LECTURE V.

Note I., p. 136.

Analogy, Part I. Ch. VI.

Note II., p. 137.

“When he (the Skeptic) awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself; and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.” Hume, Essay on the Academical Philosophy, Part II.

Note III., p. 137.

See Plato, Parmenides, p. 129, Philebus, p. 14, Sophistes, p. 251, Republic, VII. p. 524. The mystery is insoluble, because thought cannot explain its own laws; for the laws must necessarily be assumed in the act of explanation. Every object of thought, as being one object, and one out of many, all being related to a common consciousness, must contain in itself a common and a distinctive feature; and the relation between these two constitutes that very diversity in unity, without which no thought is possible.

Note IV., p. 138.

“The commerce between soul and body is a reciprocal dependence of determination. Accordingly we ask in the first place, how is such a commerce possible between a thinking being and a body? . . . The foundation of the difficulty seems to lie here: The soul is an object of the inward sense, and the body an object of the outward. . . . . Now by no reason do we come to understand, how that which is an object of the internal sense, is to be a cause of that which is an object of the outward.” Kant’s Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik, (1821), p. 224.

Note V., p. 139.

“When we examine the idea which we have of all finite minds, we see no necessary connection between their volition and the movement of any body whatsoever; we see, on the contrary, that there is none at all, and can be none.”—Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, L. VI. Part II. Ch. 3. “Man is, to himself, the most astonishing oblject of nature; for he cannot conceive what body is, and still less what is spirit, and least of all can he conceive how a body can be united with a spirit. That is the acme of his difficulties; and yet that is his own being.”—Pascal, Pensées, Partie I. Art vi. § 26. “I am, to be sure, compelled to believe,—that is, to act as if I thought, that my tongue, my hand, my foot, can be put in motion by my will; but how a mere breath, a pressure of the intelligence upon itself, such as the will is, can be the principle of motion in the heavy earthly mass,—of that not only can I have no conception, but the mere assertion is, before the tribunal of the reflecting intelligence, nothing but sheer unintelligence.”—Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen, (Werke, II. p. 290.)—Spinoza, Ethica, III. 2, denies positively that such commerce can take place. “Neither can the body determine the mind to thought, nor the mind the body to motion, or to quiet, or to anything else.”

Note VI., p. 139.

The theory of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes was partially hinted at by Descartes, and more completely elaborated by his followers, De La Forge and Malebranche. See Descartes, Principia, L. II. § 36. De La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, Ch. XVI. Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, L. VI. P. II. Ch. 3; Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, Ent. VII. Cf. Hegel, Geschichte der Phil. (Werke, XV. p. 330.) For Leibnitz’s theory of a Prëestablishled Harmony, see his Systême nouveau de la Nature, § 12-15, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 197; Troisième Eclaircissement, lbid. p. 134; Théodicée, §, 61, Ibid. p. 520. A brief account of these two systems, together with that of Physical Influx, which is rather a statement of the phenomenon, than a theory to account for it, is given by Euler, Lettres à une Princesse d’Allemagne, Partie II. Lettre 14. ed. Cournot; and by Krug, Philos. Lexikon; Art. Gemeinschaft der Seele and des Leibes. The hypothesis, that the commerce of soul and body is effected by means of a Plastic Nature in the soul itself, is suggested by Cudworth, Intellectual System, B. I. Ch. III. § 37, and further developed by Leclere, Bibliothèque Cloisie, II. p. 113, who supposes this plastic nature to be an intermediate principle, distinct from both soul and body. See Mosheim’s Note in Harrison’s edition 306 of Cudworth, Vol. 1. p. 248. See also Leibnitz, Sur le Principe de Vie, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 429; Laromiguière, Leçons de Philosophie, P. II. 1. 9.

Note VII., p. 139.

These two analogies between our natural and spiritual knowledge are adduced in a remarkable passage of Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, Orat. XII. Of the soul, and its relation to the body, he says: . . . . “We live in ignorance of all things, of ourselves first of all, and then of all other things. For who is there, that has come to a comprehension of his own soul? Who has a knowledge of its essence? whether it is material or immaterial? Whether purely incorporeal, or whether there be something corporeal in it? how it comes into being, how it is regulated? whence it enters the body, how it departs?” etc. (Opera, Paris. 1615. Vol. II. p. 321.) Of body as distinguished from its attributes, he says: “For if any one were to analyze, into its component parts, what appears to the senses, and, having stripped the subject of all its attributes, should strive to get a knowledge of it, as it is in itself, I do not see what would be left for the mind to contemplate at all. For once take away color, figure, weight, size, motion, relativity, each one of which is not of itself the body, and yet all of them belong to the body,—what will be left to stand for the body? Whoever, therefore, is ignorant of himself, how is he to have knowledge of things above himself?” Ibid. p. 322.

Note VIII., p. 139.

Essay on the Academical Philosophy, (Philosophical Works, Vol. IV. p. 182.)

Note IX., p. 140.

The difficulty is ingeniously stated by Pascal, Pensées, Partie I. Art II. “For is there anything more absurd, than to pretend, that in dividing ever a space, we come finally to such a division, that in dividing it in two, each of the halves remains invisible, and without any extension? I would ask those, who have this idea, if they clearly conceive how two invisibles touch each other; if everywhere, then they are only one thing, and consequently the two together are indivisible; and if not everywhere, then it is only in a part that they come in contact; then they have parts, and therefore they are not indivisible.”

Note X., p. 142.

Kant’s theory, that we know phenomena only, not things in themselves, is severely criticized by Dr. McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 536 (4th edition). I have before observed that Kant has, in two points at least, extended his doctrine beyond its legitimate place; first, in maintaining that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phenomenal with that of external objects; and secondly, in dogmatically asserting that the thing in itself does not resemble the phenomenon of which we are conscious, Against the first of these statements it may he fairly objected, that my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of that existence; and that any other aspect of my personality, if such exists in relation to any other intelligence, is in this case the phenomenon to which my personal consciousness furnishes the real counterpart. Against the second, it may be objected, that if, upon Kant’s own hypothesis, we are never directly conscious of the thing in itself, we have no ground for saying that it is unlike, any more than that it is like, the object of which we are conscious; and that, in the absence of all other evidence, the probability is in favor of that aspect which is at least subjectively true. But when these deductions are made, the hypothesis of Kant, in its fundamental position, remains unshaken. It then amounts to no more than this; that we can see things only as our faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of other intelligences, embodied or spiritual. Within these limits, the theory more nearly resembles a truism than a paradox, and contains nothing that can be regarded as formidable, either by the philosopher or by the theologian.

In the same article, Dr. McCosh criticizes Sir William Hamilton’s cognate theory of the relativity of all knowledge. With the highest respect for Dr. McCosh’s philosophical ability, I cannot help thinking that he has mistaken the character of the theory which he censures, and that the objection which he urges is hardly applicable. He attempts to avail himself of Sir W. Hamilton’s own theory of the veracity of consciousness. He asks, “Does not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be a real object?” Undoubtedly; but reality in this sense is not identical with absolute. existence unmodified by the laws of the percipient mind. Man can conceive reality, as he conceives other objects, only as the laws of his faculties permit; and in distinguishing reality from appearance, he is not distinguishing the related from the unrelated. Both appearance and reality must be given in consciousness, to be apprehended at all; and the distinction is only between some modes of consciousness, such as those of a dream, which are regarded as delusive, and others, as in a waking state, 308 which are regarded as veracious. But consciousness, whatever may be its veracity, can tell us nothing concerning the identity of its objects with those of which we are not conscious.

Dr. McCosh, in the above criticism, also classes Professor Ferrier as a representative of the same school with Kant and Hamilton. This classification is, at least, questionable. Professor Ferrier’s system more nearly approaches to the Philosophy of the Absolute than to that of the Relative. He himself distinctly announces that he undertakes “to lay down the laws, not only of our thinking and knowing, but of all possible thinking and knowing.”¹⁹⁹¹⁹⁹   Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 55. Such an undertaking, whether it be successful or not, is, in its conception, the very opposite of the system which maintains that our knowledge is relative to our faculties.

Note XI., p. 143.

See above, Lecture IV. Note 25.

Note XII., p. 143.

“It is the same with other mysteries, where, for well regulated minds, there is always to be found an explanation, sufficient for faith, but never as much as is necessary for comprehension. The what it is (τί ἐστι) is sufficient for us; but the how (πῶς) is beyond our comprehension, and is not at all necessary for us.”—Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, §.56.

Note XIII., p. 144.

“It is plain, that, in any communication from an Infinite Being to creatures of finite capacities, one of two things must happen. Either the former must raise the latter almost to His own level; or else He must suit the form of His communication to their powers of apprehension. . . . . If we turn to Scripture, however, we shall see how this matter is decided. In God’s dealings with men we find ‘wrath,’ ‘jealousy,’ ‘repentance,’ and other affections, ascribed to the Divine Being. He is described as ‘sitting on a throne;’ His ‘eyes’ are said ‘to behold the children of men;’ not to mention other instances, which must suggest themselves to every one, in which God condescends to convey to us, not the very reality indeed, but something as near the reality as He sees it expedient for us to know.” Professor Lee, The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, pp. 63, 61 (second edition).

Note XIV., p. 146.

Plato, Sophistes, p. 242. “But our Eleatic sect, from Xenophanes, and yet earlier, go through with their views, as if what we call all were in irellity only one.”—Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 225. “Xenophanes laid down the doctrine . . . . that the All was One.”—Arist. Metaph. II. 4. 30. “For whatever is different from that which is, (entity), is not; so that, according to the view of Parmenides, it must of necessity be the case, that all things that are, are one, and that this is that which is (entity).”—Plato, Panmenides, p. 127. “How is it, Zeno, did you mean this, that if the things in being are many, then that these many must be like and unlike, and that this is impossible . . . . . did you not say so? Exactly so, said Zeno.”—Arist. Soph. Elench. 10. 2. . . . . “Zeno thought that all things are one . . . . “—Arist. De Cœlo III. 1. 5. “For some of these did away altogether with the idea of generation and of dissolution; for they maintained that none of the things in existence really came into being, and perished, but that all this only appeared so to us.”—Diog. Laert. ix. 24 (De Melisso). “It seemed to him, that the All was infinite, and unchangeable, and immovable, and one, like itself, and complete; and that motion was not real, but only apparent.” Cf. Plato, Theætebus, p). 183. Compare Karsten, Parmenidis Reliquiæ, p. 157, 194. Brandis, Commentationes Eleaticæ, p. 213, 214.

Note XV., p. 146.

Plato, Theæt. p. 152. “I will tell you,—and this is no trifling talk,—that nothing is an independent unity, and that you can rightly attribute to nothing any quality whatsoever; but if you call a thing great, it will at once appear small, if heavy, light, and so in like manner of all, so that nothing is one or somewhat or of any quality soever; but, that by motion, change, mixture, all things together are only becoming, while we say wrongly that they are; for nothing ever really is, but all things are ever becoming; and herein are the philosophers agreed, Parmenides excepted.”—Diogenes Laert. ix. 51. “He said (Protagoras) that the soul was nothing but perceptions.”—Aristot. De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 5. (De Gorgia.) “He said that there was nothing in existence; and if there were anything, that it was not an object of knowledge; and that if there were anything in existence and an object of knowledge, it could not be made known to others.” . . . . “What we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Part IV. sect. 2.—“‘Tis confessed by the 310 most judicious philosophers, that our ideas of bodies are nothing but collections formed by the mind of the ideas of the several distinct sensible qualities, of which objects are composed, and which we find to have a constant union with each other. . . . . The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought . . . . readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities.” Ibid. sect. 3.

Note XVI., p. 146.

“We must come now to the great question, which M. Bayle has lately brought upon the tapis,—namely, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can be subject to insolvable objections. . . . . He thinks that, in Theology, the doctrine of Predestination is of this nature, and in Philosophy that of Continuity (the Contiunum) in space. These are in fact the two labyrinths, which have tried theologians and philosophers of all times. Libertus Fromodus, a theologian of Louvain, who has studied much the subject of Grace, and has also written a book, entitled Labyrinthus de compositione Continui, has well expressed the difficulties of each; and the famous Ochin has well represented what he calls the Labyrinths of Predestination.” Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, § 24. Compare Sir W. Hamilton’s Discussions, p. 632.

Note XVII., p. 147.

See Bishop Browne’s criticism of Archbishop King, Procedure of the Understanding, p. 15. “He hath unwarily dropped some such shocking expressions as these, The best representations we can make of God are infinitely short of Truth. Which God forbid, in the sense his adversaries take it; for then all our reasonings concerning Him would be groundless and false. But the saying is evidently true in a favorable and qualified sense and meaning; namely, that they are infinitely short of the real, true, internal Nature of God as He is in himself.” Compare Divine Analogy, p. 57. “Though all the Revelations of God are true, as coming from Him who is Truth itself; yet the truth and substance of them doth not consist in this, that they give us any new set of ideas, and express them in a language altogether unknown before; or that both the conceptions and terms are so immediately and properly adapted to the true and real nature of the things revealed, that they could not without great impropriety and even profaneness be ever applied to the things of this world. But the truth of them consists in this; that whereas the terms and conceptions made use of in those Revelations are strictly proper to things worldly and obvious; 311 they are from thence transferred analogically to the correspondent objects of another world with as much truth and reality, as when they are made use of in their first and most literal propriety; and this is a solid foundation both of a clear and certain knowledge, and of a firm and well grounded Faith.”

Note XVIII., p. 147.

Augustin. Confess. 1. XIII. c. 16. “For as Thou altogether art, so Thou alone knowest,—Thou, who art unchangeably, and knowest unchangeably, and wiliest unchangeably. And Thy essence knoweth and willeth unchanegeably, and Thy knowledge is and willeth unchangeably, and Thy will is, and knoweth unchangeably. Nor doth it seem right in Thy sight, that, as the Light unchangeable knoweth itself, so It be known by the changeable being, that is enlightened by It.”

Note XIX., p. 148.

See Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. pp. 238, 298; Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 356, XII. p. 119. Schleiermacher substantially admits the same facts, though he attempts to connect them with a different theory.²⁰⁰²⁰⁰   Reden über Religion, (Werke, I. pp. 401, 441.) He considers that there is a pantheistic and a personal element united in all religions: and this is perhaps true of heathen religious subjected to the philosophical analysis of a later age; though it may be doubted whether both elements are distinctly recognized by the worshipper himself. But even from this point of view, the Jewish religion stands in marked contrast to both Eastern and Western heathenism. In the latter forms of religion, the elements of personality and infinity, so far as they are manifested at all, are manifested in different beings: this is observable both in the subordinate emanations which give a kind of secondary personality to the Illndian Pantheism, and in the philosophical abstraction of a supreme principle of good, which connects a secondary notion of the infinite with the Grecian Mythology. The Jewish religion still remains distinct and unique, in so far as in it the attributes of personality and infinity are united in one and the same living and only God.

Note XX., p. 150.

“And the Father, who, indeed, in respect of us, is invisible and indeterminable, is known by His own Word; and being indeclarable, is declared 312 to us by the Word Himself. Again, it is only the Father that knoweth His Word; and that both these things are so hath the Lord manifested. And on this account the Son revealeth the knowledge of the Father by His own manifestation. For the knowledge of the Father is the manifestation of the Son; for all things are manifested by the Word. That therefore we might know, that it is the Son himself who hath come, that maketh known the Father to them that believe on Him, he said to his disciples: ‘No man knoweth the Son but the Father, neither knoweth any man the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him.’” Irenæus, Contr. Hæres. IV. 6, 3. “Accordingly, therefore, the Word of God became incarnate, and lived in human form, that He might quicken the body, and that, as in the creation, He is known by His works, so also He might work in man, and manifest Himself everywhere, leaving nothing void of His divine nature and knowledge.” Athanasius, De Incarn. Verbi c. 45. . . . . “The Son of God became incarnate . . . . in order that man might have a way to the God of man through the man-God. For He is the Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus.” . . . Augustin. De Civ. Dei, XI. 2.

Note XXI., P. 150.

“We who believe that God lived upon the earth, and that He took upon Him the lowliness of human form for the sake of man’s salvation, are far from the opinion of those who think that God has no care for anything.” Tertullian, Adv. Marc. II. 16.

Note XXII., p. 150.

It is only a natural consequence of their own principles, when the advocates of a philosophy of the Absolute maintain that the Incarnation of Christ has no relation to time. Thus Schelling says: “The theologians also expound, in like empiric manner, the Incarnation of God in Christ,—that God took upon Him human nature in a definite momentum of time, a thing impossible of conception, as God is eternally out of all time. The Incarnation of God is therefore an incarnation from eternity (a becoming’ manifest in the flesh’ from all eternity) . . . .”²⁰¹²⁰¹   Vorlesungen über die Methode des Academischen Studium, p. 192. Fitche speaks to the same effect, Anweisung zum seligen Leben (Werke, V. p. 482). Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History,²⁰²²⁰²   Werke, IX. p. 388. thus comments on the language of St. Paul: “When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son; such is 313 the language of the Bible. That means nothing else than this: the self-consciousness had risen up to those momenta, which belong to the conception of the Spirit, and to the necessity of apprehending these momenta after an absolute method.” This marvellous elucidation of the sacred text may perhaps receive some further light, or darkness, from the obscure passages of the same author, quoted subsequently in the text of this Lecture: and such is the explanation of his theory given by Baur, Christliche Gnosis, p. 715: “From the stand-point of speculative thought, the Incarnation is no single historical fact, once taken place, but an eternal determination of the essential nature of God, by virtue of which God only so far becomes man (in every individual man) as He is man from eternity. The sorrowful humiliation to which Christ made Himself subject as God-man, God bears at all times as man. The atonement achieved by Christ is not a fact which has come to pass in time, but an eternal reconciliation of God with Himself, and the resurrection and exaltation of Christ is only the regress of the Spirit to itself. Christ as man, as God-man, is man in his universality, not a particular individual, but the universal individual.” It is no wonder that, to a philosophy of these lofty pretensions, the personal existence of Christ should be a question of perfect indifference.²⁰³²⁰³   For a criticism of these pantheistic perversions of Christianity, see Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 247. The consummation of the pantheistic view may be found in Blasche, Philosophische Unsterblichkeitlehre, § 51-53. Here the eternal Incarnation of God is exhibited as the perpetual production of men, as phenomenal manifestations of the absolute unity. From a similar point of view, Marheineke says: “The incarnation of God, apprehended in its possibility, is the real incarnation of divine truth, which is not only the thought of God, but also his very essence; and Divine and Human, though still different, are yet no longer separate.” Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 312. It is difficult to see what distinction can be made, in these theories, between the Incarnation of Christ as Man, and His eternal Generation as the Son of God; and indeed these passages, and those subsequently quoted from Hegel, appear intentionally to identify the two.

Note XXIII., p. 151.

Encyklopädie, §§ 564, 566. For the benefit of any reader who may be disposed to play the part of Œdipus, I subjoin the entire passage in the original. The meaning may perhaps, as Professor Ferrier observes of Hegel’s philosophy in general, be extracted by distillation, but certainly not by literal translation.

“Was Gott als Geist ist,—Dies richtig und bestimmt im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird gründliche Speculation erfordert. Es sind zunächst die 314 Sätze darin enthalten: Gott ist Gott nur in sofern er sich selber weiss; sein sich Sich-wissen ist ferner sein Selbstbewusstseyn im Menschen, und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott, das fortgeht zum Sich-wissen des Menschen in Gott.

Der absolute Geist in der aufgehobenen Unmittelbarkeit und Sinnlichkeit der Gestalt und des Wissens, ist dem Inhalte nach der an-und-für-sich-seyende Geist der Natur und des Geistes, der Form nach ist er zunächst für das subjective Wissen der Vorstellung. Diese giebt den Momenten seines Inhalts einerscits Selbstständigkeit und macht sie gegen einander zu Voraussetzungen, and zu einander folgenden Erscheinungen und zu einem Zusammenhang des Geschehens nach endlichen Reflexionsbestimmungen; anderseits wird solche Form endlicher Vorstellungsweise in dem Glauben an den Einen Geist und in der Andacht des Cultus aufgchoben.

In diesem Trennen scheidet sich die Form von dem Inhalte, und in jener die unterschiedenen Momente des Begriffs zu besondern Sphären oder Elementen ab, in deren jedem sich der absolute Inhalt darstellt,—α) als in seiner Manifestation bei sich selbst bleibender, Ewiger Inhalt;—β) als Unterscheidung des ewigen Wesens von seiner Manifestation, welche durch diesen Unterschied die Erscheinungswelt wird, in die der Inhalt tritt;—γ) als unendliche Rückkehr und Versöhnung der entäusserten Welt mit denm ewigen Wesen, das Zurückgehen desselben aus der Erscheinung in die Einheit seiner Fülle.”

The passage which, though perhaps bearing more directly on my argument, I have not ventured to attempt to translate,²⁰⁴²⁰⁴   [After what has been said by the author, both here and in the Lecture, on page 152, it were certainly unbecoming to attempt a translation for the American edition.—Transl.] is the following, § 568. “Im Momente der Besonderheit aber des Urtheils, ist dies concrete ewige Wesen das Vorausgesetzte, und seine Bewegung die Erschaffung der Erscheinung, das Zerfallen des ewigen Moments der Vermittlung, des einigen Sohnes, in den selbstständigen Gegensatz, einerseits des Himmels und der Erde, der elementarischen und concreten Natur, andererseits des Geistes als mit ihr im Verhältniss stehenden, somit endlichen Geistes, welcher als das Extrem der in sich seyenden Negativität sich zum Bösen verselbstständigt, solches Extrem durch seine Beziehung auf eine gegenüberstehende Natur und durch seine damit gesetzte eigene Natürlichkeit ist, in dieser als denkend zugrleich auf das Ewige gerichtet, aber damit in äusserlicher Beziehung, steht.”

Görres, in the preface to the second edition of his Athanasius, p. ix., exhibits a specimen of a new Creed on Hegelian principles, to be drawn up by a general council composed of the more advanced theologians of the day. The qualifications for a seat in the council are humorously described, 315 and the creed itself contains much just and pointed satire. It will hardly, however, bear quotation; for a caricature on such a subject, however well intended, almost unavoidably carries with it a painful air of irreverence.

Note XXIV., p. 152.

See especially Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 557; Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 387; Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 247; Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 222, XV. p. 88.

Note XXV., p. 152.

The indecision of Hegel upon this vital question is satisfactorily accounted for by his disciple, Strauss. To a philosophy which professes to exhibit the universal relations of necessary ideas, it is indifferent whether they have actually been realized in an individual case or not. This question is reserved for the Critic of History. See Streitschriften, Heft III. p. 68. Dorner too, while pointing out the merits of Hegel’s Christology, admits that the belief in a historical Christ has no significance in his system; and that those disciples who reject it carry out that system most fully. See Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 409.

Note XXVI., p. 153.

Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 286. In another passage of the same work, p. 281, the Atonement is explained in the following language: “Therein only is the possibility of the atonement—that the essential oneness of the divine and the human nature becomes known; that is the necessary basis; man can know himself taken up into God, so far as God is not somewhat foreign to him, somewhat external, accidental, but when he, according to his essential being, his freedom and subjectivity, is taken up into God; but this is possible, only in so far as this subjectivity of human nature is in God Himself.” Compare also p. 330, and Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. pp. 544, 572. Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 405. Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XV. p. 100.

Note XXVII., p. 153.

Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 319, 320.

Note XXVIII., p. 154.

Ibid. §§ 325, 326. A similar theory is maintained, almost in the same language, by Rosenkranz, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, § 26, 27. The substance of this view is given by Hegel himself, Werke, IX. pp. 394, 457; XV. p. 89. Some valuable criticisms on the principle of it may be found in Dr. Mill’s Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles to the Criticism of the Gospel, pp. 16, 42.

Note XXIX., p. 155.

Leben Jesu, § 151. English Translation, Vol. III. p. 437. The passage has also been translated by Dr. Mill in his Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles, etc. p. 50. I have slightly corrected the former version by the aid of the latter. A sort of anticipation of the theory may be found in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 569.

Note XXX., p. 155.

“Only the Metaphysical, but in nowise the Historical, makes our salvation.” Fichte, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, (Werke, V. p. 485). With this may be compared the language of Spinoza, Ep. XXI. “I say that it is not at all necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh; but of that eternal Son of God, the eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, and especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, we must have a far different opinion.”