SERMON CLXXIV.

OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, AS DISCOVERED BY NATURE AND BY REVELATION.

But is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.—2 Tim. i. 10.

I PROCEED to the second argument, that this notion or principle of the immortality of the soul, doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but doth very well accord and agree with all those other notions which are most natural. I shall mention two, which seem to be the most natural notions that we have, and the most deeply rooted in our natures; the one is the existence and the perfections of God; and the other the difference of good and evil. Mankind do universally agree in these two principles, that there is a God who is essentially good and just, and that there is a real difference between good and evil, which is not founded in the opinion and imaginations of persons, or in the custom and usage of the world, but in the nature of things. Now this principle of the immortality of the soul, and future rewards after this life, is so far from clashing with either of these principles, that the contrary assertion, viz. that our souls are mortal, and that there is nothing to be hoped for, or feared, beyond this life, would very much contradict those other principles. To shew this then particularly,

1. The immortality of the soul is very agreeable to the natural notion which we have of God, one part whereof is, that he is essentially good and just.

(1.) For his goodness. It is very agreeable to that, to think that God would make some creatures for as long a duration as they are capable of. The wisdom of God hath chosen to display itself, in creating variety of things of different degrees and perfections; things devoid of life and sense; and several degrees and orders of sensitive creatures, of different shapes and figures, of different magnitude; some vastly great, others extremely little, others of middle sort between these. And himself being a pure spirit, we have no reason to doubt, but he could make creatures of a spiritual nature, and such as should have no principle of self-corruption in them. And seeing he could make creatures of such perfection, if we believe him to be essentially good, we have no reason to doubt, but that he hath done so. For it is the very nature of goodness to communicate and diffuse itself, and to delight in doing so; and we cannot imagine, but that the same goodness which prompted and inclined him to give being to those creatures which are of an inferior degree of perfection, would move him likewise to make creatures more perfect, and capable of greater degrees of happiness, and of a longer enjoyment of it, if it were in his power to make such; and no man that believes the omnipotency of God can doubt of this. For he who by a pure act of his will can command things to be, and in an instant to start out of nothing, can as easily make one sort of creatures as another. Now the power of God being supposed, his goodness secures us of his will: 543for we cannot imagine any such thing as envy in a Being which we suppose to be perfectly good; no thing being more inconsistent with perfect goodness, than to be unwilling to communicate happiness to others, and to grudge that others should partake of it.

Now this being supposed, that God could and would make creatures of a spiritual and immortal nature, and the utmost imaginable perfections of such creatures being knowledge and liberty, wherever these perfections are found, we have reason to conclude that creature to be endowed with a principle that is of a spiritual and immortal nature. Now these perfections of understanding and will being found in man, this argues him to be endowed with such a principle, as is in his own nature capable of an immortal duration.

It is true, indeed, this spiritual part of man, which we call his soul, is united to a visible and material part, viz. his body; the union of which parts constitutes a peculiar sort of creature, which is utriusque mundi nexus, unites the material and immaterial world, the world of matter and of spirits. And as it is very suitable to the wisdom of God, which delights in variety, that there should be a sort of creatures compounded of both these principles, matter and spirit; so it is very agreeable to his goodness to think, that he would design such creatures for as long a duration and continuance as they were capable of. For as it is the effects of goodness to bring creatures forth into the possession of that life and happiness which they are capable of; so to continue them in the enjoyment of it for so long as they are capable.

The sum of all this is, that as it is agreeable to 544the wisdom of God, which made the world, to display itself in all variety of creatures; so it is agree able to his goodness, to make some of as perfect a kind as creatures are capable of being. Now it being no repugnancy nor contradiction, that a creature should be of a spiritual and immortal nature, we have no reason to think, but that the fruitfulness of the Divine goodness hath brought forth such creatures; and if there be reason to conclude any thing to be of a spiritual and immortal nature, certainly the principle of understanding and liberty, which we are conscious of in ourselves, deserves to be reputed such.

(2.) It is very agreeable to the justice of God, to think the souls of men remain after this life, that there may be a state of reward and recompence in another world. If we believe God to be holy and just, we cannot but believe that he loves righteousness and goodness, and hates iniquity; and that, as he is governor and public magistrate of the world, he is concerned to countenance and encourage the one, and to discountenance and discourage the other. Now the providences of God being in a great measure promiscuously administered in this world, so that no man can make any certain judgment of God’s love and hatred towards persons by what befals them in this world, it being the lot of good men many times to suffer and be afflicted, and of wicked men to live in a flourishing and prosperous condition; I say, things being thus, it is very agreeable to those notions which we have of the Divine holiness and justice, to believe that there will a time come, when this wise and just Governor of the world will make a wide and visible difference between the righteous and the wicked; so that 545though for a while the justice of God may be clouded, yet there will a time come when it shall be clearly manifested, and every eye see it and bear witness to it; when “judgment shall break forth as the light, and righteousness as the noon-day.” It is possible that sin for a while may go unpunished, nay, triumph and prosper; and that virtue and innocence may not only be unrewarded, but oppressed, and despised, and persecuted. And this may be reconcileable enough to the wisdom of God’s providence and the justice of it, supposing the immortality of the soul, and another state after this life, wherein all things shall be set straight, and every man shall receive according to his works: but unless this be supposed, it is impossible to solve the justice of God’s providence. Who will believe that the affairs of the world are administered by him who loves righteousness, and hates all the workers of iniquity, who will not let the least service that is done to him pass unrewarded, nor, on the other hand, acquit the guilty, and let sin go unpunished, which are the properties of justice; I say, who will believe this, that looks into the course of the world, and sees with how little difference and distinction of good and bad the affairs of it are managed? That sees virtue discountenanced and despised, poor and destitute, afflicted and tormented; when wickedness is many times exalted to high places, and makes a great noise and ruffle in the world? He that considers what a hazard many times good men run, how for goodness’ sake they venture, and many times quit all the contentments and enjoyments of this life, and submit to the greatest sufferings and calamities that human nature is capable of; while in the mean time prosperity is poured into the lap of the wicked, and 546Heaven seems to look pleasantly upon those that deal treacherously, and to be silent whilst the wicked devours the man that is more righteous than himself; he that considers this, and can, without supposing another life after this, pretend to vindicate the justice of these things, must he as blind as the fortune that governs them. Would not this be a perpetual stain and blemish upon the Divine Providence, that Abel, who offered up a better sacrifice than Cain, and “had this testimony, that he pleased God;” yet, after all this, should have no other reward for it, but to be slain by his brother, who had offender! God by a slight and contemptuous offering? If there were no reward to be expected after this life, would not this have been a sad example to the world, to see one of the first men that served God acceptably thus rewarded? What a pitiful encouragement would it be to men to be good, to see profane Esau blessed with the dew of heaven, and fatness of the earth; and to hear good old Jacob, in the end and conclusion of his days, to complain, “Few and evil have the days of my pilgrimage been!” If this had been the end of Esau and Jacob, it would puzzle all the wit and reason of mankind to wipe off this reproach from the providence of God, and vindicate the justice of it. And therefore I do not wonder, that the greatest wits among the heathen philosophers were so much puzzled with this objection against the providence of God—If the wise, and just, and good God do administer the affairs of the world, and be concerned in the good or bad actions of men, cur bonis male et malis bene? “How comes it to pass, that good men many times are miserable, and bad men so happy in the world?” And they had no other way to wipe off this objection, 547but by referring these things to another world, wherein the temporal sufferings of good men should he eternally rewarded, and the short and transient happiness of wicked men should be rendered insignificant, and drowned in an eternity of misery.

So that, if we believe the being of God, and the providence of God (which I do all along take for granted in this argument), there is no other way imaginable to solve the equity and justice of God’s providence, but upon this supposition—that there is an other life after this. For to say, that virtue is a sufficient and abundant reward for itself, though it have some truth in it, if we set aside those sufferings, and miseries, and calamities, which virtue is frequently attended with in this life; yet, if these be taken in, it is but a very jejune and dry speculation. For considering the strong propension and inclination of human nature to avoid these evils and inconveniencies, a state of virtue attended with great sufferings, would be so far from being a happiness, that it would be a real misery; so that the determination of the apostle (1 Cor. xv. 19.) is according to nature, and the truth and reason of things, that, “If in this life only we had hope, we were of all men most miserable.” For although it be true, that, as things now stand, and as the nature of man is framed, good men do find a strange kind of inward pleasure and secret satisfaction of mind in the discharge of their duty, and doing what is virtuous; yet every man that looks into himself and consults his own breast, will find that this delight and contentment springs chiefly from the hopes which men conceive, that a holy and virtuous life shall not be unrewarded: and without these hopes virtue is but a dead and empty name; and notwithstanding the reasonableness of 548virtuous actions compared with the contrary of them, yet when virtue came to be incumbered with difficulties, and to be attended with such sufferings and inconveniencies, as were grievous and intolerable to human nature, then it would appear unreasonable to choose that for a happiness, which would rob a man of all the felicity of his life. For though a man were never so much in love with virtue for the native beauty and comeliness of it; yet it would strangely cool his affection to it, to consider that he should be undone by the match; that when he had it, he must go a begging with it, and be in danger of death, for the sake of that which he had chosen for the felicity of his life. So that, how devout soever the woman might be, yet I dare say she was not over-wise and considerate, who, going about with a pitcher of water in one hand, and a pan of coals in the other, and being asked what she intended to do with them, answered, that she intended with the one to burn up heaven, and with the other to quench hell, that men might love God and virtue for their own sakes, without hope of reward or fear of punishment.

And the consequence of this dry doctrine does sufficiently appear in the sect of the Sadducees, which had its rise from this principle of Sadoc, the master of the sect, who, out of an indiscreet zeal to teach something above others, and indeed above the pitch of human nature, inculcated this doctrine upon his scholars—that religion and virtue ought to be loved for themselves, though there were no reward of virtue to be hoped, nor punishment of vice to be feared, in another world; from which his disciples inferred, that it was not necessary to religion to believe a future state, and, in process of time, peremptorily maintained, that there was no life 549after this. For they did not only deny the resurrection of the body, but, as St. Paul tells us, they said, that “there was neither angel nor spirit;” that is, they denied that there was any thing of an immortal nature, that did remain after this life. And what the consequence of this was, we may see in the character which Josephus gives of that sect; for he tells, that the commonalty of the Jews were of the sect of the Pharisees, but most of the great and rich men were Sadducees; which plainly shews, that this dry speculation, of loving religion and virtue for themselves, without any expectation of future rewards, did end in their giving over all serious pursuit of religion; and, because they hoped for nothing after this life, therefore laying aside all other considerations, they applied themselves to the present business of this life, and grasped as much of the present enjoyments of its power and riches, as they could by any means attain to.

And for a farther evidence of this, that it is only or principally the hopes of a future happiness that bear men up in the pursuit of virtue, that give them so much comfort and satisfaction in the prosecution of it, and make men encounter the difficulties, and oppositions, and persecutions they meet withal in the ways of religion, with so much undauntedness and courage; I say, for the farther evidence of this, I shall only offer this consideration—that, according to the degree of this hope and assurance of another life, men’s constancy and courage in the ways of virtue and religion have been. Before Christ’s coming into the world, and the bringing of” life and immortality to light by the gospel,” we do not find in all ages of the world, so many instances of patience and constant suffering for religion, as happened in the 550first age after Christ. God did not think fit to try the world so much in this kind, till they were furnished with a principle which would bear them up tinder the greatest sufferings, which was nothing else but the full assurance which the gospel gave the world of a blessed immortality after this life; the firm belief and persuasion of which, made Christians dead to the world, and all the contentments and enjoyments of it, and by raising them above all the pleasures and terrors of sense, made them to despise present things, “in hopes of eternal life, which God that could not lie had promised.” This was that which set them above the fears of death, so that they were not to be frightened out of their religion by the most exquisite torments, and all the most horrid and fearful shapes, that the malice of men and devils could dress up misery and affliction in. Whereas, under the old dispensation of the law, before the revelation of the gospel, when the promises of eternal life were not so clear, and men’s hopes of it more weak and faint, the express encouragement to obedience was founded in the promises of temporal blessings; God herein complying with the necessity of human nature, which is not to be wrought upon to any great purpose, but by arguments of advantage.

The sum of this argument, which I have thus largely dilated upon, because I look upon it as one of the most strong and convincing of the soul’s immortality, is this; that the justice of God’s providence cannot sufficiently be vindicated, but upon the supposal of this principle of the soul’s immortality: whereas, if this principle be admitted, that men pass out of this life into an eternal state of happiness or misery, according as they have behaved 551themselves in this world; then the account of the unequal providences of God in this world is easy. For if we look upon this life as a state of probation, of trial to wicked men, and of exercise to good men, in order to a future and eternal state; and if we consider withal, how vast the difference is between time and eternity; it will be easy then to apprehend how all things may be set straight in another world, and how the righteousness of God may appear, in giving an abundant recompence to good men for all their temporal service and sufferings, which do but prepare them the more for a quicker relish of the glory and happiness which is reserved for them; and, on the other hand, in punishing wicked men, whose short ease and prosperity in this world will, by the just judgment of God for their abuse of the blessings of this life, set out their misery and torment to the greatest disadvantage. For, as nothing commends happiness more than precedent sorrow; so nothing makes pain and suffering more bitter and intolerable, than to step into them out of a state of ease and pleasure; so that the pleasures and prosperity of wicked men in this life, considered with the punishment of the next, which will follow upon them, is an addition to their misery. This is the very sting of the second death; and in this sense also that of the wise man is true—“The ease of the simple will slay them;” and the prosperity of these fools shall be the great aggravation of their destruction.

2. Another notion which is deeply rooted in the nature of man, is, that there is a difference between good and evil, which is not founded in the imagination of persons, or in the custom and usage of the world, but in the nature of things: that there are some things which have a natural evil, and turpitude, 552and deformity in them; for example, impiety and profaneness towards God, injustice and unrighteousness towards men, perfidiousness, injury, ingratitude; these are things that are not only condemned by the positive laws and constitutions of particular nations and governments, but by the general verdict and sentiments of humanity. Piety and religion towards God; justice, and righteousness, and fidelity, and reverence of oaths; regard to a man’s word and promise; and gratitude towards those who have obliged us; these and the like qualities, which we call virtues, are not only well spoken of, where they are countenanced by the authority of law, but have the tacit approbation and veneration of mankind. And any man that thinks that these things are not naturally and in themselves good, but are merely arbitrary, and depend upon the pleasure of authority, and the will of those who have the power of imposing laws upon others; I say, any such person may easily be convinced of his error, by putting this supposition:—suppose wickedness were established by a law, and the practice of fraud, and rapine, and perjury, falseness in a man’s word and promises, were commended and rewarded; and it were made a crime for any man to be honest, to have any regard to his oath or promise; and the man that should dare to be honest, or make good his word, should be severely punished, and made a public example; I say, suppose the reverse of all that which we now call virtue were solemnly enacted by a law, and public authority should enjoin the practice of that which we call vice; what would the consequence of this be, when the tables were thus turned? Would that which we now call vice gain the esteem and reputation of virtue; and those things which 553we now call virtue, grow contemptible and become odious to human nature? If not, then there is a natural and intrinsical difference between good and evil, between virtue and vice; there is something in the nature of these things which does not depend upon arbitrary constitution. And I think nothing can be more evident, than that the authority which should attempt such an establishment, would there by be rendered ridiculous, and all laws of such a tendency as this would be hissed out of the world. And the reason of this is plain, because no government could subsist upon these terms: for the very forbidding men to be just and honest, the enjoining of fraud, and violence, and perjury, and breach of trust, would apparently destroy the end of government, which is to preserve men and their rights against the encroachments and inconveniences of these: and this end being destroyed, human society would presently disband, and men would naturally fall into a state of war: which plainly shews that there is a natural, and immutable, and eternal reason for that which we call goodness and virtue; and against that which we call vice and wickedness.

To come then to my purpose, it is very agreeable to this natural notion of the difference between good and evil, to believe the soul’s immortality. For no thing is more reasonable to imagine, than that good and evil, as they are differenced in their nature, so they shall be in their rewards; that it shall one time or other be well to them that do well, and evil to the wicked man. Now seeing this difference is not made in this world, but all things happen alike to all, the belief of this difference between good and evil, and the different rewards belonging to them infers another state after this life, which is the very 554thing we mean by the soul’s immortality; namely, that it does not die with the body, but remains after it, and passeth into a state wherein it shall receive a reward suitable to the actions of this life.

And thus I have done with the second argument for the soul’s immortality; namely, that this principle doth not contradict those other principles which nature hath planted in us, but doth very well accord and agree with those natural notions which we have of the goodness of God, and of the justice of his providence, and of the real and intrinsical difference between good and evil.

III. This principle, of the soul’s immortality, is suitable to the natural hopes and fears of men.

To the natural hopes of men. Whence is it that men are so desirous to purchase a lasting fame, and to perpetuate their memory to posterity, but that they hope that there is something belonging to them, which shall survive the fate of the body, and when that lies in the silent grave, shall be sensible of the honour which is done to their memory, and shall enjoy the pleasure of the just and impartial fame, which shall speak of them to posterity without envy or flattery? And this is a thing incident to the great est and most generous spirits; none so apt as they to feed themselves with these hopes of immortality. What was it made those great spirits among the Romans so freely to sacrifice their lives for the safety of their country, but an ambition that their names might live after them, and be mentioned with honour when they were dead and gone? Which ambition of theirs, had it not been grounded in the hopes of immortality, and a natural opinion of another life after this, in which they might enjoy the delight and satisfaction of the fame which they had 555purchased, nothing could have been more vain and unreasonable. If there were no hopes of a life beyond this, what is there in fame that should tempt any man to forego this present life, with all the contentments and enjoyments of it? What is the pleasure of being well spoken of, when a man is not? What is the happiness which men can promise to themselves, when they are out of being, when they can enjoy nothing, nor be sensible of any thing, because they are not? So that the spring of all those brave and gallant actions, which the heathens did with the hazard of their lives, out of a desire of after-fame and glory; I say, the spring of all those actions, could be no other than the hopes of another life after this, in which they made account to enjoy the pleasure of the fame, which they purchased with the expense and loss of this present life.

But this ardent desire and impatient thirst after fame, concerns but a few of mankind in comparison. I shall therefore instance in something which is more common and general to mankind, which plainly argues this hope of immortality. What is the ground of that peace, and quiet, and satisfaction, which good men find in good and virtuous actions, but that they have a secret persuasion, and comfortable hopes, that they shall sometime or other be rewarded? and we find that they maintain these even when they despair of any reward in this world. Now what do these hopes argue, but a secret belief of a future state, and another life after this, wherein men shall receive the reward of their actions, and inherit the fruit of their doings? Whence is it else, that good men, though they find that goodness suffers, and is persecuted in this world, and that the best designs are many times unsuccessful; what is it that 556bears them up under these disappointments, and makes them constant in a virtuous course, but this hope of another life, in a better state of things hereafter? They have some secret presage in their own minds of a life after death, which will be a time of recompence, as this is of trial.

2. The same may be argued from the natural fears of men. Whence is the secret shame, and fear, and horror, which seizeth upon the minds of men, when they are about a wicked action; yea, though no eye see them, and though what they are doing do not fall under the cognizance of any human court or tribunal? Whence is it that they meet with such checks and rebukes in their own spirits, and feel such a disturbance and confusion in their minds, when they do a vile and unworthy thing; yea, al though it be so secretly contrived and so privately managed, that no man can charge them with it, or call them to account for it? What art thou afraid of, man, if there be no life after this? Why do thy joints tremble, and thy knees knock together, if thou beest in no danger from any thing in this world, and hast no fears of the other? If men had not a natural dread of another world, and sad and dreadful presages of future vengeance, why do not men sin with assurance when no eye sees them? Why are not men secure, when they have only imagined a mischief privately in their own hearts, and no creature is privy and conscious to it? Why do men’s own consciences lash and sting them for these things, which they might do with as great impunity from men in this world, as the most virtuous actions? Whence is it that cogitare, peccare est, as Min. Felix expresseth it, et non solum conscios timet, sed et conscientiam? Whence is it that “a wicked 557man is guilty upon account merely of his thoughts, and is not only fearful because of those things which others are conscious of, but because of those things which nobody knows but his own conscience?” Whence is it that,

That “he that does but devise and imagine secret mischief in his heart, is guilty to himself, as if the fact had been committed?” And when no man can charge and accuse him for it, yet,

“He carries his accuser in his breast, who does night and day incessantly witness against him?”

And that these fears are natural, the sudden rise of them is a good evidence, They do not proceed from deliberation, men do not reason themselves into these fears, but they spring up in men’s minds they know not how; which shews that they are natural. Now, a man’s natural actions, I mean, such as surprise us, and do not proceed from deliberation, are better arguments of the intimate sense of our minds, and do more truly discover the bottom of our hearts, and those notions that are implanted in our natures, than those actions which are governed by reason and discourse, and proceed from deliberation. To demonstrate this by an instance: if a man upon a sudden sight of a snake, do recoil and start back, tremble and grow pale; this is a better argument of a natural antipathy and fear, than it is of a natural courage, if afterward, when he hath commanded down his fear, he should by his reason 558persuade himself to take up the snake into his hand. If you would know what a man’s natural apprehensions are, take him on the sudden, and give him no time to deliberate. Therefore, some cunning politicians have used this way of surprise and sudden questions, to dive into the hearts of men, and discover their secrets.

In like manner, if you would know what men’s natural apprehensions are concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future state, observe what men’s first thoughts are, whether a man’s conscience does not suggest to him such fears upon the commission of sin. There is no doubt but men may offer violence to their natures, and reason themselves into great doubts about the soul’s immortality; nay, men may be bribed into the contrary opinion: but this man who, in his deliberate discourses, denies any reward after this life, shall, by his natural actions, acknowledge them, by those fears and terrors, which his guilty conscience is ever and anon surprised withal.

The sum of this argument is, that it is natural for men that live piously and virtuously, that do just, and honest, and worthy actions, to conceive good hopes that it shall some time or other be well with them; that however they may meet with no reward and recompence in this world, yet “verily there will be a reward for the righteous:” and, on the other hand, wicked men, though they flourish and prosper in their wickedness, yet they are not free from guilt, they are fearful and timorous, even when their condition sets them above the fear of any man upon earth. Now, what does this signify, but that they have some secret presages of an after-punishment? Nature suggests this thought to them, that 559there will be a time when all the sins which they have committed, and the wickedness which they have done, shall be accounted for.

And it is no prejudice to this truth, that some men sin against their consciences, and by frequent acts of sin, and offering notorious violence to their own light, bring themselves into a brawny and in sensible condition, so that they have not those stings and lashes, are not haunted with those fears and terrors, which pursue common sinners. This is but reasonable to be expected, that men, by frequent acts of sin, should lose the tender sense which men’s consciences naturally have of good and evil; that men that lay waste their consciences by gross and notorious sins, should lose the sense of good and evil, and that their consciences should grow hard, like a beaten road; nay, it is suitable to the justice of God, to give up such persons to a reprobate sense, to an injudicious mind, that they, who would not be awakened and reclaimed by the natural fear of Divine justice, which God hath hid in every man’s conscience, should at last lose all sense and apprehension of these things, and be permitted securely and without remorse to perfect their own ruin.

IV. This doctrine of the immortality of the soul, does evidently tend to the happiness and perfection of man, and to the good order and government of the world: to the happiness and perfection of man, both considered singly, and in society.

1. To the happiness and perfection of man, considered in his single capacity, if it be a thing desirable to be at all, then it is a thing desirable to be continued in being as long as may be, and for ever if it be possible. If life be a perfection, then eternal 560life is much more so; especially if the circumstances of this present life be considered, together with the state which we hope for hereafter. The condition of men in this present life, is attended with so many frailties, liable to so great miseries and sufferings, to so many pains and diseases, to such various causes of sorrow and trouble, of fear and vexation, by reason of the many hazards and uncertainties, which not only the comforts and contentments of our lives, but even life itself, is liable to, that the pleasure and happiness of it is by these very much rebated; so that were not men trained on with the hopes of something better hereafter, life itself would to many men bean insupportable burden: if men were not supported and borne up under the anxieties of this present life, with the hopes and expectations of a happier state in another world, mankind would be the most imperfect and unhappy part of God’s creation. For although other creatures be subjected to a great deal of vanity and misery, yet they have this happiness that as they are made for a short duration and continuance, so they are only affected with the present, they do not fret and discontent themselves about the future, they are not liable to be cheated with hopes, nor tormented with fears, nor vexed at disappointments, as the sons of men are.

But if our souls be immortal, this makes abundant amends and compensation for the frailties of this life, and all the transitory sufferings and inconveniences of this present state; human nature, considered with this advantage, is infinitely above the brute beasts that perish.

As for those torments and miseries which we are liable to in another world, far greater than any 561thing that men suffer in this life, this ought not, in reason, to be objected against the immortality of the soul, as if this doctrine did not tend to the happiness and perfection of man: for if this be truly the case of mankind, that God hath made men’s souls of an immortal nature, and designed them for a perpetual duration and continuance in another state after this life, in order to which state he hath placed every man in this world, to be, as it were, a candidate for eternity, he hath furnished every man with such helps and advantages, such opportunities and means for the attaining of everlasting happiness, that if he be not grossly wanting to himself, he shall not miscarry; if this be the case, then an immortal nature is a real and mighty privilege. If God puts every man into a capacity of happiness, and if no man becomes miserable but by his own choice, if no man falls short of eternal happiness but by his own fault, then immortality is a privilege in itself, and a curse to none but those who make it so to themselves.

2. This doctrine tends to the happiness of man considered in society, to the good order and government of the world. I do not deny, but if this principle of the immortality of the soul were not believed in the world, if the generality of mankind had no regard to any thing beyond this present life: I say, I do not deny, notwithstanding this, but there would be some kind of government kept up in the world; the necessities of human nature, and the mischiefs of contention, would compel men to some kind of order: but I say withal, that if this principle were banished out of the world, government would want its most firm basis and foundation; there would be infinitely more disorders in the world were men not 562restrained from injustice and violence by principles of conscience, and the awe of another world. And that this is so, is evident from hence, that all magistrates think themselves concerned to cherish religion, and to maintain in the minds of men the belief of a God, and of a future state.

This is the fourth argument—that this doctrine does evidently tend to the happiness of man, and the good order and government of the world. I grant that this argument alone, and taken singly by itself, is far from enforcing and necessarily concluding the soul’s immortality: but if the other arguments be of force to conclude, this added to them is a very proper inducement to persuade and incline men to the belief of this principle; it does very well serve the purpose for which I bring it; namely, to shew, that if there be good arguments for it, no man hath reason to be averse or backward to the belief of it; if by other arguments we be convinced of the suitableness of this principle to reason, this consideration will satisfy us, that it is not against our interest to entertain it. And no man that is not resolved to live wickedly, hath reason to desire that the contrary should be true. For what would a man gain by it, if the soul were not immortal, but to level himself with the beasts that perish, and to put himself into a worse and more miserable condition than any of the creatures below him?