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Scotus Erisena THE NEW SCHAFF-HERZOG 804

was his entrance into the Gottschalk controversy concerning predestination (see GomCHALg, 1). He was urged by Hincmar and Pardulus of Laon to take part in this, and wrote between 849 and 853 the De diving prmdestinatione, in which he charged Gottschalk with heresy and ignorance, and expressed with great frankness his views on the being of God, the identity of foreknowledge and predestination, and good and evil. These views sounded so strange and blasphemous to his contemporaries that a very storm was aroused and synodical condemnation of some of his theses was evoked (Synod of Valence, 855). Hincmar pronounced against some of the positions of Scotus, though holding others. Pope Nicholas disapproved of Scotus in a letter to Charles (extant in C. Du Boulay, Hist. univemitatis Parisien sis, i.184, Paris, 1665), because the translation of the writings of Dionysius had not, as ecclesiastical custom demanded, been sent for approval, an offense aggravated by the fact that the translator was under suspicion in respect to matters of faith. He desired Charles to notify Scotus to appear before the pope or at least to remove him from his place at the head of the school in Paris.

The poems of Scotus permit the tracing of his life till the death of Charles in 877, and he seems to have lived even until 882, if an extant epigram may be attributed to Hincmar. But of the end of his life

French sources give no information. 3. Reports This last is not surprising considering

of Later the confusion of the times and the fact Life. that Scotus held no ecclesiastical preferment. There are reports of activity in England. Thus Asser, the biographer of Alfred the Great, speaks of a certain Johannes "of the race of old Saxons" called to England and made abbot of Athelney where he was assassinated by Gallic enemies (Monuments historica Britannica, i. 493 sqq., ed. H. Petrie, J. Sharpe, and T. D. Hardy, London, 1848); but this can not have been John Scotus Erigena, who was not a Saxon. The same author (p. 489) mentions a " Johannes, a priest and monk, a man of acute intellect, skilled in letters and other arts," who may be identical with the one named above but is more likely another man, and he can not be Scotus since he is designated a monk. While there is no reason for holding, as has been maintained, that Alfred would not have invited Scotus to England because of the latter's unortho doxy, the advanced age of Scotus at this time would be a real obstacle. Later reports like that of William of Mahnesbury (MPL, clxxix. 10, 1653) rest upon inference from the statement of Asser and from a tradition about the murder of an abbot of Mahnes bury, over whose grave a light appeared to show that he was a martyr and a saint. Tradition identified this abbot with Scotus, and possibly upon the basis of a combination of these different supposed data arose the medieval tradition and the making of a statue to " John Scotus who translated Dionysius from Greek into Latin." Little dependence can be placed upon this entire story. The most probable conclusion is that Scotus died in the Frankish kingdom.

Among his contemporaries he enjoyed a reputation for wonderful gifts and learning and great keen-

ness and eloquence. Yet his writings do not show that he towered above the great men of his time.

What seems to have made his reputa4. His tion was his close knowledge of Greek, Learning. an acquirement rare and in that period

usually elementary when it was known. While the extent of his knowledge of Greek authors is uncertain, since he cited many of them from Latin translation, his translation of Dionysius and of the difficult Ambigud of Maximus speaks for a real scholarship. With his knowledge of Greek went a high valuation of Greek ideas, evinced in various ways-in his manner of speaking of the Greeks, and in his regard for the formula regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son, though he held also that the filioque was justified. The knowledge of Greek mediated for him a freer handling of theological and philosophical questions. But the entire disposition of Scotus differed from that of his contemporaries by virtue of his aptness in handling philosophical and philosophical-theological questions, added to a certain ready facility. . From Dionysius and Maximus he learned how to treat speculatively the doctrine of God and the problems related to this in a way strange to the western theological discussions of the period. He thus had the key to an understanding of the speculative elements so rich in such older theologians as Basil, the two Gregorys, Origen, Ambrose, and Augustine,-elements which went back to Neoplatonism or to Philo. It is suspected but not proved that Scotus knew and used the works of the Greek philosophers; he certainly had in hand Boethius, Macrobius, Marcianus Capella, and other mediators of ancient learning to the Middle Ages, and he gained from them a meaning different from the more literal and constrained results won by his contemporaries. He was the first Westerner of the Middle Ages to think comprehensively and philosophically and to attempt the construction of a system.

Scotus made no sharp distinction between philosophy and theology; rather they were both essential means by which to gain knowledge of truth. He never stopped to consider whether his system was more philosophy than theology. So, in the matter

of reason and authority he would not g. Views on have said that the first belonged to Reason and philosophy and the other to theology;

Authority. for him both had their right in both

regions and sprang from the same root -divine wisdom. Still, reason had the precedence, and authority had its origin from reason; reason, being in itself worthful and invariable, did not need the support of authority, while, on the other hand, authority appears feeble when not upheld by reason. Hence Scotus would employ authority for those who could not rightly use reason; yet he could advise: "Let ho authority drive thee in terror from the conclusions suggested by right contemplation" (De divisions naturce, i. 66). As contrasted with his times, he had a clear consciousness of what might be accomplished by means of human reasoning power. Yet he did not undervalue authority, though he emphasized reason where it led to clear results. The authority of Scripture he fully allowed. The