Chapter 21.—Whether There Ever Was a Roman Republic Answering to the Definitions of Scipio in Cicero’s Dialogue.

This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the promise gave in the second book of this work,^12961296    Ch. 21. and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero’s De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the weal of the people.  And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people’s weal was never attained among the Romans.  For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests.  And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice.  Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right.  For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right.  For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party.  Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people.  Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice.  Further, justice is that virtue which gives every one his due.  Where, then, is the justice of man, when he deserts the true God and yields himself to impure demons?  Is this to give every one his due?  Or is he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man who has no right to it, unjust, while he who keeps back himself from the God who made him, and serves wicked spirits, is just?

This same book, De Republica, advocates the cause of justice against injustice with great force and keenness.  The pleading for injustice against justice was first heard, and it was asserted that without injustice a republic could neither increase nor even subsist, for it was laid down as an absolutely unassailable position that it is unjust for some men to rule and some to serve; and yet the imperial city to which the republic belongs cannot rule her provinces without having recourse to this injustice.  It was replied in behalf of justice, that this ruling of the provinces is just, because servitude may be advantageous to the provincials, and is so when rightly administered,—that is to say, when lawless men are prevented from doing harm.  And further, as they became worse and worse so long as they were free, they will 415 improve by subjection.  To confirm this reasoning, there is added an eminent example drawn from nature:  for “why,” it is asked, “does God rule man, the soul the body, the reason the passions and other vicious parts of the soul?”  This example leaves no doubt that, to some, servitude is useful; and, indeed, to serve God is useful to all.  And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices.  Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices?  And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons.  Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic.  And why need I speak of the advantageousness, the common participation in which, according to the definition, makes a people?  For although, if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godlessly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship of men though they are most impure spirits, yet what I have said of the common acknowledgment of right is enough to demonstrate that, according to the above definition, there can be no people, and therefore no republic, where there is no justice.  For if they assert that in their republic the Romans did not serve unclean spirits, but good and holy gods, must we therefore again reply to this evasion, though already we have said enough, and more than enough, to expose it?  He must be an uncommonly stupid, or a shamelessly contentious person, who has read through the foregoing books to this point, and can yet question whether the Romans served wicked and impure demons.  But, not to speak of their character, it is written in the law of the true God, “He that sacrificeth unto any god save unto the Lord only, he shall be utterly destroyed.”^12971297    Ex. xxii. 20.  He, therefore, who uttered so menacing a commandment decreed that no worship should be given either to good or bad gods.