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We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first
place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being
elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the
will.
Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must
therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the
end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems
that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz.
"volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition;
(2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be
considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will
moved? (3) How is it moved?
Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will is of good only?
(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?
(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and
to the means, by the same movement?
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Article: 1 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same
power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and black. But
good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but
also of evil.
Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is a rational
power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima iii, 9.
Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its
volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed
not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we wish "not to
walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for future things,
which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the
scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is
only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards
that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to
the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being
and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to
something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1)
that "the good is that which all desire."
But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form,
the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of
things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or
rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended
form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a
thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is
apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is
requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be
apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that
"the end is a good, or an apparent good."
Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to
them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and
evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the
actual desire of good is called "volition" [*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To
avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of
explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous], meaning
thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now
speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better
described as "nolition": wherefore, just as volition is of good, so
nolition is of evil.
Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite
purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object; for
no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will
is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as
are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak
or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be directed to either
under the aspect of good.
Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a
being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be
"beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as they
are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like are
beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus
that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a good."
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Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end
only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is of the
end, while choice is of the means."
Objection 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are corresponding
different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end and the means
are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either
of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus "quality," or "action," or
"passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end,
is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of
the end, it is not of the means.
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are
perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical arts,
the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a
ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the
building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of
the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the
means.
On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing
passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But the
means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or
terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.
I answer that, The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the
will, sometimes its act [*See note: above Article [1], Reply Objection [1]].
Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to
the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in
which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way
whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any
way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of
the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly
speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated
from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to
understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the
simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object
of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end.
Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other
hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred
to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it
is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus,
to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in
themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding
with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as
we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is what
principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the
simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will.
Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that differ in genus
and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different
genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the
useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which is
of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like
objects are always referred to the same power; for instance, the power of
sight perceives both color and light by which color is seen.
Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the
powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain
special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and
the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as
that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the
other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it
effects; but it considers that which is the end, as that to which it
refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end
proper to it and means that belong properly to that art.
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Article: 3 [<< | >>]
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end
and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2)
"where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the
will does not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore it is
moved to both by the same act.
Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the means.
Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends
through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in comparison
to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the
same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the
means.
On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But
the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful
good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as
such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be
moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be
moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly
the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely
and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the means. Hence it is
evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end,
as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it
is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely. And
sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man
first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to
be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in
regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in
themselves; but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions,
inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to
the end as the reason for willing the means.
Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen;
but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like manner
whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not
the conversely.
Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle
space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement
sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so
sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in
willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to
will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through
the principles which are called "means." Hence it is that sometimes the
intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the
conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet
does not proceed to will the means.
The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what
has been said above (Article [2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are
not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its
own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore the
act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not
conversely.