A Survey of the Second Chapter

[Alleged power of the magistrate over the conscience in matters of morality refuted — Distinction between moral virtue and grace — Meaning of the terms — Four propositions of Parker on grace and virtue considered — Agreement between the views of Parker and those of the Socinian Seidelius — Exceptions taken to these views — Power of the magistrate in reference to moral duties — The true ground of obligation to these duties.]

The “summary” of this chapter must needs give the reader a great expectation, and the chapter itself no less of satisfaction, if what is in the one briefly proposed be in the other as firmly established: 410for, amongst other things, a scheme of religion is promised, reducing all its branches either to “moral virtues” or “instruments of morality;” — which being spoken of Christian religion, is, as far as I know, an undertaking new and peculiar unto this author, in whose management all that read him must needs weigh and consider how dexterously he hath acquitted himself; for as all men grant that morality hath a great place in religion, so, that all religion is nothing but morality many are now to learn. “The villany of those men’s religion that are wont to distinguish between grace and virtue” (that is, moral virtue) is nextly traduced and inveighed against. I had rather, I confess, that he had affixed the term of “villany” to the men themselves whom he intended to reflect on than to their religion, because, as yet, it seems to me that it will fall on Christianity, and no other real or pretended religion that is or ever was in the world; for if the professors of it have, in all ages, according to its avowed principles, never before contradicted, made a distinction between moral virtues (since these terms were known in the church) and evangelical graces, if they do so at this day, what religion else can be here branded with this infamous and horrible reproach I know not. A farther inquiry into the chapter itself may possibly give us farther satisfaction; wherein, we shall deal as impartially as we are able, with a diligent watchfulness against all prejudicate affections, that we may discover what there is of sense and truth in the discourse, being ready to receive whatever shall be manifested to have an interest in them. The civil magistrate, we are also here informed, amongst many other things that he may do, “may command any thing in the worship of God that doth not tend to debauch men’s practices or to disgrace the Deity;” and that “all subordinate duties, both of morality and religious worship” (such as elsewhere we are told the sacraments are), “are equally subject to the determination of human authority.” These things, and sundry others represented in this summary, being new, yea some of them, as far as I know, unheard of amongst Christians until within a few years last past, any reader may justify himself in the expectation of full and demonstrative arguments to be produced in their proof and confirmation. What the issue will be, some discovery may be made by the ensuing inquiry, as was said, into the body of the chapter itself.

The design of this chapter, in general, is to confirm the power of the magistrate over religion and the consciences of men, ascribed unto him in the former, and to add unto it some enlargements not therein insisted on. The argument used to this purpose is taken from “the power of the magistrate over the consciences of men in matters of morality,” or with respect unto moral virtue; whence it is supposed the conclusion is so evident unto his “power over their 411consciences in matters of religious worship,” that it strikes our author with wonder and amazement that it should not be received and acknowledged. Wherefore, to further the conviction of all men in this matter, he proceeds to discourse of moral virtue, of grace, and of religious worship, with his wonted reflections upon and reproaches of the Nonconformists for their ignorance about and villanous misrepresentation of these things; which seem more to be aimed at than the argument itself.

I must here wish again that our author had more perspicuously stated the things which he proposeth to debate for the subject of his disputation; but I find an excess of art is as troublesome sometimes as the greatest defect therein. From thence I presume it is that things are so handled in this discourse that an ordinary man can seldom discern satisfactorily what it is that directly and determinately he doth intend beyond reviling of Nonconformists; for in this proposition, — which is the best and most intelligible that I can reduce the present discourse unto, — “The supreme civil magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in morality, or with respect unto moral virtue,” excepting only the subject of it, there is not one term in it that may not have various significations, and those such as have countenance given unto them in the ensuing disputation itself. But “contenti sumus hoc Catone,” and make the best we can of what lies before us.

I do suppose that in the medium made use of in this argument, there is, or I am sure there may be, a controversy of much more importance than that principally under consideration. It, therefore, shall be stated and cleared in the first place; and then the concernment of the argument itself, in what is discoursed thereupon, shall be manifested. It is about moral virtue and grace, their coincidence or distinction, that we are in the first place to inquire; for without a due stating of the conception of these things, nothing of this argument nor what belongs unto it can be rightly understood. We shall, therefore, be necessitated to premise a brief explanation of these terms themselves, to remove as far as may be all ambiguity from our discourse.

First, then, the very name of virtue, in the sense wherein it is commonly used and received, comes from the schools of philosophy, and not from the Scripture. In the Old Testament we have “uprightness, integrity, righteousness, doing good and eschewing evil, fearing, trusting, obeying, believing in God, holiness,” and the like; but the name of “virtue” doth not occur therein. It is true, we have translated אֵשֶׁת חַיִל‎, “a virtuous woman,” and once or twice the same word “virtuously,” Ruth iii. 11, Prov. xii. 4, xxxi. 10, 29; but that word signifies, as so used, “strenuous, industrious, diligent,” and 412hath no such signification as that we now express by “virtue.” Nor is it anywhere rendered ἀρετή by the LXX., although it may have some respect unto it, as ἀρετή may be derived from ἄρης, and peculiarly denote the exercise of industrious strength, such as men use in battle; for חַיִלּ‎ is “vis, robur, potentia,” or “exercitus” also. But in the common acceptation of it, and as it is used by philosophers, there is no word in the Hebrew or Syriac properly to express it. The rabbins do it by מִדָּה‎, which signifies properly “a measure;” for, studying the philosophy of Aristotle, and translating his Ethics into Hebrew, which was done by Rabbi Meir, and finding his “virtue’’ placed in mediocrity, they applied מִדָּה‎ to express it: so they call Aristotle’s Ethics סֵפֶר הַמִּדּוֹת‎, “The Book of Measures,” — that is, of virtues; and מִדּוֹת טוֹבוֹת‎ are “boni mores.” Such a stranger is this very word unto the Old Testament. In the New Testament ἀρετή occurs four times; but it should not seem anywhere to be taken in the sense now generally admitted. In some of the places it rather denotes the excellency and praises that do attend virtue, than virtue itself. So we render ἀρετάς “praises,” 1 Pet. ii. 9, as the Syriac doth also תֵּשְׁבוּחֹתֵה‎, “praises;” and the same translation, Phil. iv. 8, renders εἴ τις ἀρετή, “if there be any virtue,” by עֲבֹדֵא דִשׁוּבְחֹא‎, “works glorious” or “praiseworthy,” 1 Pet. ii. 19. It is a peculiar gracious disposition and operation of mind, distinguished from “faith, temperance, patience, brotherly-kindness, godliness, charity,” etc., and so cannot have the common sense of the word there put upon it.

The word “moral” is yet far more exotic to the church and Scripture. We are beholden for it, if there be any advantage in its use, merely to the schools of the philosophers, especially of Aristotle. His doctrine περὶ ἤθων, commonly called his Ἠθικά or “Moralia,” his Morals, hath begotten this name for our use. The whole is expressed, in Isocrates to Demonicus, by ἡ τῶν τρόπων ἀρετή, “the virtue of manners.” If, then, the signification of the words be respected as usually taken, it is virtue in men’s manners that is intended. The schoolmen brought this expression with all its concerns, as they did the rest of Aristotle’s philosophy, into the church and divinity; and I cannot but think it had been well if they had never done it, as all will grant they might have omitted some other things without the least disadvantage to learning or religion. However, this expression of “moral virtue” having absolutely possessed itself of the fancies and discourses of all, and, it may be, of the understanding of some, though with very little satisfaction when all things are considered, I shall not endeavour to dispossess it or eliminate it from the confines of Christian theology. Only, I am sure had we been left unto the Scripture expressions of “repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, of the fear of God, of holiness, righteousness, 413living unto God, walking with God, and before him,” we might have been free from many vain, wordy perplexities, and the whole wrangle of this chapter in particular had been utterly prevented; for let but the Scripture express what it is to be religious, and there will be no contesting about the difference or no difference between grace and moral virtue. It is said that “some judge those who have moral virtue to want grace, not to be gracious;” but say that men are “born of God, and do not commit sin,” that they “walk before God and are upright,” that they “ cleave unto God with full purpose of heart,” that they are “sanctified in Christ Jesus,” and the like, and no man will say that they have not grace, or are not gracious, if they receive your testimony. But having, as was said, made its entrance amongst us, we must deal with it as well as we can, and satisfy ourselves about its common acceptation and use.

Generally, moral virtues are esteemed to be the duties of the second table: for although those who handle these matters more accurately do not so straiten or confine them, yet it is certain that in vulgar and common acceptation (which strikes no small stroke in the regulating of the conceptions of the wisest men about the signification of words) nothing else is intended by “moral virtues,” or “duties of morality,” but the observation of the precepts of the second table; nor is any thing else designed by those divines who, in their writings, so frequently declare that it is not morality alone that will render men acceptable to God. Others do extend these things farther, and fix the denomination of moral firstly upon the law or rule of all those habits of the mind and its operations which afterward thence they call moral. Now, this moral law is nothing but the law of nature, or the law of our creation, which the apostle affirms to lie equally obligatory on all men, even all the Gentiles themselves, Rom. ii. 14, 15, and whereof the decalogue is summarily expressive. This moral law is, therefore, the law written in the hearts of all men by nature; which is resolved partly into the nature of God himself, which cannot but require most of the things of it from rational creatures, partly into that state and condition of the nature of thing and their mutual relations wherein God was pleased to create and set them. These things might be easily instanced and exemplified, but that we must not too much divert from our present occasion. And herein lies the largest sense and acceptation of the law moral, and consequently of moral virtues, which have their form and being from their relation and conformity thereunto. Let it be, then, that moral virtues consist in the universal observance of the requisites and precepts of the law of our creation, and dependence on God thereby. And this description, as we shall see, for the substance of it, is allowed by our author.

414Now, these virtues, or this conformity of our minds and actions unto the law of our creation, may be, in the light and reason of Christian religion, considered two ways:— First, as with respect unto the substance or essence of the duties themselves, they may be performed by men in their own strength, under the conduct of their own reason, without any special assistance from the Spirit or sanctifying grace of Christ. In this sense they still bear the name of “virtues,” and, for the substance of them, deserve so to do. Good they are in themselves, useful to mankind, and seldom, in the providence of God, go without their reward in this world. I grant, I say, that they may be obtained and acted without special assistance of grace evangelical, though the wiser heathens acknowledged something divine in the communication of them to men. Papinius speaks to that purpose:—

But old Homer put it absolutely in the will of his god:—

[Il. Υ., 242.]

Thus we grant moral virtue to have been in the heathen of old, for this is that alone whereby they were distinguished amongst themselves: and he that would exclude them all from any interest in moral virtue takes away all difference between Cato and Nero, Aristides and Tiberius, Titus and Domitian, and overthrows all natural difference between good and evil; which, besides other abominations that it would plentifully spawn in the world, would inevitably destroy all human society. But now, these moral virtues, thus performed, whatever our author thinks, are distinct from grace, may be without it, and in their present description, which is not imaginary, but real, are supposed so to be; and, if he please, he may exercise himself in the longsome disputes of Bellarmine, Gregory de Valentia, and others to this purpose innumerable, — not to mention reformed divines, lest they should be scornfully rejected as systematical. And this is enough, I am sure, to free their religion from villany who make a distinction between moral virtue and grace; and if our author is otherwise minded, and doth believe that there is grace evangelical wherever there is moral virtue, or that moral virtues may be so obtained and exercised without the special assistance of grace as to become a part of our religion and accepted with God, and will maintain his opinion in writing, I will promise him, if I live, to return him an answer, on one only condition, which is, that he will first answer what Augustine hath written against the Pelagians on this subject.

415Again; these moral virtues, this observance of the precepts of the law of our creation, in a consonancy whereunto originally the image of God in us did consist, may now under the gospel be considered, as men are principled, assisted, and enabled to and in their performance by the grace of God, and as they are directed unto the especial end of living unto him in and by Jesus Christ. What is particularly required hereunto shall be afterward declared. Now, in this sense no man living ever distinguished between grace and virtue any otherwise than the cause and the effect are to be, or may be, distinguished; much less was any person ever so brutish as to fancy an inconsistency between them: for, take grace in one sense, and it is the efficient cause of this virtue, or of these virtues, which are the effects of it; and in another, they are all graces themselves, for that which is wrought in us by grace is grace, as that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. To this purpose something may be spoken concerning grace also, the other term, whose ambiguity renders the discourse under consideration somewhat intricate and perplexed. Now, as the former term of “moral virtue” owes its original to the schools of philosophy, and its use was borrowed from them, so this of “grace” is purely scriptural and evangelical. The world knows nothing of it but what is declared in the word of God, especially in the gospel; for “the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” All the books of the ancient philosophers will not give us the least light into that notion of grace which the Scripture declares unto us. As, then, we allowed the sense of the former term, given unto it by its first coiners and users, so we cannot but think it equal that men be precisely tied up in their conceptions about grace unto what is delivered in the Scripture concerning it, as having no other rule either to frame them or judge of them; and this we shall attend unto. Not that I here design to treat of the nature of gospel grace in general; but whereas all the divines that ever I have read on these things, whether ancient or modern (and I have not troubled myself to consider whether they were systematical ones only, or otherwise qualified), allow some distinctions of this term to be necessary for the right understanding of those passages of Scripture wherein it is made use of, I shall mention that or those only which are so unto the right apprehension of what at present under debate.

First, therefore, Grace in the Scripture is taken for the free grace or favour of God towards sinners by Jesus Christ. By this he freely pardoneth them their sins, justifieth and accepteth them, or makes them “accepted in the Beloved.” This, certainly, is distinct from moral virtue. Secondly, It is taken for the effectual working of the Spirit of God in and upon the minds and souls of believers, 416thereby quickening them when they were “dead in trespasses and sins,” regenerating of them, creating a new heart in them, implanting his image upon them. Neither, I presume, will this be called moral virtue. Thirdly, For the actual supplies of assistance and ability given to believers, so to enable them unto every duty in particular which in the gospel is required of them; for he “worketh in them both to will and to do of his own good pleasure.” As yet the former distinction will appear necessary. Fourthly, For the effects wrought and produced by this operation of God and his grace in the hearts and minds of them that believe; which are either habitual, in the spiritual disposition of their minds, or actual, in their operation: all which are called “grace.” It may be our author will be apt to think that I “cant,” “use phrases,” or “fulsome metaphors.” But besides that I can confirm these distinctions, and the necessity of them, and the words wherein they are expressed, from the Scriptures and ancient fathers, I can give them him, for the substance of them, out of very learned divines, — whether systematical or no I know not; but this I know, they were not long since bishops of the church of England.

We are now, in the next place, to inquire into the mind of our author in these things; for, from his apprehensions about them, he frames a mighty difference between himself, and those whom he opposeth, and from thence takes occasion and advantage afresh to revile and reproach them.

First, therefore, He declares his judgment, that the moral virtues which he treats of do “consist of men’s observance of the law of nature, of the dictates of reason, and precepts thereof.” Secondly, That “the substance, yea, the whole of religion, consists in these virtues or duties, so that by the observation of them men may attain everlasting happiness” Thirdly, That “there is no actual concurrence of present grace enabling men to perform these duties, or to exercise these virtues, but they are called grace on another account.” Fourthly, That “his adversaries are so far from making virtue and grace to be the same, that they make them inconsistent.”

And these things shall we take into a brief examination, according as indeed they do deserve.

The first of them he plainly and more than once affirms, nor shall I contend with him about it. So he speaks, p. 68: “The practice of virtue consists in living suitably to the dictates of reason and nature; and this is the substance and main design of all the laws of religion, to oblige mankind to behave themselves in all their actions as becomes creatures endowed with reason and understanding, and, in ways suitable to rational beings, to prepare and qualify themselves for the state of glory and immortality.” This is a plain description both of 417the rule of moral virtues and of the nature of them. The law of reason and nature is the rule; and their own nature, as acting or acted, consists in a suitableness unto rational beings acting to prepare themselves for the state of immortality and glory, — the first end of all virtue, no doubt. We need not, therefore, make any farther inquiry into this matter, wherein we are agreed.

Secondly, That the substance, yea, the whole of religion, consists in these moral virtues he fully also declares, p. 69: “Moral virtue having the strongest and most necessary influence upon the end of all religion, namely, man’s happiness, it is not only its most material and useful part, but the ultimate end of all its other duties” (though I know not how the practice of virtue in this life can be the ultimate end of other duties); “and all true religion can consist in nothing else but either the practice of virtue itself or the use of those means and instruments that contribute unto it.” So also, p. 70: “All duties of devotion, excepting only our returns of gratitude, are not essential parts of religion, but are only in order to it, as they tend to the practice of virtue and moral goodness, and their goodness is derived upon them from the moral virtues to which they contribute; and in the same proportion they are conducive to the ends of virtue, they are to be valued among the ministers of religion.” So, then, the whole duty of man consists in being virtuous, and all that is enjoined beside is in order thereunto. Hence we are told elsewhere that “outward worship is no part of religion.” Again, p. 76: “All religion must of necessity be resolved into enthusiasm or morality; the former is mere imposture, and therefore all that is true must be reduced to the latter.” But we need not insist on particulars, seeing he promoteth this to confirmation by the best of demonstrations, — that is, an induction of all particulars, which he calls “a scheme of religion;” wherein, yet, if any thing necessary be left out or omitted, this best of demonstrations is quickly turned into one of the worst of sophisms. Therefore we have here, no doubt, a just and full representation of all that belongs to Christian religion; and it is as follows, p. 69: “The whole duty of man refers either to his Creator, or his neighbour, or himself. All that concerns the two last is confessedly of a moral nature, and all that concerns the first consists either in praising of God or praying to him. The former is a branch of the virtue of gratitude, and is nothing but a thankful and humble temper of mind, arising from a sense of God’s greatness in himself and his goodness to us: so that this part of devotion issues from the same virtuous quality, — that is, the principle of all other resentments and expressions of gratitude; only, those acts of it that are terminated on God as their object are styled “religious;” — and therefore gratitude and devotion are not diverse things, but only differing 418names of the same thing, devotion being nothing else but the virtue of gratitude towards God. The latter, namely, prayer, is either put up in our own or other men’s behalf. If for others, it is an act of that virtue we call kindness or charity; if for ourselves, the things we pray for, unless they be the comforts and enjoyments of this life, are some or other virtuous qualities; — and therefore the proper and direct use of prayer is, to be instrumental to the virtues of morality.” It is of Christian religion that this author treats, as is manifest from his ensuing discourse, and the reason he gives why moral virtues are styled “graces.” Now, I must needs say, that I look on this of our author as the rudest, most imperfect, and weakest scheme of Christian religion that ever yet I saw; so far from comprising an induction of all particulars belonging to it, that there is nothing in it that is constitutive of Christian religion, as such, at all. I wish he had given us a summary of the “credenda” of it, as he hath done of its “agenda,” that we might have had a prospect of the body of his divinity. The ten commandments would, in my mind, have done twice as well on this present occasion, with the addition of the explication of them given us in the church catechism; but I am afraid that very catechism may, ere long, be esteemed fanatical also. One, I confess, I have read of before who was of this opinion, that all religion consisted in morality alone; but withal he was so ingenuous as to follow the conduct of his judgment in this matter unto a full renunciation of the gospel, which is certainly inconsistent with it. This was one Martin Seidelius, a Silesian, who gave the ensuing account of his faith unto Faustus Socinus and his society at Cracovia:—

“Cæterum ut sciatis cujus sim religionis, quamvis id scripto meo quod habetis, ostenderim, tamen hic breviter repetam. Et primum quidem doctrina de Messia, seu Rege illo promisso, ad meam religionem nihil pertinet; nam Rex ille tantum Judæis promissus erat, sicut et bona illa Canaan. Sic etiam circumcisio, sacrificia, et reliquæ ceremoniæ Mosis ad me non pertinent, sed tantum populo Judaico promissa, data, et mandata sunt. Neque ista fuerunt cultus Dei apud Judæos, sed inserviebant cultui divino, et ad cultum deducebant Judæos. Verus autem cultus Dei quem meam religionem appello est decalogus, qui est æterna Dei voluntas; qui decalogus ideo ad me pertinet, quia etiam mihi a Deo datus est, non quidem per vocem sonantem de cœlo sicut populo Judaico, at per creationem insita est menti meæ. Quia autem insitus decalogus, per corruptionem naturæ humanæ et pravis consuetudinibus, aliquâ ex parte obscuratus est, ideo ad illustrandum eum adhibeo vocalem decalogum, qui vocalis decalogus ideo etiam ad me, ad omnes populos pertinet, quia cum insito nobis decalogo consentit, imo idem 419ille decalogus est. Hæc est mea sententia de Messiâ seu Rege illo promisso, et hæc est mea religio, quam coram vobis ingenuè profiteor. Martin Seidelius Olavensis Silesius.”

That is, “But that you may know of what religion I am, although it is expressed in that writing which you have already, yet I will here briefly repeat it. And, first of all, the doctrine of the Messiah or King that was promised doth not belong to my religion; for that King was promised to the Jews only, as was the good land of Canaan. So in like manner circumcision, sacrifices, and the rest of the ceremonies of Moses, belong not to me, but were promised, given, and granted unto the people of the Jews alone. Neither were they the worship of God among the Jews, but were only subservient unto divine worship, and led the Jews unto it” (the same opinion is maintained by our author concerning all exterior worship). “But the true worship, which I call my religion, is the decalogue; which is the eternal and immutable will of God” (and here also he hath the consent and concurrence of our author): “which decalogue doth therefore belong unto me, because it is given by God to me also; not, indeed, by a voice sounding from heaven, as he gave it to the people of the Jews, but it is implanted in my mind by nature. But because this implanted decalogue, by reason of the corruption of human nature and through depraved customs, is in some measure obscured, for the illustration of it I make use of the vocal decalogue; which therefore also belongs unto me and all people, because it consenteth with the decalogue written in our hearts, yea, is the same law with it. This is my opinion concerning the Messiah or the promised King, and this is my religion, which I freely acknowledge before you.” So he. This is plain dealing. He saw clearly that if all religion and the worship of God consisted in morality only, there was neither need nor use of Christ nor the gospel; and accordingly, having no outward advantage by them, he discarded them. But setting aside his bold renunciation of Christ as promised, I see not any material difference between the religion of this man and that now contended for. The poor deluded souls among ourselves, who, leaving the Scripture, pretend that they are guided by the light within them, are, upon the matter, of the same religion: for that light being nothing but the dictates of reason and a natural conscience, it extends not itself beyond morality; which some of them understanding, we know what thoughts and apprehensions they have had of Christ and his gospel, and the worship of God instituted therein; for hence it is (and not as our author pretends, with a strange incogitancy concerning them and the Gnostics, that they assert the Scripture to be the only rule of religious worship) that they are fallen into these fond imaginations. And these are the effects which this principle doth 420naturally lead unto. I confess, then, that I do not agree with our author in and about this scheme of Christian religion; which I shall, therefore, first briefly put in my exceptions unto, and then offer him another in lieu of it.

First, then, This scheme seems to represent religion unto us as suited to the state of innocency, and that very imperfectly also; for it is composed to answer the former assertion of confining religion to moral virtues, which are granted to consist in our conformity unto and expression of the dictates of reason and the law of nature. Again, the “whole duty of man” is said to refer “either to his Creator, or his neighbour, or himself.” Had it been said to God absolutely, another interpretation might have been put upon the words; but being restrained unto him as our Creator, all duties referring to our Redeemer are excluded, or not included, which certainly have some place in Christian religion. Our obedience therein is the “obedience of faith,” and must answer the special objects of it, And we are taught in the church catechism to believe in God the Father, who made us and all the world; and in God the Son, who redeemed us and all mankind; and in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifies us and all the elect people of God. Now, these distinct acts of faith have distinct acts of obedience attending them; whereas none here are admitted, or at least required, but those which fall under the first head. It is also very imperfect as a description of natural religion, or the duties of the law of nature: for the principal duties of it, such as fear, love, trust, affiance of and in God, are wholly omitted, nor will they be reduced unto either of the heads which all religion is here distributed into; for gratitude unto God hath respect formally and directly to the benefits we ourselves are made partakers of; but these duties are eternally necessary on the consideration of the nature of God himself, antecedent unto the consideration, of his communicating of himself unto us by his benefits. Prayer proceeds from them, and it is an odd method, to reduce the cause under the head of its effect; and prayer itself is made at length not to be so much a moral virtue as somewhat instrumental to the virtues of morality.

Secondly, I cannot think we have here a complete representation of Christian religion, nor an induction of all its particulars, because we have neither supposition nor assertion of sin, or a Redeemer, or any duty with respect unto them. Gratitude and prayer, I confess, are two heads whereunto sundry duties of natural religion, without respect unto these things, may be reduced; but since the fall of Adam, there was never any religion in the world accepted with God that was not built and founded on the supposition of them, and whose principal duties towards God did not respect them. To prescribe now unto us a religion, as it respects God, without those duties which 421arise from the consideration of sin and a Redeemer, is to persuade us to throw away our Bibles. Sin, and the condition of all men on the account thereof; what God requires of them with reference thereunto; the way that God hath found out, proposed, and requires of us to make use of, that we may be delivered from that condition; with the duties necessary to that end, — do even constitute and make up that religion which the Scripture teacheth us, and which, as it summarily expresseth itself, consists in “repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, neither of which, nor scarce any thing that belongs unto them, appears in this scheme: so that, —

Thirdly, The most important duties of Christian religion are here not only omitted but excluded. Where shall we find any place here to introduce repentance, and, as belonging thereunto, conviction of sin, humiliation, godly sorrow, conversion itself to God? For my part, I will never be of that religion where these duties towards God have no place. Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, with all that is necessary to it, preparatory for it, included in it, and consequential on it, are in like manner cast out of the verge of religious duties here schematized. An endeavour to flee from the wrath to come, to receive Jesus Christ, to accept of the atonement, to seek after the forgiveness of sins by him (that we may cant a little), and to give up our souls in universal obedience to all his commands, belong also to the duties of that religion towards God which the Scripture prescribeth unto us; but here they appear not in the least intimation of them. No more do the duties which, though generally included in the law of loving God above all, yet are prescribed and determined in the gospel alone; such are self- denial, readiness to take up the cross, and the like. Besides, all the duties wherein our Christian conflict against our spiritual adversaries doth consist, and, in especial, the whole of our duty towards God in the mortification of sin, can be of no consideration, there where no supposition of sin is made or allowed.

But there would be no end, if all exceptions of this nature, that readily offer themselves, might here have admittance. If this be the religion of our adversaries in these things, if this be a perfect scheme of its duties towards God and induction of all its particulars, let our author insult over and reproach them whilst he pleaseth who blame it as insufficient without grace and godliness, I would not be in the condition of them who trust their eternal concernment to mere observance of it, as knowing that there is no name under heaven given unto men whereby they may be saved, but only the name of Jesus Christ. It will be in vain pretended that it is not a description of Christian religion, but of religion as religion in general, that is here attempted; for besides that it is Christian religion, and that as used and practised by Christians, which is alone under consideration, 422and an introduction of religion here under any other notion would be grievously inconsistent and incoherent with the whole discourse, it is acknowledged by our author in the progress of his disputation, as was before observed, when he gives a reason why moral virtue is styled “grace,” which is peculiar and appropriate to Christian religion alone. Besides, to talk now of a religion in the world, which either hath been or may be since the fall of Adam, without respect unto sin, is to build castles in the air. All the religion that God now requires, prescribes, accepts, that is or can be, is the religion of sinners, or of those who are such, and of them as such, though also under other qualifications. On, many accounts, therefore, this scheme of religion, or religious duties towards God, is exceedingly insufficient and imperfect. To lay it, therefore, as a foundation whereon to stand and revile them who plead for a super-addition unto it of grace and godliness, is an undertaking from whence no great success is to be expected.

I can easily supply another scheme of religion in the room of this, which though it have not any such contexture of method, nor is set out with such gaudy words as those which our author hath at his disposal, yet I am confident, in the confession of all Christians, shall give a better account than what is here offered unto us both of the religion we profess and of the duties that God requires therein, — and this taken out of one epistle of St Paul, namely, that to the Romans; and I shall do it as things come to mind in the haste wherein I am writing. He, then, gives us his scheme to this purpose: as, first, That all men sinned in Adam, came short of the glory of God, and rendered themselves liable to death and the whole curse of the law; then, that they do all, as left to themselves, accumulate their original sin and transgression with a world of actual sins and provocations of God; that against men in this condition God testifies his wrath and displeasure, both in his works and by his word. Hence it necessarily follows that the first duty of man towards God is to be sensible of this condition, of the guilt of sin, with a fear of the wrath and judgment due to them. Then he informs us that neither the Jews by the law, nor the Gentiles by the light of nature, could disentangle themselves from this state, or do that which is pleasing unto God, so as they might obtain forgiveness of sin and acceptation with him. This bespeaks unto all the great duty towards God of their acknowledgment unto him of their miserable and helpless condition, with all those affections and subordinate duties wherewith it is attended. In this state he declares that God himself, in his infinite wisdom, goodness, and grace, provided a remedy, a way of relief, on which he hath put such an impression of his glorious excellencies as may stir up the hearts of his creatures to endeavour a 423return unto him from their apostasy; and that this remedy consists in his setting forth Jesus Christ to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the forgiveness of sin; which he proposeth unto men for their receiving and acceptance. This renders it the greatest duty of mankind towards God to believe in the Son of God so set forth, to seek after an interest in him, or being made partakers of him; for this is the great work that God requires, namely, that we believe on him whom he hath sent. Again; he declares that God justifieth them who so believe, pardoning their sins, and imputing righteousness unto them; whereon innumerable duties do depend, even all the obedience that Christ requires of us, seeing in our believing in him we accept him to be our king, to rule, govern, and conduct our souls to God. And all these are religious duties towards God. He declares, moreover, that whereas men are by nature dead in trespasses and sins, and stand in need of a new spiritual life, to be born again, that they may live unto God, that God in Jesus Christ doth, by his Spirit, quicken them and regenerate them, and work in them a new principle of spiritual life; whence it is their great duty towards God (in this religion of St Paul) to comply with, and to yield obedience unto, all the ways and methods that God is pleased to use in the accomplishment of this, work upon them, the especial duties whereof are too many to be instanced in. But he farther manifests, that notwithstanding the regeneration of men by the Spirit and their conversion to God, there yet continues in them a remainder of the principle of corrupted nature, which he calls “the flesh,” and “indwelling sin,” that is of itself wholly “enmity against God,” and, as far [as] it abides in any, inclines the heart and mind unto sin; which is to be watched against and opposed. And on this head he introduceth the great religious duty towards God of our spiritual conflict against sin, and of the mortification of it; wherein those that believe are to be exercised all the days of their lives, and wherein their principal duty towards God doth consist, and without which they can perform no other in a due manner. Moreover, he farther adds the great gospel privilege of the communication of the Spirit of Christ unto believers, for their sanctification, consolation, and edification, with the duties of thankfulness towards God, joy and rejoicing in him, cheerfulness under trials, afflictions, and persecutions, and sundry others that on that account are required of us; — all religious duties towards God, in the religion by him proposed unto us. Having laid these foundations, and manifested how they all proceed from the eternal counsel and free grace of God, in which it is our duty to admire, adore, and praise him, he declareth how hereby, and on the account of these things, we are bound unto all holiness, righteousness, godliness, honesty, and 424usefulness in this world, in all relations and conditions whatsoever; — declaring our duties in churches, according to our especial interest in them, towards believers, and towards all men in the world in our several relations; in obedience to magistrates and all superiors; in a word, in universal observance of the whole will and all the commands of God. Now, whether any one will call this a “scheme” or no, or allow it to have any thing of method in it or no, I neither know nor care, but am persuaded that it makes a better, more plain and intelligible, representation of the religious duties towards God which Christian religion requires of us, unto all that suppose this whole religion to depend on divine revelation, than that of our author. But I find myself in a digression. The end of this discourse was only to manifest the sentiments of our author on the second head before laid down; which, I think, are sufficiently evinced.

The third is, That there is no actual work of present grace, either to fit the persons of whom these duties of moral virtues are required unto the performance of them or to work and effect them in them; for although they are called “graces,” and the “graces of the Spirit,” in the Scripture, yet that is upon another account, as he declares himself, p. 72: “All that the Scripture intends by the ‘graces of the Spirit’ are only virtuous qualities of the soul; that are therefore styled ‘graces,’ because they are derived purely from God’s free grace and goodness, in that, in the first ages of Christianity, he was pleased, out of his infinite concern for its propagation, in a miraculous manner to inspire its converts with all sorts of virtue.”

“Virtuous qualities of the soul” is a very ambiguous expression. Take these virtuous qualities for a new principle of spiritual life, consisting in the habitual disposition, inclination, and ability of mind unto the things required of us in the will of God, or unto the acts of religious obedience, and it may express the graces of the Spirit; which are yet far enough from being so called upon the account here mentioned. But these virtuous qualities are to be interpreted according to the tenor of the preceding discourses that have already passed under examination. Let now our author produce any one writer of the church of God, from first to last, of any repute or acceptation, from the day that the name of Christian was known in the world unto this wherein we live, giving us this account why the fruits of the Spirit, the virtuous or gracious qualities of the minds of believers, are called “graces” that here he gives, and I will give him my thanks publicly for his discovery; for if this be the only reason why any thing in believers is called “grace,” why virtues are graces, — namely, because God was pleased in the first ages of Christianity miraculously to inspire its converts with all sorts of virtue, — then there is no communication of grace unto any, no work of grace in and upon any, in an ordinary way, through the ministry 425of the gospel in these latter ages! The whole being and efficacy of grace, according to this notion, is to be confined unto the miraculous operations of God in gospel concernments in the first ages, whence a denomination in the Scripture is cast upon our virtues, when obtained and exercised by and in our own strength! Now, this plainly overthrows the whole gospel, and contains a Pelagianism that Pelagius himself never did nor durst avow.

Are these things, then, so indeed, that God did, from his free grace and goodness, miraculously inspire the first converts of Christianity with all sorts of virtues, but that he doth not still continue to put forth in any actually the efficacy of his grace, or make them gracious, holy, believing, obedient to himself, and to work in them all suitable actings towards himself and others? Then farewell Scripture, the covenant of grace, the intercession of Christ, yea, all the ancient fathers, councils, schoolmen, and most of the Jesuits themselves! Many have been the disputes amongst Christians about the nature of grace, the rule of its dispensation, the manner and way of its operation, its efficacy, concurrence, and cooperation in the wills of men; but that there is no dispensation of it, no operation but what was miraculous in the first converts of the gospel, was, I think, until now undiscovered. Nor can it be here pretended that the virtuous qualities of our minds and their exercise, — by which is intended all the obedience that God requireth of us, in principle and practice, that we may please him and come to the enjoyment of him, — are not said to be called graces only on the account mentioned; for as in respect of us they are not so termed at all, so if the term “only” be not understood, the whole discourse is impertinent and ridiculous: for those other reasons and accounts that may be taken in will render that given utterly useless unto our author’s intention, and, indeed, are altogether inconsistent with it, and he hath given us no reason to suppose that he talks after such a weak and preposterous rate. This, then, is that which is here asserted: The qualities of our minds and their exercise, wherein the virtues pleaded about and affirmed to contain the whole substance of religion do consist, are not wrought in us by the grace or Spirit of God through the preaching of the gospel, but are only called “graces,”as before. Now, though here be a plain contradiction to what is delivered but two pages before, namely, “that we pray for some or other virtuous qualities,” — that is, doubtless, to be wrought in us by the grace of God, — yet this present discourse is capable of no other interpretation but that given unto it. And, indeed, it seems to be the design of some men to confine all real gifts and graces of the Spirit of God to the first ages of the gospel, and the miraculous operations in it; which is to overthrow the whole gospel, the church, and the ministry of it, as to their use and 426efficacy, leaving men only the book of the Bible to philosophize upon, as shall be elsewhere demonstrated. Our author, indeed, tells us, that on the occasion of some men’s writings in theology, “there hath been a buzz and a noise of the Spirit of God in the world.” His expressions are exceedingly suited to pour contempt on what he doth not approve, not so to express what he doth himself intend. But I desire that he and others would speak plain and openly in this matter, that neither others may be deceived nor themselves have occasion to complain that they are misrepresented; a pretence whereof would probably give them a dispensation to deal very roughly, if not despitefully, with them with whom they shall have to do. Doth he, therefore, think or believe that there are not now any real gracious operations of the Spirit of God upon the hearts and minds of men in the world? that the dispensation of the Spirit is ceased, as well unto ordinary ministerial gifts, with its sanctifying, renewing, assisting grace, as unto gifts miraculous and extraordinary? that there is no work at all of God upon the hearts of sinners but that which is purely moral and persuasive by the word? that what is asserted by some concerning the efficacy of the grace of the Spirit, and concerning his gifts, is no more but “a buzz and a noise?” I wish he would explain himself directly and positively in these things, for they are of great importance; and the loose expressions which we meet with do give great offence unto some, who are apt to think that as pernicious a heresy as ever infested the church of God may be covered and cloaked by them.

But to return: in the sense that mortal virtue is here taken, I dare boldly pronounce that there is no villany in the religion of those men who distinguish between virtue and grace, — that is, there is not in their so doing, — this being the known and avowed religion of Christianity. It is granted that wherever grace is, there is virtue; for grace will produce and effect all virtues in the soul whatever. But virtue, on the other side, may be where there is no grace; which is sufficient to confirm a distinction between them. It was so in sundry of the heathen of old; though now it be pretended that grace is nothing but an occasional denomination of virtue, not that it is the cause or principle of it. But the proofs produced by our author are exceedingly incompetent unto the end whereunto they are applied. For that place of the apostle, Gal. v. 22, 23, “The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,” though our author should be allowed to turn “joy” into “cheerfulness,” “peace” into “peaceableness,” “faith” into “faithfulness,” as he hath done, corruptly enough, to accommodate it to his purpose, yet it will no way reach his end, nor satisfy his intention; for doth it follow, that because the Spirit 427effects all these moral virtues in a new and gracious manner, and with a direction to a new and special end in believers, either that these things are nothing but mere moral, virtues, not wrought in us by the grace of God (the contrary whereof is plainly asserted in calling them “fruits of the Spirit”), or that wherever there is moral virtue, though not so wrought by the Spirit, that there is grace also, because virtue and grace are the same? If these are the expositions of Scripture which we may expect from them who make such outcries against other men’s perverting and corrupting of it, the matter is not like to be much mended with us, for aught I can see, upon their taking of that work into their own hands.

And indeed his quotation of this place is pretty odd. He doth not in the print express the words as he useth, and as he doth those of another scripture immediately, in a different character, as the direct words of the apostle, that no man may charge him with a false allegation of the text; yet he repeats all the words of it which he intends to use to his purpose, somewhat altering the expressions. But he hath had, I fear, some unhappiness in his explanations. By “joy” he would have “cheerfulness” intended; but what is meant by cheerfulness is much more uncertain than what is intended by joy. Mirth, it may be, in conversation is aimed at, or somewhat of that nature; but how remote this is from that spiritual joy which is recommended unto us in the Scripture, and is affirmed to be “unspeakable and full of glory,” he that knows not is scarce meet to paraphrase upon St Paul’s epistles. Neither is that “peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ,” which is wrought in the hearts of believers by the Holy Ghost, who “creates the fruit of the lips, peace, peace, unto them,” a matter of any more affinity with a moral peaceableness of mind and affections. Our faith also in God, and our faithfulness in our duties, trusts, offices, and employments, are sufficiently distinct. So palpably must the Scripture be corrupted and wrested to be made serviceable to this presumption! He yet adds another proof to the same purpose, — if any man know distinctly what that purpose is, — namely, Tit. ii. 11; where he tells us that the same apostle makes the “grace of God” to consist in gratitude towards God, temperance towards ourselves, and justice towards our neighbours. But these things are not so; for the apostle doth not say that the grace of God doth consist in these things, but that the “grace of God teacheth” us these things. Neither is the grace here intended any subjective or inherent grace, nor, to speak with our author, any “virtuous quality, or virtue;” but the love and grace of God himself in sending Jesus Christ, as declared in the gospel, as is manifest in the words and context beyond contradiction. And I cannot but wonder how our author, desirous to prove that the whole 428of our religion consists in moral virtues, and these only called “graces” because of the miraculous operations of God from his own grace in the first, gospel converts, should endeavour to do it by these two testimonies; the first whereof expressly assigns the duties of morality, as in believers, to the operations of the Spirit; and the latter, in his judgment, makes them to proceed from grace.

Our last inquiry is into what he ascribes unto his adversaries in this matter, and how he deals with them thereupon. This, therefore, he informs us, p. 71: “‘It is not enough,’ say they, ‘to be completely virtuous, unless ye have grace too.’” I can scarce believe that ever he heard any one of them say so, or ever read it in any of their writings: for there is nothing that they are more positive in than that men cannot, in any sense, be completely virtuous unless they have grace; and so they cannot suppose them to be so who have it not. They say, indeed, that moral virtues, as before described, so far as they are attainable by, or may be exercised in the strength of, men’s own wills and natural faculties, are not enough to please God and to make men accepted with him; so that virtue as it may be without grace, and some virtues may be so for the substance of them, is not available unto salvation. And I had almost said, that he is no Christian that is of another mind. In a word, virtue is or may be without grace, in all or any of the acceptations of it before laid down. Where it is without the favour of God and the pardon of sin, where it is without the renewing of our natures and the endowment of our persons with a principle of spiritual life, where it is not wrought in us by present efficacious grace, it is not enough, nor will serve any man’s turn with respect unto the everlasting concernments of his soul.

But he gives in his exceptions, p. 71: “But when,” saith he, “we have set aside all manner of virtue, let them tell me what remains to be called grace, and give me any notion of it distinct from all morality, that consists in the right order and government of our actions in all our relations, and so comprehends all our duty; and therefore if grace be not included in it, it is but a phantasm and an imaginary thing.” I say, first, Where grace is, we cannot set aside virtue, because it will and doth produce and effect it in the minds of men; but virtue may be where grace is not, in the sense so often declared. Secondly, Take moral virtue in the notion of it here received and explained by our author, and I have given sundry instances before of gracious duties that come not within the verge or compass of the scheme given us of it. Thirdly, The whole aimed at lies in this: That virtue that governs our actions in all our duties may be considered either as the duty we owe to the law of nature for the ends of it, to be performed in the strength of nature, and by 429the direction of it; or it may be considered as it is an especial effect of the grace of God in us, which gives it a new principle and a new end, and a new respect unto the covenant of grace wherein we walk with God; — the consideration whereof frustrates the intention of our author in this discourse.

But he renews his charge, p. 73: “So destructive of all true and real goodness is the very religion of those men that are wont to set grace at odds with virtue, and are so far from making them the same that they make them inconsistent; and though a man be exact in all the duties of moral goodness, yet if he be a graceless person (that is, void of I know not what imaginary godliness) he is but in a cleaner way to hell, and his conversion is more hopeless than the vilest and most notorious sinner’s; and the morally righteous man is at a greater distance from grace than the profane; and better be lewd and debauched than live an honest and virtuous life, if you are not of the godly party,” — with much more to this purpose. For the “men that are wont to set grace at odds with virtue, and are so far from making them the same that they make them inconsistent,” I wish our author would discover them, that he might take us along with him in his detestation of them. It is not unlikely, if all be true that is told of them, but that the Gnostics might have some principles not unlike this; but beside them, I never heard of any that were of this mind in the world. And, in truth, the liberty that is taken in these discourses is a great instance of the morality under consideration. But the following words will direct us where these things are charged; for some say that if “a man be exact in all the duties of moral goodness, yet if he be a graceless person, void of I know not what imaginary godliness, he is but in a cleaner way to hell.” I think I know both what and who are intended, and that both are dealt withal with that candour we have been now accustomed unto. But, first, you will scarce find those you intend over-forward in granting that men may be “exact in all the duties of moral goodness,” and yet be “graceless persons:” for taking moral virtues to comprehend, as you do, their duties towards God, they will tell you such persons cannot perform one of them aright, much less all of them exactly; for they can neither believe in God, nor trust him, nor fear him, nor glorify him, in a due manner. [Secondly,] Take the duties of moral goodness for the duties of the law between man and man, and the observation of the outward duties of God’s worship, and they say, indeed, that they may be so performed as that in respect of them men may be blameless, and yet be graceless; for that account, if they mistake not, the apostle Paul gives of himself, Phil. iii. 6–9. They do say, therefore, that many of these duties, so as to be useful in the world and blameless before men, they may perform who are 430yet graceless. Thirdly, This gracelessness is said to consist in being “void of I know not what imaginary godliness.” No, no; — it is to be void of the Spirit of God, of the grace of Christ; not to be born again, not to have a new spiritual life in Christ; not to be united to him or ingrafted in him; not to be accepted and made an heir of God, and enabled to a due, spiritual, evangelical performance of all duties of obedience, according to the tenor of the covenant. These are the things intended. And as many with their “moral duties” may come short of them and be “graceless,” so those to whom they are “imaginary” must reject the whole gospel of Christ as an imagination. And I must say (to give matter of a new charge), that, to the best observation that I have been able to make in the world, none have been, nor are, more negligent in the principal duties of morality than those who are aptest to exalt them above the gospel and the whole mystery of it; unless morality do consist in such a course of life and conversation as I will not at present characterize.

It is farther added, that the “conversion of such a one is more hopeless than the vilest and most notorious sinner’s; and the morally righteous man, etc. Setting aside the invidious expression of what is here reflected upon, there is nothing more openly taught in the gospel. The Pharisees were a people morally righteous, whereon they “trusted in themselves that they were righteous;” and, yet our Lord Jesus Christ told them that “publicans and harlots,” the vilest and most notorious of sinners, entered before them into the kingdom of God. And where men trust to their own righteousness, their own duties, be they moral or what they will, there are no men farther from the way of the gospel than they; nay, our Saviour lets us know that, as such, the gospel is not concerned in them, nor they in it. “I came not,” he says, “to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance,” — not men justifying or lifting up themselves in a conceit of their moral duties, but those who are burdened and laden with a sense of their sins; and so, in like manner, that “the whole have no need of a physician, but the sick.” And St Paul declares what enemies they were to the righteousness of God who went about to set up their own righteousness, Rom. x. 3. Now, because moral duties are incumbent on all persons at all times, they are continually pressed upon all, from a sense of the authority and command of God, indispensably requiting all men’s attendance unto them. Yet such is the deceitfulness of the heart of man and the power of unbelief, that oftentimes persons who, through their education or following convictions, have been brought to some observance of them, being not enlightened in their minds to discern their insufficiency unto the great end of salvation in and of themselves, are apt to take up with them and to rest in them, without ever coming 431to sincere repentance towards God, or faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; whereas others, the guilt of whose sins doth unavoidably press upon them, as it did on the publicans and sinners of old, are ofttimes more ready to look out after relief. And those who question these things do nothing but manifest their ignorance in the Scripture, and want of experience in the work of the ministry. But yet, upon the account of the charge mentioned, so unduly framed and impotently managed, our author makes an excursion into such an extravagancy of reproaches as is scarce exceeded in his whole book; part of it I have considered before in our view of his preface, and I am now so used to the noise and bluster wherewith he pours out the storm of his indignation, that I am altogether unconcerned in it, and cannot prevail with myself to give it any farther consideration.

These things, though not direct to the argument in hand, and which on that account might have been neglected, yet supposing that the author placed as much of his design in them as in any part of his discourse, I could not wholly omit the consideration of; not so much out of a desire for their vindication who are unduly traduced in them, as to plead for the gospel itself, and to lay a foundation of a farther defence of the truths of it, if occasion shall so require. And we have also here an insight into the judgment of our author, or his mistake in this matter. He tells us that it is better to tolerate debaucheries and immoralities than liberty of conscience for men to worship God according to their light and persuasion! Now, all religion, according to him, consisting in morality, to tolerate immoralities and debaucheries in conversation is plainly to tolerate atheism; which, it seems, is more eligible than to grant liberty of conscience unto them who differ from the present establishment only as to some things belonging to the outward worship of God!

These things being premised, the argument itself pleaded in this chapter is capable of a speedy despatch. It is to this purpose: “The magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference to morals or moral virtues, which are the principal things in religion; and therefore much more hath so in reference to the worship of God, which is of less importance.” We have complained before of the ambiguity of these general terms, but it is to no purpose to do so any more, seeing that we are not like to be relieved in this discourse. Let us, then, take things as we find them, and satisfy ourselves on the intention of the author by that declaration which he makes of it up and down the chapter. But yet here we are at a loss also. When he speaks, or seems to speak, to this purpose, whether in the confirmation of the proposition, or the inferences whereof his arguments consist, what he says is cast into such an intertexture with invectives and reproaches, and expressed in such a 432loose, declamatory manner, as it is hard to discover or find out what it is that he intends. Suppose, therefore, in the first place, that a man should call his consequent into question, — namely, that because the magistrate hath power over the consciences of his subjects in morals, that therefore he hath so also in matters of instituted worship, — how would he confirm and vindicate it? Two things are all I can observe that are offered in the confirmation of it:— First, That “these things of morality, moral virtues, are of more importance in religion than the outward worship of God,” which the amplitude of power before asserted is now reducing to a respect unto. Secondly, That “there is much more danger of his erring and mistaking in things of morality than in things of outward worship, because of their great weight and importance.” These things are pleaded, p. 28, and elsewhere up and down. That any thing else is offered in the confirmation of this consequent I find not. And it may be some will think these proofs to be very weak and feeble, unable to sustain the weight that is laid upon them; for it is certain that the first rule, — that he that hath power over the greater hath so over the lesser, — doth not hold unless it be in things of the same nature and kind. And it is no less certain and evident that there is an especial and formal difference between these things, — namely, moral virtues and instituted worship; the one depending, as to their being and discovery, on the light of nature, and the dictates of that reason which is common to all, and speaks the same language in the consciences of all mankind; the other, on pure revelation, which may be and is variously apprehended. Hence it is, that whereas there is no difference in the world about what is virtue and what is not, there is no agreement about what belongs to divine worship and what doth not.

Again; lesser things may be exempted from that power and authority, by especial privilege or law, which hath the disposal of greater committed unto it, and intrusted with it; as the magistrate amongst us may take away the life of a man, which is the greatest of his concernments, the name of his all, for felony, but cannot take his estate or inheritance of land, which is a far less concernment unto him, if it be antecedently settled by law to other uses than his own. And if it cannot be proved that the disposal of the worship of God, as to what doth really and truly belong unto it, and all the parts of it, is exempted from all human power by special law and privilege, let it be disposed of as whoso will shall judge meet.

Nor is the latter consideration suggested to enforce this consequent of any more validity, — namely, “that there is more danger of the magistrate’s erring or mistaking about moral virtue than about rites of worship,” because that is of most concernment in religion; for it is true, that suppose a man to walk on the top of a high house or 433tower, on a plain floor, with battlements or walls round about him, there will be more danger of breaking his neck if he should fall from thence than if he should fall from the top of a narrow wall that had not the fourth part of the height of the house. But there would not be so much danger of falling: for from the top of the house, as circumstantiated, he cannot fall, unless he will willfully and violently cast himself down headlong; and on the top of the wall, it may be, he cannot stand, with the utmost of his heed and endeavours. The magistrate cannot mistake about moral virtues, unless he will do it willfully. They have their station fixed in the world on the same ground and evidence with the magistracy itself. The same evidence, the same common consent and suffrage of mankind, is given unto moral virtues, as is to any government in the world; and to suppose a supreme magistrate, a lawgiver, to mistake in these things, in judging whether justice, and temperance, or fortitude, be virtues or no, and that in his legislative capacity, is ridiculous. Neither Nero nor Caligula was ever in danger of any such misadventure. All the magistrates in the world at this day are agreed about these things. But as to what concerns the worship of God, they are all at variance. There is no such evidence in these things, no such common suffrage about them, as to free any absolutely from failings and mistakes; so that in respect of them, and not of the other, lies the principal danger of miscarrying as to their determination and administration. Supposing, therefore, the premises our author lays down to be true, his inference from them is feeble and obnoxious to various impeachments, whereof I have given some few instances only, which shall be increased if occasion require.

But the assertion itself which is the foundation of these consequences is utterly remote from accuracy and truth. It is said that “the magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference unto moral duties, which are the principal parts of religion.” Our first and most difficult inquiry is after the meaning of this proposition; the latter, after its truth. I ask, then, first, Whether he hath power over the consciences of men with respect unto moral virtue, and over moral virtue itself as virtue and as a part of religion, or on some other account? If his power respect virtue as a part of religion, then it equally extends itself to all that is so, by virtue of a rule which will not be easily everted. But it doth not appear that it so extends itself as to plead an obliging authority in reference unto all duties; for let but the scheme of moral duties, especially those whose object is God, given us by our author, be considered, and it will quickly be discerned how many of them are exempted from all human cognizance and authority, and that from and by their nature, as well as their use in the world. And it is in vain to ascribe an authority to 434magistrates which they have no power to exert, or take cognizance whether it be obeyed or no. And what can they do therein with respect unto “gratitude to God,” which holds the first place in the scheme of moral virtues here given in unto us? We are told, also, p. 83, “That in matters both of moral virtue and divine worship, there are some rules of good and evil that are of an eternal and changeable obligation, and these can never be prejudiced or altered by any human power, because the reason of their obligation arises from a necessity and constitution of nature, and therefore must be as perpetual as that; but then there are other rules of duty that are alterable according to the various accidents, changes, and conditions of human life, and depend chiefly upon contracts and positive laws of kingdoms.” It would not be unworthy our inquiry to consider what rules of moral duty they are which are alterable and depend “on accidents and contracts;” but we might easily find work enough should we call all such fond assertions to a just examination. Neither doth the distinction here given us between various rules of moral virtue very well answer what we are told, p. 69, — namely, “that every particular virtue is therefore such, because it is a resemblance and imitation of some of the divine attributes;” which I suppose they are not whose rules and forms are alterable upon accidents and occasions. And we are taught also, p. 68, that the “practice of virtue consists in living suitably to the dictates of reason and nature;” which are rules not variable and changeable. There must be some new distinction to reconcile these things, which I cannot at present think of. That which I would enquire from hence is, Whether the magistrate have power over the consciences of men in reference unto those things in morality whose rules of good and evil are of an eternal obligation? That he hath not is evidently implied in this place. And I shall not enter into the confusion of the ensuing discourse, where the latter sort of rules for virtue, the other member of the distinction, are turned into various methods of executing laws about outward acts of virtue or vice, and the virtues themselves into outward expressions and significations of duty; for I have at present no contest with this author about his manner of writing, nor do intend to have. It is enough that here at once all the principal and most important virtues are vindicated to their own unalterable rules as such, and the consciences of men in reference unto them put under another jurisdiction. And what, then, becomes of this argument, “That the magistrate must have power over the consciences of men in matters of divine worship, because he hath so in things moral, which are of greater importance,” when what is so of importance is exempted from his power?

Hence it sufficiently appears that the authority of the magistrate 435over men, with reference unto moral virtue and duty, doth not respect virtue as virtue, but hath some other consideration. Now what this is, is evident unto all. How moral virtues do belong unto religion, and are parts of it, hath been before declared. But God, who hath ordered all things in weight and measure, hath fore-designed them also to another end and purpose. For preparing mankind for political society in the world among themselves for a time, as well as for religious obedience unto himself, he inlaid his nature and composition with principles suited to both those ends, and appointed them to be acted with different respects unto them. Hence moral virtues, notwithstanding their peculiar tendency unto him, are appointed to be the instrument and ligament of human society also; — as the law of Moses had in it a typical end, use, and signification, with respect to Christ and the gospel; and a political use, as the instrument of the government of the nation of the Jews. Now, the power of the magistrate in respect to moral virtues is in their latter use, — namely, as they relate to human policy, which is concerned in the outward actings of them. This, therefore, is granted; and we shall inquire farther, whether any more be proved, namely, that the magistrate hath power over the outward actings of virtue and vice, so far as human society or public tranquillity is concerned in them, and on that account?

Secondly, It may be inquired, What is the power and authority over moral virtues which is here ascribed unto the civil magistrate, and over the consciences of men with respect unto them? Is it such as to make that to be virtue which was not virtue before, or which was vice, and oblige men in conscience to practice it as virtue? This would go a great way indeed, and answer somewhat of what is, or, as it is said, may be, done in the worship of God, when that is made a part of it which was not so before. But what name shall these new virtues be called by? A new virtue, both as to its acts and objects, will as much fly the imaginations of men as a sixth sense doth. It may be our author will satisfy us as to this inquiry; for he tells us, p. 80, that “he hath power to make that a particular of the divine law that God hath not made so.” I wish he had declared himself how and wherein; for I am afraid this expression, as here it lies, is offensive. The divine law is divine, and so is every particular of it; and how a man can make a thing divine that is not so of itself, nor by divine institution, is hard to find out. It may be that only the subject-matter of the law, and not the law itself formally, is intended; and to make a thing a particular of the divine law is no more but to make the divine law require that in particular of a man which it did not require of him before. But this particular refers to the nature, essence, and being of the thing, or to the acting and occasion 436of it in particular. And if it be taken in the latter sense, there is no more ascribed unto the magistrate than is common with him to every man in the world: for every one that puts himself into new circumstances or new relations, doth so make that unto him to be a particular of the divine law which was not so before; for he is bound and obliged unto the actual performance of many duties which, as so circumstantiated, he was not bound unto before.

But somewhat else seems to be intended from the ensuing discourse: “They are fully empowered to declare new instances of virtue and vice, and to introduce new duties in the most important parts of religion.” And yet I am still at the same loss; for by his “declaring new instances of virtue and vice,” I suppose he intends an authoritative declaration, such as that they have no other foundation, nor need none to make them what they are. They are new instances of virtue and vice, because so declared. And this suits unto the “introducing of new duties in the most important parts of religion,” — made duties by that introduction. I wish I could yet learn what these “new instances of virtue and vice” are or mean; whether they are new as virtues and vices, or as instances. For the first, would I could see a new practice of old virtues! but, to tell you the truth, I care not for any of the new virtues that I have lately observed in the world, nor do I hope ever to see any better new ones.

If it be the instances that are new, I wish again I knew what were more in them than the actual and occasional exercise of old duties. Pages 79, 80, conduce most to extricate us out of these ambiguities. There we are informed that “the laws of every nation do distinguish and settle men’s rights and properties, and that distinctly; with respect whereunto justice, that prime natural virtue, is in particular instances to be exercised. And, p. 84, it is farther declared, that “in the administration of justice there may be great difference in the constitution of penalties and execution of them.” This, it seems, is that which is aimed at: The magistrate, by his laws, determines whether Titius have set his hedge upon Caius’ ground, and whether Sempronius have rightly conveyed his land or house to his son or neighbour; whereby what is just and lawful in itself is accommodated to the use of political society. He determines, also, how persons guilty of death shall be executed, and by whom, and in what manner. Whence it must needs follow, that he hath power to assign new particulars of the divine law, to declare new bounds or hedges of right and wrong, which the law of God neither doth nor can limit, or hath power over the consciences of men with respect to moral virtues; which was to be demonstrated. Let us lay aside these swelling expressions, and we shall find that all that can be ascribed unto the civil magistrate in this matter is no more than to preserve 437property and peace by that rule and power over the outward actions of men which is necessary thereunto.

Having made some inquiry into the terms of “moral virtue” and the “magistrate’s power,” it remains only that we consider what respect this case hath unto the consciences of men, with reference unto them; and I desire to know whether all mankind be not obliged in conscience to the observation of all moral virtues antecedently to the command or authority of the magistrate, who doth only inspect their observation of them as to the concerns of public peace and tranquillity? Certainly, if all moral virtues consist in “living suitably to the dictates of reason,” as we are told, — and in a sense rightly, if the rule of them all and every one, which gives them their formal nature, be the law of our creation, which all mankind enter the world under an indispensable obligation unto, — it cannot be denied but that there is such an antecedent obligation on the consciences of men as that inquired after. But the things mentioned are granted by our author; nor can by any be denied without offering the highest outrage to Scripture, reason, and the common consent of mankind. Now, if this obligation be thus on all men, unto all virtue as virtue, and this absolutely, from the authority of God over them and their consciences, how comes an inferior authority to interpose itself between that of God and their consciences, so as immediately to oblige them? It is granted that when the magistrate commandeth and requireth the exercise of any moral duty, in a way suited unto public good and tranquillity, he is to be obeyed for conscience’ sake, because he who is the Lord of conscience doth require men to be obedient unto him, whereon they are obliged in conscience so to be: but if the things required of them be in themselves moral duties, as they are such, their consciences are obliged to observe and exercise them from the command of God; and other obligation unto them, as such, they neither have nor can have. But the direction and command for the exercise of them in these and those circumstances, for the ends of public good whereunto they are directed, belongs unto the magistrate, who is to be obeyed: for as in things merely civil, and which have nothing originally of morality in them, but secondarily only, as they tend to the preservation and welfare of human society, which is a thing morally good, the magistrate is to be obeyed for conscience’ sake, and the things themselves, as far as they partake of morality, come directly under the command of God, which affects the conscience; — so in things that have an inherent and inseparable morality, and so respect God in the first place, when they come to have a civil sanction in reference to their exercise unto public political good, that sanction is to be obeyed out of conscience; but the antecedent obligation that was upon the conscience unto a 438due exercise of those duties, when made necessary by circumstances, is not superseded, nor any new one added thereunto.

I know what is said, but I find not as yet what is proved, from these things, concerning the uncontrollable and absolute power of the supreme magistrate over religion and the consciences of men. Some things are added indeed here, up and down, about circumstances of divine worship, and the power of ordering them by the magistrate; which though there may be some different conceptions about, yet they no way reach the cause under debate. But as they are expressed by our author, I know not of any one writer in and of the church of England that hitherto has so stated them as they are by him; for he tells us, p. 85, that “all rituals, ceremonies, postures, and manners of performing the outward expressions of devotion, that are not chargeable with countenancing vice or disgracing the Deity, are capable of being adopted into the ministries of divine service, and are not exempted from being subject to the determinations of human power.” Whether they are so or no, the magistrate, I presume, is to judge, or all this flourish of words and concessions of power vanish into smoke. His command of them binds the consciences of men to observe them, according to the principle under consideration. Hence it must be absolutely in the power of every supreme magistrate to impose on the Christian subjects a greater number of ceremonious observances in the worship of God, and those of greater weight, than ever were laid upon the Jews; for who knows not that under the names of “rituals, ceremonies, postures, manners of performing all divine service,” what a burdensome heap of things are imposed in the Roman church? whereunto, as far as I know, a thousand more may be added, not chargeable in themselves with either of the crimes which alone are allowed to be put in in bar or plea against them. And whether this be the liberty whereunto Jesus Christ hath vindicated his disciples and church, is left unto the judgment of sober men. Outward religious worship, we know, is to be performed by natural actions. These have their circumstances; and those ofttimes, because of the public concernment of the exercise of religion, of great importance. These may be ordered by the power and according to the wisdom of those in authority; but that they should make so many things as this assertion allows them to make to belong unto and to be parts of the worship of God, whereof not one is enjoined or required by him, and the consciences of men be thereby obliged unto their observance, I do not believe, nor is it here at all proved.

To close this discourse about the power of obliging the consciences of men; I think our author grants that conscience is immediately obliged to the observation of all things that are good in themselves, 439from the law of our creation. Such things as either the nature of God or our own requires from us, our consciences surely are obliged immediately by the authority of God to observe: nor can we have any dispensation for the non-performance of our duty from the interposition of the commands and authority of any of the sons of men; for this would be openly and directly to set up men against God, and to advance them or their authority above him or his. Things evidently deduced and necessarily following the first principles and dictates of nature are of the same kind with themselves, and have the authority of God no less enstamped on them than the other; and in respect unto them, conscience cannot by virtue of inferior commands plead an exemption. Things of mere revelation do remain; and concerning them I desire to know, whether we are not bound to observe and do whatever God in his revealed will commands us to observe and do, and to abstain from whatever he forbids, and this indispensably? If this be denied, I will prove it with the same arguments whereby I can prove that there is a God and that we are his creatures, made to serve him; for the reason of these things is inseparable from the very being of God. Let this be granted, and ascribe what ye will, or please, or can, to the supreme magistrate, and you shall not from me have the least contradiction.