CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.

I. The Objections that may be urged against arguing from Analogy to Religion may be answered, in general, by saying that they are owing to half views—to indeterminate language, and the deficiencies and abuse of words; but each objection can be separately precluded.

II. This Treatise proceeds upon the principles of others, and, therefore, is not as full a confirmation of Religion as it might otherwise be.

I. 1st. OBJECTED. “IT is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation by saying, that there are the same in natural religion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as others their respective, difficulties.”

ANSWER. The having all difficulties cleared, may be the same as requiring to comprehend the Divine Nature, and the whole plan of Providence. As to its being a poor thing to argue from natural to revealed religion, it has always been allowed, and it is often necessary to argue in such a way of probable deduction from what is acknowledged to what is disputed; and, indeed, the epithet poor is an 217 properly applicable to the whole of human life. Is it not a poor thing, for instance, that even the most eminent physician should have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases as often to act upon conjecture, where the life of a man is concerned? Yet it is not a poor thing in comparison of having no skill at all. Farther, it is of great consequence to show that objections urged against revelation are as much leveled against natural religion; for thus we prove that the objectors are arguing against moral Providence, while they seem, whether intentionally or not, to argue against revelation; for nothing more has been taken for granted in the second part of this treatise than there was in the first, viz., the existence of an Author of nature; so that Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the constitution of nature.

2d. OBJECTED. “It is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits.”

ANSWER. Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as there is reason to think is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under His government. Now, if men can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this as to believe that care of their temporal affairs 218 will be their advantage—this, with the infinitely superior interest which religion proposes, will be an argument for the practice of it. But the chief and proper force of the argument, referred to in the objection, lies in another place; for it is said, that the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful; and this is made a positive argument against its truth, since, if it were true, it is said to be incredible that it should be left to doubtful evidence. Now, the observation, that, from the natural constitution of things, we must, in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument, because it is a general instance made up of numerous particular ones of somewhat in the conduct of the Author of nature toward us similar to what is said to be incredible.

3d OBJECTION. “It is a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show that the like objections lie against natural Providence. This is a way of answering objections against religion without even pretending to make out that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable; especially when it is admitted that analogy is no answer to 219 such objections, i. e., those against wisdom, justice, and goodness.”

ANSWER. The design of this treatise is, not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men—not to justify his Providence, but to show us our duty. For, 1st, It is not necessary to justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any further than to show, that the things objected to may be consistent with, and even instances of justice and goodness, as has been already shown (Chap. 4, Part II.). 2d. The objections are not endeavored to be removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be conclusive, lie against natural Providence; but these objections being shown to be inconclusive, the credibility of the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, is shown from their conformity to the constitution of nature. 3d. This would be of weight, even though these objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion, above set down, and religion implying several facts—for instance, the fact that God will hereafter reward and punish men for their actions—the observation, that His present government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible. 4th. Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion, can not be answered without entering into the consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against the 220 credibility or truth of the system may; because the system of it is reducible into matter of fact, and the probable truth of facts may be shown without considering their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary to prove the reasonableness of every precept and dispensation; though, in some cases, it is highly useful to do so. But the general obligations of religion are made out by proving the reasonableness of its practice. 5th. Though analogy be not an immediate answer to such objections, yet it is an immediate answer to what is intended by them, which is—to show that the things objected against are incredible.

4th. OBJECTED. “When analogical reasoning is carried to the utmost length, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state.”

ANSWER. It is acknowledged that the foregoing treatise is far from satisfactory; but so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence on which we are obliged to act, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion, then, being admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, i. e., as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being; for satisfaction, in this sense, 221 does not belong to such a creature as man. They also forget the very notion of religion; for religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty, just as much as speaking to a man presupposes that he understands the language in which you speak, or the warning a man of danger presupposes in him self-concern. And, therefore, the question is, not whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory as to the purposes of curiosity, but whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes.

5th. OBJECTED. “It must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine that men will be prevailed upon to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.”

ANSWER. Religion is intended for a trial and exercise of the morality of every person’s character who is a subject of it; and thus considered, it has its ends upon all persons to whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice; for it puts them in a state of probation, let them behave as they will in it. And the purpose of this treatise is to show how, in reason, men ought to behave—not how, in fact, they will behave. But the objection itself allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight; hence it is probable that the treatise 222 will have some influence; and this is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there would be if it were likely to have a greater influence.

II. Thus the whole of the foregoing objections arise in a great measure firom half views, and undeterminate language, but farther, it is to be observed, concerning them, that this treatise has proceeded upon the principles of others (i. e., notwithstanding these principles—even admitting them to be true). Thus we have argued upon, or notwithstanding, the principles of Fatalists, which we d( not believe; and there have been omitted two principles of the utmost importance, namely, the abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness⁸⁹⁸⁹Bishop Butler throughout the present work has only considered the moral difference, by which virtue and vice, as such, are approved and disapproved. Dr. Samuel Clarke, has demonstrated (vide his sermons at Boyle’s Lectures), that there are essential differences in the qualities of human actions established in nature, and this natural difference of things, prior to and independent of all will, creates a natural FITNESS in the agent to act agreeably to it: it is obvious that the introduction of this principle would materially confirm Bishop Butler’s arguments.—which force themselves upon the mind, and in endeavoring to avoid them, the form of expression. sometimes made use of will appear strange, to such as do not observe the reason of it. Now these two abstract principles being omitted, religion can only be considered as a question of fact, and in this view 223 it is here considered, since Christianity, and its proof, are historical; and since also, natural religion is a matter of fact—as its general system is contained in the fact, that there is a righteous Governor of the World. This may be considered apart from these abstract principles; for instance, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, may be considered apart from their appearing so to our minds; the former is an abstract truth—the latter is only a matter of fact. So likewise, that there is in the nature of things an original standard of right and wrong, in actions, independent upon all will; but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise the moral government of finally righteous rewards and punishments—contains an abstract truth as well as matter of fact. But suppose that the government of righteous rewards took place here—it would not be an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact; and the same questions as are now raised, might still be raised about liberty and moral fitness; so that this proof would remain, however the questions might be decided. And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, which naturally approves some actions as of good desert, and condemns others as of ill desert. This final righteous judgment is not to be considered as an abstract truth, but as mere a fact as if it took place here. This future fact has not, 224 indeed, been proved with the force with which it might be proved, by taking in the considerations of liberty and moral fitness; but by omitting these, we have avoided the abstract questions concerning them, which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings; and we have confined ourselves to matter of fact, which must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, who would not have admitted abstract truth, but pretended to doubt whether there was any such thing as truth, or whether we could depend upon faculties for the knowledge of it in any case.

Hence, therefore, the force of this treatise may be distinctly observed. To such as are convinced of religion upon the proof of the two last-mentioned principles, it will be an additional proof and confirmation of it; to such as are not satisfied with abstract reasonings, it will be an original proof of it. Those who believe will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and its evidence peculiarly strengthened. Those who do not believe, will be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, and they will also be shown its plain undoubted credibility at the least. Ridicule may be applied to show the argument from analogy in a disadvantageous light, but it is unquestionably a real one; for, religion implying in it numerous facts, analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied; as it is the 225 only proof of most, so it can not but be admitted by every one to be of considerable weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed.

CONCLUSION.⁹⁰⁹⁰The summaries prefixed to each chapter should now be read in continuation, as the force of the treatise consists in the whole analogy considered together. Deduct, now, what is to be deducted from the positive evidence of religion, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in the objections against it upon the most skeptical principles, and the practical consequences will be—1st. That immorality is greatly aggravated in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity: because the moral system of nature which Christianity lays before us, approves itself almost intuitively to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. 2d. That there is a middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of Christianity, and a satisfaction of the contrary; which middle state of mind consists in a serious, doubting apprehension, that it may be true: and this serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of their life. 3d. It will appear that blasphemy and profaneness, with regard to Christianity, are without excuse; for there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can continue to vilify or 226 disregard Christianity—which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood—there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a demon stration of its truth.

QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VIII.

1. How may the objections urged against arguing from analogy to religion be generally answered?

2. Give a special reply to each of the following objections: 1st. What is wanted is, not to solve difficulties in revelation by saying that there are the same in natural religion, but to clear both of them of their common as well as their respective difficulties.

3. 2d Objection. It is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits.

4. 3d Objection. We can not vindicate the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and remove objections against both, to which the system of nature is open, by showing that the like objections lie against natural Providence.

5. 4th Objection. Analogical reasoning, carried to the utmost extent, does not fully satisfy the mind.

6. 5th Objection. We can not imagine that men will forego their present interests and pleasures from regard to religion upon doubtful evidence.

7. Give an exposition of the argument, by which Butler distinguishes between abstract truths and matters of fact in religion. What important conclusion does he draw from thence?

8. To what purpose may the force of this whole treatise be effectually applied?

9. Deducting every thing that can, upon skeptical principles, be required to be deducted from the positive evidence of religion, what practical consequences can be drawn from that which remains unassailable by sophistry and cavil?

THE END.