UTILITARIANISM. I. Definition. II. History.

Cumberland, Berkeley, and Hume (§ 1).

Bentham, Mill, and Spencer (§ 2).

III. Doctrines of Utilitarianism. IV. Criticism.

I. Definition: Utilitarianism may be considered from two different points of view, viz., from abstract ethical theory, or from a practical relation to social and political institutions. In England, where utilitarianism has had its worthiest exponents, it is usually viewed from the practical side, and is tersely defined in the well-known formula, "The greatest happiness to the greatest number." On the continent and in America, where utilitarianism is known chiefly as one among numerous ethical theories, it is considered to be synonymous with hedonism, and is defined as the doctrine that actions derive their moral character from their consequences; or, that actions are right when they promote happiness, wrong when they produce misery. The ethical value of an action depends on, and is derived from, its utility. An action may, however, be useful to the individual alone; or, to society. This distinction in the extent of utility leads to another. The individual generally considers those actions useful which produce pleasure, which is egoistic hedonism. But if he looks upon his actions not so much from the point of view of single pleasures as from that of happiness, he finds that the latter is closely connected with the happiness of

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his fellow men; and if he acts with a view to prometing happiness in general, he is an altruistic hedonist, or, properly speaking, a utilitarian.

II. History: Utilitarianism is historically and theoretically connected with the classical Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools of philosophy. The doctrine of these schools was, however, chiefly egoistic hedonism. As a doctrine of altruistic hedonism, utilitarianism is said to have had its origin with the Italian publicist Cesare Marchese de Becearia Bonesana (1735-94). This doctrine has, however, generally been connected with English philosophy, since England has not only produced the earliest and best exponents of this system, but also the strongest advocates of the practical bearings of this theory.

Richard Cumberland (1631-1718) was the first philosopher to propound a system of utilitarianism.

The keywords to his doctrine are the z. Cumber- statements that feelings are by naland, tore both egoistic and altruistic; and

Berkeley, that man is fitted for society by the and Hume. lattei. Rationality emphasizes the

altruistic feelings in this . respect in two ways: first, by enabling one to recognize his own good as indissolubly connected with that of society and thus leading to objectively moral conduct from ultimately egoistic motives; second, by enabling one to recognize and desire the good in and for itself. "Good" is defined by Cumberland as that which perfecta both mind and body. Cumberland is, however, somewhat ambiguous concerning the things which have a tendency in that direction, and speaks more frequently of happiness as the good. Happiness is pleasure depending (1) upon the unimpeded normal activities of mind and body; (2) upon a tranquil frame of mind, which is conditioned sometimes by external circumatanees, sometimes by the feeling that one has acted consistently, and again by the consciousness that one has acted for the common weal; and (3) upon the knowledge that others are happy. George Berkeley (1685-1753) is the father of "theological utilitarianism." This term indicates the attempt to reconcile ultimately selfish motives of action with morality. If self-interest is the ruling principle of human nature, it must be shown that the interest of the individual demands moral action. But this can not always be proved to be the case, particularly if supernatural sanction be disregarded, since no man is able to predict the consequences of his actions. Divine omniscience alone can do that and formulate rules of action which will tend toward the well-being of all men and all nations, and, therefore, toward the well-being of the individual. Supernatural sanctions are thus necessary to produce moral actions. David Hume (1711-76) boldly argued. that men never actually continue to approve of any quality in human nature which dote not at least appear to be either useful or agreeable. A moral distinction is possible only on the ground of utility and pleasure, or uselessness and pain. Usefulness and agreeableness must, however, be extended to others than self; and the consideration of others must become a sentiment of humanity which may be reasonably regarded se the ultimate cause of all moral phenom-

ena,. It may happen that by acting in accordance with this sentiment, the individual becomes the loser; but mental tranquillity and consciousness of integrity-so necessary for happiness-will nevertheless be cultivated and cherished by every true man. Home freed utilitarianism from the dogma that the motive of the agent is always, in the last analysis, egoistic, and defended the altruistic tendencies of human nature.

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) emphasized .the pleasurable aspect of actions as motives, but chiefly those which give pleasure to the doer. s. Bentham, He distinguished thirteen kinds. of

Mill, and pleasures with their corresponding Spencer. pains, viz.: sense, wealth and priva tion, skill and awkwardness, amity and enmity, reputation and disgrace, power, piety, be nevolence and malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, and . association. Only two of these classes-benevolence and malevolence-have ref erence to fellow men; all others concern only the individual. John Stuart Mill (18()fr73) rounded out the system of utilitarianism, freed it from its narrowness, and made it acceptable to statesmen and theologians. By his insistence upon the " ac quired character" of moral feelings he emphasized their social nature as no one'had done before, and thus gave this system of ethics an importance in English life which hardly any other philosophy has enjoyed. This great influence is due to his claim that disinterested public spirit should be the prom inent motive is the performance of all.soeially use ful work, and that, eg., even hygienic --precepts should be inculcated not chiefly on grounds. of pru dence, but because " by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering services to our fellow creatures." Herbert Spencer (182-1903) introduced the principle of, slow racial development into the concepts of utilitarianism. It had.:always proved insuperably difficult for utilitarians to show how the abstract principle of general happiness could arise from that of personal happiness, since experience demonstrates that actions for the gen eral welfare frequently conflict with personal in terests and happiness. Spencer tried to show that this transformation is next to impossible in the in dividual, but that it is probable in the race by slow and gradual accretions which the individual in herits as he does other traits favorable in the. strug gle for existence. The habit of. acting with a view to other people's happiness is an advantage to any race or nation; and it is, therefore, probable. that with growing intelligence the principles of benevo lence were developed and eventually inherited by the individual, who practises them as naturally as he does those of personal interest. .

III. Doctrines of Utilitarianism: The connection between utilitarianism and hedonism is close, and many defenders of the former have had difficulty in disentangling their system from the latter; some of them have more or less openly espoused hedonism, and have attempted to free it only from its grosser, implications. An outline of Bentham's system in its most complete form (Principles of Morals and Legislation, London, 1789) makes this clear. He starts with the hedonistic and utilitarian propo-

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sition that the desire for pleasure and the fear of pain are the only motives which, can influence. the human will, and. that the attainment of the great est possible happiness is, therefore, the supreme interest of every individual. Society consists, how ever, of individuals, and it must be animated by the same desire for happiness; this takes the form of the attainment of the greatest possible happiness for all its component members. This happiness to one and to all can, however, be gaged only by the consequences resulting from actions as the experi ence of the individual and of the race, has registered them. Experience shows pleasurable: actions to be useful on the whole, painful actions to be use less, except. as warning signals. The principle of utility or of the greatest happiness is, consequently, the only test of morality, since the latter means usefulness in the broadest sense. The moral char acter of an action is to be ascertained by a calcula tion of the pleasures and pains involved in the ele ments.which constitute it. Pleasure and pain may be greater or less according to intensity, duration, certainty or. uncertainty,. nearness or remoteness, strength of expectation, fecundity, purity, and ex tent, i.e., number of persons affected. Pleasure and pain have different sources or sanctiona physical, political, moral, and also religious, since God himself wills his children to be happy. The moral faculty, with which ethics is alone concerned, is constituted by good-will or benevolence, the love of amity, the love of reputation, and the dictates of religion and of prudence. Ethical systems not in agreement with utilitarianism may be divided into two classes, those of asceticism which disap prove of actions in proportion as they tend to aug ment happiness, and approve of them as they tend to diminish it; and those of sympathy. John Stuart Mill is the best representative of the newer utilitarianism. He maintains in his Utilitarianism (1863) that the criterion of, morality, the founda tion of morality, and the chief good are identical. From this basis he argues that the steadiness and consistency of the moral beliefs of mankind are mainly due to the tacit influence of utilitarianism, because this doctrine sets before men as chief aim the greatest happiness not of the individual, but of the race. But utilitarianism rests on a distinction of pleasures into kinds--high and low, noble and ignoble. If men make this distinction, they are' led to recognize the power to sacrifice their own great est happiness for that of their fellow men, because actions of this kind may be more useful to the race. In every-day life man does not, as a rule, calculate the consequences of his actions, because conscien tious feeling has invested utility with obligatory force-sufficient in the main to lead to right action. Justice is a form of utility, and means originally the animal desire to repel a hurt or to retaliate; but becomes widened so as to include all -persons by the human capacity for enlarged sympathy and. the conception of intelligent self-interest. James Mill (1773-1836) contributed s few other elements. Useful actions are of four kinds-acts of prudence, fortitude, justice, and benevolence; the first two include acts primarily useful to us, secondarily to others; the last two, those which are

primarily useful to others, and secondarily to ourselves. . The moral feelings are a complex growth, of which the ultimate constituents are pleasurable and painful sensations, e.g., disinterestedness is a real feet which has developed by association from personal interest and has eventually been detached from its original roots.

IV. Criticism: Utilitarianism .as a theory of life is inadequate (1) from the point of its motive, (2) from that of its fundamental principle.. Morality is based on the conception of duty. Utilitarians regard pleasure and self-interest as the.original roots of morality. But duty can never be developed from these roots: It is easy to show that virtue is useful; but impossible to prove virtue a derivative o_ utility. When utilitarians approach this crucial point, they appeal either to the will of God (John Austin), or to the authority of the law (Alexander Bain), or to conscientious feeling (John Stuart Mill). The theory fails, thus, both in regard to sufficiency of mauve and of logical consistency. The fundamental principle of utilitarianism is the calculability of actions. Man is to act with a view to the pleasurable or painful effects of his acts, both to himself and to others. That might be a good rule to follow were man omniscient. Since he is limited ,in his foresight, he must act in many cases according to law and precept-either divine or human. But the moment he does so, he abandons the utilitarian principle, and obeys some rule either of man or of God. The principle "The greatest happiness to the greatest number," if taken as guide, does not afford basis for computation of pleasure and pain, since one can not know what will give pleasure or pain to others. Pains and pleasures differ not only with different individuals, but with different classes and stages of civilization. It was the impossibility of making fixed standards of variable pains and pleasures that caused Herbert Spencer to say: " Hence if the method of egoistic hedonism is unsatisfactory, far more unsatisfactory for the same kindred reasons is the method of universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism" (Principles of Ethics, i. 155, London and New York, 1910).

Rudolph M. Binder.

Bibliography: E. Albee, Hist. of English Utilitarianism, London. 1902; F. E. Beneke, llrundlinien des nataTrlichen Systems der praklaschen Philosophie, 3 vols., Berlin, 1837-1840; A. Bain, The Emotions and the Wall, London, 1859; W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals; 2d ed., 2 vela., ib. 1889; J. Grote, Examination of Utilitarian Philosophy, Cambridge, 1870; H. Bleckley, A Colloquy on the Utilitarian Theory of Morals, London, 1873; J. S. Blaekie, Four Phases of Morals, Edinburgh, 1874; A. Comte, Positive Philosophy, 2 vols., 2d ed., ib. 1875; L. Stephen, Science of Ethics, ib. 1882; idem, The English Utilitariana, 3 vets.. ib. 1900; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1883; G. P. Best, Morality and Utility, London, 1887; H. Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, 14th ed., ib. 18$8; H. Sidgwiek, Method oJEth%cs, 4th ed., ib. 1890; idem, Outlines of the Hist. of Ethics, 3d ed., ib. 1892; G. Von Gizyeki, Introduction to the Study of Ethics, ib. 1891; G. F. James, T. H. Green und der Utilitarismus, Halle, 1894; S. Chapman, The bathetic Element in Morality and its Place in a Utilitarian. Theory of Morals, New York, 1895; A. Germain, Du beau moral Jarmel. Paris, 1895; W. Wundt, Ethical Systems, New York; 1897; F. Paulsen, A System of Ethics, ib. 1899; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government,- latest issue, London, 1910.