SECTION L.

THEOLOGICAL Christian ethics, as distinguished from philosophical ethics, has an historical presupposition—the redemption accomplished in Christ. But redemption presupposes sin, from the power of which it delivers man; and sin presupposes the moral idea per se, of which it is the actual negation. Hence the knowledge of Christian ethics, as resting on the accomplished redemption, presupposes a knowledge of the moral state of man while as yet unredeemed, as in turn this knowledge presupposes a knowledge of that ideal state of being from which man turned aside in sin. Christian ethics has therefore a threefold state of things to present:

(1) The ethical or moral per se irrespectively of sin,—the moral in its ideal form, the proto-ethical, that which God, as holy, wills.

(2) The fall from the truly moral, namely, sin, or the guilty perversion of the moral idea in the actual world,—that which man, as unholy, wills.

(3) The moral in its restoration by redemption, that is, the regeneration of moral truth out of sinful corruption,—that which is willed by God as gracious, and by man as repentant.

These three forms of the moral or ethical stand, in relation to humanity, not beside but before and after each other,—constitute a moral history of humanity: the first stage is pre-historical; the second is the substance of the history of humanity up to Christ; the third is the substance of that stream of history which proceeds from Christ and is embodied in, and carried forward by, those who belong to Christ.

As in Christianity all religious and moral life stands in relation to the redemption accomplished in Christ, that is, to an historical fact, hence Christian ethics must also, under one of its phases, bear an historical character. Man is Christianly-moral only in so far as he is conscious of being redeemed by Christ; hence in this Christianly-moral consciousness the above-stated three thoughts are directly involved. Only that one can know himself as redeemed who knows himself as sinful without redemption; and only he can know himself as sinful who has a consciousness of the moral ideal. The classification of ethics here presented is based therefore in the essence of Christian morality itself. The first division presents ideal morality as unaffected as yet by the reality of sin,—morality in the state of innocence; the second presents the actual morality of man as natural and spiritually-fallen,—morality in the state of sin; the third presents the Christian morality of man as rescued from sin by regeneration, and reconciled to and united with God,—morality in the state of grace. The first part is predominantly a steadily-progressive unfolding of the moral idea per se; the second belongs predominantly to historical experience; while the third, as a reconciling of reality with the ideal, belongs at the same time to both fields. The historical person of Christ is, for all three spheres of the moral, a revelation of the truth that is to be embraced; in relation to ideal morality Christ is the pure moral prototype per se—the historical realization of the moral idea; in relation to the moral state in the second sphere, he manifests the antagonism of sin to moral truth, in the hatred of which he is the object; in relation to the third sphere, he 3is the essentially founding and co-working power, and manifests the antagonism of holiness to sin.

To present distinctively-Christian morality alone would be scientifically defective, as, without the two antecedent forms of the moral, it cannot be properly understood. To present ideal morality alone is the task of purely philosophical ethics,—usually, however, instead of the proposed pretendedly ideal ethics, the result is simply an artfully disguised justification of the natural sinful nature of unredeemed man. The ideal morality of our first division is in itself fully sufficient only for such as do not admit an antagonism between the actual state of humanity and the requirements of the moral idea, or who explain it into a mere remaining-behind the subsequently to-be-attained perfection, instead of conceiving of it as an essentially perverted state. The fundamental thought of Christian morality is this, namely, that the natural man is not simply normally imperfect, but that he is, guiltily, in an essential antagonism to the truly good, and that he is in need of a thorough spiritual renewing or regeneration. That this is the case is not to be proved à priori, not to be developed scientifically, but to be recognized as a fact. With the reality of sin the moral life becomes essentially changed, and an ethical treatise which should make reference to sin only as a mere possibility, as is the case with purely philosophical ethics, would, for this reason, be insufficient for the actual state of humanity. The history of humanity has become in all respects other than it would have been without sin, and hence a complete system of ethics cannot have merely a purely philosophical, but must have also an historical character,—must grapple with the entire and dread earnestness of real sin. If it ended at this stage, however, it would present but a dismal panorama of woe, utterly unrelieved by a gleam of comfort. But divine love has interrupted the history of sin by an historical redemption-act, and founded a history of salvation inside of humanity,—has given to man the possibility and the power to overcome sin in himself, and to rise up from his God-estrangement toward the moral goal. This is the third sphere, that of distinctively Christian morality, which, while it has indeed its prototype in the ideal ante-sinful form of morality, is nevertheless not identical therewith, inasmuch as 4its actual presuppositions and conditions are entirely different,—namely, no longer a per se pure, and spiritually and morally vigorous, subject, and no longer a per se good, and, for all moral influences, open and receptive, objective world, but, on the contrary, in both cases an obstinate resistance; it is in both respects therefore a morality of incessant struggle, while that of our first division is rather the morality of a simple development;—it is also not a mere pressing forward out of an, as yet, incomplete and in so far, imperfect state, but a real overcoming of actual immoral powers; and the earnestness of the morality, as well as of the ethical system, rises in proportion as we more deeply comprehend the inner and essential difference between the above-given three divisions of the subject-matter of ethics, as well as at the same time their inner and historical connection.

This our distribution of the subject-matter of ethics, though manifestly very accordant with the Christian consciousness, has been assailed on many sides; and especially have some writers manifested great concern as to whence in fact we could have any knowledge of this ideal and strictly-speaking non-realized morality. Such an objection ought at least not to be urged by those who think themselves able to construct a system, even of Christian ethics, upon the mere facts of the consciousness, or indeed upon a basis purely speculative. But certainly all who conceive of sin as a something absolutely necessary, will of course have to regard our first division as a pure product of a dreamy imagination; we contest, however, to writers holding such an opinion; the right to deny to a system of Christian ethics—which is throughout inspired with the thought that sin is the ruin of men [Prov. xiv, 34] and an abomination to the Lord [xv, 9]—the privilege of treating upon and discussing that which God, as holy, requires of his good-created children. As to whether for such discussion we have also a source of knowledge, will appear as we proceed.