that one, because He certainly foresaw his persevering faith in Christ.” If it be asserted of the decree that it is not conditioned, it appears to contradict the former assertion that it is not absolute. HOLL. (632) explains the apparent contradiction by the following: “When the decree of predestination is said to be not absolute, it must not be regarded on that account conditional. For the idea is not, that God from eternity would elect this or that one to salvation, if he would believe in Christ, and depart hence in the true faith, but because he would believe and would persevere. Faith regarded in the will of God, before the act of predestination, is therefore indeed a condition, under which He desires the salvation of all; yet in the decree itself it is not a condition under which the election was made, but a reason by which God was moved to elect. Therefore, the decree should not be denied to be absolute, when considered with respect to that which is conditional; yet not in such a manner as to exclude the consideration of the a priori reason outside of God, as a part in the order of predestination, which is, without doubt, faith in Christ foreseen from eternity, or, what amounts to the same thing, the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith. For the decree must not be confounded with the antecedent will of God, which, we affirm, from the Word of God, does not exclude a condition, but appoints it, Rom. 11:23.” [21] QUEN. (III, 21): “Through mortal sins the elect may altogether lose and banish the Holy Ghost, faith and the grace of God, and thus for a time become subjects of condemnation, yet they cannot be wanting to the end, and perish eternally. Total loss of grace is one thing, final loss of grace is another. That is total, by which any one is entirely deprived of the grace of God; that is final, by which any one, shortly before death, departs from the faith, and dies in unbelief.” [22] HOLL. (642): “A regenerate man in the midst of the course of his life is certain of his election conditionally (Phil. 2:12); but at the end of life, he rejoices in the absolute certainty of his predestination.” [23] HOLL. (644): “The word ‘reprobation’ (apodokimasia) is not found in just so many syllables in Holy Scripture. The word adokimoß is used, 1 Cor. 9:27; 2 Cor. 13:5; Heb. 6:8.” QUEN. (III, 21): “It is otherwise called prografh eiß to krima, Jude 4.” [24] BRCHM.: “When the case of reprobation is considered, there is need of pious caution. We must avoid considering God the cause of reprobation in the same manner as He is the cause of election. For He is the cause of election, but with regard to His effecting it and with regard to the end; both with regard to the decrees and to all the means leading to the end. But the matter is different in reprobation. For, since reprobation is eternal perdition, to which there is no direct way except through sin, and especially unbelief, every one must see that reprobation cannot be ascribed to God as effecting it, inasmuch as it is either damnation itself or sin, the means leading thither. The true cause of reprobation is in man himself, and is undoubtedly the obstinate contempt of the grace offered in the Gospel. . . . God, meanwhile, is not the indifferent witness of reprobation, but, as the just avenger of crimes and of despised grace, is occupied with certain special acts concerning the wicked and unbelieving, who, although they have been for a long time admonished, invited, and punished, yet out of pure malice have continued to despise and resist the Gospel.”