CHAPTER III.

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION, AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.

Objections against the scheme of Christianity, as distinguished from objections against the evidences of it are frivolous, for analogy furnishes a general answer to them.

I. That we are incompetent judges of it.

II. That it is probable, beforehand, that men will imagine they have strong objections against a revelation, however unexceptionable.

III. This leads to the determining the office of reason, namely, to judge only of the meaning, the morality, and evidence of revelation.

VARIOUS OBJECTIONS: The whole scheme of Christianity is objected to; the whole manner in which it is put and left in the world; several particular relations in Scripture; things in it appearing to men foolishness; things appearing matters of offense; the incorrectness of the style of revelation, especially of the Prophetic parts, in consequence of the rashness of interpreters, and the hieroglyphic 136and figurative language⁴⁷⁴⁷Thus Voltaire pretended to believe that Ezekiel eat the roll of parchment in reality, which the Prophet expressly asserts to have been a mere vision. in which they are expressed.

I. General Answer to all objections against Christianity considered as a matter of fact. Upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree, and that it would contain many things apparently liable to great objections in case it be judged of otherwise than by the analogy of nature. Not that the faculty of reason is to be depreciated—for it is not asserted that a supposed revelation can not be proved false from internal characters; for it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions, and either of these would prove it false; this belongs to reason to decide. (Vide this Chap. III.)

Proof from analogy that we are likely to be incompetent judges. If the natural and the revealed dispensations are both from God, if they coincide and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent judges of one, must render it credible that we may also be incompetent judges of the other. Since, then, upon experience, the natural dispensation is found to be greatly different from what, before experience, would have been expected, and is supposed to be liable to great objections, 137this renders it highly credible, that if they judge of the revealed dispensation in like manner, they will find it different from expectations formed beforehand, and apparently liable to great objections. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known laws, and that upon some exigencies he should suspend them—if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand of the wisdom of the ordinary administration, it could not be expected that he would be a competent judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. Thus we see generally that the objections of an incompetent judgment must needs be frivolous. But let us apply these observations to a

PARTICULAR EXAMPLE. Upon supposition of a revelation, let us compare our ignorance concerning inspiration before experience, with our ignorance concerning natural knowledge. We are not judges beforehand.

1st. What degree or kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own reason or experience; nor, 2d, how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it; nor, 3d, whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor, 4th, whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all; nor, 5th, whether it or the faculty of obtaining it would be given us 138 at once, or gradually. In like manner, respecting supernatural knowledge, we are ignorant beforehand, 1st, what degree of it should be expected; 2d, how far miraculous interposition would be made to qualify men for communicating it; 3d, whether its evidence would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; 4th, whether its evidence would be the same to all; and, 5th, whether the scheme should be revealed at once or gradually—committed to writing, or left to be handed down by verbal tradition.

OBJECTION. But we know that a revelation, in some of the above circumstances, one, for instance, not committed to writing, and thus secured against the danger of corruption, would not have answered its purposes.

ANSWER. What purposes? It would not have answered all these purposes which it has now answered; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees: and could we tell beforehand which were the purposes of God? It must, therefore, be quite frivolous to object to revelation, in any of the fore-mentioned respects, against its being left in one way rather than another; for this would be to object against things because they are different from expectations, which has been shown to be without reason. And thus we see that the only question concerning the truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation, not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we 139 should have looked for; and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulgated, as weak men imagine it should be. And therefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor multiplied objections of this kind, could overthrow the authority of Scripture, unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord had promised that it should be secure from these things. So that there are several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture, at least not to the Prophetic parts of it. We can not argue that this can not be the sense of any particular passage of Scripture, for then it would have been expressed more plainly, or have been represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with respect to common books, because in Scripture we are not, as we are in common books, competent judges how plainly, or under how apt an image the true sense ought to have been represented. The only question is, what appearance there is that this is the sense, and scarce any at all how much more determinately it might have been expressed.

OBJECTION. But is it not self-evident that internal improbabilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof?

ANSWER. Doubtless; but to what practical purpose can this be alleged in the present case, since internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and since we scarcely know what are improbabilities as to the matter before us.

II. The analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible men may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections against revealed knowledge, however really unexceptionable; for so, prior to experience, they would think they had against the whole course of natural instruction. Prior to experience, they would think they had objections against the instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and propensions, and to men, by these, together with reason, merely on account of the means by which such instruction is given. For instance, would it not have been thought highly improbable that men should have been so much the more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the laws of matter and of the planetary motions than the causes and cures of diseases, wherein human life appears so much more nearly concerned, or that they should discover in an instant, and unexpectedly, by the faculty of invention, what they have been in vain searching after, perhaps for years? or, that language—the only means of communicating our thoughts, should, in its very nature, be inadequate, ambiguous, 141 and liable to abuse, both from neglect and design I or that brutes should, in many respects, act with a sagacity and foresight often superior to what is used by man? These general observations will furnish an answer to almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence; because these objections are no more, nor greater, than analogy shows beforehand to be highly credible that there might seem to lie against revelation. This will more clearly appear by applying these observations to a

PARTICULAR OBJECTION. The gifts said to be miraculous, exercised by some persons in the apostolic age in a disorderly manner, were not really miraculous; for had they been so, they would have been committed to other persons, or these persons would have been endued with prudence also, or have been continually restrained in the exercise of their miraculous power.⁴⁸⁴⁸It is an objection of the same kind, and, therefore, to be answered in the same way—that the apostles were ignorant of the true nature of demoniacs; for, even if their ignorance be admitted on this or any other point of the like kind, it can not be concluded that they could not be taught Divine truth, without a knowledge of bodily diseases, or of other points equally extraneous from the design of their mission.

ANSWER. That is, in other words, God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or higher degree. But from the above observations it appears undeniable, that we are not 142 judges in what degrees and manners it were to be expected he should miraculously interpose. Let us look to the natural course of Providence, and see are the superior gifts of memory, eloquence, and knowledge conferred only on persons of prudence and decency. And it is to be supposed that persons endued with miraculous gifts, had the same influence over them as if they were natural endowments. Farther, our natural instruction is not always given us in a way most suited to recommend it, but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against it.

The analogy between natural and revealed instruction farther appears from this circumstance, that the improvements and hindrances of both are of the same kind. Practical Christianity, like the common rules of our conduct in temporal affairs, is plain and obvious. The more accurate knowledge of Christianity, like many parts of natural and civil knowledge, may require exact thought and careful consideration. The perfect understanding of revelation, if it come to pass before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interposition, must be arrived at in the same way as that of natural knowledge is attained to, namely, by pursuing hints and intimations which are generally disregarded by others. Nor is it at all incredible that the Bible, though so long in our possession, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered (possibly 143 only to be developed by events as they come to pass); in the same way as with the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, as men were possessed of long ago, great discoveries have been lately made in natural knowledge.

OBJECTION. “This analogy between natural and supernatural light fails in a material respect; for natural knowledge is of little or no consequence.”

ANSWER. We have been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not afford us. Besides, some parts of natural knowledge are of the greatest consequences. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from the whole constitution and course of nature; which shows that God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantages and consequence they would be to us. And this in general, with His method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would make out an analogy full to the point.

Objection against Christianity as a Remedy: “Scripture represents Christianity as an expedient to recover a lost world, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it then credible that this supply should be so long withheld, and then be made known to so small a part of mankind—should be so deficient, obscure, doubtful, and liable to the like perversions and objections as the light of nature itself?

ANSWER. Without determining how far this is so in fact, it is by no means incredible from analogy that it might be so; for are the remedies which nature has provided for diseases, certain, perfect, or universal? The same principles which would lead us to conclude that they must be so, would lead us also to conclude that there could be no occasion for them, i. e., that there could be no diseases at all; and these principles being found fallacious, from the fact that they are diseases, would render it credible beforehand that they may be false with respect to these remedies—as, by experience, we find they are—since the remedies of diseases are far from being certain, perfect, or universal.

III. Does it follow from all these things that reason can do nothing? By no means, unless it follows that we are unable to judge of any thing from our inability to judge of all things. Reason can and ought to judge (as has been partly shown already), not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and evidence of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of Scripture, that is, not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; for objections of this kind have been now obviated; but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness—to what the light of nature teaches us of God. There is no objection of this kind 145 against Scripture but such as would equally apply against the constitution and course of nature.

OBJECTION. But are there not some particular precepts in Scripture requiring actions immoral and vicious?⁴⁹⁴⁹For example, the command given by God to destroy the nation of Canaan.—Vide Graves on the Pentateuch.

ANSWER. There are some requiring actions that would be immoral and vicious, but for such precept; but the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; for these precepts are not contrary to immutable morality—they require only the doing an external action, e. g., taking away the property or life of any, to which men have no right, but what arises solely from the grant of God; when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either. If, indeed, it were required to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But are not these precepts liable to be perverted by designing men, and to mislead the weak and enthusiastic True, they are; but this is not an objection against revelation, but against the whole notion of religion as a trial, and against the general constitution of nature. Secondly, reason is to judge of the evidence of revelation, and the objections against it (which will form the subject of the 146 7th chapter] And it can also comprehend what is to be expected from enthusiasm and political views; and, therefore, can furnish a presumptive proof that a supposed revelation does not proceed from them, and is consequently true.

QUESTIONS—CHAPTER III.

1. Name the three principal divisions under which the subjects in this chapter are comprehended.

2. What are the various objections usually brought against the Christian revelation; and what general answer may be given to them, assuming Christianity to be a matter of fact?

3. Prove from analogy that we are likely to be incompetent judges as to what were to be expected in a Divine revelation.

4. State fully the particular example, in which Butler compares our ignorance concerning inspiration, before experience, with our ignorance concerning natural knowledge.

5. How is the objection obviated that “Revelation, unless given in such or such a way (i. e., according to the objector’s judgment of what was proper) would not answer its purposes?”

6. Give the argument by which the following assertion is proved, viz., that the analogy of nature shows it to be probable, beforehand, that men will imagine they have strong objections against a revelation, however unexceptionable.”

7. Answer the objection against Christianity, drawn from the abuse of gifts and powers, said to be miraculous, by persons exercising them.

8. Show that the improvements and hinderances of both natural and revealed instruction are of the same kind.

9. Answer the objection, that, “If Christianity be so great a remedy, why it has been so long withholden, and now so little known?”

10. What is the proper province of reason in judging of revelation?