5. Mechanical View in Modern Philosophy

In modern times, without knowing anything of Epicurus, Galileo revived the Democritean mechanical conception of the universe, denying, in opposition to the scholastio-Aristo telian philosophy, any real coming into existence or perishing, and referring all changes to shifting of parts, to quantitative not qualitative relations. The mechanical view of nature, if not of the universe, was dominant at the beginning of modern philosophy with the most apparently opposite thinkers, with Rene Descartes (q.v.) as well as with Thomas Hobbes (q.v.), who, regarding philosophy as the science of bodies, considered an incorporeal substance as an absurdity

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and explained mental processes in a purely mechanical manner. According to Descartes matter con sists of corpuscles-not the absolutely indivisible atoms of Democritus, but parts indivisible by us. The mass of matter and motion originally estab lished by God is as a whole incapable of increase or diminution. Equally with Hobbes, Descartes ex plained mental processes, e.g., the association of ideas, in a purely mechanical way by particular material changes in the brain arising from affection through the senses, and by the generation of new concepts as a result of these changes. Descartes is thus one of the founders of the mechanical-mate rialistic school as far as anthropology is concerned. It was only necessary to leave out the thinking soul to reach the view of Lamettrie, who believed that the thing to do was not, with Leibnitz (q.v.), to spiritualize matter, but to materialize the soul. For him the soul is the material consciousness; he finds the principle of life not in it but in all the separate parts, since each smallest particle of the organized body is forced to move by an innate principle. Similar views are held by most physiologists and biologists of the present day.

6. Weakness of the Theory

The most obvious justification of materialism lies in the fact that the basis of our knowledge is sense perception, which shows us the real as having three dimensions; and this leads us to con sider these three dimensions as existing outside ourselves and constituting the objects of the intuitive world. There is also the experience that men tal processes do not occur without a material base. While it may be admitted that as far as our expe rience goes the material (especially the nerves, and in higher animals the brain) is a sine qua non for mental phenomena, no one has ever succeeded in deducing the latter from the former or explaining them by it. In spite of the progress recently made in cerebral anatomy and the success attained in the localization of mental activities, the question is still unanswered, how out of what is visible and tangi ble, cognizable by the external senses, that which is invisible and intangible, cognizable only by the inner sense, can originate. Moreover, the whole conception of matter is a vague and indeterminate one, resisting exact analysis. What we first get is not matter-that is secondary-but sensations or perceptions. If we try to find external causes for these, we still do not reach matter, as is usually assumed, but forces that work upon us. We are thus driven into a sort of dynamism, according to which matter is a generally operative force, its whole essence being found in operation. This ex treme dynamism is represented by Leibnitz and many of his adherents. Another objection to the ordinary materialism is that as far as our perceptions go they present themselves to us as something immanent and spiritual, which is to us the datum, known, from which we must proceed in all our philosophizing, even to the acceptance of an ex ternal world; and it is a complete inversion for materialism to set before us first the external world which is unknown to us and explain what is known to us from that. These and other objections are so conclusive that thoroughgoing materialism may now be considered as philosophically untenable, in spite of the number of physicists who still accept it because it harmonizes with their tendencies or preconceptions.

Theoretical materialism is not, however, inconsistent with strict moral views, and does not necessarily lead to absorption in purely material, i.e., sensual, things. Not only the Stoics but also Democritus and Epicurus may be cited to prove this, as may also Tertullian on the Christian side. And in the most decided materialists of modern times, such as Lamettrie, Holbach, and others, a by no means despicable inculcation is to be found of a virtue which is, indeed, primarily self-love but gives the public interests the preference over the individual. Even Hbckel acknowledges as a golden rule "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Altruism is so deeply implanted in the mind of humanity that the most extreme theoretical tendencies, even those which assert the most extreme egoism in the region of morals, are forced to give it a predominant place in their practical counsels; and there is scarcely an absolutely egoistic work to be cited, except Max Stimer's Der Einzige und sein Eigerdum (Leipsic, 1845); but he is not to be classed as a theoretical materialist.

(M. Heinze .)

Bibliography: An extensive list of works on the subject, including periodical literature, is given in J. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, iii. 820-828, New York, 1905. The beet history of Materialism is still F. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus and Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Geyenwart, 6th ad., Leipsic, 1896, Eng. transl. of earlier ad., London, 1877. Consult further: T. Hobbes, Works, ad. W. Molesworth, 11 vols., London, 1839-45; N. S. Bergier, Examen du materialinne,Paris, 1854; Herbert Spencer, System of Synthetic Philosophy, London, 1860-97; P. Janet, Le Materialisme contamporain, Paris, 1864, Eng transl., London, 1865; F. Westhoff, Sto$, Kraft and Gadanks, Münater, 1865; E. Caro, Le Mat6rialiame at la science, Paris, 1868; H. B. Jones, Croonian Lecturea on Matter and Force, London, 1868; W. Maccall, The Neweet Materialism, ib. 1873; J. A. Piston, The Mystery of Matter, ib. 1873; J. Martineau, Modern Materialism, ib. 1876; P. Zimmermann, Do& Rdthsel des Lebena und die Rathloe%pkeit des Materialismus, Leipsic, 1877; t. Syffert, Le Mat6rialisme, Paris, 1878; R. Flint, Antitheiatic Theories, lectures ii. iv., London, 1879-80; L. Weis, Idealrealismus and Materaalismus, Berlin, 1879; A. Lefhvre, La Renaissance du maMrialiame, Paris, 1881; J. Dourif, Le Maurialiame at Z'ath6roahne, ib. 1882; G. A. Him, R6JUxiona critiques our la thiorde cinhmatique de l'univera, ib. 1882; M. Berger. Der Materialism= in Kampfe mit dem Spiritualismus and Idealismus, Triest, 1883; A. Stadler, Kant's Theorie der Materie, Leipsic, 1883; w. F. Wilkinson, Modern Materialism, London, 1883; H. Stiiven, Daratellung and Kritik der Grunda&u des Materialismus, Hamburg, 1885; J. A. Kilb, Plato's Lehre roan der Materie, Marburg, 1887; P. Ribot, Spirilualiame et maMrialiame, Paris, 1887; R. Abendroth, Dae Problem der Materie, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1889-90; W. Strecker, Welt and Menarhheit room Standpunkta des Materaalismus, ib. 1891; L. Stephen, An Agnostic's Apology, London, 1893; G. Plechanow, Beiträge cur Geschichte des ASaterialiemue, Stuttgart, 1896; T. Manzi, Der Materialiemua vor dem Riehteratuhl der Wissenschaft, Zurich, 1897; R. C. Shettle, The Origin of Matter and Force, London, 1897; L. Büchner, Kraft and Stof, Frankfort, 1898, Eng. transl. of earlier ed., London, 1870; E. Du Bois-Reymond, Ueber die Grenzen der Naturerkenntnia, Leipsic, 1898; C. Barbagallo, Del Materialismo atorico, Rome, 1899; E. Gaynor, The New Materialism, Dublin, 1899; W. A. Preuss, Geist and Stof Oldenburg, 1900; J. Royce, The World and the Individual, New York, 1900-01; 1. W. Riley, American Philosophy; the early Schools, New York, 1907; the works on the history of philosophy; and the literature under InaALie9.

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