APPENDIX.

WE have quoted, in pages 100 and 112, from the work of Zanchius in defence of Calvinism, translated by Toplady, in order to establish what many blind and ignorant Calvinists of the present day endeavour to deny—the identity of Calvinism with the FATALISM of the ancients. We here subjoin what Toplady himself published, and what the late Dr. Pringle of Perth republished, in the way, not of DENYING (for it cannot truthfully be denied), but of explaining and defending, after pleading guilty to the charge. Our readers will be pleased to mark the absence of all reference to the Word of God, and the barefaced appeal made by CHRISTIAN MEN to HEATHEN AND ANTICHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS in support of this theology! If the supporters of this system could discover in the Bible any foundation for their creed, would they be foolish enough to make their appeal to a document like the following? But we cheerfully give them the benefit of the best defence of their system they can find, and here append the entire document, It is intituled

AN APPENDIX concerning the FATE OF THE ANCIENTS, From the Latin of JUSTUS LIPSIUS.⁷⁷   Vide LIPSII Physiolog, Stoic, Lib. 1. Dissert. xii.

Fate [says Apuleins] according to Plato, is that, “Per quod, inevitabiles cogitationes Dei atque incepta complentur” whereby the purposes and designs of God are accomplished. Hence, the Platonics considered Providence under a threefold distinction: 1 The Providentia prima, or that which gave birth to all effects and is defined by them to be, του πρωτου Θεου νοεσις, the intention or will of the Supreme GOD. 2. The Providentia secunda, or actual 284 agency of the secondary or inferior beings, who were supposed to pervade tile heavens, and, from thence, by their influence, to regulate and dispose of all sublunary things; and, especially, to prevent the extinction of any one species below. 3. The Providentia tertia, supposed to be exerted by the Genii; whose office it was, to exercise a particular care over mankind: to guard our persons, and direct our actions.

But the STOICAL view of Providence, or Fate, was abundantly more simple, and required no such nicety of distinction. These philosophers did, at once, derive all the chain of causes and effects from their true and undoubted source, the WILL of the ONE LIVING AND TRUE GOD. Hence, with these Sages, the words DEITY, FATE, PROVIDENCE, were frequently reciprocated as terms synonymous. Thus Seneca, speaking of God; “Will you call him Fate? You will call him rightly: for all things are suspended on him. Himself is causa causarum, the cause of causes beside.” The laws of the universe are from God; whence the same philosopher, elsewhere, observes, “Omnia certa et in aeternum dicta lege decurrere:” All things go on, according to a certain rule or decree ordained for ever: meaning in the law of Fate. So Cicero: “All things come to pass, according to the sovereignty of the eternal law.” And Pindar, probably, had an eye to this, where he says, Νομον παντων Βασιλεα, θανατων τε και αθαατων, ειναι. That The law ruleth all, whether gods or mortals. Manlius most certainly had:

Sed nihil in tota magis est mirabile mole.

Quam RATIO et certes quod LEGIBUS omnia parent. Where by Ratio, is evidently meant, the decreeing mind of God; and by Leges, is meant Fate, or that series of causes and effects which is the offspring of his decree.

Homer cannot begin his Iliad, without asserting this grand truth: Διος ὂ ετελειετο βελη: the counsel or decree of Jupiter was fulfilled. The divine poet sets out on this exalted principle; he puts it in the front of the noblest poem in the world, as a testimony both of his wisdom and his faith. It was as if he had said, “I shall sing of numberless events, equally grand, entertaining and important; but I cannot begin to unfold them without laying down THIS, as a first, fundamental axiom, That, though brought to pass by the instrumental agency of men, they were the fruit of God’s determining Will, and of his all-directing Providence.”

Neither are those minuter events, which seemingly are the result of chance, excluded from this law: even these do not happen, but come to pass in a regular order of succession, and at their due period of time. “Causa pendet ex causa: privata ac publica longus ordo rerum trahit,” says Seneca: “Cause proceeds from cause; the long train of things draws with it all 285 events, both public and private.” Excellent is that of Sophocles; (Aj. Flagell.)

i. e. “I am firmly of opinion, that all these things, and whatever else befall us, are in consequence of the Divine purpose: whoso thinks otherwise, is at liberty to follow his own judgment; but this will ever be mine.”

The Longus ordo rerum, mentioned by Seneca, is what he elsewhere styles, “Causarun implex series,” or a perpetual implication of causes. This, according to Laertius, was called by the Stoics, αιτια των οντων ειρομενη, an involved, or concatenate causality of whatever has any existence: for, ειρμος is a chain, or implicate connexion. Agreeably to this idea, Chrysippus gives the following definition of Fate: Ἐιμαρμενην ειναι, φυσικην συνταξιν των ὅλων εξ αιδιου, των ἑτερων τοις ἑτεροις επακαλουθουντων, αμεταβολου και απαραβατου ουσης της ποιαυτης συμπλοκης. “Fate is that natural, established order and constitution of all things, from everlasting, whereby they mutually follow upon each other, in consequence of an immutable and perpetual complication.”

Let us examine this celebrated definition of Fate. 1. He calls it a natural συνταξις: meaning by nature, the great Natura Prima, or GOD, for, by some Stoics, GOD and NATURE are used promiscuously. But, because the Deity must be supposed both to decree and to act with wisdom, intelligence, and design, FATE is sometimes mentioned by them under the name of λογος, or Reason. Thus they define FATE (Laert. in Zen.) ἑιμαρμενεν, λογου, καθ᾽ ὁν ὀκοσμος διεξαγεται, to be that supreme “Reason, whereby the world is governed and directed;” or, more minutely thus, λογον, καθ᾽ ὁν οτα μεν γεγονοτα γεγονε, τα δε λεγομενα γινεται, τα δε γενησομενα γενησεται: “that reason, whereby things that have been, were: the things that now are, have a present existence: and the things that are to be, shall be. Reason, you see, or Wisdom, in the DEITY, is an antecedent cause, from whence both Providence and inferior Nature are derived. It is added in Stobaeus, μεταλαμβανει δε του λογου, την αληθειαν, την αιτιαν, την φισιν, την αναγκην, i. e. that Chrysippus sometimes varies his terms; and, instead of the word reason, substitutes the words truth, cause, nature, necessity; intimating, that Fate is the true, natural, necessary cause of the things that are, and of the manner in which they are.—2. This FATE is said to be εξ αιδωυ from everlasting. Nor improperly: since the constitution of things was settled and fixed in the Divine mind (where they had a sort of ideal existence) previous to their actual creation: and therefore, considered as certainly future in his decree, 286may be said to have been, in some sense, co-eternal with himself.—3. The immutable and perpetual complication, mentioned in the definition, means no more than that reciprocal involution of causes and effects, positis omnibus ponendis, are necessarily produced, according to the plan which infinite wisdom designed from the beginning. GOD, the First Cause, hath given being and activity to an immense number of secondary, subaltern causes; which are so inseparably linked and interwoven with their respective effects (a connexion truly admirable, and not to be comprehended by man in his present state), that those things which do in reality come to pass necessarily, and by inevitable destiny; seem, to the superficial observer, to come to pass in the common course of nature, or by virtue of human reasoning and freedom. This is that inscrutable method of Divine wisdom, “A qua” (says St. Austin) “est omnis modus, omnis species, omnnis ordo, mensura, numerus, pondus; a qua sunt semina formarum, formae seminum, motus feminum atque formarum.”

NECESSITY is the consequence of Fate. So TRISMEGISTUS: Παντα δε γιγνεται φυσει και ἑιμαρμενη, και ουκ εστι τοπος ερημος προνοιας, προνοια δε εστι, αυτοτελης λογος του επουρανιου Θεου. Δυο δε τουτου αυτο φυεις δυναμεις αναγκη και ἑιμαρμενη: i. e. “All things are brought about by Nature and by Fate; neither is any place void of Providence. Now, Providence is the self-perfect reason of the super-celestial God; from which reason of his, issue two native powers, Necessity and Fate.” Thus, in the judgment of the wiser heathens, effects were to be traced up to their producing causes; those producing causes were to be farther traced up to the still higher causes by which they were produced; and those higher causes to GOD, the cause of them. Persons, things, circumstances, events, and consequences are the effects of necessity; Necessity is the daughter of Fate: Fate is the offspring of God’s infinite wisdom and sovereign WILL. Thus, all things are ultimately resolved into their Great Primary Cause; by whom the chain was originally let down from heaven, and on whom every link depends.

It must be owned, that all the fatalists of antiquity (particularly among the Stoics) did not constantly express themselves with due precision. A Christian, who is savingly taught by the Word and Spirit of God, must be pained and disgusted, not to say, shocked, when he reads such an assertion as Την πεπρμενην μοιραν αδυνατον εστι αποφυγειν και Θεω. God himself cannot possibly avoid his destiny (Herodot. 1.), or that of the poet Philemon:

Common men are servants to kings; kings are servants to the gods; and God is a servant to necessity. So Seneca: “Eadem necessitas et Deos alligat: irrevocabilis Divina pariter atque 287 humana cursus vehit. Ille ipse, omnium conditor ac rector, scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret: Semel jussit.” “The self-same necessity binds the gods themselves. All things, divine as well as human, are carried forward by one identical and overpowering rapidity. The supreme Author and Governor of the universe hath, indeed, written and ordained the Fates; but, having once ordained them, he ever after obeys them. He commanded them at first, for once: but his conformity to them is perpetual.” This is, without doubt, very irreverently, and very incautiously expressed—whence it has been common with many Christian writers, to tax the Stoics with setting up a First Cause superior to God himself, and on which he is dependent.

But, I apprehend, these philosophers meant, in reality, no such thing. All they designed to inculcate was, that the WILL of God and his Decrees are unchangeable: that there can be no alteration in the Divine intention; no new act arise in his MIND; no reversion of his eternal plan; all being founded in adorable Sovereignty; ordered by infallible Wisdom; ratified by Omnipotence; and cemented with Immutability. Thus Lucan:

And this, not through any imbecility in God, or as if he was subject to Fate, of which (on the contrary) himself was the ordainer: but because it is his pleasure to abide by his own decree. For, as Seneca observes, “Imminutio majestatis sit, et confessio erroris, mutanda fecisse. Necesse est ei eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt:” “It would detract from the greatness of God, and look as if he acknowledged himself liable to mistakes, was he to make changeable decrees: his pleasure must necessarily be always the same; seeing, that only which is best can at any time please an all-perfect being. A good man (adds this philosopher) is under a kind of pleasing necessity to do good; and, if he did not do it, he could not be a good man.”

“Magnum hoc argumentum est firmae voluntatis, ne mutare quidem posse:” “It is a striking proof of a magnanimous will, to be absolutely incapable of changing.” And such is the will of God—it never fluctuates nor varies. But, on the other hand, was he susceptible of change; could he, through the intervention of any inferior cause, or by some untoward combination of external circumstances, be induced to recede from his purpose and alter his plan; it would be a most incontestable mark of weakness and dependence: the force of which argument made Seneca, though a heathen, cry out, “Non externa Deos cogunt; sed sua illis in legem aeterna voluntas est:” “Outward things cannot compel the gods; but their own eternal will is a law to themselves.” It may be observed, that this seems to infer, as if the Deity was still 288 under some kind of restaint. By no means. Let Seneca obviate this cavil, as he effectually does, in these admirable words: “Nec Deus ab hoc minus liber aut potens est; IPSE ENIM EST NECESSITAS SUA:” “God is not hereby, either less free or less powerful; FOR HE HIMSELF IS HIS OWN NECESSITY.”

On the whole, it is evident, that when the Stoics speak, even in the strongest terms, of the obligation of Fate on God himself, they may, and ought to be understood, in a sense worthy of the Adorable Uncreated Majesty. In thus interpreting the doctrine of Fate, as taught by the genuine philosophers of the Portico, I have the great St. Austin on my side: who, after canvassing and justly rejecting the bastard, or astrological Fate, thus goes on: “At qui omnium connectionem seriemque causarum, qua fit omne quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum eis, de verbi controversia, certandum atque laborandum est: quandoquidem ipsum causarum ordinem, et quandam connectionem, SUMMI DEI tribuunt VOLUNTATI:” i. e. “But for those philosophers [meaning the STOICS] who, by the word Fate, mean that regular chain and series of causes to which all things that come to pass owe their immediate existence; we will not earnestly contend with these persons, about a mere term: and we the rather acquiesce in their manner of expression, because they carefully ascribe—this fixed succession of things, and this mutual concatenation of causes and effects, to the WILL of the SUPREME GOD.” Austin adds many observations of the same import, and proves, from Seneca himself, as rigid a Stoic as any, that this was the doctrine and the meaning of his philosophic brethren.

THE END.