Chapter XXIII.

Of the death of Christ as it was a punishment, and the satisfaction made thereby.

So is the death of Christ revealed as a price and a sacrifice. What are the proper effects of it under these considerations shall be afterward declared.

III. The third consideration of it is its being a penalty or a punishment. To clear this I shall demonstrate four things: 1. What punishment, properly so called, is; 2. That Christ’s death was a punishment, or that in his death he did undergo punishment; 3. What that was that Christ underwent, or the material cause of that punishment; 4. Wherein the formality of its being a punishment did consist, or whence that dispensation had its equity.

For the first, I shall give, 1. The definition of it, or the description of its general nature; 2. The ends of it are to be considered.

1. For the first, that usual general description seemeth to be comprehensive of the whole nature of punishment; it is “malum passionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis,” — an evil of suffering inflicted for doing evil. Or, more largely to describe it, it is an effect of justice in him who hath sovereign power and right to order and dispose of offenders, whereby he that doth contrary to the rule of his actions is recompensed with that which is evil to himself, according to the demerit of his fault.⁴⁶⁶⁴⁶⁶   “Si non reddit faciendo quod debet reddet patiendo quod debet.” — Aug, lib. iii. de Lib. Arbit.

(1.) It is an effect of justice.⁴⁶⁷⁴⁶⁷   Vid. Diat. de Just. Vindic., translated, vol. x. Δίκη τιμωρίας ἀπαίτησις παρὰ τῶν προηδικηκότων. — Hier. Hence God’s punishing is often called an inflicting of anger; as Rom. iii. 5, “Is God unrighteous, ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργήν, who inflicteth anger?” Anger is put for the justice of God, Rom. i. 18, “The anger (or wrath) of God is revealed 434from heaven,” etc.; that is, his vindictive justice against sin is manifested by its effects. And again, the cause [is put] for the effect, manger for the effect of it in punishment; and therefore we have translated the word “vengeance,” Rom. iii. 5, which denotes the punishment itself.

(2.) It is of him who hath sovereign power and judiciary right to dispose of the offenders: and this is either immediate in God himself, as in the case whereof we speak, — he is the “only lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy,” James iv. 12, — or it is by him delegated to men for the use of human society; so Christ tells Pilate, he could have no power over him (whom he considered as a malefactor) unless it were given him from above, John xix. 11, though that is spoken in reference to that peculiar dispensation.

(3.) The nature of it consists in this, that it be evil to him on whom it is inflicted, either by the immission of that which is corrupting, vexing, and destroying, or the subtraction of that which is cheering, useful, good, and desirable, in what kind soever; and therefore did the ancients call the punishment “fraus,” because when it came upon men, they had deceived and cut short themselves of some good that otherwise they might have enjoyed. So the historian: “Cæteræ multitudini diem statuit, ante quam liceret sine fraude ab armis discedere;” that is, that they might go away freely without punishment.⁴⁶⁸⁴⁶⁸   Sallust. Bell. Catilin. cap. xxxvi. And so is that expression explained by Ulpian, Dig. lib. xx.: “Capitalem fraudem admittere est tale aliquid delinquere, propter quod capite puniendus sit.”

The schoolmen have two rules that pass amongst them without control:— First, that “Omne peccatum est adeo voluntarium, ut si non sit voluntarium non est peccatum.” It is so of the nature of sin that it be voluntary, that if any thing be not voluntary, it is not sin. The other is, “Est ex natura pœnæ ut sit involuntaria.” It is so of the nature of punishment that it be against the will of him that is punished, that if it be not so, it is not punishment.

Neither of which rules is true, yea, the latter is undoubtedly false.

For the former, every sin is thus far, indeed, voluntary, that what is done contrary to the express will of him that doth it is not his sin; but that the actual will or willing of the sinner is required to make any thing his sin is false, — in the case of original sin manifestly. Wherefore John gives us another definition of sin than theirs is, that it is “dictum, factum, concupitum, contra legem,” — namely, that it is ἀνομία, “a transgression of the law.” Have it the actual consent of the will or no, if it be a transgression of the law, an inconformity to the law, it is sin.

For the latter, it is true, indeed, that for the most part it falls out that every one that is to be punished is unwilling to undergo it, and 435there is an improper nolleity (if I may so speak) in nature unto the subtracting of any good from it, or the immission of any evil upon it; yet as to the perfection of the nature of punishment, there is no more required than what was laid down in general before, that there be “malum passionis ob malum actionis,” — a suffering of evil for doing of evil, whether men will or no: yea, men may be willing to it, as the soldiers of Cæsar, after their defeat at Dyrrachium, came to him and desired that they might be punished “more antiquo,” being ashamed of their flight.⁴⁶⁹⁴⁶⁹   Quanta fortitudine dimicaverint, testimonio est, quod adverso semel apud Dyrrachium prælio, pœnam in se ultro depoposcerunt.” — Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. cap. lxviii. “More patrio decimari voluerunt.” — Appianus. But whatever really or personally is evil to a man for his evil, is punishment. Though chiefly among the Latins “punishment” relates to things real, capital revenges had another name. Punishments were chiefly pecuniary, as Servius on that of Virgil, Æn. i. 140: “ ‘Post mihi non simili pœna commissa luetis.’ Luetis, persolvetis, et hic sermo a pecunia descendit, antiquorum enim pœnæ omnes pecuniariæ fuerunt.” And “supplicium” is of the same importance. Punishments were called “supplicia,” because with the mulcts of men they sacrificed and made their supplications to God: whence the word is sometimes used for that worship, as in Sallustius; describing the old Romans, he says they were “in suppliciis deorum magnifici,” Bell. Cat. cap. ix.

(4.) There is the procuring cause of it, which is doing evil, contrary to the law and rule whereby the offender ought to walk and regulate his actings and proceedings. “Omnis pœna, si justa est, peccati pœna est,” says Augustine; indeed, not only “si justa est,” but “si pœna est.” Taking it properly, offence must precede punishment. And whatever evil befalls any that is not procured by offence is, not properly punishment, but hath some other name and nature. The name “pœna” is used for any thing that is vexatious or troublesome, any toil or labour; as in the tragedian, speaking of one who tired himself with travel in hunting, “Quid to ipse pœnis gravibus infestus gravas:”⁴⁷⁰⁴⁷⁰   Senec. Hippol. act. ii. but improperly is it thus used. This Abraham evinceth in his plea with God, Gen. xviii. 25, “That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee: shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?” It is God as the judge of all the earth of whom he speaks; that is, of him that hath the supreme power of disposing of offenders; and of his justice inflicting, which, as I said, was the cause of punishment. It is that whereby God doth right. And he gives the procuring cause of all punishment, — the wickedness of men: “That be far from thee, to slay the righteous with the wicked.” And therefore that place of 436Job, chap. ix. 22, “This is one thing, therefore I said it, He destroyeth the perfect and the wicked,” is not to be understood absolutely, but according to the subject of the dispute in hand between him and Bildad. Bildad says, chap. viii. 20, that “God will not cast away a perfect man;” that is, he will not afflict a godly man to death, he grants that a godly man may be afflicted, which Eliphaz’ companion seemed to deny; yet, says he, he will not cast him away, — that is, leave him without relief from that affliction, even in this life. To this Job’s answer is, “This is one thing,” — that is, “One thing I am resolved on,” — “and therefore I said it,” and will abide by it, “He destroyeth the perfect and the wicked.” Not only wicked men are destroyed and cut off in this life, but perfect men also; but yet in this very destruction, as there is a difference in the persons, one being perfect, the other wicked, so there is in God’s dealing with them, one being afflicted to the door of heaven, the other cursed into hell. But for punishment, properly so called, the cause is sin, or the offence of the person punished; and therefore in the Hebrew, the same words (many of them) signify both sin and punishment, — so near and indissoluble is their relation! Προσήκει δήπουθεν ὡς χρέα κληρονομίας διαδέχεσθαι τῆς πονηρίας τὴν κόλασιν, Plut. de Sera Numin. Vindicta.

(5.) The measure of any penalty is the demerit of the offence; it is a rendering to men, as for their works, so according to them:—

I shall not trouble the reader with the heathens’ apprehension of Rhadamanthean righteousness, and the exact rendering to every one according to his desert, even in another world.

There is a twofold rule of this proportion of sin and punishment, the one constitutive, the other declarative. The rule constitutive of the proportion of penalty for sin is the infinitely wise, holy, and righteous will of God; the rule declarative of it is the law.

For the first, it is his judgment “that they which commit sin are worthy of death,” Rom. i. 32. This the apostle fully declares, chap. ii. 5–11. The day of punishing he calls “The day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God;” that is, what his judgment is concerning the demerit of sin. The world shall then know what in justice he requires for the due vengeance of it, and this according to his will. Verse 6, he will, in his righteous judgment, render to every one according to his deeds.

And here it is to be observed, that though there be an exceeding great variation in sin in respect of degrees, so that some seem as 437mountains, others in comparison of them but as mole-hills, yet it is the general nature of sin (which is the creature’s subducting itself from under the dominion of God and dependence upon him) that punishment originally is suited unto; whence death is appointed to every sin, and that eternal, wherein the degrees of punishment vary, not the kind.

2. For the several kinds of punishment (I call them so in a general acceptation of both words), they are distinguished according to their ends and causes.⁴⁷²⁴⁷²   “Puniendis peccatis tres esse debere causas existimatum est. Una est quæ νουθεσία vel κόλασις ςελ παραίνεσις dicitur; cum pœna adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit, attentior fiat, correctiorque. Altera est, quam ii, qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt, τιμωρίαν appellant, ea causa animadvertendi est, quum dignitas authoritasque ejus, in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne prætermissa animadversio contemptum ejus pariat, et honorem elevet,” etc. — Vid. A. Gell. lib. vi. cap. xxiv. The ends of punishments, or of all such things as have in them the nature of punishments, may be referred to the ensuing heads:—

(1.) The first end of punishment is the good of him that is punished; and this is twofold:—

[1.] For amendment and recovery from the evil and sin that he hath committed. This kind of punishing is frequently mentioned in Scripture: so eminently, Lev. xxvi., doth the Lord describe it at large, and insist upon it, reckoning up in a long series a catalogue of several judgments, he interposing, “But if ye will not be reformed by me by these things, but will walk contrary to me” (as verse 23), “then will I do so and so,” or add this or that punishment to them foregoing; and this in reference to the former end, of their reformation. And the success of this procedure we find variously expressed. Sometimes the end of it in some measure was fulfilled, Ps. lxxviii. 32–35; sometimes otherwise, Isa. i. 5, “Why should ye be smitten any more? ye will revolt more and more,” intimating that the end of the former smiting was to cure their revoltings. And this kind of punishment is called νουθεσία,⁴⁷³⁴⁷³   Καὶ γὰρ ἡ νουθεσία καὶ ὁ ψόγος ἐμποιεῖ μετάνοιαν καὶ αἰσχύνην — Plut. de Virtut. correction for instruction, and is not punishment in its strict and proper sense.

[2.] For the taking off of sinners, to prevent such other wickednesses as they would commit, should patience be exercised towards them. The very heathen saw that he that was wicked and not to be reclaimed, it was even good for him and to him that he should be destroyed. Such an one, as Plutarch says, was ἑτέροις γε πάντως βλαβερὸν αὐτῷ τε βλαβερώτατον — “hurtful to others, but most of all to himself.” How much more is this evident to us, who know that future judgments shall be proportionably increased to the wickedness of men in this world! And if every drop of judgment in the world to come be incomparably greater than the greatest and heaviest a man can possibly suffer in this life or lose his life by, it is most evident 438that a man may be punished with death for his own good, “mitius punientur.” This is κολασία. And this hath no place in human administrations of punishments when they arise to death itself. Men cannot kill a man to prevent their dealing worse with him, for that is their worst; they can do no more, says our Saviour: but accidentally it may be for his good. Generally, κόλασις or κολασία is, as Aristotle speaks, πάσχοντος ἕνεκα, and is thereby differenced from τιμωρία (of which afterward), which, as he says, is τοῦ πονοῦντος ἕνελ``κα ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῆ.⁴⁷⁴⁴⁷⁴   Arist. Rhet. i. Hence ἀκολάστος is one not corrected, not restrained, “incastigatus.” And therefore the punishment of death cannot at all properly be κόλασις: but cutting off by God to prevent farther sin hath in it τὶ ανάλογον thereunto.

(2.) The second end of punishment, which gives a second kind of them, in the general sense before mentioned, is for the good of others, and this also is various:—

[1.] It is for the good of them that may be like-minded with him that is punished, that they may be deterred, affrighted, and persuaded from the like evils This was the end of the punishing of the presumptuous sinner, Deut. xvii. 12, 13, “That man shall die; and all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously.” “The people;” that is, any among them that were like-minded unto him that was stoned and destroyed. So in some places they have taken lions that have destroyed men, and hung them on crosses, to fright others that should attempt the like. Hence “exemplum” is sometimes put absolutely for punishment, because punishment is for that end. So in the comedian, “Quæ futura exempla dicunt in eum indigna;”⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁵   Terent. Eunuch. act. v. sc. 5, l. 4. on which place Donatus, “Graves pœnæ, quæ possunt cæteris documento esse, exempla dicuntur.” And this is a tacit end in human punishment. I do not know that God hath committed any pure revenge unto men, — that is, punishing with a mere respect to what is past; nor should one man destroy another but for the good of others Now, the good of no man lies in revenge. The content that men take therein is their sin, and cannot be absolutely good to them. So the philosopher: “Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur: revocari enim præterita non possunt, futura prohibeantur;”⁴⁷⁶⁴⁷⁶   Sen. and Rom. xiii. 4, “If thou do that which is evil, be afraid,” etc.; — “See what he hath done to others, and be afraid.”

[2.] It is for the good of others, that they may not be hurt in the like kind as some were by the sin of him who is punished for it. This seems to be the main end of that great fundamental law of human society, “Let him that hath killed by violence be killed, that the rest of men may live in peace.”⁴⁷⁷⁴⁷⁷   “Naturale jus talionis hic indicatur.” — Grot. in Gen. ix. 6.

And these kinds of punishments, in reference to this end, are called 439παραδείγματα, “examples,”⁴⁷⁸⁴⁷⁸   Inde παραδειγματικὸς συλλογισμός et παραδειγματικὸν ἐνθύμημα. that others by impunity be not enticed to evil, and that the residue of men may be freed from the harm that is brought upon them by reason of such evils.

Hence the historian says, that commonwealths should rather be mindful of things done evilly than of good turns. The forgetfulness of the latter is a discouragement to some good, but of the former an encouragement to all licentiousness. Thus Joseph suspecting his espoused consort, yet refused παραδειγματίσαι to make an open example of her by punishment, Matt. i. 19. And these punishments are thus called from their use, and not from their own nature; and therefore differ not from κολασίαι, and τιμωρίαι, but only as to the end and use, from whence they have their denomination.”⁴⁷⁹⁴⁷⁹   Κολάσατε δὲ ἀξίως τούτους τι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις παράδειγμα σαφὶς καταστήσατε. — Thucyd. lib. iii. 40.

[3.] The good of him that punisheth is aimed at; and this is proper to God. Man punisheth not, nor can, nor ought, for his own good, or the satisfaction of his own justice; but “the Lord made all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil,” Prov. xvi. 4, Rom. ix. 22: and in God’s dealing with men, whatever he doth, unless it be for this end, it is not properly punishment.

This is τιμωρία, “vindicta noxæ,” purely the recompensing of the evil that is committed, that it may be revenged. This, I say, in God’s dealing is properly punishment, the revenge of the evil done, that himself or his justice may be satisfied; as was seen before from Rom. ii. 5–11. Whatever of evil God doth to any, — which is therefore called “punishment,” because it partaketh of the general nature of punishment, and is evil to him that is punished, — yet if the intendment of God be not to revenge the evil past upon him in a proportion of law, it is not punishment properly so called; and therefore it will not suffice, to prove that believers are or may be punished for sin, to heap up texts of Scripture where they are said to be punished, and that in reference to their sin, unless it can be also proved that God doth it “animo ulciscendi,” and that their punishment is “vindicta noxæ,” and that it is done τοῦ πονοῦντος ἕνεκα ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῆ: but of this I am not now to treat.

The reader may hence see what punishment is in general, what are the ends of it, and its kinds from thence, and what is punishment from God, properly so called. It is “vindicta noxæ, animo ulciscendi, ut ipsi satisfiat:” and this kind of punishment was the death of Christ; which is to be proved.

Secondly, That the death of Christ was a punishment properly so called (which is the third consideration of it, as I said), is next to be proved. Of all the places of Scripture and testimonies whereby this may be demonstrated, I shall fix only on one portion of Scripture, and 440that is Isa. liii. What in particular shall be produced from thence will appear when I have given some general considerations of the chapter; which I shall do at large, as looking on that portion of Scripture as the sum of what is spoken in the Old Testament concerning the satisfactory death of Jesus Christ.

1. This whole prophecy, from verse 13 of chap. lii., which is the head of the present discourse, is evinced to belong to the Messiah, against the Jews:—

(1.) Because the Chaldee paraphrast, one of their most ancient masters, expressly names the Messiah, and interprets that whole chapter of him: “Behold,” saith he, “my servant, the Messiah, shall deal prudently.” And the ancient rabbins, as is abundantly proved by others, were of the same mind: which miserably entangles their present obdurate masters, who would fix the prophecy upon any rather than on the Messiah, seeing evidently that if it be proved to belong to the Messiah in thesi, it can be applied to none other in hypothesi but Jesus of Nazareth.

(2.) Because they are not able to find out or fix on any one whatever to whom the things here spoken of may be accommodated. They speak, indeed, of Jeremiah, Josiah, a righteous man in general, the whole people of Israel, of Messiah Ben Joseph, a man of straw of their own setting up: but it is easy to manifest, were that our present work, that scarce any one expression in this prophecy, much less all, doth or can agree to any one or all of them named; so that it must be brought home to its proper subject. Of this at large in the ensuing digression against Grotius.

2. That to us it is evident above all contradiction that the whole belongs to Jesus Christ; because not only particular testimonies are taken from hence in the New Testament, and applied to him, as Matt. viii. 17, Mark xv. 28, Luke xxii. 37, Rom. x. 16, but it is also expounded of him in general for the conversion of souls, Acts viii. 26–40. The story is known of Philip and the eunuch.

3. This is such a prophecy of Christ as belongs to him not only properly but immediately; that is, it doth not in the first place point out any type of Christ, and by him shadow out Christ, as it is in sundry psalms, where David and Solomon are firstly spoken of, though the Messiah be principally intended: but here is no such thing. Christ himself is immediately spoken of. Socinus says, indeed, that he doubted not but that these things did primarily belong to another, could he be discovered who he was, and that from him was the allusion taken, and the accommodation made to Christ; “And if,” saith he, “it could be found out who he was, much light might be given into many expressions in the chapter.” But this is a bold figment, for which there is not the least countenance given either from Scripture or reason, which is evidently decried from the 441former arguments, whereby the impudence of the Jews is confounded, and shall be farther in the ensuing digression, where it shall be proved that it is impossible to fix on any one but Jesus Christ to whom the several expressions and matters expressed in this prophecy may be accommodated.

Now, there are three general parts of this prophecy, to consider it with reference to the business in hand, as the seat of this truth in the Old Testament:—

1. A description given of Christ in a mean, low, miserable condition, from verse 14 of chap. lii. to verse 4 of chap. liii.: “His visage was marred more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men,” chap. lii. 14; “he hath no form nor comeliness, no beauty,” chap. liii. 2; “he is despised and rejected, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief,” verse 3; looked on as “stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted,” verse 4.

2. The reason is given of this representation of the Messiah, of whom it is said in the entrance of the prophecy that he should “deal prudently, and be exalted and extolled, and be very high;” to which this description of him seems most adverse and contrary. The reason, I say, hereof is given from verses 5 to 10; it was on the account of his being punished and broken for us and our sins.

3. The issue of all this, from verse 10 to the end, in the justification and salvation of believers.

It is the second that I shall insist upon, to prove the death of Christ to have in it the nature of punishment, properly and strictly so called.

Not to insist upon all the particular passages, that might be done to great advantage, and ought to be done, did I purpose the thorough and full handling of the business before me (but I am “in transitu,” and pressing to somewhat farther), I shall only urge two things:— The expressions throughout that describe the state and condition of Christ as here proposed. Secondly, One or two singular assertions, comprehensive of much of the rest.

For the first, let the reader consider what is contained in the several words here setting forth the condition of Christ. We have “despising and rejecting, sorrow and grief,” verse 3. He was “stricken, smitten, afflicted,” or there was striking, smiting, affliction on him, verse 4; “wounded, bruised, chastised with stripes,” — wounding, bruising, chastising unto soreness, verse 5; “oppressed, stricken, cut off, killed, brought to slaughter,” verses 7–9; “bruised, sacrificed, and his soul made an offering for sin,” verse 10.

Now, certainly, for the material part, or the matter of punishment, here it is abundantly: here is “malum passionis” in every kind, — immission of evil, subtraction of good in soul and body; here is plentiful measure, heaped up, shaken together, and running over.

442But it may be said, though here be the matter of punishment, yet it may be all this was for some other end; and so it may be it was νουθεσία, or δοκιμασία, or παιδεία, not τιμωρία, or punishment properly so called.

Consider, then, the ends of punishment before insisted on, and see what of them is applicable to the transaction between God and Christ here mentioned.

1. Was it for his own correction? No; says the prophet, verse 9, “He had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth.” He was perfectly innocent, so that he had no need of any chastisement for his amendment. And so signally in sundry places, where mention is made of the death of Christ, his own spotless innocency is often pleaded.

2. Neither was it for his instruction, that he might be wise and instructed in the will of God; for at the very entrance of the prophecy, chap. lii. 13, he says he shall “deal prudently, and be exalted.” He was faithful before in all things. And though he experimentally learned obedience by his sufferings, yet habitually to the utmost his ears were bored, and himself prepared to the will of God, before the afflictions here principally intended. Neither, —

3. Was he παράδειγμα, punished for example, to be made an example to others that they might not offend; for what can offenders learn from the punishment of one who never offended? “He was cut off, but not for himself,” Dan. ix. 26. And the end assigned, verse 11, which is not the instruction only, but the justification and salvation of others, will not allow this end: “He shall justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities.” He set us an example in his obedience but he was not punished for an example. Neither, —

4. Was it μαρτυρία, a suffering to bear witness and testimony to the truth. There is no mention of any such end in this place; yea, to make that the main intendment here is a monstrous figment. The expressions all along, as we shall see in the next place, are, that all this was “for our transgressions, for our sins, for our iniquities, for our peace.” God wounded, bruised, killed him, for our iniquities; that is, he died to bear witness to his doctrine! “Credat Apella.”

Then, the matter of punishment being expressed, see the cause of the infliction of it. It was for “transgressions,” for “iniquities,” verse 5; for wandering and “iniquity,” verse 6; for “transgression,” verse 8; for “sin,” verse 12. Let us now remember the general description of punishment that was given at the beginning, — it is “malum passionis quod infligitur ob malum actionis,” — and see how directly it suits with this punishment of Jesus Christ: first, Here is “malum passionis” inflicted, wounding, bruising, killing; and, secondly, There is “malum actionis” deserving, sin, iniquity, and transgression. How these met on an innocent person shall be afterward 443declared. Go we along to the peculiar description of punishment properly so called, as managed by God, — it is “vindicta noxæ.” Now, if all other ends and causes whatever, as of chastisement for example, etc., be removed, and this only be asserted, then this affliction of Christ was “vindicta noxæ,” punishment in the most proper sense; but that these ends are so removed hath been declared upon the particular consideration of them.

And this is the first argument from this place to prove that the death of Christ and his suffering have the nature of punishment.

The second is from the more particular expressions of it to this purpose, both on the part of the person punishing and on the part of the person punished. A single expression on each part may be insisted on:—

1. On the part of God punishing, take that of verse 6, “The Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all;” of which sort also is that of verse 10, “Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief: when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin,” etc.

2. On the part of him punished, verse 11, “He shall bear their iniquities.”. From the consideration of these expressions we shall evidently evince what we have proposed. Of these in the next chapter.