SCHEME OF PART I.
ON NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAP. I. |
Analogy fully confirms the Scripture account of the existence of a Future State— |
CHAP. II. |
And that it will be one of Rewards and Punishments— |
CHAP. III. |
And that these Rewards and Punishments will be dispensed according to the merit and demerit of our actions. |
CHAP. IV. |
Therefore it becomes incumbent on us to resist all Temptations in this State of Trial. |
CHAP. V. |
And to make use of all the Means of Improvement for another Life, which this Probation State affords as
intended for Moral Discipline. |
CHAP. VI. |
For these Obligations are not in the least degree affected by the opinion of Universal Necessity. |
CHAP. VII. |
Or by any objections which may be urged against God’s Moral Government. |
PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
ON A FUTURE STATE.
I. A Future State probable from the Changes which we have undergone.
II. And from the probability of our continuing endued with the same
Capacities, unless there be some ground for supposing that Death
will destroy us—we have no ground from Analogy or Reason, and we can
not have it from any thing else.
III. Yet there are Imaginary
Presumptions founded on the notion of Living Beings being
Compounded, and therefore divisible. A proof of the Contrary
confirmed by a general Observation from Experience, leading to four
particular Observations. An Objection to some of these, “that they
tend to prove the immortality of Brutes,” answered.
IV. A contrary Analogy proved to be only apparent.
V. Our entrance on another State shown to be natural.
I. PASSING by the difficulties raised
by some concerning personal identity,To the Analogy are usually subjoined two
dissertations. both originally inserted in the body of the work. One
on Personal Identity, in which are contained some strictures on Mr.
Locke, who asserts that consciousness makes or constitutes Personal
Identity; whereas, as our author observes, consciousness makes only
Personality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e., a
thinking, intelligent being; but presupposes, and therefore can
not constitute, personal identity; just as knowledge, in any other
case, presupposes truth, but does not constitute it. Consciousness
of past actions does indeed show us the identity of ourselves, or
gives us a certain assurance that we are the same persons or living
agents now which we were at the time to which our remembrance call
look back: but still we should be the same persons as we were,
though this consciousness of what is past were wanting, though all
that had been done by us formerly were forgotten—unless it be true
that no person has existed a single moment beyond what he can
remember. The other dissertation is on the Nature of Virtue, which
does not be long to the religious, but to the moral, system of our
author.—Bishop Halifax. the probability of a future
state appears from the changes we have undergone—from the imperfect
state of infancy to mature age. Nor is this a law of our being only,
that we should exist at one period of our life with capacities of
action, of enjoyment, and suffering greatly different from those at
another period of it; we find it in other creatures also; for
example, the change of worms into flies—birds and insects bursting the shell,
and, by this means, entering into a new world. But, as far as we are concerned,
that there should be a future state of existence, as different
from the present as the
present is from our state in the womb and in infancy, is only what
is warranted by the analogy of nature.
II. Secondly, from the
probability of our continuing endued with the same capacities of
action, happiness, and misery which we feel that we now possess.
This is probable, unless there be some ground for supposing that
death will destroy them; for, in any thing, existence leads to a
probability of continuance, except where we have some reason to
think it will be altered. This seems to be our only reason for
believing that any one substance now existing will continue to exist
a moment longer (the self-existent substance only excepted). There
is the same kind of probability, though not the same degree of it,
that our living powers will continue after death as there is that
our substances will; and there would be no probability against the
former, if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not
the destruction of our faculties of perception and action; i. e.,
there would be no probability against it arising from any thing
else, unconnected with death, being able to destroy them. Now, if
death be justly presumed to destroy them, and if this be not merely
a confused suspicion, we must have some ground for the presumption from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy of nature. First,
we have it not from the reason of the thing, for we know not what
death is in itself,
but only some of its effects,
such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones; we know not upon
what the exercise (much less the existence) of our living powers
depends; for they may exist without being exercised, and when there
is no present capacity of exercising them, as in a sleep or swoon.
They may depend on something out of the reach of the King of
Terrors; so that there is nothing more certain than that the reason
of the thing shows us no connection between death and the
destruction of living agents.Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably
ambiguous, and may signify either the destruction of a living being,
so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever
perceiving or acting again at all, or the destruction of those means
and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its
present state of perception, and of action. It is here used in the
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is
added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in
the latter sense; but we have no reason to think the destruction of
living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more
reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them
during his whole existence than to believe that a stone ever
acquires them.—Butler. Secondly, we have it not from the
analogy of nature, for, throughout the whole of it, there is not the
slightest presumption that animals ever lose their living powers—much
less, if possible, by death. This event destroys the sensible proof which
we had before their death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does
not appear to afford the least reason to
believe that they are then, or by
that event, deprived of them. As far as our faculties can trace,
they retain them, and this is in itself a probability of their
retaining them beyond that period, especially when viewed in
connection with our first proof.
III. Objected against the assertion
that “there is no proof from the reason of the thing.”There is no subject on
which doubts and difficulties may not be started by ingenious and
disputatious man; and therefore from the number of their objections,
and the length of the controversy to which they give occasion, we
can not, in any case, conclude that the original evidence is weak,
or even that it is not obvious and striking. Were we to presume
that every principle is dubious against which specious objections
may be contrived, we should be quickly led into universal
skepticism. The two ways in which the ingenuity of speculative men
has been most commonly employed are dogmatical assertions of
doubtful opinions, and subtle cavils against certain
truths.—Gerard’s Dissertation, II., 4. “Living
beings are compounded, and so divisible.”
ANSWER. There is no proof
of this; it arises not from reason, but from that delusive
faculty—useful, indeed, to apprehension, but the author of all error—Imagination. Since consciousness is indivisible, it should rather
seem that the perceptive power, and consequently the subject in
which it resides, must be so too.See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Dodwell, and the defenses of it.
As a particle of matter (as well as its power of motion) is one and indivisible,
if its motion be absolutely one and indivisible—for if the
particle were divisible, one part
might be moved and the other at rest, and thus its motion could not
be as is supposed—-in the same way, if the subject of consciousness
be divisible, the consciousness of our own existence would be
divisible; so that one part would be here and another there,
contrary to what is supposed and experienced.That it is highly
unreasonable and absurd to suppose the soul made up of innumerable
consciousnesses, as matter is necessarily made up of innumerable
parts; and, on the contrary, that it is highly reasonable to believe
the seat of thought to be a simple substance such as can not
naturally be divided and crumbled into pieces, as all matter is
manifestly subject to be, must, of necessity, be confessed.
Consequently the soul will not be liable to be dissolved at the
dissolution of the body, and, therefore, it will naturally be
immortal. All this seems to follow, at least, with the highest
degree of probability, from the single consideration of the soul’s
being endued with sense, thought, or consciousness.—Clarke’s Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion.
Hence the absolute oneness of the living agent renders the body unessential to
its being, and our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves,
than any other matter around us; and yet it is as easy to conceive how such
matter may be appropriated to our use in the manner that our present bodies are,
as how we receive impressions from, and have power over any matter. It is
as easy to conceive that we may exist out of bodies as in them; that we might
have animated bodies, of any other organs and senses, wholly different from
those now given us, and that we may hereafter animate
these same or new bodies, variously
modified and organized, as to conceive how we can animate such
bodies as our present. Their destruction, then, might be like that
of any other matter, without any tendency to destroy our living
powers. Even without determining whether our living substances be
material or immaterial, all this is confirmed (though from the
nature of the case not properly proved) by observations from
experience. We remain the same living agents after the loss of our
limbs, organs of sense, or even the greatest part of our bodies; we
can remember ourselves the same when our bodies were extremely
small, and we lose now, and might have lost then, a great part of
our bodies, and yet remain the same. And it is certain, that the
bodies of all animals are in a constant change from that
never-ceasing attrition which there is in every part of them. All
this leads us to distinguish the large quantity of matter in which
we are nearly interested from the living agent who remains one and
the same permanent being.
OBJECTION. What is alienated or lost is no
part of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter.
ANSWER. Surely entire limbs which we may lose must contain many
solid parts and vessels of the original body; or, if this be not
admitted, we have no proof that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death.
From this it follows:—1st. Even
though the living being be not absolutely indivisible, yet it can
not be assumed that death will be the dissolution of it until its
proper bulk be determined, and till it be determined to be larger
than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no
ground to think any natural power can dissolve. 2dly. Our interest
in systems of matter does not imply the destruction of ourselves the
living agents, for we have, though not to the same degree, the like
interest in all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, and over which
we have any power; nor have we any ground to conclude that any other
systems of matter, suppose internal systems, are the living agents
themselves; for we can have no reason to conclude this, except from
the same principle—our interest in such systems. 3d. If we consider
the component parts of our body, this will more clearly appear. Our
organs of sense and our limbs are only instruments which the living
persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with; and
therefore we have no other kind of relation to them than we have to
any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and
motion—suppose into a microscope and a staff. But are not our organs
themselves percipient. No; the common optical experiments show that
we see with our eyes in the same sense that we see with glasses; and
the like may justly be concluded from analogy of all our other
senses.
Some of these organs may be lost,
while the living beings, the former occupiers, remain unimpaired. In
dreams we have a latent power, and, what would otherwise be an
unknown power, of perceiving sensible objects in as strong and
lively a manner without our external organs of sense as with them.
But are not our limbs endued with the power of moving and directing
themselves. No; a man can move an artificial leg, for example, as he
used to move his natural one, only that the natural instrument of
motion was more exactly formed, so as to move and produce motion in
its several parts; his active power remains unlessened. And thus the
finding that the dissolution of matter in which living beings were
most nearly interested is not their dissolution, and that the
destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception
and of motion is not their destruction, shows, demonstratively, that
there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other
matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be
the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from the like kind
of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand in any other
kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death.
OBJECTION. Brutes, in the same way, might be proved to be immortal,
and, by consequence, capable of everlasting happiness.
ANSWER.
(1st.) In a moral point of view, no such
consequence necessarily follows as
that they should. be capable of everlasting happiness; and, even
admitting it, there is no difficulty; for we know not what latent
capacities they may be endued with; and it is a general law of
nature, that beings should possess capacities of virtue for some
time without exercising them, as in infancy and childhood, and often
without exercising them at all in this world. (2dly.) As to a
natural immortality, the economy of the universe may require living
creatures without any capacities of this kind. Therefore we must
know the whole system before such can be an objection to this part
of the proof of the immortality of the human soul: it is less
applicable to the next part, which is more peculiar to man. (3dly.)
Our present powers of reflection not being dependent on our gross
bodies in the manner in which our organs of sense are, we may
conclude that they are not destroyed by death. We can live in a
state of reflection, after ideas are gained, when none of our senses
are affected or appetites gratified, and in this state enjoy the
greatest pleasure, or feel the greatest pain, without any assistance
from our senses, and without any at all, which we know of, from that
body which will be destroyed by death. Further, there are some
mortal diseases which do not affect, and, therefore, it may be
presumed, will not destroy our present intellectual powers. Indeed,
the body and intellectual
powers mutually affecting each other
would no more prove the necessity of their joint dissolution than
the connection of the body and the living agent required their joint
destruction, as already shown: but instances of their not affecting
each other afford a presumption of the contrary. Several things,
indeed, greatly affect all our living powers, and at length suspend
the exercise of them—as, for instance, drowsiness increasing till it
ends in sound sleep; and from hence we might have imagined it would
destroy them, till we found, by experience, the weakness of this way
of judging. But by these diseases there is not even a shadow of
probability that our present reflecting powers will be destroyed.
And if death, by diseases of this kind, is not their destruction, it
will scarcely be thought that death by any other means is; and as it
does not destroy, it is probable it does not interrupt the continuance of the exercise of these powers, since they can be
exercised without the aid of the body, and in a most lively manner,
during the whole progress of a mortal disease; nay, it may even
remove the hinderance to our existing in a higher state of
reflection,There are three distinct questions
relating to a future life here considered: Whether death be the
destruction of Living agents? if not, whether it be the destruction of their
present powers of reflection, as it
certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation?
and if not, whether it be the suspension or discontinuance of the
exercise of these present reflecting powers? Now, if there be no
reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible,
less for the next, and less still for the first.—Butler. namely, those external organs which render us capable
of existing in our present state of sensation, so that it may in
some respects answer to our
birth,This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans. not a suspension, but a
continuation of our former faculties, with great alterations.
IV.
Objected against the assertion that “there is no proof from
analogy.” There is an analogy for death being the destruction of
living creatures—namely, the decay of vegetables.
ANSWER. This
comparison may be just enough for poetic similes, but not for an
analogy; for one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that
which is the chief thing in the other, and which is the only thing
about the continuance of which we are inquiring—the power of
perception and of action.St. Paul answers objections against the resurrection, by analogy from the
works of nature. Vide 1 Cor., xv., 36. “The seed dies—it is only the
germ or bud that springs; the body of the seed first feeds this bud,
and then turns to corruption.” It is particularly to be noted, that
St. Paul is not speaking of the identity of the raised bodies.—Vide
Whitby on the passage.
V. Thus, when we go out of this world, we
may pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, just
as naturally as we came into the present; for it would be a contradiction
to say, that no state is natural but the present,
and yet that the probability of a future one appears from reason.
The meaning of the word natural is, stated, fixed, or settled; since
what is natural as much requires and presupposes an Intelligent
Agent to render it so, i. e., to effect it continually, or at stated
times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for
once. And from hence it must follow, that our notion of what is
natural will be enlarged in proportion to our greater knowledge of
the works of God, and the dispensations of His Providence. And this
state may naturally be a social one, and the advantages of
it—advantages of every kind may naturally be bestowed, according to
some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in proportion to
the degrees of his virtue.
NOTE. The credibility of a future life,
which has been here insisted upon, seems to answer all the purposes
of religion. Even a demonstrative proof of it would not be a proof
of religion; for it is just as reconcilable with the scheme of
Atheism as the fact that we are now alive; but as religion implies a
future state, presumptions against the latter would be urged against
the former, and, therefore, it was necessary to remove them.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER I.
1. Describe at full length the scheme of the
first part of the Analogy which treats on natural religion.
2. How
does Butler correct Locke in his definition of personal identity?
3.
How does the analogy of Nature warrant us to assert that a future
and different state of existence is probable?
4. Why is it probable
that we may continue endued with the same capacities, unless they
may be destroyed by death?
5. Show that there is no ground, from
reason or from analogy, to presume that death does destroy any
faculty of perception or action.
6. What answer can be given in
refutation of the objection that “Living beings are compounded,
and so divisible,” and consequently liable to complete destruction?
7. By what argument do we arrive at the following conclusion: viz.,
“That the dissolution of matter in which living beings were most nearly interested, is not
their dissolution?” And to the proof of
what truth is this conclusion applied?
8. Show that there is no
probability that death will cause the destruction of our present
powers of reflection.
9. Explain what is meant by the assertion
that, “Our entrance on another state will be natural.”
10. Show
that the credibility of a future life, insisted on by Butler in this
chapter, answers all the purposes of religion that a demonstrative
proof would.
CHAPTER II.
ON THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, AND PARTICULARLY ON THE LATTER.
I. If a Future State were only as
credible as the last Chapter proves it to be, yet it is sufficient
to urge us seriously to inquire, whether it is to be a State of
Rewards and Punishments, depending upon our Conduct here? The
probability of this appears from our happiness, and, in a great
measure, our misery, in this life, being left dependent on our own
actions; and objections to it are answered.
II. That there is to be a Future State of Punishments, appears from several particular analogies.
I. THE importance of the question concerning a future
life arises from our capacity of happiness and misery. But the consideration of this question would appear of so little importance
as only to be brought into our thoughts by curiosity concerning the
mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own, if there were
not a supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter depending
upon our actions here.
That there is a future state of rewards and
punishments, appears from the following General Analogy—We are at
present under such a government;
all that we enjoy, and a
great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power; for pleasure
and pain are the consequences of our actions, and we are endued, by
the Author of our nature, with capacities of foreseeing the
consequences. Our preservation, and every kind and degree of our
enjoyment, is effected by the means of our own actions. Generally
(though not always) our sufferings are produced by our own actions,
though instruction, example, and experience forewarned us that the
effect of such conduct would be injurious to our reputation, our
property, or our life. But why is the happiness and misery of
creatures left dependent on themselves Perhaps any other course
would, from the nature of things, be impossible, or would confer a
less degree of happiness, or not answer the end of an infinitely
Perfect Mind, which may be pleased with the moral piety of moral
agents in and for itself, as well as on account of its being a means
of conferring happiness, or, perhaps, it would not answer the whole
end of the Deity, which our faculties can not discern. But is not
the dispensation of happiness and misery in this world to be
ascribed to the general course of nature? True, this is the very
point asserted; it is to be ascribed to the general course, and,
therefore, to the Author of nature; for we must not deny that He
does things at all, because He does them constantly—because the
effects of His acting are permanent
whether His acting be so or
not, though there is no reason to think it is not. The natural
course of things is the appointment of God; our natural faculties,
which guide us in our actions, by enabling us to foresee their
effects, are given by Him also; the consequences of our actions are,
therefore, His appointment, and the foresight of these consequences
a warning given us by Him how we are to act; so that we are at
present actually under His government in the strictest sense—in such
a sense as that He rewards and punishes us for our actions—in the same sense as
that we are under the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing
pleasure to some actions and pain to others in our power to do or forbear, and
giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the
proper formal notion of government. It matters not, in this case, whether the
Deity interpose or not. If civil magistrates could make offenders execute
their laws upon themselves, or could execute them some other way,
without interposing at all, we should be under their government in
the same sense then as we are now, but in a much higher degree and
more perfect manner. 1st. Objected: Is the pleasure, then, naturally
accompanying every particular gratification of passion, intended as
an inducement and a reward for the gratification of it in every such
particular instance? No, certainly; no more than our
eyes, which were
unquestionably given us to see with, were intended to give us the
sight of each particular object to which they do or can extend,
however destructive of them, or however improper. 2d. Objected: Is
every trifling pain an instance of Divine punishment. The general
thing here asserted can not be evaded, without denying all final
causes; for if pleasure and pain be annexed to actions, as apparent
inducements for our conduct, they must be admitted as instances of
final causes, and as rewards and punishments. If, for example, the
pain felt on approaching too near the fire be intended to prevent
our doing what tends to our destruction, this is as much an instance
of God’s punishing our actions, as if He did after having warned us
by a voice from heaven.
II. A future state of punishment, being what
men chiefly object against (either from man’s nature being so frail
and exposed to temptation as almost to annihilate the guilt of human
vice, or from the nature of God, irresistible in His will, or
incapable of offense and provocation), will appear farther credible
from the following particular analogies between the punishments in
this life and what religion teaches us of those in the next:—
“1st.
Natural punishments often follow actions that are accompanied with
present gratification; for example, sensual pleasure followed by
sickness and untimely death.
2d. The punishments are
often much greater than the present pleasures or advantages.
3d. The
punishments are often delayed a great while, sometimes till long
after the actions occasioning them are forgotten, contrary to what
we might imagine, that they would immediately follow crimes or not
at all.
4th. After such delay, these punishments often come, not by
degrees, but suddenly, with violence and at once.
5th. Though these
punishments, in very many cases, inevitably follow at the appointed
time, yet persons have seldom a distinct full expectation, and, in
many cases, see, or may see, only the credibility of their
following: e. g., that intemperance will bring after it diseases.
6th. The thoughtlessness and imprudence of youth does not prevent
the punishments of excess following, and continuing the whole course
of their existence in this life. These consequences are generally
not considered, and can seldom be properly said to be believed
beforehand.
7th. There are frequent punishments for want of
acquirements, which being neglected at the natural season of
acquiring, could not be acquired afterward: this is very observable
in the natural course of things. The indocility of youth makes the
consequent defects of old age irretrievable; the neglect of the seed
time brings with it the irrecoverable
loss of the whole year.
There is a time when real reformation may prevent the consequences
of extravagance; ascend to a higher degree, and there is no place
for repentance.
8th. The punishments of neglect from
inconsiderateness are often as dreadful as those of any active
misbehavior from the most extravagant passion.
9th. Civil government
being natural, its punishments are so too, and some of these
capital; as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often
mortal. So that many natural punishments are final,It can
not be said that it is Scripture only, and not natural religion,
which informs us of a future state of punishment, and the duration
and degree of it. For this was known to the heathen poets and
moralists; and reason might well conclude that it would be
finally, and upon the whole, ill with the wicked. But what is
peculiar to revelation is, it fixes the time when this distributive
justice shall take place; namely, at the end of this world.—Butler. and seem
inflicted naturally to diminish the aggregate of mischief, either by
the removal of the offender from such a course, or by his example.
These things are so analogous to what religion teaches us concerning
the future punishment of the wicked, that both would naturally be
expressed in the same words. So much so, that it is doubtful to
which of the two, principally, the following passage from the book
of Proverbs, i., 22-32 refers:—Wisdom
is introduced as frequenting the most public places of resort, and as rejected
when she
offers herself as the
natural appointed guide of human life—“How long, ye simple ones,
will ye love simplicity? and the scorners delight in their scorning,
and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my reproof; behold, I will pour
out my Spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you. Because
I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no
man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would
none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock
when your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your
destruction cometh as a whirl wind; when distress and anguish cometh
upon you: then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they
shall seek me early, but they shall not find me: for that they hated
knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord: they would none
of my counsel: they despised all my reproof: therefore shall they
eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own
devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the
prosperity of fools shall destroy them.”
The instances of
punishments now mentionedHence may be deduced experimental answers to many popular objections and
excuses; as, that God is too merciful to inflict everlasting
punishment; that we were sincere in our intentions; that we did not
know it was a sin we were committing, &c. Our misery, like our
neglect, is self-induced. (for men are not always punished here in
proportion to their sins) are sufficient to show what the
laws of the universe may
admit, and to answer the usual objections against a future state of
punishment. Indeed, nothing but a universally acknowledged
demonstration on the side of Atheism can justify unconcern about
such a state. The folly of such security without proof appears from
the following analogy. May it not be said of any person upon his
being born into the world, that he may act in such a manner as to be
of no service to it but by being made an example of the woful effects of vice
and folly; he may bring death upon himself from the hands of civil justice, or
from the effects of his excesses; or infamy and diseases worse than death. So
that even with regard to the present world, it had been better for him that he
had never been born. And shall we suppose that there is no danger of something
similar in a future state, under the providence and government of the same God,
though we rest as secure and act as licentiously as we please?
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER II.
1. What supposition makes the consideration of
the question, concerning a future life, evidently important to each
individual?
2. Describe the general analogy, which makes a future
state of rewards and punishments perfectly probable.
3. Why is the
present happiness or misery of creatures left so much dependent
upon themselves?
4. Suppose it to be granted that “The dispensation
of happiness and misery, in this world, is to be ascribed to the
general course of nature,” what follows from that admission?
5. What
is the proper formal notion of government, whether human or divine?
And what would be the most perfect manner of it?
6. State the two
objections urged against the assertion that, “pleasure or pain is
annexed by God to certain actions as an apparent inducement for our
conduct,” and refute them.
7. Describe at full length the particular
instances of analogy between natural punishments in this life, and
what religion teaches us of those in the next.
8. For what purposes
are the above-mentioned instances of analogy amply sufficient?
9. By
what analogy may the folly of a person, who s unconcerned about a
future state, be demonstrated?
CHAPTER III.
OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
Having shown in the
last Chapter that, as the appearances of Final Causes prove an
Intelligent Maker of the World, so tile particular instances of
Final Causes, there mentioned, prove an Intelligent Governor of it.
In this Chapter, it is shown that He is a MORAL Governor. Omitting
to consider that the natural notion we have of God is as a Moral
Governor, and that, from the Nature He has given us, we may conclude
that Vice will finally be punished, and Virtue rewarded—and not
dwelling on the proof that, even in this Life, Virtue has its own
reward, and Vice its punishment, it is shown that the Government by
Rewards and Punishments is to be moral.
I. Because no other seems so
suited to our minds.
II. Our Prudence is here rewarded, and
Imprudence punished
III. Vicious Actions, as injurious to Society,
are, in a great degree, punished.
IV. Virtue, as such, is actually
rewarded, and Vice punished; 1st, by their effect on the Mind; 2d,
by the opinion of the World in general.
V. The natural tendency of
Virtue and Vice, if not so much obstructed, is to produce good and
bad effects in a greater degree than they do; and it is probable
that these Obstructions will be removed in a Future State.
I.
HAVING seen that we are under a government of rewards and
punishments in this life, we shall next inquire whether this
government be moral, and, if so, to what extent? For moral
government consists,
not barely in
rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most
tyrannical person may do, but in rewarding the righteous and
punishing the wicked—in rendering to men according to their actions,
considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government
consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures, in
an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. Let us,
then, examine whether there be in the constitution and conduct of
the world any intimations of a moral government—clear to those who
will carefully examine itThe
objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being
universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged
against natural religion as well as against revealed. And,
therefore, the consideration of them belongs to the first part of
this treatise as well as the second; but, as these objections are
chiefly urged against revealed religion, I chose to consider them in
the second part. And the answer to them there (Chap VI.), as urged
against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as
urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the
reader is referred to that chapter.—Butler.—and consequently of a Moral Governor.
That simple absolute benevolence is the only character and principle
of action of the Author of nature—which makes him disregard the
actions of his creatures farther than they might produce higher
degrees of happiness—requires to be proved before it is asserted.
But the possibility of its being proved or disproved is foreign to
our purpose, which is to inquire whether in our world a
righteous government be
not discernible, which implies necessarily a righteous Governor. It
may at once be granted, that, if there be a moral government here,
it is not perfect; the question is, therefore, reduced to this, can
there be discerned any principles of a moral government, further
than the moral nature which God has given us, and our natural notion
of Him as a Moral Governor?
It might be urged that, in general,
less uneasiness and more satisfaction are the natural consequences
of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life; but it is difficult
so to weigh pleasures and uneasinesses as exactly to estimate the
overplus of happiness on the side of virtue; this is more difficult
in the case of those who have led a vicious life for some time. They
have, upon their reformation, their former passions craving for
their accustomed gratification; their former vices will be more
frequently thrown in their way, by the conversation of men, or
otherwise, after their amendment, when, from having acquired a
deeper sense of shame, the infamy will be more felt; for, though
this properly belongs to their former vices, yet it will, in part,
be attributed to their change of life. We, therefore, rather dwell
on the following considerations: Since it has appeared that we are
under the government of God, by the methods of rewards and
punishments, according to some settled rule of distribution, what
rule for finally rewarding and
punishing appears
more natural to us than that of distributing justice?
II. In this
world our prudence is rewarded, and our imprudence punished; the one
by satisfaction and external advantages, the other by inconveniences
and sufferings. These afford instances of a right constitution of
nature.
III. Vicious actions are, to a great degree, punished, as
mischievous to society, by the actual infliction of the punishment,
or by the fear of it. And this is necessary for the very being of
society; therefore these punishments are as natural as society
itself.
OBJECTION. Actions beneficial to society are often punished,
as in the case of persecutions, &c., and actions injurious to it
rewarded.
ANSWER. This is not, in the same sense, necessary, and,
therefore, not natural, neither are they punished as being
beneficial, nor rewarded as being mischievous.
IV. Virtue, as such,
is actually rewarded, and vice, as such, punished. In order to see
this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions in the
abstract, and with morality attached to them. An action by which any
natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures delight
or advantages abstracted from all consideration of the morality of
such action. Consequently the pleasure or advantage in this case is
gained by the action itself—not by the morality, the
virtuousness, or the viciousness of it; though it be, perhaps,
virtuous or vicious. 1st. Then it appears, from the effects of
virtue and vice on the mind and temper, that un easiness arises from
vice—pleasure from virtue This is evident from daily experience. A
man says, he is vexed with himself, when the uneasiness does not
arise from a sense of mere loss or harm, but from a sense of some
action being vicious in a greater or less degree. This feeling, in
more serious language, we call remorse. Again, a man laments an
accident or event, and, besides that, feels additional grief, when
he has to admit that it was his own doing; or else some redeeming
satisfaction, if he can not blame himself. Thus also vice, even
where there is no reason to fear resentment or shame, causes
disturbance from a sense of being blameworthy. And it may be
added—where there are some fears, not to be got rid of, of the
possibility of retribution in after life. On the contrary,
satisfaction and complaisancy are found in the real exercise of
virtue, together with the peaceful hopes of a better life. 2d. From
the opinion of the world in general—from the encouragement given by
good and honest men, and even by most men, to a person considered to
be virtuous. Public honors are the consequences of actions
considered as virtuous—for example, patriotism, eminent justice;
while actions considered as vicious have been punished;
e. g.,
tyranny, from a sense of its own nature, independent of the miseries
it brings with it. For men resent injuries under the notion, not
merely of having received harm, but for having received wrong, and
they feel this resentment in behalf of others as well as of
themselves. In returning kind actions, we are influenced, not only
by the actions themselves, but by the kind intention and good desert
they imply in the doer. In domestic government, children are
punished for falsehood, injustice, &c., as such, and rewarded for
the contrary. The authors of crimes, punished by civil government,
merely as being prejudicial to society, are brought to justice very
much from the sense which men have for their actions as immoral.
Absence or aggravation of guilt in the moral senses often effects
the remission or retention of penalties annexed to civil crimes.
These instances may seem trivial, but they borrow importance from
the subject to which they are applied. But whence is it that virtue,
as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as such, punished, and this
rule never inverted It proceeds, in part, from the moral nature
which God has given usThat we
have an approving and disapproving faculty of this kind is evident
from our own experience—from the words right and wrong, odious and
amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification in
all languages applied to actions and characters—from the many
written systems of morals which suppose it—from our natural sense
of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good and
intending it, &c., &c.—Vide Bishop Butler on the Nature of Virtue. (and is an additional
proof to
that furnished by the
possession of such a nature; for this last is a proof that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually; while the former
is an example of his favoring and supporting it at present, at
least in some degree), and it proceeds, in part, from his having
given us, together with this nature, so great a power over each
other’s happiness and misery. For, from the first, we are so made,
that well-doing, as such, gives us satisfaction, at least, in some
instances—ill-doing, as such, in none. And, from both conjoined,
vice must be, in some degree, infamous, and men disposed to punish
it, as detestable. There is nothing on the side of vice to answer
this, because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as
the logicians say, to virtue. Any instances of such a thing, if they
be not imaginary, are, at least, unnatural perversions. There are,
it is admitted, cases where persons are prosperous, though wicked—afflicted, though righteous—and even rewarded for wicked actions,
and punished for virtuous ones. But this arises not from the
reversion of the natural tendencies of virtue and vice, which is
impossible, but it may arise from there being other wise rules for
the distribution of happiness, besides that of personal merit or
demerit., as, for example, the way of
mere discipline. We
see enough to know on which side the Author of nature is; and, in
the degree that we co-operate with Him, we naturally feel a secret
satisfaction and sense of security, and an implicit hope of somewhat
farther; and this hope is confirmed by—
V. The natural tendency in
virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned,
in a greater degree than they do, in fact, produce them. For
instance, good and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished,
as such, were it not that justice is often artificially eluded. With regard to
individuals, these tendencies are obvious. But it
may require more particularly to be considered, that power in a
society, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally
increases, and has a natural tendency to prevail over opposite power
not under the direction of it; in like manner as power, by being
under the direction of reason, increases, and has a tendency to
prevail over brute force. The superiority which reason gives to
power is considered to be, not the accidental, but the natural
tendency of reason; and yet it could not prevail over altogether
disproportionate force. It is possible that brute force, either by
excess of numbers, by union, by want of sufficient length of time,
or of some other opportunities in the rational creatures, should
gain the superiority over them. No one would, notwithstanding,
hesitate to consider this as
an inverted order of
things; i. e., that the natural tendency of reason is—to be
superior. Now, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure
superiority and additional power, considered either as the means of
security from opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages. It
has this tendency, among other ways, by rendering public good an
object and end to every member of society, and by uniting society by
the chief bonds of union—veracity and justice. But yet there must be
some proportion between the natural power or force which is under
the direction of virtue, and that which is not: there must be
sufficient length of time; for the complete success of virtue, as of
reason, can not, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than
gradual. There must be a fair field of trial, a stage large and
extensive, proper opportunities for the virtuous to join together,
to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the fruit of
their united labors. Since much less power, under the direction of
virtue, would prevail against power not under the direction of it,
good men, if united, would prevail even here, to a considerable
degree, over the bad. But there are various obstacles to their being united; for example, they can not be sufficiently assured of each
other’s characters. These obstacles may be removed in a future state
(which implies a more perfect one, like the state of mature ago
compared with that of childhood), where men may
unite among
themselves and with other orders of virtuous creatures. Virtue is
here militant. Among other things, the shortness of life denies to
it its full scope in several other respects. In a future state it
may prevail, and enjoy its consequent rewards. There may be scenes
there lasting enough, and, in every other way adapted to afford it a
sufficient sphere of action; and it may be added, if this tendency
were carried into effect, it would serve as an example to those
orders of creatures capable of being recovered to a just sense of
virtue. These are merely suppositions, which are not to be
considered true, because not incredible; but they are mentioned to
show that there can be no objections against the natural tendency of
virtue, from the obstacles that prevent it in this world, as we can
easily conceive how these obstacles can be removed; and the
presumption that they will be removed, as they are only accidental,
is proportionate in degree to the length of time through which the
natural tendency will continue. The happy tendency of virtue might
be seen by imagining an instance even in this world, by supposing a
kingdom, or society of men, perfectly virtuous for a succession of
many years—every individual contributing to its preservation by
contentedly employing his capacity in its proper sphere; injustice,
whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, and
their wisdom, inviolable
union, &c., would
fully secure them against their neighbors, devoid of such virtuous
qualities, allowing both a sufficient time to try their force. The
head of this society, by the tendency and example of virtue, would,
in time, become a universal monarch in another sense than any mortal
has yet been, and all people, nations, and languages would serve him, And thus the wonderful power and prosperity promised, in
Scripture, to the Jews, would be, in a great measure, the
consequence of what is also predicted of them—“that the people
should be all righteous and inherit the land forever;” i. e., taking
the term “forever” to mean length of time sufficient to acquire
this power. Suppose the obstacles against the fulfillment of this
prediction to be removed, and the dominion and pre-eminence promised
must naturally follow to a very considerable degree. All this might
appear of little importance, if we did not consider what would be
the consequence if vice had naturally these advantageous tendencies,
or virtue the direct contrary ones.
OBJECTION. But prove that the
obstacles will be removed in a future state.
ANSWER. Even if they
were not removed in a future state, if there was to be a
continuation of the apparent confusion of rewards and punishments
that exists in this, it could not be said that vice, upon the whole,
would have the advantage rather than virtue. But that the future
state is to be one
perfectly moral,
can be proved by the usual arguments, of which the things here
alleged afford a strong confirmation; for, 1st, they show that the
Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice, so that even
the course of nature, as here explained, furnishes us with a real
practical proof of the obligations of religion. 2d. The distributive
justice, which Scripture declares is to take place in a future
state, will not be different in kind, but only in degree, from what
we experience here: it will be that in effect to which we now see a
tendency. 3d. Our experience that virtue and vice are actually
rewarded and punished at present in a certain degree, gives us just
ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded and punished in
a higher hereafter; and 4thly, there is sufficient ground to think
that they will, from the natural tendencies of virtue and
vice—obstructed, indeed, in this life by obstacles, which being, in
numberless cases, only accidental, are more likely to be removed in
a future state than the natural and necessary tendencies.
From these
things joined with the moral nature which God has given us,
considered as given us by Him, arises a practical proof (vide chap.
6., ad fin.) that it will be completed—a proof from fact, and,
therefore, a distinct one from that which is deduced from the
eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of
actions.Vide the Note, Part II., Chap. VIII., 2.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER III.
1. Explain the meaning of the term, “Moral Government,” and show in what it consists.
2. In commencing the
inquiry “whether in our world a righteous government be not
discernible,” what considerations, that might fairly be adduced in
proof of it, does Butler omit to press as arguments? What reasons
does he give for these omissions?
3. State the four general heads,
under which the arguments, showing that God’s government is to be
moral, are comprehended in this chapter.
4. How does it appear from
their effects on the mind and temper, that the uneasiness arises
from vice, and pleasure from virtue?
5. Show that from the world in
general, virtue, considered as such, is actually rewarded; and vice,
considered as such, punished.
6. Whence is it that the
above-mentioned rule of judging and acting is never inverted by
mankind in general?
7. To the proof of what assertions does Butler
apply these two facts; viz., that mankind possess a moral nature,
and that they (taken as a whole) judge and act according to it?
8.
How may we answer the objection “that some persons are even
rewarded for wicked actions, others punished for virtuous ones?”
9. Give a summary of the
comparison which Butler institutes between reason and virtue; as to
their natural tendency in causing power under their direction to
increase in a society.
10. Name some of the obstacles which
counteract the natural tendency of virtue to prevail. How and when
does Butler suppose they may be removed?
11. For what purpose are
the above-mentioned suppositions brought forward?
12. By what
supposed case (the possibility of which, however, is intimated in
Scripture) may the natural happy tendency of virtue in a society be
seen?
13. All the reasonings here alleged, affording confirmation of
the usual arguments that the future state is to be perfectly moral,
are summed up under four heads. Name them distinctly.
CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.
1. Having shown the confirmation which
Analogy affords to the Scriptural Doctrine of a righteous
distribution of Rewards and Punishments in a Future State, it is
next shown that this World is our state of Probation previous to it.
1st. As implying Trials and Difficulties. 2d. As intended for Moral
Discipline and Improvement. 3d. As a Theatre of Action for the
manifestation of Persons’ Characters to the Creation of God. That
this World is a state of Probation in the first sense of the word,
is proved in the present Chapter, from the Analogy that, in our
Temporal Capacity, we are in a state of trial and danger for our
Temporal Interest.
II. This Analogy is more perfect, since the same
constitutes both trials; men behave the same way under them, and the
dangers in both are increased from the same causes
III. Objections
answered.
I. A STATE of probation (in the most common meaning of the
word) is, in a great measure, the same with the moral government
which we have already proved to exist—affording us scopes and
opportunities for that good and bad behavior, which God will
hereafter reward and punish; for, in order
that there may be some
ground for future judgment, there must be some sort of temptation to
what is wrong; but the word “probation” expresses more clearly and
particularly this allurement to wrong, together with the dangers and
difficulties to be encountered in adhering uniformly to what is
right. That the present is such a state appears from the following
analogy:—Natural government by rewards and punishments, which
leaves our happiness and misery dependent on ourselves (chap. 2), as
much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral trial.
Accordingly, in our temporal interests, we find ourselves in a state
of trial; all temptations to vices contrary to that interest prove
it; also all difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in any thing
relating to our worldly happiness.
II. This will more distinctly
appear, if we consider, 1st, that the same constitutes both trials;
namely, something either in our external circumstances or in our
nature. In the one case, a temptation may be so singular or sudden
as to overpower; in the other, a person may be so habituated to vice
as to seek opportunities, and go out of his way to gratify sinful
passions; and these passions are as much temptations to act contrary
to prudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of which is our
worldly interest, as they are to act contrary to the principle of
virtue and religion. However, these
two sources of temptation
coincide and mutually imply each other, for there must be somewhat
within men themselves to render outward circumstances temptations,
and there must be external occasions and exciting objects to render
their inward passions so. Thus mankind, having a temporal interest
depending upon themselves, and a prudent course of behavior being
necessary to secure it, passions inordinately excited are dangerous
temptations to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal
interest, for the sake of present gratification. Such is our state
of trial in our temporal capacity; and it will answer that in our
religious capacity, by merely substituting the word future for
temporal, and virtue for prudence,Parables are founded on
analogical reasoning. Vide, in this case, the Scripture parable of
the Ten Virgins, but more especially that of the Unjust Steward.
“The Lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely,
for the children of this world are, in their generation, wiser than
the children of light.”—Luke, xvi., 8. so analogous are they to each
other. 2d. That mankind behave in the same way under both trials. lIany do not
look beyond their present gratification, not even to the consequences in this
life, whether they are blinded by inordinate passions, or forcibly carried away
by them against their better judgment, or willingly yield in defiance of all
consequences temporal and eternal. 3d. That the difficulties of right behavior
are increased in a like way in both
capacities—in our religious
capacity by the ill behavior of others, by an education wrong in a
moral sense, sometimes positively vicious, by general bad example,
by dishonest artifices in business, and by religions being corrupted
into superstitions which indulge men in their vices. In our temporal
capacity our difficulties are, in like manner, increased by a
foolish education—by the extravagant and careless example of
others—by mistaken notions, taken from common opinion, concerning
temporal happiness; and these difficulties are increased to men, in
both capacities, by their own wrong behavior in any stage of their
existence; for example, in youth, it renders their stage of trial
more dangerous in mature age.
III. 1st OBJECTION. Why is not this
state of trial less uncertain. Would it not be more credible if it
were not so uncertain?
ANSWER. There are natural appearances of our
being in a state of degradation, and, though our condition may not
appear the most advantageous, this furnishes no cause for complaint; for, as
men, by prudent management, can secure, to a tolerable degree, their temporal
interest, so religion requires no more of us than what we are well able to do,
if we do not neglect the appointed means. But the chief answer to the objection
against such a state as religion declares this to be, is the foregoing analogy,
for, from it, this appears to be throughout
uniform and of a piece with
the general conduct of Providence toward us in all other respects
within the compass of our knowledge. If our present interest were
not uncertain, but secure, it might furnish some presumption against
the truth of religion, which represents our future interest, not as
secure, but depending on our behavior; but from the contrary being
the fact, the objection is of no force.
2d OBJECTION. It is
improbable that any kind of hazard and danger should be put upon us
by an Infinite Being, when every thing which is hazard and danger in
our manner of conception, and which will end in error, confusion,
and misery, is now already certain in His foreknowledge.
ANSWER. It
might seem improbable, did not analogy prove it false in fact. The
difficulty of accounting for it in speculation can not be removed
till we know the whole, or, at least, much more of the case.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER IV.
1. What is the meaning of the term, “a state
of probation,” as used in this work?
2. From what analogy does the
present life appear to be such a state?
3. Explain the analogy which
appears to exist between our state of trial in our temporal, and
that in our religious capacity.
4. How do mankind commonly behave
under both trials?
5. By what causes, common to both, are the
difficulties of doing well increased?
6. Answer the following two
objections: 1st. Why is not this state of trial less uncertain?
7.
2d Objection. Is it not improbable that hazard should be put upon us
by a Being whose foreknowledge is certain?
CHAPTER V.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.
1. That we are in a state of Probation, in the
second sense, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement for
another state, appears from Analogy—from the beginning of Life
considered as a preparation for mature age.
II. The extent of this
Analogy may be determined from the following considerations. 1. In
both respects, new Characters must be acquired. 2. We are capable of
acquiring these new Characters by our capacities of Knowledge and
power of Habit (Habits are either active or passive; Habits either
bodily or mental; all virtuous Habits formed by active exertion). 3.
The possession of these Capacities implies what experience also
proves to us-the necessity of using them. And, 4th, we can show how
virtuous Habits can be useful in the preparation for another Life;
and Discipline necessary even for Creatures finitely perfect.
III. Objections to such a State answered.
IV. This World is a state of Probation in the third and last sense.
I. FROM considering that we
are in a state of probation, the question naturally arises, how came
we to be placed in it? But this is a question involved in
insuperable difficulties. We may lessen
these difficulties by
observing that all wickedness is voluntary, and that many of the
miseries of life have apparent good effects; but it is plain folly
and presumption to pretend to give an account of the whole reason of
the matter. Perhaps the discovery or comprehension of it is beyond
the reach of our faculties, or, perhaps, the knowledge of it would
be prejudicial to us. Religion affords a partial answer to it, but
a satisfactory one to a question of real importance to us, namely,
What is our business here? And this answer is, we are placed in a
state of so much affliction and hazard for our improvement in virtue
and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state of
security and happiness.
GENERAL ANALOGY: The beginning of life
considered as an education for mature age, in the present world,
appears plainly to be analogous to this our trial for a future one:
the former being in our temporal capacity what the latter is in our
religious capacity. This will more clearly appear from the following:—
II. PARTICULAR ANALOGIES: 1st. Every species of creatures
is, we see, designed for a particular way of life, to which the
nature, the capacities, temper, and qualifications of each species
are as necessary as their external circumstances. One thing is set
over against another, as an ancient writer expresses it (Eccles.,
xlii., 24). Our nature
corresponds to our external
condition.Bishop Butler has clearly shown, in his
sermons, the peculiar correspondence between the inward frame of man
and the external conditions and circumstances of his life; that the
several passions and affections of the heart, compared with those
circumstances, are certain instances of final causes; for example,
anger leads us to the immediate resistance of injury, and compassion
prompts us to relieve the distressed, &c., &c. So that there must be some determinate capacities—some
necessary character and qualifications, without which persons can
not but be utterly incapable of a future state of life; in like
manner as there must be some without which men would be incapable of
their present state of life. 2d. The constitution of human
creatures, and, indeed, of all creatures within our observation, is
such as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for
states of life for which they were once wholly unqualified. We may
imagine creatures, but we do not know of any, whose faculties are
not made for enlargement by experience and habit. We find ourselves
in particular, endued with capacities of acquiring knowledge,
namely, apprehension, reason, and memory. And by the power of
habits, we can acquire a new facility in any kind of action, and settled
alterations in our temper and character. But neither the perception of ideas nor
knowledge of any sort are habits, though they are absolutely necessary to the
forming of them; but the improvements of our
capacities of acquiring
knowledge, especially in the case of memory, may, perhaps, be so
called. That perceptions come into our minds readily and of course,
by means of their having been there before, seems a thing of the
same kind as readiness in any particular kind of action proceeding
from being accustomed to it; and aptness to recollect practical
observations of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in many
cases. There are habits of perception, as, for example, our constant
and even involuntary readiness in correcting the impressions of our
sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute,
imperceptibly to ourselves, judgment in the room of sensation. And
it seems as if all other associations of ideas, not naturally
connected, might be called passive habits, as properly as our
readiness in understanding languages upon sight or hearing of words.
There are also active habits, as, for example, our readiness in
speaking and writing languages. For distinctness, we may consider
habits as belonging to the mind or to the body. As habits of the
body, i. e., all bodily activities and motions, are produced by
exercise; so are habits of the mind—including, under this
denomination, general habits of life and conduct, such as those of
obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular person;
those of veracity, justice, and charity; and those of attention,
industry, self-government, revenge. But there is this difference
between them, that bodily
habits are produced by repeated external acts—mental habits by the
exertion of inward practical principles carried into action, or
acted upon. No external course of action can form these habits
otherwise than as it proceeds from the inward principles, e. g., of
obedience and veracity; because it is only these inward principles
exerted which are strictly acts of obedience, veracity, &c. It will
contribute toward forming virtuous habits to resolve to do well, and
to endeavor to impress on our minds a practical sense of virtue, or
to beget in others that practical sense of it which a man really
feels himself (for resolutions and endeavors are properly acts).
Practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts; not
so with passive impressions—they grow weaker by being repeated; so
that going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures, in place of forming a habit of
virtue, may form a habit of insensibility to all moral
considerations. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are
felt less sensibly. Thus—
(lst.) Being accustomed to danger begets
intrepidity, i. e., lessens fear.
(2d.) Being accustomed to distress
lessens the passion of pity.
(3d.) Being accustomed to instances of
others’ mortality lessens the sensible apprehension of our own.
And these effects of active
and passive habits may occur at the same time; active habits may be
strengthening while the motives that excite them are less and less
sensibly felt; and experience confirms this, for active principles,
at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they
were, are found to be somehow wrought more thoroughly into the
temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing our
practice. Thus, in the three examples of passive habits just
mentioned, active habits may be operating at the same time.
(lst.)
Active caution may be increasing, while passive fear is growing
less.
(2d.) The practical principle of benevolence may be
strengthening, while the passive impression of pity, in consequence of frequently witnessing distress, will be less and less sensibly
felt.
(3d.) It greatly contributes to strengthen a practical regard
to death; i. e., to form a habit of acting with a constant view to
it; to behold daily instances of men dying, around us, though these
instances give us a less sensible feeling or apprehension of our
own mortality.
Thus it appears that passive impressions made upon
our minds by admonition, experience, and example tend to form active
habits, not from our being so affected, but from our being induced
to such a course of, action; i. e., it is the acting, and
not the affection, that forms
them; only it must be always remembered that real endeavors to
enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous
actions. And practical principles grow stronger absolutely in
themselves by exercise, as well as relatively with regard to
contrary principles, which, by being accustomed to submit, do so
habitually and of course. Thus a new character, in several respects,
may be formed.
3d. We should be totally unqualified for the
employments and satisfactions of a mature state of life, unless we
exerted the capacities that are given us, and therefore, we may
conclude, intended to be made use of. Even maturity of understanding
and bodily strength require the continued exercise of our powers of
mind and body from our infancy. But if we suppose a person brought
into the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is
conceivable, he would plainly, at first, be as unqualified for the
human life of mature age as an idiot. Want of acquired habits would
be like want of language—it would destroy society. Children, from
their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the scene in
which they are to have a future part, and learning something
necessary to the performance of it; he, from his ignorance would be
distracted with astonishment, apprehension, and suspense. The
subordination to which they are accustomed teaches them subjection
and obedience;
he would be so strangely
headstrong and self-willed as to render society insupportable. And
there are numberless little rules of action, learned so insensibly
as to be mistaken for instinct, which he would be ignorant of,
without which we could not live. Thus, by example, instruction and
self-government, we are suited to different stations in life, and
our conduct in each (which depends upon habits from our youth)
determines our character and rank in society. All this is an analogy
applicable to the present life, considered as a preparation for a
future. Our condition in both respects is uniform, and comprehended
under one and the same general law of nature.
4th. But do we know
how this world is calculated for such a preparation? If we did not,
this would be no objection against it being so. We might, with as
much reason, object to the known fact that food and sleep contribute
to the growth of the body, because we do not know how they can do
it, and, prior to experience, we could not have thought that they
would. Children are as ignorant that sports and exercise are useful
for their health; and they might as well object to restraints in
them, and in other matters necessary for their discipline, because
they do not see the reason of them: But taking in the consideration
of God’s moral government, and, consequently, that the character of
virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for a future
state, we may
distinctly see how and in what respects the present life may be a
preparation for it, since we want, and are capable of, improvement
in that character by moral and religious habits, and the present
life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement. Now,
first, as regards the state for which we are to prepare, analogy
leads us to conclude that it will be a society as Scripture
describes it; and it is not at all unreasonable to suppose, though
there be no analogy for it, that it will be, according to the
representation of Scripture, under the more immediate or sensible
government of God. That we are capable of improvement, has been
already shown; and that we want it, every one will admit who is
acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind, or even with those
imperfections which the best are conscious of. But the necessity for
discipline in human creatures is to be traced up higher than to
excess in the passions by indulgence and habits of vice. From the
very constitution of their nature they are deficient, and in danger
of deviating from what is right, and, therefore, they stand in need
of virtuous habits for a security against this danger; for, besides
the general principle of moral understanding, they have, in their
inward, frame, various affections toward external objects, which the
principle of virtue can neither excite nor prevent being excited;
and when the object of any affection can not be obtained with the
consent of the moral principle,
yet may be obtained without it, such affection, though its being
excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as
it is natural and necessary, tends to incline them to venture upon
an unlawful means of indulgence. Now, what is the general security
against their actually deviating from what is right? As the danger
is from within, so, also, must the security be—from the inward
practical principle of virtue;It may be thought that a sense of
interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong.
But if, by a sense of interest, is meant a speculative conviction,
or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater
uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to
present experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient
to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if, by a sense
of interest, is meant a practical regard to what is, upon the whole,
our happiness, this is not only coincident with the principle of
virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it
is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved as really
as any principle in our nature; for we daily see it overmatched not
only by the more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love
of imitation—by any thing, even indolence; especially if the
interest—the temporal interest suppose—which is the end of such
self-love, be at a distance; so greatly are profligate men mistaken
when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and
self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim
this principle.—Butler. and the strengthening this principle will
lessen the danger or increase the security against it. All this is under the
supposition that particular affections remain in a future state. If this
supposition
be true, acquired habits
will probably be necessary to regulate them; if it be not, it
amounts to the same thing; for habits of virtue, thus acquired by
discipline, are improvements in virtue; and improvements in virtue
must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the universe
be moral. The necessity of moral improvement by discipline will
further appear by considering, 1st, how creatures, made upright, may
fall; and, 2d, how, by preserving their integrity, they may raise
themselves to a more secure state of virtue. The nature of liberty
can no more account for the former than the possibility of an event
can account for its occurrence. But it seems distinctly conceivable,
from the very nature of particular affections or propensions; for,
suppose creatures intended for a state of life for which these
propensions are necessary, endued with them, together with a moral
understanding, having all these principles exactly proportioned to
their intended state of life, such creatures would be made upright
or finitely perfect. Now, these propensions must be felt, the
objects being present; they can be gratified without the consent of
the moral principle, and, therefore, possess some tendency to induce
persons. to such forbidden gratification; which tendency, in such
particular cases, may be increased by a greater frequency of
occasions to excite them, by the least voluntary indulgence, even in
thought, till, by
peculiar conjunctures
conspiring, the danger of deviating from right ends in actual
deviation—a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, which, on this account, could not have been prevented,
though it might have been innocently passed through.This proves that it was not
necessary for our Lord to take upon him our sinful nature in order
to be capable of temptation. Vide two Sermons, by Dr. O’Brien, to
prove that he might be “tempted like as we are, and yet without
sin.” It is
impossible to say how far the first actThis may serve as an answer to the common objection, that
the consequences of a single crime in our first parents are
represented in Scripture as incredibly excessive. of irregularity might
disorder the inward constitution, but repetition of irregularity
would produce habits, and, in proportion to this repetition,
creatures, made upright, would become depraved. But, 2d, by steadily
following the moral principle, creatures might have preserved their
uprightness, and, consequently, might have been raised to a higher
and more secure state of virtue, since the moral principle would
gain strength by exercise, and the propensions from habit would more easily
submit. Thus, then, vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also
depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous self-government is
not only right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution, and may
improve it to such a degree as that the danger of actually
deviating from right may be
almost infinitely lessened. Thus it appears, that creatures without
blemish, even possessed of a moral principle, may be in danger of
going wrong, and so stand in need of the higher perfection and
security. of virtuous habits formed in a state of discipline. Much
more are they in danger, and much do they require such habits, whose
natures are corrupted, and whose passions have become excessive from
habits of indulgence. They require to be renewed, not merely
improved; for them, discipline of the severer sort must be
necessary. This world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline
for this purpose. Such experience as it affords of the frailty of
our nature—of the danger and actual event of creatures losing their
innocence and happiness—hath a tendency to give us a practical
sense of things very different from a speculative knowledge of what
we are liable to. But what renders it peculiarly fit, are the snares
and temptations to vice, because they render caution, recollection,
and self-denial necessary to such as will preserve their integrity.
And strong temptations particularly call these into action; and,
requiring a stronger effort of virtue, or a continued exercising of
it, they confirm a habit of it much more than weak or instantaneous
temptations could possibly do. It is, indeed, ridiculous to assert
that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety; but it is nearer
the truth, though not strictly the truth itself,
to say, that it is essential
to discipline and improvement; for, though actions materially
virtuous may not be an exercise of the virtuous principle, i. e.,
not virtuous actions at all, but merely done from being agreeable to
our own particular inclinations, yet they may be an exercise of that
principle, and, when they are, they tend to form and fix the habit
of virtue; and this in proportion to the frequency or intensity of
the exercise of the virtuous principle; but, as neither our
intellectual power nor bodily strength can be improved beyond a
certain degree, and both may be overwrought, possibly there may be
some trifling analogy to this in the moral character. Thus it
appears, in general (for there may be some other minute exceptions),
that this world is peculiarly fit to be a state of trial, in the
same sense that some sciences are fit to form to habits of attention
the minds of such as will attend to them. These several
observations, concerning the active principle of virtue, are
applicable to passive submission, or resignation to the Divine will,
which is another essential part of a right character, connected with
the former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to.
III.
1st OBJECTION. “The present state is so far from proving, in event,
a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that, on the
contrary, they seem to make it a discipline of vice.”
ANSWER. The
viciousness of the world is, in different
ways, the great
temptation, which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the
degree it is, to good men. The whole end of man being placed in such
a state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for. It is
a discipline to some who attend to and follow the notices of virtue
and religion; and if it be not to the generality, this can no more
be urged as a proof against its being intended for moral discipline
than the decay of the greater part of the numerous seeds of
vegetables and bodies of animals put in a way to improve to maturity
and perfection can be urged as an objection against their being
intended for that end, to which only one in a million attains to.I can not forbear
adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the appearance
of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these seeds and
bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable as, what is
much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral
agents by themselves, i. e., by vice.—Butler.
2d OBJECTION. As far as a course of behavior materially virtuous
proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and
strengthening of self-love.
ANSWER. Doing what God commands, because he commands it, is
obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear; and a course of such obedience
will form habits of it. There is no foundation for this great nicety; for
veracity, justice, and charity (regard to which must form habits of
self-government),
respect to God’s authority, and to our own chief interest, are not only all three
coincident, but each of them is, in itself, a just and natural
principle of action.Religion is so far from disowning
the principle of self-love, that it often addresses itself to that
very principle, and always to the mind in that state where reason
presides; and there can no access be had to the understanding but by
convincing men that the course of life we should persuade them to is
not contrary to their interest.—Butler’s Sermons.
3d OBJECTION. How can passive submission and resignationResignation to
the will of God is the whole of piety; it includes in it all that is
good, and is a source of the most settled quiet and composure of
mind. It may be said to be perfect when our will is lost and
resolved into His.—Butler’s Sermons.
be in any way necessary to qualify for a state of
perfect happiness, since nothing but afflictions can give occasion
for, or require this virtue?
ANSWER. Experience contradicts this
assertion. Even prosperity begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts.
Imagination is as much a source of discontent as any thing in our external
condition. It is, indeed, true, that there can be no scope for patience when
sorrow shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind which shall
have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered as an active
principle leading us to pursue our real and chief interest, must coincide with
the principle of obedience to God’s command (this obedience and the pursuit of
our own interest being
synonymous), yet it can
not be said so certainly to coincide, considered merely as the
desire of our own interest, any more than particular affections can,
i. e., so as to be incapable of unlawful excitements. So that habits
of resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all
creatures—habits, i. e., what are formed by use. However, in general
it is obvious that both self-love and particular affections in human
creatures, considered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the
mind, and, therefore, require discipline to moderate them. But the
proper discipline for resignation is affliction, since a right
behavior under that trial will habituate the mind to a dutiful
submission, which, with the active principle of obedience, make up
the character which belongs to us as dependent creatures.
4th
OBJECTION. All the trouble and danger, un avoidably accompanying
such discipline, might have been saved us by our being made at once
the creatures which we were to be.
ANSWER. This is contrary to the
general conduct of nature, which is not to save us trouble or
danger, but to furnish us with capacities for going through them,
and to oblige us to do so. Acquirements of our own experience and
habits are the natural supply to our deficiencies, since it is as
plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications as
the external things which we stand in need of.
IV. There is a third sense of
the word probation: a theatre of action for the manifestation of
persons’ characters to the creation of God. This may, perhaps, be
only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other
senses. However, this manifestation of the real character of men may
have respect to a future life in ways unknown to us: particularly it
may be a means of their being disposed of suitably to their
characters, and of its being made known to the creation, by way of
example, that they are thus disposed of.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER V.
1. What is the only question of real importance
to us, that arises from the consideration of our being in a state of
probation here? And how may it be answered?
2. State, 1st, the
general analogy by which Butler illustrates this subject; and, 2d,
the four distinct considerations by which he shows the extent and
force of that analogy.
3. How does he explain the passage in
Ecclesiasticus, chap. xlii., 24; and what consequence does he deduce
from it?
4. State what are our capacities of acquiring knowledge;
and by what power we may acquire settled alterations of our
character.
5. What comparison may we institute between the habits of
the body and those of the mind?
6. Give a summary of the argument
showing the momentous difference between practical habits and
passive impressions on the mind; noting especially the only way in
which the latter can become useful to us.
7. Prove that the
possession of capacities implies the necessity also of using them.
8. By what considerations may we distinctly see how, and in what
respects, the present life may be a preparation for a future state?
9. Show that, from the very constitution of our nature being
deficient, there is a necessity for discipline in human creatures.
10. What meaning does Butler affix to the
term “a sense of our interest,” when he proves it is perfectly
compatible with moral rectitude? State his argument on this point.
11. How does it seem distinctly conceivable, from the very nature of
particular affections implanted in them, that creatures, made
upright, may fall?
12. How does it appear that upright creatures, by
pursuing their integrity, may raise themselves to a more secure
state of virtue? What inference is drawn from the two foregoing
positions?
13. By what arguments is it proved that “this world is
peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for the purpose, not
merely of improving, but of renewing men?
14. Answer the following
objections. 1st. The present state becomes to most men a discipline
of vice instead of virtue.
15. 2d. Actions proceeding from hope or
fear, though they be materially virtuous, only discipline and
strengthen self-love.
16. 3d. How can passive submission and
resignation, which are required only in afflictions (and they are
occasioned by a state of sin), serve to qualify us for perfect
happiness and virtue?
17. 4th. Might not all our trouble and danger
in this state of discipline have been saved by God making us at once
the creatures which he intends us finally to be?
18. What purpose
may be served by the manifestations of the real character of
individuals in this life?
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.
I. The proof of the existence of an Intelligent Author of
nature, taken for granted in this Treatise, is not affected by the
opinion of Universal Necessity, For, 1st, when a Fatalist asserts
that every thing is by necessity, he must mean by an agent, acting
necessarily; and, 2d, the necessity by which such an agent is
supposed to act does not exclude intelligence and design.
II.
Neither does the opinion of Universal Necessity affect the system of
there being a Moral Governor, or of our being in a state of
religion; for, if that opinion can be reconciled with our condition
under the present Moral Government, it can be reconciled with that
which religion teaches us to expect; but, in the former case, it is
found to be practically false.
III. The opinion of Universal
Necessity does not affect the practical proof of religion, derived
from the particular final causes of pleasure and pain annexed to
actions, combined with the external evidence of Natural Religion.
1. AN objection may be made from universal necessity against the
existence of an Intelligent Author of nature, which has been taken
for granted throughout this treatise as a thing proved, as it
may be supposed that such
necessity will account for the origin and preservation of all
things. But, in the first place, when it is said by a fatalist that
every thing is necessary, and could not possibly have been
otherwise, it is to be observed that this necessity does not exclude
deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles
and to certain ends, because all this every man may every moment be
conscious of. So that the assertion that every thing is by necessity
of nature is not an answer to the question whether the world came
into being as it is, by an Intelligent Agent forming it thus or not?
but to quite another question—whether it came into being in that way
and manner which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner
which we call freely? For, suppose farther, that, in a dispute
between a fatalist and one who believed himself a free agent, a
house was instanced; they would both agree that it was built by an
architect; the point of their difference would be, whether he built
it necessarily, or freely? We ascribe to God a necessary existence,As to the meaning of necessary existence, logicians have
long since determined that there are but two modes according to
which any Being can be said to exist, or to be what it is; and these
are contingency and necessity. Where the non-existence of a Being is
possible, that is, where we can, without a contradiction, suppose it
not to exist, that Being exists contingently, or contingency is the
mode of its existence. But if there is any Being who demonstrably
must exist, and whose non-existence is therefore impossible and inconceviable, that
Being exists necessarily, or necessity is
the mode of its existence. But necessity can in no sense be
considered as the cause, or even as the ground or reason of any
existence, or of any effect whatever.—Hamilton on the Existence of
God. uncaused,
by any agent: for we find
within ourselves the idea of infinity, i. e., immensity and
eternity, impossible even in imagination to be removed out of being;
and from hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies a
concrete) we conclude that there is, and can not but be, an Infinite
and Immense Eternal Being, answering this idea, existing prior to
all design contributing to his existence; and, therefore, from the
scantiness of language, we say necessity is the foundation of his
existence. But there can not be said to be this kind of necessity
for the existence of every thing—a necessity antecedent in nature to
design, for many reasons: but chiefly because it is admitted that
design in the actions of men contributes to many alterations in
nature.
II. The condition of mankind under the present moral
government being greatly analogous to our condition under a farther
government, which religion teaches us—if any assert, as the fatalist
must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable with
the former, there immediately arises a question, in the way of
analogy,“Fatalists are fond of inferring moral necessity from
physical, in the way of analogy,” In effect, says Voltaire, it would
be very singular that all nature, all the planets, should obey
eternal laws, and that there should be
a little animal five feet high, who, in contempt of these laws,
could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice. We do too
much honor to such reasoning when we reply to it in the bold but
sublime words of a great genius:”
Know’st thou th’ importance of a soul immortal?
Behold this midnight-glory, worlds on worlds!
Amazing pomp! Redouble this amaze;
Ten thousand add; add twice ten thousand more;
Then weigh the whole. One soul outweighs them all,
And calls the astonishing magnificence
Of unintelligent creation poor.
BEATTIE.
whether he must
not also own it to be
reconcilable with the latter, i. e., with the system of religion
itself, and the proof of it. Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate
any one from his youth up in his own principles—to eradicate the
very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by
teaching him that he can not possibly behave otherwise than he does;
suppose the child to judge, from this system, what treatment he is
to expect from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into the
world—as the fatalist judges from it what he is to expect from the
Author of nature, and with regard to a future state. At first lie
would have a great degree of conceit and vanity at being freed from
the restraints of fear and shame with which his playfellows were
fettered; but this is not all; he must evidently, by constant
correction, have the want of those natural perceptions of blame and
commendation supplied, which this system destroyed, and thus be
convinced that, if it be not
false, it is misapplied when
applied to practice. Or, supposing his temper could remain still
formed to the system, upon his coming abroad into the world he
would be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would
receive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of
soon committing some act for which he would be delivered over into
the hands of civil justice. Any other practical application of this
opinion will be found equally fallacious; for instance, that there
is no need for taking care to preserve life, for, if we are destined
to live, we shall live without it; and, if to die, we can not
prevent it. None of these practical absurdities result from
reasoning upon the supposition that we are free; and, therefore,
though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were
speculatively true, yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it
were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole
of our present life. And how can people think themselves so very
secure, that the same application of the same opinion may not
mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect to a
future one, on which is dependent a more general and more important
interest. For religion being a practical subject, and the analogy of
nature showing us that we have not faculties to apply this opinion,
were it a true one, to practical subjects, whenever we do apply it
to the subject of religion, and thence conclude that we are free
from its obligations, it
is plain this conclusion can not be depended upon. Nor does this
contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what is
unreasonable—applying our reason to subjects to which experience
shows us they are not suited. Farther, we find within ourselves a
will, and are conscious of a character, i. e., that frame of mind
whereby we act in one manner rather than another. Now, if this in
us be reconcilable with fate, it is reconcilable with it in the
Author of nature (besides natural government and final causes imply
a character and a will in the Governor concerning the creatures whom
He governs); and it is as reconcilable with the particular character
of benevolence, veracity, and justice in Him, which attributes are
the foundation of religion, as with any other character, since we
find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than
cruel—true than faithless—just than unjust—or, if the fatalist
pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said, indeed, that what,
upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment, upon
supposition of necessity becomes manifestly unjust; because it is
punishment inflicted for doing what persons could not avoid doing.
As if the necessity which is supposed to destroy the injustice of
murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice of
punishing it. However, as little to the purpose as this objection is
in itself, it shows how the notions of justice and injustice
force themselves
upon the mind, even while we are making suppositions destructive of
them.
III. But, though it is most evident that universal necessity,
if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that
character in the Author of nature, which is the foundation of
religion, yet does it not plainly destroy the proof that He is of
that character, and consequently the proof of religion? By no means;
for we find that happiness and misery are not our fate in any such
sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior, but that they
are the consequences of it. But as the doctrine of liberty, though
experienced to be true, may be perplexed with difficulties, and as
necessity seems to be the basis of infidelity, we shall prove more
distinctly and particularly that necessity does not destroy the
obligations of religion. The proof, from final causes, of an
Intelligent Author of nature, is not affected by it. And it is a
matter of fact—and, therefore, there can be no objection against it
from necessity—that He governs the world by the method of rewards
and punishments, and also that He hath given us a moral faculty, by
which we distinguish between actions virtuous and vicious. This is a
rule of such authority, that we can not depart from it without being
self-condemned. It is plainly a Divine command, immediately
producing a sense of duty, being a direction of the Author of nature
to creatures capable of looking upon it as
such; and his having
annexed to some actions an inseparable senseFrom hence might easily be deduced the obligation of
religious worship, were it only to be considered as a means of
preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God,
and securing our obedience to it; which yet is an extremely
imperfect view of that most important duty.—Butler. of good desert, and to
others of ill, surely amounts to declaring upon whom his punishment
shall be hereafter inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed.The conclusion,
that God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is
not here drawn from it appearing to us fit that He should, but from
its appearing that He has told us He will. However, I am far from
intending to deny that the will of God is determined by what is fit,
by the right and reason of the case; though such abstract subjects
are rather to be declined, or, at least, treated with
caution.—Butler. But
besides this, natural religion hath an external evidence which the
doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, would not effect. 1st.
Somewhat of this system has been professed in all ages and countries
of which we have any information. This general consent shows the
system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind. 2d. It is a
certain historical fact, as far as we can trace, that religion was
believed in the first ages of the world, and this when it was
unadulterated by superstition. The only alternative is, either that
it came into the world by revelation, or that it is natural and
obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The former is the conclusion of
learned men, rendered more
probable by the inaptness of uncultivated minds for speculation, and
by the early pretenses to revelation, otherwise not easily accounted
for. 3d. There is express historical, or traditional evidence, as
ancient as history, of the system of religion being taught mankind
by revelation; and why should not the most ancient tradition be
admitted as some additional proof of a fact against which there is
no presumption; and this proof is mentioned here, because it tends
to show that religion came into the world by revelation prior to all
consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed to
contain a revelation, and even prior to all consideration whether
the revelation itself be purely handed down.
It is carefully to be
observed, and ought to be recollected, after all proofs of virtue
and religion, which are only general, that, as speculative reason
may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral
understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of it not
impartially attended to; this should admonish us not to take custom,
and fashion, and slight notions of honor, or imaginations of present
ease, use, and convenience to mankind for the only moral rule.
The
foregoing observations together amount to a practical proof,
sufficient to influence the actions of men, who act upon thought and
reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof of the
contrary.
OBJECTION. “There are
many probabilities which can not be shown to be no probabilities,
and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the other
side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object
against particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the
opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false. Now the method of
government by rewarding ana punishing good and ill desert, as such,
supposes that we are free, and not necessary, agents; and it is
incredible that the Author of nature should govern us upon a
supposition, as true, which he knows to be false,Hume goes so far as to affirm, “that, though man, in
truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by
fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he
acts with the conviction of being a free agent.” Who conceals it?
Does the Author of nature conceal it, and this writer discover it?
To laugh were want of goodness and of grace,
And to be grave exceeds all power of face.
BEATTIE.
and, therefore,
absurd to think that he will reward or punish us for our actions
hereafter, especially considered as of good or ill desert.”
ANSWER.
The whole analogy of nature shows that the conclusion, from this
reasoning, is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of
freedom, indeed, clearly shows where—in supposing ourselves necessary, when, in
truth, we are free agents. But, upon supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies
in taken for granted that it is incredible
that necessary agents should
be rewarded and punished. It is matter of fact that men are rewarded
and punished for their actions, considered as virtuous and vicious;
so that, if it be incredible that necessary agents should be thus
rewarded and punished, then men are not necessary, but free. But if,
on the contrary—which is the supposition we have been arguing
upon—it be insisted that men are necessary agents, then there is
nothing incredible in the farther supposition of necessary agents
being thus rewarded and punished, since we ourselves are thus dealt
with.
Is, then, the common assertion true, that the opinion of
necessity is essentially destructive of all religion? It is true,
1st, ill a practical sense, that atheists encourage themselves in
vice by this notion. 2d. In the strictest sense, that it is contrary
to the whole constitution of nature, and so to every thing. But it
is not true; as we have seen that necessity, supposed reconcilable
with the constitution of things, is not also reconcilable with
natural religion; its proof remains unaffected by it, and,
therefore, the proof of revealed religion.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VI.
1. Show that the proof of the existence of an intelligent Author of nature is not affected by the opinion of
universal necessity; and give a familiar illustration of the
argument.
2. Explain the meaning of ascribing to God a necessary
existence. Why can not any thing similar be predicted of all natural
objects?
3. In what manner does Hamilton distinguish between the
existence of God and creatures?
4. By what examples does Butler
illustrate his assertion, that the opinion of universal necessity,
when practically applied to our condition in the present life, is
found to be fallacious?
5. How is it proved that, in the application
of the above opinions to the things of a future life, it will be
found equally fallacious?
6. Show that from the fact of “our
finding within ourselves a will, and our being conscious of a
certain character belonging to us,” arguments may be deduced against
the idea of Universal Necessity affecting the system of a Moral
Governor.
7. Prove that the opinion of necessity does not affect the
practical proof of religion, derived from the particular final
causes of pleasure and pain annexed to actions.
8. State the heads under which it is
argued, that natural religion has an external evidence that can not
be affected by the doctrine of necessity.
9. Answer upon his own
grounds the following objection of a fatalist, viz., “the method of
government by rewards and punishments in a future life must go upon
the supposition that we are not necessary agents; but the Author of
nature knows that we are so; and, therefore, will not reward or
punish us for our actions hereafter under the notion that they are
of good or ill desert.”
10. In what sense is it true that the
doctrine of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion?
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
I. Admitting the credibility
of the general doctrine of religion as a matter of fact, there may
yet be objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of it.
Analogy affords a general answer to such objections, by showing that
God’s moral government must be a scheme beyond our comprehension.
II. This appears more clearly from particular analogies. 1st. In the
natural government means are used to accomplish ends, and often such
means as appear to us unsuitable. 2d. The natural government is
carried on by general laws, with which we are unacquainted.
III.
Objection answered, viz:—“This is only arguing from our ignorance,
which may as well be made use of to invalidate the proof of
religion.”
I. HAVING shown the credibility of religion, as a matter
of fact, there may yet be objections against the wisdom, equity, and
goodness of the Divine government implied in the notion of religion,
and against the method by which this government is conducted. To
these objections analogy can furnish
no direct answer. For
the credibility or certainty of a matter of fact, which is all that
analogy call directly prove, does not immediately prove any thing
concerning the wisdom or goodness of it. But analogy furnishes a
remote answer—it suggests, and makes it credible, that this
government must be a scheme or system, as distinguished from a
number of single, unconnected acts of distributive justice and
goodness, and a scheme beyond our comprehension.The
ignorance of man is a favorite doctrine with Bishop Butler. It
occurs again in the second part of the Analogy; it makes the subject
of his 15th Sermon, and we meet with it also in his Charge.
GENERAL ANALOGY.
Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the
world, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it
credible that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our
comprehension.—1st. It must be a scheme—for the world, and the whole
natural government of it, appears to be so,—to be a scheme or
system, whose parts correspond to each other, and to a whole, as
really as any work of art, or as any particular model of a civil
constitution and government. And as there is not any action or
natural event, with which we are acquainted, so single and
unconnected as not to have a respect to some other actions and
events, so, possibly, each of them, when it has not an immediate
natural relation
to other actions and events, may yet have a remote one, beyond the
compass of this present world. Things, apparently the most
inconsiderable, are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions
to the most important matters; so that any one thing whatever, for
aught we know to the contrary, may be a necessary condition to any
other. In short, there is not any one thing of which we can give the
whole account, of all its causes, ends, and adjuncts necessary to
its existence. Thus it appears that the natural government is a
scheme, and a scheme so incomprehensible, that a man must really
know nothing at all who is not sensible of his ignorance in it. This
immediately suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the
moral world and government of it may be so too. Indeed, the natural
and moral constitution and government are so connected as to make up
together but one scheme; and it is highly probable, but more than is
necessary to be proved at present, that the first is formed and
carried on merely in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable
world is for the natural and organized bodies for minds. In the same
way, then, every act of Divine justice and goodness may be supposed
to look much beyond itself and its immediate object; it may have
some reference to other parts of God’s moral administration, and to
a general moral plan: and every circumstance of this government may
be adjusted
beforehand, with a
view to the whole of it; as, for example, the time, degrees, and
ways in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and
discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have its
progress; the kinds of rewards and punishments, &c., &c.There is no manner of absurdity in supposing a veil,
on purpose, drawn over some scenes of infinite power, wisdom, and
goodness, the sight of which might, some way or other, strike us too
strongly; or that better ends are designed and served by their being
concealed than could be by their being exposed to our knowledge. The
Almighty may cast clouds and darkness round about Him for reasons
and purposes of which we have not the least glimpse or
conception.—Butler’s Sermons. And
supposing this to be the case, it is most evident that we are not
competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which
come within our view in the present life, and therefore we are
supplied with an answer to all objections to it. For, suppose it
were objected, “the origin and continuance of evil might easily have
been prevented by repeated interpositions, so guarded as to preclude
all mischief arising from them. Or, if this were impracticable, that
a scheme or system of government is itself an imperfection, since
more good might have been produced without it, by continued single,
unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness, because these
would have occasioned no irregularities.” The answer is obvious.
Were these assertions true, yet the government of the world might be
just and true,
notwithstanding; for, at
the most, they would infer nothing more than that it might have been
better. But, indeed, they are mere arbitrary assertions, no man
being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of things to
bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability; for
though what is asserted may seem to be possible, yet many instances
may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of
suppositions absolutely impossible, which few would perceive to be
such, and perhaps no one, at first sight, suspect. Some unknown
relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is objected
against just and good, nay, good in the highest practicable degree.
II. PARTICULAR ANALOGIES: 1st. As in the scheme of the natural world
no ends appear to be accomplished without means, so we find that
means very undesirable often conduce to bring about ends, in such a
measure desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness
of tie means. Experience also shows many means to be conducive and
necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before experience, we
should have thought would have had even a contrary tendency. In the
same way, the things objected against in the moral government, may
be means by which an overbalance of good, will, in the end, be found
produced; and likewise, it appears to be no presumption against this,
that we do not see those means to have any
such tendency, or that they
seem to us to have a contrary one.
In order to obviate an absurd and
wicked conclusion from any of these observations, it is to be
observed, that though the actual permission of evil may be
beneficial to the world (i. e., less mischievous than if it had been
forcibly prevented by another person), yet it would have been much
more beneficial if this evil had never been done. Thus, in the
natural world, some disorders bring their own cures—some diseases
are themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been
for the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert
that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though
the like has been asserted with regard to the moral world.
2d. The
natural government of the world is carried on by general laws. For
this there may be wise and good reasons: and that there are such may
be concluded from analogy. For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments
but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental in procuring
ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to procure
them; now there could not be this foresight were not the government
of the world carried on by general laws. Though every single case
may be at length found to have been provided for, even by these,
yet, by general laws, the prevention of all irregularities may be
naturally impossible.
Objected. Could
not then the necessary defects of general laws be remedied by
interpositions? Ans. This were to be wished, if these interpositions
would have no other effects; but it is plain they would have some
visible and immediate bad effects—for instance, they would encourage
idleness and negligence, and they would render doubtful the natural
rule of life, which is ascertained by this very thing, that the
course of the world is carried on by general laws. And it is certain
they would have distant effects, and very great ones too, by means
of the wonderful connections before mentioned: thus, for aught we
know, interpositions would produce greater evil than they would
prevent, and prevent greater good than they would produce; so that
the not interposing, so far from being a ground of complaint, is an
instance of goodness.
III. Objected against this whole argument from
our ignorance. “We must argue from what we know, not from what we
are unacquainted with; or, however, the answers here given to
objections against religion might equally be made use of to
invalidate its proof.
ANSWER: 1st. Though total ignorance in any
matter equally precludes all proof concerning it, and objections
against it, yet partial ignorance does not. The proof of religion is
a proof of the moral character of God, and consequently that his
government is moral We may
know this, and yet not know the means for accomplishing it; so that
objections against the means actually made use of might be answered
by our ignorance—though the proof that such an end was intended
might not be at all invalidated by it. 2dly. Admitting that the
proof of religion was affected by it, yet it is un deniably true
that moral obligations would remain certain; for they arise
immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind,
unless perverted, which we can not violate without being
self-condemned; and the credibility that the consequences which
religion teaches us, may result, would make them certain from
considerations of interest.
But, 3dly, the above analogies show that
the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is
delusive, because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could
we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the
disorders objected against to be consistent with justice and
goodness, and even instances of them. Now this is not applicable to
the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it, and
therefore can not invalidate that proof, as it does these
objections.
4thly. Strictly speaking, as it appears from the last
observation, the answers above given are not taken merely from our
ignorance, but from somewhat which analogy shows us concerning it.
CONCLUSION.A connected view of the preceding
Part, similar to that in the conclusion of the original, may be
formed by reading in continuation the short summaries prefixed to
each chapter. The
credibility of religion, from experience and facts here considered,
should afford sufficient motives to religion, and ought to make men
live in the general practice of virtue and piety. The plea of
ungovernable passion, on the side of vice, is no reason, and is but
a sorry excuse; for men, in their temporal concerns, are inured and
necessitated to govern their passions. But the proper motives to
religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature,St. Paul commences his Epistle to the Romans with
the professed acknowledgment, or rather the authoritative assertion, of the two great evidences of Natural Religion—the one legible
in the book of the Creation, the other indigenous in the soul of man
This latter is the moral constitution of our souls, which is the
transcript, obscured and defaced indeed, but still the transcript of
the great law of God: that law which the very Heathen know, and can
not avoid knowing, because “they have the work of it written in
their hearts,” and their thoughts “ accusing or excusing them” by
its dictates. And when St. Paul charges the Gentiles with the
knowledge of this law, it is such a knowledge, as in his mind,
was sufficient to bring them under the capacity, and consequent
obligation, of some obedience; otherwise his whole doctrine and
inculcation of that law, as subjecting them to judgment, would be a
lifeless argument.—Davison on Primitive Sacrifice. from
the presages of conscience, and from our natural apprehension of God
under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge—a nature, conscience, and
apprehension
given us by Him; and from the
confirmation of the dictates of reason given us by life and immortality brought to light by the Gospel; and
the wrath of God revealed
from heaven, against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VII.
1. What answer can analogy furnish to
objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of God’s moral
government?
2. How does it appear that God’s natural government of
the world is a scheme, and one that is incomprehensible?
3. To what
extent does Butler assert that the Divine, natural, and moral
governments are connected; and what does he suppose to be credible
from them?
4. Prove that, from our very ignorance of the universal
scheme of Divine government, we are supplied with a reasonable
answer to all objections against it.
5. “In the scheme of the
natural world no ends are accomplished without means; and good ends
are often brought about by means undesirable and apparently
unsuitable.” Apply this to the case of the moral world.
6. What good
reasons may be given for the fact, that the natural government of
the world is carried on by general laws?
7. Answer the following
objections:
1st. That we must argue from what we know, not from
what we are unacquainted with.
8. 2d Objection. That the answers
here given to objections against religion might equally be made use
of to invalidate its proof.
9. What conclusion does Butler draw from all that he has advanced in respect of natural religion?
SCHEME OF PART II.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.
CHAP. I. |
The Christian Revelation is important as a clear and authoritative republication
of Natural Religion, and as containing Duties additional to those of
Natural Religion, which duties we are bound to perform. |
CHAP. II. |
For the supposed presumptions against Revelation in general, are obviated by Analogy |
CHAP. III., IV., V., VI. |
As well as objections
against the Christian Revelation in particular. First, as a Matter
of Fact. Secondly, as being contrived by Wisdom, Justice, and
Goodness. Thirdly, as being proved by sufficient Evidence |
CHAP. VII. |
Namely, the positive Evidence for its Truth; of which Analogy
furnishes a great confirmation, notwithstanding |
CHAP. VIII. |
The Objections which may be made against ar. guing from the Analogy of
Nature to Religiom |
PART II.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.
I. The importance of Christianity is here considered,
as it can not but be a proper introduction to a Treatise concerning
the credibility of it; especially as there are some who reject
revelation as in its very notion incredible; and others who think it
of indifferent value, as they both consider the light of nature to
be sufficient.
II. The importance of Christianity is more distinctly
shown by considering it, 1st, As a republication of Natural
Religion, being authoritative, with new light, and other
circumstances of peculiar advantage. 2d, As containing an account of
things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several
distinct precepts are enjoined us.
III. Two deductions are added by
way of illustration, stating the distinction between moral and
positive precepts, and the preference due to the former.
I. SOME persons avowedly
reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible, and
necessarily fictitious, as the light of nature is considered to be
fully sufficient.That the principles of natural
religion have come to be so far understood and admitted as they are,
may fairly be taken for one of the effects of the Gospel revelation;
a proof of its actual influence on opinions at least, instead of a
disproof of its necessity or use.—Davison on Prophecy. Indeed, if it were so, no revelation would have
been given. But that it is not, appears from the state of religion
in the Heathen world before revelation, and its present state in
those countries which have borrowed no light from it—from the
doubts of the greatest men concerning vital points, and the
inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is not likely
that any could reason out natural religion clear of superstition.
Certainly the generality would want the power, or the inclination.
But admitting that they did not, and so might reason it out,
revelation might be required, and might afford the greatest
assistance and advantage.Socrates,
Plato, Confucius, and others, the bright and shining lights of
antiquity, have given their authority to the opinion of the
probability of a revelation from God.—Vide Leland on the Advantages
and Necessity of the Christian Revelation. Therefore to affirm that
revelation is superfluous, is not less extravagant than saying that, men being
so completely happy in the present life, it implies a contradiction to suppose
they could be more so.
But, 2dly, there are other
persons not to be ranked with these, who, with little regard to the
evidence of revelation, or even upon the supposition of its truth,
affirm that its only design must be to establish the moral system
of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue;
but that it is immaterial whether these things are believed and
practiced upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation.
Now, this opinion borders very nearly upon the former, and therefore
the particular consideration of it will be a confirmation of the
answer above given. At first sight it is evident, if God has given a
revelation, we can not consider it an indifferent matter whether we
obey or disobey the commands contained in it, unless we are certain
that we know all the reasons for them, and that they are now ceased;
and this is a thing impossible.
II. But the importance of
Christianity will more distinctly appear, by considering it, 1st, as
a republication and external institution of natural or essential
religion; and, 2dly, as containing an account of a dispensation of
things not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several
distinct precepts are enjoined us.
1st. It is a republication of
natural religion.It has been admitted by Infidels, that
Christianity is a republication of the law of nature; but they deny
that there are any additional advantages arising out of this
republication. So that if they do not themselves draw the
conclusion, they leave it to be inferred, that Christianity is
useless. This latter is the method and design of the author of “Christianity as Old as the Creation.”
It instructs mankind in the
moral system of the world—that it is the work of an infinitely
perfect Being, and under his government—that virtue is His law, and
that there will be a future righteous judgment. This republication
presents natural religion free from the superstition under which it
was in a manner lost. It is authoritative, and so affords the
evidence of testimony for the truth of it. For though the miracles
and prophecies recorded in Scripture were intended to prove a
particular dispensation of Providence, yet they prove God’s general
providence as our moral Governor and Judge;Miracles not only contain a
new demonstration of God’s existence, but strengthen the proofs it
draws from the frame of the world, and clear them from the two
principal objections of Atheism, viz., either that the world is
eternal, or that it owed its existence to the fortuitous concourse
of atoms.—Vide Farmer on Miracles. for these two are
necessarily connected, and they are both alike taught by those that
wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. While the law of
Moses, then, and the Gospel of Christ, afford the only evidence of
revealed religion, they afford an additional evidence, and a new
practical proof of natural religion; for would not the working of
miracles, and foretelling of future events, add credibility and authority to a
person,
e. g., teaching natural
religion to a nation wholly ignorant of it? or would it not be a
great confirmation to a person who had never heard of a revelation,
believing from principles of reason in the moral system of things,
but yet wavering from perceiving in the world little or no practical
sense of these things, to hear that this system was distinctly
revealed, and that the revelation was proved by miracles?. Farther,
this is a clear republication of the doctrine of a future state—of
the danger of a course of wickedness, and especially of the efficacy
of repentance. Life and immortality are eminently brought to light
by the Gospel. Moreover, revelation considered only as subservient
to natural religion, is important as an external institution of it.
As miraculous powers were given to the first preachers of
Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the world, a
visible church was established, in order to continue it, and carry
it on successively throughout all ages. This visible church is like
a city built upon a hill, a standing memorial to the world of the
duty which we owe our Maker—a repository of the oracles of God. It
prevents us forgetting the reality of religion, by the form of it
being ever before our eyes; and it has a further tendency to promote
natural religion, as being an instituted method of education, that
the body of Christ, as the Scripture speaks, should be edified. The
benefit of a visible church being thus apparent,
it follows that positive
institutions are beneficial, for the visibility of the church
consists in them. The importance of Christianity in this view, then,
is far from being inconsiderable. It lays every Christian
practically under an obligation to contribute toward continuing and
carrying it on.From these
things appears the weakness of all pleas for neglecting the public
service of the church. For though a man prays with as much devotion
and less interruption at home, and reads better sermons there, yet
that will by no means excuse the neglect of his appointed part of
keeping up the profession of Christianity among mankind. This
neglect, were it universal, must be the dissolution of the whole
visible church.—Bishop Butler’s Sermon before the Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel. If any one will yet doubt whether there arises from
Christianity any benefit to natural religion, let him consider
whether the generality of mankind in the Heathen world were in as
advantageous a situation with regard to natural religion, as they
are now among us?
OBJECTED. Christianity has been perverted, and has
had little good influence.
ANSWER. Even admitting this assertion
(though the effects of Christianity have been by no means small, nor
its supposed ill effects, properly speaking, any effects of it at all),Vide Paley’s Evidences, Part III.,
Chap. 7. the dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by
their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies—by what they
would effect if mankind performed their duty; for
such an objection applies
with the same force against the manifestation of the law of nature
by reason, as we see that has been perverted, and thus it leads to
downright Atheism.
2d. But revelation makes known to us, in addition to the
general providence of God in natural religion, a particular dispensation of
providence carrying on by His Son and Spirit. From this being revealed,
important duties arise on our part to the Son and Holy Ghost. We are to be
baptized in their name, as well as in the name of the Father. Now, the
importance of these duties may be judged of by considering that they arise not
merely from positive command, but also from the offices, which appear from
Scripture to belong to these Divine Persons in the Gospel dispensation, or from
the relations which they are declared to stand in to us. Now, considering
religion as divided into internal and external, under the first notion, the
essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to God the Father Almighty, and the
essence of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to
consist in religious regards to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. And
the obligations we are under, of paying these religious regards to
each of these Divine Persons respectively, arise from the
respective relations which they each stand in to us. How these
relations are made known, whether by reason, as those belonging to
the first Person are, or
by revelation, as those
belonging to the other two Persons, makes no alteration in the case,
because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of
the manner in which we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have
each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence—the
redemption of the world—the one our Mediator, the other our
Sanctifier. Before revelation, we could be under no obligations from
these offices and relations, yet upon their being revealed, the duty
of religious regards to both these Divine Persons, as immediately
arises from them, as charity toward our fellow-creatures arises out
of the common relations between us and them. But it will be asked,
What are these inward religious regards? I answer, the religious
regards of reverence, honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In
what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed is a
matter of pure revealed command; as perhaps the external manner in
which God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are
ready to suppose.
The conclusion from all this is, that Christianity
can never be esteemed of little consequence, till it be positively
supposed false. If Christ be what Scripture declares him to be, no
one can say what may follow not only the obstinate, but the careless
disregard of the high relations He stands in to us as our Lord, our
Saviour, and our God. If we require
the assistance of
the Holy Ghost to renew our nature for another state (as Scripture
declares—“Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he can not
enter into the kingdom of God.”—John, iii., 5), is it a slight matter
whether we make use of the means, expressly commanded by God for
obtaining this Divine assistance, when analogy shows us that without
using the appointed means we can not expect any benefit l Reason
shows us nothing of the particular immediate means of obtaining
either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must
learn, either from experience or revelation. And the present case
does not admit of experience.
III. The two following deductions may
be proper to be added, in order to illustrate the foregoing
observations, and to prevent their being mistaken.
First. Hence we
may clearly see where lies the distinction between what is positive,
and what is moral, in religion.
Moral Precepts, are precepts the
reasons of which we see. Positive Precepts, are precepts the reasons
of which we do not see.This is the distinction between moral and
positive precepts, considered respectively as such. But yet, since
the latter have somewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of
them considered is this view. Moral and positive precepts are in
some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they are
alike, we discern the reasons of both: so far as they are
different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the
latter.—Butler.
But we are not to suppose that because we can not
see the reasons for them, that God has not the wisest and best
reasons for imposing them. This would not be worth remarking, if
Deistical writers, who deny the possibility of such precepts, did
not confound positive with arbitrary precepts.
Moral Duties, arise out of
the nature of the case itself, prior to external command.
Positive
Duties, do not arise out of the nature of the case itself, but from
external command: nor would they be duties at all but for such
command.
The manner in which the relation is made known, does not
constitute a duty positive, as has been already shown in the
instance of Baptism; nor does it constitute a duty moral, as has been
also shown in the instance of religious regards to Christ. Hence, also, we may
see that positive institutions are founded either on natural religion, as
Baptism in the name of the Father (though this has also a reference to the
Gospel dispensation, for it is in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ)—or
on revealed religion, as Baptism in the name of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost.
Secondly. From the distinction between what is moral and
what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar
preference which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former.
Positive institutions, in general, as distinguished from this or
that particular one, have the nature of moral commands,
since the reasons
of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external worship of God is a
moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care, then, is to
be taken, when a comparison is made between positive and moral
duties, that they be compared no farther than as they are different.
This being premised, should there be a moral and positive precept
enjoined by the same authority, and should it be impossible, in
certain conjectures, to obey both—which is to be preferred?
Undoubtedly the moral. For, 1st, there is an apparent reason for the
preference, and none against it, since we see the reason of the
moral, but not of the positive precept. 2d. The positive
institutions enjoined by Christianity are means to a moral end: and
the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. 3d. The
observance of positive institutions is no religious obedience at
all, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This is
the logical way of deciding the matter; but, in a practical and more
lax way of considering it, moral law and positive institutions are
both alike matter of revealed command: but the Author of nature has
given an intimation which is to be preferred, by writing the moral
law upon our hearts, and interweaving it with our nature. But we are
not left to reason alone; for, first, Scripture, by its general
tenor and particular declarations, condemns the idea to which men
have been always
prone—that peculiar
positive rites constitute religion, in place of obedience to moral
precepts. Secondly, in comparing positive and moral duties together,
it always puts the stress of religion upon the latter, and never
upon the former; as our Lord himself, when the Pharisees censured
him for eating with publicans and sinners, and also when they
censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath
day, answered, “I will have mercy and not sacrifice” (Mat., ix., 13,
and xii., 7); and, by this manner of expression, authoritatively
determined, in general, which should have the preference: for it is
as applicable to any other instance of a comparison between positive
and moral duties as to this upon which it was spoken. And that He
intended to explain wherein the general spirit of religion consists,
appears from the Pharisee, on both occasions, not understanding the
meaning of it; for the literal sense of the passage (Hos., vi.) has
no difficulty in it. But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of
human nature, when, upon comparison of two things, one is found to
be of greater importance than the other, to consider the other as of
scarcely any importance at all,“A neglect of the ordinances of
religion of Divine appointment is the sure system of a criminal
indifference about those higher duties by which men pretend to atone
for the omission. It is too often found to be the beginning of a
licentious life, and for the most part, ends in the highest excess
of profligacy and irreligion.”—Bishop Horsely’s Sermons on the Sabbath. we
ought to remember how
great presumption it is to make light of any institutions of Divine
appointment, and that our obligation to obey all God’s commands, of
whatever kind they may be, are absolute and indispensable.
NOTE.—The
account now given of Christianity enforces upon us the obligation of
searching the Scriptures; and if there be found any passages
therein, the apparent meaning of which is contrary to natural
religion, such, we may conclude, is not the real meaning. But it is
not at all a presumption against an interpretation of Scripture,
that it contains a doctrine which the light of nature can not
discover, or a precept which the law of nature does not oblige to.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER I.
1. Give summarily the scheme of the second part of this book; in which the support given to
revealed religion by
analogy is described.
2. Show the extravagance of the assertion that
Revelation is in its very notion not incredible, as being
superfluous.
3. Refute the argument that “the only design of
Revelation must be to enforce the practice of natural piety; and it
is immaterial whether we believe and practice upon the evidence of
nature, or of revealed religion.”
4. What are the two views which
must be taken of Christianity, in order that we may understand its
importance?
5. In what manner does the revelation of Christianity
confirm and support natural religion?
6. How is it proved that this
Revelation, considered only as subservient to natural religion, is
important, as an external institution of it?
7. Answer the objection
“that Christianity has been proved, and has had little good
influence.”
8. What important duties arise on our part to God the
Son, and the Holy Spirit, from Christianity revealing to us the
particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on through them?
9.
What are the two instances by which Butler illustrates his
conclusion, “that Christianity can never be esteemed of little
consequence till it be positively supposed false?”
10. Show clearly
where is the distinction between what is moral and what is positive
in religion.
11. Prove that the peculiar preference, which the
Scripture teaches us is due to the former, is reasonable.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
Before the positive evidence for
Christianity is considered, together with the objections against
that evidence, the prejudices against revelation in general, and the
Christian revelation in particular, must be removed; to the former
the present chapter is devoted.
I. There is no presumption from
analogy against the general scheme of Christianity; for it is no
presumption against it that it is not discoverable by reason and
experience, or that it is unlike the course of nature; and there can
be no other kind of presumption.
II. There is no presumption against
a revelation, considered as miraculous, in the beginning of the
world, for this is a question about a matter of fact, or about the
extent of the exertion of an ordinary power, or about the extent of
the exertion of a power called extraordinary, but certainly exerted.
III. There is no presumption against it from analogy after the
settlement of a course of nature, for we have not a parallel case to
compare with it, &c., &c., &c.
I. IT is commonly supposed that there
is some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against
the Christian scheme, at least, against miracles,
so as that stronger
evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them than
would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of
fact.Hume has gone farther; he asserts, “the
credit we give to testimony is derived solely from experience”—“a
miracle is contrary to experience.”—“No testimony should ever gain
credit to an event, unless it is more extraordinary that it should
be false, than that the event should have happened.”—“It is
contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not
contrary to experience that testimony should be false.” In short, he
considers miracles as impossible, for, speaking of the Abbé de
Paris’s miracles, he says, “What have we now to oppose to such a
cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility OR miraculous
nature of the events they relate.” Besides the answers here given,
vide the Introduction to “The Analogy,” and that to “Paley’s
Evidences.” The fallacy of Hume’s reasoning consists in this, that
he argues from the laws of matter and motion established in the
world, which laws, being confessedly arbitrary constitutions of the
Creator, the manner of their operation can not be drawn from any
previous reasoning, but must be drawn solely from experience; but if
we admit the existence of a God, we must admit that we can discover
by reasoning “a priori” a connection between all Almighty cause and
every effect which is the object of power. To establish his position
it is necessary to prove, that nothing is possible but what is
established in the usual course of nature. And as to his objection
from testimony—for he opposes the uncertainty of testimony to the
certainty of contrary experience—this is answered Infra, III.
Farther, that the evidence of testimony is superior to that of
experience, and that they are somewhat connected, so that the
weakening of the one weakens the other, is shown in “Price’s
Dissertations,” page 400, and in “Dr. Adam’s Essay on Miracles,” page 5.
Now there is no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature, against
the
general scheme of
Christianity—that God created, and invisibly governs the world by
Jesus Christ; and by him will hereafter judge it in righteousness;
and that good men are under the secret influence of his spirit. For,
if there be a presumption from analogy, it must be either because
it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or else, because it
is unlike the known course of nature, which is so discoverable. Now
there is none on the first account, because that things lie beyond
the natural reach of our faculties is no sort of presumption against
the truth and reality of them; because it is certain there are
innumerable things in the constitution and government of the
universe which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties.
And there is no presumption on the second account, for, in the
natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government
of it, we see things in a great degree unlike one another, and
therefore we ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things
visible and invisible. However, the Christian and natural schemes
are by no means entirely unlike. So that whether we call this
general Christian dispensation miraculous or not, we see there is no
presumption against it from analogy. But we are to consider miracles
as visibleA miracle is defined by Hume to be a
violation of a law of nature, by a particular volition of the Deity,
or by the interposing of an invisible agent. It is correctly defined
by others, as an extraordinary work, in which the
interposition of Divine Power is clear and indisputable. and invisible.
The former furnish a proof of
a Divine mission; the latter, being secret, do not, but require
themselves to be proved by visible miracles, as, for example, the
incarnation of Christ. Revelation itself, too, is miraculous, and
miracles are the proof of it—the supposed presumption against these
we shall now consider.
II. There can be no peculiar presumption from
the analogy of nature against a revelation considered as miraculous
at the beginning of the world—no such presumption as is implied in
the word miraculous; for a miracle, in its very notion, is relative
to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it,
considered as being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at
that time, or if there were, we do not know what the course of
nature is upon the first peopling of worlds. And therefore this is
not to be considered as a question about a miracle, but as a common
question of fact, admitting of the report of tradition, like other
matters of fact of equal antiquity. Or else it is a question about
the extent to which an ordinary power exerted itself—a power
different from the present course of nature (but not, as we have
seen, to be called miraculous) namely, whether this power merely
made man, or exerted itself farther in giving him a revelation. Or
even if the power be
called miraculous, it will make
no difference, for the power, whatever it be called, was exerted;
and the question will then be, the extent to which an extraordinary
power exerted itself. Against this there is as little presumption as
there would be, if it were granted that our Saviour exerted
miraculous powers, against his exerting it in a greater degree, or
in more or fewer instances. If, then this is a fact, admitting the
testimony of tradition, what is that testimony? not that religion
was reasoned out, but altogether the contrary—that it came into the
world by revelation. This was mentioned in the former part of this
treatise, as affording a confirmation of natural religion; and here
we see it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a
subsequent revelation.
III. But it may be objected that there is
some peculiar presumption from analogy against miracles;
particularly against revelation, after the settlement, and during
the continuance of a course of nature.
GENERAL ANSWER. Before we can
raise an argument from analogy, for or against a revelation,
considered as miraculous, we should be acquainted with a similar or
parallel case. And nothing short of the history of a world in like
circumstances with our own can be a parallel case; and had we even
this, it would be but a single instance, and a presumption from it
must be infinitely precarious.
PARTICULAR ANSWERS: 1st.
There is a very strong presumption against common speculative
truths, and against the most ordinary facts prior to the proof of
them, which, yet, is overcome by almost any proof. The question,
therefore, whether there be any peculiar presumption at all from
analogy, is of no consequence; for if there be a small additional
presumption against miracles, is that worth reckoning with the
millions to one that there are against the most common facts?As this has been controverted, and as it does not appear to have been
Locke’s opinion (for in his chapter on Probability he says, in
things happening indifferently, there is nothing for nor against
them), it may be useful to confirm the account of Butler by a
passage from Price’s Dissertations. “In many cases of particular
histories, which are immediately believed upon the slightest
testimony, there would have appeared to us, previously to this
testimony, an improbability of almost infinity to one against their
reality, as any one must perceive who will think how sure he is of
the falsehood of all facts that have no evidence to support them, or
which he has only imagined to himself. It is, then, very common for
the slightest testimony to overcome an almost infinite
improbability. In order to discover whether there is this
improbability, let the connection of such facts with testimony be
withdrawn, and then let it be considered what they are. If upon
doing this, i. e., upon making them objects of imagination
unsupported by any proof, they became improbable, the point, I
should think, will be determined; for, to find that a fact, when its
connection with testimony is withdrawn, becomes improbable, is the
same as to find that independently of testimony it is improbable.—Vide Price’s Four Dissertations.
The only material question is, whether there be any such presumption
against miracles as to render them in any sort incredible.
2d. Leaving out the
consideration of religion, the presumption against miracles is,
beyond all comparison, less than against common facts, before any
evidence for either. For we are so ignorant, as to what the course
of nature depends on, that there is no improbability for or against
supposing that length of time may have given cause for changing it.
3d. But taking in the consideration of religion, we see distinct
reasons for miracles, namely, to afford mankind instruction,
additional to that of nature, and to attest the truth of it; and
this gives a positive credibility to their history in cases where
these reasons hold.
4th. Miracles must not be compared to common
natural events, but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature, such
as comets, the power of magnetism and electricity; and as
distinguished from such phenomena there is no peculiar presumption
against miracles.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER II.
1. Explain what Butler means by, “the general
scheme of Christianity;” and show that there is no appearance of a
presumption from the analogy of nature against it.
2. By what arguments does Hume attempt to prove that we ought not to believe in
any miracles? Wherein does the fallacy of his reasoning consist?
3. Give the correct definition of a “miracle;” and illustrate by
examples the two classes, into which they are divided, of visible
and invisible.
4. Why can there be no peculiar presumption firom the
analogy of nature against a revelation, considered as miraculous, at
the beginning of the world?
5. Describe the three views, under which
alone the subject of a revelation from the beginning can be fairly
considered.
6. Why may we safely admit the testimony of tradition as
to the original revelation? And what is that testimony?
7. Give a
general answer to the objection that “after the settlement, and
during the continuance of a course of nature, there is a presumption
from analogy against miracles.”
8. What comparison does Butler draw
between miracles and ordinary facts, in order to show what is the
only material question respecting the former? How does Price
support these assertions?
9. What weight does the consideration of
religion add to the testimony concerning miracles?
CHAPTER III.
OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED
IN A REVELATION, AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.
Objections against
the scheme of Christianity, as distinguished from objections against
the evidences of it are frivolous, for analogy furnishes a general
answer to them.
I. That we are incompetent judges of it.
II. That it
is probable, beforehand, that men will imagine they have strong
objections against a revelation, however unexceptionable.
III. This
leads to the determining the office of reason, namely, to judge only
of the meaning, the morality, and evidence of revelation.
VARIOUS
OBJECTIONS: The whole scheme of Christianity is objected to; the
whole manner in which it is put and left in the world; several
particular relations in Scripture; things in it appearing to men
foolishness; things appearing matters of offense; the incorrectness
of the style of revelation, especially of the Prophetic parts, in
consequence of the rashness of interpreters, and the hieroglyphic
and figurative languageThus Voltaire pretended to believe that
Ezekiel eat the roll of parchment in reality, which the Prophet
expressly asserts to have been a mere vision. in
which they are expressed.
I. General Answer to all objections
against Christianity considered as a matter of fact. Upon
supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand that
we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree, and that it
would contain many things apparently liable to great objections in
case it be judged of otherwise than by the analogy of nature. Not
that the faculty of reason is to be depreciated—for it is not
asserted that a supposed revelation can not be proved false from
internal characters; for it may contain clear immoralities or
contradictions, and either of these would prove it false; this
belongs to reason to decide. (Vide this Chap. III.)
Proof from
analogy that we are likely to be incompetent judges. If the natural
and the revealed dispensations are both from God, if they coincide
and together make up one scheme of Providence, our being incompetent
judges of one, must render it credible that we may also be
incompetent judges of the other. Since, then, upon experience, the
natural dispensation is found to be greatly different from what,
before experience, would have been expected, and is supposed to be
liable to great objections,
this renders it highly credible, that if they judge of the revealed dispensation in
like manner, they will find it different from expectations formed
beforehand, and apparently liable to great objections. Thus, suppose
a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by
common known laws, and that upon some exigencies he should suspend
them—if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand of
the wisdom of the ordinary administration, it could not be expected
that he would be a competent judge of the wisdom of the
extraordinary. Thus we see generally that the objections of an
incompetent judgment must needs be frivolous. But let us apply these
observations to a
PARTICULAR EXAMPLE. Upon supposition of a revelation, let us compare our ignorance concerning
inspiration
before experience, with our ignorance concerning natural knowledge.
We are not judges beforehand.
1st. What degree or kind of natural
information it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his
own reason or experience; nor, 2d, how far he would enable and
effectually dispose them to communicate it; nor, 3d, whether the
evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or doubtful; nor,
4th, whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction
to all; nor, 5th, whether it or the faculty of obtaining it would be
given us
at once, or gradually. In
like manner, respecting supernatural knowledge, we are ignorant
beforehand, 1st, what degree of it should be expected; 2d, how far
miraculous interposition would be made to qualify men for
communicating it; 3d, whether its evidence would be certain, highly
probable, or doubtful; 4th, whether its evidence would be the same
to all; and, 5th, whether the scheme should be revealed at once or
gradually—committed to writing, or left to be handed down by verbal
tradition.
OBJECTION. But we know that a revelation, in some of the
above circumstances, one, for instance, not committed to writing,
and thus secured against the danger of corruption, would not have
answered its purposes.
ANSWER. What purposes? It would not have
answered all these purposes which it has now answered; but it would
have answered others, or the same in different degrees: and could we
tell beforehand which were the purposes of God? It must, therefore,
be quite frivolous to object to revelation, in any of the
fore-mentioned respects, against its being left in one way rather
than another; for this would be to object against things because
they are different from expectations, which has been shown to be
without reason. And thus we see that the only question concerning
the truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation, not
whether it be attended with every circumstance which we
should have looked for;
and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it
claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so
promulgated, as weak men imagine it should be. And therefore,
neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various
readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts,
nor multiplied objections of this kind, could overthrow the
authority of Scripture, unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord
had promised that it should be secure from these things. So that
there are several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to
other writings, are not applicable to Scripture, at least not to the
Prophetic parts of it. We can not argue that this can not be the
sense of any particular passage of Scripture, for then it would have
been expressed more plainly, or have been represented under a more
apt figure or hieroglyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with
respect to common books, because in Scripture we are not, as we are
in common books, competent judges how plainly, or under how apt an
image the true sense ought to have been represented. The only
question is, what appearance there is that this is the sense, and
scarce any at all how much more determinately it might have been
expressed.
OBJECTION. But is it not self-evident that internal
improbabilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof?
ANSWER. Doubtless; but to
what practical purpose can this be alleged in the present case,
since internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty,
are overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and since we scarcely
know what are improbabilities as to the matter before us.
II. The
analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly
credible men may, but also probable that they will, imagine they
have strong objections against revealed knowledge, however really
unexceptionable; for so, prior to experience, they would think they
had against the whole course of natural instruction. Prior to
experience, they would think they had objections against the
instruction which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and propensions, and to men, by these, together with reason, merely on
account of the means by which such instruction is given. For
instance, would it not have been thought highly improbable that men
should have been so much the more capable of discovering, even to
certainty, the laws of matter and of the planetary motions than the
causes and cures of diseases, wherein human life appears so much
more nearly concerned, or that they should discover in an instant,
and unexpectedly, by the faculty of invention, what they have been
in vain searching after, perhaps for years? or, that language—the
only means of communicating our thoughts, should, in its very
nature, be inadequate, ambiguous,
and liable to abuse,
both from neglect and design I or that brutes should, in many
respects, act with a sagacity and foresight often superior to what
is used by man? These general observations will furnish an answer to
almost all objections against Christianity, as distinguished from
objections against its evidence; because these objections are no
more, nor greater, than analogy shows beforehand to be highly
credible that there might seem to lie against revelation. This will
more clearly appear by applying these observations to a
PARTICULAR
OBJECTION. The gifts said to be miraculous, exercised by some
persons in the apostolic age in a disorderly manner, were not really
miraculous; for had they been so, they would have been committed to
other persons, or these persons would have been endued with prudence
also, or have been continually restrained in the exercise of their
miraculous power.It is an objection of the same kind, and, therefore, to
be answered in the same way—that the apostles were ignorant of the
true nature of demoniacs; for, even if their ignorance be admitted
on this or any other point of the like kind, it can not be concluded
that they could not be taught Divine truth, without a knowledge of
bodily diseases, or of other points equally extraneous from the
design of their mission.
ANSWER. That is, in other words, God should have
miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or higher
degree. But from the above observations it appears undeniable, that we are
not
judges in what degrees and
manners it were to be expected he should miraculously interpose. Let
us look to the natural course of Providence, and see are the
superior gifts of memory, eloquence, and knowledge conferred only on
persons of prudence and decency. And it is to be supposed that
persons endued with miraculous gifts, had the same influence over
them as if they were natural endowments. Farther, our natural
instruction is not always given us in a way most suited to recommend
it, but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against it.
The
analogy between natural and revealed instruction farther appears
from this circumstance, that the improvements and hindrances of both
are of the same kind. Practical Christianity, like the common rules
of our conduct in temporal affairs, is plain and obvious. The more
accurate knowledge of Christianity, like many parts of natural and
civil knowledge, may require exact thought and careful
consideration. The perfect understanding of revelation, if it come
to pass before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous
interposition, must be arrived at in the same way as that of natural
knowledge is attained to, namely, by pursuing hints and intimations
which are generally disregarded by others. Nor is it at all
incredible that the Bible, though so long in our possession, should
contain many truths as yet undiscovered (possibly
only to be developed by
events as they come to pass); in the same way as with the same
phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, as men were
possessed of long ago, great discoveries have been lately made in
natural knowledge.
OBJECTION. “This analogy between natural and
supernatural light fails in a material respect; for natural
knowledge is of little or no consequence.”
ANSWER. We have been
speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not
afford us. Besides, some parts of natural knowledge are of the
greatest consequences. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not,
fail in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from the
whole constitution and course of nature; which shows that God does
not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantages
and consequence they would be to us. And this in general, with His
method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would make out an
analogy full to the point.
Objection against Christianity as a
Remedy: “Scripture represents Christianity as an expedient to
recover a lost world, to supply the deficiencies of natural light.
Is it then credible that this supply should be so long withheld, and
then be made known to so small a part of mankind—should be so deficient,
obscure, doubtful, and liable to the like perversions and objections as the light of nature itself?
ANSWER. Without determining
how far this is so in fact, it is by no means incredible from
analogy that it might be so; for are the remedies which nature has
provided for diseases, certain, perfect, or universal? The same
principles which would lead us to conclude that they must be so,
would lead us also to conclude that there could be no occasion for
them, i. e., that there could be no diseases at all; and these
principles being found fallacious, from the fact that they are
diseases, would render it credible beforehand that they may be false
with respect to these remedies—as, by experience, we find they
are—since the remedies of diseases are far from being certain,
perfect, or universal.
III. Does it follow from all these things
that reason can do nothing? By no means, unless it follows that we
are unable to judge of any thing from our inability to judge of all
things. Reason can and ought to judge (as has been partly shown
already), not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and
evidence of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge
of the morality of Scripture, that is, not whether it contains
things different from what we should have expected from a wise,
just, and good Being; for objections of this kind have been now
obviated; but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to
wisdom, justice, or goodness—to what the light of nature teaches us
of God. There is no objection of this kind
against Scripture but such as would equally apply against the constitution and course of
nature.
OBJECTION. But are there not some particular precepts in
Scripture requiring actions immoral and vicious?For example, the command given by God to destroy
the nation of Canaan.—Vide Graves on the Pentateuch.
ANSWER. There are
some requiring actions that would be immoral and vicious, but for
such precept; but the precept changes the whole nature of the case
and of the action; for these precepts are not contrary to immutable
morality—they require only the doing an external action, e. g.,
taking away the property or life of any, to which men have no right,
but what arises solely from the grant of God; when this grant is
revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either. If, indeed,
it were required to cultivate the principles, and act from the
spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, the command would not
alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these
instances. But are not these precepts liable to be perverted by
designing men, and to mislead the weak and enthusiastic True, they
are; but this is not an objection against revelation, but against
the whole notion of religion as a trial, and against the general
constitution of nature. Secondly, reason is to judge of the evidence of
revelation, and the objections against it (which will form the subject of the
7th chapter] And it can
also comprehend what is to be expected from enthusiasm and political
views; and, therefore, can furnish a presumptive proof that a
supposed revelation does not proceed from them, and is consequently true.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER III.
1. Name the three principal divisions under
which the subjects in this chapter are comprehended.
2. What are the
various objections usually brought against the Christian revelation;
and what general answer may be given to them, assuming Christianity
to be a matter of fact?
3. Prove from analogy that we are likely to
be incompetent judges as to what were to be expected in a Divine
revelation.
4. State fully the particular example, in which Butler
compares our ignorance concerning inspiration, before experience,
with our ignorance concerning natural knowledge.
5. How is the
objection obviated that “Revelation, unless given in such or such
a way (i. e., according to the objector’s judgment of what was
proper) would not answer its purposes?”
6. Give the argument by
which the following assertion is proved, viz., that the analogy of
nature shows it to be probable, beforehand, that men will imagine
they have strong objections against a revelation, however
unexceptionable.”
7. Answer the objection against Christianity,
drawn from the abuse of gifts and powers, said to be miraculous, by
persons exercising them.
8. Show that the improvements and hinderances of both natural and revealed instruction are of the
same
kind.
9. Answer the objection, that, “If Christianity be so great a
remedy, why it has been so long withholden, and now so little
known?”
10. What is the proper province of reason in judging of revelation?
CHAPTER IV.
OF CHRISTIANITY CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
I. Admitting the credibility of
Christianity as a matter of fact there may yet be objections against
the wisdom, justice, and goodness of it. Analogy furnishes a general
answer to such objections, by showing that Christianity (like God’s
moral government, Chap. VII., Part I.) must be a scheme beyond our
comprehension.
II. This appears more clearly from particular
Analogies. 1st. Means are used to accomplish ends; and, 2d, it is
carried on by general laws.
III. The principal objections in
particular, may be answered by particular and full Analogies in
Nature. One of these objections, being against the whole scheme of
Christianity, is considered here, namely, “That it supposes God to
have been reduced to the necessity of using roundabout means to
accomplish man’s salvation.”
I. IT has appeared, from the seventh
chapter of the First Part, that objections against the wisdom,
justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature may be answered
by its being a constitution or scheme imperfectly comprehended. We
now proceed to consider the like objections against revelation. And
it is evident, if Christianity be a scheme, and of the same kind,
the like objections against it must admit of the like answer.
Now, Christianity is a scheme
beyond our comprehension. The moral government and general plan of
Providence is gradually proceeding, so that finally every one shall
receive according to his deserts, and truth and right finally
prevail. And Christianity is a particular scheme under this general
plan of Providence, and a part of it conducive to its completion,
consisting itself also of various parts—a mysterious economy for the
recovery of the world by the Messiah (John xi., 52; and 2 Pet.,
iii., 13)—after successive manifestations of this great and general
scheme of Providence (1 Pet., i., 11, 12)—the incarnation and
passion of the Redeemer (Phil., ii.)—the miraculous mission of the
Holy Ghost—the invisible government of the church—Christ’s second
coming to judgment, and the re-establishment of the kingdom of God
(John, v., 22, 23; Mat., xxviii., 18;
1 Cor., xv.). Surely this is a
scheme of things imperfectly comprehended by us; or, as the
Scripture expressly asserts it to be, a great mystery of Godliness
(1 Tim., iii., 16).
II. But this will more fully appear, by
considering, 1st, that it is obvious means are made use of to
accomplish ends in the Christian dispensation as much as in the
natural scheme of things; and thus the things objected against, how
foolish soever they may appear to men, may be the very best means of
accomplishing the very best ends. And, 2dly, that the Christian
dispensation may have been all
along no less than the course of
nature, carried on by general laws. To show the credibility of this,
let us consider upon what grounds the course of nature is said to be
carried on by general laws. We know several of the general laws of
matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents is
reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing by what
laws storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilences become
the instruments of destruction to mankind; by what laws some die as
soon as they are born, and others live to extreme old age; by what
laws one man is so superior to another in understanding; and
innumerable other things which we know so little of as to call them
accidental, though we know there can not be such a thing as chance.
Thus it appears that it is from analogy—from finding that the course
of nature, in some respects, and so far, goes on by general
laws—that we conclude this of the rest. And if this be a just ground
for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, at least, to render
it credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that
God’s miraculous interpositions may have been all along in like
manner, by general laws of wisdom; and, if so, there is no more
reason to expect that every exigence should be provided for by them
than that every exigence in nature should be by the general laws of
nature.
III. Objected against the whole scheme of Christianity:
“The Gospel scheme seems to
suppose, that God was reduced to the necessity of a long series of
intricate means in order to accomplish His ends—the recovery and
salvation of the world; just as men, for want of understanding or
power, are forced to go roundabout ways to arrive at their ends.”
ANSWER. The use of means is the system of nature (and means which we
often think tedious). The change of seasons, the ripening of the
fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower is an instance of
this. Rational creatures form their characters by the gradual
accession of knowledge; our existence, too, is successive, and one
state of life is appointed to be a preparation for another. Men are
impatient, and for precipitating things—the Author of nature appears
deliberate throughout His operations. This is a plain answer to the
objection; but we are greatly ignorant how far things are
considered, by the Author of nature, under the single notion of
means and ends, so as that it may be said, this is merely an end,
and that merely means, in His regard.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER IV.
1. In obviating objections against the wisdom,
Justice, and goodness of Christianity, with what does Butler compare
it; and what connection does he assert to exist between it and the
general plan of Providence?
2. Name two particular analogies, by the
consideration of which the credibility of Christianity being a
scheme imperfectly comprehended by us, will more fully appear.
3.
Upon what grounds is it said that the course of nature is carried on
by general laws? What inference may be drawn from this subject,
applicable to miraculous interpositions?
4. How may the principal
objections in particular against Christianity be answered?
5. Answer
the following particular objection, viz., “The Gospel scheme
supposes God to have been reduced to the necessity of using
roundabout means to accomplish man’s salvation.”
CHAPTER V.
OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY—THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM.
I. Proceeding
to answer other Particular Objections.—Analogy shows that there can
be no objection against the general notion of a Mediator.
II. This
analogy appears more fully upon the supposition of future
punishments following in the way of natural consequences.
III. The
Analogy of Nature shows that there is no probability that behaving
well for the future, or any thing that we could do, would alone, and
of itself, prevent the consequences of vice.
IV. The Scripture
view of Redemption explained, and two Objections against the
Atonement answered, viz., “That we can not see the efficacy of it,
and that it represents the innocent as suffering for the guilty.”
I. THE whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption
against the general notion of a Mediator between God and man; for we
find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their
life, in infancy, is preserved by the instrumentality
of others; and every
satisfaction of it is bestowed by the like means. Is not then the
supposition that His invisible government is, in part, at least,
carried on by the like means as credible as the contrary? The light
of nature, therefore, furnishes no presumption against the general
notion of a mediatorThe instances of Codrus, the last Athenian king,
exposing himself to inevitable death; and Marcus Curtius, a noble
Roman, leaping into the gulf, have been both considered, from the
certainty of the offering, and the feelings of their respective
nations, as proofs of a disposition in mankind to think that the
voluntary and certain death of a person reputed noble and innocent
(Pliny says of Curtius, “virtute ac pietate ac morte præclara
expleverat”), may prevent impending and Divinely threatened
calamities. Vide the Epistle to the Romans, v., 7, 8. “For
scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a
good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love
towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.” (and it is against this that the objection is
urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar
sense in which Christ is our Mediator), since we find by experience
that God does appoint mediators to be the instruments of good and
evil to us—the instruments of His justice and His mercy.
II. The moral government of the world (which must be supposed
before we can consider the revealed doctrine of its redemption by Christ)
implies that the consequence of vice shall be misery in some future state, by
the righteous judgment of God; but since we are altogether unacquainted
how future punishment is to
follow wickedness, there is no absurdity in supposing that it may
follow of course, or in the way of natural consequence, from God’s
original constitution of the world (in the same way as many miseries
follow particular courses of action at present)—from the nature He
has given us, and from the condition in which He places us; or in
like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice falls
down, breaks his limbs, and without help perishes—all in the way of
natural consequence.
OBJECTION. Is not this taking the execution of
justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature?
ANSWER.
When things come to pass according to the course of nature, this
does not prevent them from being His doing, who is the God of
nature; and Scripture ascribes those punishments to Divine justice,
which are known to be natural. Yet, after all, this supposition is
of no consequence, but a mere illustration of our argument; for, as
it must be admitted that future punishment is not a matter of
arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice, so it
amounts to perhaps the same thing, whether they follow by a natural
consequence or in any other way. Without this supposition, we have
a sufficient analogy, but with it, we have a full analogy in the
course of nature for a provision made for preventing the future
consequences of
vice from following
inevitably, and in all cases. For there is at present a provision
made, that all the bad natural consequences of men’s actions should
not always actually follow, but should in certain degrees be
prevented. As the Author of nature permits evil, so He has provided reliefs, and in many cases, perfect remedies for it—reliefs and
remedies even for that evil which is the fruit of our own
misconduct, and which otherwise would have ended in our destruction.
And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence in the
constitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now
mentioned, of a man’s trifling upon a precipice might be prevented;
or some, at least, by the assistance of others, in obedience to the
suggestion of their nature, and by this assistance being accepted.
Now, suppose the constitution of nature were other wise; that the
natural bad consequences of actions, foreseen to have such
consequences, could not, in any instance, be prevented, after the
actions were committed, no one can say whether such a more severe
constitution of things might not have been really good. But the
contrary being the case, this may be called mercy or compassion, in
the original constitution of the world—compassion, as distinguished
from goodness in general. Therefore, the whole known constitution
and course of things affording us instances of such compassion, it
would be according to the analogy of nature to hope that
however ruinous the natural
consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God’s
government over the universe; yet provision might be made, possibly
might have been originally made, for preventing these ruinous
consequences from inevitably following, at least from following
universally and in all cases. Some will, perhaps, wonder at finding
it spoken of as at all doubtful, that the ruinous consequences of
vice might be prevented, having scarcely any apprehension or thought
at all concerning the matter. But, judging from the present scene,
we find the effects of even rashness and neglect are often extreme
misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death. Now, it is natural to
apprehend that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater
in proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison
between these irregularities and the greater instances of vice,
whereby mankind have presumptuously introduced confusion and misery
into the kingdom of God. So that, as no one can say in what degree
fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the
general rule of Divine government, so it is, by no means,
intuitively certain, how far these consequences could possibly be
prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what
is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would
be large ground to hope, that the universal government was not so
severely strict, but
that there was room for
pardon, or for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet,
III.
There seems no probability that any thing we could do would alone,
and of itself, prevent them; for we do not know all the reasons
which render future punishments necessary, nor all the natural
consequences of vice, nor in what manner they would follow if unprevented, and, therefore, we can not say whether we could do ally
thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Farther, that
repentance and reformation alone, and by itself, is wholly
insufficient to prevent the future consequences of vice,The case of penitence is
clearly different from that of innocence—it implies a mixture of
guilt precontracted, and punishment proportionably deserved; it is
consequently in consistent with rectitude that both should be
treated alike by God. The present conduct of the penitent will
receive God’s approbation; but the reformation of the sinner can not
have a retrospective effect; the agent may be changed, but his
former sins can not be thereby canceled. The convert and the sinner
are the same individual person, and the agent must be answerable for
his whole conduct.—Balguy’s Essay on Redemption.
Cicero goes no farther on this head than to assert—Quem pœnitet peccasse, pene est
innocens.—Dr. Shuckford.
or to put
us in the condition in which we should have been had we preserved
our innocence, appears plainly credible from analogy; for we see it
does not avail in a much lower capacity. In their temporal capacity,
men ruin their fortunes, and bring on diseases, by extravagance and
excess. Will sorrow for these follies
past, and behaving well for
the future, alone and of itself, prevent the natural consequences of
them? On the contrary, their natural abilities of helping themselves
are often impaired; or, if not, yet they are absolutely forced to
seek assistance from others for retrieving their affairs.
2d. It is contrary to all our notions of govern ment, that reformation alone
would prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having done
evil:If it
be said that this would not be proper in human governments, because
they may easily be deceived by false shows of repentance; I answer,
that, supposing human governors could certainly distinguish a true
repentance from a false one, the inconvenience of such a
constitution to the public would still be the same; for it would
encourage persons to commit crimes, in hopes of doing it with
impunity, since every criminal would think that, in order to escape
punishment, he had nothing more to do but to repent, and that this
alone would satisfy the law; and he would be apt to flatter himself
that this was at any time in his power.—Leland against Tindal. and though it might prevent them in some cases, yet we could
not determine in what degree and in what cases it would do so.
3d.
It is also contrary to the general sense of mankind, as appears from
the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world.That
the heathen supposed their animal sacrifices to be not only of
an expiatory, but of a vicarious nature, might be shown from a
variety of passages. The following from the Book of Ovid’s Fasti is
full to the point:
“Cor pro corde, precor, pro fibris, sumite fibras
Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.”
IV. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call
in which you please,
Revelation comes in—confirms every doubting fear which could enter
into the heart of man concerning the future unprevented consequence
of wickedness—supposes the world to be in a state of ruin (a
supposition which seems the very groundwork of the Christian
dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no
wise contrary to it)—teaches us too, that the rules of. Divine
government are such as not to admit of pardon immediately and
directly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it; but then
teaches, at the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that
the moral government of the universe was not so rigid but that there
was room for an interposition; and that God hath mercifully provided
this interposition to prevent the destruction of the human kind. “God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that
whosoever believeth in him (i. e., in a practical sense) should not
perish.” He gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the world as
He affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their
fellow-creatures; when without it, their temporal ruin would be the
certain consequence of their follies—in the same way of goodness, I
say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree. And the
Son of God loved us, and gave himself for us, with a love which he
himself compares to that of human friendship; though, in this case,
all comparisons must fall infinitely short
of the thing intended to be
illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner as to prevent
the appointed or natural punishment that would otherwise have been
executed upon them.It can not, I suppose, be imagined, that it is
affirmed or implied, in any thing said in this chapter, that none
can have the benefit of the general redemption but such as have the
advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But
it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which have
been brought into the subject before us, and determined, are not in
the least entered into here—questions which have been, I fear,
rashly determined, and, perhaps, with equal rashness contrary ways.
For instance, “Whether God could have saved the world by other
means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws
of his government?” And “Had not Christ come into the world, what
would have been the future condition of the better sort of men—those
just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses, in his
prayer, asserts repentance was not appointed?” The meaning of the
first of these questions is greatly ambiguous; and neither of them
can properly be answered without going upon that infinitely absurd
supposition that we know the whole of the case. And, perhaps, the
very inquiry, What would have followed, if God had not done as he
has? may have in it some very great impropriety, and ought not to be
carried on any farther than is necessary to help our partial
conceptions of things.—Butler. Nor is there any thing here
inconsistent with Divine goodness; for were we to suppose the constitution of
things to be such that the whole creation must have perished, but for something
appointed by God to prevent it, even this supposition would not be inconsistent,
in any degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness.
OBJECTION. But Christianity
supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state of
degradation.
ANSWER. This is true, but it is not Christianity which
has put us into this state, and there will be little reason to
object against the Scripture account, if we consider the miseries
and wickedness of the world; the wrongness which the best experience
within themselves; and that the natural appearances of human
degradation were so strong, that the heathen moralists inferred it
from them, and that the earth, our habitation, has the appearances
of being a ruin. It was, according to Scripture, the crime of our
first parents that placed us in this state, and this account of the
occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition is
particularly analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural
Providence, as the recovery of the world by Christ has been shown to
be so in general.
But let us consider the Scripture account of the
particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption of
the world, or his office of mediator, in the largest sense between
God and man. He is the light of the worldJohn, i., and viii., 12.—the revealer of the will
of God in the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrificeRom., iii., 25, and v., 11;
Cor., v., 7; Eph., v., 2;
1 John, ii., 2; Mat., xxvi., 28.—the Lamb of
GodJohn, i., 29, 3C6 and throughout the Book of Revelation.—our High
PriestThroughout the Epistle to the
Hebrews.—and, what seems of
peculiar weight, he is described beforehand, in the Old Testament,
under the same characters of a Priest and an expiatory victim.Is., liii.; Dan., ix., 24;
Ps., cx., 4.
OBJECTION. Christ’s atonement is merely by way of allusion to the
sacrifices of the Mosaic law.
ANSWER. The Apostle, on the contrary,
asserts, that the “law was a shadow of good things to come;”Heb., x., 1. that
the Levitical priesthood was a shadow or type of the priesthood of
Christ (Heb., viii., 4, 5), in like manner, as the tabernacle made
by Moses, was a copy of that shown him in the mount. Nor can any
thing be more express than the following passage: “It is not
possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin.
Wherefore, when he cometh into the world, he saith, sacrifice and
offering (i. e., of bulls and goats) thou wouldest not, but a body
hast thou prepared me. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. By the
which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of
Jesus Christ once for all.” Heb., x., 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. Again, “Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that
look for him shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto
salvation.” Heb., ix., 28. Without sin, i. e., without bearing
sin—without being a sin-offering.
Moreover, Scripture declares
that there is an efficacy in what Christ did and suffered for us,
additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, and government.
That Jesus should die for that nation (the Jews), and not for that
nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, he
should gather together in one the children that are scattered
abroad;John, xi., 51, 52. that he suffered for sins,
the just for the unjust;1 Pet., iii., 18.
that he gave his life—himself a ransom;Mat., xx., 29. Vide, also,
Mark, x., 45; 1 Tim., ii., 6;
2 Pet., ii., 1; Rev., xiv., 4;
1 Cor., vi., 20; 1 Pet., i., 19;
Rev., v., 9; Gal., iii., 13;
Heb., vii., 25; 1 John, ii., 1, 2;
Heb., ii., 10, and v., 9;
2 Cor., v., 19; Rom., v., 10;
Eph., ii., 16; Heb., ii., 14. See also a
remarkable passage in the Book of Job, xxxiii., 24;
Phil., ii., 8, 9; John, iii., 35, and
v., 22, 23; Rev., v., 12, 13. that he is our advocate,
intercessor, and propitiation.
Let us now consider the nature of
Christ’s office, according to the three heads under which it is
usually treated of, namely Prophet, Priest, and Kin, reserving the
second head for the last, in order to answer the objections against
it. First. He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet—that Prophet that
should come into the worldJohn, vi., 14.
to declare the Divine will. He taught authoritatively; Ile gave to the moral
system of nature the additional evidence of testimony; He distinctly revealed
the manner in which God would be worshipped, the efficacy of
repentance, and a future
state of rewards and punishments; and He set us a perfect example,
that we should follow his steps. Secondly. He is a King, as he has a
kingdom which is not of this world. He founded a visible church, to
be a standing memorial of religion, and invitation to it; over this
He exercises an invisible government, “for the perfecting of the
saints—for the edifying his body.”Eph., iv., 12. All persons who live in
obedience to his laws are members of this church, and for these he
is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them to himself;John,
xiv., 2; Rev., iii., 21,
and xi., 15.
and likewise to take vengeance on those that know not God,
and obey not his Gospel.2 Thes., i., 8.
Against these parts of Christ’s office
there are no objections, but what are fully obviated in the
beginning of this chapter.
Thirdly. As to the priesthood of Christ,
he offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the
world. Expiatory sacrifices were commanded the Jews, and obtained
among other nations from traditions, the original of which was
probably revelation. These were continually repeated. “But now, once
in the end of the world, Christ appeared to put away sin, by the
sacrifice of himself.”Heb., ix., 26.
How the atonement has this efficacy, which the heathen sacrifices had not, and
the Jewish had only in a
very limited degree, Scripture
has not revealed to us. Some have gone beyond what the Scripture
has authorized in explaining it; and others, because they could not
explain it, have rejected it, and confine the office of Christ, as
Redeemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government
of the church. Whereas the Gospel doctrine is, not only that He
taught the efficacy of repentance, but that He made it of the
efficacy which it is, by what He did and suffered for us; that he
revealed to sinners that they were in a capacity of salvation, and
how they might obtain it, and also put them in that capacity.
1st
OBJECTION. We do not see the necessity or expediency of the
sacrifice of Christ.
ANSWER. Our ignorance with regard to the means,
manner, and occasion of future punishments, and with regard to the
nature of future happiness, shows evidently that we are not judges,
antecedently to revelation, whether a Mediator was or was not
necessary. And for the very same reasons, upon supposition of the
necessity of a Mediator, we are not judges, antecedently to
revelation, of the whole nature of his office. And, therefore, no
objection can be urged against any part of that office, until it can
be shown positively not to be requisite to the ends proposed, or
that it is in itself unreasonable. There seems to be something of
this positive kind in this.
2d OBJECTION. “The doctrine
of Christ’s being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world,
represents God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent
or the guilty.”
ANSWER. 1. This is not an objection against
Christianity merely; but concludes as much against the constitution
of nature, since, in the daily course of natural providence, it is
appointed that innocent persons should suffer for the guilty. The
objection does not apply the more against the appointment in
Christianity, because it is of infinitely greater importance, since
notwithstanding, it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the
same kind, but it would apply (if it had any force) more against the
appointment in nature, where we are commanded, and even
necessitated, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the
sufferings of Christ were voluntary. Yet, there is no objection to
the former; for, upon the completion of the moral scheme every one
shall receive according to his deserts. But during the progress of
this scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit and absolutely
necessary. 2d. This method of our redemption is unanswerably
justified by its apparent natural tendency—its tendency to
vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and to deter his creatures
from sin.
This (though by no means an account of the whole of the
case) would be a sufficient answer to objections of the foregoing
kind, which are insisted
upon, either from ignorance
of what are to be considered God’s appointments, or forgetfulness
of the daily instances of this case in those appointments; and, from
this ignorance or forgetfulness, together with their inability of
seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the
redemption of the world, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will,
they conclude that they could not contribute to it any other way.
But to see the absurdity of such an objection against Christianity,
or, as it really is, against the constitution of nature, let us
consider what it amounts to—that a Divine appointment can not be
necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to
be so, though he must own that the nature of the case is such as
renders him incapable of judging whether it be so or not, or of
seeing it to be necessary, though it were so! The presumption of
this kind of objections to particular things revealed in Scripture,
seems almost lost in the folly of them; and the folly of them is yet
greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against things in
Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensations of
Providence which are matter of experience. And the absurdity is
still farther heightened by the consideration that we are not
actively concerned in the parts, the expediency of which can not be
understood, for these relate to the Divine conduct, which is a very
different subject from our duty, with respect to which
none need plead want of
information. The constitution of the world, and God’s natural
government over it, is all a mystery, as much as the Christian
dispensation. Yet, under the first, He has given men all things
pertaining to life (though it is but an infinitely small part of
natural providence which experience teaches us), and, under the
others, all things pertaining unto godliness. There is no obscurity
in the common precepts of Christianity; though, if there were, a
Divine command ought to impose the strongest obligation to
obedience. But the reasons of all the Christian precepts are
evident. Positive institutions are necessary to keep up and
propagate religion. The internal and external worship which we owe
to Christ arises out of what He has done and suffered for us—out of
His authority, and the relation He (according to revelation) stands in to us.
QUESTIONS—-CHAPTER V.
1. Show that there can be no objection from
analogy against the general notion of a Mediator.
2. In reasoning
upon the redemption of the world, what supposition may we, without
absurdity, assume, respecting the way in which punishment may follow
sin?
3. Answer the objection that, “supposing punishment to be the
natural consequence of sin, is taking the execution of justice out
of the hands of God.”
4. Give fully the argument illustrating the
assertion that “with this supposition, we have a full analogy, in
the course of nature, for a provision made for preventing the future
consequences of vice from following inevitably and in all cases.”
5.
How may we prove the unreasonableness of those who wonder at finding
it spoken of as at all doubtful that the ruinous consequences of
vice might have been prevented?
6. What considerations show the
improbability that behaving well for the future, or any thing that
we could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent the fatal
consequences of vice?
7. What confirmation is given to the teaching
of the light of nature by the Scriptural view of man’s redemption?
8. Prove that there is no weight in the
objection that “Christianity supposes mankind to be naturally in a
very strange state of degradation.”
9. Explain at large, under three
different heads, the particular manner in which Christ interposed in
the redemption of the world.
10. Against what part of Christ’s
office have most objections been urged, and how have men erred on
contrary sides in their reasonings concerning it?
11. Answer the
following objections: 1st. We do not see the necessity or expediency
of the sacrifice of Christ.
12. 2d Objection. The doctrine of
Christ’s being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world,
represents God as being indifferent whether He punished the innocent
or the guilty.
13. By what arguments does Butler expose the
presumption and folly of these, and similar objections, to
particular things revealed in Scripture?
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION, AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.
I. The next Objections to be
considered are, 1. That Revelation is left upon doubtful evidence,
and, therefore, it can not be true. 2. Revelation is not Universal,
and, therefore, can not be true. These Objections are answered by
full Analogies in the Constitution of Nature.
II. Admitting
Revelation to be uncertain in its evidence, the three following
practical reflections will tend to remove all causes of complaint:
1. The evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, may constitute
one particular part of some men’s Trial, in the religious sense. 2.
Doubting implies some degree of evidence, and puts men into a
general state of Probation, in the moral and religious sense; and
consequently, 3. These difficulties are no more to be complained of
than external circumstances of temptation.
III. But this uncertainty may partly arise from our own neglect.
IV. An apparent Analogy
against the fitness of doubtful evidence answered.
I. IT has been
objected, 1st, that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful,
this itself turns into a positive argument against it; because it
can not
be supposed that, if it
were really true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful
evidence; 2d, that revelation can not be true from its want of
Universality.
Now the weakness of these objections may be shown by
observing the suppositions upon which they are founded, which are
really such as these: 1. It can not be thought that God would bestow
ally favor at all upon us unless in the degree we imagine might be
most to our particular advantage; and, 2, that it can not be thought
he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon
all.
General Answer to the 1st Objection. Let the objectors to
revelation, on account of its supposed doubtfulness, consider what
that evidence is which they act upon with regard to their temporal
interests. There are various circumstances which render it uncertain
and doubtful; such as the difficulty and almost impossibility of
balancing pleasure and pain, to see on which side the overplus
lies—of making allowances for the difference of feeling which we may
have, when we have obtained the object in view—and of the casualties
which may prevent our obtaining it, e. g., sudden death—the danger of
our being deceived by the appearances of things, especially if we
are inclined to favor deceit. Yet all this is considered to be
justly disregarded, upon account of there appearing
greater advantages in case of
success, though there be but little probability of it; and even when
the probability is greatly against success, if there be only a
possibility that we may succeed.
General Answer to the 2d Objection.
These objectors should observe that the Author of nature, in
numberless instances, bestows upon some what he does not upon others
who seem equally in need of it; for instance, health and strength,
capacities of prudence and of knowledge, riches, and all external
advantages; and, notwithstanding these varieties and uncertainties,
God exercises a natural government over the world; and there is such
a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard
to our health and our affairs under this government.
Now, let us
more particularly consider what is to be found in the evidence and
reception of revelation analogous to the preceding, and we will see farther the futility of these objections. As neither the Jewish nor
Christian revelation has been universal, and, as they have been
afforded to a greater or less part of the world at different times,
so likewise at different times, both revelations have had different
degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of
prophets, that is, from Moses till after the captivity, had higher
evidence of the truth of their religion than those had who lived in
the interval between the captivity and the
coming of Christ. And the first
Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in
attestation of Christianity than we have now. They had also a strong
presumptive proof of the truth of it, of which we have little
remaining—the presumptive proof from the influence which it had upon
the lives of the generality of its professors. And we, or future
ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have,
from the conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of
the world and of Christianity. And, farther, if we were to suppose
the evidence which some have of religion to amount to little more
than seeing that it may be true; others to have a full conviction of
its truth; and others severally to have all the intermediate degrees
of evidence between these two; if we put the case that revelation,
for the present, was only intended to be a small light in the midst
of a world greatly overspread with darkness, so that some at a
remote distance might receive some glimmerings of it, and yet not be
able to discern its origin; and others, in a nearer situation,
should have its light obscured in different ways and degrees; and
others within its clearer influence, enlivened and directed by it,
and yet, even to these, that it should be no more than a light
shining in a dark place; all this would be perfectly uniform with
the conduct of Providence in the distribution of His other
blessings. If the fact of the case really
were, that some have received no
light at all from Scripture, as many heathen nations; that others
have had, by this means, natural religion enforced upon them, but
never had Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to
them, like, perhaps, the ancient Persians and modern Mohammedans;
that others have had revelation proposed to them, but with such
interpolations in its system, and with its evidence so blended with
false miracles, &c., as to produce doubt and uncertainty, which may
be the case with some thoughtful men in most Christian nations; and, lastly, that
others have Christianity proposed to them in its
proper light, but yet not light sufficient to satisfy curiosity.
Now, if this be a true account of the degrees of moral and religious
light and evidence, there is nothing in it but may be paralleled by
manifest analogies in the present natural dispensations of
Providence.
But does not this unequal distribution appear harsh and
unjust? By no means; for every one shall be equitably dealt with: no
more shall be required of any one than what might have been
equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was
placed: i. e., every man shall be accepted according to what he had,
not according to what he had not. This, however, doth not imply that
all persons’ condition here is equally advantageous with respect to
futurity; and their being placed in darkness is no more a reason why
persons
should not endeavor to get out of
it, and why others should not endeavor to bring them out of it, than
it is a reason why ignorant people should not endeavor to learn, or
should not be instructed.
II. What, in general, may be the account
or reason of these things? It is not unreasonable to suppose that
the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed
the Author of nature to make different kinds and orders of
creatures, disposed Him also to place creatures of the like kinds in different situations: and that the same principle which disposed Him
to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed Him to
place creatures of like moral capacities, in different religious
situations, and even the same creatures, at different periods of
their being. And the account, or reason of this, is also, most
probably, the account why the constitution of things is such, that
creatures of moral capacities, for a considerable part of their
life, are not all subjects of morality and religion.
But can we not
give a more particular account of these things. Here we must be
greatly in the dark,To expect a distinct, comprehensive view of the whole subject,
clear of difficulties and objections, is to forget our nature and
condition, neither of which admit of such knowledge with respect to
any science whatever: and to inquire with this expectation, is not
to inquire as a man, but as one of another order of
creatures.—Butler’s Sermon on the ignorance of Man. were it only
that we know so very little, even
of our own case. We are in the
midst of a system; our present state probably connected with the
past, as it is with the future. A system in its very notion implies
variety, so that were revelation universal, yet from men’s different capacities of understanding, from the different lengths
of their lives, from their difference of education, temper, and
bodily constitution, their religious situations would be widely
different, and the disadvantages of some in comparison to others
would be altogether as much as at present; and the true account of
our being placed here must be supposed also to be the true account
of our ignorance of the reasons of it. But the following practical
reflections may deserve the consideration of those persons who think
the circumstances of mankind, or their own, in the fore-mentioned
respects, a subject of complaint. 1st. The evidence of religion not
appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men’s
trial, in the religious sense, as it gives scope for a virtuous
exercise, or vicious neglect of their understanding, in examining,
or not examining, into that evidence. There seems no possible reason
to be given why we may not be in a state of moral probation with
regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of
religion, as we are with regard to our behavior in common affairs.
For religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and
inference; a conviction of its truth is not forced
upon every one, but left to be by some
collected by heedful attention to premises. The careful and
solicitous examination of the evidence of religion before
conviction, is an exercise of the same inward principle that renders
a person obedient to its precepts after conviction; and neglect is
as much real depravity in the one case as in the other.
2d. Even if
the evidence of religion were, in the highest degree, doubtful, it
would put men into a general state of probation, in the moral and
religious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt whether
such a person had not done him the greatest favor, or whether his
whole temporal interest was not depending on that person, he could
not consider himself (if he had any sense of gratitude or of
prudence) in the same situation as if he had no such doubt; or as if
he were certain he had received no favor from such a person, or that
he no way depended upon him. So that, considering the infinite
importance of religion, there is not so great a difference as is
generally imagined between what ought in reason to be the rule of
life to those who really doubt and those who are fully convinced of
the truth of religion.For would it
not be madness for a man to forsake a safe road, and prefer to it
one in which he acknowledges there is an even chance he should lose
his life, though there were an even chance, likewise, of his going
safe through it? Yet there are people absurd enough to take the
supposed doubtfulness of religion for the same thing as a proof of
its falsehood, after they have concluded it doubtful, from hearing it often
called in question. This shows how infinitely unreasonable skeptical
men are with regard to religion, and that they really lay aside
their reason, upon this subject, as much as the most extravagant
enthusiast.—Butler’s Charge. Their hopes, and fears, and
obligations will be in various
degrees; but as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the
same, so the subject-matter of their obligations is not so very
unlike. For doubting gives occasion and motives to consider farther
the important subject; to preserve a sense that they may be under
the Divine moral government, and an awful solicitude about religion,
so as to bind them to refrain from all immorality and profaneness;
and such conduct will tend to improve in them that character which
the practice of religion would in those fully convinced of its
truth. And they are farther accountable for their example, if with a
character for understanding, or in a situation of influence in the
world, they disregard all religion, though doubtful to them; and
very accountable, as they may do more injury this way, or might do
more good by the opposite, than by acting ill or well, in the common
intercourse among mankind.
The ground of these observations is, that
doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that of
which we doubt: for no person would be in doubt concerning the truth
of a number of facts, accidentally entering his mind, and of which
he had
no evidence at all. In the case of an
even chance, we should commonly say we had no evidence at all for
either side; yet this case is equivalent to all others, where there
is such evidence on both sides of a question as leaves the mind in
doubt concerning the truth: and in all these cases, although there
is no more evidence on the one side than on the other, there is much
more for either than for the truth of a number of random thoughts.
And thus, it will appear that there are as many degrees between no
evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground for
doubt, as there are between that degree. which is the ground of
doubt, and demonstration. And it is as real an imperfection in the
moral character, not to be influenced by a lower degree of evidence,
when discerned, as it is in the understanding not to discern it. The
lower degrees of evidence will be discerned or overlooked, according
to the fairness and honesty of men, as in speculative matters,
according to their capacity of understanding.
3dly. The speculative
difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, are no
more a just ground of complaint than external circumstances of
temptation, or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full
conviction of its truth. (And there is no ground for objection here,
for temptations render our state a more improving state of
discipline, by giving occasion to a more attentive and continued exercise
of the virtuous principle.) Now, it will appear, that the same account may be given of the doubtful
evidence of religion, as of temptation and difficulties, with
regard to practice; for they belong to a state of probation. (1st.)
As implying trial and difficulties. The doubtfulness of its evidence
affords opportunities to an unfair mind of explaining away and
deceitfully hiding from itself that evidence which it might see, and
of being flattered with the hopes of escaping the consequences of
vice; though it is clearly seen that these hopes are, at least,
uncertain, in the same way as the common temptation to many
instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the
ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with
impunity, i. e., the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand that such
foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. The examination
of this evidence requires an attentive, solicitous, and, perhaps,
painful exercise of the understanding. And there are circumstances
in men’s situations, in their temporal capacities, analogous to
those concerning religion. In some situations the chief difficulty,
with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it is
known, but the principal exercise is recollection, and being guarded
against deceit. In other situations, the principal exercise is
attention, in order to discover what is the prudent part to act.
(2d.) This, and, indeed, temptation in general, as
it calls forth some virtuous efforts
additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, can not but be
an additional discipline and improvement of virtue, nay, may form
the principal part of some persons’ trial; for as the chief
temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives
to injustice or pleasure, or to live in the neglect of religion,
from a frame of mind almost insensible to any thing distant, so
there are others, without this shallowness of temper, of a deeper
sense as to what is invisible and future, who, from their natural
constitution and external condition, may have small temptations and
difficulties in the common course of life. Now, when these latter
persons have a full conviction of the truth of religion, its
practice is to them almost unavoidable; yet these persons may need
discipline and exercise in a higher degree than they would have by
such an easy practice of religion.
(3d.) This may be necessary for
their probation in the third sense of the word,Vide Chap. IV., Part I. for a farther
manifestation of their moral character to the creation of God, than
such a practice of it would be.
III. But all the preceding
reflections suppose that men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of
religion, does not arise from their neglect or prejudices; but may
it not be owing to their own fault? Levity, carelessness, passion,
and prejudice do hinder
us from being rightly
informed with respect to common things, and they may in like manner
(and perhaps in some farther providential manner) hinder us with
respect to moral and religious subjects. But does not the Scripture
declare that every one shall not understand?Daniel, xii., 10. See also Is., xxix., 13, 14;
Mat., vi., 23, and xi., 25,
and xiii., 11, 12; John, iii., 19, and
v., 44; 1 Cor., ii., 14;
2 Cor., iv., 4; 2 Tim., iii., 13;
and that affectionate, as well
as authoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, He
that hath ears to hear let him hear. Grotius saw no plainly the
thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like
sense, as to say that the proof given of Christianity was less than
it might have been for this very purpose. “Ut ita sermo Evangelii
tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia
explorarentur.”—Butler. Certainly. Bult it
does not determine how this shall be effected; and it makes no
difference whether it be effected by the evidence of Christianity
being originally and with design so ordered, as that those who are
desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it, and that
honest-minded persons should;The internal evidence of religion seems
chiefly to have been intended as a means of moral probation. Vide
John, vii., 17. or whether it come to pass by any
other means. Farther, the general proof of natural religion lies
level to the meanest capacity; for all men, however employed in the
world, are capable of being convinced that there is a God who
governs the world; and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature
and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in
with this natural sense of things, so
they may be persuaded and made to see that there is evidence of
miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing
completions of prophecy. But though this general proof be liable to
objections, and run up into difficulties which can not be answered
so as to satisfy curiosity, yet we can see that the proof is not
lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. It is
true, this requires knowledge, time, and attention, and therefore
can not be the business of every man; but it ought to be considered
by such as have picked up objections from others, and take for
granted upon their authority that they arc of weight against
revelation, or by often retailing them, fancy they see that they are
of weight. In this, as in all other matters, doubtfulness,
ignorance, or error must attend the neglect of the necessary means
of information.
IV. Analogy objected against the fitness of the
evidence of Revelation. “If a prince or common master were to send
directions to a servant, he would take care that they should always
bear the certain marks of him from whom they came, and that their
sense should always be plain; so that there should be no possible
doubt, concerning their authority or meaning.”
ANSWER. The proper
answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy
lies, it is even certain we can not argue thus with respect to
Him who is the Governor of the
World, and particularly that he does not afford us such information,
with respect to our temporal affairs and interests. However, there
is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature of
religion—for they are not parallel cases. The prince regards only
the external event—the thing’s being done; religion regards the
inward motive—and exercise by action. Of the prince regarded the
same, if he wished to prove the understanding or loyalty of a
servant, he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner.
It may be added, the Divine Will respecting morality and religion
may be considered either absolute or conditional; it can not be
absolute in any other way than that we should act virtuously in such
given circumstances, and not by His changing of our circumstances;
so that it is still in our power to do or contradict His will. But
the whole constitution of nature affords certain instances of its
being conditional, that if we act so or so, we shall be rewarded; if
otherwise, punished.
Several of these observations may well seem
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men; but if the
persons for whose sake they are made, think so—persons who object as
above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want
of evidence, they are desired to consider whether their thinking so
be owing to any thing unintelligible
in these observations, or to
their not having such a sense of religion, as even their state of
skepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced upon
the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition
require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much
lower than probable, and to engage in pursuits when the probability
is greatly against success, if it be credible that possibly we may
succeed in them.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VI.
1. Upon what supposition is the weak objection
founded that “because revelation is left upon doubtful evidence it
can not be true?” Give a general answer to it.
2. Explain in like
manner the foundation of the 2d objection that “Revelation can not
be true from its want of universality;” and answer it generally.
3.
Give a particular application of the subject to the evidence of
revealed religion in different ages, and the degrees of religious
light enjoyed by various parts of mankind.
4. What considerations
may tend to reconcile us to the apparently unequal dispensations of
the Creator in regard to religion?
5. Admitting revelation to be
uncertain in its evidence, there are three practical reflections
which will tend to remove all causes of complaint. Name them.
6. How
does Butler prove that there is not a great difference between what
might in reason be the rule of life to those who really doubt, and
those who are fully convinced of the truth of religion?
7. How does
Butler prove that doubting necessarily implies some degree of
evidence for that for which we doubt?
8. Show that the same account
may be given of doubts in the evidence of religion as of temptation
and difficulties in practice.
9. Give a summary of the argument in
which it is explained, that uncertainty in religious truths may
partly arise from our own neglect.
10. Answer the apparent analogy,
by which an objection is raised against the fitness of revelation
being left upon doubtful evidence.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
The presumptions against Revelation, and objections against the general
scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it being
removed, there remains to be considered what positive evidence we
have for its truth; this is considered under two heads.
I. The direct and fundamental evidence for Christianity from Miracles and
Prophecy, and various objections answered.
II. The direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument.
WE proceed to consider what is the positive evidence for the truth of Christianity. We shall, therefore, First, make some observations
relating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy,
(which are its fundamental proofs), and consider what analogy
suggests in answer to the objections brought against this evidence;
and, Secondly, We shall endeavor to give some account of a general
argument, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence (for
the latter ought never to be urged apart from the former),
considered as making up one argument; this being the kind of proof
upon which we determine most
questions of difficulty concerning common facts, alleged to have
happened, or seeming likely to happen, especially questions relating
to conduct. The conviction arising from this kind of proof, may be
compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works
of art—a result from a great number of things so and so disposed and
taken into one view.
I. 1. The Historical Evidence of Miracles.
The
Old Testament affords the same historical evidence of the miracles
of Moses and of the Prophets, as of the common affairs of the Jewish
nation. And the Gospels and Acts afford the same historical evidence
of the miracles and of the common facts—because they are alike
related in plain, unadorned narratives. Had the authors of these
books appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, the case
would be different; then it might be said that the miracles were
introduced, like poetic descriptions and prodigies, to animate a
dull relation—to amuse the reader and engage his attention.
2. Some
parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles fully
sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as
authentic and genuine from the age in which they are said to be
written, down to the present.
3. The miraculous history, in general,
is confirmed—by the establishment of the Jewish and Christian
religions; events
cotemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation
of both, or subsequent to them. These miracles are a satisfactory
account of those events, of which no other satisfactory account can
be given, nor any account at all but what is merely imaginary and
invented. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to
historical evidence, prove nothing, burt that historical evidence is
not demonstrative. There must be something positive alleged against
the proof of the genuineness and authenticity of Scripture, before
it can be invalidated; either that this evidence may be confronted
by historical evidence on the other side, or the general
incredibility of the things related, or inconsistency in the general
turn of history; none of which can be proved.
4. The Epistles of St.
Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and moreover, from
several of them being written, not to particular individuals, but to
Churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond
what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at
large. One Epistle especially, which is chiefly referred to here
(the 1st to the Corinthians), has a distinct and particular
evidence, from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus,
in an epistle of his own to that Church. Indeed, the testimony of
St. Paul is to be considered as detached from that of the rest of
the Apostles, for the author declares,
in his Epistles, that he
received the Gospel in general, and the institution of the Communion
in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles, or jointly
together with them, but alone and from Christ himself; and he
declares farther, that he was endued with the power of working
miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, in the
manner any one would speak to another of a thing which was as
familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing in
the world.Vide Rom., xv., 19;
1 Cor., xii., 8, 9, 10-23, &c.,
and xii., 1, 2, 8, and the whole of xiv.;
2 Cor., xii., 12, 13; Gal., iii., 25. This evidence, joined with what these Epistles have in
common with the rest of the New Testament, does not leave a
particular pretence for denying their genuineness: for, as to
general doubts concerning it, any single fact, of such kind and
antiquity, may have them, from the very nature of human affairs and
human testimony.
5. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that
Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be
received, upon the allegation of miracles, publicly wrought to
attest the truth of it, in such an age, and that it was actually
received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed
belief of the reality of these miracles. Now all this is peculiar to
the Jewish and Christian dispensations. Mohammedism was not introduced on the
ground of miracles, i. e.,
public ones, for as revelation itself is miraculous, all pretence to
it must necessarily imply some pretence to miracles.This was all that Mohammed pretended to. “The Koran itself is a miracle.” So
far was he from claiming to himself the working of public miracles,
that he declared he did not work them, since those wrought by
others, the Prophets, Apostles, and Jesus Christ, failed to bring
conviction with them!—Vide Sale’s Koran, passim. Particular
institutions in Paganism or Popery, confirmed by miracles after they
were established, or even supposed to be introduced and believed on
the ground of miracles, are not parallel instances, for single
things of this kind are easily accounted for, after parties are
formed, and have power in their hands—when the leaders of them are
in veneration with the multitude, and political interests are
blended with religious claims and religious distinctions. But even
if this be not admitted to be peculiar to Christianity, the fact is
admitted that it was professed to be believed on the evidence of
miracles. Now, certainly it is not to be supposed that such numbers
of men, in the most distant parts of the world should forsake the
religion of their country, and embrace another which could not but
expose them to much self-denial, and, indeed, must have been a
giving up of the world in a great der gree, unless they were really convinced of
the truth of these miracles, as they professed, when they became Christians, and
this their testimony is the
same kind of evidence for
those miracles as if they had written it, and their writings had
come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts of
which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves.
It is also distinct from the direct historical evidence, though of
the same kind; for the general belief of any fact at the time in
which it is said to have happened, is distinct from the express
testimony of the historian. We admit the credulity of mankind; but
we should not forget their suspicions, and backwardness even to believe, and greater still to
practice, what makes against their
interest. So that the conversion of many to Christianity, when
education, prejudice and authority were against it, is an undoubted
presumption of its Divine origin. It lies with unbelievers to show
why such evidence as all this amounts to, is not to be credited.If it be
objected that it is rather slender ground upon which to stand,
merely that we cannot prove the contrary, or the falsehood of the
thing, we may answer, that it is not intended to be ground to rest
on; it is intended to set us in motion; and the evidence will grow
in proportion to the earnestness and sincerity to ascertain the
point. Now, is there not a moral fitness in this, that evidence
should be progressive, and that in proportion to the singleness of
eye and the diligence with which it is sought and investigated?—Wolfe’s Remains.
Accordingly, there is
OBJECTED. 1st. “Numberless enthusiastic people, in different
ages and countries expose themselves
to the same
difficulties which the primitive Christians did, and are ready to
give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable.”
ANSWER.
Though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any
opinions at all, yet (as is allowed in all other cases) it is a
proof of facts. The Apostles’ sufferings proved their belief of the
facts; and their belief proved the facts, for they were such as came
under the observation of their senses.
2d OBJECTION. “But
enthusiasm greatly weakens, if it does not totally and absolutely destroy, the evidence of testimony even for facts, in matters
relating to religion.
ANSWER. If great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak or negligent, affirm that they saw
and heard such things plainly with their eyes and ears, and are
admitted to be in earnest, such testimony is evidence of the
strongest kind we can have for any matter of fact. Such an account
of their testimony must be admitted, in place of that far-fetched,
indirect, and wonderful one of enthusiasm, until some incredibility
can be shown in the things thus attested, or contrary testimony
produced. The very mention of enthusiasm goes upon this previous
supposition, which must be proved before such a charge need be
answered; but as the contrary has been proved, an answer to it is
much less required. However, as religion is
supposed to be peculiarly
liable to enthusiasm, we will consider what analogy suggests.
Nameless and numberless prejudices, romance, affectation, humor, a
desire to engage attention or to surprise, party spirit, custom,
little competition, unaccountable likings and dislikings, are to be
considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm, because they
are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves
who are influenced by them. These influence men strongly in common
matters, yet human testimony in these matters is naturally and
justly believed notwithstanding.
3d OBJECTION. “But the primitive
Christians might still, in part, be deceived themselves, and, in
part, designedly impose upon others, which is rendered very credible
from that mixture of real enthusiasm and real knavery to be met with
in the same characters.”
ANSWER. It is a fact that, though endued
with reason to distinguish truth from falsehood, and also with
regard to truth in what they say, men are all liable to be deceived
by prejudice; and there are persons who, from their regard to truth,
would not. invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, but
yet would propagate it after it is once invented, with heightened
circumstances. And others, though they would not propagate a lie,
yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without
contradiction. This is analogical to the ground of the
objection; yet,
notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural
ground of assent, and this assent a, natural principle of action.
4th OBJECTION. But it is a fact that mankind have, in different
ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and
wonders.”
ANSWER. They have been, by no means, oftener, nor are
they more liable to be, deceived by these pretences than by others.Counterfeit coin supposes that there
is such a thing in the world as good money, and no one would pretend
outwardly to be virtuous, unless some were really so. In the same
manner, false miracles suppose the existence of real ones; and the
cheats that have been imposed upon the world, far from furnishing us
with reasons to reject all miracles in general, are, on the
contrary, a strong proof that some, of which they are imitations,
have been genuine.—Douglas on Miracles.
5th OBJECTION. But there is a very considerable degree of historical
evidence for miracles acknowledged to be fabulous.”
ANSWER. Is
there the like evidence? By no means.Vide Paley’s Evidences,
Part 2, where this point is satisfactorily proved. But, even admitting that
there were, the consequence would not be that the evidence of the
latter is not to be admitted; for what would such a conclusion
really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by contrary
evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other
evidence neither confuted nor overbalanced? If two men, of equally
good reputation, had given evidence
in different cases no
way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, would
this confute the testimony of the other?
In addition to all these
answers, it may be observed, it can never be sufficient to overthrow
direct historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so
many principles from whence men are liable to be deceived
themselves, and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of
religion, that one knows not what to believe. It, indeed, weakens
the evidence of testimony in all cases, and it will appear to do so
in different degrees according to men’s experience or notions of
hypocrisy or enthusiasm; but nothing can destroy the evidence of
testimony in any case, but a proof or probability that persons are
not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony, or
that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it,
in such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of
human actions require that testimony be admitted. Now, the first and
most obvious presumption is, that they could not be deceived
themselves, nor would deceive others; for the importance of
Christianity must have engaged the attention of its first converts,
so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from
carelessness, than they would in common matters; and the strong
obligations to veracity which their religion laid them inder made
them less liable to deceive
others. The external
evidence for Christianity, unbelievers, who know any thing at all of
the matter, must admit; that is, as persons in many cases own they
see strong evidence from testimony for the truth of things which yet
they can not be convinced are true—supposing that there is contrary
testimony, or that the things are incredible. But there is no
testimony contrary to that which we have been considering; and it
has been fully proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity
in general, or in any part of it.
I. 2d. The evidence of Christianity from Prophecy. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of
one part of a prophecy, whether it arise from the nature of prophecy
or from want of learning or of opportunities of inquiry, or from the
deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of
historians, does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of
foresight arising from the clear fulfillment of those parts which
are understood. For the case is evidently the same as if those
parts which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or
written in an unknown tongue. Suppose a writing partly in cipher and
partly in plain words at length, and that in the part understood
there appeared mention of several known facts; it would never come
into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that, if he understood the
whole, perhaps he might find that those facts were not in reality
known by the writer.
The fulfillment of the facts
known is extensive enough to prove foresight more than human.
1st
OBJECTION. “Considering each prophecy distinctly, it does not at all
appear that the prophecies were intended of those particular events
to which they are applied by Christians; and, therefore, if they
mean any thing, they are intended of other events unknown to us, and
not of these at all.”
ANSWER. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof that it referred to
them. This appears from analogy; for there are two kinds of writing
which bear a great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the
matter before us—the mythological, and satirical where the satire
is, to a certain degree, concealed. In the former kind, a man might
be assured that he understood what an author intended by a fable or
parable, related without any application or moral, merely from
seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such a
moral might naturally be deduced from it. And, in a satirical
writing, he might be fully assured that such persons and events were
intended, merely from its being applicable to them; and his
satisfaction that he understood the intended meaning of these
writings would be greater or less, in proportion as he saw the
general turn of them and the number of particular things to be
capable of such application.
In the same way, if a long
series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church,
and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some
thousand years after these prophecies were delivered; and if a long
series of prophecy, delivered before the coming of Christ, is applicable to Him, these things are in themselves a proof that the
prophetic history was intended of Him, and of those events, in
proportion as the general turn of it, and the number and variety of
particular prophecies are capable of such application. And although
the appearing fulfillment of prophecy is to be allowed to determine
its meaning, it may be added that prophecies have been determined
beforehand, as they have been fulfilled. The prophecies of a Messiah
were applied to Him, by the Jews, before the coming of Christ; and
those concerning the state of the Church in the last ages, were
applied to it by the primitive Christians, as the event seems to
verify.
Farther, even if it could be shown, to a high degree of
probability, that the Prophets thought of events different from
those which Christians allege to be the completion of their
predictions; or that their prophecies are capable of being applied
to other events than what Christians apply them to; yet to say that
the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no other
or farther meaning than those persons thought or had, who first
recited or wrote them, is
evidently saying that those persons were the original, proper, and
sole authors of these books, and not the amanuenses of the Holy
Ghost; which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under
consideration—it is begging the question. If we knew the whole
meaning of the compiler of a book, taken from memoirs, for instance,
we would not suppose that we knew, from this, the whole meaning of
the author of the memoirs. So that the question is, whether a series
of prophecy has been fulfilled, in any real sense of the words: for
such completion is equally a proof of foresight, more than human,
whether the Prophets are or are not supposed to have understood it
in a different sense. For, though it is clear that the Prophets did
not understand the full meaning of their predictions, it is another
question how far they thought they did, and in what sense they
understood them. So that it is useless to show that prophecy is
applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages
before it. To have proved this, before the completion, might,
indeed, have answered some purpose; for it might have prevented the
expectation of any such farther completion. For example, if Porphyry
could have shown that some principal parts of the book of Daniel,
for instance the 7th verse of the 7th chapter, which the Christians
interpreted, of the latter ages, was applicable to events which
happened before, or about, the age
of Antiochus Epiphanes,It appears that Porphyry did nothing,
worth mentioning, in this way. For Jerome, on the passage, says: “Duas posteriores bestias in uno Macedonum regno ponit.” And as to
the ten kings, “Decem reges enumerat, qui fuerunt sævissimi:
ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedoniæ,
Syriæ, Asiæ, et Egypti, sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum
ordinem.” And in this way of interpretation any thing may be made
of any thing.-Vide Newton on the Prophecies, and Bishop Chandler’s
Vindication of Christianity.
this might have prevented them from expecting any farther
completion of it. But even if he could prove his assertion—which by
no means appears—these remarks show it to be of no consequence: and
they are remarks which must. be acknowledged, by those of a fair
mind, to be just, and the evidence referred to in them real. But it
is much more easy, and more falls in with the negligence,
presumption, and willfulness of the generality, to determine at
once, with a decisive air—there is nothing in them.
II. We shall
now endeavor to give some account of the general argument for the
truth of Christianity; consisting both of the direct and
circumstantial evidence, considered as making up one argument, for
three reasons—1st, this is the kind of evidence upon which most
questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined—evidence arising
from various coincidences, which support and confirm each other; 2d, this seems
to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to
by every one: 3d, the matters
of fact here enumerated, being acknowledged by unbelievers, the
weight of the whole, collectively, must be acknowledged to be very
important.
(1.) Revelation, whether real or supposed, may be
considered as wholly historical—for prophecy is nothing but
anticipated history—and doctrines and precepts are matters of fact.
The general design of Scripture, containing this revelation, thus
considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account
of the world in one single view as GOD’S WORLD; by which it appears
distinguished from all other books. It begins with an account of
God’s creation of the world, in order to ascertain by what He has
done, the object of our worship, distinct from idols, and the Being
of whom the whole volume treats. St. John, perhaps in allusion to
this, begins his gospel with an account of Him by whom God created
all things. It contains an abridgment of the history of the world,
in the view just mentioned, from the first transgression, during the
continuance of its apostacy from God, till the times of the
restitution of all things;Acts, iii., 21. Vide, also
Rev., x., 7; Dan., ii., 44,
vii., 22; Rev., xxii., 5;
Dan., vii., 27. giving a
general account of the governments by which religion is, has been, or shall be
affected. On this it may be remarked, that the supposed doubtfulness of the
evidence for revelation, in place of implying a positive
argument that it is
NOT true, implies a positive argument that it
IS TRUE: for, if any
common relation of such antiquity, such extent, and variety could be
proposed to the examination of the world, and if it could not be
confuted in any age of knowledge and liberty, to the satisfaction of
reasonable men, this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of
its truth; strong in proportion to the probability that if it were
false, it might have been shown to be so. Now Christianity is not
said, by any, to have been thus confuted. Farther, the Old
Testament, together with the moral system of the world, contains a
chronological account of the beginning of it; and, from thence, an
unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history
begins. It contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a
particular nation—His government of them—His threatenings “that he
would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto
the other”—and His promise “that he would bring again the
captivity of His people Israel, and plant them upon their land—and
they should be no more pulled up out of the land.”Vide Deut., xxx., 2, 3;
Is., xlv., 17, lx., 21;
Jer., xxx. 11, xlvi., 28;
Amos, ix., 15; Jer. xxxi., 36. It foretells
that God would raise them up a particular person—the Messiah—in whom all His
promises should be finally fulfilled; and consequently (as profane, as well as
sacred, history informs us),
there was a general
expectation of his appearing at such a particular time, before any
one appeared claiming to be that person. It foretells also, that he
should be rejected by those to whom he was so long promised,Vide Is., viii., 14, 15,
xlix., 5, xliii.;
Mal., i., 10, 11, and iii. and
that he should be the Saviour of the Gentiles.Is., xlix., 6, ii.,
xi., lvi., 7;
Mal., i., 11. To which must be
added the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New
Testament, and very many in the Old, which describe what shall be
the completion of the revealed plan of Providence. The Scripture
farther informs us, that at the time the Messiah was expected, a
person arose in this nation claiming to be that Messiah, to whom all
the prophecies referred. He continued some years working miracles,
and endued his disciples with a power of doing the same, to be a
proof of the truth of that religion which He commissioned them to
publish; that they, accordingly, made numerous converts, and
established His religion in the world; to the end of which the
Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this
religion among mankind.
(2.) Suppose now a person, quite ignorant of
history, to remark these things in Scripture, without knowing but
that the whole was a late fiction; then to be informed of the
following confessed facts: that the profession and establishment of
natural religion is greatly owing to this book, and the supposed
revelation which it
contains,But it is to be remembered, that how much
soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing
to Scripture-revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion
from reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Elements is
destroyed by a man’s knowing, or thinking, that he should never have
seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had
those propositions come into his thoughts, but for that
mathematician.—Butler. even in those countries which do not acknowledge the
proper authority of Scripture; yet that it is acknowledged by many
nations-that religion is highly important (all this, considered
together, would make the appearing and receiving of this book seem
the most important event in the history of mankind, and would claim
for it, as if by a voice from heaven, a serious examination); that
the first parts of Scripture are acknowledged to be of the earliest
antiquity; that its chronology, and common history, are entirely
credible, being confirmed by the natural and civil history of the
world, collected from common historians, from the state of the
earth, and from the late inventions of arts and sciences; that there
appears nothing related as done in any age, not conformableThere are several objections to passages
of Scripture, occasioned by not considering them in reference to the
manners of the times. Thus it appears that the things objected to,
like many others that are censured in Christianity, and in
Scripture, are, in a greater or less degree, actual proofs of their truth and authenticity. to the
manners of that age; that there are all the internal marks
imaginable of REAL
characters; that the
miracles are interwoven with the common history—which, therefore,
gives some credibility to them—that the Jews, of whom it chiefly
treats, are acknowledged to have been an ancient nation, and divided
from all others; that they preserved natural religion among them,
which can not be said of the Gentile world—(which again adds a
credibility to the miracles, for they alone can satisfactorily
account for this event); that as there was a national expectation
among them,Vide Bishop
Chandler’s Vindication of Christianity, where it is fully proved
that this expectation was general among the Jews and Samaritans. The
effects of it may be judged from its extension among the Gentiles.
To say nothing of the Arabians and of the appearing of the star to
the Magi—Suetonius informs us (Vespasian, cap. iv., 8), “Percrebuerat oriente toto vetus et constans opinio, esse in fatis,
ut eo tempore Judæâ profecti rerum potirentur.” And Tacitus, in his
history (lib. v., cap. 9), testifies, that “Pluribus persuasio
inerat, antiquis sacerdotum literis contineri, eo ipso tempore fore,
valesceret oriens, prœfectique Judæâ rerum potirentur.”
raised from the prophecies of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this
time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that he was rejected by this nation
(as seemed to be foretold), but received by the Gentiles, yet not upon the
evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught supported
itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the
religion of the world; that, in the mean time, the Jewish polity was utterly
destroyed, and the nation dispersed
over the face of the
earth; that, notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct
numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which, not
only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies
concerning them, but also renders it, as one may say, a visible and
easy possibility that the promises made to them, as a nation, may
yet be fulfilled; that there are obvious appearances of the state of
the world in other respects, besides what relates to the Jews, and
of the Christian Church having so long answered, and still answering
to the prophetic history. Let him view these acknowledged facts in
connection with what has been before collected from Scripture, and
the weight must appear very considerable to any reasonable mind.
OBJECTIONS PRECLUDED: All these
things, and the several particulars contained under them, require to be
distinctly and most thoroughly examined. This has not been attempted here.
However, the things advanced, must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for though
they may say that the historical evidence of miracles, wrought in attestation of
Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really
wrought, they can not deny that there is such historical evidence, it being a
known matter of fact that there is. They object to the appearance of a standing
miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion,
accounting for
this fact by their religion forbidding them intermarriages with
those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities
in their food, which prevent them being incorporated with any other
people. But an event, considered apart from all coincidence, may not
appear miraculous, yet the coincidence with prophecy may be so,
though the event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our
Saviour’s being born at Bethlehem, with a long series of prophecy
and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous, though the event
itself—his birth at that place, appears to have been brought about
in a natural way, of which, however, no one can be certain. Men may
say, the conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident;
but there are many instances in which such conformity itself can not
be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of collateral
things as those above mentioned, that any odd accidental events,
without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful
people. Men, I say, may talk thus, but no one who is serious can
possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the
importance of collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances,
in the evidence of probability, as distinguished in nature from the
evidence of demonstration. This general view of evidence may induce
serious persons to set down every thing, which they think may be of
any
real weight at all in
proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of
prophecy. Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down what he
thought made for the contrary side; but let him remember that a
mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous
than a mistake on the other; but is not this prejudice? If suffered
to influence the judgment,Thus, though it is
indeed absurd to talk of the greater merit of assent upon little or
no evidence than upon demonstration, yet the strict discharge of our
duty with less sensible evidence, does imply in it a better
character than the same diligence in the discharge of it upon more
sensible evidence. This fully accounts for, and explains, that
assertion of our Saviour—“Blessed are they that have not seen and
yet have believed”—have become Christians, and obeyed the Gospel,
upon less sensible evidence than that which Thomas, to whom he is
speaking, insisted upon.—Butler’s Sermon on the Ignorance of Man. it is so indeed, and, like other
prejudices, it operates contrary ways in different men; for some are
inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear; and
it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order
to gain their assent. But, in deliberations concerning conduct,
there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the
account than the importance of it. But the truth of our religion, like
the truth of common facts, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together.
And, unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument,
and every particular
thing in it, can reasonably
be supposed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the
argument for Christianity lies), then is the truth of it proved; in
like manner as, if in any common case, numerous events acknowledged
were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed, the truth
of this event would be proved, not only if any one of the
acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one
of them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken
together could not, in reason, be supposed to have happened, unless
the disputed ones were true.The evidences of religion being so
exceedingly dissimilar are highly characteristic of its truth. If
man’s contrivance, or if the favor of accidents, could have given
to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies—either its miracles
or its prophecy, its morals or its propagation, or, if I may so
speak, its Founder—there could be no room to believe, nor even to
imagine, that all these appearances of great credibility could be
united together by any such causes. If a successful craft could have
contrived its public miracles, or so much as the pretence of them,
it required another reach of craft and new resources to provide and
adapt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it demanded not
only a different art, but a totally opposite character, to conceive
and promulgate its admirable morals. Again, the achievement of its
propagation in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world—but
the hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. For, each of these
suppositions of contrivance being arbitrary, as it certainly is, and
unsupported, the climax of them is an extravagance; and if the
imbecility of art is foiled in the hypothesis, the combinations of
accident are too vain to be thought of.—Davison on Prophecy.
It is obvious how much
advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who
attack Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to
show, in a short and lively manner, that such and such things are
liable to objection—that this and another thing is of little weight
in itself—but impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of
the whole argument in one view.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VII.
1. In what does Butler proceed to consider
the positive evidence for the truth of Christianity?
2. Give
summarily the five heads under which Butler treats of the historical
evidence of miracles.
3. Why must peculiar importance be attached to
the testimony afforded by the writings of St. Paul?
4. State the
argument which leads to the conclusion that “the conversion of many
to Christianity, when education, prejudice, and authority were
against it, is an undoubted presumption of its Divine origin.”
5.
Answer the objection, that “Enthusiasm greatly weakens, if not
destroys, the credibility of evidence given even for facts, in
matters relating to religion.”
6. How may we answer the assertion
that “there is a considerable degree of historical evidence for
miracles acknowledged to be fabulous?”
7. What general answer may be
given to all the foregoing objections against evidences of religion,
taken from the liability of men to be deceived?
8. In stating the
evidence of Christianity derived from prophecies, how does Butler
excuse the defects imputed to them, from the alleged obscurity of
certain parts in them?
9. Answer the objection, that “Considering
each prophecy distinctly, it does not at all appear that the
prophecies were intended for those particular events to which they
are applied by Christians.”
10. Explain why we may reasonably
Assert, that “It is useless (for a person arguing against the
truth of prophecy) to show that prophecy is applicable to events of
the age in which it was written.” Also give
Butler’s remarks in conclusion of this
part of the chapter.
11. When considering both the direct and
circumstantial evidence for the truth of Christianity, as making up
one argument, in what light may Scriptural revelation be looked
upon? What is its general design? And how does the supposed
doubtfulness of evidence bear upon the question of its genuineness?
12. Give a summary of the acknowledged facts, which, in
connection
with what is collected from the Old Testament respecting its ancient
chronology, the history of Israel, prophecies of Christ; or from the
New, respecting the Gospel History or prophecies, ought to have
great weight with a reasonable and impartial inquirer.
13. Mention
some of the specious reasonings by which unbelievers endeavor to
evade the force of the above arguments; and answer them.
14. Prove
the reasonableness of the following warning, given to a man noting
down every thing which seems to be a proof against religion, “Let
him remember that a mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other.”
15. Taking it as
an admitted principle, that the truth of our religion, as of other
common facts, is to be judged by all the evidence taken together,
show where the stress of the argument for Christianity lies.
16.
Describe the argument given by Davison, to show that the evidences
of religion being so exceedingly dissimilar, are highly
characteristic.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.
I. The Objections that may
be urged against arguing from Analogy to Religion may be answered,
in general, by saying that they are owing to half views—to
indeterminate language, and the deficiencies and abuse of words; but
each objection can be separately precluded.
II. This Treatise
proceeds upon the principles of others, and, therefore, is not as
full a confirmation of Religion as it might otherwise be.
I. 1st.
OBJECTED. “IT is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation
by saying, that there are the same in natural religion, when what is
wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as
others their respective, difficulties.”
ANSWER. The having all
difficulties cleared, may be the same as requiring to comprehend the
Divine Nature, and the whole plan of Providence. As to its being a
poor thing to argue from natural to revealed religion, it has
always been allowed, and it is often necessary to argue in such a
way of probable deduction from what is acknowledged to what is
disputed; and, indeed, the epithet poor is an
properly applicable to
the whole of human life. Is it not a poor thing, for instance, that
even the most eminent physician should have so little knowledge in
the cure of diseases as often to act upon conjecture, where the life
of a man is concerned? Yet it is not a poor thing in comparison of
having no skill at all. Farther, it is of great consequence to show
that objections urged against revelation are as much leveled against
natural religion; for thus we prove that the objectors are arguing
against moral Providence, while they seem, whether intentionally or
not, to argue against revelation; for nothing more has been taken
for granted in the second part of this treatise than there was in
the first, viz., the existence of an Author of nature; so that
Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural
religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the constitution of
nature.
2d. OBJECTED. “It is a strange way of convincing men of the
obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little
reason for their worldly pursuits.”
ANSWER. Religion is a practical
thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as there
is reason to think is commanded by the Author of nature, and will,
upon the whole, be our happiness under His government. Now, if men
can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this as
to believe that care of their temporal affairs
will be their
advantage—this, with the infinitely superior interest which religion
proposes, will be an argument for the practice of it. But the chief
and proper force of the argument, referred to in the objection, lies
in another place; for it is said, that the proof of religion is
involved in such inextricable difficulties as to render it doubtful;
and this is made a positive argument against its truth, since, if it
were true, it is said to be incredible that it should be left to
doubtful evidence. Now, the observation, that, from the natural
constitution of things, we must, in our temporal concerns, almost
continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence
of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer
to this argument, because it is a general instance made up of
numerous particular ones of somewhat in the conduct of the Author of
nature toward us similar to what is said to be incredible.
3d
OBJECTION. “It is a strange way of vindicating the justice and
goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing objections against
both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show that the
like objections lie against natural Providence. This is a way of
answering objections against religion without even pretending to
make out that the system of it, or the particular things in it
objected against, are reasonable; especially when it is admitted
that analogy is no answer to
such objections, i. e.,
those against wisdom, justice, and goodness.”
ANSWER. The design of
this treatise is, not to vindicate the character of God, but to show
the obligations of men—not to justify his Providence, but to show
us our duty. For, 1st, It is not necessary to justify the
dispensations of Providence against objections, any further than to
show, that the things objected to may be consistent with, and even
instances of justice and goodness, as has been already shown (Chap.
4, Part II.). 2d. The objections are not endeavored to be removed,
by showing that the like objections, allowed to be conclusive, lie
against natural Providence; but these objections being shown to be
inconclusive, the credibility of the things objected against,
considered as matters of fact, is shown from their conformity to the
constitution of nature. 3d. This would be of weight, even though
these objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of
religion, above set down, and religion implying several facts—for
instance, the fact that God will hereafter reward and punish men for
their actions—the observation, that His present government is by
rewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be
incredible. 4th. Though objections against the reasonableness of the
system of religion, can not be answered without entering into the
consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against the
credibility or truth of the
system may; because the system of it is reducible into matter of
fact, and the probable truth of facts may be shown without
considering their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary to prove the
reasonableness of every precept and dispensation; though, in some
cases, it is highly useful to do so. But the general obligations of
religion are made out by proving the reasonableness of its practice.
5th. Though analogy be not an immediate answer to such objections,
yet it is an immediate answer to what is intended by them, which
is—to show that the things objected against are incredible.
4th.
OBJECTED. “When analogical reasoning is carried to the utmost
length, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state.”
ANSWER. It is acknowledged that the foregoing treatise is far from
satisfactory; but so would any natural institution of life appear,
if reduced into a system, together with its evidence. Indeed, the
unsatisfactory nature of the evidence on which we are obliged to
act, in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men
do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon
account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion, then, being
admitted real, those who object against it, as not satisfactory, i.
e., as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very
condition of our being; for satisfaction, in this sense,
does not belong to such
a creature as man. They also forget the very notion of religion; for
religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a certain
degree of integrity and honesty, just as much as speaking to a man
presupposes that he understands the language in which you speak, or
the warning a man of danger presupposes in him self-concern. And,
therefore, the question is, not whether the evidence of religion be
satisfactory as to the purposes of curiosity, but whether it be, in
reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it
presupposes.
5th. OBJECTED. “It must be unaccountable ignorance of
mankind, to imagine that men will be prevailed upon to forego their
present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon
doubtful evidence.”
ANSWER. Religion is intended for a trial and
exercise of the morality of every person’s character who is a
subject of it; and thus considered, it has its ends upon all persons
to whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in reason to
influence their practice; for it puts them in a state of probation,
let them behave as they will in it. And the purpose of this treatise
is to show how, in reason, men ought to behave—not how, in fact,
they will behave. But the objection itself allows the things
insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight; hence it is
probable that the treatise
will have some influence;
and this is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it
before men, as there would be if it were likely to have a greater
influence.
II. Thus the whole of the foregoing objections arise in a
great measure firom half views, and undeterminate language, but
farther, it is to be observed, concerning them, that this treatise
has proceeded upon the principles of others (i. e., notwithstanding
these principles—even admitting them to be true). Thus we have
argued upon, or notwithstanding, the principles of Fatalists, which
we d( not believe; and there have been omitted two principles of the
utmost importance, namely, the abstract principles of liberty and
moral fitnessBishop Butler throughout the present work has only considered the moral
difference, by which virtue and vice, as such, are approved and
disapproved. Dr. Samuel Clarke, has demonstrated (vide his sermons
at Boyle’s Lectures), that there are essential differences in the
qualities of human actions established in nature, and this natural
difference of things, prior to and independent of all will, creates
a natural FITNESS in the agent to act agreeably to it: it is obvious
that the introduction of this principle would materially confirm
Bishop Butler’s arguments.—which force themselves upon the mind, and in
endeavoring to avoid them, the form of expression. sometimes made
use of will appear strange, to such as do not observe the reason of
it. Now these two abstract principles being omitted, religion can
only be considered as a question of fact, and in this view
it is here considered,
since Christianity, and its proof, are historical; and since also,
natural religion is a matter of fact—as its general system is
contained in the fact, that there is a righteous Governor of the
World. This may be considered apart from these abstract principles;
for instance, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles, may be considered apart from their appearing so to our
minds; the former is an abstract truth—the latter is only a matter
of fact. So likewise, that there is in the nature of things an
original standard of right and wrong, in actions, independent upon
all will; but which unalterably determines the will of God, to
exercise the moral government of finally righteous rewards and
punishments—contains an abstract truth as well as matter of fact.
But suppose that the government of righteous rewards took place
here—it would not be an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact;
and the same questions as are now raised, might still be raised
about liberty and moral fitness; so that this proof would remain,
however the questions might be decided. And thus, God having given
mankind a moral faculty, the object of which is actions, which
naturally approves some actions as of good desert, and condemns
others as of ill desert. This final righteous judgment is not to be
considered as an abstract truth, but as mere a fact as if it took
place here. This future fact has not,
indeed, been proved with
the force with which it might be proved, by taking in the
considerations of liberty and moral fitness; but by omitting these,
we have avoided the abstract questions concerning them, which have
been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings; and we
have confined ourselves to matter of fact, which must have been
admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, who would not
have admitted abstract truth, but pretended to doubt whether there
was any such thing as truth, or whether we could depend upon
faculties for the knowledge of it in any case.
Hence, therefore, the
force of this treatise may be distinctly observed. To such as are
convinced of religion upon the proof of the two last-mentioned
principles, it will be an additional proof and confirmation of it;
to such as are not satisfied with abstract reasonings, it will be an
original proof of it. Those who believe will here find the scheme of
Christianity cleared of objections, and its evidence peculiarly
strengthened. Those who do not believe, will be shown the absurdity
of all attempts to prove Christianity false, and they will also be
shown its plain undoubted credibility at the least. Ridicule may be
applied to show the argument from analogy in a disadvantageous
light, but it is unquestionably a real one; for, religion implying
in it numerous facts, analogy being a confirmation of all facts to
which it can be applied; as it is the
only proof of most, so
it can not but be admitted by every one to be of considerable weight
on the side of religion, both natural and revealed.
CONCLUSION.The summaries prefixed to each chapter should now be read in
continuation, as the force of the treatise consists in the whole
analogy considered together. Deduct, now, what is to be deducted from the positive evidence of
religion, upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain
in the objections against it upon the most skeptical principles, and
the practical consequences will be—1st. That immorality is greatly aggravated
in persons who have been made acquainted with Christianity: because the moral
system of nature which Christianity lays before us, approves itself almost
intuitively to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. 2d. That there is a
middle, between a full satisfaction of the truth of Christianity, and a
satisfaction of the contrary; which middle state of mind consists in a serious,
doubting apprehension, that it may be true: and this serious apprehension that
Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations of a
serious regard to it throughout the whole of their life. 3d. It will appear that
blasphemy and profaneness, with regard to Christianity, are without excuse; for
there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth. If
this be a just account of things, and yet men can continue to vilify or
disregard
Christianity—which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration
of its falsehood—there is no reason to think they would alter their
behavior to any purpose, though there were a demon stration of its truth.
QUESTIONS—CHAPTER VIII.
1. How may the objections urged against
arguing from analogy to religion be generally answered?
2. Give a
special reply to each of the following objections: 1st. What is
wanted is, not to solve difficulties in revelation by saying that
there are the same in natural religion, but to clear both of them of
their common as well as their respective difficulties.
3. 2d
Objection. It is a strange way of convincing men of the obligations
of religion, to show them they have as little reason for their
worldly pursuits.
4. 3d Objection. We can not vindicate the justice
and goodness of the Author of nature, and remove objections against
both, to which the system of nature is open, by showing that the
like objections lie against natural Providence.
5. 4th Objection.
Analogical reasoning, carried to the utmost extent, does not fully
satisfy the mind.
6. 5th Objection. We can not imagine that men will
forego their present interests and pleasures from regard to religion
upon doubtful evidence.
7. Give an exposition of the argument, by
which Butler distinguishes between abstract truths and matters of
fact in religion. What important conclusion does he draw from
thence?
8. To what purpose may the force of this
whole treatise be effectually applied?
9. Deducting every thing that
can, upon skeptical principles, be required to be deducted from the
positive evidence of religion, what practical consequences can be
drawn from that which remains unassailable by sophistry and cavil?
THE END.