7. Relation to New-Testament Statements

the Monothelites were affirmed to be followers of Apollinaris. On account

Testament of the obscurities and ambiguities in

Statementa. volved in the term "energy," Sergius and his school abandoned its use, and concentrated their attention on the kernel of the whole question, the unity of the will. For two wills seem to call for two willing subjects. When pas sages like Matt. xxvi. 39, with their contrast of the human and divine will, were appealed to, they argued against the two-will theory on the basis that with the appropriation of human nature through the personal Logos, a will that makes itself known in the personal subject of the God-man, in distinction from his divine will, must be due to an undivine direction in the nature which has been assumed. They appealed to Gregory of Nyssa'a statement (Gratio ii., De flio) "for his act of will is in no way contrary to God, it is wholly from God."

They insisted on the impossibility of two mutually distinct wills even if they had the same content, and quoted the dictum of Macarius: "For it is impossible that there be in one and the same Christ, our God, two wills together and at the same time contrary, even if they are alike." More ancient patristic authorities in their comments on this passage of St. Matthew treat it as if the God-man, in conditioning himself to a human will, assumed as it were voluntarily a special character in this as a distinct act of salvation. The Monothelites made use of this explanation, for they did not deny a human operation, they only affirm that it was called forth by the divine will. Accordingly, in relation to the divine energy, the human manifestation of it is passive rather than active. When Gregory of Nyssa (MPG, xlvi. 616D), speaking of Christ, says, the soul wills, he means, according, to Monothelite explanation, that the willing of the soul takes place through the divine willing of the Godhead, which is personally united with it. It is, therefore, divine willing in human form. The Monothelite conception, therefore, was not far removed from the position of the Church on the teaching of the incarnation. Even Maximus himself, after the term "one energy" had been abandoned, made no essential objection to the standpoint of Pyrrhus. But through the efforts of Maximus, the logical consequences of the Chalcedonian decrees were drawn. The will was treated as an essential and characteristic part of human nature. He who denies the human will in Christ, denies the human soul in him. If Christ did not take a human will, but only adopted one, he placed himself in the relation of a willing human subject; the taking of all the other characteristics of humanity must be placed in the same class and the whole incarnation becomes docetic. Yet the opponents of Monothelitism were careful not to allow to Christ a gnomic will, that is, he did not de cide for the good through weighing arguments for and against it; unity of the human nature with the

484

divine Logos directed necessarily the decision toward the selection of the good. Maximus was not afraid of saying that the God-man had, according to his nature, a human will, but according to his essence, a divine one. This statement is hard to reconcile with the Scriptural passages adduced to prove the duality of the will (John i. 43, v. 21, xvii. 24, xix. 28; Matt. xxvii. 34; Luke xiii. 24); it shows how close Maximus approached Monothelite terminology. See Christology, V., § 2.

(G. Krüger.)

Bibliography: Sources are: The acts of the Lateran and other synods and councils mentioned in the text, for which consult Mansi, Concilia, vols. x.-xi., and Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, books xvi.-xvii. in the Ger. and Fr. (vol. iii.) and in Eng. (vol. v.); Collectanea ad Joaxinem diaconum, most convenient in MPL, exxix. 561-690; the Opera of Maximus the Confessor, also convenient in MPG, xc. xci.; the Chronikon pmachale, in MPG, xcvii.; the His toria syntomos of the Patriarch Nicephorus, ed. C. de Boor, Leipsic, 1880; the Chronographia of Theophanes, ed. De Boor, ib. 1883--85; the Vita Maximi Confessoris, in MPG, xc. 67-110. Earlier discussions of note are: F. Combefis, Auctarium novum, ii. 1-198, Paris, 1648; J. B. Tamagnini, Hist. Monotheletarum, ib. 1678; C. W. F. Walch, Historie der %ettereien, ix 1-686, Leipsic, 1780. Of modern discussions not to be overlooked is G. Owsepian, Die Bntstehunpageschichte des Monothelatismus, Leipsic, 1897. Consult further: F. C. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit and Menschmerdung Gotten, ii. 96-128, Tübingen, 1842; 1. A. Dorner, Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1862; 0. Bardenhewer in TQ lxxviii (1896), 353-401; Krumbacher, Geschichte, pp. 946-959; F Gregorovius, Hist. of the City of Rome, vol. ii., chap. v., London, 1894. The eubjelt in, of course, treated in the works on the church history of the period, e.g., Schaff, Christian Church, iv. 489-511; Neander, Christian Church, iii. 175-197; and in those on the history of dogma, e.g., Harnack, Dogma, vols. iii.-v. Note also the works given under Christology.

For the relation of Honorius to the discussion and the consequent debate in its bearing upon infallibility see the literature under Honorius, and P. Bottata, Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of Reason and History, London, 1868; G. Sehneemann, Studien über die Honoriuefrage, Freiburg, 1868; J. von Hefele, Honorius and dal sechate allgenwine Concil, Tübingen, 1870, Eng. transl., in Presbyterian Quarterly and Presbyterian Reviem, Apr., 1872; J. Pennaehi, De Honorai 1 . . . . cauea in concilio V1., Rome, 1870; P. Le P. Renouf, The Condemnation of Pope Honoriue, London, 1868; idem, The Case of Honorius Reconsidered, ib. 1870; J. J. 1, von Döllinger, Fables Respecting the Popes in the Middle Ages, pp. 223-248, New York, 1872.