VIRTUE: An ethical concept almost synonymous with morality, denoting, in its original Greek sense, every excellence which affords worth to a person or a thing and secures recognition, thus incidentally signifying honor and reputation. In the discourses of Socrates the term is yet in its plastic state, but appears at the same time in its ethical application, and this coincides with the usage of the Sophists. After Plato, and especially Aristotle, virtue came to denote that quality of man whereby he is adapted for true moral action. The more popular History of parenetic or descriptive ethics became, Concept. as in the early Middle Ages, a mere enumeration of virtues and vices; and in the period of the Enlightenment the concepts of morality and virtue so coincided that even an individual act might be termed virtue, and Kant distinguished the moral as virtue in distinction from the legal. Schleiermacher, therefore, seeking to delimit virtue from the good and duty, defined it as " the power of reason in nature morally united with it, and in the human individual in particular." In like manner R. Rothe distinguished virtue as the productive power from the good as the moral product, and from duty as the form of the moral process. More generally accepted is the definition of C. F. Schmid, that the good is the character of the will of the human subject. Underlying all these definitions is the view that man in his activities can but acquire a fixed character determinative of conduct, and such a character is either true or perverted, virtue or baseness; and they presuppose the concept of the good or morally true as already given. Aristotle presumes to derive the nature of the ethical itself from virtue; namely, by the Hellenic concept of the mean between extremes. The formal distinction of virtue from the subethical or brutal and the super-ethical, or heroic, as well as his "heap" of virtues, amidst which, only, he sought the elassconcept, were the more urgent upon him as empiricist. The other followers of Socrates assumed with their leader that virtue was one, an idea which Plato systematized. Following his anthropological trichotomy he differentiates virtue into "wisdom, courage, and temperance." Justice, bringing these into the equilibrium of the good, completes the character, and determines the social relationship of the

individual. Through Ambrose the four receive the permanent appellative of " cardinal "; and Augustine demonstrated from them the " love of God," so that the "brief and true definition of virtue" sounds, "order is of love." Love, however, practically is unfolded in faith, hope, and charity, later the theological virtues. Thus the sevenfold character of the virtues became traditional, making way for the seven spiritual gifts paralleled by the seven deadly sins. Scholasticism inheriting this scheme continued to lay emphasis on the unity of virtue, and to see in love the basal Christian virtue, and through Thomas Aquinas the scheme has descended canonically to the present. Venatorius, however, substituted faith for love. Melanchthon, developing "civil justice" on a scheme of justice, truth, and moderation, led, by reference to the Decalogue, to the postulation of the precedence of the concept of duty, a scheme commonly accepted by Protestantism, especially by Wolff. This chaos was opposed by Schleiermacher with a reconstruction of the Platonic tetrad of virtues: inner virtue is wisdom in cognition, and love in action; in terms of time, cognition is prudence, and action is perseverance. The Socratic doctrine of the unity of virtue is closely connected with the identification of virtue and understanding. This intellectualistic determinism was completed by Stoicism, which not only derived the primary virtues from the mere moral concept, but maintained that virtue was present a priori without the necessity of a gradual approach. The empiricist Aristotle, without overlooking the "determinism of consequence," emphasizes caprice while he recognizes that perfection is to be attained only by practise. Orthodox Semipelagianism had the aid of the "infused grace;" following Aristotle in the doctrine of virtue. The antithesis persisted later. C. Wolff triumphantly favored the intellectual determinism, while Rousseau rings the appeal, "back to nature." Such underlying presumptions give rise, ,here and there dignified by Kant's sternness of duty, to the enthusiasm for the self-sufficient striving of virtue, antagonized, as they are, by the Biblical Evangelical theology.

In fact this concept of virtue has no Biblical connection, except in the Hellenistic portions of the Apocrypha (Wisdom iv. 1, v. 13, viii. 7; IV Mace.). In I Pet. ii. 9 and Phil. iv. 8 the term arete (Gk. " virtue ") denotes the laudable in general; in II Pet. i. 3 it implies a manifestation of divine power; and only in II Pet. i. 5 does it refer to

In' the any specific virtue. If Schleiermacher Bible; did not employ the concept of virtue Practise in his system of theological ethics,

of Virtue. neither did he construct this as a sys tem of duty. Herein he followed the example of G. Calixtus and of the Pietists, who set forth the process of origin and the demonstration of the Christian life, thus affording a substructure for the theory of duty. Here is the point of de parture taken up by the ancient Church in depend ence upon available scientific forms, and here the doctrine of virtue may be developed in thoroughly Christian style. Social ethics must not crowd out the presuppositions, training, and development of

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Christian character; the scientific treatment of virtue will then afford a satisfactory presentation of its unity and origin. At the same time the ground is won also for asceticism and the consideration of the means to virtue. The latter has been defined as "all that has an advantageous influence for the actual exercise and accomplishment of acts in so cord with duty." It may include eveiything, then, within the ethical horizon, even temptation and offenses as tests, and involve the help of God, moral motives, fate, nature, vocation, and every personal relation: Means they become so far as they are used for s special purpose, the practise of virtue or morality, i.e., ascetics. With such was concerned the ancient Church in dependence upon the applied ethics of the Stoics. Ascetics has been defined by Rothe as conduct designed simply to gain personal virtue, without regard to any other end whatsoever lying outside the acting subject. Against the ad mission of such a view to scientific ethics it is ob jected that every moral act must have reference to society as well as to the individual; and that duty comprehends life as a whole, and no moment in its course can be conceived as involving merely medi ate obligation. But certainly duty demands at every moment the performance of what is most expedient to the purpose. One is bound therefore to the ex ercise of the means of virtue, if it be fitting. That social relations are to take the place of these modes of activity can be claimed only if the training and purification of personal character are overlooked, in which also one discharges some of his social in debtedness. In character-culture pedagogy and as ceticism are materially identified, for self-culture follows training as maturity supersedes immaturity, and what argues for the means of pedagogy argues for the means of asceticism as well. Finally, self-cul ture has to rid itself of the unethical false culture. Reactionary efforts and preventives are indeed in dispensable; but they become superfluoT in an ideal self-unfolding. Christian ethics in ifs intense rebound from immoral corruption, leading to a total disentanglement from .'a sin-ridden world, swung to the untrue pole of social seclusion and futile per formances. On the contrary, only modes of con duct are valid for means to virtue which are justi fied and required for Christians in general, and their special place is to be perceived in that they afford an advantage to conduct in the building of charac ter and alienation of evil, not otherwise to be gained. Moderation is requisite of itself; it must be raised to abstinence if an evil is to be conquered. The difficulty is that the pedagogy from without the.in dividual possesses no knowledge of the situation within, while the individual himself is not sufficiently master safely to treat himself. Hence Christian asceticism presupposes sanctification, which God affords continually, and in this the -means to virtue and grace are provided (Titus ii. 11-12). In the last analysis religious and ethical means to virtue are brought to the same plane; religion and ethics are not exclusive circles, but among ethical means to virtue the moat important are the religious. The means to virtue may, accordingly, be more strictly defined as moral modes of conduct with special reference to the development of personal character,

and with particular regard to the imperfections of the individual, different in each one. Since, however, individuals are not absolutely different, the means to virtue may be reduced to categories, though this can properly be done only in connection with the theory of character-culture, or virtue, as a whole, and in this sense ascetics becomes a necessary part of ethics. An enumeration of the means to virtue seems unnecessary; since a classification is self-suggestive, according to the various aspects of the development of character. Protestant ascetics is essentially different from Roman Catholic. The latter makes the individual means laws imposed by the Church, and forcing them from their vital moral relations considers the acts meritorious in themselves, thus transforming them from means. Finally, it develops classes to the abuse of the individual as well as society on the whole, based on the distinction between the legitimate secular. and the perfect spiritual life (see Consilia Evangelica). On the other hand, Protestants variously represent a point of view by which they regard Christian ethics as the fruit of the inner levy so that discipline and means to virtue are ignored as such.

(M. Kähler.)

Bibliography: Consult the literature under Ethics.