LECTURE IV.

Note I., p. 114.

Thus Wegscheider, after expressly admitting (Instit. Theol. § 52) that the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite, and that its idea can only be represented by analogy and symbol, proceeds to assert, with the utmost confidence, that the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience do not truly represent the internal nature of God (§ 69); that a plurality of persons in the Godhead is manifestly repugnant to reason, and that the infinite God cannot assume the nature of finite man (§ 92); that the fall of man is inconsistent with the divine attributes (§ 117); that repentance is the only mode of expiating sin reconcilable with the moral nature of God (§ 138); that the doctrine of Christ’s intercession is repugnant to the divine nature (§ 143).

By a somewhat similar inconsistency, Mr. Newman, while fully acknowledging that we cannot have any perfect knowledge of an infinite mind, and that infinity itself is but a negative idea, yet thinks it necessary to regard the soul as a separate organ of specific information, by which we are in contact with the infinite; and dogmatizes concerning the similarity of divine and human attributes, in a manner which nothing short of absolute knowledge can justify. (See The Soul, pp. 1, 3, 34, 54, 58.) He compares the infinite to the “illimitable haziness” which bounds the sphere of distinct vision. The analogy would be serviceable to his argument, if we possessed two sets of eyes, one for clearness and one for haziness; one to be limited, and the other to discern the limitation. The hypothesis of a separate faculty of consciousness, whether called soul, reason, or intellectual intuition, to take cognizance of the infinite, is only needed for those philosophers who undertake to develop a complete philosophy of the infinite as such. But the success of the various attempts in this province has not been such as to give any trustworthy evidence of the existence of such a faculty.

Note II., p. 115.

See above, Lecture I., Note 3.

Note III., p. 115.

See Mr. Rose’s remarks on the reaction against the Wolfian demonstrative method. State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 206 (second edition).

Note IV., p. 116.

See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 497. ed. Rosenkranz. This admission, rightly understood, need not be considered as detracting from the value of the speculative arguments as auxiliaries. All that is contended for is, that the foundation must be laid elsewhere, before their assistance, valuable as it is, can be made available. Thus understood, this view coincides with that expressed by Sir W. Hamilton, in the second of the Lectures on Metaphysics, shortly to be published, “that the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation,—that the study of the external world, taken with and in subordination to that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us.” The atheistic tendency is perhaps too strongly stated; as the same phenomena may be surveyed, by different individuals, in different spirits and with different results; but the main position, that the belief in God is primarily based on mental, and not on material phenomena, accords with the view taken in the text.

Note V., p. 116.

Kant, Kritik der r. V., p. 488. Compare Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part V. Kant’s argument is approved by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XII. p. 37). The objection which it urges is of no value, unless we admit that man possesses an adequate notion of the infinite, as such. Otherwise the notion of power indefinitely great, which the phenomena certainly suggest, is, both theoretically and practically, undistinguishable from the infinite itself. This has been well remarked by a recent writer. See Selections from the Correspondence of R. E. H. Greyson, Am. Ed., p. 550.

Note VI., p. 116.

Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. II. p. 406. Professor Jowett considers the comparison between the works of nature and those of art as not merely inadequate, but positively erroneous. He says, “As certainly as the man who found a watch or piece of mechanism on the seashore would conclude, ‘here are marks of design, indications of an 296 intelligent artist,’ so certainly, if he came across the meanest or the highest of the works of nature, would he infer, ‘this was not made by man, nor by any human art and skill.’ He sees at first sight that the seaweed beneath his feet is something different in kind from the productions of man.”¹⁹²¹⁹²   This argument is substantially the same with that of Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part II. “If we see a house, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder . . . But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause.” But surely the force of the teleological argument does not turn upon the similarity of the objects, but upon their analogy. The point of comparison is, that in the works of nature, as well as in those of art, there is an adaptation of means to ends, which indicates an intelligent author. And such an adaptation may exist in an organized body, no less than in a machine, notwithstanding numerous differences in the details of their structure. The evidence of this general analogy is in nowise weakened by Professor Jowett’s special exceptions.

Note VII., p. 116.

“When the spiritual man (as such) cannot judge, the question is removed into a totally different court from that of the Soul, the court of the critical understanding.. The processes of thought have nothing to quicken the conscience or affect the soul.” F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 245 (second edition).—Yet he allows in another place (not quite consistently) that “pure intellectual error, depending on causes wholly unmoral, may and does perpetuate moral illusions, which are of the deepest injury to spiritual life.” p. 169. Similar in principle, though not pushed to the same extreme consequences, is the theory of Mr. Morell, who says, “Reason up to a God, and the best you can do is to hypostatize and deify the final product of your own faculties; but admit the reality of an intellectual intuition (as the mass of mankind virtually do), and the absolute stands before us in all its living reality.”¹⁹³¹⁹³   Philosophy of Religion, p. 39. This distinction he carries so far as to assert that “to speak of logic, as such, being inspired, is a sheer absurdity;” because “the process either of defining or of reasoning requires simply the employment of the formal laws of thought, the accuracy of which can be in no way affected by any amount of inspiration whatever:”¹⁹⁴¹⁹⁴   Ibid., p. 173, 174. and in another passage he maintains, to the same effect, that “the essential elements of religion in general, as of Christianity in particular, appertain strictly 297 to the intuitional portion of our nature, and may be realized in all their varied influence without the cooperation of any purely reflective processes.”¹⁹⁵¹⁹⁵   Philosophy of Religion, p. 193. Here he apparently overlooks the fact that the intuitive and reflective faculties invariably act in conjunction; that both are equally necessary to the existence of consciousness as such; and that logical forms are never called into operation, except in conjunction with the matter on which they are exercised.

Note VIII., p. 119.

In acknowledging Expiation as well as Prayer to be prompted by the natural feelings of men, I have no intention of controverting the opinion, so ably maintained by Archbishop Magee and Mr. Faber, of the divine origin of the actual rite of sacrifice. That the religious instincts of men should indicate the need of supplication and expiation, is perfectly consistent with the belief that the particular mode of both may have been first taught by a primitive revelation. That religion, in both its constituent elements, was communicated to the parents of the human race by positive revelation, seems the most natural inference from the Mosaic narrative.¹⁹⁶¹⁹⁶   Even Mr. Davison, who contends for the human origin of the patriarchal sacrifices, which he regards as merely eucharistic and penitentiary, expressly admits the divine appointment of expiatory offerings. See his Inquiry into the Origin of Primitive Sacrifice ( Remains, p. 121). Yet we may admit that the positive institution must from the first have been adapted to some corresponding instinct of human nature; without which it would be scarcely possible to account for its continuance and universal diffusion, as well as for its various corruptions. We may thus combine the view of Archbishop Magee with that exhibited by Dr. Thomson. Bampton Lectures, pp. 30, 48.

Note IX., p. 121.

That the mere feeling of dependence by itself is not necessarily religion, is shown by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke XII. p. 173). Speaking of the Roman worship of evil influences, Angerona, Fames, Robigo, etc., he rightly remarks that in such representations all conception of Deity is lost, though the feeling of fear and dependence remains. To the same effect is his sarcastic remark that, according to Schleiermacher’s theory, the dog is the best Christian.¹⁹⁷¹⁹⁷   See Rosenkranz, Hegel’s Leben, p. 346. Mr. Parker (Discourse of Religion, 298 Ch. 1.) agrees with Schleiermacher in resolving the religious sentiment into a mere sense of dependence; though he admits that this sentiment does not, itself, disclose the character of the object on which it depends. Referred to this principle alone, it is impossible to regard religious worship as a moral duty.

Note X., p. 121.

See Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Abschn. II. (pp. 61, 71. ed. Rosenkranz.) His theory has been combated by Julius Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, B. I. c. 2. Compare also Hooker, E. P. I. ix. 2. Some excellent remarks to the same effect will be found in McCosh’s Method of the Divine Government, p. 298 (fourth edition), and in Bartholmèss, Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la philosophic moderne, vol. i. p. 405.

Note XI., p. 122.

The theory which regards absolute morality as based on the immutable nature of God, must not be confounded with that which places it in his arbitrary will. The latter view, which was maintained by Scotus, Occam, and others among the schoolmen, is severely criticized by Sir James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, section III., and by Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, B. I. c. 3. The former principle is adopted by Cudworth as the basis of his treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality. See B. I. c. 3. B. IV. c. 4.

Note XII., p. 122.

On the universality of expiatory rites, see Magee on the Atonement, Note V. On their origin, see the same work, notes XLI., XLVI. to LI., LIV. to LVIII., and Mr. Faber’s Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice.

Note XIII., p. 123.

Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 4.

Note XIV., p. 124.

Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p. 75. Mr. Morell here goes beyond the theory of his master, Schleiermacher. The latter (Christliche Glaube, § 4) admits that this supposed feeling of absolute dependence can never be 299 completely attained in any single act of consciousness, but is generally suggested by the whole. Mr. Morell speaks as if we could be immediately conscious of our own annihilation, by a direct intuition of the infinite. Both theories are inadequate to prove the intended conclusion. That of Schleiermacher virtually amounts to a confession that the infinite is not a positive object of consciousness, but a mere negation suggested by the direct presence of the finite. That of Mr. Morell saves the intuition of the infinite, but annihilates itself; for if in any act of consciousness the subject becomes absolutely nothing, the consciousness must vanish with it; and if it stops at any point short of nothing, the object is not infinite.

Note XV., p. 125.

That this is the legitimate result of Schleiermacher’s theory, may be gathered from a remarkable passage in the Christliche Glaube, § 8, in which the polytheistic and monotheistic feelings of piety are compared together. The former, he says, is always accompanied by a sensible representation of its object, in which there is contained a germ of multiplicity; but in the latter, the higher consciousness is so separated from the sensible, that the pious emotions admit of no greater difference than that of the elevating or depressing tone of the feeling. This seems to imply that, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, to worship a God of many attributes, is equivalent to worshipping a plurality of Gods. And to those philosophers who make the Infinite in itself a direct object of religious worship, this identification is natural; for a God of many attributes cannot be conceived as infinite, and therefore in one sense partakes of the limited divinity of Polytheism. But, on the other hand, a God of no attributes is no God at all; and the so-called monotheistic piety is nothing but an abortive attempt at mystical self-annihilation. Some acute strictures on Schleiermacher’s theory from this point of view will be found in Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 84.

Note XVI., p. 126.

Schleiermacher himself admits (Christliche Glaube, § 33) that the theory of absolute dependence is incompatible with the belief that God can be moved by any human action. He endeavors, however, to reconcile this admission with the duty of prayer, by maintaining (§ 147) that the true Christian will pray for nothing but that which it comes within God’s absolute purpose to grant. This implies something like omniscience in the true Christian, and something like hypocrisy in every act of prayer.

Note XVII., p. 126.

Schleiermacher (Chr. Glaube, § 49) attempts, not very successfully, to meet this objection, by maintaining that even our free acts are dependent upon the will of God. This is doubtless true; but it is true as an article of faith, not as a theory of philosophy: it may be believed, but cannot be conceived, nor represented in any act of human consciousness. The apparent contradiction implied in the coexistence of an infinite and a finite, will remain unsolved; and is most glaring in the theories of those philosophers, who, like Schleiermacher (§ 54), maintain that God actually does all that he can do. The only solution is to confess that we have no true conception of the infinite at all. Schleiermacher himself is unable to avoid the logical consequence of his position. He admits (§ 89) that God’s omnipotence is limited if we do not allow him to be the author of sin; though he endeavors to soften this monstrous admission by taking it in conjunction with the fact that God is also the author of grace.

Note XVIII., p. 128.

De Augmentis Scientiarum, L. III. c. 1. Compare Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, I. 5. “As the soul in the human body is not seen, being invisible to men, but is made known through the movement of the body, so God cannot be seen by human and bodily eyes, but is discovered to human intelligence by His providence and His works.”¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁸   Compare a similar argument in Bishop Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. IV. § 4. And Athanasius, Contra Gentes, c. 35. “For often the workman is recognized in his works; as they say of the sculptor Phidias, that the symmetry and nice proportions of his works revealed him to the beholders, even when he was not present himself, so the order of the universe necessarily reveals the divine Creator, though He is invisible to mortal eyes.” On the other hand, Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XII. p. 395), insists on the necessity of knowing God as He is, as an indispensable condition of all Theology.

Note XIX., p. 128.

Justin. Mart. Apol. I. c. 6. “Indeed, Father, and God, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but only appellatives, derivatives from His benefits and His works.”—Basil. Adv. Eunom. I. 12. “As to the conceit of having found out the very essential being of God,—what arrogance and pride 301 does it display! . . . for let us inquire of him, by what method he boasts of having made such a discovery? is it from the common conception? But this only suggests that God exists, not what is His essence.”—Gregor. Nyssen. Contr. Eunom. Orat. XII. “Thus also of the maker of the world,—we know that He is, but we do not deny that we are ignorant of the mode of his being.”—Cyril. Hieros. Catech. VI. 2. “For we do not point out what God is; but we candidly confess that we have no accurate knowledge of Him, for in things pertaining to God, it is great knowledge, to confess our ignorance.”—Pascal, Pensées, Partie II. Art. II. § 5. “We know that there is an infinite, and we are ignorant of its nature. For example, we know that it is false, that numbers are finite; then it is true that there is an infinite in numbers. But we do not know what it is. It is false that it is even; equally so that it is uneven; for, in adding the unit, it does not change its nature; nevertheless it is a number. . . . . We may, then, well know that there is a God, without knowing, what He is.” The distinction is strongly repudiated by Hegel, Werke, XII. p. 396. Cf. IX. p. 19. XIV. p. 219. In the last of these passages, he goes so far as to say, that to deny to man a knowledge of the infinite is the sin against the Holy Ghost. The ground of this awful charge is little more than the repetition of an observation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, that God is not envious, and therefore cannot withhold from us absolute knowledge.

Note XX., p. 129.

Advancement of Learning, p. 128. ed. Montagu. Compare De Augmentis, III. 2.

Note XXI., p. 130.

This argument is excellently drawn out in Sir W. Hamilton’s forthcoming Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture II. So Mr. F. W. Newman observes, acutely and truly, “Nothing but a consciousness of active originating Will in ourselves suggests, or can justify, the idea of a mighty Will pervading Nature; and to merge the former in the latter, is to sacrifice the Premise to the glory of the Conclusion.” The Soul, p. 40 (second edition).

Note XXII., p. 130.

Arist. Metaph. 1. 5. “Xenophanes was the first . . . who, on surveying the universe, said that the One was God.”—Cicero, Acad. Quæst. IV. 37. “Xenophanes said that the One was All, and that that was not changeable, 302 and was God.”—Apuleius, Asclepius Herm. Trimeg. c. 20. “For I do not expect that the Maker of all majesty, and the Father or Lord of all things can be called by one name, though that were made up of many; but that He be unnamed or rather all-named, since indeed he is One and All, so that necessarily, either all things be designated by his name, or He himself by the names of all things.”— Lessing, as quoted by Jacobi, Werke, IV. p. 54. “The orthodox notions of the Deity are no more for me; I cannot enjoy them,—One and All. I know nothing else.”—Schelling, Bruno, p. 185. “So the All is One, the One is All, both the same, not different.”

Note XXIII., p. 132.

Clemens Alex. Stromata, V. 11. “If therefore . . . . we should in some way draw nigh to the intelligence of the Omnipotent, we should come to know, not what He is, but what He is not.”—Augustin. Enarr. in Psalm lxxxv. 12. “God is ineffable; we more easily say what He is not, than what He is.”—Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen (Werke, II. p. 305). “Thou willest,—for thou wilt, that my free obedience have consequences unto all eternity; the act of Thy Will I do not apprehend, and only know, that it is not like my own.”

Note XXIV., p. 132.

The distinction between speculative and regulative knowledge holds an important place in the philosophy of Kant; but his mode of applying it is the exact reverse of that adopted in the text. According to Kant, the idea of the absolute or unconditioned has a regulative, but not a speculative value: it cannot be positively apprehended by act of thought; but it serves to give unity and direction to the lower conceptions of the understanding; indicating the point to which they tend, though they never actually reach it. But the regulative character thus paradoxically assigned, not to thought, but to its negation, in truth belongs to the finite conceptions as actually apprehended, not to any unapprehended idea of the infinite beyond them. Every object of positive thought, being conceived as finite, is necessarily regarded as limited by something beyond itself; though this something is not itself actually conceived. The true purpose of this manifest incompleteness of all human thought, is to point out the limits which we cannot pass; not, as Kant maintains, to seduce us into vain attempts to pass them. If there is but one faculty of thought, that which Kant calls the Understanding, occupied with the finite only, there is an obvious end to be answered in making us aware of its limits, and warning us that the 303 boundaries of thought are not those of existence. But if, with Kant, we distinguish the Understanding from the Reason, and attribute to the latter the delusions necessarily arising from the idea of the unconditioned, we must believe in the existence of a special faculty of lies, created for the express purpose of deceiving those who trust to it. In the philosophy of religion, the true regulative ideas, which are intended to guide our thoughts, are the finite forms under which alone we can think of the infinite God; though these, while we employ them, betray their own speculative insufficiency and the limited character of all human knowledge.

Note XXV., p. 132.

“The purport of these remarks is only this . . . . that, in the further progress of the investigations, the question cannot be, what and how God is constituted in Himself, but only how we have to think of Him in relation to ourselves and the whole morally-natural world. For by our faith it is not that the being of God is theoretically known, but only His existence, in the special relation to the moral design of the world, is revealed for us, as morally constituted beings; and this is in a double sense a purely relative knowledge, first by being limited to a determined nature of the subject that knows, and secondly by the determined relation of the object that is known. Hence it follows, that there is nothing to be said here of the knowledge of the essence, the quality of a Being, but only of a nearer determination of the idea of God, as we have to form it, from our point of view; in other words, we are to think of God only by means of relations.” Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 189.—”The Scripture intimates to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being: but conveying them to us by the medium of language, it only brings them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God;—for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice;—it is altogether inadequate in point of Science.” Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 54 (second edition).—”We should rather point out to objectors that what is revealed is practical, and not speculative;—that what the Scriptures are concerned with is, not the philosophy of the Human Mind in itself, nor yet the philosophy of the Divine Nature in itself, but (that which is properly Religion) the relation and connection of the two Beings;—what God is to us,—what He has done and will do for us,—and what we are to be and to do, in regard to Him.” Whately, Sermons, p. 56 (third edition).—Compare Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. § II.