Sec. 2.—Arguments drawn from the Nature of the Moral Idea.

In the last place, a word must be said on the position taken with regard to the subject under consideration by modern speculative criticism.²²⁵²²⁵   The literature of this subject is well known. I therefore merely mention, on the one side, Strauss’s Schlussabhandlung zum Leben Jesus and the christological portion of his Glaubenslehre, especially pp. 153-240, vol. ii.: on the other side, the essays of Alb. Schweizer on the Dignität des Religionstifters, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1834; and on Strauss’s Leben Jesu, also in the Studien und Kritiken, No. III. 1837; my own treatises in the work Historisch oder Mythisch, Hamb. 1838; Fischer’s Prüfung der Straussischen Glaubenslehre, Tüb. 1842, Heft ii. p. 10 ff.; and De Wette’s Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, §§ 6 and 46. This decidedly opposes the sinlessness of Jesus, and does so chiefly on philosophic grounds, i.e. upon such arguments as are derived from the nature of the moral idea and its development in humanity: we are therefore under the necessity of meeting these objections also.

Modern speculation does indeed leave to Jesus a certain residuum of greatness, in virtue of which He was capable of being the ‘occasion’ of the rise of a new faith. Yet this greatness is of an indefinite kind, and in no case constitutes a specific distinction between Him and all other men. As a proof of this equality, two maxims are brought forward which are evidently regarded as fundamental axioms. One of these axioms is, ‘ that the first in a series of developments cannot at the same time be the greatest;’ the other, ‘that it is not the manner of the idea to realize itself in a single individual, but only in the sum-total of individuals,—in the genus.’ If the first axiom held universally and necessarily true, we should be driven to conclude that the moral greatness of Jesus did not surpass the succeeding links of the chain of development realized in the Christian world and 170the relative eminence of Jesus, His character as our pattern, would thus be destroyed. But if the former axiom were shown to be inadmissible, and there remained only the second, this latter would, if applied to Jesus, at the least exclude the possibility of believing in His absolute moral greatness, and consequently do away with His typical relation to men.

In both these propositions, individually considered, there is a certain amount of truth; but in the application made of them to the founder of Christianity, we find but another exemplification of the erroneous tendency of modern speculation to merge the particular in the general, the concrete in the abstract; and this tendency we cannot but decidedly oppose. It is perfectly correct to say that in certain spheres of life the first in a series of developments is not at the same time the most perfect,—the commencement is not also the fulfilment. But it is no less true that in other spheres the first of a series must be also the highest, as certainly as that there would be no development at all were it otherwise. For our present purpose, we shall distinguish between the spheres of science, of art, and of the moral and religious life. In the first department, all is dependent on the range of knowledge; in the second, on the inventive intuition of genius, and the distinctive capacity to give shape and form to that which is imagined; in the third, on the entire inner life, in so far as it takes up a special position to things human and Divine. Knowledge is by nature progressive, because, on the one hand, it is dependent on experience, whose circle is widened only gradually, and by the co-operation of many; and, on the other hand, because it is based on processes of thought, which become ever deeper in their course. Consequently, if this progress goes on unimpeded, the later inquirer ordinarily surpasses the earlier. Here the axiom mentioned previously, holds good as a general rule. It is not possible that one man 171should comprehend in himself all that can be known. Least of all can this be expected of him who is the pioneer in any special branch of science or knowledge. Every inquirer and knower is complemented by other inquirers and knowers. It ie. true that at certain epochs giant minds arise, which either unite the elements they find at hand in higher combinations, or sagaciously anticipate the future; but even they cannot pass beyond certain definite limits, and it cannot fail that some of those who follow after may gain a higher eminence. It is quite different even in the sphere of art. There only those individuals accomplish anything great who are endowed with special creative powers, and with remarkable talents of execution; there, the most important works owe their origin not to a co-operation of many, but to the intuitions and technical skill of individual genius. In this department, supposing that the masters who arise, possessed of higher genius, do form schools, they ordinarily surpass their scholars and successors, and thus, whilst first in the order of time, are also relatively the most eminent. It is even conceivable, that a master endowed with the very highest powers should produce works in his department, which remain pre-eminent and unequalled in all subsequent times. The case is different, again, in the matter of religion. Religion has indeed an element of knowledge in common with science, and one of intuition and representation in common with art; but in its inmost nature, it is a peculiar state of being affecting the whole life of man,—it is that reference of the life of the individual to God which governs every thought and action. Here the personality, as such, is all in all. Everything depends on the manner in which it stands inwardly related to God. To speak of the gradual introduction of an essentially new form, of a principle of religion, by the combined exertions of many, is almost preposterous; for the life, the consciousness, is not the joint 172product, the joint result of the efforts of a community, but must originally reside in One, from whom it then passes on to others. He through whom a new religious life and consciousness are produced in others, is the founder of a religion; and he will naturally be the most perfect, as well as the first, in the series of development of which he is the originating cause. Only once can a peculiar religious consciousness be said to dawn for the first time; only once can there be a really original religious life; and of necessity the life and consciousness will be present with the greatest freshness, purity, and energy in the spirit of him in whom they take their rise. He who should surpass the founder of the system to which he belongs, in the intensity and energy of his religious life and consciousness, would himself become the founder of a new religion, and be the first in a new series of developments.

A speculative system which treats religion as a mode and branch of knowledge, and considers it, in contrast with philosophy, but an imperfect, elementary, childish knowledge, may find it very natural to conceive of piety as gradually progressing from a lower to a higher state (like all things else), and may consequently be unable to consider the founder of a religion as even relatively the greatest, for he is in its view only the occasion of its existence. But it is quite incredible that such should be the actual state of the case, because religion is not mere knowledge, and therefore its development is governed by totally different laws from those which hold good in the case of science. In one aspect, undoubtedly, religion may be classed as knowledge; that is, so far as it is a doctrinal system. On this side, religion may undergo a development through the co-operation of many. This is the domain of theological science, and in it the later may far surpass the earlier. But surely the more recent theological science is generally acknowledged to have gained at least one step,—to have established the principle, that 173religion is not properly knowledge, that Christianity is not originally a system of doctrine, and that the nature and functions of theology are quite distinct from those of religion. In religion there is ever an element which is primitive, underived, direct, which does not gradually arise, but is present perfectly, undividedly, and originally; and this is the case simply on account of its being life, consciousness, a peculiar state of the whole soul. No thought of individuals supplementing each other, especially when the institution of a religion is concerned, can possibly be entertained. If a new religion is to arise, that which constitutes its vitality must at first exist in a single individual. And if this has once been the case, there is neither room nor need for others to contribute aught else to this its essential foundation. Sound sense, on the contrary, will not fail to recognise in the originator of the new religious life the greatest in his own peculiar sphere; and in fact there is no historical religion which does not in this sense place its founder at the, head of its community. Moreover, a glance at actual history necessarily raises the question: If Christ is not to be considered the most perfect in that whole series of development, of which He was the first, who in the whole Christian world, during its successive ages, is to be regarded as having actually surpassed Him? A most expressive and intelligible silence is its only answer.

Still Jesus might, as the founder of Christianity, have been the greatest within the Christian community, without being therefore absolutely perfect. We may admit that He is an example, without absolutely regarding Him as our prototype. Against the latter criticism urges, that ‘it is not the manner of the idea to realize itself in one individual, and grudgingly to deny itself to the rest; it realizes itself in the totality of individuals, in the race. Consequently, where an individual is represented to be the absolute embodiment of the idea, there is a transference to it of that 174which properly holds good only of the genus, for the individual is but a symbol of the totality.’ In this objection also there is an element of truth. The idea does undoubtedly realize itself in humanity as a whole. Otherwise what significance could we attach to the existence and development of mankind? But in order to get at the whole truth, the other side must be taken into consideration, namely, that the idea realizes itself in humanity only in and through individuals. So far from the former excluding the latter, it is not even conceivable without it. All development in humanity has its ground in personalities: the higher the sphere thereof, the more certainly is this true. All great men derive their chief significance and importance from the fact that their life is not something isolated, but that whilst itself having its foundation in the foregoing development of humanity, it passes over into and becomes part of the succeeding development. The more fully this can be affirmed of any person, the greater he is; and if there existed a spirit possessing the capacity to diffuse and expand its inner life till it should become the life of entire humanity, we should be under the necessity of esteeming it absolutely great.

In connection, however, with the question as to the realization of the moral idea, everything will depend on the way in which we define the idea of humanity. The idea of humanity does not relate to any special sphere, such as that of science, or art, or political wisdom; nor can be said to have attained its realization in the perfection of any endowment which belongs exclusively to one of these spheres. The idea of humanity comprises in itself that which all men, as men, are bound to accomplish,—that for the performance of which, each, apart from his special talents, is endowed with the requisite capacities,—that which may be described as the universal task,—the task which all men, as such, are bound to accomplish, whatever other powers or gifts may have fallen to their 175share. Now this absolutely universal thing is religion and morality. These belong to all men alike,—make man in the full sense man, in relation first to himself, then to human society, and specially in the highest relation of all,—that, namely, to his holy Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge. If we recognise the highest aim of all humanity, and of every individual, to be the attainment of perfection in piety and morality, or, in other words, the state of perfect union with God, and the holiness which has its ground therein, we shall be driven to concede at once, either that this ideal perfect condition is never realized at all, or, that such realization takes place, first in the individual personality, and then, through it, in a greater or less number of individuals, but not in the race as such.

The fundamental thought ever firmly embraced by modern criticism is, that the idea is by no means a something lying beyond actuality,—a mere ‘ought,’—but that it necessarily enters into real existence. This is, moreover, equally the result of our conviction, that the idea of man, which we recognise as Divine, but which we can only regard in God as creative, would, if it remained unrealized, be but empty and unreal. For if the idea. of man originated with God, and if man must therefore have been conceived of as perfect, as fulfilling, and not in conflict with, his destiny,—if, moreover, we are necessitated to ascribe reality to the thoughts of God,—we must assume that the Divine idea of man will in some way, and at some time, arrive at realization. But where is the realization to be met with? Modern speculation points us to the race, to the totality of human individuals forming a complement to each other. But from this standpoint, though original sin is denied, it is confessed that, taken together, we are sinful and imperfect beings.²²⁶²²⁶   Strauss, Glaubenslehre, B. ii. p. 184. Whence, then, is the realization of the idea to come? A series of imperfect beings, 176even if it is continued indefinitely, can never produce one that is perfect; the totality of all sinful men will not originate one who is sinless. Religious and moral perfection is a thing complete in itself, and can never be attained by the supply on the part of one imperfect being of that which was lacking in others. It must either be perfectly and completely present, or not at all. If the individuals are not moral and religious, the race cannot be said to be so.²²⁷²²⁷   Julius Müller remarks very justly, in his Christian Doctrine of Sin, i. 265, that ‘the moral idea demands complete realization—a realization that embraces all its fundamental aspects—in the life of the individual: it endures no division of the task; it does not allow one person to limit himself to the exercise of one virtue, and to leave to others to supplement him by the cultivation of the other virtues. It is one of the most flagitious attacks on the majesty of the moral idea, to refer its claims to a reciprocal compensation of men, which shall make up for the shortcomings of one by the virtues of the rest.’ Schaff (On the Moral Character of Christ, p. 52) observes, that the realization of the idea in an individual is no more contradictory than its realization in the race,—that, on the other hand, what is true in the idea must necessarily be realized in individual life, and that all history points to such realization.’ In this method we should be driven to look upon the idea as a thing which ought to be,—as a goal ever revolved about, but never attained; and a notion of this kind cannot be called, even by modern criticism, an idea at all, but a mere fiction.

In maintaining that the idea bestows itself in its fulness on one individual,—a thing which we find, at all events, to be approximatively the fact in all departments, and specially in art,—we are far from implying that it is for this reason niggardly towards all other individuals: we mean, in truth, just the reverse. That special bestowment on one, is the commencement of the historical process by means of which alone it is possible for all the rest to become participators. It is eminently requisite that the idea should be realized in an individual, when a perfect manifestation of God is to be made, when a perfect atonement and deliverance are to be effected, and, by means of both, a perfect religion is to be 177established. If the establishment of any definite historical religion presupposes one who is the greatest as regards that stage of the religious life, one who is therefore a pattern, how much more must the establishment of the perfect religion presuppose one who is not only relatively the highest, but altogether perfect in the sphere of religion, and who is consequently our prototype! It is a sheer contradiction to call Christianity the absolute religion, and yet to declare its founder morally or religiously imperfect. The fundamental requirement of all religion is the union of God and man. This is allowed by modern speculation: but it makes the effecting thereof an infinitely light and easy matter by its pantheism, by its regarding God and man as directly one. But, apart from the objection, that union can only be spoken of as taking place between two objects essentially distinct from one another, the most important point of all is entirely lost sight of, viz. sin, which, wherever it exists, necessarily causes a separation between God and man. If the reality and significance of sin are admitted, union with God can only be conceived of as reunion, brought about by the breaking down and taking away of sin,—in other words, by atonement and redemption. But it is evident, again, that atonement and redemption, if they are to be accomplished by an individual, require the appearance at the head of the human race of one perfectly free from sin, well-pleasing to God, and in full communion with Him. Hence in this respect, also, we are reduced to a choice between two alternatives,—either religion is reduced to an unaccomplished ‘ought,’ or the religious idea was perfectly realized in its founder. But so far is the idea from being niggardly to others through its realization in one person, that, on the contrary, it is therein alone that efficient means exist for rendering the attainment of perfection possible to others, and for giving it the greatest possible extension.