ligious and scientific (see ALBERTUS MAGNUS). It studied afresh the literature of classic Rome; through the revival of Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Aristotelianism the freshness and freedom of the Greek spirit were reawakened; and the ancient Greek cosmology, doctrines of nature, philosophical skepticism, and the eclectic mixture of incongruous elements all came to life again. Owing to the new scientific spirit discoveries and inventions of great magnitude were on the threshold. With the rediscovery of many splendid examples of Greek statuary there was quickened the illimitable sense of beauty and wonder associated especially with the human form as the most perfect embodiment of the ideal. In a word, Humanism drew attention once more to man himself as a rational being with capacities of inexhaustible richness, susceptible of infinite culture (cf. J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, 5 vols., new ed., New York, 1885). (3) The Enlightenment (q.v., 1650-1800; also see RATIONALISM AND SUPERNATURALISM). More than two centuries after the decline of Humanism and when the Protestant Reformation was well under way, interest was again directed to man, this time centering in his rational nature and its capacities as such. The movement may be summarized as the sufficiency of the human reason for all the problems of life. Humanism had indeed implied this, but it had not proceeded far enough to become self-conscious, to reflect upon what would be required to justify its attitude and activity, and to offer a rational defense for the entire movement. The Enlightenment was, however, the spirit of Humanism come to life again in the English, French, and German consciousness. Like Humanism it eschewed metaphysics; it continued the investigation into the inner nature of man always from the side of experience, the validity of his knowledge of the world, and the meaning of human life both individual and social; and it allied itself with the culture and literary activity of the period. Yet it was conscious of having awakened in a new world, no longer that of the church or of Greece and Rome, but of new discoveries, a new scientific method, new economic and social values, a new psychology, and new historical postulates. In tile process of working out its essential principle, however, there were disclosed its inevitable limitar tions, and also its inadequacy to answer to one large element in man's nature-the poetic and imaginative and the more definitely personal. In its abstract superficial intellectualism, its individualistic and social utilitarianism, it-- denial of personal freedom, and its elimination of mystery it paved the way for a profound reaction of consciousness in which neglected regions of personality should reassert their abiding worth. The time was therefore ripe for a movement in which intellect and theoretic culture should give place to the esthetic side of man's nature wherein this should find authentic and luxuriant expression.

In a description of Romanticism the following features require attention: (1) Subjectivity. J. G. Fichte (q.v.) held that self-consciousness is determined by nothing outside of itself, and that everything exists only by the activity of the Ego. According to F. W. Schelling (q.v.) nature is the Ego

in process of becoming. In English thought nature

was conceived as an analogon of spirit so that

nature and spirit answer to eac bother

Special (cf. S. T. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection,

Features. London, 1825, and often, e.g., ed. T.

Fenby, 1873; H. Bushnell, God in

Christ, "Dissertation on Language," New York,

1849, and often). Besides this philosophical basis,

there was a profound feeling that the soul it

self was a mine of exhaustless treasure as yet

scarcely explored. Nor was this limited to the

normal consciousness, but in certain of the German

romanticists the weird, fantastic, capricious, and

morbid were developed to extreme proportions (cf.

Novalis, i.e., Baron F. L. von Hardenberg, d. Mar.

25, 1801; and E. T. A. Hoffmann, d. July 24, 1822).

(2) Not so much the rational as the esthetic aspect

of the world and human life absorbed interest.

Thus appeal was made to imagination and fancy.

Duty was determined by feeling, and even religion

was resolved into the feeling of absolute depend

ence (cf. Schleiermacher, q.v.). (3) Closely asso

ciated with the esthetic element was the sense of

beauty, not indeed that of standards derived from

Greece and Rome or even of the Middle Ages,

except in Scott. There was first the beauty of

the natural world which, slumbering for centuries,

awoke in the romantic spirit-not alone the beauty

of great mountains, of quiet or tumultuous seas,

but clouds, sunsets, moonlight, flowers. The

search became a passion. It was found in out

of-the-way places, in outcast and neglected per

sons, in common and trivial events. On the other

hand the most extravagant situations were created,

the personality subjected itself to the most ex

traordinary experiences in order to discover and

extract a quintessence of beauty never before dis

tilled. (4) Mystery arising not only from the un

fathomed depths of the soul, from the infinite as

pects of being, but also from an inner and insatiate

longing for the unexperienced and the unknown.

For Novalis philosophy is homesickness-the wish

to find one's home in the Absolute. Johann Ludwig

Tieck was consumed with longing for something

which transcended the finite. Schelling thought of

beauty as the infinite appearing in finite form.

Wordsworth was haunted by the strangeness of

nature, which only reflected a deeper strangeness

in his own soul. (5) The relation of the inner to the

outer world is presented from two points of view:

First, so far as the outer world is a copy of the in

ner world, this may be due to an idealizing panthe

ism. For either the harmony of the external world

is the creation of the Ego, or both are partial ex

pressions of the infinite and all-pervading Unity

(Novalis, Lehrlinge zu Sais). Or, secondly, the inner

world of individual consciousness is first depicted

with entire disregard of outer social conventions,

wherein two types of life are allowed to coexist

side by side, one, of untrammeled development

of those who are gifted with genius, the other,

the conventional order of such as have not the

strength or courage to assert the independent free

dom of self-realization. The first type is regarded

as the highest human ideal, and the actual world is

judged by its degree of correspondence with this