Names; Relation to Time (§1).

Conception of the Moon and its Functions (§ 2).

Worship of the Moon (§3).

The New Moon (§4).

The usual Hebrew name for the moon (yareah; cf. Assyr. irihu, arhw, " month "; Ethiopic wareh; Palmyrene yrh) is evidently to be connected with a root yarah or wdrah, cognate with 'arah, " to wander," cf. Assyr. ur(tu, " road," connoting the moon's motion among the stars.

1. Names; Relation to Time.

With this Semitic root meaning is to be contrasted the Aryan idea of the moon as " the measurer (of time)." While the moon did not among the Semites receive its name from its function as a marker of time periods, the regularity of its phases made its use general as a fixer of times and periods, as with other peoples, and with this were connoted other related conceptions. Thus in Egypt the moon-god Thoth was god of measures, then of knowledge and wisdom in general (with which cf. the Assyrian Sin, explained as zu-en, " knowledge-lord," and the Greek ideas associated with Hermes). The Manda'ans (q.v.), who derived a large part of their system from Babylonian sources, made the demiurge.

Ptahil say: " I gave the moon as time-measurer for the world " (A. J. H. W. Brandt, Die mandtiiache Religion, p. 61, Leipsie, 1889). Similarly amongthe Hebrews the idea of the moon as a divider of time was predominant, and its measuring-function is strikingly expressed in Ps. civ. 19: " He appointed the moon for seasons." The Hebrews and Phenicians called the new moon hodesh, " new," the former called the new moon kese' (cf. Assyr. kuae'u, " cap," connected with the idea that the moon-god wore a cap when the moon was full). A Hebrew poetic name for the moon is lebhenah, " white "; and in Gen. i. the terminology used is " the lesser light." The Assyrians and Babylonians called the moon-god Sin (see above; from him the Sinaitic peninsula drew its name), while other names in the Semitic region were Aku (Elamitic'), Nannar, Aa (consort of Shamash; also frequently rendered " queen "), and the Phenician Ashtaroth-Karnaim. The importance of the moon to the Hebrews is seen when it is noted how fundamental a division of time the month was for them. The date of the new moon as marking the beginning of a new reckoning of time was by them not calculated but observed. The length of a month, twenty-nine or thirty days, depended, therefore, upon the day when the moon was first seen, except that in cloudy weather the thirtieth day was reckoned to the preceding month. That this basis of reckoning determined the custom of counting the day, not from morning till morning or midnight to midnight, but from evening to evening can not be proved; but it may be confidently assumed, since in general peoples who have only lunar months use this method of defining the day. It is equally difficult to be assured that the week was derived from the month by division of the latter into four parts (see WEEK). There is general agreement that the seven-day period was derived from Babylonia, where it was employed in pre-Semitic times-this is confirmed by the fact that not only were the seventh, fourteenth, twenty-first, and twenty-eighth days of the month observed, but that the nineteenth was also a special day, the reason being apparently that thirty plus nineteen are forty-nine, this number making up a week of weeks. The union of the planetary bodies with the names of the days of the week seems to have been a very late phase, probably not completed till the Greek period. While the sacred seasons of the Hebrews were fixed by reference to lunar reckoning, there is a suggestion of solar reference in the Old Testament. It may be mere coincidence that Gen. viii. 14, cf. vii. 11, apparently makes the length of the flood a year and eleven days, i.e., a lunar year of 354 days plus eleven, or 365 days. The circumstances of husbandry necessitated regard for the solar year, but the adjustment of the solar and the lunar periods by intercalation was probably not made in the Hebrew region till after Old-Testament times (see TIME, BIBLICAL RECKONING OF).

There are a number of indications that the preCanaanitic relations of the Hebrews with the mooncult were close. Abraham is traced back to Haran (q.v.) and Ur (see BABYLONIA, IV., § 3 ), two noted centers of moon-worship. Moreover, in the Abrahamic family names and genealogies the moon has


left its mark.

2. Conception of the Moon and Its Functions.

Thus with Terah may be compared Assyr. tarahu "gazelle" (sacred to Ishtar); Nahor is connected with Nannar, the name of a moon-god; Abram recalls aburammu, "exalted father," a frequent title of the moon-deity; Sarah ("princess") and Its and Milcah ("queen") are titles of Functions. the moon-goddess; Laban is to be connected with "kbanu," the white one," cf. lebhenah above; while Lamech may be brought into relations with Assyr. Lamgu, a name of Sin. Yet with the Hebrews the moon was sub ordinate and secondary to the sun. Whether this represents the original Semitic conception is uncertain, since it is held, though not demonstrated, that the moon-cult represented an earlier Semitic stage of culture. The age of the worship of Sin is not determined; the Aramean cult at Haran was of great antiquity and persisted into the Roman period. Sahar, the name of a moon-god, is probably to be seen in the Mandeean Sauriel, while the Palmyrene deities Yarhibaal and Aglibaal were moon-deities. The Hebrews were, therefore, in the provenance of the moon-cult, and their conceptions of this body were in general agreement with those of their neighbors. The idea that the moon influenced the earth and its products was practically universal, and this influence was conceived as either malign or benign. This body was thought to be an agent in the production of crops, perhaps through its supposed function as a creator of dew (W. von Baudissin, Jahve et Moloch, p. 24, Leipsic, 1874; W. H. Roscher, Ueber Selene, pp. 49-99, ib. 1890). The Aryans went further than this and attributed to the moon the growth of animals (Avesta, Mah Yast, Mah Nyayis, SBE, xxiii. 88-91, 355); the Indo-Iranians connected the moon with the primeval bull, itself a symbol of fertility; Pliny (Hist.nat., ii. 221 associated growth with the moon; Macrobius (" On the Dream of Scipio," I., xi. 7) attributes to the moon power over terrestrial objects for increase or decline; while it is a worldwide superstition that a waging moon brings increase of crops, and occasionally even the power of impregnation is attributed to that body. The Old Testament references to this notion are necessarily scanty, yet beyond question Deut. xxxiii. 14, " the precious things put forth by the moon," is to be brought into relationship with this idea. In the Assyrian hymns the moon is called " the mighty bull, with large horns, perfect form, and flowing beard, bright as crystal " (the bull is also a Semitic symbol of fertility); the supposed beard in seals is probably the effect of a necklace with pendants. On the malign side pestilence was associated with the moon (Ps. exgi. 6), while the Greek notion of the lunar origin of epilepsy (cf. the Greek verb seleniazesthai," to be struck with epilepsy," from selene, "moon ") is shown to be held by Jews (Matt. iv. 24, xvii. 15). With this may be connected the name of the Mandaean angel of death, Sauriel, as well as such passages in the Old Testament as Gen. xxxi. 40 and Jer. xxxvi. 30. In theimagery of the Day of Yahweh (q.v.) the moon was to participate with the other heavenly bodies in the cataclysmic phenomena of that time (Isa. xiii. 10; Ezek. xxxii. 7; Joel ii. 10, iii. 4, 15; Matt. xxiv. 29; Acts ii. 20; Rev. vi. 12); also in the repair and glorifying of all nature (Isa. xxx. 26), though in the new era there will be no need for its light, since God is to be the light of his people (Isa. Ix. 19; cf. Rev. xxi. 23, xxii. 5). Yet its stability is one of the images of eternal duration (Ps. lxxii. 5, 7, bcxRix. 37), and it is also a synonym of beauty (Job xxxi. 26; Cant. vi. 9; Ecclus. i.6).

3. Worship of the Moon

Worship of the moon appears to have been native with the Semites. Wadd in Arabia, Sin and Nannar in Babylonia, Sahar in Mesopotamia (appearing on Aramaic steles at Merab near Aleppo; cf. C. Clermont-Ganneau, in Bibliotheque de l'ecole des hautes Etudes, fasc. 113, pp. 193-195, 211-215, Paris, 1897) are but a few of the examples which might be cited, the moon being representative of both male and female deities. Apart, however, from the suggestions contained in the tracing of Abraham to centers of moon-worship and in the connections of names in the Abrahamic family with names or titles of moon-deities, there is little or nothing in the early history of the Hebrews to connect them with worship of the moon (cf. Smith, Red. of Sem., 2d ed., p. 135). It was only toward the end of the monarchy, in the period of declension and of eclectic religious practices, that the worship of this body appears among them, when it is registered by the denunciation of the prophets (Jer. viii. 2, xix. 3; Zeph. i. 5), by prohibition through legislation (Dent. iv. 9, xvii.3), by the repressive measures of Josiah (II Kings xxiii. 5), and later by the disavowal of participation in the cult by the righteous sufferer (Job xxxi.26-27). In general the worship of the moon was associated with that of other heavenly bodies, and the method was by prostration, and by kissing of the hands (Job. xxxi. 26-27), the latter a custom mentioned by Pliny (Hist. nat., XXVIII., ii. 25). In Jer. vii. 18, xliv. 17-19, 25, there is mention of the " queen of heaven " in which a distinct cult is evidently distinguished, and its peculiarities in part given, as in the offering by fire of special cakes in the preparation of which men, women, and children united. The prophet in chap. xliv. represents the people as arguing for this worship on the experiential ground that its practice was attended with prosperity and the cessation of it was contemporaneous with disaster. It has been the custom since Jerome to identify this " queen of heaven " with the moon, though from the time of Isaac of Antioch (c. 450) she was also identified with Venus. The concrete deity with whom identification was made, however, was Ishtar, whose most intimate connection was with Venus and not with the moon (see ASHTORETH, § 5); accordingly later scholars are disposed to see in the cult under question the Ishtar-Venus type and to disconnect it from the moon. Perhaps the last word has not been said on the subject. As cults passed from the East to the West, Ishtar was associated with the moon, and this association registered itself in the Greek religion as well as in the Sidonian conception of Astarte as the moon. It is not beside the mark to note that cakes were offered in Athens to Artemis (the moon-


goddess), a practice which may be the analogue of that noted in Jeremiah. On the other hand, offerings like these were made in Arabia to the sun and to Venus. Other indications of worship in the Hebrew region are seen in Isa. iii. 18, in the ornaments "round like the moon," R. V., "crescents" (Hebr.saharonim; cf. the proper name Sahar, for the moon god in the vicinity of Aleppo, mentioned above), which seem to be referred to in Judges viii. 21-26, A. V. margin " ornaments like the moon," R. V." crescents," and are by the commentators associated with worship of the moon.

4. The New Moon.

The new-moon festival as an occasion of joyous character seems to belong to the oldest stratum of Hebrew observance. I Sam. xx. 5-6 shows it in connection with clan celebrations, and this implies antiquity. In II Kings iv. 23; Isa. i. 13; Hos. ii.11; and Amos viii. 5 it is placed apparently on an equal footing with the Sabbath, and 4. The New the passage last named involves cessation from work on that day, while it was in popular practce a day of assembling at the sanctuaries with offerings. It is, therefore, a peculiar phenomenon that JE and D are silent regarding the festival, which reappears in Ezekiel and the priestly legislation. Various explanations have been offered for the silence noted. Dillmann (in his commentary on Exodus-Leviticus, p. 635, Leipsic, 1897) supposes that the observance was so common and such a fixture that provision for it was unnecessary; in that case it is difficult to account for other provisions covering matters known to be no less firmly fixed (cf. Ex. xxi.-xxiii.). Benzinger (EB, iii. 3402) thinks that the increasing importance of the sabbath " forced the new-moon festival into the background "; if this be true, it is difficult to say what brought it into notice in the later codes, though it is not impossible that popular insistence made its demands felt. Wellhausen (Prolegomena, p. 118, Berlin, 1883) makes the ignoring in the JE and D legislation purposive, the intent being to wean the people away from an observance in which the Canaanitic rites were an especial feature. Whatever the reason for this silence, later popularity of the festival is evinced by the fact that the prophets dated their oracles by it (Ezek. xxvi. 1, xxix. 17, xxxi. 1, xxxii. 1; Hag. i. 1), and this further implies actual gatherings of the people at which the prophecies were delivered, while it is known that at this time the people also visited the prophets (II Kings iv. 23). In the newer legislation the day was not one of rest (except the new moon of the seventh month, Lev. xxiii. 24) but of extraordinary sacrifices, surpassing in richness those of the Sabbath. Thus in Ezekiel (xlvi. 4-6) for the new moon there were prescribed a bullock, six lambs, and a ram; for the Sabbath, six lambs and a ram. In Num. xxviii. 9-13 (which prescribes from a national standpoint) for the Sabbath were prescribed two lambs with one-tenth deal of flour for each;, for the new moon, two bullocks with three-tenths deal of flour for each, a ram with two-tenths deal of flour, and seven lambs with one tenth deal for each. To the daily burnt offering there was added a festal offering. For notes of the observance cf. I Chron. xxiii. 31; II Chron. ii. 4, viii. 13, xxxi. 3; Ezra iii. 5; Neh. x. 33, which regard the offerings as fixed and normal. Further, that the new moon was regarded as one of high observance is shown by the directions to blow the trumpets. The new moon of the seventh month has a sabbatical character in that cessation from labor is directed together with assemblage at the sanctuary, and possibly after the exile this took the character of a New Year's festival (Ezra iii. 6; Neh. viii. 1 sqq.). Judith viii. 6 shows the observance still later, while Gal. iv. 10 and Col. ii. 16 indicate that Jewish Christians were inclined to lay stress upon the observance. See FEASTS AND FESTIVALS, I.; SYNAGOGUE, II. GEO. W. GILMORE.

BIBLIOGRAPHY: C. L. Ideler, Handbuch der Chronologie, Berlin, 1831; D. Chwolsohn, Die Ssabier, pp. 399-443, Leipsic, 1856; R. Pietsehmann, Hermes Triemegistos, Leipsic, 1875; F. Baethgen, Beitrage zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte, Berlin, 1887; A. Kuenen, De Godsdiewt van Israel, Haarlem, 1889, Eng. transl., The Religion of Israel, London, 1897; P. de Lagarde, in GGA, xxxv (1889), 46; P. Jensen, Die Koemologie der Babylonier, pp. 101-108, Strasburg, 1890; W. H. Roseher, Ueber Selene and Verwandtes, Leipsic, 1890; E. Sachau, in Sitzungaberichte der Berliner Akademie, 1895, pp. 119-122; F. X. Kugler, Die babylonische Mondrechnung, Freiburg, 1900; E. Maass, Die Tagesgotter in Ram and den Provinzen, Berlin, 1902; W. St. C. Boscawen, First of Empires, pp. 31, 80-81, 306, London, 1906; J. G. Frazer, Adonis, Attis, Osiris, pp. 295 sqq., London, 1906 (for ethnic notions regarding the moon); Schrader, KAT, pp. 361-367; Benzinger, Archaeology, passim; Nowack, Archaeology, ii. 138-144; DB, iii. 433-435, 521-523; EB, iii. 3192-97, 3401-04; JE viii. 678-679, ix. 243-244.

MOORE, CLEMENT CLARKE: Protestant Episcopal; b. in New York July 15, 1779; d. in Newport, R. I., July 10, 1863. He was graduated from Columbia College, 1798; though prepared for the ministry he never took orders, but devoted himself to literature; and from 1821 to 1850 he was professor, first of Hebrew and Greek, then of Oriental and Greek literature, in the General Theological Seminary, New York. The ground on which the seminary now stands was his gift. He was the pioneer in America of Hebrew lexicography, for his Hebrew and Greek Lexicon (2 vols., New York, 1809) was the first Hebrew lexicon published in the United States. He wrote also: Poems (1844);George Castriot, Surnamed Scanderbeg, King of Albania (1850); and the favorite A Visit from St.Nicholas (1848; a story for children in verse), beginning "'Twas the night before Christmas."

MOORE, DUNLOP: Presbyterian; b. at Lurgan (19 m. s.w. of Belfast), County Armagh, Ireland, July 25, 1830; d. at Pittsburg, Pa., Nov. 14, 1905. He was educated at Edinburgh and Belfast, being graduated in 1854. He was next a missionary of the Irish Presbyterian Church in Gujarat, India (1855-67), and to the Viennese Jews (1869-1874). From 1875 to 1891 he was pastor of the Presbyterian church at New Brighton, Pa., but after the latter year was without charge, engaged in evangelistic and literary work. After a year at Lansdowne, Pa., he made his home in Pittsburg. While in India be aided in preparing the Gujarati translation of the Bible and wrote treatises on Jainism and Mohammedanism in the same language. He likewise edited the Gujarati monthly Jnanadipaka and besides a number of contributions to the


periodical press, collaborated with S. T. Lowrie in translating C. W. E. Nagelsbach's Isaiah for the American Lange series (New York, 1878).

MOORE, EDWARD: Church of England; b. at Cardiff, Wales, Feb. 28, 1835. He was educated at Pembroke College, Cambridge (B.A., 1867), and was ordered deacon in 1859 and ordained priest two years later. From 1858 to 1864 he was fellow and tutor of Queen's College, Oxford, and since the latter year has been principal of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. He has been honorary fellow of Pembroke College since 1899 and of Queen's College since 1902, as well as canon of Canterbury and librarian of Canterbury Cathedral since 1903. He is best known as a Dante scholar, and has written or edited Introduction to Aristotle's Ethics, i.-iv. (London, 1871); Aristotle's Poetics, with Notes (Oxford, 1875); Time References in the Divina Commedia (London, 1887); Textual Criticism of tie Divina Commedia (Oxford, 1889); Dante and his Early Biographers (London, 1890); Tutte le opere di Dante Alighieri nouvamente rivedute nel testo (Oxford, 1894, 1904); Studies in Dante (3 series, 1896-1903) ; L'Autenticita della Quaestio de aqua et terra (London, 1899); and Gli Accenni al tempo nella Divina Commedia (Florence, 1900).

MOORE, EDWARD CALDWELL: Congregationalist; b. at West Chester, Pa., Sept. 1, 1857. He was graduated from Marietta College, Marietta, O. (A.B., 1877), Union Theological Seminary (1884), and studied at the universities of Berlin, Gottingen, and Giessen (1884-86). He was pastor of the Westminster Presbyterian Church, Yonkers, N. Y. (1886-1889) and of the Central Congregational Church at Providence, R. I. (1889-1902). He was appointed to his present position of Parkman professor of theology at Harvard University in 1902. He was Lowell lecturer in 1903 and chairman of the Board of Preachers of Harvard University in 1905, and has also been a member of the Prudential Committee of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions since 1899, being chairman since 1905. He has written The New Testament in the Christian Church (New York, 1903).

MOORE, GEORGE FOOTE: Congregationalist; b. at West Chester, Pa., Oct. 15, 1851. He was educated at Yale (A.B., 1872) and Union Theological Seminary (1877), after having taught in the Hopkins Grammar School, New Haven, and privately in Columbus, O. (1872-74), and after having been principal of the High School at Lancaster, 0. (1874-1875). He was then pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Bloomingburg, O., in 1877-78, and of the Putnam Presbyterian Church, Zanesville, 0. (1878-1883), and Hitchcock professor of the Hebrew language and literature in Andover Theological Seminary (1883-1902). Since 1902 he has been professor of the history of religion in Harvard University. In theology he belongs to the critical school, and is a member of the Deutsche morgenlandische Gesellschaft and the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, and recording secretary of the American Oriental Society. Besides articles in the Encyclopaedia Biblica, he has written Commentary on Judges (New York, 1895) ; translated and edited Judges for the Polychrome Bile (2 vols., 1898-1900); and assisted in editing Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper, 2 vols., Chicago, 1908, to which he also contributed.

MOORE, HENRY: Wesleyan Methodist; b. in Dublin Dec. 21, 1751; d. in London Apr. 27, 1844. In 1780 he became an itinerant on the Londonderry circuit; later as the constant companion of John Wesley in London he did most efficient service. After Wesley's death he figured prominently in the discussions from 1791 to 1797 concerning the permanent ecclesiastical organization of the Methodists, personally favoring the Episcopal form. He was a stanch upholder of the authority of the conference, even though disagreeing with its policy in certain matters. He opposed the movement to found a theological institute for training men for the ministry, and as the last survivor of those ordained by John Wesley he championed the right of the Wesleyan ministers to administer the sacraments. He was active in the itinerant ministry till 1833, when he became a supernumerary. His works of significance are: The Life of the Rev. John Wesley, Including an Account of the Great Revival of Religion of which he was the . . Instrument (in collaboration with T. Coke, London, 1792); Thoughts on the Eternal Sonship of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity. Addressed to the People Called Methodists, . . (Birmingham, 1817); The Life of Mrs. M. Fletcher . . . Compiled from her Journal (2 vols., London, 1817); The Life of the Rev. J. Wesley . . . in which are Included, the Life of his Brother the Rev. C. Wesley, . . and Memoirs of their Family, Comprehending an Account of the Great Revival of Religion in which they were the Chief . . . Instruments (2 vols., 1824-25); Sermons Held on General Occasions . . . With a Brief Memoir (by the Author) of his Life and Christian Experience from his Birth to the First Conference Held after the Death of Mr. Wesley (1830).

BIBLIOGRAPHY: Mrs. R. Smith, The Life of Rev. H. Moore, ... Including the Autobiography, London, 1844; and the literature under METHODISTS dealing with the early history of that people.

MOORE, JOHN HENRY:Dunker; b. at Salem, Va., Apr. 8, 1846. He was educated in the Illinois public schools, and in 1868 entered the ministry of his denomination, of which he was chosen bishop in 1879. In 1876 he became editor of The Brethren at Work, a Dunker weekly published at Lanark, Ill., but later merged with others and removed to Elgin, Ill., and renamed The Gospel Messenger. Of this he is still editor. In theology he is strongly Puritan, being opposed to war and intemperance in all forms. Like his denomination, he accepts only the New Testament as his creed. He has written:Trine Immersion Traced to the Apostles (Elgin, Ill., 1872); The Perfect Plan of Salvation (1874); and One Baptism (1876).

MOORE, WALTER WILLIAM: Presbyterian (Southern assembly); b. at Charlotte, N. C., June 14, 1857. He was educated at Davidson College, N. C. (A.B., 1878), and Union Theological Seminary, Va. (1881). He was an evangelist in Bun


oombe County, N. C. (1881-82) and pastor at Millersburg, Ky. (1882-83). Since 1883 he has been professor of the Hebrew language and literature in Union Theological Seminary, Va., of which he has also been president since 1904. He is a member of the Richmond Education Association and has been a trustee of Hampden-Sidney College since 1905. He has written A Year in Europe (Richmond, Va.,1904).

MOORE, WILLIAM EVES: Presbyterian; b. at Strasburg, Pa., Apr. 1, 1823; d. at Columbus, O., June 5, 1899. He graduated from Yale College, New Haven, Conn., 1847; studied theology under Dr. Lyman H. Atwater at Fairfield, Conn.; became pastor at West Chester, Pa., 1850; and at Columbus, O., 1872. From 1884 he was permanent clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. He was the author of The New Digest of the Acts and Deliverances of the Presbyterian Church, New School (Philadelphia, 1861); and The Presbyterian Digest, United Church (1873).

MOORHOUSE, JAMES: Church of England, former bishop; b. at Sheffield Nov. 19, 1826. He was educated at St. John's College, Cambridge (B.A., 1853), and was ordered deacon in 1853 and ordained priest in the following year. He was curate of St. Neots (1853-55), Sheffield (1855-59), and Hornsey (1859-61), and perpetual curate of St.John's, Fitzroy Square, London (1881-67). From 1867 to 1876 he was vicar and rural dean of Paddington, London, and in 1876 was consecrated bishop of Melbourne, Australia. In 1886 he was translated to the see of Manchester, which he resigned in 1903. He was Hulsean lecturer in 1865 and Warburtonian lecturer in 1874 and chaplain in ordinary to the queen and prebendary of Caddington Major in St. Paul's Cathedral (1874-76). He has written Nature and Revelation (London, 1861); Our Lord Jesus Christ the Subject of Growth in Wisdom (Hulsean lectures; 1866); Jacob (three sermons before the University of Cambridge; 1870); The Expectation of the Christ (1889); The Dangers of the Apostolic Age (Manchester, 1891); The Teaching of Christ (London, 1891); Church Work (1894); and The Roman Claim to Supremacy (Manchester, 1894).



Moralists, British

I. Introduction. II. Development of the Autonomy of Ethics.

The Roman Catholic Theory (§ 1).
The Protestant Position (§ 2).
The State and the Law of Nature (§ 3)·
Influence of the Renaissance (§ 4).
Importance of Reformed Protestant Ethics ($ 5).
English Ethics under Puritanism (§ 6).
The New Psychological Basin (§ 7).
Problems Presented (§ 8).
III. Specific Contributions.
Hobbes and Mandeville (§ 1).
Cambridge School, Cudworth, More, and Cumberland (§ 2).
Clarke, Hartley, and Price (§ 3).
John Locke (§ 4).
Shaftesbury, Butler, and Huteheson (§ 5).
Hume and Adam Smith (§ 6).
Results (§ 7).

I. Introduction: The British moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries accomplished for ethics what the English deists of the same period accomplished for the science of religion. The deists cut loose from the ideal conception of religion founded on psychology and metaphysics, and established an analysis of religion founded on the psychological study of its phenomena. The British moralists cut loose from a dogmatically founded system of ethics, controlling the State, the Church, and private life, and founded an autonomous system of modern scientific ethics. In neither case were these movements isolated, they were a part of the social phenomena of an age which, among other things, tended to build up independent treatment of the various sciences. Specifically the work of the British moralists may be distinguished as follows. First they gave a scientific form to the practical material furnished them by Christian ethics, to which they stood sometimes in a hostile relation, sometimes enlarging its conceptions, sometimes incorporating with it purely secular interests and aims. Second, in place of deriving morality from dogmatic authoritative teaching and from the supernatural dualistic system of salvation and grace, they introduced the method of psychological analysis.

II. Development of the Autonomy of Ethics:

The first stage of the discussion concerns itself with the ethical ideas of Roman Catholicism. The combination of Christianity with the culture of the ancient world drove into the background the primitive system of Christian ethic, which concerned itself with the end of the world and a life of complete divine indwelling. The great process of amalgamation resulted in the Catholic objectification of Christianity, with the Church conceived as a supernatural institution of grace. Various elements were taken up in the process of combination. Participation in the divine was secured through neo-Platonic theories, by which the interval between the natural and supernatural was bridged. As each of these two spheres had its legitimate existence, a place was made for an ethical system resting largely upon the traditional law of nature as found in the philosophy of the Stoics, while the Aristotelian conception of the State was also wrought into the scheme. The esthetic ethics of antiquity completely disappeared. The law of nature was made identical with the decalogue, hence the sphere of a real political and civil ethics was very limited. Ecclesiastical ethics had the predominance. A different value was given to the morality of the layman from that of the clergy. As time went on, the weak points of this system were criticized and the secular element accentuated, and at the same time direct protests were heard against the prevailing conception of ethics as a system of laws and regulations enforced by the objectively divine institution of the Church.


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it proclaimed the independence of secular morality from the traditional transcendent ethical theories of the Middle Ages, and produced a sharp-cut expression of individualism.

4. Influence of the Renaissance.

But the leaders in the Renaissance lacked system; they were inclined to skepticism and anarchy and represented an exclusive and aristocratic type of thought. Through its great representative Machiavelli, the Renaissance exercised strong influence over Hobbes and his critics. The ethical analysis of the Renaissance with its dependence on a psychological treatment of ethics is of importance, but on the whole the ethical ideas of the Renaissance had slight impelling power and were too esthetic in character to admit of wide application. In this way the influence of the Renaissance remained in direct and of minor importance. Of really decisive importance was Protestant ethics in the particular form assumed by it in the Reformed Church in Geneva, France, Holland, and England, where the supremacy of the Calvinistic system of predestination worked out a complete civil order.

5. Importance of Reformed Protestant Ethics.

It recognized political, economic, and social elements, but its science was theology, while it left art altogether out of account. The law of nature was made identical with the revealed law; the State was to aid the Church to advance pure teaching and establish a civil life corresponding to Christian ideals. On the one hand, there was the external discipline keeping citizens in subjection to those ideals and, on the other hand, the so-called " guardianship of both tables " by which civil discipline and the purity of church teaching were maintained, a combination of the law of nature and the proclamation of salvation. Calvin's position on this point was much more thoroughgoing than Luther's, who left to the State a large sphere of activity for its natural functions and assigned to it considerable control in Church administration (see POLITY, IV., 2). Calvin provided for a theocracy by which the demands and forms of civil life should be brought into barmony with the exact standards of Christian ethics, proclaimed by an independently organized Church acting as the interpreter of the Bible. The various elements of Calvinistic theology, its theory of predestination and grace, were brought into practical application in the life of the individual and the State. But the political conception of Calvinism was aristocratic. It thought of the Church as the fellowship of the predestinated who were to bear sway over the whole sphere of life; the Bible in all its details was the standard of ethical conduct, not simply a source of grace and guide to penitence. Calvinism was not content with the small sphere of Lutheranism in directing the moral conduct and ethical aspirations of the individual citizen, it attacked also directly the control of important ecclesiastical functions by the State authorities. The State indeed was bound to maintain order and execute law, and also by divine and natural right it had to maintain Biblical truth and Scriptural ordinances within its territory. If it failed to do this the society of the elect had the right of revolt, and this right was exercised in the wars of the Huguenots and of the Netherland Reformers. The Christian people were sovereign, and the Christian democracy was the supreme court of appeal. This was a very different principle from the Lutheran conservatism with its principles of practical passive obedience and its inconsistent distinction between the Church with its guidance of the individual and the State with its right to carry out measures of general utility. With Calvin Church and State worked together to establish the Scriptural social order. So one of the crucial stages in the spiritual development of modern times is reformed teaching and practise in ethics and politics and in the construction of state and society. (Cf. M. Schneckenburger, Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen and reformierten Lehrbegrifes, Stuttgart, 1855; Elster, Calvin als Staatsmann, Gesetzgeber and National6konom, in Jahrbiicher fur National6konomie and Statistik, 1878; W. Walker, John Calvin, chap. x., New York, 1906.)

6. English Ethics Under Puritanism.

This system found realization in England on a different ground from that in any other country, for there was a monarchy struggling for absolutism, a church catholicizing in tendency, both set over against a parliamentaiy system standing for the rights of the peoplc and a popular demand for a purely spiritual ecclesiastical system. As a result there came about a dissolution of the old historical constitution. Cromwell and his army did away with that compromise with historical institutions which prevailed on the continent, and proceeded to the erection of a real Christian state on a revolutionary basis. Scotch and French Huguenot influences combined with the theory of the rights of the people and natural law to make up Puritanism. The most radical religious ideas, the desire for autonomy, the claim for toleration, the separation of the Church from the State, found a home in Cromwell's army. Some of these ideas are due to continental influences, to the Anabaptists, and others. A considerable mystical element was also present among the armed supporters of the Commonwealth. They were desirous of a certain amount of freedom in dogma and worship, but their moral idea was meant to be strictly and absolutely maintained. So far as Christian society went Church and State had a common aim, the erection of a Christian commonwealth where the pious minority would be in control. The new system was to be built on the basis of specific English traditions, and it held to the old English idea of the rights and duties of a Christian state. Its special marks are religious and ecclesiastical autonomy, sovereignty of the people, puritanical strict morality, a continental policy based on uniting the Protestants and opposing Roman Catholics, popularizing and Christianizing law and justice. The experiment lasted only a short time and failed because of its impracticability, since it not only destroyed the existing church organization but also conflicted with the rights and interests of individuals. The gains made by the Commonwealth could he maintained in succeeding periods only by treating the


idea of church autonomy as entirely distinct from the idea of political freedom. The two spheres, the ecclesiastical and political, had to be isolated from one another. As to the moral ideal of Puritanism, it had massed together State and law, war and polities, property and trade, trying to control them and the individual in his private life through the conception of a God-serving and God-fearing peoplc. But the leaders of Puritanism soon realized that these various elements could not be developed in such a combination. Cromwell became an opportunist and gave up his idealistic religious international policy for a realistic commercial policy. Milton allowed that true Christian morality could be practised only by the select few, not by the whole people. Among the masses the problem was solved in quite a different way. There. the various religious convictions led to the foundation of numerous sects, some with extravagant political ideals like those of the Fifth Monarchy Men (q.v.), or like those of the Quakers and Ranters, who were indifferent to political forms and secular ordinances. In this confusion there came a severe crisis to a purely Christian ethics. Traditional elements had to be sacrificed, ethical problems in their practical shape were econsidered, and, in the Restoration, the ethical consciousness was investigated objectively and scientifically, Christian and secular aims were surveyed under new relations, and the opposition, combination, or compromise between the two was treated from the scientific point of view. (Cf. on this section the literature under Cromwell, Oliver; and PURITANISM.)

7. The New Psychological Basis.

This scientific reconstruction of ethics depends first of all on a psychological analysis which leaves aside all metaphysical assumptions of the essence of the soul and the action of God upon it, and devotes itself to discovering the laws of its own action and nature from a study and peculiar processes. This marks a distinct separation from the old theologizing ethics. Psychological analysis of a sort entirely different from its form in the scholastic theological system assumes the chief role, different, too, from the old psychology, which was a compromise between the religious language of the Bible and the scientific psychology of Greek philosophy. The old system insisted on the eternal worth, the unity, and the isolation of the soul from things of sense; transcendent causes were introduced as its influences-God, angels, and demons--just as all extraordinary natural processes were referred to the immediate activity of divine or diabolic power. This naive psychological supernaturalism had been transmitted as a part of the traditional system of revelation, which worked upon the soul in a miracu lous way through its association with the means of revelation in the sacraments and ecclesiastical ordinances. Ancient psychology was brought in as its support, and place was made for immanent psychological explanation, which, however, played a very subordinate role. The chief concern of both Roman and Protestant ethics was with the processes of salvation, and revelation and the power of grace. The opposition to this as far as the thirteenth century. It had two sours, the Stoic study of the emotions and temperament and the free poetical and artistic analysis of man as found in the literature and art of the Renaissance. It ended in the principle of universal psychological analysis, based on historic induction and supported by the achievements in the study of nature. Especially original in this respect is Machiavelli, with his psychological analysis, his historical comparison, and his empirical generalization. Men like Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, and Bayle contributed also by their study of the emotions and passions. But the chief impulse came from Hobbes, the founder of a purely psychological analysis, intended to build up an original conception of morality. Along with Hobbes must be placed Spinoza, the creator of the mechanical method of treating the emotions and passions. These were the tendencies that were popularized by English thinkers. One of the effects of this method was a change in the view of history. The matter of history had been studied only in relation to conceptions about the character and purpose of a world derived from the revelation of the Church and the Bible. A causal determination of facts in themselves had not been attempted; but with this new view of psychology there came a causal explanation of history, with its study of historical characters on the basis of psychological analysis. Nothing consistent could be achieved here, however, unless there were a' new foundation of ethical rules inductively derived from social and historical facts. This was really an extension of the principle of the consensus of mankind acknowledged to be valid by theological ethics. So there came from this psychological foundation a so-called natural system of intellectual sciences, in which the eighteenth century produced the most original work, just as the seventeenth century holds the first place in scientific analysis of the natural sciences. Even when a distinction was made between natural and supernaturally caused processes, the fixed point of departure was the results of psychological analysis founded on the assumption of regularity and normality in the phenomena under review. Morality was no longer regarded as a miracle of grace, the moral law was no longer identified with the revealed law. All of the old dogmatic scholastic problems either disappeared or became of subordinate interest, and an entirely new set of fundamental problems were treated as of primary importance.

8. Problems Presented.

First in older came psychogenetic problems. In these are discussed the sources of moral phenomena, whether they have grounds outside of their own sphere, as utilitarianism declares; or whether their source is exclusive and independent, according to the stand point of idealistic intuitionism. This is a crucial question for Christian morality as a whole; all others, such as the connection of morality with grace and its dependence on revelation, are concerned ultimately with this. Another primary classification arises from the question of determinism; not determinism in the old sense of divine predestination, but that scheme which brings morality within a fixed causal nexus of psychological laws.


Determinism seems to destroy the value of ethics altogether, while indeterminism may be made to harmonize with the recognition of grace. There is bound to come up also the principle of autonomy, that is, whether conduct is necessarily subordinated to the principles of rational insight or to the effects of psychological motives. From this point of view, all individuals stand alike. It is really an application of the convictions of political equality and ecclesiastical toleration, as they were developed in the course of the seventeenth century. The next problem is concerned with the relation of morality and religion. Under the older system they were identical; no true morality was possible without faith. The new point of view was to treat religion as a kind of by-product, a special modification of a common natural morality. Religion itself became the subject of psychological analysis. The question arose as to the necessary relation between divine sanction or the fate of man in the next world and man's striving and willing in this. Finally, it be came necessary to establish a formulation of the content of the moral law as a psychological principle in such a way that its obligations could be established as ultimate derivatives from the principles above classified and analyzed. If the Biblical standards were abandoned as necessarily authoritative, in what way could Christian ethics be brought into relation with this general analysis outlined above? The problem was finally solved by turning over the discussion of Christian ethics to theology, although at first the general formulation of moral ideas was certainly influenced by Christian types of thought. But these attempts were unsatisfactory, old scholastic conceptions were seen to lack clearness, and in proportion to the degree of removal of extraneous elements from the moral idea, the more its autonomy became plain and independent by right. These were the problems which the political and social condition of England in the seventeenth century forced into the atmosphere of thought and discussion, as they are represented in the speculations of Hobbes, the ideas of the Levellers (q.v.), and the the Erastians (see Erastus, THOMAS, Erastianibm).

III. Specific Contributions:

1. Hobbes and Mandeville.

It was Hobbes (q.v.; and see DEISM, I., § 2), writing under the influence of the French and Italian Renaissance, who opposed the practical workings of the Reformed independent ideal, the rigoristic spiritualism of their Christian social order, and tried to found morality on a purely sensualistic basis. His political ideal of the State was that of Machiavelli, and the weapons he employed against spiritualism were the sensualistic ideas of Pierre Gassendi(q.v.). But the whole structure of his thought is based on keen psychological analysis. Heaccomplished a complete and radical revolution in ethics, finding the source of the moral law in the secular sphere. The law of nature and divine law he interprets in an entirely novel way. The law of nature is differenti-a·ted from natural law, which by itself implies a primitive war of all against all. The law of nature is maintained because man's interests demand it. The. absolute State which comes into existence through its operation has also the right to establish the true religion, for the divine law has also its sanctions from the existence of that absolute political system which man, coming out of his original confusion and discord, discovers as the sole condition of his social existence. Hobbes brings Christianity into full conformity with his absolute State. The State decides what form of Christianity shall be adopted by its subjects; even heathen states have the right of maintaining untrue religions for the sake of common welfare, and must not be resisted on this account. Hobbes' originality consists in his concentration on secular interests, his psychological analysis, and his introduction of historical illustrations into his system. Mandeville (1670-1733; see DEisM, I., § 8) is important as attempting to show that moral onceptions are artificial creations intended to hold the mass of people in subjection, and from his arguments that the specific ideas of Christian ethics can not be accommodated to political, social, commercial needs.

2. Cambridge School Cudworth, More, and Cumberland.

In the Restoration there was a strong reaction against the sensualism and nominalism of Hobbes, showing itself in an attempt to establish the necessity and the apriority of moral ideas by metaphysics, and more particularly/the metaphysics of Platonism. This was the work of the Cambridge school (see CAMBRIDGE, PLATONIBTS) which allied itself with Anglican rationalism and Arminianism and was antagonistic to Calvinis tic positivism and rigorism. The law of nature is completed, according to this school, in the divine law. Stress is laid upon the necessary element of ethics and the impossibility of a purely psychological foundation. The head of the school was Cudworth (q.v.), who, like Kant and Plato, insisted upon the absolute character of morality. He asks whether the mind as the source of all necessary truth is the first factor and the experience of sense, the simple material of mind, is the second; or whether the reverse is true, so that the spiritual and the necessary must be derived from the accidental and occasional. He himself, of course, defends the neceseariness of ethical ideas on the basis of the eternally necessary relations of minds to one another, which relation is based ultimately on God and is, in a fragmentary way, reflected from the conceptually necessary in God's mind to the mind of man. Henry More (q.v.) introduds the element of psychological analysis, applying it to the feelings and emotions, and combining morality with the happiness of the whole community and the individual member. It is in what he calls the " boniform faculty " that he finds the special sphere for the moral principles. The coincidence of happiness with moral conduct follows from the divine plan of the world. Richard Cumberland (1631-1718), whose special interest lay in contesting Hobbes' view of the original condition of man, shows the a priori character of the moral demands by proving that the faithful maintenance of Hobbes' contract between the individual and the State depends on a previously existing moral element. The operations and processes of sense only bring out


some latent element, while the coincidence of happiness with morality is teleological. Good-will, love of one's neighbor, altruism, the whole field of Christian morality, work in and for the common weal.

3. Clarke, Hartley, and Price.

Related to the Cambridge school is Samuel Clarke (q.v.), who accepts an absolute standard for all positive laws. Moral distinctions are therefore not accidental; the standard which isrepresented in the typical ideas of the good, the righteous, the truthful, and so on, the moral judgment of the plain man, come from the necessary relations between the parts of the world, themselves all arising like mathematical relations from the idea of the whole, which, in turn, is dependent on the will of God. The above relations are assumed to be normal because the welfare and maintenance of the whole depends upon them. On this law of nature is based both positive human law and positive divine law, the latter bringing the completion of happiness through the idea of immortality. David Hartley (1705-57) derives from an original self love the moral judgment in its objective shape; obligations associated with commands apart from the individual have the immediateness of an in stinct. These different products of the psycholog ical process are parts of the accomplishment of the divine purpose in man, hence the moral law has a divine necessary character, representing a deter ministic pantheism. Richard Price (1.723-91) represents the defense of the intuitional character of the moral judgments of approval and disapproval. What originally is confused in instinct is clarified by thought. These judgments do not stand for considerations of interest, are quite distinct from any sensuous feeling of pleasure, and rest ultimately on the system of values established in the divine mind. This rationalizing Christian ethics aimed to establish the derivation of individual and social moral ideas from the presence of God in man's soul. It recognized no distinction between religious and secular aims, and had no intimate connection between the teaching of grace and original sin, but the coincidence in the next world of moral worth and happiness was brought out. The autonomy and divine nature of moral law was not brought into connection with the acts or facts of individual social life. These thinkers were not concerned with the erection of a Christian state nor the separation between a religious morality and the morality of man as citizen and subject of law.

4. John Locke.

Against such a priori idealistic theories, John Locke (see DEisns, I., § 4) worked out his a posteriori sensualistic system, opposed by his philosophy all innate ideas, making the foundation as well for ethics as for knowledge the investigation of the simplest elements of experience, viz., the feeling of pleasure and pain and the power of reflection. There was no criterion, according to him, of intuitive knowledge; this was proved by the great variety of ethical ideas in the field of ethnography and history. On the simplest elements of consciousness he based his principles of conduct. It is this common and simple basis that gives the character of necessity to morality. The law of nature is only an abstraction from the acts of men directed toward happiness. But moral law depends on a positive legislative will, adding pleasure and pain to the fulfilment of these commands and requiting them by punishment and reward. In this way the divine law of Moses and of Christ is introduced into his system as holding the supreme place, and after that the law of civil society in the State and in justice, with its ordinances resting expressly or unconsciously on a social contract. A third type of law, lying outside of both of these two, is developed from the free intercourse and judgment of society, having its sanction in public opinion and its motive in social respect. These are the chief rules of human action, because the highest attainment of happiness comes through their pursuit they correspond with the law of nature, and harmonize with the revealed law of God; they represent the principles by which the law of the State secures social welfare; they stand for the principles by which public opinion reaches its clearest form. The State law aims at the union of the religious and political autonomy of the individual with the welfare of the whole, while the other two types of law require self-control and benevolence. In Locke's system the Christian character of morality is preserved, but it has a very loose relation to the fundamental basis of his thought. It comes into view chiefly in his discussion of tolerance, the freedom of the Church, and the political freedom of the individual. But Locke's ethics was the point of departure for two movements, one which further reduced the religious element of Deism (q.v.) contained in it, while on the other side he was appealed to by the anti-deists who established a system of utility and ethical law characterized by rational supernatural elements (William Warburton, 1698-1.779, and William Paley, 1743-1805, qq.v.). But after all, in deism the chief point was its criticism of positive religion, rather than its ethical teaching; nor can any real progress be shown by the opponents of deism, in their combination of a natural and rational with a supernatural eudemonism. The greatness of Locke's work consists in his denial of innate ideas and in his establishment of moral rules adequate to the manifold examples of historical morality. He widened the sphere of ethics also by making a place for political and social morality. The practical side of his teaching made him popular in England, although in appreciating the true character of ethical study, he was less profound than the Cambridge school.

5. Shaftesbury, Butreler, and Hutcheson.

The separation of this sensualistic empiristic eudemonism from Christian ethics was made more complete by Lord Shaftesbury (see Drism, I., § 8), who handled the subject as a kind of arithmetic of the feelings. His work shows the esthetic standpoint of ancient times and the Renaissance, especially as he produces many Stoic points of view. He opposes the rationalism of the Cambridge school, and rejects the place acoorded to reflection by Locke. Man approves the altruistic impulses and feelings that tend to social progress in the State and society, and disapproves whatever disturbs the harmony of so


society or of his own nature. Ethics assumes the harmony, internal and external, between nature and man. But there is no connection in the system either ethically or metaphysically with positive religion. The power of reflection and the content of consciousness were clearly and powerfully analyzed by Bishop Joseph Butler (q.v.). The natural impulses, the feelings of self-love and benevolence, are distinguished by the different objects to which they are referred. Moral judgments arise only after reflection has established their relation to one another and their place in the economy and constitution of man. From these thoughts arises the authority of conscience, which acts as a governor over the interplay of the feelings. The central ides of tile conscience is love to one's neighbor, or the ideal of the harmony of society as a whole, in which the individual ego forms s part. The idea of God is included in the idea of morality, but the power of morality is strengthened by revelation and salvation as developed is Christianity. Locks practically kept the field in England, Shaftesbury influenced both German and Scottish thought. The purely human basis of his system was never recognized in England, or in any case it received narrow limitations and applications. At the head of the Scotch school stands Francis Hutcheson (1894-1746), with his development of the life of the soul from the principle of self-love. He distinguishes moral principles from sensual feeling. An instinctive tendency admires benevolence wherever it is seen, and man's conduct is controlled by this feeling of admiration. The approval of altruistic acts is seen by further reflection not to exclude a just type of self-love. This reflection is worked out in a casuietical and mathematical formulation of moral judgments in general, on which family life, private life, the society, and the State are ordered. By the same standard historical diversities in morality are socounted for. There is no difference in feeling itself, variations are produced solely by reflection on the feeling, or the conquest of the moral sense through egoistic passions.

6. Hume and Adam Smith.

It is this intuitive moral sense that David Hume opposes (q.v.; and see DEISM, L, § 8). . As an empiricist he desires to introduce nothing except the sensations and the feeling of pleasure and pain for the establishment of moral principles. Imagination, sympathy, association, habit, and custom are the foundation of all ethical acts and judgments. Man can place himself in a sympathetic attitude toward the action of others even when that action does not personally concern him, and can arrive at an average conception of the kind of action that benefits the individual and society. This attains the character of an objective ideal which he uses as a standard for his own conduct. A common norm is thus attained for all types of conduct. By education, culture, tradition, and positive law, this ideal has an objective power, either as law or in the instinct of conscience; its origin is forgbtten. It will thus be seen that sympathy does not aim at the satisfaction of common self-love as such, but at attaining what is useful to men as a whole. So Hume ends with the humanity idea of Shaftesbury and his morality takes on a utilitarian character. Hume's system has nothing to do with positive religion or Christianity, for morality is destroyed by superstition; theism or antheism would form a better combination with it. Hume's theory of sympathy was further developed and applied by Adam Smith (1723-90), who made the foundation of society enlightened self-interest. Ethics constituted only one part of a whole; the significance and action of ethics on that whole had to be determined. Moral ideas can arise only through association with others. By reflecting on the judgments of others sympathetically, there arises the idea of an impartial observer sympathizing with us with whom we also can sympathize; this makes up the corporate common consciousness, giving a necessary character to morality. The rules for man's conduct are at the same time the rules for attaining happiness and the harmony of society. Accordingly ethics, while not created by considerations of happiness, yet has its power increased by being brought into living relation with the harmonious organization of the whole of nature. So the idea of sympathy was transferred to the sphere of social psychology, and its individual basis was virtually abandoned. This social philosophy is regarded as coinciding with Christian altruism.

q. Results.

So arose the conception of modern scientific ethics. Great continental teachers such as Kant and Schleiermaeher were making their several contributions, contemporaneous with the progress of English ethical thought. But the impulse of the whole current came from English sources. Through the effects on theology, a new religious philosophy, dependent on moral psychology, came into existence. Theological ethics was established as a new form of study, made independent of dogmatic theology with a far wider sphere of interest than the old; laying down the lines of Christian ethics by analytical processes without sacrificing supernatural im pulses, it tried to unite Christian determination of ethical value, originating in an other-worldliness, with a human " in-the-worldliness." See ETHICS; MORALITY, MORAL LAW. (E. TROELTaCH.) BIBLIOGRAPHY: L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, 2 vols., Oxford, 1897; Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the ISth Century, London, 1881; 0. F. StsOdlin, Gio achichle der chrisuichen Moral, Gottingen, 1808; w. Gene, licechichte der chrieuiahen Ethik, Berlin, 1881-1887; F. Jodi, OescAiehte der Ethik do der neuren Philosophic Stutt gart, 1882; V. Cousin, Coura d'hieEeire de la philosophis morale au 18iPme aaPck, Paris, 1840-1841; I. H. Fichte, System der Ethik, vol. i., Leipeic, 1850; H. T. Buckle. History of Civilization in England, 3 vole., London, 1889;

J. Tulloch, Rational Philosophy and Christian Philosophy in England during, the 171h Century, Edinburgh, 1874; C. de Rkmueat, Hietoirs do la philosophic en Anglatene dspuis Bacon juaqu'h Locke, 2 vole., Paris, 1875; P. Janet, I>H7dtOiT6 de la science politique done acs.rappmis sues lammwTe, Paris, 1887; C. E. Luthudt, Geachirhte der eAfserliehen EAik Leipeio, >188893, Eng. transl., Edinburgh,1889 eqq.; J. H. Overton, The Church in England, 2 vole.,1897; M. Guysu, La Morale anpdaiee eontemporaine, Paris,1900; J. H. Overton and F. R.elton, The English Church,1714-1800, London, 1908.


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