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Question: 78 [<< | >>]
We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and
under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which
is to receive usury?
(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of
consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money
taken in usury?
(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
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Question: 78 [<< | >>]
Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent.
For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our Lord
said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): "At My coming I might have exacted it," i.e.
the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for
lending money.
Objection 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is
unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is
allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: "Thou shalt not
fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the
stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance
of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate* to many
nations, and shalt not borrow of any one." [*'Faeneraberis'---'Thou shalt
lend upon usury.' The Douay version has simply 'lend.' The objection lays
stress on the word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of rendering it by
'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
Objection 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws.
Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.
Objection 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other
counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing thereby."
Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.
Objection 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a
price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not
bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful
for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
Objection 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from
silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the
loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price
for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.
Objection 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner
freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the usury.
Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.
On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any
of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be
hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."
I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because
this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to
inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident,
we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists
in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and
we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things
the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself,
and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself
and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the
ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the
use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be
selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of
injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or
wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in
equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in
their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy
it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man
may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to
himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of
the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may
lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this,
revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as
happens in renting and letting a house.
Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was
invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper
and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is
sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment
for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a
man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore
the money which he has taken in usury.
Reply to Objection 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the
increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes us
ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for
our own profit not for His.
Reply to Objection 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren,
i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take
usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as
our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto
all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: "He
that hath not put out his money to usury," and (Ezech. 18:8): "Who hath
not taken usury [*Vulg.: 'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor
taken any increase . . . he is just.']." They were permitted, however, to
take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to
avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were
prone according to Is. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who
were worshippers of God.
Where we find it promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to
many nations," etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for
lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: "Many have refused to
fenerate, not out of wickedness," i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly
the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they
would be able to lend to others.
Reply to Objection 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of
the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of
many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments
appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it
looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of
many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de
Usufructu] it is stated that "those things according to natural reason
and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of
usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct
to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by permitting
usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i,
3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural."
Reply to Objection 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it
is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek
profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in
comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds of
usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a matter of counsel.
Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, but of the
hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed
through hope in man, but only through hope in God.
Reply to Objection 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for
what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according
to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if
he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the
consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something
non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
Reply to Objection 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its
consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one's
ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is
sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at
the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be
observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an
exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there may
be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend
coins for show, or to be used as security.
Reply to Objection 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but
under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money which
the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
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Question: 78 [<< | >>]
Article: 2 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of
consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify
himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money.
Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides
the money lent.
Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by a
point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to lend
money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should
be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural
debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to
an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in
lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as condition
of the loan.
Objection 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal
remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15,
"Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes [*Vulg.: 'Which of
you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He that shaketh his
hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept service or praise
from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is
lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.
Objection 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted.
Objection 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of
money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts it to a
merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money
entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also lawful to
receive interest for money lent.
Objection 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of
which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his land
or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive
interest for money lent.
Objection 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his
goods under guise of loan, or buys another's goods at a low figure; or
raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers his price that
he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to be
payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit.
Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for
money lent.
On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is
stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he "hath not taken usury and increase."
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is
reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money." Consequently,
just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by tacit or express
agreement, in return for lending money or anything else that is consumed
by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or express agreement to
receive anything whose price can be measured by money. Yet there would be
no sin in receiving something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as
though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but
as a gratuity: since, even before lending the money, one could accept a
gratuity, nor is one in a worse condition through lending.
On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in
respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money, for
instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.
Reply to Objection 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the
borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to
have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It
may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender
incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has
gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation,
through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money: because he
must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways
from having.
Reply to Objection 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way,
as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed
contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor received.
Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use of which is its
consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in loan: and
consequently it is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In
another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor received is based
on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the
feeling with which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the
favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation,
involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature
of such a repayment.
Reply to Objection 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though there
had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in
the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the same
as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, because both can be
priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer
for hire the labor which they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the
other hand the remuneration by service or words be given not as an
obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money
value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it.
Reply to Objection 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount
lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a
demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence which
cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the basis of a
spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future
time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an obligation of this
kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to
borrow something else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to
bind the borrower to grant him a loan at some future time.
Reply to Objection 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to
the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk and is
bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. On
the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so
as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the ownership of his
money to them, for it remains his, so that at his risk the merchant
speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and
consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part
of the profits derived from his money.
Reply to Objection 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something
that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the use of that
thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous
use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is the same as if he took
money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps it were such a thing
as friends are wont to lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the
loan of a book.
Reply to Objection 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that
which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is
manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the
price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the
just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan,
which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at
a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the
goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again
this anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price
of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other
hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he
may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.
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Question: 78 [<< | >>]
Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he
has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says (Rm. 11:16):
"If the root be holy, so are the branches." Therefore likewise if the
root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected with usury.
Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury.
Therefore he is bound to restore it.
Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: 'Cum
tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, and the
price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted." Therefore,
likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored.
Objection 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due
to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more
right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound
to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is also bound to
restore what he acquired with it.
On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired.
Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully
acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), there are certain things whose
use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according
to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means
of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is not
bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such
things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry), unless
indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured through
the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.
On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their
consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land
property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from
another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or
land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the
fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.
Reply to Objection 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money
made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active
cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison
fails.
Reply to Objection 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to
the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that
paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the
other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that such property
should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since the property is
perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is commanded that
the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to
the amount taken in usury.
Reply to Objection 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person
who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental
cause, but on account of his own industry as principal cause. Wherefore
he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the
usurious money itself.
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Question: 78 [<< | >>]
Article: 4 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a
condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rm. 1:32) that they "are worthy
of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that
consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a
condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an
occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.
Objection 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an
occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, which
is always sinful, as stated above (Question [43], Article [2]). Now he that seeks to
borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to
be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
Objection 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's
money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether
unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be
unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with a libertine,
or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a
usurer.
On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two
vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an
injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury.
Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.
I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it
is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even God
uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as
stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it
were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods
(which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine
(Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good
purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to
his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact whereby he kept
his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods, he
would sin.
Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by
no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet
it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is
a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in view,
such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful
for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them
(which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the example
of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): "Kill us not: for we have
stores in the field."
Reply to Objection 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's
sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that
pleases him, but his lending, which is good.
Reply to Objection 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not
for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion
of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on his
part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the person who
seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other
person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, since this passive
scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.
Reply to Objection 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking
other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a
greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving
a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in his
guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one's money
has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to
him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a
good purpose.