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Scotus Zrigena THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG Boo Scribes as also proceeding thence and as having in a certain manner independent existence. The third category of Scotus is the world in the usual sense of that term. The basis of this is the primal causes; it is therefore eternal in the same sense as those causes (v. 25). This eternity did not come about through constant repetition of a world cycle, as with the Stoics and Origen. g. The The apparent contradiction involved World of in the conception of the world's return Sense. to God (the fourth category) is solved by the distinction of Scotus between the material or sensible existence and the purely spiritual existence of the world. At the head of the created world stood the angels, with spiritual bodies and free from all material qualities; at times these really appeared to men (v. 38). They were produced all at once from the primordial causes, were in nine classes, of which only those in the highest class were free from error. Their knowledge comes not from experience but from view of God in theophany and of their own being. The fallen angels, Satan at the head, fell immediately after their creation, they have material bodies which feel desire and will go out of existence with the world (v. 13, iv. 24). Next to the creation of these was that of the world of space and time. In considering space (cf. i. 21 sqq.) he regarded locality as limitation in space equivalent to definition or circumscription in logic; apace is that in which matter is extended. Space and time are not prior to the world, but with it came into existence from the eternal basis. Geometrical rela tions Scotus distinguished from the figures which represented them (iv. 8), and they are reducible to absolute spacial unity. The monad is the principle of number (iii. 1, 12). Matter is not eternal (iii. 14), but came into existence in the course of creation by the concourse of immaterial principles, quantity and quality. Elsewhere (i. 56) it appears as the vari ability of variable things, i.e., that which lies at the basis of everything variable, the Aristotelian Kyle. Distinction is to be made between matter and the physical world; a body comes to exist when the substantial form unites with matter, and these two are to be distinguished apart. The "form" is something constant, eternal, issues from the pri mordial causes, and returns thither; but constant change underlies matter. One can hardly explain how Scotus derived matter from quantity and quality, but his realism shows in his drawing the particular from the general. Scotus' anthropology is difficult because it is involved with his doctrine of evil and sin. He held that by divine appointment man had preeminent rank in the All. Man shares in the being of lower creatures that are without souls, in the :o. Anthro- life force of plants, in the physical life pology; of animals, and in the intellectual life Doctrine of angels (iv. 8, 14). He is the world's of Evil. central point and the part which leads in the return to God. As to evil, the monistic conceptions of Scotus compelled him to think of evil as a necessary factor in evolution, which was, however, to be overcome. But this involved him in difficulties which he did not surmount. He sought to exclude evil from divine appointment,
even from divine foreknowledge, since God knew only what he created; he did not create evil, therefore did not know it (ii. 28). Elsewhere Scotus was compelled to concede to God knowledge of evil, but he did not reconcile the disagreement. To do this he would have had to show a difference in the kind of divine knowledge, and that would have conflicted with his doctrine of unity. Even though God did not create evil, he included its existence or entrance in his world plan. If the basis of evil were sought, the answer was-it had none (v. 35); yet the instability of the will was noted by Scotus and the pride which made man and not God the end. If there were in Scotus' system a ground for evil, it was in formal creative freedom. Paradise was for Scotus man's original complete condition, to which he will again attain in the future (iv. 17 sqq.). Exactly in view of the fall it is said that the origin of man was so ordered that not all individuals at one time proceeded from the background of existence as did the angels (iv. 12, ii. 6). Originally man was, like the angels, in spite of the mass of individuals, intended to be a unity; but in consequence of sin the female sex was derived from the male (iv. 23). This conception can be held only by means of a fully spiritual interpretation of the history of creation, for which Origen furnished the pattern. Original sin is not purely a matter of inheritance but is to be brought into relation with man's origin. But how sin comes as an actuality in the life and soul Scotus does not explain. Nevertheless, according to this author, the present material condition is determined by human sin, though a clear presentation of the fats is not given.
The last division in the system of Scotus is the termination of the entire course of the world and the return of all things to God. Central in this process is the person of Christ, in whom are embraced all mankind and the whole world, who
rz. Con- leads all back to God and frees man.summation This comes about through his death of All and resurrection, which last abolishes
Things. distinction of sex, the risen being nei ther male nor female (ii. 13, v. 20, 25). Following resurrection comes a double change; one affects all men, and is attainment of all knowledge suited for the creature; the other affects the most exalted clarified spirits, and is induction into-the deepest secrets and into the transcendent absorption into the godhead. A development of the lower creature into the higher with continual progress to the highest is affirmed-after the elimination of sex distinctions earth and paradise will become one (v. 20), then paradise and heaven, the higher ab sorbing the lower. All unnatural distinctions will be abolished, all natures will return to their primor dial causes and with these become one in God. Evil is nothing substantial, it had no place in pri mordial cause, it is only instability of will which is an accident attendant upon God-created natures. Since the changes outlined above produce a will fully sanctified and united with God, the will is in full accord with the divine will; there is then no cause of evil. The consequences of evil likewise vanish, since that which is only an accident can not assume the form of substance; at the end of world.