Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 30 [<< | >>]
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person."
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 30 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For
person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then there
are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which
appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there
is no plurality but of relations (Question [28], Article [3]). Therefore there cannot be
several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is truly
one which has no number." But plurality implies number. Therefore there
are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in
God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part in God;
which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father, and
the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above (Question [29], Article [4]) that this word
"person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature.
It was also established (Question [28], Article [1]) that there are several real
relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several
realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that there are
several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as
meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by the
addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however, accustomed to
say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences or
natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and
wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really
distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is, several
persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist,
although they are really distinguished from each other, as whiteness and
sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in God subsist, and
are really distinguished from each other (Question [28], Article [3]). Hence the
plurality of persons in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind
of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because
relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import
composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius teaches in
the same book.
Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and
four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and two
horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there
is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and thus number
in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded
apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if number be
taken as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in
creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of
two men, and two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the
Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall show
further on (Question [42], Articles [1], 4).
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 30 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For
the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative
properties as stated above (Article [1]). But there are four relations in God as
stated above (Question [28], Article [4]), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and
procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.
Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from
His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as love;
and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds
from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from His
nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three
persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not
only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the
intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an
infinite number of persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He
communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine person. But
also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost
produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to infinity.
Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for
number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we say in the
Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy
Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not contained within the
number three.
On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those
who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4),
"Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons
in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real
distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative
opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to
the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite
relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the
subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting
filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not
opposed to either of these, but they are opposed to
each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person:
hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or
one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now,
procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them;
for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in
God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived, would
issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are
derived, if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from
the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Question [27], Articles [3],4). We must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the person
of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no
relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently
that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of
the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained.
Therefore only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,
spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son,
but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a
property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a
personal relation---i.e. constituting a person. The three
relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is
the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,
proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way of
nature; thus, as above explained (Question [27], Article [3]), the procession of the
divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, as
such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds;
although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the
procession of love is not called generation in God.
Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more
intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real
operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions
was above explained (Question [27], Articles [1],4).
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed
another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if the
Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also
would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same
goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the
personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived
from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its
communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the
relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of
another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons
who are in God.
Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same (Question [42], Articles [1],4), and the same is not measured by the same.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 30 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in
God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is
unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the
essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God
in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote
something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.
Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality
is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows
that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the
truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the
numeral terms denote something real in God.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness and
of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God, unity
excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God." Hence we
see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and
not to denote anything positive.
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and is
division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species
of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material things which
have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is
effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results
in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental
in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of
multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but
remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict
sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is
no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper sense
of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a
metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in
a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the
many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being" is
related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being,
except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine
unity (Question [11], Article [1]); for "one" signifies undivided being. So, of whatever
we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, "one"
applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In
the same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter
sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added
to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that number.
Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are
said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24);
in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say,
the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence undivided; and
when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and
when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their
individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature of multitude that
it should be composed of units.
Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general
than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence in God
it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still,
the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond
substance and relation; as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a
species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike
transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it
is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to God.
Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which
logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, but
division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This
was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Question [11], Article [2]).
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is
excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not
follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness
is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not
signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
Index [<< | >>]
First Part [<< | >>]
Question: 30 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to the
three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.
Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But
the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears from
the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Question [29], Article [3], ad 4).
Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three persons.
Objection 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is
common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise
the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically;
otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is neither
universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above
(Question [3], Article [5]). Therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term
"person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when we
say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is
clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were
common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the
three, as also one essence.
What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those
who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of
exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word
"incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of intention, as
the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that
to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations,
however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a name of
exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore
resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is common by a
community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual
thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to
signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those
common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or "species." The vague
individual thing, as "some man," signifies the common nature with the
determinate mode of existence of singular things---that is, something
self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a designated
singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing;
as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is
this difference---that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the
individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of
singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the
individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that
nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that each of
them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this
name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of
incommunicable existence can be common to many.
Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it
does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or genus,
or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of
person the same as community of genus or species; and because the divine
persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other
universal are predicated of many which differ in being.