Truth, Truthfulness

TRUTH, TRUTHFULNESS. I. Theory of Religious Knowledge.

Aristotelian Logic (� 1).
Critique of Kant (� 2).
Theory of Historical Truth (� 3).
Religion and History (� 4).
The Value-judgment (� 5).
Summary (� 6).

II. Truthfulness.

Historical (� 1).
Candor and Orthodoxy (� 2).
Essentials of Truthfulness (� 3).

In a treatment consistent with the modern scientific position, truth and truthfulness or reality can no more be separated than " faith which is believed " and " faith which believes." Truthfulness presupposes a "will for truth." Such truth has become a possession that discloses itself to the entire man only as he fulfils certain conditions.

I. Theory of Religious Knowledge: For the naive consciousness human knowledge is the inner picture of outer reality. This postulate lies at the basis of all systems of identity of

z. Aristo- thought and being. The view pre- telian veiled until the time of Kant, and, Logic. though not wholly overcome, yet since his day scientific knowledge has come to be contrasted from the naive as critical. Kent opened his critique upon experience, the classified knowledge of experience, or the mathematical sci entific knowledge of nature, a sphere in which the identity of thought and being seemed precisely self-evident. All logic (the science of knowledge till Kant) until then was Aristotelian and the logic of the cognition of nature. There was scarcely the inception of a logic of history. Of the Greeks Soc rates turned from nature and founded ethics, and Plato's ethics came more and more to be relig ion. Medieval logic, however, stood upon Aris totle; and how seriously it claimed to deal with experience is best shown in the fundamental con tentions over the universal and the particular, a problem occupying anew the inquiry of the theory of knowledge to-day. But upon the point that truth was simply a picture of the real experientially there was no disagreement; and historical, ethical, and religious knowledge was logically conceived in forms derived from the cognition of nature. To the truth thus attained by the natural reason was added, in Christian dogmatics, that given by su pernatural revelation alone; and yet positively as revelation was preferred, it did not alter the con-

ception of truth as such. There has never been a more unitary universal philosophy than, Scholasticism (q.v.), and yet this was but the scientific projection of naive knowing and popular faith. Even the peculiar products of the original knowledge of the mystics, derived by contemplation .and ecstasy, were not too remote to be incorporated in the general world-view, under the ruling impression that truth was the image of reality and fundamentally one. The first to waver were the nominalists. William of Occam taught that the most important dogmas contained elements inconsistent with the principle of reason. His pupil; Robert Halcot, was the first to teach the "twofold sense," which the Lateran Council (1515) condemned, namely, that the same thing may be theologically false and philosophically true and vice verses. Luther was a nominalist, repudiated the Aristotelian logic in theology, adhered to the twofold sense, mysticism, and the Bible; he deserved to be recognized as the first theologian of experience, who from his own inner life and conduct arrived at a new conception of truth. Through Melanchthon, reinepired by a new philological, critical edition of Aristotle, the medieval view again gained central place in Protestantism. Meanwhile, philosophy was diverted from dogmatism to become empiricism, sensationalism, or skepticism.

The mathematical physical science of Sir Isaac Newton had attained a degree of certainty, until recently unanticipated and almost unsurpassable. At this point, Kant sought the fundamentals of this drift, and found them by a critical analysis of human experience. He discovered

z. Critique that the d priori forms of time and of Sent. space and the categories of the in tellect were the tools whereby the reason reaches into and legislates upon the unde fined raw materials of sense, thus first making sci entific sense-experience possible. Reason, to gether with what it contributes, alone enforces itself upon sense phenomena, producing knowledge, to which it imparts strict conformity with law, necessity, and universality. In drawing attention to the universal relations that make knowledge possible, Kant removed knowledge from the things in themselves, which recede to, an inaccessible re moteness, into the inner sanctum of the active human spirit itself. He did not surrender it to the empirical individual; but, by logical critical de duction, he set forth pure reason as an inner struc ture of the human spirit-life, transcending every form of individuality and all empirical psychology, and possessing its own cohesive laws as well as uni versal validity. Neither has pure subjectivism any claim here; on the contrary only thus is mathemati cal physical knowledge made possible. The old naive conception of truth with the indulgence -of extrava gant suppositions on the part of speculative philos ophy had to be destroyed, in order, as he professed, to save faith; for to apply the instruments of pure reason to that which is not subject of experience (sense) would lead to unbelief. The truth of the subjects outside of that experience must be approached by another way, that of faith. This way is by the course of the a priori moral law.

Founded upon the experience of the practical reason, the knowledge of freedom, immortality, and God (on the three postulates, see Religion, Philosophy of, I., 3, § 4) is more secure than if derived from the complex of outer experience. This meant the reenthronement of the will in philosophy, which in the Aristotelian metaphysics had become a mere attendant of the intellect (of. Thomas Aquinas, in SCHOLASTICISM, III., 2, § I). In this realm of the practical reason, ethical truth obtained an impregnable security, and here Kant laid the basis. The doctrine of the twofold sense had become firmly established in principle and method, and notwithstanding recurring attack, it prevails to this day in theology and philosophy.

Certainly there is only one truth; but it does not lend itself so readily to the convenient scheme of reality there and thought here. On the contrary, in different ways, by means of differ-

3. Theory ent powers, and in pursuit of differing of Historical interests, the human spirit avails itself

Truth. of that accessible to it which proves to be truth. According to the ways pur sued, truth is realized as knowledge of nature, of morality, of religion, or of art. A precipitated gen eralization, like the popular German "monism" of the day, affords no more than an abridgment of the kingdom of realization allotted to man. Thus, by this specialized interest, one aide of the truth has come to light only recently, the truth of history . Just as the preparation of the materials of physical knowledge by Newton and his colleagues was necessary to render the critical analysis of Kant , possible, so the theory of history, neglected from the time of Aristotle, had to await the pre paratory historical research and grouping of ma terial by Leopold von Ranke and his colaborera. Now, the distinction between the processes of knowledge of natural science and scientific history is seriously undertaken as well as an inquiry as to their limits. The human spirit operates under the voluntary impulse toward historical research dif ferently from its method toward the knowledge of natural science. In the latter the process is from the individual as a mere example of the many to the concept of multiplicity, and further to law amidst manifold phenomena. Starting out from the particular, yet essentially indifferent to par ticularity, the reason ascends by ever repeated and rarer abstractions to the ultimate universal and necessary. But in respect of historical research, the interest attaches to the individual as regards its particularity, singularity, and unity. To in vade the mystery of the individual is the specific undertaking of history. This does not mean its isolation; for the experimenter in natural science isolates the individual in order to master its phe nomena, but, for the historical investigator, the single indivisible possesses its unity only in its re lations, as a social individual. The term individual is not used here to refer only to the single human being, the individual exchange medium, but also to the collective unities, such as the State, the peo ple, or the Church. The correctness of the process with reference to natural science is shown by the applied technical results. While this test is want-

ing in the other, yet in the sum total of scientific knowledge, historical science presents a conception of history which is equally fundamental to a comprehensive world-view with natural science. Natural science aims to grasp the rational in the universe; historical science, the irrational in the particular and singular in the world: both are essential to a knowledge of the whole.

This examination is of the utmost importance to theology as the science of religion; because at the present hour, the question of. the verity of religion resolves itself into an inquiry into the truth of historical religion.. In fact, religion and

4. Rdligion history at present constitute the and ground themes of theology whereby

History. it is to create its master-work. Two reasons may be ascribed for the unrest manifested on this account is certain theological and lay circles: (1) the historical critical theology (from J. S. Semler down) has done its earnest work in advance of a clear theory of the relation of history and religion; but the problems of historical theology lie momentarily more in the order of his torical theory than in research; ( 2) the naive or traditional Christianity of many has not yet adapted itself to that advantage which devolves, with re spect to the historical material, upon the subjective factor of appropriation by faith or personal con viction independently achieved. No longer is the truth that system of supernatural cognitions and opinions handed down by the theologians from generation to generation. Nor is it simply search for truth without rest or aim (Leasing). Just as for natural science there is in order a "will for natural science," so for religious truth there is requisite a "will for religious truth." The latter is undoubted ly at hand as idea, in general; but as reality it is present only in that receptive subject in which it has become reality. Religious truth is also the common historical property of the religious society, but only so far as experienced and adapted anew in the experience of the individuals. The absoluteness of Christianity no longer rests upon Aristote lian logic and Platonic mysticism, or syllogistic abstractions and the via negdtivd; but upon the fact that from the time of Jesus Christ there have been men continually who attributed absolute worth to Christianity and gave their life for it. There is no absoluteness on earth but that of per sonal estimation and conviction. Religion de mands no more than that men affirm: thou art true. God requires no more than that men shall fear, love, and trust him in all things. Christ asks no more than that men accept him as the way, the truth, and the life. The relativity of the history of religion can be overcome only practically, each man working for himself and not by proxy in any other way. The only triumphant answer to the relativity of universal religious history is its mis sion to the world, which is also its necessary com plement for the theory of religious truth.

Under these circumstances error has woo a different position in the religious system. There is not only tolerable, but also, on the average, necessary, dissonance in 'the harmony. Not every error is meant, but that of the sincerely seeking man,

who doubts in the interest of his own purity and honesty. Also poetry, myth, legend-every activity and endowment of man may serve as

g. The a vessel of truth; whether it is so is in

Valuejudgment.

each case a question of fact, which must find its answer partly in the in terest of reason and partly in the free personal judgment of the moral person. In this connection the value-judgment (see Ritschl, Albrecht) has become of great importance. This does not imply its substitution for the ontological judgment, but it signifies that man as a religious ethical person, together with those of his kind, dis covers himself in the midst of a world of values, without the estimation and possession of which he can not live, and the assent to which affords him grasp and support. Man amidst these value-relations is the man of history, the subject of historical conduct and the object of historical science; there fore preeminently the man of religion. In contrast with morality, which is not to be based on the con cepts of values and properties (although belonging in this kingdom of values and value-relations) re ligion, as to its basis and certainty, refers primarily to values and value-relations: Value and truth are its synonyms. Here also absoluteness is to be predicated. In his personal valuations man con tinuously fulfils absolute estimations. Whoever would permit himself to be deterred from this privilege, through the relativity of comparative rational criticism, would no longer be a spiritually sound person. To the Christian who is really such, Christianity remains the true religion. This con ception of religious truth approves itself also in Scripture, although the problem of truth then ap peared differently. The Hebrew 'emeth, " truth," expresses " firmness," " faithfulness." The Greek alltheia denotes that which is manifest. Univer sally in the New Testament, truth is the revelation of salvation and happiness, a possession rescuing to life. Hence it is no instruction of the intellect but a worth to be conceived through its appropriation on the part of every religious ethical person. Although from the point of view of purely human observation this appears as the moral act of the one who seeks, yet the peculiar religious judgment is to the effect that the religious man always accepts the knowledge of religious truth as simply a gift or act of God, or a divine revelation; namely, as a finding or being found without merit on the part of the finder.

If, after what precedes, truth is not a mental picture of reality to which mind is passive, but comes to realization under conditions arising

6. Sum- out of the structure of the human many. soul, then truth can be conceived only from conditions under which the hu man spirit produces and possesses truth. Always in speaking of truth it is customary to have in mind something without, independent of self, an outer reality; this even in reflecting on the ego; but truth results only as this apparent reality (conno ting phenomena with things) is investigated and resolved. Truth comes to light in receiving the effects of the objects of one's interest. How or under what conditions this takes place is for the

inquiry of the criticism of knowledge. This-socording to the manifoldnes$ of inquiring intereatmay be criticism of scientific, esthetic, moral, or religious truth. Religious truth is the internal grasp of the objects of the religious interest (" the will for religious truth "), so far as this is manifest to one who is religiously truthful; i.e., has become a factor of his spiritual possession under the conditions peculiar to religious cognition. See also Revelation; and Religion.

II. Truthfulness: As duty and virtue, truthfulness has been recognized in the ethics of all nations at all times. Falsehood from selfish

1. Histor- motive points, on the other hand, to ical. radical evil in man. Truthfulness is demanded in Scripture expressly and unconditionally (Matt. v. 37; James v. 12). The lax construction in the East of the injunction of the New Testament is illustrated in the work of Chrya ostom, "On the Priesthood." Guilty of leading by deception a friend into the priesthood, which then he himself evaded, he greatly exults over the "advantage of deceit." The end justifies the means. Otherwise testifies Augustine in De mendacio (395), and in Contra mendacium (420). In the latter, on a special case, he takes the positive ground of repudiating the lie of pretense for pious objects. This precedent unfortunately was not followed in the mendacious casuistry which reached its worst phases in Probabilism (q.v.) and mental reservation (see Reservation, Mental). Also on Prot estant soil a vigorous construction (Kent, Fichte) was in conflict with a laxer theory (Rothe). In practise a decided improvement has made itself apparent: specially in scientific research and rep resentation, the sense for truth and the will to be truthful have manifestly increased. It is a reproach to the Church that this victory had to be won in combating ecclesiastical antagonism. Moral re sponsibility for the mistaking of historical fact can first with safety be referred to individuals with the rise of Humanism and the printing of books. The passion for controversy and the interest of partizan conviction on the part of the Reformers also misled some into doing violence to historical truth. The psychology of autobiographies presents a chapter full of interesting riddles. The moat admirable enthusiasm for truth can under the circumstances pass over into immoral fanaticism. No longer sur prising, then, is the hypocritical pretense of ,H. S. Reimarus (q.v.), in offering his religion of reason for the security of the religion of revelation (1754), when at least ten years previous he had volunteered a new religion and violently assailed the Christian pretending to defend it. The truthful Lessing after ward had to taste the bitterness of this falsehood, as well as that of the customary anonymous author ship, with which, then as always, was invariably covered something untruthful.

The pathetic complaint of Reimarus was the necessity of double-facednesa all his lifetime, and this was the lot of all liberal-minded men under the imminence of orthodox coercion. The situation for science and life has been much relieved; yet the accomplishment of truthfulness in theology and Church is a vital question. The difficulty

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2. Candor and Orthodoxy

is due to the Church's acting as guardian of the heritage of its members, while it will not grant its officers and representatives of learning the free use of new knowledge before it has been compromised or reconciled with the old. It is then a matter for individuals or parties to choose between a conservative, a radical, or a mediating position. Mediating tendencies are usually alleged by their opponents to be "counterfeit." This implies the demand that to the words and formulas of tradition must ever be given only their original meaning, while new views must employ new words and new formulas. Such a thing is impossible; for the store of words is limited, and the life of the language must perpetuate itself naturally only through a continuous change of the inherent sense. Even the most rigorous conservative observance of the import of words and formulas can not prevent some shifting of the meaning; for men change, and likewise their relation to tradition. There are no verbal instruments at the disposal of truthfulness other than those offered by a continuously changing language medium. Again, several systematists have drawn attention by placing the problems of truth and truthfulness in the center; namely, in religion W. Herrmann, and in ethics, among others, W. Koppelmann.

3. Essentials of Truthfulness.

Every definition of truthfulness as duty and virtue that exhausts itself simply in the agreement of speech and thought on the part of the professor is both trivial and unsatisfying. It is apt to be wrecked presently on the shoals of casuistry. Truthfulness is to be conceived as no less than that duty and virtue which constitute the ethical person himself and which permeate life uniformly in all its relations to the person. The truthful person is truthful though he be silent or even carries on untrue speech. He is such not only for himself, but disseminates an atmosphere of truthfulness about him. While the regard for the true import and degree of verity of a statement is of great pedagogical interest and solicits frequently the moral verdict upon itself, yet when it comes to the establishment of truthfulness in character and conduct, it all depends on whether men are truthful persons. That means men who do not belie themselves and who prove their uprightness with them selves in their relation with other men and with facts; men who do not deceive God, and hence not themselves or their fellow men; men who from an inner necessity and choice accept things as they are and represent themselves as being what they are. Religion is truthfulness toward God, and morality, if this be granted, is nothing but applied religion.

(Martin Rade.)

Bibliography: The subject is of course treated in the works on Ethics such as R. Rothe's, iii. 537-602, Wittenberg, 1848; and W. Herrmann's, 3d ed., Tübingen, 1904. Three important books are: H. Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1896-1902; G. Simmel, Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, >2d ed., ib. 1905; and S. Eck, Religion and Geschichte, Tübingen, 1907. Consult further: A. A. Courant, Essai sur les fundements de nos cannaissances, 2 vols., Paris, 1851; J. F. Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysics: the Theory of Knowing and Being, Edinburgh, 1854; W. Windelband, Ueber die Gewissheit der Erkenntniss, Berlin, 1873; J. Witte, Zur Erkenntnisatheor%e and Ethik, ib. 1877; H. P. Biddle, Elements of Knowledge, Cincinnati, 1881; J. Rebmke, Die Welt ala Wahrnelamung and Beyri$, Berlin, 1881; H. de Cossoh, La Certitude philosophique, Paris, 1883; E. de Pressense, Les Origines. Le Problems de la connaiasance, ib. 1883, Eng. transl., A Study of Origins, London, 1883; G. Ellinger, Das Verh6ltnis der 6$entl%chen Meinung zu 4Yahrheit and Lilye am 10. 1,8. Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1884; E. Bumouf, La Vie et la Pen&_e, Paris. 1886;_ F. Grung, Das 'Problem der Gewisaheit, Heidelberg, 1888; E. L. Fischer, Die GrurudJragen der Erkenntn%astheorie. Mainz, 1887; B. Laseb, Das Erwachen und die EntwicTclung der historischen Rr%tik %m MittelaTter, Breslau, 188?; W. Poesaneeker, Die Welt als unsere Eracheinungawelt and uiisere Gedankwelt, Berlin, 1887; H. Bergson, Esaai our les donnies immedimtea de la conscience, Paris, 1890, Eng. transl., Time and Free Will; An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, London, 1910; A. Schmid, Erkenntniaslehre, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1890; J. Gardair, La Connaiasance, Paris, 1895; J. Koestlin, Der Glaube und seine Bedeutung far ErkennEn%ss, Leben and Kirche, Berlin, 1895; H. Gomperz, Die Psychologie der loyischen Grundthatsachen, Vienna, 1898; G. Gory, L'Zmmauence de la orison dens la conreaisanee sensible, Paris, 1896; D. L. Jordan. The Stability of Truth, is Popular Science Monthly, i (1897), pp. 642-654, 749-757; S. H. Hodgson, The Metaphysics oJExPerience. 4 vols., London and New York, 1898; St. G. Mivart, The Groundwork of Science, New York and London, 1898; J. W. Powell, Truth and Error; or, The Science of lntellection, Chicago, 1898; F. S. Turner, Knowledge, Belief and Certitude, London, 1900; J. Mausbaeh, Die kathol%sche Moral, Cologne 1901; W. Herrmann, eömisch and evangelische S%ttl%chkeit, 3d ed., Marburg, 1903; W. 7iopPelmann. Kritik des a%ttlichen Bewuastse%ns, Berlin, 1904; idem, Die Ethik Karats, ib. 1907.