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THE little work now offered to the public has but gradually attained its present form. Its substance first appeared as an essay in the Studien and Kritiken for 1828, since which time it has undergone many alterations, and been enlarged by various additions in the successive editions which have been called for.
In his preface to the sixth edition (1853), the author says that he was first led to publish this treatise in a separate form, from the desire of showing to others the way by which he had himself been brought to a living belief in Christianity, hoping thereby to assist his own hearers, and younger theologians in general, in attaining a firmer foundation for their faith. The work, however, finding much acceptance beyond the circle for which it was chiefly intended, and new editions being repeatedly demanded, much new matter was added to meet the requirements made by the theological movements of the period, and several sections were rewritten.
Of the present seventh edition, Dr. Ullmann remarks that he has
for some years delayed responding to the call made for it, because he could neither
feel satisfied to reprint it with merely unimportant corrections, nor find time
for such a thorough recasting of the whole as he felt desirable. This task has now
at last been accomplished. In executing it, the author says that it has been
his endeavour, first, to give, in a more condensed form, such matter as
he has retained from former editions, and then so to combine with this those
‘Amidst the various struggles which the Church has to pass through,’ says the author, ‘I am fully persuaded that, if its health and vigour are to be maintained, the silent labours of theology must not be omitted. And I am as certain—nay, I am more deeply penetrated with the truth—that as in every age, so also in our own,, the first and chief concern is to lead souls to Christ, to implant Him and His salvation in the hearts of men. If the work here offered may, in the midst of the turmoils of these times, contribute, in ever so small a degree, to accomplish this most vital duty of theology, it will not have failed in the purpose for which it has been written.’
WHEN I first reprinted the present treatise in a separate form from the theol. Stud. und Krit., it was specially designed for the use of my own pupils and of young theologians in general. I desired to point out to them the way in which I had myself been led to a vital interest in Christianity, and hoped thus to contribute to the establishment of their faith, to encourage them in their studies, and to increase their delight in their high and holy calling. Nor have my hopes been disappointed. But besides the circle for which it was at first designed, this little work has passed into the hands of both theological and general readers, and has gained such acceptance that repeated editions have been necessary.
In, preparing this new edition, it was impossible to omit noticing, either to refute or to agree with them, the various theories advanced by the theological movements which have meanwhile taken place. And how varied and eventful has been our experience in this respect since 1828! At the same time, it was also necessary to pay due attention to, and to profit by, whatever might have been said on our subject by theological contemporaries. Thus matter has gradually accumulated, till what was at first but an article of moderate compass, has become a complete and sizeable volume.
The demand for a new edition has given me the opportunity
In doing this, I found myself obliged to give an entirely new form to whole sections, and to endeavour, by copious additions and corrections, to improve and complete those parts which I have allowed to remain essentially unaltered.
The parts which have undergone a complete process of recasting are, besides the Introduction, chiefly the following:—the chapters and sections on Sin, on Sinlessness, on the Gospel Portraiture and Self-testimony of Jesus; on the Proofs of the Sinlessness of Jesus furnished by the effects of Christianity; on the narrative of the Temptation; and especially the whole of the Fourth Part, which treats of the inferences to be drawn from the Sinlessness of Jesus. These portions I desire most to commend to the reader’s investigation, since it is with respect to them that I cherish the hope of receiving the assistance of either a correction, an expansion, or a refutation of my opinions.
It is not for me to say whether, amidst the present constellation
of devotional and theological works, this little book will find the interest formerly
accorded to it. The strife of parties, their internal and external contests,—some
really necessary, some provoked by violence,—have turned attention to other subjects.
Besides, many at the present day, even among my younger contemporaries, have so
exclusively surrendered themselves to the forms of a ready-made dogmatism
But if I feel uncertain in this respect, there is another in which I feel no kind of doubt. I am certain that, if in the midst of all this contention the health and vigour of the Christian Church is to be maintained, the silent labours of theology must not be intermitted. And I am as certain—nay, far more deeply penetrated with the certainty—that as in all times, so also in our own, the first and essential thing is to bring souls to Christ, to implant Him and His salvation in the hearts of men. If this treatise may subserve this, the highest object of theology, and contribute to effect it, in ever so small a degree, its aim will not be unaccomplished.
Heidelberg, March 15, 1858.
A NEW edition of this book has now for some years been required but, notwithstanding the representations of its publisher, I could neither find time for such a recompilation as I felt necessary, nor consent to a mere reprint, with detached and unimportant corrections. At first, my official engagements forbade such an undertaking and subsequently, physical ailments interposed to prevent any continuous labour. Thus I have been unable till now to complete such improvements as might allow me to offer this new edition to the public and I can only wish that the many interruptions amidst which this little work has been brought to its present state, may be as little perceptible as possible in my execution of the task.
In the present edition my efforts have chiefly been directed to give a more concise and distinct form to those portions which I have retained from former editions, and at the same time to combine with this such new matter as seemed desirable, whether from the works of others, or from the results of my own further investigation of the subject during the last ten years. I hope this has been done in such a manner as nowhere to interfere with the organic connection of the whole. It has been my aim that the book, while losing none of its essential contents, should, in spite of the addition of new elements, be at once more brief and more lucid, and, above all, that its fundamental thought should be more clearly developed and more conclusively argued.
How far this may have been attained, it is not for me, but for intelligent readers, to determine.
My wishes for its success naturally accompany the work in its present, as in its former state yet I do not allow myself to cherish any sanguine hopes with respect to non-theological readers. I am well convinced, indeed, that there are among these many who will not give up the name of Christians, and who will consent to a Christianity which accommodates itself with but very little scruple to the humanitarian notions of the age. But I see, too, that matters take quite a different turn when Christianity appears, not perhaps as a mere dogmatical system, but in the simple and unadulterated form in which it was delivered to the world by its Founder and first confessors, and especially when it advances those great and deep-reaching moral claims which are absolutely inseparable from its very nature. A willingness to receive it in this form involves more than a wish just to maintain an amicable relation thereto it implies a mind earnestly striving after eternal happiness,—a mind estimating the invisible inheritance above all visible possessions, and therefore capable of the greatest sacrifices, especially the sacrifice of self, for its attainment in short, it implies the felt need of salvation.
That the number of such earnest seekers is in our days a large, or even an increasing one, I cannot, so far as my acquaintance with the religious and intellectual condition of the age extends, persuade myself. And since this treatise, though based only upon the general principles of morality, has nevertheless no other end in view than the advocacy of that primitive and scriptural Christianity, with its positive. creed and its moral demands upon the obedience of the whole human race, I cannot venture to anticipate for it, in this respect, a very favourable reception.
Yet I do not doubt that there are, in the different classes
ULLMANN.
Carlsruhe, June 25, 1863.
PAGE | |
Introduction.—Importance of the Subject, |
1-14 |
PART I. THE IDEA OF SINLESSNESS, | 15-38 |
Chap. 1. Of Sin, |
15-32 |
Chap. Of Sinlessness, |
33-38 |
PART II. THE SINLESS HOLINESS OF CHRIST, |
39-106 |
Chap. I. Testimony to the Sinlessness of Christ— |
|
Sec. 1. By Others.—Expressions of a general kind, |
40-47 |
The Gospel Portraiture of Jesus, |
47-69 |
Sec. 2. The Testimony of Jesus to Himself, |
69-81 |
Chap. II. The Sinlessness of Christ proved from the Effects produced by His Manifestation, |
81-106 |
Sec. 1. The New Life of Christianity in its Moral and Religious Aspects, |
83-90 |
Sec. 2. Morality and Religion united in Holiness, |
90-93 |
Sec. 3. These Effects caused not by an Idea, but an actual Person, |
94-106 |
PART III. OBJECTIONS, | 107-177 |
Chap. I. Arguments against the actual Sinlessness of Jesus, |
109-159 |
Sec. 1. The Development of the Person of Jesus, |
109-114 |
Sec. 2. The Development of the Messianic Plan, |
114-123 |
Sec. 3. The Temptation, |
123-144 |
Sec. 4. Other Acts and Expressions of Jesus as Arguments against His Sinlessness, |
144-159 |
Chap. II. Arguments against the Possibility of Sinlessness in general, |
160-177 |
Sec. 1. Arguments drawn from Experience, |
160-169 |
Sec. 2. Arguments drawn from the Nature of the Moral Idea, |
169-177 |
PART IV. INFERENCES FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS AND ARGUMENTS, |
178-247 |
Chap. I. Significance of Sinlessness with respect to the Person of Jesus, |
180-206 |
Sec. 1. The Human Nature of Jesus, |
182-196 |
Sec. 2. Inferences in respect to the Divine Nature of Jesus, |
196-206 |
Chap. II. Significance of the Sinlessness of Jesus with respect to His relation to Mankind, |
207-247 |
Sec. 1. The Sinless Jesus as the Personal Revelation of God, |
209-219 |
Sec. 2. The Sinless Jesus as the Mediator between God and Sinful Man, |
219-232 |
Sec. 3. The Holy Jesus as the Founder of the true Fellowship of Men, |
232-239 |
Sec. 4. The Sinless Jesus as the Pledge of Eternal Life, |
239-247 |
CONCLUSION, | 248-253 |
SUPPLEMENTS. | |
---|---|
I. THE HISTORY AND LITERATURE OF THE SUBJECT, |
254-264 |
II. THE DIFFERENT VIEWS HELD WITH RESPECT TO THE TEMPTATION, |
264-291 |
Chap. I. Explanation of the Details, |
265-276 |
Chap. II. General View of the History of the Temptation, |
276-291 |
Sec. 1. Explanations which represent the whole Narrative as a mere Product of Thought, |
277-284 |
Sec. 2. Explanations which recognise a Historical Basis of the Narrative, |
284-291 |
THE idea of sinlessness being the starting-point of the following
treatise, it is of the first necessity to point out that this word is not used in
the merely negative sense of an absence of antagonism to the Divine law, but in
its essentially positive meaning of actual conformity to the will of God. Sinlessness,
according to our view of it, is a state in which man occupies that position with
respect to the order of life appointed by God, nay, rather to the holy God Himself,
which alone becomes a being endued with personality, and created in the Divine image.
Sinlessness, taken in this sense, is the culminating point of human development.
It is a perfection both religious and moral, not merely resulting from complete
conformity to a Divine type, but itself inherent it is perfect and complete holiness.
The very notion of such a quality is highly significant, and is at once both elevating
and humbling. Elevating, because it brings before the mind the highest attainment
it can possibly conceive. For the moral sense of every one will tell him, that if
a man were perfectly sinless, he would be in the state to which, as a human being,
he is really destined would need no wealth to be truly rich, no sword to be a hero,
no crown to be a king. He would be in possession of that truth which is at the same
time the highest wisdom, and of that purity which is of itself both peace and happiness.
But not less is. the thought a humbling and depressing one for it is
But we are not about to treat of a mere idea, but of a reality,—of the appearance, in the midst of the history of the sinful human race, of a genuine and actual personality, of whose perfect and spotless holiness we have most incontestable evidence. It is this fact which gives its full importance to our subject. For freedom from sin, perfect righteousness, or whatever other term may be used to express the notion, was by no means utterly unknown, as a general idea, whether to the præ-Christian or the heathen world. Some notion of the kind is seen to hover over the altitudes reached even by Pagan wisdom, while the prophetic writings of the Old Testament refer to it with far greater distinctness. But as a reality, as filled ‘with vital energy, and especially as bringing forth actual results, it is found only in Christianity, nay, even in Christianity only in one solitary instance, in the person of the Author and Finisher of the Christian faith—in Christ Jesus.
It is obvious that a quality thus significant in itself, peculiar
to Christianity, and realized therein as an actual phenomenon only in one single
Person, must be of the highest importance, if we are rightly to appreciate either
the character of that Person Himself, or the entire sphere of life called into existence
by Him, viz. Christianity in general. No one can dispute that the tenet of the sinlessness
of Christ is deeply rooted in the Christian faith, and has grown up as an intrinsic
part of it. It forms, whether as a necessary postulate or a self-evident conclusion,
so essential a portion
Nevertheless it is not—as the reader is requested to observe—from this point of view, viz. the doctrinal, that we propose to treat the subject.
It is rather an apologetic aim which we exclusively set before us in our
treatment of this matter, and that more expressly and entirely than has as yet been
done by other writers. As it is my intention to deal more completely with the history
and literature of the subject in an appendix, I shall here confine myself
to a short statement of its most recent treatment. Among theologians of our own
days, it is acknowledged that it was Schleiermacher who first effectually
asserted the fundamental importance of the sinfulness or sinlessness of Christ.
He did this, however, chiefly in a doctrinal point of view; hence an apologetic
use of the subject, which necessarily demanded an entirely different treatment,
yet remained to be made. I first attempted to supply this need in the year 1828,
in an article on the ‘Sinlessness of Christ,’ in the Theologischen Studien and
Kritiken. From this article the present work has, by means of a series of alterations
and additions, been elaborated. Since that period, this important question has been
frequently discussed by other Protestant theologians from the apologetic point of
view; and that not merely in Germany, but in other countries where a lively interest
is taken in the development of modern theology. Among the works which have been
written on this subject, that of Dorner, On the Sinless Perfection of
Christ, Gotha 1828, occupies a high position. I would also direct attention to the following:—The Moral Character
of Christ, or the Perfection of Christ’s Humanity a proof of His Divinity,
1861, by Phil. Schaff, Professor of Theology at the Theological Seminary of
Mercersburg; The Christ of History: An Argument grounded on the Facts of His Life on Earth, Edinburgh 1856, by John Young, LL.D.; Chaps. x. and xi. of Nature and the
Supernatural, etc., New York 1858, by Horace Bushnell; Essai sur la Divinité
du Caractère Morale de Jesus Christ, Genève 1850, by E. Dandiran; Le Redempteur, Paris 1854, by E. Pressensé. Fel. Pecaut, a Frenchman, has, on the other hand,
come forward as a decided sceptic of the sinlessness of Christ, in his work,
Le Christ et le Conscience, Paris 1859. The treatise of Keim, too, On
the Human Development of Christ, Zurich 1861, and Gess’s Lehre von der Person
Christi, Basel 1856, bear also upon the subject. Compare also in general all
the works on the life of Christ which have appeared since Strauss; among which
I would call special attention to the Lectures of Riggenbach, Basel 1858,
Lect. x. I shall adduce other works as opportunity may offer.
But a religion is not proved to be the absolutely perfect one, by merely showing that it furnishes true doctrine and a faultless code of morals, and that it has produced many beneficial results. The Greeks might have taught a far deeper philosophy than the Platonic or Aristotelian,—the Jews might have had purer doctrines and precepts than those of even Moses and the Prophets; and yet they would not, therefore, have been in possession of the true religion. Nay, even Christianity itself might have furnished, in the Sermon on the Mount, the parables, and other teachings of Christ and His apostles, the sublimest religious material conceivable, and have even brought mighty things to pass thereby; but if this had been all, it would still have been far from satisfying man’s deepest need, from filling up the chasm existing between human nature and the holy God, and from exhibiting that culminating point of religious development, which cannot possibly be surpassed.
Religion—as no one in the present day will deny—is not merely
a system of doctrine or a code of morality. It must indeed have both, and
both must be deducible from its inner life; but it cannot be maintained that either
one or the other, or even both together, really is true religion. It is not
in a summary of ideas, doctrines, and moral postulates, floating, as it were, over
our life and influencing it from without, that the special and intrinsic nature
of true religion consists, but in being a reality born into life itself,—an effectual
all-influencing power therein. True religion is the real bond of union between
God and man; it is that position of the personal creature with respect to the personal
Creator by which the
By what distinctive mark, then, shall we chiefly recognise this
personal Being, thus revealing and founding the perfect religion and by what means
will such a Being be most certainly authenticated? Clearly our most trustworthy
sign will be the utter absence of that which separates man from God, even of sin,—the leading of a perfectly pure and
holy life, and a consequent abiding
in that vital union with God, by means of which, power to eradicate sin and its
consequences, and to create in man a new and holy life, may be attained. For
only One thus holy and sinless, entering into all the conditions and conflicts of
human life, and when suffering, suffering not for His own guilt, but that of His
brethren, could be able to reconcile the discord between the holy God and sinful
humanity, and in such wise to purify the latter, as forthwith to implant, in the
place of sin, a life of true holiness. But if once the true relation between God
and man were brought to pass by such a Being, if once access to God were opened
to all, and the power of divine renovation bestowed upon the human race, this cannot
be repeated,—it would be
We say, then, that the perfect revelation and the procuring of salvation can only be effected by means of a Person, and that a Person of sinless holiness. But then, too, on the other hand, we may affirm that if we can find such a Person, one really proved to have been in all respects sinlessly perfect, we have every reason for believing that in Him we actually possess a perfect revelation of the divine means of salvation, and have therefore attained the culminating point of vital religion. Hence all that proceeds from, or is connected with this Person, will bear for us the impress of an authority far surpassing any other.
Now such a Person is presented to us by Christianity in its Founder. It is not this or that doctrine, though of ever so fundamental importance, not this or that special fact, though of ever so decisive a nature, but Himself, the personal Christ, that is the vital centre of Christianity, the pulsating heart from which all proceeds, and to which all returns. There is no other religion in which the person of its founder occupies so central, so all-controlling, so all-pervading a position,—none into which it is so inseparably interwoven. Here, as nowhere besides, the divine revelation is a personal one,—the salvation, one wrought by means of a person. It is, however, obvious, that where the divinity of His work and Person is in question, there is one special point which must in the last instance be a decisive one, and that is the great subject of His sinless perfection.
This question has, under all circumstances, been one of the deepest
importance with regard to the stability of the
If there were substantial grounds for rejecting His sinless perfection, the Founder of Christianity must descend from that all-surpassing eminence on which Christian faith has from the very first beheld Him, and mingle in the ranks of other mortals, as one perhaps of prominent moral excellence and superior wisdom, yet still as one yielding homage to the power of sin. He would not then be even, in the full meaning of the term, the Son of man, the realized prototype of mankind, and the spiritual progenitor of a renewed race, well-pleasing to God, still less the only-begotten Son of God of the apostolic faith, and, least of all, the Reconciler of sinful man with the Holy God, and the all-sufficient Redeemer from sin and death for all times and generations. Not only would the Church which is built upon Him be standing upon an insecure foundation, but the Christian faith itself would have lost all solid basis.
If, on the other hand, the sinlessness of Jesus is proved by
convincing reasons, He is then beheld as the one perfect man, raised to a moral
elevation above the whole sinful race. Then there really is. in Him a perfect and
new moral creation, and the foundation for a similar new creation of the entire
race. Then we have in this fact a pledge of the certainty of that whole summary
of doctrines which has from the very first made Him the object of Christian faith,
Of such critical importance is the question of the sinless holiness of Christ. It is a question of the very existence or non-existence of Christianity itself. If there are no certain grounds for affirming the sinlessness of Jesus, the moral basis of Christianity is itself insecure. If, on the contrary, the faith in His sinless perfection is proved to be well founded, it becomes at the same time a firm foundation-stone for the whole edifice of the Christian faith.
We have now, as it seems to us, sufficiently pointed out the chief features of the aim we propose to ourselves. Perhaps, however, we may be permitted to preface the following pages by a few more remarks, which may contribute to the appreciation of their contents.
In making the sinless perfection of Christ our starting-point for a vindication of the Christian faith, we would by no means be understood to regard it as the only valid mode of proof, or to esteem all others slight in comparison. There is in Christianity so great an exuberance of life, and so many points at which it comes in contact with minds of every kind, that it cannot but offer many ways of access to its inner sanctuary; and every way must be welcomed which does but really lead to a sound and vital faith. At the same time it will be granted that different ages and different individuals have different needs; and our age, whose tendencies are eminently moral, practical, and historical, has its own special claim, which we believe will be best met in the path upon which we are about to enter.
The evidence derived from miracles and prophecy, which has hitherto been that most frequently adduced, must ever maintain its value so long as it occupies its true position, and is surrounded by its fitting adjuncts. It has, moreover, in its favour the example of our Lord Himself and His apostles. But there is an evident difference in this respect between the contemporaries and fellow-countrymen of Christ and us moderns, who are, moreover, the children of an essentially different sphere of culture. The former stood directly and independently upon the platform of faith in the Old Testament, and had either seen miracles themselves, or had received testimony of such occurrences from eye-witnesses. With us, on the contrary, faith in the Old Testament has to be founded upon the appearance and authority of Christ, while, with respect to miracles, the case is, that we are far more likely to accept the miracles of Christ for the sake of His person, than to believe in His person for the sake of His miracles. Miracles and predictions, too, ever refer to the person of Christ, or proceed from it. Hence that which is most essential and decisive is this personality itself, which in the first instance supports, causes, and casts a true light upon, all else. It is to this, in its moral and religious value, that even miracle and prophecy finally refer us and its peculiar, nay, its utterly unique nature, must, after all, ever remain the firmest support of the Christian faith; for here we have within the sphere of Christianity that which least needs extraneous testimony to its indwelling truth and excellence,—that which is, on the contrary, in the highest degree self-evidencing, and cannot fail of making an impression upon such an age as ours, more powerfully influenced, as it ever is in such cases, by moral views and motives than by any other.
To this must be added the specially practical advantage
involved in, and connected with, the anode of proof which we
Christianity, as is universally acknowledged, is of a more thoroughly ethical character than any other religion. It addresses chiefly the heart, the conscience, the will of man. It would beget in him, not merely a correct knowledge of Divine things, but a new life; it would make the whole man, from the very deepest centre of his moral life to the whole circumference of his practice, other than he is by nature. Hence, even the entrance of the individual into the sphere of Christianity is not brought about by a process of reasoning, but by a change of life. There is, as one has well said, indeed an up-breaking, but it is an up-breaking not of the head, but of the heart. The first step in this process is a man’s felt conviction of his sinfulness, and of his inability to effect his own salvation; the second, his believing acceptance of the salvation graciously offered him in Christ, and his attainment thereby of the power of leading a new life. Thus the old apostolic way of repentance and faith is the only one in which the eternal salvation given in Christianity can be really acquired. The evidences of Christianity are incapable of making any man truly a Christian; for this, after all, is a work to be effected not by men, but by God. Yet evidences may contribute to it, by clearing away opposing obstacles, by increasing the mind’s inclination to accept the grace of God; and they will do this the more effectually, the more they are of such a nature as to make a near approach to that which constitutes the pole upon which the actual entrance into Christianity turns. Of such a nature is especially that kind of evidence of which we here propose to treat.
If we are to be assured of the sinless perfection of the
Thus this kind of evidence, while it objectively justifies the Christian faith, is at the same time that which is most adapted—so far as this can by such means be effected—subjectively to excite or cherish it, by preparing a way of entrance into the mind for that holy Personality who is the object of this faith.
It only remains briefly to point out the course we propose to follow in the following pages.
We start, then, from the phenomenon presented by the merely human life of Jesus. In this we have a stable and independent point of Christianity, comprehensible to all, and calculated to gain access to minds of the most opposite constitutions; a point which cannot fail of producing an impression wherever general moral earnestness and a feeling for purity and holiness exist, and which is of equal significance for men of the most exalted, and of the meanest intellectual attainments. We shall not, however, consider this phenomenon as an isolated one; but, while seeking to maintain it, shall be ever keeping in view our further aim,—the establishment of the Christian faith in general. And in this we are justified by the very nature of our subject. For it is this very moral phenomenon, presented by the human life of Jesus, which is so constituted, that it is impossible to stop at accepting it as a bare fact. Starting therefrom, a very little reflection will necessarily drive us to conclusions of the last importance with regard to the deepest and sublimest doctrines of Christianity.
Hence the matter of the present treatise will naturally consist of two main subjects:—First, that Jesus was indeed the sinlessly Holy One which Christianity, on scriptural grounds, acknowledges Him to have been. Secondly, that this acknowledgment involves most important consequences, justifying our faith in Him as the Son of God, and Redeemer of mankind, and in, the fundamental truths of Christianity in general.
We shall not, however, be able to confine ourselves to the
simple establishment of the fact of His sinlessness, and to drawing the inferences
resulting therefrom. Before entering upon our first subject, it will be desirable
to define more exactly what we mean by sinlessness, and thus to enter into some
discussion upon this notion; and before passing on to our second, we must not shun
the task of defending
Thus the first section will treat of the notion of sinlessness in general; the second, of Jesus Christ as actually sinless; the third, of the objections made against His sinlessness; and the fourth, of the conclusions to be drawn therefrom.
WE must not omit to define more exactly than we have done in the Introduction, what we understand by the word sinlessness when we apply it to the Lord Jesus. It is evident, however, that the full signification of this expression can only be arrived at by the definition of its opposite,—viz. sin. Nor can its real importance be appreciated, till the nature of sin, and its power over mankind, are perceived. Hence this section will treat upon two subjects,—first, upon the nature and power of sin, then upon what is to be understood by the term sinlessness.
OF SIN.
THE idea of sin Only the leading features of the notion of sin can be here
given. For a more extensive treatment of this subject I refer especially to the
much esteemed work of J. Müller, Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde; especially
the first book, ‘On the Reality of Sin,’ pp. 32-866, ed. 8.
We cannot conceive of the order of the world otherwise than as an all-including unity. There cannot be two different orders of the world, there can be but one; nor can this have different ends,—it must have one supreme end. But this one world-order unfolds itself in different spheres: it unfolds itself as the order of nature, in which force reigns, and as the order of moral life, where liberty rules.
In the domain of nature, everything that takes place is accomplished by a necessity in the things themselves; and even in those cases where we discover something resembling freedom, as in the actions of animals, it must be borne in mind that even their impulses spring from a mere unconscious natural desire, that is, instinct. Now we call that which thus operates in the domain of natural life a law of nature. This law of nature is not, however, a power acting from without, but it is the nature and constitution of the things themselves making itself irresistibly felt. Therefore, here the law is immediately one with its fulfilment; nor can there ever be a contradiction between the two. Hence, also, when apparent deviations from the ordinary course occur, when dangerous and destructive agencies enter in, we cannot speak of imputation or of guilt in this province, because nature does only what she cannot help doing, and therefore remains guiltless.
The marvels of this course of nature, with its connection and
consistency in all its parts, from the scarcely perceptible atom to the sun-systems
in their unchanging paths, are innumerable. But, in the midst of these miracles
of nature, there arises a miracle greater still. It is the miracle of a will which
interrupts the course of nature; it is free personality making her subject to mind.
On the basis of the
In the order of nature, law does not appear as duty, because
it is directly self-fulfilling. In the moral order, on the contrary, it becomes,
under certain conditions, duty, because here the law, and the will which performs
that law, may be separate. When the law commands—when it is obliged to take the
form of ‘Thou shalt!’—this argues an unsatisfactory moral condition; for where
the moral condition
In the first place, it is evident that sin, being a deviation
from the true order of life, is also a falling short and a failure of the end which
that order has in view, of the true destination of man. The ordinary N. T. expression ἁμαρτία points this out, as do also the
Hebrew and Latin words by which sin is designated. Sin is a ψεῦδος; it proceeds from the
πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης
(
But it is not merely those actions which meet the eye that we
must here bring under notice: the important matter is the inward source from which
they proceed. It is only by fixing our attention upon that, that we can attain a
clear idea of the nature of sin. Tao often does it happen that details hide from
our view the whole: content to contemplate the phenomena, we forget the substance.
So, too, in the case before us. We own the existence of sins,—that no man would
deny; but of sin we will hear nothing. And yet sin is the root from which all acts
of sin shoot forth; and the man who will not go beyond the latter, but stops short
at faults and failings, transgressions and crimes, without penetrating to their
source,—the perverted will, which is the source of all the evil,—
But if we fix our earnest attention upon the real inner source
of sin, we shall not run the risk of adopting that false method of viewing it, which
looks no further than its isolated external manifestations. The whole of life, and
of moral life in particular, developes itself systematically; its several parts
are intimately bound up together, and form one whole. Only the most thoughtless
folly could for a moment entertain the opinion that a human being can, in virtue
of his moral liberty, perpetrate in wanton caprice, first an action truly good,
and then immediately thereafter an evil action. This ‘Then, when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin’ (
These definitions of sin are in close connection with the
nature of the moral law. The fact that we cannot rightly -estimate the moral
character, except in so far as we have respect to its internal nature, and
regard it as a whole, has-its explanation in this, that the law is itself the
expression of an inner life, and that a consistent and connected life. It is called παρακοή in
But if we would understand the true nature of sin, we must not stop at mere law. We must first of all inquire what is the origin of law, and the end it has in view; for law does not appoint itself, but must be appointed. Behind every law there is a life of which it is the expression, and a. power of which it is the command. In the case of the moral law, the life it expresses cannot be merely the life of nature, nor the power by which it is enforced merely the power of nature. The moral, from its very nature, transcends the merely natural the unity of the law has for its foundation the unity of a consciousness from which it proceeded and only a personal will can address itself to our will with the command, Thou shalt! There must, then, be a personal, conscious, absolutely moral life, exalted above nature, from which the law springs.
Will it perhaps be asserted that it is man himself who
gives himself the law, and that he bears to himself first the relation of lawgiver,
and then of law-obeyer? The natural moral law (as it is called), the law of
conscience, has been indeed brought forward in this sense, and a system built
up, according to which man is his own moral governor and lawgiver. But the moral
law cannot be derived from such a source, nor even the so-called natural law. Conscience
is not the source of moral principles, but the regulator of moral action. Besides,
the material of which it is composed is not absolutely and under all circumstances
the same, nor derived from its own resources, but rather furnished from a source
external to itself, and hence differing according to the measure of religious development.
The conscience of the true Christian is not merely more cultivated, but may be said
to be of more intrinsic value than that of a heathen or Compare Güder, Die Lehre von Gewissen in den theol. Stud.
and Krit., 1857, pp. 246, etc.
A similar result ensues from the very nature of the subject.
For wherever in the sphere of life we find an all-powerful and universal law enforcing
itself, we are compelled to acknowledge that it has sprung from the very same source
from which that life itself is derived. It follows that the source of both the law
and the life must be something higher than either, and lie beyond the sphere of
that life. It is the power which determined the conditions under which that life
is intended to unfold itself and fulfil its destiny, and under which alone it can
do so. The plant, the animal, or the star, did not choose for itself its law of
life, but received it from that creative Power which gave it being; and it is because
that Power is Omnipotence that the laws it has implanted work with undeviating certainty.
The same holds true of man and his order of life; only with this difference, that
in his case that order is one of liberty, because it is a moral order. If
man had been his own creator, he might J. Müller, Lehre von der Sunde, pp. 108-117.
It follows, that what we have to do with in the order of human
life, ethically considered, is not the law as such, but much rather, in the law
and beyond the law, its holy Originator. This thought underlies the whole parable of the prodigal son; see especially
The will of God concerning us, which finds expression in the law, is the will of holy love. In it God gives Himself to us, in order to make us holy and blessed in His fellowship. And the only fitting relation that man can occupy with reference to this holy, loving will of God, is that of absolute, trustful submission, and thankful love; and this state of mind is called faith. Where this, and the love that flows from it, are found, the law is fulfilled as a natural consequence. To faith and love, in their inseparable union, the law no longer imposes commands from without, the spirit of the law being by them implanted in the human will, as an all-governing principle. He in whom this has taken place has found the centre and nucleus of his life in God, and has therefore attained true liberty, perfect contentment, perfect blessedness.
But if the only real fulfilling of the law proceeds from a personal
self-surrender to God in faith and love, sin, the transgression of the law, must
of necessity have its source in the opposite of this,—in the want of personal surrender
to God, in the want of faith and of love; in a word, in man’s having severed himself
from his true and proper centre of life in God. Thus sin, in its inseparable connection
with As far as Scripture is concerned, we would not so much call attention
to special passages, such as
But when man has once severed himself from the true centre of
his life, from God, he cannot stop at this point. His life must of necessity have
some object, some aim and if he forsakes the centre appointed him, he must choose
for himself a wrong one. This is the point at which the negative character of sin
is naturally converted into something positively evil. The first thing to which
the man who has forsaken God will turn, is the creature, the World, in
the good things of which he deludes himself with the hope of finding
satisfaction. But when he surrenders himself to the world, the impulse by which
he is really possessed is the desire of making all things conduce to his own
profit or advantage. It is self that he really seeks in everything,—even in
those relations which have the appearance of love.
‘Thus the Ego becomes the real centre of life, and that
self-love which in itself is natural and right—nay, which is the basis of the full
development of the Divine likeness, of free personality in man—is perverted into
the selfishness which is alike opposed to nature and to God. It is in this
selfishness—in virtue of which a man can know no surrender to anything higher than
himself, but subjects everything to his own particular ends, and at length shuts
himself up either in dull indifference, or positive hatred and defiance—that we
recognise both the essential nature of sin, and at the same
The effects of sin correspond to its nature.
The proper seat of sin is the will. But the spirit which manifests
itself in the will is the very same spirit that is seen at work in the thoughts
and feelings, in the imagination and the fancy; and this spirit becomes a living
personality only by being united, by means of the soul, with a material body. Now,
whatever makes the will go out in a wrong direction, whatever introduces into the
region over which the will presides a power which interferes with the development
of life, and produces desecrating or destructive effects, must produce like effects
in the whole region of the spirit and the soul,—nay, through the soul those evil
influences will
Man forms a unity, which is, however, only the foundation of
that higher unity which is to be brought about in him, as a being made in the Divine
image, by means of communion with God. Now sin does not merely obstruct this unity,
but sets up in its place that which is its direct opposite. He who has fallen away
from God by sin, does, as a necessary consequence, fall out both with himself and
with all mankind. True unity in man is possible only when that which is godlike
in him—that is, the mind—acquiesces in the divine order of life, and governs the
whole being in conformity therewith. But when he has once severed himself from the
true centre of his being, that is, from God, then also does that element of his
being—his mind—which is akin to God, and which was intended to be the connecting
and all-deciding centre of his personal life, lose its central and dominant position; he ceases to be lord of himself, and of his own nature; the various powers which
make up his complex nature, begin to carry on, each for itself, an independent existence; the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit wages a fruitless war with
the flesh (
Hence no true fellowship, no fellowship worthy of human nature, can exist among those in whom sin prevails. The. wicked are never naturally social. The gregarious instinct, however, is indestructible in human nature and even those who are the servants of sin, mutually need each other’s assistance in the pursuit of their various aims. Hence there arises among them, in the place of that moral fellowship, whose prototype is the kingdom of God, a spurious kind of fellowship, an external combination, which being, however, in reality founded only upon mutual spoliation, results in overreaching and violence. Such combination, on a large scale, begets a kingdom of evil; a kingdom, indeed, which cannot stand, because it hears within it the germ of discord and destruction, but which is yet so constituted, as to render it fearfully evident that sin is indeed a great and powerful fact.
It is undeniable that sin is a phenomenon absolutely universal
in human nature; and the saying of Holy Scripture, that the whole world lieth
in wickedness, is indisputably confirmed both by history and individual experience.
During the whole course of the natural development of mankind, history never brings
before us a form of perfect purity, but shows us, on the contrary, that in spite
of all the efforts exerted,
IT is impossible to lay down à priori definitions concerning the actions and dispositions of sinless beings. It would be but a perverted manner of treating the subject, to insist upon a series of abstract requirements in all special cases, and then to measure an actual character by such a standard. The right way of proceeding is, on the contrary, to ascertain from an actual character, how sinless perfection, where it really existed, was manifested in the several features of the life. And yet it is both possible and necessary first to state, at least by a few fundamental definitions, what we conceive to be essential under all circumstances to the notion of sinlessness. Alter what has been already advanced, a short discussion will, however, suffice.
The idea of sinlessness—anamartesia—does not in itself
exclude the possibility of sinning. On the contrary, it is only where this
possibility is in some manner presupposed, that sinlessness, properly so called,
can be conceived. Absolute impeccability exists only in Him who is infinitely removed
from evil, who never can be tempted with evil,—that is, in God. In applying to Christ the well-known formula, it is self-evident
that sinlessness excludes the non potuit non peccare, since any kind of necessity
to sin would make the remaining free therefrom à priori inconceivable. On the other
hand, the fact of sinlessness directly involves not only the potuit non peccare, and the
non peccavit,—the possibility of remaining free from sin, and
the actual freedom therefrom,—but also demands, at least as the postulate of the
whole moral development, the potuit peccare. Without this the temptation
of Christ would be devoid of reality, and His example would lose an essential element
of its importance. How far, however, when we take into account His office of Redeemer,
and other circumstances, together with the potuit peccare—the possibility
of sin, and the total abstinence therefrom—the non potuit peccare, and therefore
a higher necessity of not sinning, might be predicated of Him, is a question
which, as appertaining to the province of dogmatic theology or speculation, it is
beside our purpose to discuss. Compare Steudel, Glaubenslehre, p. 241, and
J. Müller, Lehre von der Sünde, ii. 225 and 226.
The meaning of the term sinlessness is, first of all, a negative
one. But it is not applied in this sense to a single act of the will, or to the
outward act. In such cases we employ the expressions ‘irreproachability’ or
‘guiltlessness.’
When, on the contrary, the far deeper term sinlessness is used, we always have in
view the entire moral condition, and we contemplate this in its inmost nature. It
is, however, also evident that here, too,—as in our definition of the nature of
sin,—we cannot stop short at a mere negation. Sinlessness is indeed a notion which
can be applied only to personal beings, called upon to will and to act as moral
agents, and in whom, consequently, the very omission of such willing and acting
is a violation of the divine order of life. This, in itself, requires the positive
choice and practice of what is good. But this becomes still more decidedly the case,
from the fact that sinlessness has to be maintained in a world that lieth in wickedness,—a
world in which evil has become a ruling power. At the first commencement of the
development
What this involves in the case of an individual, will be evident
if we bear in mind those main features of the nature of sin already stated. We saw
that sin was disobedience to the Divine order of life,—a disobedience at first internal,
but afterwards appearing in external actions; that it was, moreover, a severance,
through lack of faith and love, from the Divine Ruler of the world Himself; from
God, the only true centre of life, and at the same time a setting up of the false
one Self and the world; which, instead of the satisfaction sought therein, yields
only discord, disorder, and ruin, whether to individuals, or to the whole sin-possessed
community. In contrast to this, we should regard as sinless, one who should
render obedience to the Divine law in the whole extent of its requirements,—an obedience
not only maintained under all, even the most difficult, circumstances and conditions,
but itself a fundamental fact of the character. Hence the moral life resulting
from this obedience is no patched and piecemeal product, but a tissue woven of one
material throughout,—an inseparable, undivided whole. Nor will this obedience be
rendered merely to the law as such, but through this to its holy Author. The life
will consequently
Such a being is inconceivable, except as perfectly free, peaceful, happy, repelling all defilement and obscurity from the mental and corporeal life, and exercising, under all circumstances, a perfect self-control. From such a one, united by the band of perfect love to both God and man, might be reasonably expected the possession of an ‘incalculable power, both to conquer sin in general in the human race, and, in spite of all the might and authority of evil, to call into existence a moral and religious community, in accordance with the Divine purpose towards the human race.
It is in this its essentially positive as well as in its negative sense, that we apply the epithet sinless to the Lord Jesus. We view Him as the sinlessly Perfect, the absolutely Holy One, ever filled with the spirit of obedience, faith, and love, and so constantly and under all circumstances acting up to this spirit, that sin had no place in His life. It is self-evident that such a life could only have been developed from a pure basis: no original sinful tendency, no naturally evil inclination, is here conceivable, but only a fulness of moral power, perfect and inviolable even in its first rudiments. This, however, is not the point from which we start, but the conclusion at which we shall arrive in the course of . our discussion. Our starting-point is simply the historical manifestation of Jesus Christ, the actual facts presented by His human life; and our task is in the first instance to prove from these His sinless perfection.
In the fulfilment of this task, however, we are conscious of the limits imposed upon us by the nature of the subject.
Truths of the highest
nature, especially those religious
This, too, is the case with the sinlessness of Christ. As all
moral greatness appearing in human form may be denied, or, where its manifestation
cannot be contested, may at least have a doubt cast upon its inward motive, so also
may the moral dignity and purity of Jesus. Doubt and opposition cannot even here
be absolutely excluded or refuted, and, least of all, where there is an absence
of all susceptibility for receiving impressions from purity and elevation of character,
and of a capacity to appreciate them, unless manifested in a striking and brilliant
manner. What is wanted is a willing and joyful confidence in Him who is exhibited
to us as so exalted and so unique a Being,—an elevation of our own minds when approaching
one so elevated,—a moral soaring towards that height which He occupies. Such a confidence,
such an exaltation, may, however, be justified it can be shown that they are based
upon the soundest external and internal evidence, and that their opposites would
involve us Theologians, says even De Wette, must not, when
bringing forward historical proofs, overlook the importance of faith, nor commit
themselves to the vain effort of demonstrating, as evident, palpable truth, that
which is to be apprehended by the faith which, though it does not see, yet
seeing not, believes. Compare my article, ‘Polemisches in Betreff der Sundlösigkeit Jesu,’ Stud.
und Kritik.
1842-3, p. 687, etc.
In this sense, then, we now proceed to prove, in its special reference to the person of Jesus Christ, the existence of that sinlessness of which we have hitherto spoken only according to its general features.
OUR purpose of treating in an apologetic point of view the sinlessness of Christ, leads us to consider this as manifested by the actual facts of His history. Hence our first task will be to establish these as historical facts in general are wont to be established,—on the one hand by credible testimony; on the other, by the undeniable effects resulting therefrom. With respect to the first point, we shall not confine ourselves to the testimony of others, but shall adduce that of Jesus Himself. For in this case we need for our full assurance the indissoluble concurrence of the two facts, that Jesus made upon others an inevitable impression that He was sinlessly perfect, and also that He was Himself both conscious of being absolutely free from sin, and ever ready unhesitatingly to affirm the same. With respect to the effects produced, moreover, all will depend upon our being able to exhibit such historical phenomena as can only be satisfactorily explained upon the supposition that the Lord Jesus was sinless; for it is evident, on the one hand, that if one perfectly pure and free from all sin did actually appear in the midst of an otherwise universally sinful race, so unique an occurrence could not fail to produce effects of an utterly peculiar, nay, of a unique kind; and, on the other, that if such historical phenomena actually exist, we are justified in inferring the reality of the cause from that of the effects.
These, then, are the chief points which we have to discuss in the following chapters. We start from the evidence, and draw inferences by referring to effects. With respect to evidence, moreover, we distinguish not merely between the testimony of others and the self-testimony of Christ, but also, as far as the former is concerned, between expressions of a general kind and that portraiture of the Lord Jesus, exhibiting as it does the minutest details of His character, delivered to us by the circle most intimately connected with Him.
Sec. 1.—By Others.
WHEN we cast a searching glance at the actual events
of our Lord’s life, we cannot help wishing that men of the most opposite ranks
and dispositions, occupying positions exterior to Christianity, sceptical, or even
inimical, had left us express accounts of the impressions produced by His actions
and character. Such a wish is, however, but scantily gratified by history. We know,
indeed, with unquestionable certainty, from the testimony of heathen authors, that
Jesus suffered death by crucifixion in the reign of Tiberius, Tacitus, Annals, xv. 44; Suetonius,
Life of Claudius,
cap. xxiv., and elsewhere. Pliny, in the well-known, epistle to Trajan, Epist.
x.
97. Archæol. xviii. 3, 3. The passage appears to me to be a compound
of genuine elements and later additions. At all events, Jesus is mentioned by Josephus
as He ‘who was called Christ’ (Archæol. xx. 9, 1). Compare my work, Historisch oder Mythisch, pp. 10-13.
We proceed to consider this more closely, and will first
review some features and expressions of a more general kind.
It is one leading mark of a strong and sharply defined
character, to call forth a decided, and even an inimical reaction. On the character of Pilate, see especially Philo, in the Legat. ad Caj., t.
ii. p. 590, ed. Mang.
Nowhere did the conduct of Jesus leave its beholders indifferent,—nowhere
did it fail to produce a powerful impression. His Person produced upon all with
whom He came in contact, the effect of compelling a moral decision; Αἷμα ἀθῶον (
A contrast to this picture is exhibited in the case of St.
Peter. The same apostle who first made a confession of faith in Jesus as the Son
of the living God, makes an equally remarkable, though more indirectly
expressed, confession of the moral glory of his Master. We allude, in the first
place, to the expressions which broke from his lips after the miraculous draught
of fishes: ‘ ‘Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord.’ The notion of the incompatibility between the possession of the
power of working miracles and a sinful nature is also expressed by others not included
in the apostolic circle. See
The same truth which is in these instances brought before us
by facts, is still more definitely and expressly asserted by the apostles in many
doctrinal passages; and this is done in a manner which makes it obvious that they
are by no means The expressions ’separate from
sinners’ and ‘higher than the heavens,’ used in this passage, must undoubtedly
be understood, in the first instance, in a local sense, but they are at the same
time as certainly employed to symbolize that inward elevation of an ethical and
metaphysical kind, which the writer attributes to Christ. They denote a state of
most perfect fellowship with God, far surpassing aught attained by sinful
creatures, and proved to be such by the super-mundane glory of its possessor.
The entrance upon such a state naturally presupposes the absolute sinlessness
and holiness of Him who is raised thereto: hence this, if it had not been most
expressly affirmed in the former expression, would be decidedly asserted even by
the latter. Compare the full discussion of this subject in Riehm’s Lehrbegriff
des Hebräerbriefs, ii. § 55, p. 400, etc.; and also the same work, sec. i. §§ 37
and 38, pp. 317 and 321, etc., on the doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ in general,
as stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is not indeed expressly stated in the Old Testament that
the Messiah was to be sinless, but His sinlessness is implied by the very nature
of the case, and is at least alluded to
The task, then, which we have now to perform, is to gather together into a whole the various features of the portrait of the Lord Jesus, as furnished by the Gospels. This is a subject which, as all must allow, can never be exhaustively treated,—a task whose accomplishment can at best be but approximated. It is a theme infinite in its nature, and ever offering new aspects, at various ages of the world, and in successive stages of human development. As such it inevitably meets us in the course of our argument; and we consequently attempt its treatment, though we do so with the fullest conviction of our own insufficiency.
All must agree that the impression produced by the Gospel delineation
of the Lord Jesus is one of moral greatness,—a greatness which has frequently
overcome even the opponents of positive Christianity. It is, however, a greatness
utterly new in kind. It is not said of Jesus that He was great in the
eyes of the world, but ‘great in the sight of the Lord.’ Even
Homer expresses in this respect the consciousness of the Grecian world in the
pregnant words, ‘Ever to lead in the van, and to surpass others.’
Quite otherwise was it with the Lord Jesus. His path was not
upwards, but downwards. He was great, not by ascending, but by condescending: hence His was not a brilliant, but a silent greatness. The aim of His
every action was to draw near to the mean and despised, to seek the lost, to minister
to others, instead of being ministered to. His dignity was veiled under the form
of a servant and as He ever avoided worldly honour,
This is not a greatness which directly strikes the eye, and makes
a powerful external impression, but a greatness of the inner nature. Jesus
was great in the inner man before He had done anything externally great. And even
when He
But this personality found the roots of its being and the object
of its existence, not in anything special and limited like national genius,
not in any single province of human activity, but in that which concerns all men
without exception,—in the manifestation of the true relation to God, and the true
relation to man. The whole life of Jesus was spent in realizing this relation in
Himself, and from Himself towards all mankind, as at once the Son of God and the
Son of man. Hence His was no special calling, but the calling of callings, the perfect fulfilment of which was to impart to all individual vocations a
sure and eternal foundation. Compare Mortensen, Christian Dogmatics, § 142, p. 282
(Clark’s Foreign Theological Library); Schöberlein, Grundlehren des Heils.
p. 62; Dorner, Jes. sündl. Vollk. p. 15.
It is not enough, however, thus to allude to the greatness of
Christ in general outlines,—we must also descend to particulars. Yet we would guard
against doing this in such wise as to seem, by presenting a collection of specially
striking
The very first thing which strikes us in the Gospel portraiture
of Jesus, is the harmony which pervaded His whole life, the peace
which flowed around Him, and which He ever communicated to those about Him. The
impression made upon us by His appearance is ever one of repose, self-possession,
and self-reliance, combined with deep inexhaustible mental emotion: He was distinguished,
neither by the lofty ecstasy of an Isaiah or an Ezekiel, nor by the legislative
and mighty energy of a Moses; His nature, on the contrary, was all serenity and
gentleness. The sacred flame which glowed in the ancient prophets was in Him transformed
into the soft but ever-energizing presence of the creative breath of the Spirit.
As it was not the storm which rent the mountains, nor the fear-inspiring earthquake,
nor the devouring fire, but ‘the still small voice,’ which announced to Elijah the
presence of the Lord, so was it also with the Lord Jesus.
The harmony and peace which prevailed in the character of Jesus did riot arise, however, from such a toning down of the various powers and activities as would prevent any of them from attaining its full energy of action. A harmony so attained would be not the harmony of greatness, but of mediocrity. The harmony of greatness can exist only in a strong character, where a rich, deep, powerfully stirred life wells up, and where discordant qualities are brought into unison. And this was eminently the case with Jesus,—with Him who came to send a sword as well as to send peace, and is with equal right entitled the Lion of the tribe of Judah, and the Lamb that taketh away the sin of the world. The harmony manifested in His character is based upon the richest fulness of heart and spirit, and proves itself to be the harmony of true greatness, by the fact that the tendencies which in other cases mutually exclude each other,—the powers and activities which are elsewhere found apart,—here work side by side in their full energy, and are blended by supreme power of mind into one glorious whole. In Him the Individual and the universally Human, independence and submission, doing and enduring, sublime majesty and humble condescension, are united, and pervade one another in a manner entirely new, and not even approximated by any who preceded Him. They are so combined that we cannot omit one of them, if we would have His portrait unimpaired and undiminished.
Let us first contemplate the relation of the Individual to the universally Human in the person of Jesus. As a man, Jesus was placed under all the laws of human existence. He lived under the conditions of race and family; He had certain endowments of mind, and a certain mental disposition; He belonged to a certain nation, and lived at a certain historical era He entered into all these special relations, and did justice to them all. But instead of being limited by them, they served Him as means of realizing and manifesting that which was truly human in and beyond them.
The invincible will which He ever maintained was such, that we
must call the Lord Jesus a man in the fullest sense of the word; yet we must not,
on this account, make His peculiar characteristic to consist in manliness in so
far as this is opposed to womanliness, for He equally manifested all the gentleness,
purity, and tenderness of the female character. We find in Him high intellectual
endowments; but it would be an error to characterize Him as pre-eminently acute or profound, clever or imaginative, because not any
one of these gifts, though they were all seen in rich abundance, was the predominant
quality of His mind. Nor less do we perceive in Him varying frames of mind and changes
of disposition,—cheerfulness and freedom from anxiety, as well as deep seriousness
and depression; quick susceptibility and imperturbable equanimity; painful fear
and joyful resignation. And yet we could not but consider it unseemly to attribute
to Him a peculiar temperament, in the ordinary acceptation of the term; for all
that we know of Him produces the impression of a thoroughly sound and healthy
mingling of dispositions, and a constantly natural interchange of emotions. For
admirable remarks on this subject, see Martensen’s
Christian
Dogmatics, § 141. Formerly, indeed, even the special temperament of Jesus was
spoken of. Winkler, especially, in his Psychographie Jesu, Leipzig 1826,
p. 122, ascribes to Him the choleric as that of great minds. See also Naumann,
De Jesu Chr. ab animi afectibus non immuni, Lips. 1840; and, on the other side, Thiele, in the Theol.
Lit. Bl. Feb. 1841, No. 19. In agreement with my views are Dorner, Jes. sundl, Vollk. p. 30; and Schaff,
The Moral Character of Christ, p. 28.
But this interpenetration of the particular and the general,—this repletion of a given individual form with the higher and universal spirit
of humanity,—is super-eminently shown in the position which Jesus occupied with
regard to His family and nation. He fulfilled all His duties as a member
of a family, and especially manifested, even to His dying hour, the tenderest filial
affection. But at the same time He subordinated all that occurred in the family
circle to the Divine purposes, and made individual interests yield to those which
were higher and universal. E.g.
This is one of the principal characteristics by which Jesus Among the ancients, Socrates rises most above national limits,
and he himself desired to be regarded as a cosmopolitan (Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. v. 37:
Socrates quidem cum rogaretur, cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum,
inquit, totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur); nevertheless,
his whole nature, not excepting his moral character, had a Greek impress, and stood
in immediate relation to the laws and customs of his country (Ritter, Gesch.
der Philos. ii. 35). The same holds good of his piety, which, in spite
of his peculiarities, was based upon the national traditions, and by no means possessed
the universal character of Christian piety (ib. p. 38).
Jesus Christ was surpassed by no sage or hero of any era, either
in power of action, or in readiness for self-sacrifice. But the principle which
determined and guided His whole life was not national, but human; not temporal,
but eternal. His moral character did not bear the impress of the age to which He
belonged, but had ‘the ring of eternity’ about it. Developed from His own inner
nature, He was the first to present an example of a full and perfect man,
and, though connected with a particular nation, yet, by breaking through and abolishing
national restrictions, to realize the idea of See Hundeshagen
On the Nature and Development of the Idea of
Humanity, Heidelberg 1852 especially pp. 15-21. Compare Dorner, Jes. sundl. Vollk. pp. 15 and 44; also Schaff On the Moral Character of Christ,
pp. 26, etc.
But not only are the individual and the universal resolved into
one beauteous whole in the person of Christ, but other opposing characteristics
of human life—self-dependence and resignation, action and suffering—mingle in Him
in perfect harmony. It is true, indeed, that in every human development which is
not, morally speaking, abnormal, we shall find both self-dependence and submission,
power to do and to suffer. In every case, however, it will be manifest that
Similar to this is the relation between doing and suffering in
the life of Christ. Jesus appears, at first sight, to have been essentially a man
of action. He was wont, indeed, to Compare Schöberlein, Grundlehren des Heils. p. 64.
Again, such a life could not fail to bear the fullest impress
both of humilityy and majesty,—a majestic humility, and a majesty
of a humble nature. Rightly, indeed, could Jesus say of Himself, ‘I am meek and
lowly of heart.’ His whole life was one continuous act of self-sacrifice, and one
uninterrupted course of self-abasement. Even at its close, when He knew that He
was about to depart to the Father, He gave the most touching example of that condescending
love which ministers to others, by washing His disciples’ feet;
Thus is the portrait of our Lord presented to us as full of dignified
majesty and holy gentleness; and that in traits so clearly defined, that they cannot
fail to strike even the dullest mind. Nowhere do we find aught of show or ostentation,—nowhere
a trace of labouring for effect or of imitation: all is truth and simplicity;
every act is the product of His inmost soul, and yet every act is sustained by a
repose and self-consciousness, whose marvellous composure is never for a moment
disturbed. Everywhere is seen the perfect harmony of a strong and noble character,—or,
to speak more correctly, of this One character,—which in this its perfectly harmonious
blending, both of deepest feeling, and rich, full manifestation, is utterly beyond
comparison. What, then, was the source of this harmony? It surely
And, first of all, the governing principle of the Lord’s life
was the maxim, To do the will of God. Compare
Finally, it is in this love that we find that unifying power,
in virtue of which, varied and seemingly opposite qualities are blended into one
harmonious whole in the character of Jesus. This love it was which, entering into
all the divinely ordained distinctions of human life, at the same time rose above
them to embrace the whole human race; which blissfully resting in God, nevertheless
impelled to ceaseless activity for man which, free and independent in its own nature,
gave itself to be a ministering servant to all which imparted strength both to do
and to endure, and was as majestic in its holy earnestness as it was lowly in its
condescension. It was this which set upon every act of the Lord Jesus the ineffaceable
mark of religion, and which elevated what we should else call morality into
holiness. Hence it is, that while the piety of Jesus never obtrudes itself as a
special, and, as it were, an independent quality, every act becomes in His case
one of religion, of worship; Everything becomes in His hands, and by the breath of His month,
a symbol, nay, a typical or prophetic expression of the spiritual and the Divine.—Dorner,
Jesu sundl. Vollk. pp. 83 and 34.
In such a Being, sin—i.e. antagonism to God—could have no place, because selfishness, which is the principle of sin, was utterly abolished by the all-conquering energy of love to God and man. And, in fact, we find the picture of the Lord Jesus which the Gospels furnish, and which all the apostles received, to be such, that even if nothing had been expressly stated on this point, we could never have conceived of sin—of alienation from God—as a feature thereof, without being immediately sensible that we were thus essentially disfiguring, nay, altogether destroying it.
But, it may be asked, is not all this but fiction? If
it were, we could not but say, with the noble-minded Claudius, See the first of the
‘Briefen au Andres’ in the
Wandsbecker
Boten.
Besides, who could have invented it? Is it answered,
Many—the whole Apostolic Church? Was such a thing ever heard of in the world, as
a whole community combining to invent a portraiture of character so rich in
details? How should the Church in general have hit upon such a notion and how,
since the thing could not take place in a dream, could it have set about its
execution? And, even admitting the possibility of the attempt being made by the
Church, would the portrait produced have exhibited that harmony which is so
decidedly found in the Gospel representation of the Lord Jesus? Or is it said
that the fiction was the work of an individual? How, then, should the image of
One sinlessly pure and holy have entered into the mind of a sinful human being?
And, even if this were possible, whence could he, in addition to the idea of
sinless perfection, derive all those special features and expressions which give
life and substance to the idea? Such traits and such sayings, upon which not
only the character of the highest originality is everywhere impressed, but to
which, moreover, it must at least be conceded that they are of such a nature as
to render it impossible to suppose them to be the mere productions of
fancy;—these their inventor must, unless they had really been placed before him
by the actual life of Jesus, have derived from himself and then, as Rousseau
strikingly observes, the inventor of such an image would be greater and more
astonishing than his subject. ’L’inventeur en seroit, plus
étonnant que le héros.’
But we will enlarge no further, as we shall subsequently return
to this point, especially when treating on the effects produced by the manifestation
of Jesus. For the present we confine ourselves to one remark with respect to the
apostolic testimony. Efforts have been made to depreciate this by such suggestions
as the following:—The apostles, it is said, were not so precise in their use
of the words in which we find the sinlessness of Jesus testified, Strauss, Glaubenslehre,
ii. p. 192. Memorab. i. 11. These thoughts are further carried out in the programme of
Dr. Weber: Virtutis Jesu integritas neque ex ipsius professionibus neque ex
actionibus doceri potest, Viteb. 1796 (reprinted in his Opusc. Acad.
pp. 179-192). He is followed, to a certain point, by Bretschneider in his Dogm. § 138; and more fully by the elder Fritzsche in his
IV. Commentationes de
ἀναμαρτεσίᾳ Jesu Christi, Hal. 1835-37 (reprinted in the Opusc. Fritzschiorum, Lips. 1838, pp. 45 seq.): compare especially the last Comment. The objections
in question are briefly summed up by Hase in the Leben Jesu, § 32, and further
developed, in a decidedly inimical sense, by Strauss in his Glaubenslehre,
ii. 92. The opposite arguments are fully carried out in the article, ‘Polemisches
in Betr. der Sündlosigkeit Jesu,’ Stud. und Kritik. 1842-3, pp. 640, etc., to
which I invite attention.
With respect, however, to the other objections, it must be granted
that the apostles in general were acquainted with Jesus only during their three
years of intimacy with Him. Is the moral life, then, so to speak, such a piece
of patchwork, that during three years of mature manhood its character could be perfection,
unless its previous development had been of a similar nature? If not, would not
every previous sin, of, necessity, have so stunted or obscured the moral character
of Christ, that He could not subsequently have produced the impression of sinless
perfection? Must not the traces of former sin have been perceived at some one juncture? The indissoluble connection of the entire moral development enables us here, if
anywhere, to infer the character of the whole from the part, and the nature of the
root from its fruit. But besides this, we have the testimony of one intimately acquainted
with Him from His youth upwards, I can only understand the expression of John (
It is also unquestionably correct to say that the apostles could not look immediately into the heart of their Master, and hence could not judge with the certainty of Him who searcheth the heart and reins, concerning the secret motives of His actions. But does the fact that their knowledge of His moral condition was not Divine, make them forfeit their claim of being able to pass a human judgment concerning His person? This human judgment, when exercised within the province of morals, cannot but infer that where the whole external life is pure and undefiled, the internal source must be pure and undefiled also, and would only be justified in arriving at an opposite conclusion, if reasons existed for supposing a contrariety between the outward course of action and its inward motives. Had the apostles, then, cause for suspecting that the conduct which appeared so irreproachable, could have sprung from any but the purest source? If not, they had every ground for the assurance that His heart was as pure as His conduct; and that because they perceived no sin in it, there was no sin in Him.
Men are not generally too much given to the weakness of believing in moral excellence, much less in an entirely spotless virtue. When, then, such a belief strangely enough exists, and exhibits such powers of endurance as it does in the case of the apostles, we are certainly justified in the view that there must exist also a real objective reason, and a moral subjective necessity, for this belief.
Least of all can those who allow the sinless perfection of Christ
oppose the possibility of its historical manifestation. If this sinlessness was
actual, it must also have been perceptible by man. For would it not
be the most monstrous contradiction, that a moral phenomenon, which must have been
of the greatest importance to the whole human race, should actually have occurred,
but in such wise that no one was capable of obtaining any certain knowledge and
assurance Further carried out by Dorner, Sündl. Vollk. pp. 16-22.
Too much, however, must not be asserted. Apostolic testimony, valuable as it is, does not furnish us with an absolute guarantee. This it could only do, if, referring it to inspiration, we acknowledge its authority to be of directly Divine origin. The whole course of our argument, however, requires us to seek for confirmation and completion in another quarter; and this is furnished to us in that testimony of Jesus to Himself which we have now to adduce as a proof of His sinlessness: for though it may indeed be said of the apostles that they were incapable of seeing His heart, the same cannot be affirmed of Himself.
Sec. 2.—The Testimony of Jesus to Himself.
The Lord Jesus must best have known what was in Himself. Hence, the manner and nature in which He gave expression to His own moral consciousness, must naturally be of the most decided importance. The impression He produced on others, and their consequent conviction, must not, as is self-evident, be absent. Yet this might be but the echo of what originally proceeded from Jesus Himself; and hence, in the very nature of the thing, His own utterances on the subject must form the final and culminating testimony on which we embrace the persuasion of His sinlessness.
And, first, even the negative side of His testimony is
in the highest degree remarkable. For further confirmation, see my article,
‘Polemisches
in Betr. Sündl.,’ Stud. und Kritik. 1842-3, pp. 661-67. Excellent remarks on
this side of the question will also be found in Dorner, Schaff, and Young. Compare on this subject, J. G. Steinert, Dissert. de peculiari
indole precum Domini. See Neander, Leben Jesu, p. 101, ed. third.
His positive testimony, however, goes much further. And
here we have, first of all, to notice that weighty and important saying of Jesus,
which we find in St. John’s Gospel: ‘Which of you convinceth me of sin?’
But the meaning of this question must be somewhat more closely
determined. The very word ἁμαρτία. This explanation occurs in Origen, in his Commentary on John
(vol. xx. § 25). Kypke tries to justify it on philological grounds, in his observations
on the passage. On the other side see Lücke, Commentary on St. John, Pt.
2, pp. 298-301, ed. second; and Meyer’s Commentary, pp. 243, 244, ed. second. So many ancient and also the best among modern expositors,—e.g. Olshausen,
Lücke, De Wette, and Meyer. The former is the view of Weber, in his already quoted Programm, p. 185, who thinks:
Nomen
ἁμαρτίας, non solum theoreticam sed etiam practicam
aberrationem a vero et recto simul continere. The latter is proposed by Fritzsche,
Commentat. ii. 2, pp. 7, etc. Comp. my article ‘Polemisches,’ etc.
The view according to which Jesus asks, ‘Which of you convinceth
me of error?’ would seem to be favoured by the context. Immediately before, He
had designated His Jewish antagonists children of Satan, the man-murderer, the liar
from the beginning, implying that theirs was a temper which proved their relationship
to Satan, in that they refused to believe on Him who taught the truth of God, and
even persecuted Him to the death. Then He asks, ‘Which of you convinceth me of
error?’ According to one view of the passage,—that, according to Stier,
of
Now, supposing this explanation of the passage to be the correct
one, even then the passage would be of great importance for our purpose, for it
would at least contain an indirect testimony to the religious and moral purity of
Jesus. For if He claims exemption from error in the province which here comes under
consideration,—viz. that of morality and religion,—does not this imply that He
also attributes to Himself On this connection, compare Frommann,
Doctrine of St. John
(S. 181-309, 550-654, etc.).
But this explanation cannot be regarded as correct. In the first
place, there attaches to it a verbal difficulty, which it is not easy to set aside.
In classical usage, the word (ἁμαρτία) never occurs in the sense of error,
without having beside it a modifying and determining clause or word. See references (e.g. Plato, de Leg.
i. 627, 668; Thucydides,
i. 32, ii. 65) in Meyer, Comment. zu Joh. p. 243, ed. third. The passages, So even De Wette (in his Exeget. Handbuch) on this passage.
If we now take up the second explanation of the passage, ‘Which
of you convinceth me of sin?’ we shall find all these difficulties disappear.
To this rendering there is no verbal objection; it falls in admirably with the
context; it supplies a proof of the statement just made. Jesus had previously maintained,
in opposition to the unbelief of His hearers, that He spoke the truth; ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος. This is also Meyer’s view of the train of thought. See Comment. S. 244. So, too, Schumann, Christus, B. i. p. 287. Meyer (Comment. p. 243) is of opinion, that to maintain
either, with Lücke, that ‘the Sinless One is the purest and surest organ of knowledge
and medium of truth;’ or with De Wette, that ‘the knowledge of truth rests on
the purity of the will,’—would be to presuppose a knowledge of the truth
attained by Jesus in a discursive manner, or at least in His human state,
while His knowledge, especially according to St. John’s teaching, was intuitively
possessed before His earthly existence, and then maintained only by constant communion
with God. But the objection is not to the point. The question is, not how He acquired
His perfect knowledge of the truth, but how this was to be proved. For this proof,
Christ appeals directly to His sinlessness; for this is, under all circumstances,
a condition by which alone a perfect knowledge of religious truth could even intuitively
exist and be recognised. He did so when in
But with regard to this testimony of Jesus, two objections have now to be obviated: first, it is of a subjective character, and, as such, does not of itself afford a complete proof of sinlessness secondly, it is purely negative, expressing simply a consciousness of the absence of sin, not a consciousness of positive perfection of life. But neither of these two considerations can at all weaken the validity which we claim for this evidence.
With regard to the former. If we are to attain to an assured
conviction of the sinlessness of Jesus, this is only possible on the supposition
that, above all things, He Himself possessed such a conviction. It was only from
Himself that the idea could go forth to those around Him. He Himself knew best what
was in Him, This is the only correct answer to the objection urged by Fritzsche
(Comment. i. 21), and by the earliest opponents of Christ (
With regard to the second point, it is true that when Jesus in
the passage in question pronounces Himself free from sin, He makes only a negative
statement. But the positive assertions required to render it complete are also to
Jesus calls Himself the Light of the World, and the King who
is come into the world to bear witness to the truth; therefore not merely a light among other lights, but the light which lighteth every man; and
not merely one among many witnesses to truth, but the King of Truth, who can be
but One. He designates Himself as the Way, the Truth, and the Life;
Two far more important passages, however, must also come under
consideration in this respect,—the one, ‘I and my Father are one;’ The objections made by Fritzsche in the third Programm with respect to the passages which I have adduced from St. John, are discussed
in the article in Studien und Kritiken, 1842, No. 3. Compare also Weiss,
Johann. Lehrbegr. pp. 205 and 208, etc.
There can, then, be no doubt that the Lord Jesus both felt and
expressed the consciousness of His own sinlessness. If we are unwilling to admit
the validity of this self-testimony, unique as it is,—if we will put no confidence
in His sublime words,—there remains no alternative but to regard Him as either a
fanatic or a hypocrite. We must either declare that, as far as Himself was
concerned, He drew no very strict line of demarcation between good and evil,—that
He made no searching examination of the secret recesses of His heart,—was not acquainted
with every motion of His will,—did not strictly test His words and actions,—and
that He exaggerated a consciousness of noble
If, then, the rejection of the self-testimony of the Lord Jesus leads us only to untenable, nay, to unworthy conclusions, faith in this testimony, though resting on no demonstrative foundation, yet appears to be perfectly justifiable to reason, and is alone worthy of our moral dignity. Where there are no reasons to the contrary, confidence is far nobler and more dignified than distrust. But when we have a Person whose statements are in all respects corroborated in so unique a manner, as is here the case, it becomes a moral duty not to refuse our confidence to that which He simply yet solemnly asserts concerning Himself.
And this will appear still more in the light of a duty, when we add to His self-testimony that external corroboration to the consideration of which we now proceed.
EVERY personality bearing the impress of clearly defined moral and
religious qualities, will produce effects proportioned
In so doing, while we distinguish between the religious and moral
element, we would not, in an argument which must naturally have respect to the very
essence of the Christian character, be understood to do so in the sense of regarding
either as constituting separate and isolated spheres within the domain of Christian
life. On the contrary, it is in the perfect union of these two elements that we
recognise not only a leading feature, but a leading excellence of
Christianity. Nor do we only recognise, but shall very decidedly bring forward this
property with reference to the sinlessness of its Founder. Nevertheless, the religious
and moral elements admit of being distinguished the one from the other, just as
man in his inward relation to God, may be distinguished from man in his external
operations; and each presents a different aspect to our contemplation. We shall
therefore, in the first place, consider them separately; and
Sec. 1.—The New Life of Christianity in its Moral and Religious Aspects.
The moral effects of Christianity are undeniable. It has
in all ages produced, in those who have been deservedly called believers, a rich
supply of virtues, and, indeed, of virtues which were not previously in existence,
or at least not in so pure a form. This applies chiefly to humility, and to compassionate,
ministering love. Nor has it exercised a less salutary moral influence upon the
social relations of life. In marriage, and in the family, in civil and political
life, in the relation of ranks, tribes, and nations to each other,—nay, in the whole
condition of the human race,—it was Christianity which first laid the foundation
of a state of society truly worthy of man. And these changes it has accomplished,
not from without, not by any kind of constraint, but essentially from within, and
by mere moral force. But chiefly have they been brought about by the fact, that,
through the influence of Christianity, the godlike, free personality of man, and
the equality of all men before God have been really recognised as they had never
been before. All this irresistibly points to the abundance and depth of the moral
forces inherent in Christianity. For the origin of these forces, however, we must
necessarily go back to its Author and this alone is, at all events, strong testimony
to the singularly prominent position He occupies in the domain of morals. But when
our special subject is the doctrine of His sinlessness, all that has hitherto been
touched upon may be considered as essentially comprised in one leading point,
namely this, that the sum-total of these moral results makes it obvious
The idea of a new moral creation is one as peculiar to
Christianity as it is indispensable to its completeness. This the Apostle Paul
expresses in the most forcible manner when he says, ‘If any man be in Christ, he
is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become
new.’ An excellent antithetical description of Saul the Jew and Paul
the Christian is given by Hug in the Introduction, vol. ii. § 27. A short but brilliant
one will be found also in Lange’s article ‘Paul,’ in Herzog’s
Real Encycl. vol. xi. p. 24.
If, however, we are to define in general terms that new
Where, then, are we to seek the originating cause of this new
creation, which we find in the moral life of the Christian world? Not, as every
well-informed person will allow, in the moral precepts of Christianity. For
it is not in the nature of mere precepts to vitalize: life can only be generated
by life, and neither moral law nor moral ideas can produce entirely new characters.
To form these, there is needed a character of a typical kind. But, true as this
is in general, it especially holds good in Christianity. Here the moral precepts,
great as is their excellence, by no means occupy the first place,—they do but spring
from a primary source, whence all creative and vitalizing power is derived. This
primary source is the Person of Christ, to which, in this case also, we
are ultimately referred. The same apostle who, both by word and deed, bore such
decided testimony to the new creation, says also, when stating the ultimate
cause of that new life which was in him, ‘I live yet not I, but Christ liveth in
me.’ The formula, εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, must by no means be
deprived of its vital significance, by viewing it as an abstract reference
to Christian doctrine or Christian truth; but, as the words themselves and their
connection require, as a concrete reference to the Person of Christ.
If, then, the primary source of this new life—in which sin is
conquered as to its principle, and the pledge of its
To the objection, that the effect produced by the sinlessness
of Christ, if this sinlessness is to be believed, would really have been to produce
in those who came under the influence of His life a like and immediate freedom
from sin, but that neither in the apostles, nor in the Christian world in general,
were such results manifested our reply is as follows:—In the first place, we do
actually find in the apostles, and in all true Christians, a something which is
here of the greatest importance we find in them the principle of sin broken, and
the assurance of its final and complete overthrow implanted. And this furnishes
us with a pledge that a decisive victory has already been achieved over sin. If,
however, in spite of its conquest in principle, it is still found operating in their
lives, yet with this circumstance is always connected the certainty, that the reason
thereof is to be found, not in any inadequacy of the purifying and sanctifying influence
exercised upon them by Christ, but in the fact that sin is too deeply rooted in
nature to
It is evident, then, that if we assume the Author of Christianity to have been Himself subject to sin, it is impossible to comprehend how Christian morality, in its purest and most complete form, could have originated from such a being, and how its special nature could be expressed by the words, ‘Old things are passed away all things are become new.’ If, on the contrary, we acknowledge that its Founder was without sin, it is but natural that a really new moral creation should take place, within its sphere, through the fact that Christ is formed in the individual believer, and in believers collectively.
In Christianity, however, the moral element entirely depends upon the religious. Whenever we meet with a peculiar feature in the province of morals, we shall have to assume a corresponding one in that of religion and if in Christianity the moral life has been radically renewed, the religious consciousness must also have previously experienced a similar change.
What, then, is it which in this respect characterizes Christians,
and makes a marked difference between them and all other religious communities?
It is the fact that they regard themselves as reconciled to God and redeemed; that they cherish the assurance that, in the case of all who truly repent
and believe, the guilt of sin is abolished, and a filial relationship to the holy
God introduced. It was by means of this consciousness that the Christian Church
was
If, then, we find such a confidence existing in the Christian
Church, and perceive, moreover, that by this confidence she either stands or falls,
it is but reasonable to inquire whence it originated. The præ-Christian religions
also had an abundant supply of means and ordinances for reconciling sinful man to
God; and among these, sacrifices played by far the most important part. But if
we ask after the result, we find that all they could effect was to allay, for a
time, the feeling of guilt, while guilt itself was never radically abolished, nor
the certainty that it was once for all taken away, begotten. Hence the need
of repeated sacrifices was felt; and men were ever moving in the same circle of
fresh sacrifices, and ever-recurring consciousness of sin, without attaining the
satisfaction of an enduring peace with God. The reason of this was, that in this
case sacrifice was nothing more than mere sacrifice, and more or less external to
man, and that the assurance of pardon was unaccompanied by the destruction of the
power of sin, and the implantation of a new life in its place. There was thus an
attempted atonement for sin, but no real redemption from its power. A full and final
atonement is only possible when it is personally effected, when a person
intervenes, who not only by a voluntary self-surrender offers himself as a sacrifice,
but also possesses the power of begetting in those who are inwardly united to him
a new life,—a life really victorious over sin, by means of that perfect confidence
of its pardon
If, then, there is any reality in the consciousness of atonement and redemption possessed by Christians, this reality presupposes the existence of the condition under which alone it could have originated. And that this consciousness is a reality, is founded upon the fact of the experience of each individual believer. The doctrine of the sinless perfection of Jesus is therefore as secure as the experienced fact of His atoning and redeeming agency: they who would deny the former must also deny the latter, and will be either utterly incapable of explaining the phenomenon of Christian piety, in its most characteristic peculiarity, or be constrained to seek for an explanation by which it will be as good as explained away.
Sec. 2.—Morality and Religion united in Holiness.
Another circumstance must now be taken into consideration. Not
only have morality and religion, individually considered, appeared under new aspects
in Christianity, but a blending of the two, such as had never before existed, has
been by it introduced into human life. This union of the religious and moral elements,
which we call Holiness, is the
Undoubtedly a reciprocity of action between religion and morals may be found even beyond the province of Christianity. All vigorous piety manifests itself by moral results, and all deep morality is in some way or other based upon piety. If we conceive of either as existing independently, as entirely severed from the other, we should have, on the one side, a piety either of a sickly and internal character, confining itself to contemplation and emotion, or consisting solely of merely outward observances; on the other, a morality which, keeping closely within the bounds of legality, would exhibit a virtue, strict perhaps, and immoveable, but austere, and lacking all genuine warmth and heartiness. We are not, however, speaking of a greater or less degree of reciprocal action, but of a perfect fusion,—of such a oneness of religion and morality, that the one can never be found without the other;—no feeling of piety without moral worth and moral results, and no moral action which does not spring from piety. For holiness, as a human quality, exists only where a being, who has either continued free from sin, or, having sinned, has again become free from every stain of guilt, and victorious over every temptation, is ever, both in will and deed, following after good; and this not only from motives of duty, not merely for the sake of good itself, but for the sake of God; impelled, therefore, by that love which, like the Divine love itself, finds its objects even in the undeserving and the lost, and is ready to make any sacrifice for their deliverance.
Where, then, do we find even the notion of such a holiness as this?
We cannot seek for it in the heathen world. Even here
the distinction between the profane and the sacred, between the impure and the consecrated,
was understood, and its
The revelation of the Old Testament is based on an
entirely different foundation. Here the holiness of God, the free Creator and
Governor of the world, forms the central-point, and the precept, ‘Be ye holy,
for I am holy,’
And this we find in Christianity. Here first, and here
We have now, however, reached a point which will give rise to a special discussion. For it might be said: Granting that what has been hitherto advanced is correct, is it certain that the reality of a sinless life is needful to account for it? Might not the mere idea, the mere belief in such a life, produce the like effects? To this subject, then, we shall now devote a few words.
Sec. 3.—These Effects caused not by an Idea, but by an Actual Person.
The objection just hinted at is founded upon a spiritualism which everywhere flees from reality to dwell apart in a world of ideas, and seeks to resolve all life into mere intellectual conceptions. In fact, however, mere ideas have not the power of creating new life reality can only arise from reality and unless we are willing to regard the whole moral and religious life of the Christian world as a collection of mere ideas, instead of acknowledging it to be a reality, confirmed as such by our own experience, we must admit a corresponding reality as its starting-point, since there can be nothing in the effect whose germ was not previously in the cause.
But here the question specially arises: Whence came, then, the representation, or, if the term be preferred, the idea of sinless perfection? In all other cases, being and life are primitive, representation and conception derived. Yet here a notion is supposed to precede, which would not only have no foundation in an originating life, but to which there would nowhere exist a corresponding reality. And how is it to be accounted for that this thought should have appeared, with so marked a character and so powerful an energy, just at this point of the world’s history, while we find nothing similar or equal to it at any other period, nor at the same period in any other instance?
We have already alluded to the fact that the notion of sinlessness
had by no means attained so definite a form that nothing else remained to be done
but to apply it to Jesus Christ, but that, on the contrary, the idea itself was
first developed with and by the appearance of Jesus Himself. We have now arrived
at the place where it will be needful to
But it is not enough to have made this general statement. It must be historically proved; and for this purpose it will be needful to enter somewhat into particulars.
The reason why the idea of pure holiness was impossible to the
whole heathen world, lay, as has been already hinted, not only in the fact
that polytheism was deficient in a spirit of thoroughly decided morality, but also
in the positively immoral elements by which it was disfigured. For where the Divine
models themselves were not regarded as pure, there could be no place for the notion
of a virtue, spotless and in all respects perfect, within the province of human
life. Nevertheless, even the heathen world possessed, in the form of philosophy
and poetry, an extensive range of thought, which rose far above the limits of the
popular religion; and in these departments we undoubtedly meet with very exalted
views of morality. The tragic poets, especially Sophocles, present us with pictures
of a virtue as sublime as it is pious and attractive; and those philosophers whose
systems are borne up by a spirit of morality, naturally approach somewhat Plato’s Works, edited by Schleiermacher, third edition,
vol. i.; Notes, p. 535. Plato, de Republica, L. ii. P. iii. vol. i. pp. 65 and 66
of Bekker’s edition; in Schleiermacher’s edition, as above, pp. 128 and 129. Compare
on the passage, Baur in his Apollonius von Tyana u. Christus, S. 163-166.
It is remarkable that one who lived at a period when he could
survey the whole development of the ancient world, should expressly declare, as
Cicero does, that ‘he at least had never found a perfectly wise man:’ on the contrary,
he says the philosophers are all at variance as to what kind of a man such a one
would be, if ever he might be expected to exist.’ In the well-known passage of the Second Book of the Tusculan
Disputations, where he speaks of triumphing over pain, and says that the
pars inferior, the molle, demissum, humile in man, should be governed
by the domina omnium et regina ratio. Here he says,
ii. 22: In quo erit perfecta
sapientia—quem adhuc nos quidem vidimus nominem: sed philosophorum sententiis,
qualis futuris sit, si modo aliquando fuerit exponitur—is igitur, sive ea ratio
quæ erit in eo perfecta et absoluta, sic illi parti imperabit inferiori, ut justus
parens probis filiis. Here, indeed, only one aspect of morality, the
victory over pain, is spoken of; but if even in this one respect, which was the
very point in which antiquity, and especially heroic Rome, excelled, Cicero
doubted whether a perfectly wise man had ever appeared, how much more would he
have done so if the realization of a virtue absolutely pure iu every respect had
been in question! The only passage which could be
brought forward in support of an opposite assertion is in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, lib. i. cap. i.
§ 11: Οὐδεὶς δὲ πώποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πράττοντος εἶδεν, οὔτε
λέγοντος ἤκουσεν. It is evident, however, from the whole tenor of this
defence, and especially from the immediately preceding context, that it is
more legality, and especially the legality of his public dealings and discourses,
which is here intended, than morality in its higher signification. But granting
that the words are to be understood as applied to morality in the widest
sense, even then the main point is wanting, viz. the testimony of Socrates himself. This, however, is indispensable, since he alone was capable of a thorough survey
of himself. We shall, however, do no injustice to Socrates by assuming that he would
not have applied to himself that great saying of the Redeemer, ‘Which of you convinceth
me of sin?’ In the very fact that the demons of Socrates chiefly warned him
against things which he was not to do, while Christ positively
acted in all things from a pure consciousness of God within, from that Divine
Spirit by which He was impelled, lies a most important distinction between the philosopher
and the Saviour. It is not to be denied that the picture of a perfectly wise man,
not merely as an idea, but as a reality, is presented to us even within the sphere
of heathenism by Philostratus, in his Life of Apollonius of Tyana; but in
this case there is a reference to Christianity, and the whole life is but
an imitation of that of Christ, translated into Platonism and Pythagoreanism. This
is convincingly proved by Baur, in his work, Apollonius of Tyana and Christ,
or the Relation of Pythagoreanism to Christianity, Tübingen 1632, in which (p.
162) the result of his researches, as far as our present subject is concerned, is
thus expressed: ‘In the place of Him whom Christianity sets before us as the actually
manifested Redeemer of the world, we have here a sage acting only by precept and
example he is, moreover—and this must be the main point—no living form,
but an image wanting independent reality and actual existence,—a faint and
shadowy reflection of a living original, but for whom it is evident that even
the creative idea which called it forth would be absent.’ The words of Epictetus, iv. 12, 19th ed. Schweigh., are:
Τί οὐν; δυνατὸν ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι ἤδη;
Ἀμήχανον· ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δυνατὸν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τετάσθα
διηνεκῶς. In an epigram in Demosthenes,
de Corona, p. 322, the quality of doing all that is right is attributed
to the gods alone.
Such is the state of affairs with regard to the question which
now occupies us, in the intellectual high places of the heathen world. Since the notion, and the word which defines it, assume each
the other, it may not be amiss to offer a few remarks upon the expressions ἀναμαρτησία
and ἀναμάρτητος. These undoubtedly occur at a very early period in the language
of classical antiquity, but at first they are for the most part applied only to
external relations; and even when in later times used with reference to moral actions,
they lack that full significance which Christian thought attributes to them. In
Herodotus ἀναμάρτητος is applied, v. 39, to a woman who had not sinned against
her husband, and, i. 55, to a city which had incurred no debts. In Xenophon and
Plato ἀναμάρτητος is sometimes one who cannot err, sometimes one who has
not actually erred; but in both instances it is used in no higher sense than
as referring to the external affairs of life. In the first of these two meanings,
Plato says, de Repub. lib. 1,
Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοί εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες,
ἢ οἶοί τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν; in the other, Xenophon,
Ὁρῶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
οὐδένα ἀναμάρτητον διατελοῦντα. Longinus, de Sublim. xxxi. 8,
uses the word in the same sense as καθαρός and ἀσφαλής, to denote the
pure and the classical in style, and distinguishes in this respect between that
which is merely free from faults, and that which is the work of genius (de Sublim. xxxiii. 2). It is in Diogenes Laertius (vii. 122) and Epictetus that it occurs
with the most decided moral meaning. In the latter are found a whole series of passages
in which the word occurs:—e.g. i. 4, 11:
Ἐν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ἀφορμαῖς ἀναμάρτητος; iv. 8, 6:
ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου πρόληψις καὶ
ἐπαγγελία, ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι; and especially the above-mentioned remarkable passage,
iv. 12, 19. Ἁμαρτησία
also occurs, though less frequently, with the same various meanings. Compare Stephan.
Thesaur. Ling. Gr. vol. ii. p. 1920, ed. Lond. The prerogative of sinlessness has never been laid claim to
on behalf of Moses. The inadmissibility of such a notion would at once have been
shown by a reference to Much less can sinlessness be predicated of Mohammed. On this
point the reader is referred to the Contributions to a Theology of the Koran, by
Œttinger (Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, Jahrgang 1831, No. iii. pp.
62, 63), where we find the following observations: ‘Nowhere in the Koran do we
find the idea of sinlessness applied to a human being. Reference might indeed here
be made to the passage (12, 53) where Joseph says, “I will not acquit myself of
guilt, for every soul inclineth to evil, save him on whom God has compassion.” But
it is evident that this expression means no more than that every man will sin unless
God’s mercy hold him up, which by no means implies that any one may be wholly free
from sin. The Koran, in general, regards sin more as an outward than an inward occurrence,
while even the prophetic vocation does not necessarily involve a perfect freedom
from external and manifest transgression; though Mohammed, when his conscience accuses
him, or even when men reproach him for his sins, earnestly endeavours
to weaken the force of such reproaches by supposed Divine revelations.’ Still more
decidedly is this point argued by Gerock (Christologie des Koran, Hamb.
1839, pp. 100, 101). It is there shown that in the Koran Jesus is indeed held up
to imitation as a moral ensample, but necessarily without the predicate of sinlessness,
since even Mohammed, who is greater than He, confesses to the commission of mistakes
and precipitate actions. In one passage God says to Mohammed (Sur. 48, B. 1 and
2): ‘We have granted thee a decisive victory, in order that Allah may forgive thee
thy sins both past and future.’ Again (Sur. 40, B. 57), Mohammed is reminded: ‘Pray
for the forgiveness of thy sins.’ (So also p. 80, v. 1 seq.; p. 4, v. 104). Gerock, in the work already quoted, p. 101, note.
This is, then, historically the state of the case: In the ages
before Christ, no definite notion of sinless perfection, and where a shadow of the
idea is found, an accompanying certainty of the impossibility of realizing it:
since the appearance of Christ, not only the idea itself in full
What conclusion shall we then draw from this state of things? Shall we conclude that the apostles—like the God of Plato, who, contemplating
ideas, proceeded to fashion the world—by only viewing the idea of perfection and
holiness, sketched from their own internal resources the portrait of Jesus, and
filled up the details of His life from their own
We shall, however, draw this conclusion with greater confidence,
in proportion as this view is found to be in other respects consistent with the
nature of the case. For if the idea of sinless perfection does indeed belong, of
its very nature, to the human mind, and form the foundation of its whole moral development
yet, according to the laws of moral life, there can be no clear, full, and living
consciousness of it, and consequently no belief in its realization, so long as sin
is the ruling power in humanity. Hence, when the idea has become lucid and lifegiving,
and when along with it there is the firm conviction of its realization, we are entitled
to draw the conclusion that this has taken place as the result of an actual conquest
of sin, and a real manifestation of a holy and perfect life. We say then: it is
not possible to think otherwise than that He who called forth in His contemporaries,
and through them in the Christian
We have, then—as a retrospect of what has been advanced will show—a series of facts which mutually confirm each other. The moral greatness of Christ is confirmed, in a general point of view, by that judicial and dividing effect which His appearance everywhere produced, as well as by the relation in which men of the most opposite dispositions stood towards Him:—His enemies, with their deadly hatred; the seemingly impartial, who could not, however, withdraw themselves from the influence of His spiritual power the traitor, who, in his despair, passed sentence upon himself and the friends, whose love and reverence endured even unto death. But more definite confirmation of the sinless perfection of the Lord Jesus is offered by the testimony of the apostolic circle,—a testimony contained partly in direct assertions, and partly in that life-portrait of Christ which forms their commentary and confirmation. Beyond and above all this, however, is the sublime self-testimony from the lips of Jesus Himself, which leaves us in no doubt of what was His own consciousness with respect to His moral character, and the, relation to God and to the human race resulting therefrom. This, too, does not stand alone, but is supported and corroborated by the world-wide effects produced by Him in the sphere of religion and morality,—effects so entirely unique that no adequate explanation of them can be found, unless we allow that the self-testimony of Christ, and its echo in the evidence furnished by the apostles, is indeed corroborated by facts.
Surely all these circumstances, taken together, furnish ample
security for the sinless perfection of Christ. Nevertheless, Comp. Dorner, Jes. sündl. Vollk. p. 43, and Schaff On
the Moral Character of Christ, p. 53.
In this sense we must say that it is the motel portraiture of
the Lord Jesus which, in virtue of the vital power inherent in it itself, offers
the best and strongest evidence of its truth and uniqueness. As the poet, Schiller, in the Bride of Messina.
AS we have before remarked, a mathematical or logically
incontrovertible certainty is, with respect to our subject, impossible. Hence no
proofs can be adduced which will absolutely exclude all doubts. Nor are doubts
by any means lacking; for while many modern theologians have merely taken up a
sceptical position with regard to sinlessness, there are others who have stated
reasons which are sufficiently plausible to make a discussion of them needful.
Such a discussion we are the more inclined to enter upon in the following pages,
because the questions hence arising have not as yet been treated in the full and
connected manner which the subject demands. For a more cursory view of these questions, see Lutz. Biblische
Dogmata, pp. 294-299; and Schumann, Christus, vol. i. pp. 289-296.
The objections which have been raised may, in a general way,
be classed as follows:—One class rests on a denial of the actual sinlessness
of Jesus; the other on a denial of the possibility of sinlessness at all
in the sphere of human life. In the former case the sinlessness of Jesus is impugned,
partly on the ground of its being inconsistent with that law of development which
is applied to Him in reference both to His character and His work; partly as at
variance with the
Adopting this classification, we shall proceed from that which is special to that which is general,—from that which is less important to that which is more so. That doubt is of less moment, and does not directly assail the character of Jesus, which hints that if He passed through a development at all, He must have begun in imperfection, and have risen gradually to perfection. We shall find it harder to reconcile with our idea of sinlessness, the notion that Jesus could have felt inwardly drawn towards evil when exposed to temptation while the strongest objection of all would be a really immoral utterance or deed. But, even supposing all that might be urged under these heads were answered, this would be of no avail, if it could be proved that sinless perfection is altogether impossible in the region of human existence, if experience or the nature of the moral idea witnessed unanswerably against its realization in a human being.
These are the difficulties which meet us here. In endeavouring to surmount them in the order above given, we shall of course labour to keep duly separate that which is essentially distinct but since objections of both kinds glide to a certain degree into each other, many difficulties must needs be touched upon in the first part, the more complete solution of which must be reserved to the second.
IF we pass by altogether, in the first instance, the question as to whether or not sinlessness be possible in humanity, and, assuming for the time its possibility, ask only, Was Jesus actually sinless? then our business is with facts; and these, if they are questionable, would be in the first instance most efficiently contested, if other indubitable and contrary facts could be opposed to them. It has been supposed that such facts are to be found in certain parts of the Gospel narratives. And in this respect attention has first of all been called to the development which took place in the life of Jesus, and therefore to a progress from a state of imperfection to one of perfection, by which, it is urged, the idea of absolute perfection is excluded. This has been made use of in two ways,—in relation, first, to the Person of Jesus, and secondly, to the Messianic plan. We must examine both aspects of this argument more closely.
Sec. 1.—The Development of the Person of Jesus.
The Scriptures speak undeniably of a growth in wisdom
in Jesus, consequently of an increase, a progress in His intellectual life; and
not less distinctly do they intimate that His moral nature became gradually perfect. And were this not clearly taught in single passages, For the intellectual growth of Jesus we have the classic words,
προέκοπτε σοφίᾳ,
To this we reply: Certainly the gradualness, the successive
character, of the development of Jesus, must be maintained. But growth and increase
do not necessarily assume transition from a state of deficiency to one of sufficiency,—do
not presuppose an inner antagonism of sin, or an overcoming of the religious and
moral error connected therewith. All that they really imply is, development taking
place in time. There is nothing to hinder this development itself from being a perfectly
pure one. The notion of growth does but furnish another proof that Jesus shared
in everything that really belongs to finite, human nature. This is,
however, as little denied by any, as it can, on the other side, be proved that
mere human development, as such, necessarily involves some amount of sin. In
itself it may be conceived of as a perfectly normal development, in which indeed
different degrees succeed each other, each free from actual disturbance, each
exhibiting in greater maturity some quality which was but prepared for in former
stages, but which yet existed potentially from the very beginning. The idea of development does not of itself involve the passing
through antagonisms and conflicts, or, ‘that at every step in advance the hindrances
universally presented by evil have to be surmounted, and some one of its disturbing
elements to be reduced to inactivity.’ This is only true of the development of individuals,
and of mankind, when evil has already gained power over them, i.e. when
they are, morally considered, in an unnatural condition. ‘But only a slavish
dependence on a narrow empiricism, whose inductions will not even bear
application to the sphere of nature, can. lead us to represent the present form
of human development as its natural and necessary one. That would be a true
development in which nothing should ever be lost at a higher which had been once
really possessed at a lower stage; and simply on the ground that there was
nothing which it were needful and good to lose, simply because at no point was
there anything which tended to interfere with or thwart the vocation of the
being whose development was going forward.’ See Jul. Müller’s Christian
Doctrine of Sin, vol. i. pp. 80-86 of third ed. Besides, that which specially
characterizes the notion of moral development is not its negative side, viz. the
conquest of evil, but positive growth in good; and it is just in this latter
sense that it is applied to Jesus.
That this was so in the case of the Lord Jesus, cannot indeed
be positively demonstrated, throughout the whole course of His life; but still
less can the contrary be proved. Nay more, not only are we justified in inferring
from the subsequent perfection of Jesus, that the manner in which it was attained
was in general normal, but we have also a particular fact corroborating this conclusion,
and making it evident to the mind. The fact referred to is, of course, that most
significant resting-place afforded us by the narrative of His visit to Jerusalem
during His twelfth year. Lange, Leben Jesu, vol.
ii. p. 127.
This thought of a perfectly normal development does not by any
means bring us within the regions of the magical and docetical, but rather expresses
the restoration of human nature to its integrity,—nature in its primal purity
and holiness; for an orderly, faultless development is proper to There is not a trace of such monstrosities as these in
the sober narrative of the canonical Gospels, while, as is well known, they are
to be found in the apocryphal histories of Jesus. See my work, Historisch oder
Mythisch? § 4. The fundamental thought of all this was expressed even by
‘remelts
in the well-known passage, adv. hæres. ii. 22, where, among other things, it
is said: ldeo (Christus) per omnem venit ætatem et infantibus infans factus,
sanctificans infantes; in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem;
in juvenibus juvenis, etc. Among modern writers it will be found in Schleiermacher,
Glaubenslehre, ii. 178, and Olahausen, Bibl. Comment. i. 134.
As little ought we absolutely to deny the existence of what was
individual and national in the education of Jesus, See
Martensen’s
Dogmatik, § 141, p. 315. Compare Schaff, p. 12, and Young’s Christ of History, p. 197. For detailed proof, see
Keim’s already quoted works, pp. 12
seq.
What has hitherto been advanced, tends of course merely to make plain the possibility of conceiving in Jesus a perfectly pure development. But at present this is all we need, inasmuch as our only aim at this point is to show that development does not of itself involve sin. The positive certainty that the development of Jesus was sinless, must be sought in another direction,—namely, by proving that it is an indispensable presupposition, if the actual condition and character of Jesus at a subsequent period is to be satisfactorily explained, and not to seem utterly out of connection with His earlier life.
Sec. 2.—The Development of the Messianic Plan.
With still more positiveness, and with greater force, has the
objection which is based on progress from a state of imperfection to one of perfection,
been urged in relation to The phrase,
‘Plan of Jesus,’ has in recent times been so much
in vogue, that it may seem paradoxical to consider it inappropriate; and yet it
is utterly so. The devising of a plan implies an activity of mind which is
far too strongly individual and subjective to be ascribed to Jesus. So also the
acting constantly according to a plan, springs from a one-sided predominance
of reflection, such as He never manifested. That which He was commissioned to do
and to establish was marked out for Him by God and history,—was recognised, not
devised by Him. Hence, although we are not warranted in saying that there was no
connection between His various acts, seeing that in all He did and said He was possessed
and inspired by the loftiest idea still, to assume that all He did was deliberately
planned and intended beforehand, in the common sense of the words, reduces Him to
a lower position than that which He actually occupied, as One filled with the Spirit
and with God. The older terms, office and work of Christ, have much
greater congruity than the modern expression plan. If, however, this term
plan, having usage on its side, is to be retained, let us understand by it
only, as Hase very correctly defines it in his Leben Jesu, § 40, ‘His
subjective conception of the office to which God had appointed Him, without
reference to the collateral use of the word in the sense of: what is arbitrary,
the mere result of reflection.’ Compare Neander’s Life of Jesus, pp. 128, etc., fifth ed.
This view, which even at a former period was broached by Following in the steps of Von Ammon, De Wette, and some others,
Hase, in the first ed. of his Leben Jesu, published at Leipsic in 1829,
propounded at length the thought of a twofold plan of Jesus,—of a plan which was
at first theocratical, and only became purely, religious subsequently. In
opposition to his view and development of the subject, appeared Heubner, in an
appendix to the fifth ed. of Reinhard’s
Plan Jesu, Wittenb. 1830, pp. 394-407; Lücke, in two programmes of the year
1831, under the title, Examinatur, quæ speciosius nuper commendata est, sententia
de mutato per eventa, adeoque sensim emendato Christi consilio; and J. E. Osiander,
in his article, Ueber die neueren Bearbeitungen des Lebens Jesu von Paulus und Hase, in the Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie, 1831, No. i. pp. 145-148.
My controversy also, in the second ed. of this work, was with Hase. To this opposition,
especially as conducted by Lücke, Hase, with a noble love of truth, did justice,
partly in his Theologische Streitschriften, Leipsic 1834, pp. 61-102, and
partly in the subsequent editions of his Leben Jesu. He adopted from his
antagonists as much as his own convictions would allow him, and sought to unite
the opposed views in the following general result, § 50:—‘Apart from single political
institutions, which are by nature transitory, the plait of Jesus undoubtedly related
to a moral reformation and a spiritual kingdom; but still the Divine law which He
put in force was clearly meant in the course of time to subdue the world, or rather
to pervade it as its highest general law; and He, the King of Truth, intended
to become also a King of the world.’ ‘Jesus must, at one time or other, have
examined and rejected those Messianic hopes which bore a theocratic character,
for the Messianic faith could only reach Him in that form. But there is no proof
whatever that He was led to this examination and rejection by hard experience in
the midst of His career, and not by the clear judgment of His own mind ere He
entered on His work.’ Viz. by Keim in his work, Die menschliche Entwickelung
Jesu, pp. 28, etc. He advocates the view that it was not till a certain definite period
of His public ministry that the perception that the Messiah was to be a sufferer
arose upon the mind of Jesus, and that it was at the same time that His idea
of a Messianic kingdom, which was to be in the first place a Jewish one, expanded
into that of a universal spiritual kingdom. Hase, in the first edition of the
Leben Jesu, § 84. Differently in the second and later editions, § 49.
The main support of the opinion that Jesus had at first a theocratic plan of the nature just indicated, is His appropriation to Himself of the character of Messiah; and the Messiah, according to the prophets, and still more in the view of His contemporaries, was to be not only a religious and moral, but also a political deliverer. It is urged: If Jesus did not mean to awaken political hopes, He would not have given Himself out for the Messiah; but inasmuch as He did call Himself the Messiah, the political element must evidently have entered into His plan. This conclusion can, however, only be drawn when certain of His utterances are isolated, and viewed apart from their connection with the whole of His teaching and works. Jesus did appropriate to Himself the idea of the Messiah as a true and eternal one; but in the consciousness of being Himself the promised One, He also glorified the idea by manifesting its high religious realization. In doing this He would have acted very injudiciously, if He had begun by theoretical discussions. His true course was rather first to realize in His own life the idea of the Messiah, and then to bring Himself forward as the promised One, under that aspect which He had thus rendered actual and evident. At the same time, however, from the very beginning Jesus declared in divers ways, that what He sought to found was a Divine kingdom of piety and love,—a union of mankind on the basis of a moral deliverance.
When Jesus spoke of His kingdom, it was equivalent to
speaking of His plan; and at no period of His life did He leave men in uncertainty
as to the true nature of His kingdom. He ever proclaimed it to be heavenly and eternal,—to
be one whose commencements are within, in the heart, Neander, Life of Jesus, fifth ed. p. 138.
Some have laboured to show that there is a contrast between the
earlier and later utterances of Jesus, indicative of a change of feelings and views.
This supposition is based on the fact, that whilst at His first public appearances Compare De Wette, Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, § 52,
p. 268. Oslander, in the above quoted essay, p. 147, justly finds in
the constant harmony of Christ’s inner life a pledge for the unity of His plans,
and designates the contrast between the joyousness of the earlier period of His public ministry and the gloomy seriousness of the later, a
supposed one. This he then satisfactorily proves by bringing forward particular
instances. Keim, in the above quoted work, pp. 28-32, and elsewhere.
We do not dispute that the notion of suffering and of death
On the very threshold of Christ’s public life, we meet with the
history of the temptation; and it is impossible not to regard the rejection of
an externally glorious Messiahship—a rejection antecedent to any act of His public
ministry—as the very essence of this narrative. Compare especially e.g.
In this point, as well as with regard to the plan of Jesus, we cannot but hold fast the essential oneness of His views; and though we do admit a development, it is only such a one as by no means presupposes the existence of any internal discord in His mind.
Sec. 3.—The Temptation.
The very difficult problem now awaits our consideration, whether
Jesus ever experienced any inclination to sin? Our
We may very easily get rid of this difficulty by refusing to
recognise one or the other of the two sides which should here be held in
conjunction with each other; i.e. by affirming either that Jesus was not
really tempted, or that we must not be so precise in our view of sinlessness.
And there are not a few who do either deny the reality of the temptation, or
sacrifice the strict conception of sinlessness. But the problem is not solved in
this way. On the contrary, since Scripture teaches both the temptation and
sinlessness of Christ, it becomes the duty of theology to furnish an answer to
the question whether both can be held without prejudice to either, or whether
the one necessarily excludes the other. Our proper guide in answering this
question is the well-known passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews.
Our inquiry into the nature of sin has shown us that, although its focus is in the will, we are not to regard it as confined to that faculty. The life of the man in all its essential aspects must be taken into consideration. Reciprocity is the law of our constitution; and in virtue thereof, not only does the will, when affected by sin, act prejudicially on the other spheres of our life, but these latter also, when they are sinfully incited, exercise a corrupting influence upon the will. Sin does not take place simply by an abstract act of the will,—it is consummated only where there is a simultaneous darkening of the intelligence and imagination, by means of a stirring up of false and sensual emotions. The actual influence exerted by these different sides of our being varies according to the peculiarities of individual constitutions, and to the measure of our sinfulness. At the same time, however, with respect to the various spheres of our life, we must carefully distinguish between that which arises from their natural orderly action, and that which is already a beginning of sin.
We cannot consider it sinful that that which is evil should
present itself to the understanding and imagination, partly as objectively
existent, and partly as a possibility; for this is just one of the things which
man, as a moral being, cannot avoid. Nor can it with any greater reason be
looked upon as in itself sinful, that a sense of the opposition between pleasure
and pain should be called forth within us by distinct thoughts or images, and
that the one should exert an attractive, and the other a repulsive, influence.
Such experiences owe their existence to the fact that man is endowed with
sensibilities and a physical body, which being inalienable parts of his nature,
must be recognised as of Divine ordination. In the fact that Jesus had a body, and consequently sensibility,
no ground or direct occasion of sin was involved. Σάρξ is ascribed to Him in a perfectly good sense, with reference, of course, to human limitations
and lowliness, but with no reference at all to sin. In opposition to this, it
is maintained by some, chiefly persons tinged with fanaticism,—as for example,
formerly, by Dippel, Eschrich, Fend, and Poiret, and recently by the well-known
Irving, through whom this point became the subject of a religious controversy in
England,—that to Christ must be ascribed not simply flesh, but sinful flesh;
and that, though in respect of His spirit and will He is to be held perfectly
free from actual and habitual sin, it must yet be granted that in the matter of
the senses and their sinful impulses, He was not different from other men. It is
plain that these persons are somewhat lax in their views of sinlessness; for it
is involved in the true idea of sinlessness that the sensuous impulses do not
act independently of, and in opposition to, the spirit, but are altogether ruled
by it. Moreover, the words of the apostle, to which they appeal, do not furnish
a sufficient warrant for the doctrine. In the passage,
It cannot be denied that evil does enter man through the channels of thought and imagination, of feeling and sensibility. At the same time, however, it must not only be acknowledged that the real decision of the matter rests with the will,—because it is only by a determination of the will that man really appropriates evil, and makes it an internal or external act for which he is responsible,—but we must also keep in view the fact, that in the spheres of thought and imagination, of emotion and sensibility, there are boundary lines very clearly separating between that which is natural and that which is sinful.
Our inquiry concerns, then, the relation which temptation bears
to evil. In order to answer this question, we must bring before our minds the idea
and nature of temptation. For the usage of the expressions πειράζεσθαι and
πειρασμός
in the New Testament, see Tholuck’s Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount,
pp. 432 ff., and Kern’s Brief Jacobi, p. 125 ff. This subject is also
further discussed in Köster’s Bibl. Lehre von der Versuchung, Gotha 1859,
and Palmer’s article, Versuchung, in Herzog’s Theol. Real-Encycl. This is the ἐπιθυμία of which St. James speaks as the
usual commencement of sin in man (
Every being is liable to temptation whose nature is on the one
hand susceptible of good, and does not on the other necessarily shut out the possibility
of evil. God cannot be tempted, because the holiness of His nature exalts Him above all temptation. Irrational creatures cannot be tempted, because, being
incapable of true good, they are also below temptation to evil. Man alone,
free to choose, can be tempted, because he is a moral, though not yet in his inward
nature a holy, personality. Temptation begins for him when evil is presented, at
some point of his inner or outer life, in such a way that he can directly take
it up into his own being. But man is exposed in two ways to the possibility, and
seductive power, of evil. On the one hand, he may be drawn to actual sin by enticements; and, on the other hand, he may be turned aside from good by threatened, as well
as by inflicted, suffering. The former may be termed positive, the latter negative,
temptation. The one is notably illustrated in the story of Hercules at the two ways,
the other in the sufferings of Job. Luther places temptations through suffering on the left hand,
and those through pleasure on the right, and thus declares the latter to be the
stronger and more dangerous (Works, B. vii. p. 1165).
Where, then, is the point in temptation at which sin begins,
or at which it becomes itself sin? It is there where the evil which is presented
to us begins to make a determining impression upon the heart. We do not say
an impression in a general sense,—for without making this, it would be no temptation
at all,—but a determining impression, that is one which, first creating commotion
in the mind in general, then seizes upon the will in particular, and inclines it
towards an opposition to the Divine order. Luther well distinguishes between
sentire tentationem
and consentire tentationi. Unless the tempting impression be felt, there
is no real temptation; but unless it be acquiesced in or yielded to, there is no sin.
Contemplating the life of Jesus from this point of view,
At present we shall consider the narrative of the
temptation The following essays, which advert to my own earlier view,
may be compared in this connection: Usteri, Ueber die Versuchung Christi, Stud. u. Krit. 1829, 3, and 1832, 4; Hasert in the same, 1830, 1; Hocheisen,
Bemerkungen über die Vers. Gesch., in the Tübingen Zeitschrift f. Theologie, 1883,
2; Kohlschütter zur Verständigung über die Vers. Gesch., in Käuffer’s
Bibl. Studien, Jahrg. 2. The most recent discussions of the subject are by
E. Pfeiffer in the Deutsche Zeitschrift, May 1851; and by Rink in the same
periodical, September 1851; also by Laufs in the Studien und Kritiken, 1853,
2. At present briefly; more fully in a special appendix.
Among such views of this narrative as are by no means at variance
with the doctrine of Christ’s sinlessness, may be regarded those which see in the
accounts of the evangelists no actual occurrence, but simply a product of early
Christian thought. The opinions of those who take this view are divided as to whether
the account originated with Jesus Himself under the form of a parable, or with His
immediate followers under the form of a myth. Whatever our judgment may be of explanations
of this nature, it is quite clear that they do not endanger the sinlessness of Jesus.
Neither as a parable, in which Jesus set forth the fundamental maxims according
to which all efforts on behalf of His kingdom should be regulated, nor as a myth,
in which His Church glorified Him as the conqueror of Satan, would it involve anything
really at variance with His sinlessness. But though circumstances have helped to
decide the preference of some recent theologians, amongst whom are Schleiermacher
and Usteri, for the parabolical mode of interpretation, we cannot see our way clear
to the adoption of such a method of escaping the difficulties; and simply for the
reason, that we hold the view which underlies it to be an utterly inadmissible one:
The entire character of the narrative, and especially the position it occupies between
the baptism and public appearance of Jesus, argue too strongly that we have to,
do with facts, and not with parable or myth. And even if it be true, which at present
we do not stop to consider, that some portions of the account cannot be in every
respect regarded as actual history, and must be looked upon as drapery, still we
should have to hold fast a kernel of fact. When we reflect that it was involved
in the human nature of Christ that He should be tempted; further, that the Gospels
But even when maintaining that we have before us the report of actual temptations undergone by Jesus, there are still, as is well known, a variety of possible explanations from this point of view also. Before entering on an examination of these, it will be advisable to come to some decision as to the essential meaning of the history, and thus to ascertain clearly that which must hold true under all circumstances, whatever may be the mode in which single points are treated.
The narrative is undoubtedly set forth as an essential item of
the gospel of Jesus as the Christ, as a constituent part of the life of Jesus as
the Messiah. In this quality it is placed between that baptismal act which should,
and did, inaugurate the Messiah, and the actual appearance of Jesus as the Messiah.
By this we are indirectly, but notwithstanding plainly enough, taught that the temptation
bore reference to Jesus in His Messianic character; that it was not merely a trial
of the general human kind, but specially a trial of the Messiah. This is clear from
the third temptation,—the offer of worldly dominion. But it is also distinctly hinted
at in the two others, in the words, if Thou be the Son of God (
Linked together in this way, the individual temptations may be
conceived as follows. The first, which was the temptation to change stones into
bread, contains a call to the Messiah to employ His miraculous endowments for the
satisfaction of His own immediate and pressing wants. In the second temptation,
which was to cast Himself down from the pinnacle of the temple, He is urged to put
that protection which is promised to God’s chosen One to the test, by wilfully running
into manifest danger. The supposition that the second temptation calls for
a miracle of display, now seems to me to come far behind the explanation given
above. Compare Kohlschütter in Käuffer’s
Bibl. Studien, Jahrg. 2, pp. 75, 76. According to another view, we must not anticipate the command
of God, who has a thousand means of preserving life. Compare Neander’s Life of Jesus, fifth ed. p. 118.
This is unmistakeably one aspect of the temptation of Jesus;
but we cannot confine ourselves to it. Were we to do so, our conception of the whole
matter would be far too abstract. The Tempter does undoubtedly appeal to Jesus as
the Son of God, and very obviously endeavours to influence Him as such; but there
must be no separation made between. the Son of God and the Son of man. In fact,
the temptations endured by Jesus were real and genuine, for the simple reason, that
whilst they tried Him in His character of Messiah, they also assailed Him as a man.
A merely theoretical choice between a false and a true conception of Messiah would
have Special emphasis is rightly laid on this point by Kohlschütter,
pp. 68-71.
The seductive element in the several suggestions seems, so far
as its human aspect is concerned, to have consisted partly in that which would prove
tempting to human nature in general, and partly in that which would be specially
alluring to men of a higher order, who are called to a higher vocation. There was,
first of all, the inclination to use the gifts of God in the service of self; then
there was the liability to entertain the fancy, that One entrusted with a Divine
mission, and under the special guardianship of God, might unhesitatingly incur any
danger, and even arbitrarily expose Himself thereto; and lastly, there was the
desire for this world’s power and glory. To temptation of the first kind men ‘are
exposed, as men; to seductions of the second kind, those are peculiarly liable
who have the consciousness of a higher mission; by allurements of the third kind,
those are mainly affected who feel themselves destined to rule. Jesus was exposed
to all alike, for He was a man like ourselves; He had the certain consciousness
of the
We may hold, however, that this is the true significance of the
temptation, and at the same time that the history is substantially a record of facts,
and yet form very different conceptions of the facts themselves. For instance, the
matter has been represented as follows: that Jesus brought before His own mind
the chief features of the Messianic notions of His contemporaries, and consequently
that the choice between a false and true Messiahship was made as a
purely mental transaction. Such a view is, however, evidently too spiritualistic,
and out of harmony with the character of the Gospel narrative. The words of the
evangelists undoubtedly demand that we should form a more realistic conception of
the whole event. They point out that the seductive thoughts were brought to Jesus
from without, by means of an objective and personal power exterior to Himself. Thus
to have contended with him who is in the highest and most general sense the Tempter,
gives, too, to the conflict and victory of the Lord Jesus an unmistakeably sublime
and universal significance, with respect both to the person concerned and the principles
involved. Nevertheless, whatever stress we may lay upon the objective feature of
the transaction, we must always at the same time admit that if it was anything more
than the mere semblance of temptation, and is to be regarded as real, the seductive
thoughts must have entered into the mind of Jesus, in such a manner
that He did not merely hear, but
We answer that this is quite conceivable. Two suppositions must, however, be most carefully avoided in connection with this matter. The one is, that the producing cause of these seductive thoughts was in any sense in the soul of Jesus Himself; and the other, that they gained any determining influence over the heart, the will, the life of Jesus. That neither was the case may be clearly shown.
Undoubtedly, if the thoughts in question were produced
in the soul of Jesus, the conviction would be forced upon us, that its ground was
morally impure, corrupt, and that sin was present in Him in the shape of evil desire.
But there is nothing whatever to warrant such a supposition. And further, we strike
at once at the root of a hypothesis of this nature, when we hold by the recognition
of a tempter who appeared objectively to Jesus. If we were even to admit that it
was by the agency of His own mind that the Lord Jesus brought forward the false
idea of the Messiah as an object of contemplation, any misgiving which might thereby
arise is immediately obviated by distinguishing between the presentation and the
origination of a thought. The expectation of a worldly Messiah was not a notion
which had yet to be conceived; on the contrary, it was one everywhere rife, and
which Jesus must have inevitably encountered on all sides in the world around. Nay,
He could not carry out the true idea of the Messiah in its full extent, without
also taking up into His thoughts its spurious counterpart. The full and decided
appropriation of the one necessarily involved the rejection of the other; consequently,
also its
There is of course another thing yet to be taken into consideration.
If we are not to deem the moral purity of Jesus to have been stained by the presence
of the seductive thoughts, we must not suppose them to have exerted any determining
influence on His inner life: and this seems difficult to maintain, when we
take the idea of temptation in right earnest. One concession must be made in this
connection—viz. that the mere thinking of evil does not in itself constitute a temptation,
and that, in order to its being a temptation, the evil must appear adapted to, and
must be enticing to, the self-love of our sensuous nature. The false conception
of Messiah, whether suggested by the devil or by the world, was of this nature.
Moreover, there can be no doubt that Jesus, as being a real man, was susceptible
of its influence. For to the nature of man enjoyment is always dearer than privation,
honour than disgrace, and a throne than a cross. Not that we are to conceive the
enjoyments of life, honour, and rule to be essentially sinful. They are that only
under certain conditions. Nor do we necessarily contract defilement through our
sense of the pleasantness of these things. Only when it has a corrupting effect
on the moral feelings, disturbs the judgment, and gives an ungodly bias to the will
and activity, can this be affirmed. But the narrative of the temptation exhibits
the direct opposite of all this. Not like the first parents Therefore, as Hocheisen justly observes in the Tübingen
Theolog. Zeitschrift, 1833, 2, p. 115, no parallel can be drawn between the temptation
of Christ and Prodikus’s story of Hercules and the two ways; for a hesitation of
choice between two ways cannot be spoken of in connection with Jesus. In order to
anticipate and cut off possible difficulties, Menken, in his Betrachtungen über
den Matthæus, i. 104, would have the whole transaction termed trial instead
of temptation. But the Scriptures do not sufficiently justify this change.
Inasmuch as Satan comes before us πειράζων, we may fairly apply the distinction
made even by Tertullian: Deus probat, Diabolus tentat.
The positive temptations of Jesus were not, however, confined
to that particular point of time when they assailed Him with concentrated force. In
The whole life of Jesus, as depicted by the evangelists, was pervaded by suffering. They were griefs of the intensest kind which pierced His soul during the contest of His loving will with the sin of the world; and to these were added bodily pains. Both conjoined reached their climax in the tortures of the cross,—than which no agonies can be conceived higher or more intense. Jesus never expressly sought, or capriciously exposed Himself to, suffering. Nor did He need to do so, for it came unsought. Still less did He purposely avoid it, seeing in it as He did an essential constituent of His Divine calling. He resigned Himself cheerfully to all that befell Him, and thus displayed a power of endurance, which, whilst never inconsistent with the human, always ensured victory to the Divine.
The two events in question might be alleged as revealing a state of mind at variance with our assumption,—namely, the conflict of Gethsemane, in which suffering of soul is peculiarly manifest, and the moment on the cross in which the physical pain, added to the agony of soul, reached its highest point. In both instances Jesus seemed not to maintain the strength of mind consistent with sinless perfection, but to succumb to the weakness of human nature.
There have not been wanting those who have found in the conflict
of Gethsemane, See Usteri, Studien and Kritiken,
1829,3, p. 465. Usteri thinks that if the tradition were true, he must rank
Jesus under Socrates. On the other side, compare the beautiful parallel between
the death of Jesus and that of Socrates, in de Wette’s Wesen des christlichen Glaubens,
§ 53, p. 270. Rousseau says, in his pithy manner, ‘If Socrates suffered and died
like a philosopher, Jesus suffered and died like a God.’ Hasert justly remarks, Studien and Kritiken, 1830, 1,
p. 72, that the impulse of our physical nature to secure itself against destruction
is a natural expression of our life, belonging essentially to its character, and
therefore not necessarily involving sin.
But the sufferings of Gethsemane were only a foretaste of those
which in full reality and force preceded and accompanied His death on the cross.
And on the cross His agony rose to such a point that He had a sense of being deserted by God,—to which feeling He gave utterance in the well-known words
of the
The frame of mind and exclamation in question are manifestly
an intensified counterpart of the agony of Gethsemane. Jesus had in fact, for the
moment, the feeling that He was deserted by God, when physical tortures burst in
upon Him Both, in fact, were implied in the passage from the Psalms,
of which Jesus availed Himself yet if it had not fully expressed His actual feelings,
He would either not have used it, or have altered it to suit His need. But even
the passage in the Psalms itself does not express the feeling of desertion alone,
nor speak of this as a permanent state of mind, as the whole context plainly shows.
Even in the Psalmist’s mouth, the saying cannot be taken in an absolute sense, much
less in that of the Lord Jesus.
The perfect purity of Jesus shone forth, therefore, even in such
circumstances as these. At the same time, we see and As among the Fathers, Clement of Alexandria was inclined to
do, and therefore applied to Christ the expression, ἀνεπιθύμητος.
For examples, see Hagenbach’s History of Doctrines, §§ 66 and 67.
Sec. 4.—Other Acts and Expressions of Jesus, as Arguments against His Sinlessness.
If, then, there is nothing in the facts that Jesus underwent a temporal
development, and that He was tempted, which
Amongst the .scanty traditions of the earlier period of
the life of Jesus, has been preserved that account of His peculiar ripeness at twelve
years of age (
In the properly Messianic period of the life of Jesus there were many things at which even His own contemporaries cavilled. Scrutinized, however, more closely, they only furnish one proof more of the elevated nature of His moral life. Of this kind are the reproaches, that He did not live ascetically like the Pharisees, nor even like John the Baptist, but ate and drank like ordinary men; that He associated with publicans and sinners; that He broke the Sabbath by healing the sick; and the like. But it was precisely in opposition to such narrow-heartedness that Jesus manifested by word and deed the grand principles of a freer morality,—of that morality which flows from the fountain of Divine love, and which raises the gospel so far above the level of all legal service: precisely then did He take occasion to defend the simple and genuinely human cheerfulness of a truly pious life, which is marred by no spurious asceticism, but receives and uses all God’s gifts thankfully and temperately: precisely then, too, did He propound those simple doctrines, that the disposition is the test of genuine morality; that love is more than sacrifice; that ordinances are for man, and not man for ordinances, and lay them down as eternal truths in forms appropriate to the time.
The evangelists have artlessly recorded many doings of Jesus
with that unreflective objectivity which is peculiar to them, without ever thinking
that they might give moral offence. It is only the sensitiveness of the modern world
that has found them strange. and offensive. Some things of this kind scarcely deserve
examination; as, for example, the cursing of the fig-tree. Hase, Leben Jesu, third ed. § 75, p. 184.
But if we are not justified in regarding Jesus as under the influence
of passion when He cursed the fig-tree, there is another occurrence recorded by
the evangelists, in connection with which we can scarcely avoid such a supposition,—namely,
the driving out those who were buying and selling in the temple. As Pécaut does in very strong terms, p. 252. See Lücke’s Commentary on this passage, Pt. i. pp. 536,
537; and Dorner’s Jes. sündl. Vollk. p. 17, note 1.
The relation between Jesus and Judas also offers peculiar difficulty. Compare
on this relation, and the different modes of conceiving it, Dr. Gust.
Schollmeyer’s Jesus and Judas, Lüneberg 1836. See also Neander’s
Life of Jesus, fifth ed. pp. 192, 679-689; and Hase, Leben Jesu, §
110, p. 182 ff. third ed. This hypothesis is carried out in a manner correspondent to
the state of theological science at the time of its publication, in the Essay entitled
Wie könnte der grosse Menschenkenner Jesus einen Judas zum Lehrer der Menschheit
wählen? See Augusti’s Theologische Blätter, B. i. pp. 497-515. This is Daub’s conception of Judas in his Judas Ischarioth,
oder, über das Böse im Verhältniss zum Guten, Heidelberg 1816: See especially
No: I. pp. 16-20. Judas is there described as the evil which has utterly cast off
all humanity, as a devil in the flesh, who becomes the betrayer of the incarnate
God, and in whose (predestined) despair there was no stirring of good. Not quite
the same, yet similar is the view of Olshausen. See his Biblical Commentary,
vol. ii. p. 438 ff. (German ed.). The expression ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
The first of these views not only supposes that Jesus was deceived,
which is irreconcilable with the depth and acuteness of His penetration, but rests
also on a misconception of the true nature of moral development. In order to reach
the degree of evil at which we find Judas, its influence over him must have been
for a longer period growing stronger and stronger, and working its way into all
the parts, into the very tissue of his being. Had he entered into the fellowship
of Jesus with a predominant susceptibility to good impressions, the result would
have been different. Moreover (and this is decisive), this view clearly contradicts
the declaration of John,
The first two views being untenable, only the third remains for
our adoption. This has also its difficulties, but will be justified by the remarks
which follow. It was the destiny of Jesus, in His entire manifestation, to divide
the Divine from the ungodly, the good from the evil,—to awaken and quicken the one,
and to punish and spiritually overcome the other. Even whilst on earth, He thus
manifested and judged the hearts of men. In and through Him were the thoughts of
the heart to be revealed: He was to be for the rising again and the fall of many.
Either of the two results, considered in itself, might have followed in the case
of Judas. He was still a man, and, as such, capable of salvation: he might fall,
but he might too, like Peter, rise again—a ray of holy love might yet penetrate
his soul. That this would not take place, was not clearly to be foreseen; for evil,
being in its nature arbitrary, its development cannot be calculated with certainty.
Looking to the possibility of a change for the better, Jesus chose him. But by
an act of wickedness, which is at the bottom as incapable of rational explanation
as evil generally is, Judas hardened himself, even whilst in communion with the
purest goodness. Thus that Divine love which might have saved him, only worked his
destruction. And just as all evil must finally serve the good, so Judas, when the
process of hardening had once set in, was compelled to further the ends of Jesus.
In contrast to the purity of Jesus, he exhibited sin in all its abominableness;
and by bringing about the catastrophe of the death of Jesus, he helped on the accomplishment
of the work of redemption. Through him
But it is finally and almost triumphantly asked, Did not Jesus
Himself decline the predicate ‘good,’ and thereby deny His sinless
perfection? Did He not answer the young man who saluted Him as ‘Good Master,’
with the plain words which it is impossible to misunderstand, ‘Why callest thou
me good? there is none good but one, that is, God?’ See Strauss, Glaubensl. ii. 192; Fritzsche, Comment.
de ἀναμαρτ. Jesu, ii. 1, p. 7; and Pécaut in his above-named work, p. 268.
Among modern expositors the contrary view will be found advocated by J. Müller,
Lehre von der Sündl. i. 143, and Dorner, Sündl. Vollk. p. 12; also
Wimmer in the Theol. Studien und Kritiken, 1845, pp. 115-153.
The young man who accosted Him, believed, as the sequel shows,
that he had already fulfilled the whole law, and was under the delusion that in
this respect he lacked nothing. He wanted to learn from Jesus, as from a master
undoubtedly capable of instructing him, what exceptionally ‘good thing’ he must do
to obtain, besides the blessings promised by the
Undoubtedly there is a sense in which goodness can be attributed
to God alone, and another in which it may also be applied to man. The first is its
absolute sense; and that this is the sense which it bears in the passage in question,
is obvious so soon as the whole purport of the saying is considered. In this sense
God is good, as the eternally perfect and unimpeachably holy One who can be nothing
else but good Himself, and is at the same time the original source of all good in
others. But if Jesus, by this intimation, would As also Stier, among recent theologians, though he rather hints
at than expressly advances such a view, Reden Jesu, Pt. ii. p. 282. It is opposed not only to Such a τελείωσις
as is spoken of in
We have thus, we trust, solved all the graver difficulties offered
by particular occurrences. The instances derived from Pécaut, in his already frequently quoted work. For a review
of the whole treatise, see Waizsäcker in the Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. vi.
1, pp. 178, etc. Pécaut’s above-named work, Letter xvii. pp. 244, 247, etc. The same, pp. 241, 242. The same, Letter xvii. p. 237.
With regard to the difficulties offered by certain particulars,
we are certainly not of opinion that they are at once to be disposed of; on the
contrary, we have done our best to solve them. But even granting that neither the
explanations which we or others have offered should be found sufficient to obviate
all objections, does it follow that the sinlessness of Christ must be given up,
or even regarded as utterly problematic? By no means. For the sinless perfection
of our Lord is no individual view or sectarian tenet, no hobby of this or that theologian,
but the firm persuasion of all Christendom in every age,—a persuasion arising from
the overpowering impression produced by His whole life and character. A persuasion
of so universal a kind, and one
Our opponent repeatedly insists upon the axiom, E.g. p. 255, and often, besides, in individual instances.
WHEN the arguments against the actual sinlessness of Jesus, taken from matters of fact, are found to be inadequate, the possibility of sinlessness in the domain of human life may still be called in question. For if, indeed, such perfection were intrinsically impossible to human nature, it could not have been realized in the Lord Jesus, in so far as He shared that nature. Such an impossibility has been asserted, and reasons have been urged in support of it, which are partly drawn from experience, and partly from the nature of the moral idea, and the mode of its realization. The examination of the reasons of both kinds thus brought forward, is now, therefore, incumbent on us.
Sec. 1.—Arguments drawn from Experience.
In many cases, undoubtedly, the fruit of experience in connection
with the moral relations of life, is distrust of the purity of human virtue, and
unbelief in the existence of true goodness and greatness amongst men. The more earnestly
we examine the phenomena of human life around us, and the workings of our own hearts,
the harder is it to attain the conviction, that there ever did live one who was
wholly pure and perfect. Whithersoever our eyes are turned, we find concealed, under
a thousand captivating forms, vanity and ambition, the pursuit of possessions, power,
and enjoyment; malevolence and envy; and, above all, that evil of evils, selfishness,
which in the subtlest way creeps into volitions and acts of a nobler character.
Seldom does it fall to our lot to
But that acquaintance with man which leads to such a conclusion
really begins with the principle of mistrust and there must have been beforehand
an inclination to discover defects, and either not to pay attention to the good,
or to attribute it to bad motives. Besides, such a knowledge is proved to be spurious,
by the fact of its giving a result that tends to destroy our best powers, faith
and love, and that blights at the root all self-sacrificing effort for the welfare
of mankind. Moral scepticism, consistently carried out, possesses no firm
ground on which to base a moral judgment, and does in fact ultimately undermine
all those higher relations which rest upon such a judgment. Comp.
Reinhard’s
Moral Theol. iii. cap. 1, § 329.
It may, however, be further asked: Is it not a universal, indubitable truth, that the very nature of man renders it impossible
for him ever to be perfectly good? Does not experience show us that, to be
human at all, involves both sinfulness and actual sin? The question thus
started is of a very comprehensive nature; and we shall do well to examine, The difficulties which may be raised in this connection are most
fully expressed by De Wette in his Christliche Sittenlehre, Pt. i. pp. 182-193,
where the entire section on Christus der Heilige should be compared. De Wette
speaks more positively in regard to the sinlessness of Jesus in his work entitled
Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, § 53, p. 272 ff.
And, first, it has been urged that, ‘if we ascribe to Jesus
the possibility of sinning, we must also conceive of Him as subject to sinfulness
for sinfulness consists precisely in the possibility of sin, and not in the sum
of actually committed sins. Sinfulness implies necessarily a minimum of
sin, and therefore excludes absolute sinlessness.’ De Wette, Sittenlehre, Pt. p. 188.
It is a further question, whether, besides that possibility of
sin which we necessarily attribute to a personal being as such, there was
not in Jesus that bias towards evil which we term original sin? The answers given
to this question vary, Augustine calls it
difficultas boni in his earlier writings.
On the assumption of universal sinfulness among men, there
remains, therefore, no other way of accounting for the perfect purity of the
life of Jesus, than by supposing that a creative Divine influence was at work in
the origin of His personality. ’All individual life rests on an original and specifically
determined form of being, which points back to the Creator’ (Hale, Leben Jesu,
§ 32, p. 58). For a further carrying out of this proposition in relation to
the sinlessness of Jesus, see the Streitschriften, No. iii. pp. 105-109. Christ as the second Adam. Gess, Lehre von der Person
Chr. pp. 338, etc., defines the religious and moral disposition of Jesus as a natural
nobility of soul, ever powerfully attracting Him towards God and towards
good, yet by no means exempting Him either from temptation and conflict, or from
the necessity of ever fresh resolutions and self-denial.
It has been objected, and with greater apparent force, that in
this way we destroy the significance of the life of Jesus as an example to men.
If Jesus was in His origin free from sinful taint through special Divine influence,
and if He was endowed with new moral power by special Divine gift, He cannot be,
it is said, in respect of His moral perfection, a true, binding example to
those who are not similarly favoured. To this we reply: The doctrine that Christ
is an example for our imitation, must first of all be rightly understood. It evidently
does not refer to all that Jesus was and did. He had a work to perform of
an utterly unique kind, which, in its turn, required and assumed a unique personality.
In this work, none of course can imitate Him in such wise as to do a like work—as
to be a like person. He can only be Parallel, not identical. The differences are
well stated by Gess, Lehre von der Person Christi, pp. 339, etc.
Again, it is argued, that ’so far as the virtue of Jesus was
really human, there must have been a sensuous element De Wette, Sittenlehre, Th. i. p. 188. Compare Müller’s Lehre von der Sünde, i. 405 ff.; and
with special reference to the perfect holiness of Jesus, pp. 439-442. This is
beautifully unfolded in Sack’s Apologetik, second
ed. p. 207 ff.
Last of all, the objection has been raised from this side, that
‘the feeling of humility in Jesus must have arisen from a consciousness of the
imperfection and limitation of some De Wette, Sittenlehre, Th. i. p. 192.
Sec. 2.—Arguments drawn from the Nature of the Moral Idea.
In the last place, a word must be said on the position taken
with regard to the subject under consideration by modern speculative
criticism. The literature of this subject is well known. I therefore
merely mention, on the one side, Strauss’s Schlussabhandlung zum Leben Jesus and
the christological portion of his Glaubenslehre, especially pp. 153-240,
vol. ii.: on the other side, the essays of Alb. Schweizer on the Dignität des Religionstifters, in the Studien
und Kritiken, 1834; and on Strauss’s
Leben Jesu, also in the Studien und Kritiken, No. III. 1837; my own
treatises in the work Historisch oder Mythisch, Hamb. 1838; Fischer’s
Prüfung der Straussischen Glaubenslehre, Tüb. 1842, Heft ii. p. 10 ff.; and
De Wette’s Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, §§ 6 and 46.
Modern speculation does indeed leave to Jesus a certain residuum
of greatness, in virtue of which He was capable of being the ‘occasion’ of the
rise of a new faith. Yet this greatness is of an indefinite kind, and in no case
constitutes a specific distinction between Him and all other men. As a proof of
this equality, two maxims are brought forward which are evidently regarded as fundamental
axioms. One of these axioms is, ‘ that the first in a series of developments cannot
at the same time be the greatest;’ the other, ‘that it is not the manner
of the idea to realize itself in a single individual, but only in the sum-total
of individuals,—in the genus.’ If the first axiom held universally and necessarily
true, we should be driven to conclude that the moral greatness of Jesus did not
surpass the succeeding links of the chain of development realized in the Christian
world and
In both these propositions, individually considered, there
is a certain amount of truth; but in the application made of them to the founder
of Christianity, we find but another exemplification of the erroneous tendency of
modern speculation to merge the particular in the general, the concrete in the abstract; and this tendency we cannot but decidedly oppose. It is perfectly correct to say
that in certain spheres of life the first in a series of developments is not at
the same time the most perfect,—the commencement is not also the fulfilment.
But it is no less true that in other spheres the first of a series must be
also the highest, as certainly as that there would be no development at all were
it otherwise. For our present purpose, we shall distinguish between the spheres
of science, of art, and of the moral and religious life. In the first department,
all is dependent on the range of knowledge; in the second, on the inventive intuition
of genius, and the distinctive capacity to give shape and form to that which is
imagined; in the third, on the entire inner life, in so far as it takes
up a special position to things human and Divine. Knowledge is by nature
progressive, because, on the one hand, it is dependent on experience, whose circle is widened
only gradually, and by the co-operation of many; and, on the other hand, because
it is based on processes of thought, which become ever deeper in their course. Consequently,
if this progress goes on unimpeded, the later inquirer ordinarily surpasses the
earlier. Here the axiom mentioned previously, holds good as a general rule.
It is not possible that one man
A speculative system which treats religion as a mode and
branch of knowledge, and considers it, in contrast with philosophy, but an imperfect,
elementary, childish knowledge, may find it very natural to conceive of piety as
gradually progressing from a lower to a higher state (like all things else),
and may consequently be unable to consider the founder of a religion as even relatively
the greatest, for he is in its view only the occasion of its existence. But it is
quite incredible that such should be the actual state of the case, because religion
is not mere knowledge, and therefore its development is governed by totally different
laws from those which hold good in the case of science. In one aspect, undoubtedly,
religion may be classed as knowledge; that is, so far as it is a doctrinal system.
On this side, religion may undergo a development through the co-operation of many. This is the domain of theological science, and in it the later may far surpass
the earlier. But surely the more recent theological science is generally acknowledged
to have gained at least one step,—to have established the principle, that
Still Jesus might, as the founder of Christianity, have been
the greatest within the Christian community, without being therefore absolutely
perfect. We may admit that He is an example, without absolutely regarding Him as
our prototype. Against the latter criticism urges, that ‘it is not the manner of
the idea to realize itself in one individual, and grudgingly to deny itself
to the rest; it realizes itself in the totality of individuals, in the
race. Consequently, where an individual is represented to be the absolute
embodiment of the idea, there is a transference to it of that
In connection, however, with the question as to the realization
of the moral idea, everything will depend on the way in which we define the idea
of humanity. The idea of humanity does not relate to any special sphere, such as
that of science, or art, or political wisdom; nor can be said to have attained
its realization in the perfection of any endowment which belongs exclusively to
one of these spheres. The idea of humanity comprises in itself that which all men,
as men, are bound to accomplish,—that for the performance of which, each, apart
from his special talents, is endowed with the requisite capacities,—that which may
be described as the universal task,—the task which all men, as such, are bound to
accomplish, whatever other powers or gifts may have fallen to their
The fundamental thought ever firmly embraced by modern criticism
is, that the idea is by no means a something lying beyond actuality,—a mere ‘ought,’—but that it necessarily enters into real existence. This is, moreover, equally the
result of our conviction, that the idea of man, which we recognise as Divine, but
which we can only regard in God as creative, would, if it remained unrealized, be
but empty and unreal. For if the idea. of man originated with God, and if man must
therefore have been conceived of as perfect, as fulfilling, and not in conflict
with, his destiny,—if, moreover, we are necessitated to ascribe reality to the thoughts
of God,—we must assume that the Divine idea of man will in some way, and at some
time, arrive at realization. But where is the realization to be met with? Modern
speculation points us to the race, to the totality of human individuals forming
a complement to each other. But from this standpoint, though original sin is denied,
it is confessed that, taken together, we are sinful and imperfect beings. Strauss, Glaubenslehre, B.
ii. p. 184. Julius Müller remarks very justly, in his Christian Doctrine
of Sin, i. 265, that ‘the moral idea demands complete realization—a realization
that embraces all its fundamental aspects—in the life of the individual: it endures
no division of the task; it does not allow one person to limit himself to the exercise
of one virtue, and to leave to others to supplement him by the cultivation of the
other virtues. It is one of the most flagitious attacks on the majesty of the moral
idea, to refer its claims to a reciprocal compensation of men, which shall
make up for the shortcomings of one by the virtues of the rest.’ Schaff (On the
Moral Character of Christ, p. 52) observes, that the realization of the idea
in an individual is no more contradictory than its realization in the
race,—that, on the other hand, what is true in the idea must necessarily be
realized in individual life, and that all history points to such realization.’
In maintaining that the idea bestows itself in its fulness on
one individual,—a thing which we find, at all events, to be approximatively the
fact in all departments, and specially in art,—we are far from implying that it
is for this reason niggardly towards all other individuals: we mean, in
truth, just the reverse. That special bestowment on one, is the commencement of
the historical process by means of which alone it is possible for all the rest to
become participators. It is eminently requisite that the idea should be realized
in an individual, when a perfect manifestation of God is to be made, when a perfect
atonement and deliverance are to be effected, and, by means of both, a perfect religion
is to be
IF it is clearly established, in opposition to all the objections
which have been raised, that Jesus Christ led on earth a life of sinless perfection,
such a fact, being a realization of that which is best and highest in the sphere
of human life, must be admitted to be in itself of incomparable importance. At the
same time, however, this fact—as has been already hinted in the Introduction—is
so constituted, that we cannot, as in the case of other extraordinary phenomena,
stop at its simple admission. On the contrary, we shall find ourselves compelled
to look both backwards and forwards from this point, and thus to reflect on its
hidden reasons and connection. It will then quickly appear that we have here to
do with a phenomenon of the most far reaching and widely influencing significance. Dorner treats on the importance of the sinlessness of Christ
in Christian apologetics, in his already so frequently quoted work, § 4, pp. 49-58.
He well shows that, in proving the Divine authority of Christianity in these days,
more stress is to be laid upon the miracle of love, manifested in the moral
character of Christ, than in those miracles of power which have hitherto
been more appealed to for this purpose, because the special and most essential nature
of God is to be found rather in His holy love than in His omnipotence. But,
true as all is which he advances from this point of view, it is to be regretted
that the author should in this section have stopped at general allusions, instead
of going into details.
We started from the point, that perfect religion and the work
of salvation could only be conceived of as personally effected, and that by a person
who should be himself in perfect union with God, and therefore absolutely perfect.
Hence we inferred that if a person proved to be thus absolutely perfect should really
appear in the midst of the sinful human race, there would be every reason to believe
that, in and through him, the perfect religion would have been manifested in a personal
form, and the foundation laid for the salvation of mankind in all ages. We have
now to apply this to Christ and His work. And in doing so, we shall naturally direct
attention, first, to the Person of Christ, independently considered, and then to
the position He occupies towards mankind. With regard to the first point, we shall
have to show what are those inevitable inferences from the sinless holiness of Christ,
which exhibit Him in all respects as One in whom the relation of man to God and
of God to man, and therefore the religious life in all its purity, fulness, and
power,
JESUS CHRIST, viewed simply as a sinless and holy being, is undoubtedly
a phenomenon of extreme significance, and must be admitted, on this account alone,
to be invested with incomparable dignity and unimpeachable majesty. The immeasurable pre-eminence of Jesus, as the absolutely perfect
One, is shown especially in the fact that no delineation of His life and character
can possibly exhaust its subject, and that His moral greatness does but appear the
more exalted in proportion to the elevation attained in a moral sense by him who
contemplates it. It might be said that, in this case, as in that of lofty mountains,
the whole altitude is not apparent until the observer stands upon an opposite height.
The comparison, however, fails, because it deals with an elevation which, after
all, it is possible to attain and to measure while the moral eminence of Jesus,
on the contrary, is a height ever unattainable by us. The absolute and majestic pre-eminence of the morals phenomenon presented by the
life of Christ, as bearing on it the direct impress of the Divine, has been well
brought forward by Ph. A. Stapfer in his Versuch eines Beweises der göttlichen
Sendung and Würde Jesu aus seinem Charakter, Bern 1797, rendered into French
in Vinet’s Mélanges Philosophiques par Stapfer, Paris 1844, vol. ii. pp.
464-514: see especially pp. 467 and 493-95. To the two sublimities asserted by Kant,
viz. the starry heavens above, and the moral law within us, Stapfer
beautifully adds a third, viz. the fulfilment of the moral law without us,
in the Person of Jesus Christ (p. 494, note 1). I would also refer the reader to
Dandiran sur la Divinité du Caractère Moral de Jesus Christ, Geneva 1850.
It must be always in a measure detrimental, in the case of a personality of essential unity, to represent it according to the several elements of which it is composed. The impression of dismemberment thus given is at variance with that organic connection with a common centre which really exists. And yet it is only by viewing an object, first in one, then in another, of its individual aspects, that we arrive at a comprehension of the whole. This method, then, must be pursued even in our contemplation of the Person of Jesus Christ, yet in such wise as to maintain our consciousness of the ever vital connection existing between its separate components. In this sense, but in this sense only, do we propose to contemplate, each by itself, the different sides of His Person, for the purpose of considering what light is thrown upon it by His sinless perfection. Our remarks, then, as is self-evident, will relate to those two chief sides of His nature, according to which our whole subject is divided,—to the human and the Divine, the Son of Man and the Son of God.
Sec. 1.—The Human Nature of Jesus.
As we have seen at an earlier stage of our inquiry, although
sin has its true home, its central abode in the will, yet it is not limited to this
sphere of our being. On the contrary, the whole spiritual and physical life of man,
though in varying
This applies first to intellectual knowledge in matters which concern religion and morality. Such knowledge is not indeed the sole, nay, not even the highest and most prolific, element in the religious life; and yet it forms so essential a component thereof, that the existence of perfect religion in general is inconceivable apart from it. On the other hand, if the sinless perfection of any one person is proved, this will be the most valid and direct guarantee that he is possessed also of perfect and complete knowledge in the spheres of religion and morality.
In this sense, above all, does Jesus express Himself. Even when
speaking in general terms, He ever combines the knowledge of Divine truth with the
moral condition. It is in the Sermon on the Mount Compare
the discussions of this subject in Stier’s Reden Jesu, Pt. iv. pp. 427,
310; and Gess’s Lehre von der Person Chr. pp. 364-372.
The infallibility which the Lord Jesus thus simply claims in
this concise but forcible manner, follows also from the very nature of the mental
faculties. The human mind, however psychology may divide its powers
and activities, is not really separated into different departments. It is absolutely
one mind, though manifesting itself in various manners, and exerting Hase defines ‘infallibility’ as the other side of religious
perfection, with respect to the possession and communication of knowledge (Leben
Jesu, § 32). Comp. Schleiermacher’s Dogmatik, ii. 223, and his fourth
Festpredigt.
That Jesus was fully conscious of possessing such infallible
knowledge of things religious and moral, is obvious from the very manner of His
teaching. We read in the Gospels that ‘He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes;
The teaching of Jesus was no delivery of lectures on the general
truths of religion and morality, but the living testimony of facts and realities.
The fact that the kingdom of God had already come, its nature, constitution, and
future prospects, and, above all, His own position therein as its Head and King,
as He in whom the Father was to be glorified, and
That which has been advanced is not, however, important with regard only to the intellectual side, but is equally applicable to the emotional and imaginative powers, nay, even to the physical basis of life, to the whole man in general. In all these respects, sin, on the one hand, proceeds from a spurious excitement which both disturbs and destroys the true unity of life, and, on the other, begets such an excitement in an aggravated form. With sinlessness, on the contrary, an entirely opposite process takes place. We cannot conceive of sinlessness otherwise than in conjunction with a simple and harmonious movement of the feelings, with a pure and spotless activity of the imagination, and with a condition of physical life in which the spirit that rules the whole man finds its appropriate expression, and a well-ordered and sufficient instrument, for the execution of its higher aims and purposes. It will. be, moreover, wherever it exists, the foundation for an undisturbed and healthy development of the life in all these aspects. Sinless perfection can only grow from a life whose whole condition, and all whose functions are in every respect pure. Of such a life it is the noblest fruit. And while it is thus the natural result of such a state, it becomes again, in its turn, the power which maintains the entire life in health and purity.
It was precisely this which was exemplified in the historical
manifestation of Him whom we know as the only
Such, too, was the case with respect to everything belonging
to the sphere of the imagination. We perceive from His discourses how truly
and clearly He had stored up in His mind the phenomena of nature, and the various
conditions of human life and how all these were at His command for the freest and
most varied use. Comp. Keim, menschl. Entwickelung Jesu, p. 13. Weisse, the author of the Reden
über die Zukeruft der evang.
Kirche, p. 220, strikingly remarks, that ‘to the moral sinlessness of the
Saviour there is a correspondent equally inborn aesthetic spotlessness in His
manifestation; and the moral greatness of His nature is reflected in the exalted
beauty both of the thoughts He uttered, and of the expressions He employed, to
convey the fulness of His meaning,—expressions which seemed on every occasion,
and with ever equal force, to be always at His command.’
History offers but very little in the shape of fact, to enable
us to say anything definite concerning the physical condition and appearance of
Jesus. Hence arose the possibility that very different, and indeed opposite, views
could be entertained on the subject at an early period of Church history. One of
these views maintained the perfect beauty of His external The former by
Thus in Jesus, the sinless One, we have, in every respect, the model of a perfect man. And that designation, ‘Son of Man,’ which He so often applied to Himself, though used chiefly in another sense and with reference to His Messianic office, may yet most rightly be bestowed upon Jesus, as expressing also, that in Him all that was truly human was as clearly impressed as was necessary, if the Divine favour were to rest upon Him, and if a type and example of the true position of man with respect to God were to be given. The sinless and perfect Jesus was the Son of Man, bearing every feature of humanity, but imparting thereto a Divine glory; enduring every human sorrow, but rising superior to all; entering into the very depths of human weakness, yet elevating human nature to a height far surpassing its native powers.
Besides these general features of His human nature, there is another and special feature inseparable from His whole agency and manifestation, which we must not omit to bring forward. This characteristic is one which is not only of the greatest importance in a general point of view, but which, when contemplated from that of His sinless perfection, becomes specially significant, and has much light thrown upon it. We mean the miraculous element in the manifestation of Jesus, upon which we now propose to add a few words.
The miraculous feature running through the whole manifestation
The appearance of one sinlessly perfect in the midst of a sinful
race is itself a miracle. For thus the continuity of that sin which is everywhere
perceptible is broken through, and a new beginning, a perfectly original creation,
introduced. And if the essence of a miracle be the appearance, in the ordinary course
of nature or history, of something totally new, which can only be referred to a
Divine causality, such a feature is found in this instance in its full completeness.
Nay, we may even call this appearance the supreme miracle—the miracle of
miracles. The poet V. Zedlitz is said a short time before his death to
have uttered these significant words: ‘One might have thought that the miracle
of miracles was to have created the world, such as it is; yet it is a far greater
miracle to lead a perfectly pure life therein.’ At all events, one perfectly sinless
is as great a miracle in the moral, as one risen from the dead is in the physical
world. Comp. Orelli, Kampf des .Rationalismus mit dem Supernaturalismus,
p. 26. See a further discussion by Doedes, Dissert. de Jesu in
vitam reditu, Utrecht 1841, p. 192. Comp. also Reich, die Auferstehung des
Herrn ale Heilsthatsache, Darmstadt 1845; especially pp. 208-270.
But what has been said applies also to the miracles which Jesus
performed on others. Sinless holiness naturally presupposes a freedom and power
of will, a purity and fulness of vital energy, in virtue of which we should infer
in Him Comp. my letter to Strauss in my work, Historisch oder Mythisch? pp. 135, etc.
The sinless nature of Jesus was at the same time the source of
His perfectly consistent use of miraculous power. In this respect, also, it was
holy love which ever determined Him; and this quality is so clearly impressed upon
His miracles, that even if no other tokens thereof were bestowed upon us, we might
in these alone recognise its distinctive characteristics. Here, too, as everywhere,
Jesus was the merciful, condescending, and self-sacrificing Saviour, untiring in
His offices of love to the meanest and most wretched, even when of ten that were
healed, one only showed any gratitude.
These are the chief points in which the sinlessness of Jesus affects His personality, viewed on its human side. In this aspect He shows Himself to be, in all respects, and especially in His position towards God, a perfect man, who being in His ow% inner nature a miracle, is also surrounded by the miraculous, whether in the deeds which He wrought, or in the lot which He submitted to. But it is this perfect man, thus gifted with miraculous powers, who, in the most decided manner, directs us to something beyond Himself—something still higher in His own Person: hence this Jesus cannot be the perfect Son of Man, unless He is also, what He declares Himself to be, the Son of God. It is in this sense that we now proceed to consider the sinlessness of Jesus with respect to His Divine nature.
Sec. 2.—Inferences in respect to the Divine Nature of Jesus.
The Christian Church, in all its genuine branches, confesses
and teaches, besides the true humanity, the proper Divinity of Christ, and
has from its earliest days laid down, in very definite formulae, the manner in which
the Divine and human natures are inseparably united, and yet distinct, in the Person
of the God-man. To test these formulae, or even to enter into any general examination
of them, is beside our purpose, which aims rather at an apologetic than a
Besides, it is no less certain to all unprejudiced minds, that
He ascribes to Himself in plain terms, besides human existence, a nature
superhuman, heavenly, and Divine. And this not only in sayings recorded
in St. John’s Gospel, but
What, then, is the relation between this self-testimony of Jesus
and the doctrine of His sinlessness? Evidently this: that if there are good grounds
for accepting the latter, there must be equally good grounds for believing the former.
The two must stand or fall together. He who was perfectly pure
Nevertheless, in this respect also, it is not our purpose to appeal to the expressions Christ Himself as our sole authority. Here, too, the doctrine of His sinlessness furnishes an internal proof of the doctrine in question, which, in an apologetic point of view, must be by no means overlooked.
In our contemplation of the moral phenomenon presented by the
life of Jesus, we saw that there was everywhere originality and absolute independence,
that it exhibited a harmony in which all the antagonisms of human existence were
reconciled. A life of such perfection gives a direct impression of
But to say this, might seem to be affirming a principle of gradation,
which might in its application to the Lord Jesus exhibit Him as merely possessing
in the highest degree that which others shared in their measure. We perceive, however,
in Him something besides, and that a thing entirely peculiar,—even the grand
peculiarity of His sinless holiness. Others may be found truly pious, glowing
with holy love, and in whom, therefore, God’s more abundant presence must
be assumed; but we do not meet with one who is sinless,—one who, absolutely conscious
of His sinlessness, succeeds in making Himself acknowledged as such,—however carefully we may scan the boundless field opened before us by the history
of the known races of men. An explanation, then, of this absolutely unparalleled
phenomenon Pelagianism denies that Jesus was an utter exception in a moral
point of view. It is therefore driven to maintain that it is possible for other
men to be sinless. If it was possible for Jesus in His human nature to remain
sinless, it must also be possible for others, inasmuch as, according to the
Pelagian doctrine, all men enter life with their moral powers in perfect
integrity. Even if Christ were the only example of sinless perfection hitherto
seen, there is no reason why there may not arise another like Him in the course
of time. This particular view is connected with the entire Pelagian conception
of Christianity, in which the idea of the Redeemer is left quite in the
background, and example and doctrine alone are considered to be essential. Along
with Pelagianism, Nestorianisin has been reproached with holding the same view:
this was so, at all events, in the West, where it was supposed to be connected
with Pelagianism. It was argued, that if the Divine and human natures are
distinct, and holiness and sinlessness are regarded as the privilege only of the
human nature, it follows that other men may attain the same moral elevation,
without special communion with God. Compare Gieseler’s Ecclesiastical History, Pt. i. § 86, especially
the Observ. p. 447. This was, however, an inference from his doctrine, which Nestorius
would never have conceded; for he did not in reality maintain such a separation
of the Divine and human, and the presence of such a complete moral power in human
nature in its present condition, as that deduction presupposes. It is a remarkable
fact, that a renowned teacher of the ancient Church, the father of orthodoxy, Athanasius,
seems, although from an utterly different point of view, to assume the sinlessness
of other human individuals besides Jesus. He says not only generally,
ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐκ ἦν κακία· οὐδὲ
γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐστίν, οὐδ᾽ ὅλοις κατ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει
αὕτη (Contra Gentes, ab init. t.
i. p. 2, edit. Colon), but also, developing the
thought with greater specialty, he observes further, that the character of the Divine
image, of the Divine Sonship in Christ, cannot consist merely in moral unity with
God, because in that case other spiritual beings also, and especially liken, might
be designated sons of God: hence the peculiarity of Christ must rest rather on
His oneness of nature with God. In the sense of moral unity with God, he adds, patriarchs
and prophets, apostles and martyrs, and even Christians now living, might be called
the sons of God; for they resemble God, and are compassionate, like their Father
in heaven,—they are imitators of the Apostle Paul, as he imitated Christ (Contra
Arianos, Orat. iv. t. i. p. 455, and especially pp. 462, 463, edit. Colon). Still
we cannot with perfect certainty conclude from these expressions that Athanasius
distinctly held the view that other individuals were sinless besides Jesus. In the
first passage, it is to be remarked that the word κακία
is too general and indefinite. In the other passages Athanasius avails himself
of the thought of a repeatedly occurring moral perfection, only to strengthen
another doctrinal line of argument; and it
is doubtful with what degree of definiteness, and to what extent, this notion was
applied by its author.
By viewing sinlessness as an attribute of the human nature of Jesus, we have maintained the notion that a human development characterized by perfect purity is possible, because neither human nature, considered simply as such, nor the idea of development, necessarily involves any element of sin. But then the question arises: If this be the case, how comes it that experience furnishes only one example of freedom from sin? Why have not others of the human race risen up from time to time, making the same claim, and compelling their fellow-men to acknowledge their pretensions? Why is there not at least one besides Jesus, who had the same faith in himself, and was able to beget it in others? This cannot be the result of accident. The reason must be, that sinlessness, though not unattainable by human nature, as such, is not, neither has been, nor can be, attained by man in his present state, because sin has gained a mastery over the whole human race, by virtue of which it is not possible for man, by his own unaided powers, to maintain a perfect freedom therefrom. But if man’s own strength is not sufficient for this, it can only be effected by a power which is exalted above the sphere where sin prevails, and which, notwithstanding, enters into that sphere without contracting defilement; and this is precisely the Divine power. Consequently, when we meet with a man who has actually proved himself sinless in his conduct, we have grounds for inferring that a Divine power has in the fullest sense been operating within him,—that here is one who was indeed man, but who was also more than man.
But this point must now be more fully elucidated. If all men
are sinners,—and, with the exception of the Holy One of the Gospel, not even one
is sinless,—it is a plain proof that a principle of sin, is implanted in human nature, not indeed by original constitution,
but, certainly in its present state, that sin, although not the true, is still the second nature of man,
But the moral development and office of this second Adam evidently
differ from those of the physical ancestor of the human race. He was not, like the
latter, introduced in a state of full consciousness into a world as yet untouched
by sin, but was born as an unconscious infant into a world in. which sin had already
become a power. In this world He was not, for His own sake alone, to preserve in
its purity the yet unspotted Divine image, but to restore to mankind, by
His conquest of sin, that image which had been lost or obscured. In the same proportion
as the task set before Him was incomparably higher, was the difficulty of accomplishing
it infinitely greater. This difficulty lay chiefly herein: that a human life
was to be developed in perfect purity from its very earliest stages, and
that, nevertheless, this development could only take place in the midst of a sinful.
world. If the soul had entered at once into conscious possession of its freedom,
it might have been capable of directly waging war against all that was carnal and
sinful, and of Comp. Gess, Lehre von der Person Chr. pp. 229, 239. What has been advanced, must not, as is self-evident, be so
understood as to make the Divinity of Christ a mere auxiliary proposition to the
conceivability of His sinlessness. For axis would be to place that which should
fill the highest place in a subordinate position. Our purpose is only to show
how the sinlessness of Jesus points from itself to His Divinity. We may with
equal correctness say, because God was in Christ, Christ was free from sin; or,
because He was sinless, we have grounds for believing that God was in Him. The
first proposition pertains more to the doctrinal, the second to the apologetic
point of view; and since it is with this that we are here concerned, the latter
naturally occupies the more prominent position. For the manner in which the
results deduced from the development of the doctrinal side of the question
coincide with those to which we are led, see Liebner’s Dogmatik aus dem Christolog.
Princip dargestellt, B. i. pp. 291-352.
Summing up all together, we may say then, Jesus was sinless as
a man, for the idea of sinlessness is only applicable to human nature; not, however,
in the general sense of the term, man, not, in short, as a ‘mere man,’ but as
the man, in whom the humanity was on the one hand endowed with extraordinary
powers, and on the other hand was pervaded, animated, and energized by a Divine
principle. In a word, He was sinless, because He was the second Adam, and the
Such are the inferences with respect to the Person of Jesus resulting from His sinlessness. The peculiarity of His moral character and conduct in the midst of a sinful world, testify, as well as His own assertions, that in Him we have to recognise a Person in whom God and man are entirely one;—a Person, therefore, who on one side as much commands our reverent adoration, as on the other He stands before us as the pattern of a perfect life in and before God. That the last and highest stage—so far as the personal realization of the perfect religion is concerned—is thus attained, is self-evident; for in this respect nothing can surpass the indwelling of God in human nature undisturbed by sin, and a human life passed in the spotless purity resulting from union with God, and terminated by an act of supreme self-sacrifice.
The question, however, which now arises, is, how far—if Christianity is proved to be the perfect religion—did this Person furnish and accomplish all the conditions essential to the true and eternal salvation of the sinful human race? In this respect also, as we shall proceed to show, most important conclusions may be deduced from the sinlessness of Jesus.
IT is obvious that a personality constituted as we have seen the Lord Jesus to be, must have a significance for the entire human race. It is as evident that this significance must be sought in that point in which the being and nature of such a personality is most essentially comprised and concentrated. Now the earthly. life of Jesus, from its commencement to its close, the purpose to which it was entirely devoted, was to make the true relation to God and to His fellow-men a living reality. Hence, too, His life-task, and the aim of all His outward acts, was to bring men in this highest of all respects into their right position, and thus to found their true, their imperishable happiness on God, the source of all life and blessedness.
This, however, was to be accomplished, not in a race in whom
the Divine image was still pure and unobscured,—the moral power, vigorous and unscathed.
It was to be effected in one in which sin had attained a supremacy, which had eclipsed
the image and the knowledge of God, in which the true fellowship with God had been
destroyed, the moral powers enslaved, and a principle of discord and ruin introduced
even into the relations between man and man. Hence what was needed could not be
merely to give greater firmness and stability to a bond of Divine fellowship already
in existence, and to cherish and render still more energetic a life already based
on such communion. The question, on the contrary, was to form afresh the bond which
sin had destroyed,—to plant anew, in the midst of a sinful condition, an entirely
new life. The question was to bring about a re-union with
If it be then asked what was needed for the purpose of bringing
the human race, which through sin had become estranged from God, and at variance
among themselves, into saving fellowship with God, and of laying in that race the
foundation of a truly satisfactory state of life, the reply, if it is to be at once
complete and particular, must embrace the whole work and scheme of salvation. We
may, however, reduce that which falls within our present aim to a few general essential
features. These seem to us to be the following: first, the revelation of the will
of God to all men, so far as this is necessary for their salvation (knowledge of
the method of salvation); secondly, the removal of all that separates the sinner
from God, and the establishment, in its place, of a new life of fellowship with
God (atonement and redemption); thirdly, the institution, upon this foundation,
of a community whose aim and purpose should be wholly of a religious and moral character,—a
community of fosterers
We shall now proceed to consider Him in each of these several aspects.
Sec. 1.—The Sinless Jesus as the personal Revelation of God.
Sinlessness, in the case of Him to whom it cannot but be
conceded, is of itself a powerful guarantee of perfection, both in the knowledge
of things Divine and moral, and in the doctrine arising therefrom. Sinless
perfection and religious infallibility mutually condition each other; and Jesus
Himself appeals, as we have seen, in proof that He spoke the truth, and that His
doctrine was not His own, but His that sent Him, to the impossibility of
convicting Him of sin, and to the fact that He did at all times such things as
were pleasing to the Father.
But doctrine, simply as such, is not revelation. It is,
indeed, a component, but only a deduced and secondary part of revelation, and
everywhere presupposes—but most especially in Christianity—a more primitive and
more comprehensive whole,—a series of actual Divine announcements. Doctrine,
at best, can but tell us what we ought to think of God: from revelation, on the
contrary, if we regard the term in its full meaning, we expect that it should
show us what He is,—that it should manifest His nature. Without needing to itdduce
evidence, revelation will of its very nature be itself the strongest actual proof
of the Divine existence and government, by bringing the God of whom it is the witness
and lively image as near to our soul as is possible,. and above all by disclosing
to us His very nature, and making it an object of contemplation. In this sense,
that alone can be a perfect revelation which is accomplished by means of the totality
of a personal life. For God Himself, as the infinitely perfect, self-conscious Spirit,
is essentially a person; and the true relation of created spirits to Him cannot
be otherwise conceived of than as that of person to person. Hence that manifestation
of God to man which completes all revelation, in which both the relation of God
to man and of man to God is perfectly realized, must have that same form which we
recognise as the highest form of life, viz. the personal. Only in this form can
the fulness of the Divine Spirit and the Divine love suitably manifest the whole
sum of those qualities which, in a moral sense, constitute the nature of God. Only
thus can God draw so near to man, that he, according to the measure of his capacity,
may become a partaker of Him. Only thus can the true relation of man to God be expressed
by an, actual and genuine life, and a restorative, creative, vital power be implanted
in the history of mankind in such wise that, from henceforth, the higher life of
man may be renewed and
It is in this sense that Jesus is the revelation of God. It is
He Himself that is this revelation, both in His own Person and in the totality of
all that proceeded therefrom, whether in word or deed, of all the suffering and
the glory, the humiliation and the exaltation, that was accomplished therein. It
is thus that He represents Himself. He says,
We have, moreover, this revelation of God in a personal life
in Jesus, inasmuch as He was sinlessly perfect. His whole life breathes of God,
is rooted in God, is inexplicable apart. from God. There is not, nor can there possibly
be, a stronger evidence of the existence and government of God than such a life.
If God is not to be seen and felt here, where, we may ask, is He to be found? But
that He is to be found by, and that He is the rewarder of, them that seek Him, is
told us by every word and act of the Lord Jesus, and is powerfully declared by His
whole manifestation, in which the reality of a higher and a heavenly order of things
is so overwhelmingly evident. And not only does the existence of God become a certainty
through Him, but He is also the means of disclosing the nature of God, and that—as
is indeed demanded by the very notion of revelation—under an entirely new aspect,
an aspect which had not as yet become an all-pervading consciousness. Hitherto the
power, the glory, the unapproachable dignity of God had been clearly perceived,
while but a faint and distant idea of His grace had been entertained. But now, in
the sinless Jesus, who died for a sinful world, in the only begotten of the Father,
full of grace and truth,’ that which constitutes the essential nature of God,—that
which, as has been aptly said, is mast God-like in God, even His holy love, His
preventing, sin-forgiving, death-conquering, and life-giving grace, Compare Dorner,
Jesu Sündl. Volk. p. 57, and the fourth
section generally.
But a revelation of God concerns itself not merely with His nature, but also with His will. In this aspect it is still more apparent how Jesus the sinless One was the personal revelation of God to humanity. Looking at the moral side, we find that two conditions absolutely require to be complied with, if sinners—and all men are sinners—are to become well-pleasing in the sight of God. In the first place, they must be brought to know their sin, and to repent of it in their inmost soul; and further, the good must be set before their minds in its whole compass by means of a living and powerful example. Both these things—self-abasing knowledge of sin, and quickening knowledge of good—are effected in an incomparably excellent way by the manifestation of holy life given us in Jesus; and this manifestation is a moral revelation of God, because its true foundation is in Him.
Without doubt, even the moral law, both in its positive and in
its unwritten form in the conscience, produced knowledge of sin, and sorrow
on account of it. But evidently mere knowledge of and sorrow for sin in themselves
are not all,—everything depends on their purity and depth; and Martensen’s Dogmatik, § 109, p. 233.
The knowledge of sin may always be measured by the knowledge of good. The more complete and certain the latter, the truer and deeper the former. Now it is unquestionable that no law is able to communicate so sure and full a knowledge of good, as the life of one truly holy in all relations and circumstances. Conscience, when tenderly cherished and cultivated, does indeed speak with great certainty, but it is never infallible. It takes its tone in part from our own inward state it is itself entangled in that web of sin which is thrown around our whole being; and, as a thousand instances prove, it may go astray, it may even fall into a state of most fearful blindness, if it is not guided and enlightened by an external standard clearly held before it. The positive law, being more fixed and definite, is of course surer than the law in the conscience, but both lack that living completeness which is necessary for giving true knowledge of the good. They stand above and outside of our life: the commands they issue are abstract and general. Even the law as we find it in the Old Testament does not present the standard of good in its greatest perfection, not in the whole depth of its free inwardness. These defects are all overcome and supplied in the holy and sinless life of Jesus. There we have a sure standard. His life is conscience outwardly realized. We find there a perfection of good as to principle, and a carrying of it out in action, in all relations, which can never be surpassed. Consequently, in the presence of this exemplification of holy life, an entirely different knowledge of sin is awakened,—a knowledge much purer, deeper, more certain and complete, than any which arises from mere law.
That which thus holds true with respect to the knowledge of sin,
is equally true as regards sorrow for sin. ‘ Is it not Words of Nitzsch in the Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1852, No. X.
p. 81.
More important still, however, is the positive side. Not
only was the whole strength of sin laid bare, but man was made also to see and feel
the whole purity and fulness of life possessed by the good; for how could he be
brought to the determination of making goodness the substance and aim of his life,
unless he saw its beauty and loveliness? It is not of For references as to particulars, see Rothe’s work on the
Berechtigung der Sinnlichkeit nach Aristoteles, Studien und Kritiken,
1850, 2, p. 265 ff. and Schaubach’s das Verhältniss der Moral des class. Alterthums
zur Christlichen, likewise in the Studien und Kritiken, 1851,
1, p. 59 ff. ’Christology
must no longer be merely a chapter in dogmatics, but must take its place also as
a chapter in ethics.’ So speaks Ackermann in a beautiful review of Harless’s Christliche Ethik,
in Reuter’s Repertorium, 1852, 4,
p. 39. We may even speak still more strongly: not only must Christology become
one chapter, but the fundamental principle, of ethics. Christ is as
truly the principle of the moral, as of the religious revelation. Compare
De Wette, Lehrbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre, Berlin 1853, §§ 3, 41-52.
This ideal has been set before us in the Person of Jesus, in Him who was the sinless One, who, because He lived only in God, was not merely a perfectly righteous man, but also manifested a love which proclaimed itself Divine by its holy earnestness and unbounded devotion. He is man, as God would have Him be, and therefore is He also the full and living expression of the Divine will to humanity. In Him, the Son full of grace and truth, has the Sun of Righteousness arisen upon man; in His light it is that we first see light, even in a moral sense, in its full brightness.
The presence of such a distinct, fixed, and elevated standard
must unquestionably be of infinite value for the moral development of humanity.
The significance of the matter becomes still greater, when we consider the mode
and circumstances
There is a further superiority, also, of this realization in
Jesus, that it has both an all-inclusive and a universally intelligible character.
The image of goodness in Jesus, we say, is all-comprehensive. It exhibits
before us that which is true and universal in human nature under the very conditions
to which every man is subject, in the relations of individuality, of race, of family,
and of nationality, and is therefore sufficient for all, however situated as to
these conditions of life. Compare what is said, pp. 51-55, with regard to the universality
of the moral character of Jesus.
Sec. 2. The Sinless Jesus as the Mediator between God and Sinful Man.
Although the revelation of the nature and will of God form an
essential part of the scheme of salvation, yet it is evident that by it alone man
cannot be saved. The relation of man to God is not merely one of intellect to intellect,—it
is a relation of person to person, and embraces the whole life. And the more so,
since the matter here in question concerns the position which the creature occupies
with reference to
In Him, the Son of God, who is one with the Father, we recognise not merely a typical and symbolical representation, but an actual realization and communication of the holy love and saving grace of God. All that He was, all that He did and suffered, had the joint purpose of bringing back sinful man into fellowship with God, of bestowing upon him Divine grace, and of bringing about a true reconciliation between him and the holy God. His sufferings and His death, which form the consummation of His whole life of self-sacrifice, occupy so special a position in this respect, that our attention must be more particularly directed to them.
And, first, Jesus Himself attributes to His death and sufferings
the utmost importance in this respect. In His view, His death was an essential element
of the Divine counsel, and an indispensable part of that work of redemption which
He came to accomplish.
It is thus that He who offers a sinless life as a pledge of the
truth of His word, expresses Himself concerning the significance An excellent and full dissertation upon the point which we are
now to consider may be found in the Essays of Schöberlein: Ueber die Christliche
Versöhnungslehre, Stud. u. Krit. 1845, 2; and Ueber das Verhältniss der persönlichen
Gemeinschaft mit Christo zur Erleuchtung, Rechtfertigung, and Heiligung,
ditto, 1847, 1; and in a recent and comprehensive article on the doctrine of
Redemption in Herzog’s Real Encyclopädie, B. 17, pp. 87-143.
Atonement, generally speaking, turns upon the fact that the pure,
the innocent, the unpolluted, is given up, is offered to God, in the place of the
sinful, guilty, and vile, in order to bring about the deliverance of the latter.
It has for its object to restore that relation of man to God which sin had
disturbed, and to reconcile the sinner to God; and it takes place where there is
a knowledge of sin and of the holiness of God, as well as of the antagonism existing
between them, and consequently a felt need of pardon and grace. An approximation
to this idea of atonement existed even in some
Now this service of sacrifices, although it unquestionably arose
out of a deep religious want, although in itself highly significant and full of
meaning, and well adapted to that particular stage of religious development, had,
nevertheless, something inadequate about it, and could never thoroughly accomplish
that real abolition of sin and implantation of holiness which the
nature of the case required. All was symbolic representation, and there was no
actual moral transaction. In general, sin was acknowledged to be sinful, but the
full extent of its guilt was unperceived. Divine grace was prefigured, but not actually
communicated. The relation in which the offerer of the sacrifice stood to the animal
he sacrificed, was a voluntary, not a necessary relation; the rite
A free self-sacrifice of this kind necessarily presupposes and
is based upon the sinless purity of him who offers it. The very idea of such an
offering could have been justifiably conceived only by one who knew himself to be
pure and spotless in the sight of God; and such an offering, if made by a really
sinless being, could not fail of effecting the purpose contemplated. The sacrifice
of Jesus is distinguished from all previous sacrifices chiefly by this, that it
was not a representation and foreshadowing, but a real
The principal thing, however, is that the sinless holiness of Jesus was an essential reason why His free act of self-sacrifice really attained the ends which previous sacrifices had but aimed at: that is, it became the means of imparting a full knowledge of sin, and was itself an actual communication of Divine grace, a substitution in the truest and deepest sense, a real destroying of sin, and a real implanting in its place of a new life of sanctification.
In the first place, it is in the contemplation of the self-immolation
of the Holy One, that we come to understand what sin is, in its absolute
antagonism to holiness. For in the fact that both love, unreservedly sacrificing
itself, and sin, in all its power and malignity, are here exhibited in utmost
distinctness and placed in juxtaposition, the true nature of each becomes
clearer to us, and even the dullest understanding can appreciate to some extent
the vast difference between them. But further, we cannot fail to observe, that
the sin which is here brought before us is not sin in its isolated phenomena,
but that it is the dominant sin of the race,—that sin which operates as a
universal power in humanity, and of which we may trace the workings in
ourselves. The Holy One dies, ‘not in a conflict with sin in any special
manifestation, but with sin itself,’ De Wette,
Wesen des christlichen Glaubens, § 57, S. 297.
But here, too, the positive side is much stronger. All
that the sacrifices of the earlier dispensation could accomplish, was to typify
and symbolize the Divine grace: but the sacrifice of Jesus actually communicates
that grace. For if the sinless One is so united to God that His love is to us
a real manifestation of the love of God Himself, and that we must recognise Him
to be an impersonation of the Divine love, all this must be most forcibly expressed
in that highest act of His life, His free surrender of Himself to death from love
to man. In this act we see two things: we see One who has established His claim
to be regarded as the Son of God, freely giving Himself up to die; and we see God
not sparing His own Son, that He may give Him up to death for the salvation of man.
In the sacrificial death of the Holy One we see immediately the reconciled
and gracious God, because therein the eternal love of God—that love whose very nature
it is to be a sin-forgiving, a saving, a helping love—is not only manifested, but
so offered that it may be directly accepted by the sinner. Nor does this love offer
itself at the expense of the Compare
on this whole subject Rothe’s Ethik (vol.
ii. pp. 279-812): Der Erlöser und sein Erlösungswerk.
Against sin itself there can exist in God only a righteous displeasure, fully bent upon its extirpation. To the sinner, as such, He must not be a gracious, but an angry, because a holy God and such does the sinner know Him to be when conscience awakes within him. If God is to bestow His favour upon him, this can only be done on condition that the partition wall of guilt shall be done away with, and the foundation of the sinner’s sanctification at the same time laid. On the other hand, the sinner, too, needs a pledge and assurance of the Divine favour, if he is to have that delight in goodness, and that power to perform it, which lie at the very root of holiness. Thus on both sides a mediation is requisite; and here it is that the holy and sinless One comes in, and is seen living, suffering, and dying, as the sinner’s Substitute. By His unconditional surrender of Himself to God and to mankind, He renders the forgiveness of sin and the bestowal of grace, the restoration and renewal of the sinner, really possible.
There is an essential difference between the one great sacrifice
and the previous typical sacrifices. In these, sin was borne, and that but externally,
by an unconscious animal, which was itself without the sphere of religion and morality.
Jesus, however, moved by compassionate love, consciously and unreservedly entered
into the world of sinners, and though Himself untouched by sin, took upon Himself,
as an actual member of the same, the sins of all. Then, voluntarily appearing before
God with these sins upon Him, He suffered their fearful consequences to fall upon
Himself, as though
That this is possible, depends again on the nature of the fellowship
which is perfectly realized in Christ, and which takes so important a place in His
whole work. For as, on the one hand, Christ is so absolutely one with God, that
His whole manifestation, especially His death, must be regarded as an actual living
manifestation of God Himself, as a God of love; so, on the other hand, He becomes
equally one with men, enters into the fullest life-fellowship with them; gives
Himself entirely to them, in His love; lives, suffers, and dies, not for Himself,
but for them,—not in order to procure some one special benefit, but that He may
purchase the salvation of the whole race. And in virtue of this self-devotion, which
truly unites Him with humanity, He is no longer to be regarded as a separately existing
individual, but as the universal man, as comprehending the whole of humanity in
Himself, as its Substitute and Head. In this way, Christ, being one
with humanity, communicates to it everything which He Himself possesses. A holy
and happy exchange takes place between Christ and man, by which
Doubtless this presupposes something on our side: we must enter into His fellowship, we must by faith lay hold of the salvation offered to us, and thereby become partakers of the reconciling power of His life and death. And here, again, we trace the difference that exists between the old sacrifices, and the one all-efficacious propitiation of Christ. The ante-Christian sacrifices remained without the offerers; and although they doubtless made some impression upon their minds, they were still external to those for whom they were to make an atonement, and could not penetrate into their hearts with quickening and renewing power. The sacrifice of Christ, on the contrary, is from its very nature such, that it cannot remain a merely external, strange, and accidental circumstance, where there is any susceptibility for its reception, but must enter into the soul, and place him who by, faith appropriates it, in a living relation to the object sacrificed. And this is the case, because .this object is a person, and the sacrifice itself the voluntary act of holy love. Hence it is that a stream of love and life goes forth therefrom, that a tie is formed between Him who offers Himself as a sacrifice, and him who appropriates this sacrifice. By this inward personal union it is that strength is imparted to the latter, in virtue of which there is begotten in him, together with an assurance of pardon and reconciliation, the actual beginnings of a new life and of victory over sin.
Viewed thus, the idea of substitution—which, if understood merely
in an external and formal sense, is indeed to be rejected as dead and false—becomes
something living and true. The connection between Christ and His believing followers
is expressed by St. Paul in words of profound
Hence, when it is said that in Christ God is gracious to the
sinner, this does not mean that He is so by reason of an arbitrary act of grace,
but that He is gracious to the sinner in Christ, because, as soon as a sinner becomes
united to Christ, God beholds in him one in whom there is given, not in virtue of
his own strength, but in virtue of the operation of Christ in him, a pledge that
he will attain to actual freedom from sin. Schleiermacher, der christliche Glaube, ii. 145, § 104.
In this sense it is that we recognise in the sinless One the
Sec. 3.—The Holy Jesus as the Founder of the True Fellowship of Men.
Men being by their very nature disposed to associate one
with another, we find that all the chief activities of human life, as well as its
fundamental arrangements, are calculated to bring about such association. Everywhere
we meet with a reciprocal giving and taking, an acting and producing on the part
of some, a being acted upon and a receiving on the part of others, a drawing together
of the congenial, and an excluding of the uncongenial; and they who would entirely
withdraw from the mutual interaction thus arising, cannot but be regarded as individuals
of unsound and incomplete development. Hence there necessarily arises upon the foundation
of the family, as the primitive and typical association, civil, political, and national
associations; and those associations for the purposes of art, of science, and of
intercourse in the various spheres of intellectual pursuits, which are partly restricted
to the former, and partly of far greater
There is, however, a task allotted to all men, without exception,
and for which all, as beings made in God’s image, possess the requisite endowments: and this is the recovery of the right relation to the holy and living God, and
to every human being. This task, besides being universal, is absolutely the highest
that can be engaged in; and if co-operation and association are requisite for the
accomplishment of any human undertaking, they are so in this instance. For it is
only upon the soil of society that piety and morality can display a healthy and
vital energy, only from such a soil that they can derive the nutriment necessary
to their growth and perfection. In their case isolation would be synonymous with
deformity, degeneracy, annihilation. If in these respects that which is true and
excellent is to be obtained, there must of necessity exist a fellowship which, transcending
all existing limitations, is by its very nature calculated to embrace all men
without distinction, and to promote the attainment of that eternal destination
which is alike set before all. Not till such a fellowship exists will the true foundation
be laid for every other kind of association among mankind. Not before, will a possibility
exist of preventing those distinctions which naturally divide men, from effecting
a hostile separation. Not before, will communities and individuals, nay, different
nations, recognise the fact that they are made, not for themselves
Now, a fellowship of this supreme and universal kind can be founded only upon that union between man and God which is effected by faith or religion. Hence its very existence is an impossibility so long as religion cannot be found in a state of purity and independence, but only in combination with other and particular elements, by which it also is placed in a position of specialty and particularity. This was the case in the præ-Christian world, and is still so in nations beyond the pale of Christianity. In these we everywhere find a religion so indissolubly connected with the special constitution of a country, with peculiarities of nationality, with the degrees of culture and political institutions of certain nations, that it cannot be separated therefrom. We find religions in which nature, religions in which art, is deified,—state religions, and religious states but we do not find a religion free from all admixture with foreign elements, and keeping within its own proper territory,—a religion which is entirely itself, and will be nothing else but itself, which makes that, and that only, which is its special province—even the eternal salvation of its professors—its chief concern. Such a religion is not found previously to the appearance of Christianity, and is found in Christianity alone. Here religion is brought back entirely to its own special province, and thus offers that firm and self-supporting point whence the whole circle of human life may be worked upon, and gathered into one harmonious whole.
But this could be effected only by a person whose whole and sole
task it should be to exhibit in perfect purity the Divine image in man, and to make
that image comprehensible to all,—by One who actually did accomplish this task,
and
In the foundation of such a community, Jesus Himself recognised
an essential element of His mission. He invites all who need redemption; that is,
all men.
Jesus, however, not merely purposed to institute such a community, He not merely announced such a purpose, but possessed in Himself the power to form and to maintain it. An all-embracing fellowship of personal spirits, united by a common faith and a common love, presupposes a personal head. And He, the holy Son of God and Son of Man, who lived entirely for men, and gave Himself a sacrifice for them, was, from His very nature, this Head. For the Head must be so constituted, that the Spirit by which the community is to be pervaded and governed, may continually flow forth therefrom in pure and inexhaustible fulness. And this is the qualification which is offered in. Him in most abundant measure.
Men, sinful and limited as they are, do not possess, in and of
themselves, the power of forming themselves into a lasting fellowship of the highest
kind. They must find the living point of union for such a purpose in a holy Being
exalted above themselves, and capable of lifting them up above self, in One who,
by uniting them to Himself, at the same time brings them into vital union with each
other. But when One thus holy and thus exalted has once really laid hold of the
hearts of men, this union will be the inevitable result. For there is in the Divine,
when vividly presented in life, a It may be said that, in this respect also, Jesus has a
substitutionary significance. The higher kind of fellowship of which we have
been speaking is as much an ethical requirement, as those more limited associations
which we designate as civil and political. But though a participation in
such a fellowship is at once the duty and the need of all, none would have been
able to found one, unless Christ, with His personal power and authority, had done
this for all men.
It is true that all this applies immediately to those only who
have actually laid hold of Christ by faith. But then these are the salt of the earth,
the leaven which is destined gradually to leaven the mass. They are to introduce
an ever-extending, and at length an all-comprehending union. The moving spring of
this union is love,—that pitying, seeking, saving love which was brought into the
world by the holy Jesus of the gospel. This love sees in every one who needs its
aid, not only the possessor of a common nature, but rather Him who said,
‘Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have
done it unto me.’
Thus we see that there dwells in the Person of the holy Christ,
a power of uniting men, which effects its purpose from an inward necessity,—a power
which first, indeed, brings together those who are His by faith, but which afterwards
impels these to spread on all sides that salvation which they have themselves experienced,
that all may be saved by Christ, and all brought into the same fellowship. It is
a fellowship which exists only for the sake of satisfying the deepest, the universal
needs of men: it is the kingdom of God, for it is even this which is visibly manifested
in the Church of the Redeemed, so far as it is ordered according to His will and
word. And where else do we find anything equal or even similar to
this? The very idea of forming a society which should embrace the whole human family,
never entered the mind of the greatest sages, or lawgivers, or founders of empires,
before Christ. This idea is enlarged upon by Reinhard in his celebrated work,
Ueber den Plan welchen der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der
Menschenentwatf, fifth edition, with additions by Heubner, Wittenburg 1830.
Sec. 4.—The Sinless Jesus as the Pledge of Eternal Life.
The fellowship founded by Christ, however,—and this is the last point to be considered,—is not destined merely for this earthly existence, but has the promise of eternal life and perfect victory in a future and heavenly state. This promise holds good to every living member of Christ in particular, as well as to the community, formed of such members, in general. And the pledge for its performance is found in the sinless perfection of Him who, through what He was and what He did, became the sole foundation and all-comprising head of this fellowship.
This promise is, in the first place, expressed with the utmost
assurance by Jesus Himself. He testifies of Himself that the Father has given Him
to have life in Himself;
We now proceed to inquire whether that which is thus testified and promised by the Lord Jesus, is not likewise the necessary result of this sinless holiness,—in other words, what is the relation borne by this doctrine to the subject now under consideration?
It is certain that not a few so-called Christians see in Christ nothing more than a historical personage, who lived more than eighteen centuries ago, who taught certain doctrines, and perhaps performed also certain unusual acts, but who—beyond what has been handed down to us concerning Him in this respect—does not stand in any very close and immediate .relation to the present generation. In such a merely historical Christ, they who are really in earnest in their belief in His words, and sincerely His followers, do assuredly possess certain benefits. To them, however, may well be applied the saying, ‘Why seek ye the living among the dead?’ And if they will but observe somewhat more closely the Christ presented to us in the Gospels, they will be constrained to admit that He declares Himself to be—and that, if but the chief features of His character are correctly drawn, He must actually be—something very different from a past historical phenomenon. For the actual historical Christ, and especially the Being who proved Himself to be sinlessly holy, necessarily implies the living Christ, the ever living, ever acting Christ and it is only when we admit this, that we really receive even the historical Christ, in the full completeness of all that is testified concerning Him.
If Jesus is sinless, and consequently the holy Son of God and
Son of Man, as He declares Himself to be, He le one whose very existence
is a pledge of indestructible life and
But He who is thus exalted by the power of that Divine life which
dwells in Him, cannot be otherwise conceived of than as the acting. And if
even during His earthly course His agency related to the whole human race, the sphere
of its influence cannot be a more circumscribed one, now that the restrictions of
His earthly existence are done away with. We must not picture it to ourselves as
similar only to that exercised by all whose lives have produced powerful effects
upon history. Such persons do indeed exercise a lasting influence by means either
of their deeds or of their intellectual productions. This, however, is not a direct,
a living,
But, again, we cannot conceive of the eternal life and continuous
agency of the Head, unless the members also are
But least of all can we conceive of an exalted and eternally
living Christ, really the Head of His believing people, but unpossessed of the power
of bringing them into His glory, and continually losing them through death. It would
be but a very poor compensation to say: He can continually be taking new members
to Himself as the old ones die away. This would be to commit the folly of conceiving
not only of a heavenly Head with merely earthly members, but also of an eternally
living Head, with members in a continual state of coming and going, in a condition
of perpetual change. It is quite as impossible to combine faith in an actually
living Christ with the supposition of the continual dying off of His members, as
it is to supplement the idea of a living and personal God with the notion of the
annihilation of the
What is true of the individual members of Christ holds good also
of His members viewed collectively, of the kingdom of God, and its manifestation
in the Church, which is the body of Christ. From the very first, it was not
as an isolated individual that Christ received each man into His fellowship, but
as one who was also destined to form a member in His body. And this relation can
never cease, but must ever become more real and true. As the life of the individual
is perfected in a higher state of existence by his being made partaker in ever-increasing
fulness of the life of Christ, even so, and in equal measure, must the life of the
community of
If what has been advanced in this last part rests upon sound
reasoning, Jesus is thus proved to be, in virtue of His sinlessness, the One
Being in our whole race in whom Godhead and manhood are personally united, and
in whom a man well-pleasing to God, a typical man, has appeared. And if by this
very fact He has also perfectly revealed the nature and the will of God in so far
as this was needed by the world of sinners, and effected a true reconciliation between
them and the holy God; if He has at the same time established upon this foundation
a kingdom of God among men, as the highest human community, and as the guardian
of His saving benefits, and has assured to this community, and to every living member
thereof, a life of eternal happiness and glory,—then has He also fulfilled all the
conditions under which alone it was possible for man, separated as he was from God
by sin, to be readmitted to blissful fellowship with Him, and has done this in that
form in which alone it could be done, in a truly vital and really efficacious manner,
in the form of personality, of personal example and personal intervention. A more
exalted Being than one in whom Godhead and manhood were united is necessarily inconceivable.
He is, and ever will be, supreme in matters of religion,
We have now arrived at that point which we at first designated as the end we had in view, and which we may now describe as the result of what has hitherto been stated. And this was to show that Christianity, of which Jesus Christ is the inalienable vital centre, and all whose essential elements are comprised in Him, is not merely a religion, which may have its own special advantages beside or above other religions, but that it is the religion in a supreme sense,—the perfect and exclusively Divine means and revelation of salvation; and that a supreme and satisfactory, though not the sole pledge that it is so, is offered by the sinless holiness of its Founder.
THE results at which we have now arrived are not only important in a theoretical, but also in a practical, point of view and it is on this latter aspect of our subject that we now propose to add a few remarks.
When the Apostle Peter declares to the Gentile Cornelius
If, then, the Person of Christ has this all-deciding importance
with respect to the salvation both of the individual
To occupy no position at all with respect to the Person of Jesus, when once we have become acquainted with it, is simply impossible; for there is in the holy a power which can never be utterly inoperative; and man, even in his present sinful condition, is a moral being possessing an ineradicable tendency towards the Divine. As such, he is so constituted that he is incapable of remaining absolutely indifferent to that which is holy when he actually meets with it, or when it is powerfully brought to his knowledge. He can avert, or forcibly close, his spiritual eye; yet if but a ray of holy light penetrates his soul, he cannot possibly conduct himself as if there were no such thing in existence, but must necessarily take up some position with respect thereto.
And this position cannot, at least for a continuance, be a
neutral or an undecided one. The Lord, indeed, when He says, ‘He that is not
against us, is on our side,’
But in what does being with and for Him really
consist? Not in a merely esthetic approbation of His character, but in a hearty
love of His Person. If this is indeed lin us, we shall be willing, first of all,
to allow ourselves to be convinced of, and thoroughly humbled for, our sins by Him,
the Holy One, and shall then surrender ourselves in perfect confidence to Him who
is also the Son, full of grace and truth, and willingly and thankfully accept at
His hands the gifts of forgiveness, life, and salvation, which He offers without
our merits or deservings. But this is nothing else than what is called believing
in Him. And thus the only rightful position which we can occupy towards Christ,
the position all-decisive with respect to our own salvation, is that of The well-known words of Luther, in the excellent passage on faith,
in his Preface to the Epistle to the Romans.
Let him who refuses this faith clearly understand what such refusal
involves. There is, as we have seen, no neutral ground to which he can retire. In
his, as in every case, there will at last arise the necessity of deciding for or
against. He, too, will be compelled either to open his heart, by trustful self-surrender
and humility, to the Holy One of God, or to close it against Him; and having turned
away from Him, to seek salvation—if indeed he still feels himself in need of it—in ways of his own devising. If, however, he decides for the latter, he should
do so with a clear knowledge of the full significance of his choice. Perhaps he
may think it possible to give up Christ, the Son of God and Redeemer of the world,
and to retain the pure and holy Son of Man as an example. This, however, is not
possible; for it is the pure and perfect Son of Man who testifies of Himself that
He is the Son of God, the Mediator, the alone source of salvation. Besides, it is
precisely His pure and perfect manhood which leads, by an inward necessity, to His
Divine dignity, and to the truth and reality of His redeeming work, and which involves
and furnishes the surest guarantee of both. In short, we cannot have the one without
the other. For
Of him who, on the contrary, inclines to this faith, it demands
that he should embrace it with his whole heart, and in the full extent of its requirements.
The Redeemer will not be satisfied with a divided heart. He who gave Himself wholly
to us, desires that we also should give ourselves wholly to Him. He who receives
Him, must do so in a manner suited to His sacred dignity,—must accept from Him that
which He is willing to bestow. For He is not here to be fashioned and formed according
to the desires and fancies of those who need His salvation, but they must let themselves
be formed and fashioned, or rather transformed and refashioned, in their inmost
nature and being, by Him, and thus become recipients of the true basis of all true
and exalted human progress. Neither is it His will that faith should be timidly
concealed in the inner sanctuary of the heart. He would have it gladly confessed
before men, and shining forth like a bright light from the whole walk and
THE great importance of the sinlessness of Jesus, with regard both to Christian faith and to that impression thereof which we designate doctrine, has at no time been ignored. The attention paid to it, however, by Christian teachers and theologians, has been by no means uniform. The importance of the fact, and its manifold consequences, have not been at all times equally perceived, while its relation to other elements of Christianity has been variously estimated, and its treatment has been undertaken with different purposes and in different manners.
A complete statement of the various ways and modes in which the dogma of the sinlessness of Jesus has in different ages been viewed, proved, and applied, carried out with relation to the whole course of development which doctrine and practice have gone through in the Church, might well form the subject of a separate treatise of no slight interest. Such an undertaking would far transcend our limits. We feel, however, that it is due to our subject to follow up the allusions given in the Introduction by a few general outlines, and especially to make the notice there given of its literature more complete.
To the Christians of the apostolic age, and to the most distinguished of the apostles, the sinless perfection of their Master was an inalienable element, nay, a fundamental factor, of their faith in Him as the Messiah sent by God, the Son of God and Son of Man, the Reconciler and Redeemer of mankind. With them it was not a subject of reflection. They merely reproduced in very decided and pregnant statements the impression which Jesus had in this respect made upon themselves, and plainly indicated the inseparable connection existing in their eyes between His; sinlessness and other elements of Christianity, especially the atoning and priestly agency of Christ.
In the further development of the doctrine of Christ within the
Church, this apostolic view of the subject continued to prevail. A more explicit
reference to the doctrine of the sinlessness of Jesus, especially in its historical
bearings, was nowhere attempted; because it was regarded as an absolutely sell-evident
fact, and as an article of belief essentially interwoven with the whole organism
of the Christian religion. But as soon as the doctrine of the Person of Christ began
to be more fully elaborated, this article of belief was most prominently brought
forward. The first writer who uses the technical expression
ἀναμάρτητος
with reference to Christ is Hippolytus (Galandii Biblioth. 466). Then we
find the term repeatedly employed by Clement of Alexandria; still he uses also the
word ἀνεπιθύμητος (Stromat. vii. 12),—a word which, more than the other,
has reference to the inward state. It would lead us too much into detail were we to give all the
passages of the fathers referred to. The reader may consult Duncker’s Christologie
des Irenæus, S. 219 ff.; Hagenbach, Dogmen-geschichte, B. 1. § 67;
and Baumgarten-Crusius’ Dogmen-geschichte, vol. ii. p. 162. Suicer also,
in his Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, gives a tolerably complete collection of
passages from the fathers under the words
ἀναμαρτησία, ἀναμάρτητος,—vol. 1. pp.
287-289.
In the Christology of Apollinaris this doctrine has a peculiar import attached to it. He proceeded from the belief that along with human nature there is always mutability and change in the moral life, gradual development, conflict, and therefore sin: in his view, it is impossible to conceive of a complete man without sin. But as, according to his own belief, the Redeemer of men must Himself be free from all sin, nay, elevated above all conflict therewith, he was thus led to form the opinion, that in Christ the Divine and eternal Logos had taken the place of the necessarily vacillating and sinful human soul. This Logos being in itself immutable and self-determined, is thus supposed to have imparted to every action and emotion of Christ an irresistible tendency towards the holy and the Divine, and to have raised Him above all conflict with sin. Now even if by the adoption of this view the doctrine of the sinlessness of Christ seems to be placed upon a firmer basis, an evident injury is thereby done to another most vital doctrine, namely, that of the perfect humanity of Christ, and the truth of His typical character as a real man; because both these truths rest upon the assumption of a rational human soul in Christ.
Hence the importance of holding fast the doctrine of Christ’s
sinlessness along with that of His true human nature. Both were fully recognised
by Athanasius, who directed attention to the fact that sin, although found by experience
to be really present in all mankind, yet belongs not to human nature in itself considered,
whose original state was, on the
This settled the doctrine, at least within the domain of the Church and no important change of opinion with respect. to it afterwards took place. It now became more a subject of theological discussion, although it was not treated in a comprehensive spirit until modern times.
In the Middle Ages, theologians were content to abide
by the decisions of the Church; but at the same time they fully recognised the importance
of the subject. The Schoolmen indeed allowed, that if the human soul of Jesus were
viewed independently, and its union with the Divine Logos left out of the question,
the possibility of His sinning could not be denied. Peter Lombard says, Lib. sent.
iii. 12: Non est ambiguum,
animam illam entem unitam verbo peccare non posse, et eandem, si esset et non
unita verbo, posse peccare. This was to be expected in the case of theologians. I will
here name only two poets: Otfried von Weissenburg, who, in his Poetical Version
of the Gospels, iii. 21, 4, uses the expression, ther suntiloso man,
concerning Christ; and Dante, in whose view Christ is like Himself alone,
and who on this account never makes his name rhyme with any word but itself, nor
permits it to be uttered in hell on account of its supreme dignity, says, Inferno,
xxxiv. 114, 15, ‘Where the man who was born and lived without sin, perished.’ These may be found in Dupin’s edition of the works of Gerson,
vol. 1. p. 693. In thesis x. it is said, ‘It is expressly contrary to our faith to
hold that any except Christ has been born free from original sin;’ and
in thesis xii., ‘It is as contrary to Holy Scripture to say that one human
being besides Christ is excepted from original sin, as to say that ten are.’ In
thesis ix., moreover, it is laid down as a general axiom, that, ‘to declare
anything true which is contrary to Scripture, is most expressly contrary to our
faith.’
While the theology of the Middle Ages continued in theory unwaveringly
faithful to the decisions of the apostolic, and the ancient Church concerning the
Person of Christ, a corruption of another kind set in; not, in the first instance,
within the sphere of theology, but in that of the Church and of Christian life generally.
Christ, while strictly adhered to doctrinally, began to disappear from Christian
consciousness as a living, directly operating personality, and as the only medium
of salvation. The Church, with its mediation of priests, put Him more and more into
the background, while His pretended earthly representative usurped His place. The
chief merit of the Reformers consisted in restoring the Divine and human
Person of Christ to its central position as the one only ground of salvation, and
re-establishing the direct character of the relation of believers to Him, and, through
Him, to God the Father. They did this, because they felt Christ present to their
inmost soul in His Divine E.g. by Luther in the Larger Catechism. See Schmid, Dogmatik der ev. luth. Kirche, pp. 231, 236;
and Hase, Hutt. rediv. § 96, p. 226, 7th ed. Among the works of the older Protestant theologians the following
may be specially noticed:—Gerhard, Loc. theol. Pt. iii. p. 237; and Buddeus,
Compend. theol. dogm. § 497. Among modern writings in which the doctrine
is briefly or extensively treated, may be mentioned:—Doederlein, Institut. ii. pp. 206, etc.; Zacharias, bibl.
Theologie, Pt. iii. pp. 38-46; Töllner’s
theolog. Untersuchungen, vol. i. Pt. ii.; Reinhard’s Dogmatik, §
91; Bretschneider’s
Dogmat. vol. ii. §§ 135, 138; Wegscheider, Institut. § 122, pp.
446, 447, 7th ed.; Knepp’s Vorlesungen, Pt. ii. § 93, p. 151;
Schleiermacher’s christl. Glaube, Pt. ii. in the whole section concerning
Christ, especially pp. 39 and 86 of the 2d ed.; De Wette’s christl. Sittenlehre, Pt.
i. pp. 173-193, and Wesen des christl. Glaubens, § 53; Nitzsch, System der christlichen Lehre, § 129; Rothe, Theolog. Ethik.
vol. i. § p. 279, etc.—Remarks on the subject will also be found in Daub’s Judas Iscarioth,
No. I. pp. 55, 64, 78; and Steudel’s Grundzügen einer Apologetik, pp. 56,
etc. It is also discussed in Steudel’s Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-protestant-Kirche,
Tüb. 1834, pp. 233-245; in Sack’s christl. Apologetik, 2d ed. p. 201,
etc.; Hase’s Leben Jesu, pp. 23, 32; and Jul. Müller’s christl. Lehre
von der Sünde, 3d ed., in various places. Among the latest works, compare
the doctrinal writings of Grimm, Schweizer, Lange, Schoeberlein, Liebner, and
Martensen; die biblische Dogm. of Lutz, pp. 293-299; Dorner’s Entwickelungsgeschichte
der Lehre von der Person Christi; and Schumann’s Christus, vol. i. pp.
284-297.
And nothing has done more to awaken this conviction than the
doubts which have arisen in recent times upon this subject, even within the
domain of Christian belief and of theology. Indeed the development of the doctrine
which we have sketched above had not been carried far enough for the sinlessness
of Christ to be at once recognised by all men, at all times, as a perfectly unquestionable
fact. As early as the ages of ancient Christianity, we see suspicions arising and
limitations adduced in isolated instances. Basilides, the Gnostic, appears to have been the first who
entertained doubts concerning this doctrine. He even applied to Christ, as man,
the maxim that every one who suffers, does so as an expiation for his own sins.
Yet he shrinks from charging Jesus with actual sin, and places Him, in this
respect, on a level with children, who suffer indeed, not on account of sins committed,
but because of the inclination to sin existing in them,—because of the ἁμαρτητικόν.
Clemens, Strom. iv. 12; Neander, gnost. Syst. pp. 49-53. Arius and
Theodore of Mopsveste admit only the moral perfection of Christ in a more limited
sense. See Baumgarten-Crusius, Dogmengeschichte, p. 164, note 1. See on this subject the note on p. 125. The Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist is, with respect to our subject,
the advocate of the former; Strauss, in his Glaubenslehre, vol. ii. pp. 190, etc.,
of the latter. Pécaut, whose still more recent work has been already so frequently alluded to, may also be mentioned as belonging to the
deistic side.
These doubts, based as they were, not only upon historical and
critical, but upon very decided and utterly negative doctrinal prepossessions, assailed
the very heart of Christianity; and there could not fail to be a reaction against
them from the Christian side. If, in former times, the moral character of Christ
had often been the subject of special discussion, this. was now of necessity much
more the case; and we find a whole series of single works upon this subject, with
direct reference to the question of sinlessness. Among works entirely devoted to this subject are the following:—Walther, Dissert. theol. de Christi
hominis ἀναμαρτησίᾳ, Viteb. 1690,
and Dissert. de dissimilit. ortus nostri et Christi hom., in his Dissertatt.
theol. ed. Hoffmann, Viteb. 1753, pp. 207-244; Hoevel, de ἀναμαρτησίᾳ
Christi ejusque necessitate, Hal. 1741, recusa 1749, 37, p. 4—(this treatise,
whose author, Carl Ludwig Hoevel, is a pupil of Baumgarten, is strictly orthodox,
and written with much scholastic acuteness. It follows Wolf’s method of demonstration,
and bases the sinlessness of Jesus upon the unio personalis of the Divine
and human natures. In the first part the necessity of this doctrine is laid down; in the second it is defended against objections);—Erbstein, Gedanken
über
die Frage ob der Erlöser sündigen konnte? Meissen 1787—(this work, denies the
possibility, in opposition to Doederlein, Institt. § 234);—Ueber die Anamartesie
Jesu, in Grimm’s and Muzel’s Stromata, Pt. ii. pp. 113, etc.; Ph. A.
Stapfer, Versuch eines Beweises der göttlichen Sendung und Würde Jesu aus seinem
Charakter, Berne 1797; and in French in the collection of Stapfer’s writings
recently published at Paris—(it contains a very spirited and eloquent description
of the moral manifestation of Jesus, and such inferences therefrom of His Divine
dignity as were not easily drawn in that period of rationalism);—J. L. Ewald,
über die Grosse Jesu und ihrem Einfluss auf seine Sittenlehre, Hanover 1798; also his erste Forts. Beantwort. verschied. Einwürfe, Gera 1799; M. Weber,
Progr. Virtutis Jesu integritatem neque ex ipsius professionibus neque ex actionibus
doceri posse, Viteb. 1796; and in his Opusc. Acad. pp. 179-192—(Weber,
while firmly adhering to the sinlessness of Jesus, insists upon grounding this doctrine
solely on the inspired testimony of the apostles, and thus of God Himself, who,
as knowing the heart, can alone pronounce authoritatively in this case);—Fr. von
Meyer, war Jesus Christus der Sünde fähig? in the Blättern für höhere
Wahrheit, new series, 2d collection, Berlin 1831, pp. 198-208; J. G. Rätze,
die Heiligkeit und die Wunderthaten als die höchsten und genügenden Beglaubigungsgründe
der Gottheit des Welterlösers, Zittau and Leipsic 1834—(it is possible that miracles, inasmuch as
they differ from the ordinary phenomena of nature, may be doubted both on historical
and philosophic grounds; but such doubts are extinguished by the holiness of Christ’s
Person and life. A holiness manifested by precept and example, and in accordance
with the religious and moral ideals of reason, is its own best credential; and
they who deny it, would at the same time deny the consciousness of the Divine existence
and the moral law);—Al. Schweizer, über die Dignität des Religionstifters,
in the theol. Stud. und Kritik. 1834, No. III. pp. 521-571; No. IV. pp.
813-849—(Schweizer here endeavours to prove, in a speculative way, the necessity
of the absolute religious perfection, the infallibility and sinlessness of Christ,
from the notion and nature of the Founder of that religion which is to be
the religion of the whole human race);—Christ. Frid. Fritzsche, de
ἀναμαρτησίᾳ
Jesu Christi Commentationis, iv., Hal. 1835-37—(the author criticises the treatises
on the Sinlessness of Jesus by three theologians of Halle, viz. Hoevel, Weber, and
myself, and makes objections against those of the first and last. An answer will
be found in the theol. Stud. und Kritik. 1842-3);—Hase, Streitschriften, No. III. 1837, pp. 105-114—(an excellent and acute refutation of rationalistic
objections)—Guil. Naumann, Dissert. de Jesu Christo ab animi affectibus non
immuni, Lips. 1840; Gotth. Ferd. Doehner, de dictis aliquot Jesu Christi
quæ ἀναμαρτησίαν
ejus infringere videantur, Zwiccau 1840—(the contents of these
two works are cited and condemned in an article by Theile, Litt. Blatt. der allgem.
K. Zeitung, Feb. 1841, Nos. XIX. XX. XXI.);—Theile, über die sittliche Erhabenheit Jesu allg. K.
Zeitung, June 1841, Nos. XCII. XCIII. XCIV.—(a good description of the
typical nature of the character of Christ, and of its significance for
Christianity).—Remarks referring to our subject will also be found in Käuffer’s Jesus Christus unser
Vorbild, Dresden 1845, especially p. 98, etc. An article in Swedish against
my views, by Prof. Thomander of Lund, in the quarterly paper edited by himself and
Reuterdahl, unfortunately did not come to my notice till it was out of print. I
am, however, able to refer to a more detailed review by Prof. Van Oordt, in the
Gröningen journal, Waarheid in Liefde, 1838, No. I. pp. 117-224, especially
pp. 218 sq.
THE object of the brief notice given in the Treatise, of the
history of the temptation, was principally to point out the relation between the
fact of our Saviour being tempted and His sinlessness. We endeavoured to show what
aspect this relation bears, as seen from the various points of view occupied by
those who have discussed the two subjects and with this purpose we referred even
to those opinions which present the greatest difficulty. But what was there said
would be insufficient and unsatisfactory without a further investigation of the
whole subject. We subjoin, accordingly, an examination of the various expositions
of this passage, The most recent literature on the subject of the
temptation has been given above, p. 130, to which may be added Riggenbach’s Lectures on
the Life of Christ, pp. 271-286. More information may be found in Hase’s Life of Jesus,
and De Wette’s Exegetical Handbook. Specially
rich in literary notices is a treatise in the (Catholic) Tübinger Quartalschrift, 1828, 1 and 2.
Everywhere in the Bible the exposition of the details, and the view to be taken of the whole, reciprocally modify each other and this is especially the case with reference to the passage before us. But while, as is evident, the details can be fully understood only by a correct appreciation of the whole, there is a great danger of allowing one’s self to be influenced in fixing the meaning of the separate histories by a predetermined conclusion on the import of the whole narrative. That we may avoid this danger, and pursue the safest course, we shall first state what can with certainty be determined with regard to the details, and then proceed to the general history, that thus justice may be done to both, by a due consideration of their mutual relation.
IN the first .place, there arises the question as to the meaning of the several temptations. This has, as is well known, been made the theme of frequent discussion. And yet the opinions even of the most recent commentators differ so widely, that it may well repay our trouble if we submit this point to a more minute investigation.
The temptation which both Matthew and Luke agree in giving as
the first, consists in the call addressed to Jesus to Pfeiffer, die Versuchung des Herrn in the Deutschen
Zeitschrift, 1851, No. XXII. p. 177.
We now proceed to a closer inquiry as to the manner in which
Jesus met the proposal. We may anticipate that His answer will throw some light
upon the nature of the temptation itself. But here we are met by several conflicting
opinions. The retort of Jesus is expressed in words taken from See Neander in his Life of Christ, fifth ed. p. 115.
In the explanation usually given, a special import is attached
to the fact that Jesus was requested to make in a miraculous manner, not any kind
of food, but only bread, for the satisfaction of His hunger. But this is
clearly incorrect.
The temptation which in St. Luke occupies the third place, is—more correctly, as there can be no doubt—placed second in St. Matthew. This,
as well as the former, has been Compare on this subject Kohlschütter in the bibl. Studien der sächs. Geistlichkeit,
ii. 75, 76.
The enticing element in this temptation was the idea of calling
forth the Divine protection,—of proving whether God would preserve His anointed
Son in circumstances of most imminent danger, and that a danger which did not come
in the simple, God-appointed path of duty, but was arbitrarily and vaingloriously
incurred. This is essentially the view of Neander; but he mingles with
it, in what seems to me an unfitting manner, the notion of an epideiktical miracle.
Leben Jesu, pp. 116, 117.
We have now to speak of the third temptation. This is Bleek in a Ms. communication. Κοσμοκράτωρ.
See
The dominion of the world is thus the great object here presented by the devil, but at the same time he states what is the only way whereby it could be gained. And the way is unquestionably bad, for it is by subjection to the prince of the world. And in rejecting it, which He does by a reference to the great truth, that to God alone, the Lord of all, are homage and worship due, Jesus at the same time renounces the object which could only thus be arrived at. We see, then, that in this temptation a kingdom of outward glory is offered to Jesus, as to One, who must in the fullest sense be regarded as destined to be a king. And the whole turns upon the antagonism between a kingdom of the world which could be set up only by the use of worldly means, and the kingdom of God which could be founded only by the total rejection of such means, by the pure worship of God alone.
If we now briefly sum up what has been said, we shall find that
in the three temptations the following alternatives were presented. In the first,
the use of supernatural gifts for the purposes of sensuous self-love; or a complete
entrance upon a life of self-denial, which expects support and strength from God
alone. In the second, a presumptuous reliance upon Divine assistance, which, in
the consciousness of a special mission, enters upon self-chosen paths of danger;
or a pious confiding in God, which shuns all devious, God-tempting
Having thus determined the meaning of the three temptations,
the question now arises as to whom they concern. It may be thought that this is
quite a superfluous question, as it is so clearly and emphatically stated that it
was Jesus who was the object of the devil’s assaults. Yet some have thought otherwise.
Some have taken exception to the possibility of Jesus being tempted at all, others
to the particular form of temptation recorded in the Gospel. Consequently they have
regarded the alternatives expressed above, as intended to form merely a symbolical
representation of the fundamental. principles of His kingdom, Pfeiffer especially refers the temptation to the kingdom of the
Lord, and the mode of its establishment (Deutschen Zeitschrift 1851, No. XXII.).
He makes the three temptations to be: (1) The temptation to satisfy the sensible
wants of men, and thus to obtain authority and dominion among them; (2) To set
up a kingdom of caprice, of lawlessness and licence; (3) To establish a sovereignty
of merely external power.
It being thus apparent that it was Jesus Himself who was the
subject of the temptation, the next question that arises is: Was it chiefly as
the Messiah, or as a man, that He was tempted? And here, too, opinions are divided.
There are still, in the present day, writers who think that the proposals made to
Jesus were temptations of a general human character. So Rink, Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1851, No. XXXVI. p. 293.
He thinks that the more generally the temptations are viewed, the more
truly and deeply will the idea involved therein be manifested; and in fact he
regards them, in the most general way possible, as the temptations of ‘the lust
of the flesh,’ ‘the pride of life, and the lust of the eye.’ See above, pp. 134 and 135. While Rink insists upon receiving the temptation in this general
manner, Laufs, on the other hand (in the Stud. und Kritik. 1853, 2, pp. 355-386),
brings forward too exclusively its Messianic aspect. Giving in this sense
an original view of the several temptations, he finds in the first (the changing
of stones into bread) the false Messianic notions which obtained among the Jews; in the second (the sway of the world), the false idea of a Messiah in the heathen
sense, which was based on the expected alliance of the Messiah with, the Roman power; in the third (casting Himself from the temple), the notion entertained that the
Messiah’s work must begin, in spite of all dangers, at the temple, the theocratic
centre of the nation,—and therefore in the midst of the scribes, Pharisees, and
priestly officials,—that the capital being thus subjugated, the whole land might
be conquered with one blow. This view, in spite of its ingenuity, is too
far removed from the literal interpretation of the Gospel narrative (especially
the answers of our Lord), and by far too artificial, to be entertained.
Although it was to Jesus Himself that the temptation
But since Christ could be tempted as Messiah only in so far as
He could be tempted as a man, we must own that this history of His temptation has
in it something also of a more general character, and that it must be regarded as
typical of the temptations by which men are commonly assailed. Only, there is a
distinction to be drawn here. In the case of Jesus, the temptations addressed to
Him presuppose certain peculiar personal qualities: the first is based upon His
power of working miracles; the second, upon His Divine mission; the third, upon His
destination to supremacy. Now these are no common human qualities. Still the first
temptation can only be regarded as a common, a universal human temptation, if for
the power to do miracles we substitute those God-given faculties which every man
possesses, and which every man may either turn to purposes of selfishness and self-love,
or use in the service of a higher life. The second temptation can apply more particularly,
only to that
We have thus, by an examination of the several temptations in detail, obtained a starting-point for the exposition of the narrative regarded as a whole. Let us, then, proceed to this latter consideration.
IF commentators have been divided in their opinions concerning
the details of this history, we shall find that they differ far more widely in the
views which they take of the whole narrative. Here we meet with a graduating scale
of expositions, embracing all conceivable diversities, from the spiritualism
which regards the history as nothing more than a figurative mode of inculcating
doctrine, to the realism which receives every word in its most literal acceptation.
We may, however, make a general division of the various explanations into two principal
classes: the first consisting of those according to which the whole narrative is
a mere product of
Sec. 1. Explanations which represent the whole Narrative as a mere Product of Thought.
If that portion of the Gospel history which we are now considering is to be regarded as nothing more than a mental creation without any objective historical foundation, two suppositions are conceivable with regard to its authorship: it may have originated with Jesus Himself, or it may be the production of others. In the former case it would be a figurative doctrinal discourse delivered by Jesus,—a parable, having for its object to bring vividly before the mind of His disciples certain principles of His kingdom, and certain fundamental maxims to guide them in their work of establishing that kingdom. On the latter supposition it is to be regarded simply as a myth,—a tradition, which arose from the tendency to glorify Christ as the conqueror of evil and the evil one. Let us test these opinions.
The view which regards the passage as a parable, has, as is well
known, been supported in modern times by names of no small importance. Schleiermacher, Kritischer Versuch über die Schriften des
Lucas, p. 24 ff.; Baumgarten-Crusius, Bibl. Theol. § 40, p. 303; Usteri,
Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken, 1829, No. III. pp. 456-461; Hase, Leben Jesu,
§ 48, pp. 85, 86. Hase, however, admits an actual temptation of Christ; only
he holds that the inner temptation is presented as a parable, and, moreover,
that the representation is of a mythical character, because there are unhistorical
features in it. Usteri, Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken, 1832, Heft 4, p. 729
ff. The maxims and dispositions reproved by Christ have been variously
stated. Hase views them quite generally, viz. as worldliness, covetousness, and
ambition; Karsten (Mecklenb. Kirchenblatt, 1837, 1), as selfishness indolently
craving miracles, vanity boastfully tempting God, and idolatrous love of the world;
Theile (Theol. Lit. Bl.1841, Feb. No. XX.), as abuse of miraculous power,
partly for selfish purposes, partly to excite attention, and assumption of political
Messianic power.
But it is difficult to see why Jesus should have chosen the form
of parables to convey to the minds of His disciples these simple rules; and it
is altogether inconceivable how these parables should from the first have been so
misunderstood by the disciples, that they have come down to us as history, and that we cannot discover the slightest trace of a parabolic character about
them. This narrative, as it lies before us at the present day, appears as an important
event in the life of Jesus; and there can be no doubt that, in the apostolical
tradition concerning Him, it occupied a most conspicuous,. and even an essential
place. Everything in the story relates immediately to Jesus Himself. Nowhere do
we find any direct reference to the apostles; and indeed it is difficult to De Wette,
exeget. Handb. 1, 42. All the temptations,
together with the maxims expressed by their rejection, lose their full meaning,
unless referred to the Messiah. This applies more especially to the third,
the offered supremacy over the world, and to its refusal, which cannot be applied
to the apostles without doing the greatest violence to the narrative.
Besides, the apostles themselves, when this communication was
made to them, could not at first have avoided referring it to Jesus, and not to
themselves. But so radical and general a misunderstanding would cast a reproach
upon the teaching of Jesus Himself; for He must then have presented the thing to
them in so unintelligible a way, that they took what He meant to be a parable for
actual history. This idea is entirely contradicted by the whole character of His
teaching on other occasions. The origin of such a misunderstanding could be no otherwise
explained than by supposing that Jesus made Himself the subject of the parable;
but this would have introduced from the very first an inappropriate and unintelligible
element. For either the introduction of the Person of Jesus had, or it had not,
a definite purpose. If the former,—i.e. if Christ therein represented Himself as
the Messiah who rejected every false principle of conduct,—then the disciples were
necessitated to think of some actual occurrence, some real temptation which He had
undergone, and then the parable would pass into history. If the latter,—if the
Person of Jesus was introduced without any definite purpose,—then it was manifestly
unsuitable so to introduce it. For then the parable, being neither wholly history
nor wholly allegory, would have produced a vague, unsatisfactory impression of
something that was partly the one and partly the Against the parabolic interpretation, compare Hasert, Stud. u. Kritiken, 1830, 1, p. 74 ff.; and Strauss, Leben Jesu, vol. i. § 51, p. 416.
The mythical interpretation comes next to the parabolic.
This has, in modern times, been variously represented. It was first defended by
Usteri, Usteri in Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, 1832, 4, pp. 781-791.
His view, however, involves difficulties by no means insignificant.
If we allow a prehistoric time in the life of Jesus—though the expression is anything
but happily chosen, when its meaning with regard to the heathen myths is considered—still it must be acknowledged that this period ended with His baptism while the
temptation succeeds the baptism,—and this not merely by accident, but of necessity.
We
The mythical view is presented in a more natural form by two
other scholars, Strauss and De Wette. From the general point of view taken by the
former, Strauss, Leben Jesu, vol. ii. § 52, pp. 417-428, 1st ed. De Wette, Exegetisches Handbuch,
i. 42, 43.
These expositors have this advantage over Usteri, that the temptation
of Christ, being in their view not absolutely inadmissible as a fact, may naturally
be allowable as an idea. Hence they far more simply make the purport of the myth
to be, the tempting of the Messiah by Satan, not a conflict with Satan. Moreover,
the story takes a much more natural form in their hands, from their method of defining
the conception of the myth, and of applying it to the evangelic record. But hence
arises, it must be confessed, another and a greater difficulty, affecting the general
view of the evangelical history, especially in so far as that is taken up with the
public and Messianic life of Jesus. If this be entirely mythical, with the exception
of a scarcely definable minimum of fact, if it be even in most instances interfused
with mythical elements, then undoubtedly the temptation is one of those parts which
offer the least resistance to a mythical interpretation. It is unnecessary, however,
after the elaborate discussions to which this mythical view of the Gospel narrative
in general has been subjected, to show here the difficulties to which this theory
is exposed, and how it leaves the existence, not only of the Christian Church, but
even of the Christian faith, an utterly unexplained enigma; nay, is utterly at
variance with these undeniable facts. If, on the contrary, we find that the evangelical
record rests in the main, upon a historical foundation, the necessity then arises
of establishing the historical basis also of the separate parts of that
Sec. 2.—Explanations which recognise a Historical Basis of the Narrative.
The explanations according to which our narrative records an actual occurrence may be divided into two classes. First, there are those which regard the event related as something which took place inwardly in the soul of Jesus; and those which regard it as something external, as an actual transaction between the Lord Jesus and the tempter. Now, certain as it is, that if a real temptation took place, we shall be constrained to suppose also an actual agitation in the soul of Jesus; yet the idea of a purely internal occurrence by no means comes up to the meaning of the evangelists. We shall thus be necessitated to acknowledge that there was something really objective in the transaction. But before proceeding to make this more evident, we will briefly test the opinion that the temptation was only of a spiritual and internal character.
This view appears in three different forms. The event internally experienced may be regarded either as a vision or as a dream, or it may be viewed as the sum-total of certain seductive thoughts which came before the mind of Jesus when in a state of perfect consciousness. Each of these different possibilities has been adopted; but with so little success, that we need not devote much space to their discussion.
The idea of a vision or ecstasy introduces an element
of See Meyer, die Versuchung Christi als bedeutungsvoller Traum; Theol. Stud. u. Krit. 1831-32, pp. 319-329.
Among the interpretations which belong to this category, the
one which appears most plausible; is that which represents the whole occurrence
as a mental one, experienced, however, neither in a state of dream or ecstasy,
but undergone in a condition of full consciousness. According to this view,
the whole stress must be laid upon the testing of the Messianic character of Jesus,
and it must be supposed that He, before entering upon His public ministry, vividly
realized the false and carnal idea of the Messiah which was prevalent in the world
around Him and yet, notwithstanding the attractions it presented, both sensible
and spiritual, entirely, rejected it, and decided upon a life of activity in the
way appointed by God. This inward experience Jesus is supposed to have afterwards
communicated to the disciples Compare Hocheisen, Tübinger Zeitschrift, 1833, 2, p.
124.
In support of this view, there may be quoted from Scripture objective representations, whose character is, in like manner if not in equal degree, symbolical; and reference may be made to the fact, that inward experiences have always and everywhere been presented in a figurative form as outward facts. It must also be admitted that this explanation allows of a higher degree of actual temptation than do those above referred to. And yet it has great defects, and cannot be regarded as in any way exhaustive of the meaning of the text. It is not enough to confine the trial to the Messianic character of Jesus. We must, if the temptation is to be a real one, keep in view also His general human nature. Besides, without destroying the Gospel image of Jesus, we cannot concede that the temptation arose only from His own soul. It must have come to Him from without,—from a real, objective source. Thus only can the meaning of the Gospel narrative be preserved, for this would never have intended to symbolize, by the person of Satan, thoughts which arose from the soul of Jesus; and in our explanation of the whole, we must not do violence to this intention of the evangelists.
If, then, we accept the narrative of the evangelists simply as
it lies before us, it will appear indisputably evident that what we have to do with
here is an external event, which, however, from its very nature, powerfully affected
the soul of Jesus. Further, the idea of the evangelists is evidently that of a
personal tempter acting upon Jesus from without, in order to seduce Him from
the path which was pleasing to God, and especially from that way which, as Messiah,
God This opinion is supported at length in the above-cited article
of the Tübingen Quartalschrift. Lange has attempted a very peculiar combination in his Leben
Jesu (Pt. i. vol. ii. § 7, p. 205), a book in which so many ingenious theories are
advocated. On the one hand, he agrees with those who view the transaction as an
internal temptation of Jesus, resulting from the national and secular spirit, especially
the prevalent and false Messianic notions of the age. At the same time, he insists
that this influence was brought to bear upon Him by means of certain external temptations.
It is in the deputation of the Sanhedrim to John the Baptist (
Accordingly, nothing remains to us but to understand the tempter
to be Satan, as the evangelists represent. And then we have the following alternative
presented to us: either we must deny the historical credibility of the Gospel
account, and regard the whole as a myth; or, admitting its trustworthiness, we must
take the record as it is given us, and endeavour to render it intelligible.
When we reflect upon the entire character of the Gospels and their contents, as
well as upon those expressions which on other occasions fell from the lips of our
Lord Himself, we have no hesitation in deciding upon the latter alternative, and
shall accordingly, without any pretension to exhaustive argument, make a few
remarks on this view of the subject. The view of the whole as a temptation by Satan in person is
defended by Olshausen, Biblical Commentary, vol. i. p. 169 (Clark’s For.
Theol. Lib.). His explanation, however, can scarcely be considered a strictly literal
one, since he admits only an internal influence of the devil, and that only upon
the soul of Christ, while His spirit remains unaffected thereby. The supposition
that Jesus was during this occurrence deserted by the Divine Spirit, must be rejected
as being contrary to
Against the personal appearance of Satan the following objections
have been urged—not to mention the general scruples entertained against admitting
his existence at all, which have unmistakeably influenced those who have advanced
them. The bodily appearance, or speaking of Satan, it is said, is never elsewhere
mentioned in the New Testament. His personal appearance, even if disguised in a
human form (to which the text makes no allusion), must at once have taken from the
temptation all its attractions; for the Son of God must have recognised him at
a glance. De Wette, Exeget. llandbuch, i. 87.
These and similar questions might be raised in goodly number; and in truth they cannot all be so answered as to remove every difficulty. We
must not forget that we have here to do with a subject about which, from its very
nature, there must ever hang a certain amount of obscurity. Our general answer is
as follows:—Without entering at present upon infer and weighty reasons whose discussion
would lead us too far from our, more immediate object, we cannot but admit that
a belief in a kingdom of evil spirits, and a ruler thereof, as well as of
the influence of both upon mankind, is an important part of the teaching of our
Lord and His apostles. This is too expressly laid down to allow us to Martensen’s
Christliche Dogmatik, § 105.
Now, if we admit this, we shall have to understand the case
as the narrative presents it to us. In other words, even though we maintain
the historical character of the narrative, we yet distinguish very decidedly between
a recognition of its essential reality and a literal interpretation
of every detail. It is evident that the narrative cannot be taken in its
strictly literal sense, as is indeed proved by the one fact that there is no mountain
from which all the kingdoms of the world can be seen. There is undoubtedly somewhat
of a symbolical Comp.
Neander’s Leben Jesu, fifth ed. pp. 113 and 122 (Eng.
Trans. in Bohn’s Lib. 1852, pp. 74, 77).
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Ackermann quoted, 217.
Action and suffering combined in Jesus, 57.
Adam, the second, 203, etc.
Agony of Jesus in Gethsemane, 140-142.
Ἁμαρτία, import of the word, investigated, 72, etc.
Ἀναμαρτησία and ἀναμάρτητος, the meaning of the words, examined, 99.
Apollinaris, his Christology, 256.
Apollonius of Tyana, and Jesus Christ, 98.
Apologetics, the aim of, 4, etc.
Appearance, the physical, of Jesus, 190, etc.
Athanasius holds both the true humanity and sinlessness of Jesus, 256; seems to assume the sinlessness of other human individuals besides Jesus, 201.
Atonement of Jesus by His sacrificial death, 222.
Autonomy repudiated, 23.
Baur quoted respecting Apollonius of Tyana, 98.
Bretschneider referred to respecting the anamartesia of Jesus, 66.
Calling of Jesus, the, 49.
Centurion, the, his testimony to Jesus, 42.
Character of Jesus, import of the idea of the, 63.
Christianity, its nature, 4; how to be vindicated, 3-7, etc.; its effects in the domain of morals and religion, 81; new life of, in its religious and moral aspects, 83-90; combines the elements of morality and religion, 90.
Christology of Apollinaris, 256.
Church, the Christian, founded. by Christ, 232-239; His kingdom, 246.
Church of the Middle Ages pressed Christ into the background, 259.
Cicero quoted respecting Socrates, 54; respecting the impossibility of finding a wise man, 97.
Condescension, the, of Jesus, 48.
Consciousness of Jesus of His own sinlessness, 77-81.
Creative Divine influence in the origin of the personality of Jesus, 164.
Cross, the sufferings of Jesus on the, 142-144.
Cursing the fig-tree, Jesus, 146.
Daub’s conception of Judas, 150.
Death of Jesus, the, a true sacrifice, 222.
Demosthenes, .De Corona, quoted, 99.
Desertion by the Father, Jesus’ sense of, 142.
Development of the Person of Jesus, 109, etc.; does not necessarily involve antagonism with sin, 110, etc.; of Jesus perfectly normal, 110, 111; opposed to everything unnatural and monstrous, 111, 112.
Devil, the, who tempted Jesus, 287.
De Wette quoted, 75, 76, 163, 279, 282, 289.
Διάβολος, 287.
Divine nature of Jesus viewed in relation to His sinlessness, 196.
Doing and suffering, their relation in the life of Jesus, 57.
Dream, the temptation of Christ not a, 285.
Duty not the principle which regulated the actions of Jesus, but love, 16.
Ego, the, becomes the centre of life to fallen man, 27, etc.
Epictetus asserts the impossibility of moral stainlessness, 99.
Error in knowledge and fault in life, their connection, 183.
Eternal life, the sinless Jesus the pledge of, 239, etc.
Example superior in power to law, 213, etc.
Example of goodness, why a belief in, is not universal, 216.
Example of Jesus, its significance for us not destroyed by holding the Divine formation of His personality, 165.
Experience, arguments drawn from, against the sinlessness of Jesus, examined, 160-169.
Evidence, moral, however strong, may be resisted, 37; this true in relation to the evidence for Christ’s sinlessness, 37.
Faith in humanity and God, 161, etc.
Faith necessary on man’s side to enter into fellowship with Jesus, 230, etc.
Faith and love due to Jesus, 250.
Fathers of the Church, the older, their views of the physical appearance of Jesus, 191.
Fellowship of men, a true, formed by Jesus, 232.
Fig-tree, Jesus cursing the, 146.
Finiteness of Jesus, the, involves no sin nor guilt, 167.
Founder of the Church, Jesus the, 232-239.
Freedom, moral, an indestructible attribute of human nature, 164.
Free-will resident in a moral personality, 16.
Fulfilling of the law, love the only real, 26.
Gethsemane, 140-142.
God the centre of life to man, 27.
‘Good, none but One,’ 153-156.
Goodness, the image of, in Jesus, 218.
Goodness, the example of, why not the object of universal belief, 216.
Gospel portraiture of Jesus, 47-69.
Greatness of Jesus, 47; serenity of, 50, etc.
Harmony of the life of Jesus, 50, etc.
Hase’s Life of Jesus, as to the plan of Jesus, 115, note, 116, note; as to the supposed struggle of Jesus with error, 117, note; as to the infallibility of Jesus, 185; as to the temptation of Jesus, 278.
Hasert quoted, 141.
Heathen world, under the dominion of nature without a consciousness of sin, 85; viewed in relation to piety and morals, 92.
Hercules, parallel between Prodikus’ story of, and the two
Hippolytus first uses the word ἀναμάρτητος in reference to Christ, 255.
Hocheisen quoted as to the supposed parallel between the temptation of Jesus and that of Hercules, 139.
Holiness, innocence, and freedom from sin, how distinguished, 34, etc.; embraces morality and religion, 90-93; as a quality of man and an attribute of God, 91; viewed in relation to heathenism and Judaism, 92, etc.
Homer quoted, 48.
Human, the universally and the individual, united in Jesus, 52-55.
Human nature of Jesus, 182.
Humanity, the idea of, 174; realized in the sinless One, 176.
Humility and majesty of Jesus, 59, etc.
Humility, as an attribute of Jesus, does not imply sinfulness, 167.
Idea of the character of Jesus, its value, 63; not the idea of, but the fact, has influenced the world, 94-106.
Idea, the moral, arguments drawn from, against the sinlessness of Christ, examined, 169, etc.
Idea, the Divine, of humanity, 174.
Image of goodness in Jesus, all-comprehensive and intelligible, 218.
Impeccability and sinlessness, the difference between, 34.
‘In Christ,’ 231.
Individual, the, and the universally human, united and reconciled in Christ, 52-55.
Infallibility, the necessary result of moral perfection, 183, 184; this applied to Christ Jesus, 186, etc.
Inferences from the sinlessness of Jesus as to His human nature, 182, etc.; in respect to His Divine nature, 196, etc.; in regard to His relation to mankind, 207, etc.
Jesus, personally viewed, the idea whence the vindication of Christianity must proceed, 7; the influence of His image on the heart, 12; possibility of sin in, 34; His sinlessness may be denied, yet believable, 37; testimonies, borne to His sinlessness by men of different characters—Pilate, Pilate’s wife, 42,—the centurion, 42,—Judas, 43, apostles and apostolic men, 45; His moral greatness, 47, etc.; condescension, 48; a religious and moral personality, 49; harmony of His life, 50, etc.; relation of the individual to the human in the person of, as to family, nation, and humanity, 52-55; His self-reliance, 56, etc.; union of doing and suffering, 57; humility and majesty, 59, etc.; obedience to the Father’s will, 61, etc.; love to man, 61, etc.; beauty of the portrait of, 63, etc.; impossibility of inventing such a character, 64, etc. ; His sadness—its cause, 121; His temptation, 123, etc. (see Temptation); His agony in Gethsemane, 140, etc.; His sufferings on the cross, 142, etc.; His relation to Judas, 149, etc.; His physical appearance, 191, etc.; as a teacher, 186, etc.; as a worker of miracles, 194, etc.
Jesus, the Gospel portraiture of, 47, etc.
Jesus, His self-testimony to His sinlessness, 69-81.
Jesus, His relation to mankind,
Judaism, the consciousness of sin in, 85; character of its conception of holiness, 92.
Judas, his testimony to Jesus, 42; relation of Jesus to, 149-153.
Josephus’ testimony to Jesus referred to, 41.
Kingdom of Jesus ever set forth by Him as spiritual, 118; not of this world, 235.
Lauf’s view of the temptation of Jesus, 274.
Law, the moral, its nature and origin, 21-25; fulfilled by love, 26; inefficacious in comparison with example, 213.
Life, eternal, the sinless Jesus the pledge of, 239.
Love the fulfilling of the law, 26.
Love to God and man the regulating power of the life of Jesus, 61, 62.
Lücke quoted respecting the sinlessness of Jesus, 76.
Luther quoted, 251.
Majesty and humility of Jesus, 59.
Mediation, its necessity, 228.
Middle Age theologians, their adhesion to the sinlessness of Christ, 257.
Miracles, their apologetic value, 10.
Miracles of Jesus, the mode of their performance, 194, etc.
Mission of Jesus, the, 114; its object, 235.
Mohammed laid no claim to sinlessness, 100.
Monotheistic religions without the idea of sinless holiness in man, 99-101.
Moral idea, the argument drawn from the, against the sinlessness of Christ, examined, 169, etc.
Moral life, the new, in Christianity, 83-90.
Morality and religion united in holiness, 90-93.
Morals and religion, influence of Christianity in the domain of, 81; distinguished, 82.
Müller, Dr. Julius, his Doctrine of Sin quoted, 34; on the nature of personal development, 110; on the moral idea, 176.
Mythical view of the temptation of Christ examined, 280, etc.
Nationality of Jesus blended with the universal spirit of humanity, 53-55.
Nature, subjection of the heathen to the dominion of, 85, 92. Nestorius and Nestorianism falsely reproached with Pelagian views, 201.
Nitzsch quoted as to the ἀσθένεια of Christ, 126.
Obedience of love, the great principle of the life of Jesus, 61.
Objections to the apostles’ testimony to the sinlessness of Jesus examined, 65, etc.
Objections to the sinlessness of Jesus examined.—first, His mental and moral
development, 109-114; secondly, the development of the Messianic plan, 114-123; thirdly, His temptations, 123, etc.,—temptation viewed as allurement to sin, 135-137,—temptation
from sufferings, 139-144; fourthly, New Testament facts, viz.—His apparent
disobedience, 145,—His cursing the fig-tree, 146,—permitting
Œtinger’s Contributions to the Theology of the Koran quoted, 100.
Old Testament sacrifices, their nature and design, 223, etc.
Olshausen’s Biblical Commentary quoted on the human development of the Messiah, 112, etc.; on the call of Judas, 150; on the temptation of Jesus, 288. Order of the world in the domain of nature, 16; in the ethical kingdom, 17-19.
Osiander quoted respecting the joyousness and sadness of Jesus, 121.
Parable, the temptation of Christ not a, 277.
Πειράζων, the, 287.
Pelagianism, its relation to the Person of Jesus, 200.
Person of Jesus, the, not His doctrine, the source of His influence, 83-84; the centre of our religion, 248.
Personality of Jesus, the religious, 49; formed by Divine creative influence, 164.
Pfeiffer’s view of the temptation of Jesus, 266.
Pilate, his testimony to Jesus, 42.
Plan of Jesus, objection to the phrase, 115; not altered, ibid.; but ever the same, 115-118.
Plato, his portrait of a righteous man, 96.
Plenipotentiary of God, Jesus the, 147.
Portrait, the Gospel, of Jesus, 47-69; not the creation of the fancy of the early Christians, 64, etc.
Possibility of sin in Jesus, a truth, when rightly understood, 33.
Proof, moral, however strong, may be rejected, 37.
Reconciliation and redemption through Christ, 88-90.
Reformers, the Protestant, their principal merit, 259.
Religion, its basis and nature, 5, 6; and morality distinguished, 82; combined in holiness, 90, etc.
Religious life, the new, created. by Jesus, 86; consisting in reconciliation and redemption, 88.
Religious personality of Jesus, the, 49.
Revelation, the sinless Jesus, the personal, of the will of God, 209.
Righteous man, the, Plato’s portrait of, 96.
Sacrifice of Jesus, a sacrifice of atonement, 222; the condition of, 224; reveals sin, 226, etc.; awakens sorrow, 227; communicates grace, ibid.
Sacrifices of the Old Testament, their nature and design, 223.
Sadness of Jesus, its cause, 121.
Salvation only in Christ, 248.
Σάρξ ascribed to Christ in a good sense, 125.
Satan, who tempted Jesus, how to be viewed, 137.
Schleiermacher quoted, 112.
Selfishness the real essence of sin, 27, 28.
Self-reliance of Jesus, 56, etc.
Self-surrender to God’s holy will, man’s right relation, 26.
Self-testimony of Jesus respecting His sinlessness—negative, 69-71; positive, 71-81.
Sensuous element, the, in the virtue of Jesus, involved nothing sinful, 166.
Sin, its nature, 14, etc.; a violation of order, 17, etc.; a
coming
Sinfulness, and the possibility of sinning, distinguished, 163.
Sinlessness, both negative and positive, 1, 33; influence of the thought, 1; importance of, in relation to apologetics, 3-9; a moral perfection, 35, 36; perfect obedience, 35; perfect union with God, 36; distinguished from impeccability, 34; believable of Jesus, 37; testimony of Jesus to His own sinlessness, 69-81; effects of the belief of, 81, etc.; these effects not produced by an idea, but by a fact, 94, etc.; not invented by the apostles, 102.
Sinless perfection, a tradition of an actual life of, 2; the impression caused by such an appearance, 2, 3.
Sinners, all men are, 202.
Socrates and Jesus, 54, 65, 66, 97, 98.
Sophocles, the pictures of virtue which he presents, 95.
Spiritualism, 94.
Stapfer quoted, 181.
Steudel quoted on the possibility of sin in Jesus, 34.
Strauss, his mythical view of the temptation of Jesus, 282.
Substitute for sinners, Jesus the, 228.
Suffering and doing, the relation between, in Jesus, 57.
Sufferings of Christ, the, in Gethsemane, 140-142; on the cross, 142-144.
Swine, the destruction of the herd of, its bearing on the character of Jesus, 148, etc.
Teacher, Jesus viewed as a, 186, etc.
Temple, the expulsion of the buyers and sellers from the, by Jesus, 148.
Temptation, its relation to evil, 127-129.
Temptation of Jesus, its reality, 124; ground of its possibility, 126; the narrative of, considered in relation to the sinlessness of Jesus, 129; historical character of the narrative of, 131, 132; threefold, 133,134; its reference to His Messianic character, 134; its reference to Him as man, 134-136; may be viewed as an outward or inward transaction, 136; His moral purity unsullied thereby, 137; exercised no determining influence over His inward life, 138; examination of details of the narrative of, 265-276; explanations which represent the narrative as a mere product of thought, 277-286; explanations which recognise in it a historical basis, 284-291.
Tempter, the, 287.
Testimony of Jesus to His own sinlessness, 69-81.
Union with Christ, 231.
Unity, the, of mankind, secured in Christ, 232-239.
Usteri’s view of the narrative of the agony of Jesus in Gethsemane, 140; mythical view of the temptation of Jesus, 280, etc.
Vision, the temptation of Christ not a, 285.
Wandsbeeker Messenger, the, quoted on the value of the idea of the character of Christ, 63.
Weber quoted respecting the sinlessness of Jesus, 66.
Weisse quoted on the moral sinlessness of Jesus, 190.
Will of God, the, concerning us, a will of holy love, 26, etc.; the sinless Jesus, the personal revelation of the, 209, etc.
Xenophon’s testimony to Socrates, compared with the apostles’ testimony to Jesus, 65, 66; quoted, 97.
Young man, the rich, 153-156.
Zeal of Jesus, the, 148.
Genesis
Exodus
Leviticus
Deuteronomy
1 Kings
Psalms
22:1 22:1 45:8 72:1 91:11 91:12
Isaiah
Matthew
3:13-17 3:13-17 4:1 4:1-11 4:3 4:6 4:8-11 5:8 5:10-12 5:16 5:19 5:28 7:49 8:34 8:35 9:6 9:15 9:40 10:16-25 10:32 10:38 10:39 11:20-24 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:27 11:28 11:28 12:30 13:39 13:54 15:18 15:22-28 16:18 16:21 18:10 18:15-18 19:17 19:27-30 19:28 20:28 21:12-17 21:17-22 22:21 22:33 23:37-39 25:31 25:40 26:28 26:29 26:36-47 27:4 27:19 27:46 27:54 28 28:18-20 28:19 28:20
Mark
1:12 1:13 2:7 2:10 3:32-35 5:1-20 5:1-20 10:18 11:11-26 11:15-19 14:24 14:32-43
Luke
1:15 1:15 1:22 1:32 2:41-51 2:41-52 2:52 4:1-13 4:6 4:13 4:16 4:18-24 4:29 5:8 5:21 8:9-14 8:26-39 9:59 9:60 10:9 10:22 11:23 11:27 11:28 13:21-30 15:13 15:15 15:18 15:18 16:9 17:12-19 17:21 18:19 19:41-44 19:45 19:48 22:20 22:28 22:39-47 22:61 22:61 23:16 23:40 23:47 24:26 24:28 24:46 24:47
John
1:17 1:24 1:31-33 1:32 1:33 2:4 2:4 2:17 2:19 3:5 3:11 3:14 3:15 4:34 4:34 4:34 5 5:19 5:21 5:22 5:26 5:26 5:27 5:30 5:30 5:41 6:15 6:15 6:17 6:33 6:38 6:46 6:64 6:64 6:68 6:70 7:8 7:10 7:17 7:18 7:46 8:13 8:20 8:28 8:28 8:28 8:29 8:29 8:31 8:32-36 8:34 8:44 8:44 8:45 8:46 8:46 8:46 8:46 8:46 8:46 8:46 8:58 8:59 9:16 10:11-16 10:14 10:16 10:18 10:18 10:30 10:30 10:31 11:5 11:25 12:24 12:26 12:31 12:45 13:2 13:31 13:32 13:36 14 14:2 14:3 14:6 14:6 14:6 14:9 14:9 14:12 14:19 14:27 14:30 16:4 16:9 16:21 16:22 16:23 16:33 17:1 17:2 17:3 17:4 17:4-6 17:5 17:5 17:6 17:19 17:21 17:21 17:24 18:6 18:37 19:30 20:22 20:23 24:31 24:33
Acts
2:27 3:14 4:12 8:25 10:36 22:14
Romans
1:1-32 2:1-29 3:20 5:8 5:10 5:13 5:19 5:19 5:19 6:16-23 6:23 7:7-39 8:3 8:5 8:7 8:7 14:28
1 Corinthians
2 Corinthians
2:10 3:18 5:17 5:17 5:17 5:21 5:21
Galatians
Ephesians
Philippians
1 Timothy
Titus
Hebrews
1:1-3 2:2 2:10-18 2:10-18 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 4:15 5:7 5:7-9 5:7-9 5:8 5:9 7:26 7:26 7:27 7:27 7:27 7:27 9:12 9:12 9:14 9:26-28 12:2 13:8
James
1 Peter
2 Peter
1 John
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300