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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
concerning which six points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?
(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
from something?
(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?
(5) What this power means?
(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to
the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of
God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what
pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten "genera."
Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to
a notion.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which
is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or
relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the
essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names
of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition
to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.
Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But
we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to
be placed in God.
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It
is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts
are to be placed in God.
I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin.
But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to
signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute
notional acts to the persons.
Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a
twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him,
and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are
attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him,
belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the
procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the
order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the
persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what
was above explained (Question [32], Article [2]).
Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons
only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the
same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words
are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must
consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred
from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by
movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary
sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another
into a mobile object, is called "passion," so the origin of movement
itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is
called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing
more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause
or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God
no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is
only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the
principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions.
Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except
after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and
wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from
the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was
necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the
manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is
evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of
signification.
Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally
involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God.
Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical
standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we
attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary
says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget
the Son."
Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of
the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore
the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost
proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds
voluntarily.
Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word.
But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son
proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the
Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot
Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu.
vii).
On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will,
this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative
designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my
will---that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that
the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He
wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the
ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the
workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and
thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not
by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the
book De Synod, it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the
Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The
reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of
causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will
is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to
the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that
of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence
such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the
will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas
understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the
quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding. So the
will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way;
whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is
nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine
nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God
is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing.
Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that
the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle.
But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not
by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of
God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son
a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things
created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God,
subsists in the perfect likeness of God."
Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit
even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son,
for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature
that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many
things against our will from natural necessity---as, for instance, death,
old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what
follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His
will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity
did the Father beget the Son."
Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God,
inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love
were the principle of the Son's generation.
Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally,
as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally
wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself,
the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained
(Question [19], Article [3]). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God
loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by
mode of will.
Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind,
a return is made to those first principles which are naturally
understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the
conception of the divine Word is natural.
Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason
of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning:
firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means
what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said
to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end
could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of
these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the
means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to
be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is
necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the
Father beget the Son.
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be
either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since
that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows
that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this
contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them
nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from
Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something
permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we
say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is
made white---it follows that either the Father does not remain after the
Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore
the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.
Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle
regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His
own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the
Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle,
because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were,
an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one
begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved
above (Question [39], Article [5]).
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons
are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing
from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the
Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.
Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son
is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the
Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the
first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is
said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the
world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something,
but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by
reason of what is said (Zach. 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth
forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth
the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another
version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to
Himself."
I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above (Question [27], Article [2]; Question [33], Articles [2],3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God.
Now, this is the difference between true "generation," whereby one
proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes
something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of
wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman
makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will
be shown later on (Question [45], Article [1]), not as if this nothing were a part of
the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a
thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So,
were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son
would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as
is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of
similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of
nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the
contrary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus
Christ." Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He
made, but begotten.
That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only begotten," according to Jn. 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to Rm. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (Question [40], Article [2]).
Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the
preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but
not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made
by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence
is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the
Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this
denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds,
"the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"---that is, of the
Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I
say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more
explicitly, of the essence of the Father."
This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words.
For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that
it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by
observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder,
since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that
something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no
matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the
son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is
"of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the
forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that
an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that
the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the
essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the
Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that
the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed
to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no
parity of argument.
Reply to Objection 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood
not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God
to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the
Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works" (Ecclus. 1:9,10).
Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom
begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of
participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to
the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, "From the
beginning and before the world was I made"---that is, I was foreseen as
united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and
begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for
in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and
this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not
changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the
Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of
creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from
generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way
Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The
other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created
spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of
man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the
notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive;
neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we
call passive power, as above explained (Question [25], Article [1]); nor can active
power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons
were not made, as stated above (Article [3]). Therefore in God there is no power
in respect of the notional acts.
Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine
persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as
regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there
cannot be power in God.
Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of
the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the
will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards
intellect and will, as stated above (Question [25], Article [1]). Therefore, in God
power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God
the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.
I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also
a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle
of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation;
and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must
attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of
spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means
that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by
something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of
generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.
Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed
as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no
reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as
proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence
of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is
no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of
possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it
can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible
that the Son should be generated.
Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies
distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a
double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the
other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His
essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by
creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is
principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and
agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in
God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which
certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or
essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of
principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may
ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But "to understand" and
"to will" are not such actions as to designate the procession of
something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore,
with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper
sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as
we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of
understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very
essence which has no principle.
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 5 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating,
signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a
principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the
principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God
principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God,
power does not signify essence but relation.
Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are not
distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same
applies to the power of begetting.
Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the
three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three
persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the
essence.
On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills
to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore,
also, the power to beget.
I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation
in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly
called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces
something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form
by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human
nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In
every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the
begotten is like the begetter.
Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of
begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God cannot but
contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other
than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."
We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and
not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with
the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is
signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal
property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the
individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in
things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which
the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither
can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as
constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget
the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in
which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. i, 18) that generation is the "work of nature," not of nature
generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator
generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine
nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle,
for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that
which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the
agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent
acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the
generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator
generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more
perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the
divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is
common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only
of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say
that the divine essence "is the principle by which the Begetter begets,"
it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the
Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence
begets.
Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of
begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of
begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is
signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the
"essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is
signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in
respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the
Father.
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Question: 41 [<< | >>]
Article: 6 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several
Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in
God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has
the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget
Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be
several Sons in God.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son did not
beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not."
Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a
created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also:
the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after
begetting the Son.
On the contrary, In God "that which is possible," and "that which is" do
not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more
than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father, one
Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.
The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the
Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several
Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one
filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a
material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied
except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be
but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one
subsistent whiteness.
The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can
be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is
the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which
person is the Holy Ghost.
The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed.
For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said (Article [2]), and nature is
determined to one.
The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is
contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar
in regard to the other persons.
Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the
same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power
"generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the gerund of the
active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the "power to
beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not
follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added.
But if the word "generandi" [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive
of the passive verb, the power "generandi" is in the Son---that is, the
power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the
gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be "the power of
generation"---that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son
could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could
not, as we shall see later on (Question [42], Article [6], ad 3).
Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God
require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained.
Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of
begetting power in the Father.