§ II.—CHAPTER IX.

MENTAL ORDER.

IN advancing to this farther and higher branch of our illustrative evidence, we do not consider it necessary to enter into any formal proof of mind as a substance essentially distinct from matter. That it is so distinct has been assumed in the whole course of our preliminary reasoning, and quite warrantably so. For, to say the least, mind is as much entitled, apart from proof, to be held a distinct reality as matter. Nay, of the two, there cannot be any doubt to the genuine thinker which is the real, primary, and constitutive element of knowledge: and for the materialist, therefore, to demand a proof of the separate existence of mind, and for the philosopher or theologian to grant him the validity of this demand, is simply among the absurdities which have sprung out of the degradation both of philosophy and theology.¹⁰⁵¹⁰⁵   The assumption that mind is nothing else than a material function, and that the science of mind is only the highest range of the general science of physiology, is one among the many specimens of the thoroughly unphilosophic procedure which characterises Positivism. The whole tone and reasoning of M. Comte on this subject (Philosophic Positive, tome ii. p. 766 et seq.) are in fact ignorantly arrogant to such a degree as to need no refutation. His followers in this country have expressly repudiated his confusion of psychology with physiology as merely one of its branches. Vide Mr MILL’S Logic, vol. ii. p. 422-423, and Mr LEWES’ Exposition of Positivism, p. 212.
   If any one desires to see the degraded and unintelligible substitute which, under the name of “a New Cerebral Theory,” M. Comte would give us, in place of our mental philosophy, let him consult the statement of this theory, in the Politique Positive, or in the concluding section of the first part of Mr Lewes’ volume.183The right of question, the burden of proof, lies plainly all the other way; matter per se, nature independently of mind, being, according to our whole reasoning, as well as according to all true philosophy, the simply inconceivable and inexplicable.

It is only the fact of mind, the reality of a rational consciousness in man, which at once gives occasion to the theistic problem, and forms the condition of its solution. It is only to reason that the question could ever arise, Is there a God? It is only reason that could ever originate an answer to this question. Mind, therefore, in its full and comprehensive sense—the sense in which we made such frequent use of it in our first chapters—is an element of wholly peculiar significance for our argument. It is the condition of it from the beginning. Within the mental or rational sphere alone does the argument find a footing; and within this sphere alone, as we shall afterwards see, does it find its completion. It goes forth into the world of phenomena everywhere, seeking illustration and confirmation; but the rational human spirit, the νοὺς, which is one and abiding amid all variety and fluctuation of phenomena, is alone the home of its birth, and equally of its full maturity and strength.

This radical and distinctive importance of mind must not for a moment be overlooked in the course of our evidence. But mind also presents itself to us in another point of view. In its complex and various manifestations, it furnishes also an illustrative contribution to our argument. It is not only, according to its fundamental theistic meaning, the essential correlate and condition of order everywhere, but is itself, viewed objectively, in its manifold expressions, an illustration of order of the most interesting and impressive kind. Mental phenomena bring their own appropriate testimony to the Divine wisdom, while their specialty, beyond all mere material facts, enables us for the first time to trace in an inductive manner the Divine goodness.

The field of theistic illustration afforded by mental phenomena has not, indeed, been very much frequented by natural theologians. Lord Brougham, in his discourse on Natural Theology, adverted to this neglect, and so far took up the subject in one of the sections of that work. But at the same time he has done little really to rescue it from the neglect of which he complained; and it may be doubted, from his partial treatment of it, whether he fully understood its character and importance. Dr Chalmers, in his Natural Theology, has dealt more adequately with certain parts of our mental constitution in their theistic interpretation; but he has left other parts of it, equally significant, wholly untouched.

The truth is, that there is peculiar difficulty in dealing with mental phenomena for our purpose. They are at once so confluent and subtle in themselves, and so encompassed with debate and uncertainty, arising out of the ceaseless 185polemic of philosophy, that the theologian has naturally sought for illustrations of his argument in a less difficult and fluctuating class of phenomena. At the same time, the very character of mental phenomena, in their higher complicacy and refinement, only renders them the more richly fitted to display the Divine perfections, in so far as we can truly seize and represent them. The exquisite varieties of sensation, the marvellous structure of thought, the glorious workings of imagination, the infinite play of emotion, and the profound depths of passion, all speak with the most eloquent utterance of the Divine wisdom and beneficence.

In the remaining chapters of this section, we endeavour to bring into view some of the theistic meaning, which may be everywhere traced in mental phenomena. The divisions which have been commonly made of these phenomena into those of sensation, cognition, and emotion, will successively engage us. We accept these divisions as serving sufficiently to characterise the complexity of our mental life, apart from those higher rational elements which afterwards, according to our plan, receive attention by themselves; and while our treatment, no less than that of the writers of which we have spoken, must be here very inadequate, it may yet include a sufficiently comprehensive survey of the whole field, as it presents itself, in such rich diversities of aspect, for inspection.