INTRODUCTION.

“THE EVIDENCE THAT THERE IS A BEING, ALL-POWERFUL, WISE, AND GOOD, BY WHOM EVERYTHING EXISTS; AND PARTICULARLY TO OBVIATE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE WISDOM AND GOODNESS OF THE DEITY; AND THIS, IN THE FIRST PLACE, FROM CONSIDERATIONS INDEPENDENT OF WRITTEN REVELATION; AND, IN THE SECOND PLACE, FROM THE REVELATION OF THE LORD JESUS; AND, FROM THE WHOLE, TO POINT OUT THE INFERENCES MOST NECESSARY FOR, AND USEFUL TO, MANKIND.’

SOME ambiguity seems to rest on the main subject here claiming the consideration of the Essayist. The words may be so interpreted as to give for the special subject of Essay the polemical treatment of the various objections that have been urged against the wisdom and goodness of the Deity. This, however, is not the interpretation which they were probably intended to bear. The special attention claimed to difficulties respecting the Divine wisdom and goodness was not meant, in all likelihood, to constitute these the chief topics of treatment, in contrast to the general subject announced 2in the first clause; but simply to indicate that, inasmuch as these attributes have been more frequently the objects of sceptical assault, and are in themselves more obviously exposed to cavil, so they deserve a more particular proof, not only on positive grounds, but in direct reference to the objections which readily occur, and have been often brought against them. The truth is, that, in any attempt “to obviate” these difficulties, the main recourse must ever be to the vastly preponderating positive evidence in favour of the wisdom and goodness of the Deity; and just the more thorough and complete the presentation of this evidence, the less force will be felt in such difficulties, and the less trouble in dealing with them polemically.

In any point of view, therefore, we consider ourselves justified in regarding the main and proper subject of Essay as that announced in the first clause—viz., the “Evidence that there is a Being, all-powerful, wise, and good, by whom everything exists.” And to this subject, accordingly, the bulk of the present treatise is devoted.

The science of Natural Theology has especially suffered from the narrow and one-sided spirit in which it has been cultivated. Separate inquirers have generally given themselves to some favourite branch of evidence, which they have not been content merely to explore by itself, but which they have aimed to exalt over other branches. The successive labours of natural theologians appear in this way to present the spectacle rather of inconsistent structures, displacing or overlying one another, than of parts fitting harmoniously together into one great scheme of argument. The still standing dispute between the a posteriori and a priori 3classes of thinkers, testifies strongly to this discordance. While some profound and earnest men have sought to raise the whole superstructure of natural theology upon an a priori datum, others, equally earnest, though with less speculative power, have at once put aside all such attempts as useless, and even impugned them with a jealous restrictiveness.

Zeal on the one side has provoked contempt on the other; and here, as in other cases, the abstract reasoner and the popular expositor have seemed to stand as opponents, rather than as helpmates in the same cause.²²   This conflict among natural theologians was already indicated by Kant in his great work, in which he submits all the separate modes of theistic argument to a keenly scientific sifting. And it is impossible that any can be familiar with even our own British literature on the subject, without being made aware of the existence of such a conflict.

The result of this has been not a little confusion and uncertainty as to the principles of the science on the one hand, and its comprehensiveness on the other. With a general acknowledgment of the convincing mass of evidence on which it is based, the clear logical coherence and relative bearing of that evidence are still very indistinctly apprehended. The problem of natural theology—what it really is? what principles it involves? and the distinctive character and force of these principles?—it cannot be said that there exists anything like harmony of opinion on these questions. Great as was the service rendered to the science by the varied interest and argumentative skill of the Bridgewater Treatises, these questions lay beyond the formal range of any of them; and, with all the light which they cast on its diversified applications, they contributed but little to the 4 determination, the scientific analysis and co-ordination of its fundamental doctrine.

But so far as the interests of the science are concerned in our day, this is undoubtedly the special task required of the natural theologian. It is in the region of First Principles, above all, that an earnest and sifting discussion is now taking place. There is an evident striving to grasp in a clearer solution, to hold in a more thorough unity and comprehensiveness than have been hitherto attained, the elements of our science. The spirit of eclecticism which has largely penetrated philosophy in general, is seeking, in this department of it, with special eagerness, a common centre and pervading interest. We have ourselves, at least, strongly felt the necessity for a treatment of the theistic problem at once more penetrating and synthetic, and have accordingly aimed at such a treatment of it in the present essay.

We apprehend the theistic evidence, as far as possible, under one plan or scheme, which may be generally called “Inductive.” Inasmuch, however, as this plan of evidence, in its very conception, rests upon certain definite principles of philosophical belief, we consider it necessary, in the first instance, to lay down and verify these principles. We have felt that, in the present state of speculative discussion, we could not for a moment take these principles for granted, seeing that the two most living and active schools of philosophical unbelief proceed upon the express negation of them, and that in them really lies the gist of the theistic problem. It is our aim, accordingly, not merely to state these principles, but to establish them.

Having laid down a satisfactory basis of principles, we proceed, in the second section of the essay, to unfold, in something like organic relation and coherence, the array of inductive or a posteriori evidence for the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness presented by the vastly diversified phenomena of matter and of mind. This obviously is a boundless field, which no range of inquiry can exhaust, and which, even were it possible, it would be needless, for the end in view, to try to exhaust. Our object is simply to unfold the distinguishing and essential features of this ever-accumulating mass of evidence, and to present them, as far as we can, in an order of progression, in which they may be seen to bear with expansive force upon the vindication and illustration of the Divine character. We advance from the more general and simple phenomena of nature, through the more complex, up to the highest and most subtle combinations to be found in man’s intellectual and emotive constitution; and in the course of this procession it is our chief aim—that under the guidance of which we advance—to seize and set forth those ultimate typical realities which all along meet us, and which, while in their mystery they point directly back to a Divine Source, serve at the same time prominently to characterise this Source. It is only some guiding aim of this sort, however imperfectly it may be carried out, that could bring within any intelligible limits, or give any living interest to, such a survey.

Whereas the section on “Principles” will, it is hoped, serve to verify on the deepest grounds the fundamental theistic conception of an intelligent First Cause,—this second illustrative section will serve to clothe the bare 6 abstract idea of such a Cause in the attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness reflected from the great leading forms or facts of nature.

Having completed our inductive survey, we return, in a third section, which we have entitled “Moral Intuitive Evidence,” to the region of First Principles, and in this region endeavour further to establish certain elements of the theistic conception—viz., Personality, Righteousness, and Infinity—without a special verification of which, every theistic argument must, according to our view, utterly fail of its purpose. Under this section of evidence we are led to treat of the common a priori argument, and to assign to it its distinctive value in the general plan of theistic speculation.

It may be inferred from what we have said that, while our second section of Evidence corresponds to the common treatment of the a posteriori argument, as exemplified in Paley and the Bridgewater Treatises, both our first and third sections deal simply with the elements of the a priori argument. And if any choose to apply the term a priori to the discussions contained in these sections, it matters very little. They really, however, embrace a course of reasoning to which that term, in the restrictive sense in which it has been applied to definite arguments for the existence of the Deity, has no proper application.³³   The term a priori is not, in fact, applied with any consistency even to these arguments, some of the different forms of the Cartesian argument, and that of Clarke especially, resting on an express datum of experience; whereas it is the pretension of a pure a priori argument to demonstrate the Divine existence from the formal conceptions of the human mind.

Upon any definite scheme of a priori argumentation, involving a process of mere abstract deduction from some 7single element of thought, or even of experience, it will be seen in the sequel that we do not place any reliance. We are as little inclined as those who have most zealously opposed this sort of argumentation, to ascribe a convincing force to it. So far we are at one with the general spirit of natural theological inquiry which prevails in this country, as represented by such writers as Brown, Brougham, and Chalmers. But, then, we consider that these writers, while rightly repudiating the conclusiveness of a priori reasoning in reference to our subject, have failed to set forth, and even to apprehend with clearness and comprehensiveness, the subjective conditions, or, in our previous language, principles, which their a posteriori argument at once presupposes as its essential basis, and demands in order to its complete and effective validity. Now, it is simply the object of the first and third section of this essay to determine and verify these conditions or principles, which, as thus forming both the only adequate foundation, and the culminating force of the general evidence for the Divine existence and character, seem eminently in the present day to claim the attention of the natural theologian. The chain of induction goes up in unnumbered links; but this chain rests at both points on principles of intuitive belief, which must be thoroughly understood and substantiated.

While, therefore, our third section receives a distinctive name, and might, as a branch of theistic evidence, to some extent stand by itself, we would yet have it to be viewed in strict connection with the preceding sections; in which connection alone our general Evidence will be seen in its fully conclusive bearing.

A fourth and concluding section is devoted, according to our view of the terms of the subject, to a particular examination of the “difficulties regarding the wisdom and goodness of the Deity,” as they derive any explanation from the light of Nature, or finally from the disclosures of “written Revelation.”

Throughout the essay we have kept in view very prominently the anti-theistic tendencies of our time, especially as manifested in the form of Positivism. This seemed to be demanded by the character of the essay, which, prescribed at intervals of forty years, was probably designed to meet the forms of speculative scepticism likely to arise at such intervals. In the history of thought, forty years is a wide period, during which great changes of opinion may be expected to occur. And it is at least certain that, since the date of the publication of the last essays on our subject, the questions between the Christian Theist and the speculative Sceptic, if, as they must ever be, essentially the same, have yet assumed very changed aspects. Materialistic Pantheism, in the shape of “Positive Philosophy,” has especially assumed a dignity and pretension which in some respects invest it with a new character, and require a new and more comprehensive mode of treatment. Our essay throughout will be found to bear the impress of this conviction.⁴⁴   Miss Martineau’s recent translation of Comte’s great work, and Mr G. H. Lewes’ popular exposition of Positivism (published as one of the volumes of Bohn’s Scientific Library), give additional significance to the purpose that animates our essay.