Truth and innocence vindicated;
in
a survey of a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity, and the authority of the civil magistrate over the consciences of subjects in matters of religion.
Non partûm studiis
agimur; sed sumsimus arma,
Consiliis inimica tuis, discordia vecors.
Οὐδὲν ἄτερ
γραφῆς. —
London: 1669.
We refer to the Life of Owen, vol. i., p. 88, for an
account of the controversy to which
The genius of
A survey
of
a discourse concerning ecclesiastical polity.
Among the many disadvantages which
those who plead in any sense for liberty of conscience are exposed unto, it
is not the least that in their arguings and pleas they are enforced to
admit a supposition that those whom they plead for are indeed really
mistaken in their apprehensions about the matters concerning which they yet
desire to be indulged in their practice: for unless they will give place to
such a supposition, or if they will rigidly contend that what they plead in
the behalf of is absolutely the truth, and that obedience thereunto is the
direct will and command of God, there remains no proper field for the
debate about indulgence to be managed in; for things acknowledged to be
such are not capable of an indulgence, properly so called, because the
utmost liberty that is necessary unto them is their right and due in strict
justice and law. Men, therefore, in such discourses, speak not to the
nature of the things themselves, but to the apprehensions of them with whom
they have to do. But yet against this disadvantage every party which plead
for themselves are relieved by that secret reserve that they have in the
persuasion of the truth and goodness of what they profess, and desire to be
indulged in the practice of; and this, also, as occasion doth offer itself,
and in defence of themselves from the charge of their adversaries, they
openly contend and avow. Neither was it judged formerly that there was any
way to deprive them of this reserve and relief but by a direct and
particular debate of the matters specially in difference, carried on unto
their conviction by evidence of truth, managed from the common principles
of it. But after trial made, this way to convince men of their errors and
mistakes, who stand in need of indulgence with respect unto the outward
administration of the powers that they are under, is found, as it should
seem, tedious, unreasonable, and ineffectual. A new way, therefore, to
this purpose is fixed on, and it is earnestly pleaded that there needs no
other argument or medium to prove men to be mistaken in their
apprehensions, and to miscarry in their practice of religious duties, than
that at any time or in any place they stand in need of indulgence. To
dissent, at all adventures, is a crime, and he whom others persecute,
tacitly at least, confesseth himself guilty; for it is said that the law of
the magistrate being the sole rule of obedience in religious worship, their
non-compliance with any law by him established, evidencing itself in their
desire of exemption, is a sufficient conviction, yea, a
self-acknowledgment, not only of their errors and mistakes in what they
apprehend of their duty in these things, and of their miscarriages in what
they practice, but also that themselves are persons turbulent and
seditious, in withdrawing obedience from the laws which are justly imposed
The management of this plea (if I greatly mistake him not) is one of the principal designs of the author of that discourse, a brief survey whereof is here proposed. The principle which he proceeds herein upon himself, it seems, knew to be novel and uncouth, and therefore thought it incumbent on him that both the manner of its handling, and the other principles that he judged meet to associate with it or annex unto it, should be of the same kind and complexion. This design hath at length produced us this discourse; which, of what use it may prove to the church of God, what tendency it may have to retrieve or promote love and peace among Christians, I know not. This I know, that it hath filled many persons of all sorts, with manifold surprisals, and some with amazement. I have, therefore, on sundry considerations, prevailed with myself, much against my inclinations, for the sake of truth and peace, to spend a few hours in the examination of the principal parts and seeming pillars of the whole fabric. And this I was in my own mind the more easily induced unto, because there is no concernment either of the church or state in the things here under debate, unless it be that they should be vindicated from having any concern in the things and opinions here pleaded and argued. For as to the present church, if the principles and reasonings here maintained and managed are agreeable unto her sentiments, and allowed by her, yet there can be no offence given in their examination, because she hath nowhere yet declared them so to be. And the truth is, if they are once owned and espoused by her, to the ends for which they are asserted, as the Christians of old triumphed in the thoughts of him who first engaged in ways of violence against them among the nations in the world, so the Nonconformists will have no small relief to their minds in their sufferings, when they understand these to be the avowed principles and grounds on which they are to be persecuted and destroyed. And for the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction belonging to the kings of this nation, as it hath been claimed and exercised by them in all ages since the establishment of Christian religion among us, as it is declared in the laws, statutes, and customs of the kingdom, and prescribed unto an acknowledgment in the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, it hath not the least concern in the matter here in question; yea, it is allowed, acknowledged, and pleaded for, by those whom this author designs to oppose. Whatever, then, shall be spoken of this subject, it is but a bare ventilation of private opinions, and those such as which, if one doctor’s judgment may advance into the reputation of probability, so that some may venture to act upon them, yet are they not so far thereby secured as to have sanctuary given them even from private men’s examinations. Herein, then, I suppose, a liberty may be exercised without just offence to any; and our disquisition after the truth of the principles and theorems that will come under consideration may be harmlessly accompanied with a moderate plea in the behalf of their innocency who are invidiously traduced, contemptuously reproached, unduly charged and calumniated, beyond, I am sure, any ordinary examples or precedents, among men of any sort, rank, degree, difference, or profession in the world. Yea, this seems to be called for by the light and law of nature, and to be useful, yea, needful to public tranquillity, beyond what in this present hasty review shall be attempted.
For the author of this discourse, he is to me utterly
unknown; neither do I intend either to make any inquiry after him, or
hastily to fix a credit unto any reports concerning either who he is or of
what consideration in the world. I am not concerned to know what, it
seems, he was concerned to conceal. Nor do I use to consider reasons,
arguments, or writings under a relation to any persons; which contributes
nothing to their worth or signification. Besides, I know how deceitful
Thus, in the entrance of his preface, he tells us that he is “a person of such a tame and softly humour, and so cold a complexion, that he thinks himself scarce capable of hot and passionate impressions,” though I suppose he avow himself, p. 4, to be chafed into some heat and briskness with that evenness and steadiness of expression which we shall be farther accustomed unto. But in what here he avers of himself, he seems to have the advantage of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, upon less provocations than he hath undertaken the consideration of (for the Pharisees with whom he had to deal were gentlemen, he tells us, unto those with whom himself hath to do), as he saith, “fell into a hot fit of zeal, yea, into a height of impatience, which made him act with a seeming fury and transport of passion,” p. 7. And if that be indeed his temper which he commends in himself, he seems to me to be obliged for it unto his constitution and complexion, as he speaks, and not to his age, seeing his juvenile expressions and confidence will not allow us to think that he suffers under any defervescency of spirit by his years. The philosopher tells us that old men, in matters dubious and weighty, are not over-forward to be positive, but ready to cry, ἴσως καὶ τάχα, perhaps, and it may be so; and this δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, because they have experience of the uncertainty of things in this world; as, indeed, those who know what entanglements all human affairs are attended withal, what appearing causes and probable reasons are to be considered and examined about them, and how all rational determinations are guided and influenced by unforeseen emergencies and occasions, will not be over-forward to pronounce absolutely and peremptorily about the disposal of important affairs. But, as the same author informs us, Οἱ νέοι εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ διϊσχυρίζονται, “Young men suppose that they know all things, and are vehement in their asseverations:” from which frame proceeded all those dogmatical assertions of what is politic and impolitic in princes, of what will establish or ruin governments, with the contempt of the conceptions of others about things conducing to public peace and tranquillity, which so frequently occur in our author. This makes him smile at as serious consultations for the furtherance of the welfare and prosperity of this nation as, it may be, in any age or juncture of time have been upon the wheel, preface, p. 48. These considerations made it seem to me that, in an ordinary course, he hath time enough before him to improve the notions he hath here blessed the world with a discovery of, if, upon second thoughts, he be equally enamoured of them unto what now he seems to be.
I could, indeed, have desired that he had given us a more
clear account of that religion which in his judgment he doth most approve.
His commendation of the church of England sufficiently manifesteth his
interest to lie therein, and that, in pursuit of his own principles, he
doth outwardly observe the institutions and prescriptions of it; but the
scheme he hath given us of religion, or religious duties, — wherein there
is mention neither of sin nor a Redeemer, without which no man can
entertain any one true notion of Christian religion, — would rather bespeak
him a philosopher than a Christian. It is not unlikely but that he will
pretend he was treating of religion as religion in general, without an
application of it to this or that in particular; but to speak of religion
as it is among men in this world, or ever was since the fall of Adam,
without a supposition of sin, and the way of a relief from the event of it
mentioned, is to talk of chimeras, — things that neither are, ever were, or
will be. On the other hand, the profit and advantage of his design falls
clearly on the papal interest; for whereas it is framed and contrived for
the
And here I must have regard to the judgment of others. I confess, for my own part, I do not find myself at all concerned in those invectives, tart and upbraiding expressions, those sharp and twinging satires against his adversaries, which he avoweth or rather boasteth himself to have used. If this unparalleled heap of revilings, scoffings, despiteful reproaches, sarcasms, scornful, contemptuous expressions, false criminations, with frequent intimations of sanguinary affections towards them, do please his fancy and express his morality to his own satisfaction, I shall never complain that he hath used his liberty, and do presume that he judgeth it not meet that it should be restrained. It is far from my purpose to return him any answer in the like manner to these things; to do it
Yet some instances of prodigious excesses in this kind will, in our process, be reflected on; and it may be the repetition of them may make an appearance, unto some less considerate readers, of a little harshness in some passages of this return. But as nothing of that nature in the least is intended, — nothing that might provoke the author in his own spirit, were he capable of any “hot impressions,” nothing to disadvantage him in his reputation or esteem, — so what is spoken, being duly weighed, will be found to have nothing sharp or unpleasant in it, but what is unavoidably infused into it from the discourse itself, in its approach unto it to make a representation of it.
It is of more concernment to consider with what frame and temper of spirit he manageth his whole cause and debate; and this is such as that a man who knows nothing of him but what he learns from this discourse would suppose that he hath been some great commander
associate unto him who with his breath blew away and scattered all the legions of his enemies, as the wind doth leaves in autumn.
Such confidence in himself and his own strength; such
contempt of all his adversaries, as persons “silly, ignorant, illiterate;”
such boastings of his achievements, with such a face and appearance of
scorning all that shall rise up against him; such expressions “animi gladiatorii,” doth he march withal
as no man, sure, will be willing to stand in his way, unless he think
himself to have lived, at least quietly, long enough. Only, some things
there are which I cannot but admire in his undertaking and management of
it; as, first, that such a man of arms and art as he is should harness
himself with so much preparation, and enter the lists with so much pomp and
glow, to combat such pitiful, poor, baffled ignoramuses as he hath chosen
to contend withal, especially considering that he knew he had them bound
hand and foot, and cast under his stroke at his pleasure. Methinks it had
more become him to have sought out some giant in reason and learning, that
might have given him at least “par animo
periculum,” as
But leaving him to his own choice and liberty in these matters, I am yet persuaded that if he knew how little his adversaries esteem themselves concerned in or worsted by his revilings, how small advantage he hath brought unto the cause managed by him, with what severity of censures, that I say not indignation, his proceedings herein are reflected on by persons sober and learned, who have any respect to modesty or sobriety, or any reverence for the things of God as debated among men, he would abate somewhat of that self-delight and satisfaction which he seems to take in his achievement.
Neither is it in the matter of dissent alone from
the established forms of worship that this author and some others
endeavour, by their revilings and scoffings, to expose Nonconformists to
scorn and violence, but a semblance at least is made of the like
reflections on their whole profession of the gospel and their worship of
God; yea, these are the special subjects of those swelling words of
contempt, those sarcastical, invidious representations of what they oppose,
which they seem to place their confidence of success in. But what do they
think to effect by this course of procedure? Do they suppose that by
crying out, “canting phrases, silly nonsense, metaphors,” they shall shame
the Nonconformists out of the profession of the gospel, or make them forego
the course of their ministry, or alienate one soul from the truth taught
and professed amongst them? They know how their predecessors in the faith
thereof have been formerly entertained in the world. St Paul himself,
falling among the gentlemen philosophers of those days, was termed by them
σπερμολόγος, a “babbler,” or one that
canted, his doctrine despised as silly and foolish, and his
phrases pretended to be unintelligible. These things move not the
Nonconformists, unless it be to a compassion for them whom they see to
press their wits and parts to so wretched an employment. If they have any
thing to charge on them with respect to gospel truths, — as, that they own,
teach, preach, or publish, any doctrines or opinions that are not agreeable
thereunto and to the doctrine of the ancient and late (reformed) churches,
let them come forth, if they are men of learning, reading, and ingenuity,
and, in ways used and approved from the beginning of Christianity for such
ends and purposes, endeavour their confutation and conviction; — let them,
I say, with the skill and confidence of men, and according to all the rules
of method and art, state the matters in difference between themselves and
their adversaries, confirm their own judgments with such reasons and
arguments as they think pleadable in their behalf, and oppose the opinions
they condemn with testimonies and reasons suited to their eversion. The
course at present steered and engaged in, to carp at phrases, expressions,
manners of the declaration of men’s conceptions, collected from, or falsely
fathered upon, particular persons, thence intimated to be common to the
whole party of Nonconformists (the greatest guilt of some whereof, it may
be, is only their too near approach to the expressions used in the
Scripture to the same purpose, and the evidence of their being educed from
thence), is unmanly, unbecoming persons of any philosophic generosity, much
more Christians and ministers; nay, some of the things or sayings reflected
on and carped at by a late author are such as those who have used or
asserted them dare modestly challenge him, in their defence, to make good
his charge in a personal conference, — provided it may be scholastical or
logical, not dramatic or romantic. And surely were it not for their
confidence in that tame and patient humour which this author so tramples
upon, p. 15, they could not but fear that some or other, by these
Because we may not concern ourselves again in things of
this nature, let us take an instance or two of the manner of the dealing of
our author with the Nonconformists, and those as to their preaching and
praying, which of all things they are principally maligned about. For
their preaching, he thus sets it out, p. 75: “Whoever among them can invent
any new language presently sets up for a man of new discoveries; and he
that lights upon the prettiest nonsense is thought by the ignorant rabble
to unfold new gospel mysteries; and thus is the nation shattered into
infinite factions with senseless and fantastic phrases: and the most fatal
miscarriage of them all lies in abusing Scripture expressions, not only
without but in contradiction to their sense; so that had we but an act of
parliament to abridge preachers the use of fulsome and luscious metaphors,
it might perhaps be an effectual cure of all our present distempers. Let
not the reader smile at the oddness of the proposal; for were men obliged
to speak sense as well as truth, all the swelling mysteries of fanaticism
would then sink into flat and empty nonsense, and they would be ashamed of
such jejune and ridiculous stuff as their admired and most profound notions
would appear to be.” Certainly there are few who read these expressions
that can retain themselves from smiling at the pitiful, fantastic souls
that are here characterized, or from loathing their way of preaching here
represented. But yet if any should, by a surprisal, indulge themselves
herein, and one should seriously inquire what it is that stirred those
humours in them, it may be they could scarce return a rational account of
their commotions; for when they have done their utmost to countenance
themselves in their scorn and derision, they have nothing but the bare
assertions of this author for the proof of what is here charged on those
whom they deride. And how if these things are most of them, if not all of
them, absolutely false? how if he be not able to prove any of them by any
considerable avowed instance? how if all the things intended, whether they
be so or no as here represented, depend merely on the judgment and fancy of
this author, and it should prove in the issue that they are no such rules,
measures, or standards of men’s rational expressions of their conceptions,
but that they may be justly appealed from? And how if sundry things so
odiously here expressed be proved to have been sober truths, declared in
words of wisdom and sobriety? what if the things condemned as “fulsome
metaphors” prove to be scriptural expressions of gospel mysteries? what if
the principal doctrines of the gospel, about the grace of God, the
mediation of Christ, of faith, justification, gospel obedience, communion
with God, and union with Christ, are esteemed and stigmatized by some as
“swelling mysteries of fanaticism,” and the whole work of our redemption by
the blood of Christ, as expressed in the Scripture, be deemed metaphorical?
In brief, what if all this discourse concerning the preachings of
Nonconformists be, as unto the sense of the words he used, false, and the
crimes in them injuriously charged upon them? what if the metaphors they
are charged with are no other but their expression of gospel mysteries,
“not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost
teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual? As these things may
and will be made evident when particulars shall be instanced in, so when, I
say, these things are discovered and laid open, there will be a composure,
possibly, of those affections and disdainful thoughts which those swelling
words may have moved in weak and inexperienced minds. It may be, also, it
will appear that, upon a due consideration, there will be little
subject-matter remaining to be enacted in that law or act of parliament
But let us see if their prayers meet with any better entertainment. An account of his thoughts about them he gives us, p. 19: “It is the most solemn strain of their devotion, to vilify themselves with large confessions of the heinousest and most aggravated sins. They will freely acknowledge their offences against all the commands, and that with the foulest and most enhancing circumstances; they can rake together and confess their injustice, uncleanness, and extortion, and all the publican and harlot sins in the world: in brief, in all their confessions they stick not to charge themselves with such large catalogues of sin, and to amass together such a heap of impieties, as would make up the completest character of lewdness and villany; and if their consciences do really arraign them of all those crimes whereof they so familiarly indict themselves, there are no such guilty and unpardonable wretches as they. So, then, their confessions are either true or false. If false, then they fool and trifle with the Almighty; if true, then I could easily tell them the fittest place to say their prayers in.”
I confess this passage, at its first perusal, surprised me
with some amazement. It was unexpected to me that he who designed all
along to charge his adversaries with Pharisaism, and to render them like
unto them, should instance in their confession of sin in their
prayers, when it is even a characteristical note of the Pharisees
that in their prayers they made no confession of sin at all; but it was far
more strange to me that any man durst undertake the reproaching of poor
sinners with the deepest acknowledgment of their sins before the holy God
that they are capable to conceive or utter. Is this, thought I, the spirit
of the men with whom the Nonconformists do contend, and upon whose instance
alone they suffer? Are these their apprehensions concerning God, sin,
themselves, and others? Is this the spirit wherewith the children of the
church are acted? Are these things suited to the principles, doctrines,
practices, of the church of England? Such reproaches and reflections,
indeed, might have been justly expected from those poor deluded souls who
dream themselves perfect and free from sin; but to meet with such a treaty
from them who say or sing, “O God, the father of heaven,
For the particular instances wherewith he would countenance his sentiments and censures in this matter, there is no difficulty in their removal. Our Lord Jesus Christ hath taught us to call the most secret workings of sin in the heart, though resisted, though controlled and never suffered to bring forth, by the names of those sins which they lie in a tendency unto; and men in their confessions respect more the pravity of their natures and the inward working and actings of sin than the outward perpetrations of it, wherein perhaps they may have little concernment in the world: as Job, who pleaded his uprightness, integrity, and righteousness against the charge of all his friends, yet when he came to deal with God, he could take that prospect of his nature and heart as to vilify himself before him, yea, to “abhor himself in dust and ashes.”
Again; ministers, who are the mouths of the congregation to
God, may and ought to acknowledge, not only the sins whereof themselves are
personally guilty, but those also which they judge may be upon any of the
congregation. This assuming of the persons of them to whom they speak, or
in whose name they speak, is usual even to the sacred writers themselves.
So speaks the apostle Peter,
As to his instances of the confession of “injustice,
uncleanness, and extortion,” it may be, as to the first and last, he would
be put to it to make it good by express particulars; and I wish it be not
found that some have need to confess them who cry at present they are not
of these publicans. Uncleanness seems to bear the worst sound, and to lead
the mind to the worst apprehensions of all the rest; but it is God with
whom men have to do in their confessions, and before him, “What is man,
that he should be clean? and he that is born of a woman, that he should be
righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints; yea, the heavens are
not clean in his sight. How much more abominable and filthy is man, who
drinketh iniquity like water,”
But to what purpose is it to contend about these things? I look upon this discourse of our author as a signal instance of the power of prejudice and passions over the minds of men: for, setting aside the consideration of a present influence from them, I cannot believe that any one that professeth the religion taught by Jesus Christ and contained in the Scripture can be so ignorant of the terror of the Lord; so unaccustomed to thoughts of his infinite purity, severity, and holiness; such a stranger to the accuracy, spirituality, and universality of the law; so unacquainted with the sin of nature, and the hidden deceitful workings of it in the hearts, minds, and affections of men; so senseless of the great guilt of the least sin, and the manifold inexpressible aggravations wherewith it is attended; so unexercised to that self-abasement and abhorrency which becomes poor sinners in their approaches to the holy God, when they consider what they are in themselves; so disrespective of the price of redemption that was paid for our sins, and the mysterious way of cleansing our souls from them by the blood of the Son of God, — as to revile, despise, and scoff at men for the deepest humblings of their souls before God, in the most searching and expressive acknowledgments of their sins, that they do or can make at any time.
The like account may be given of all the charges that this author manageth against the men of his indignation; but I shall return at present to the preface under consideration.
Again, the chief glory of the English Reformation consisted
in the purity of its doctrine, then first restored to the nation. This, as
it is expressed in the articles of religion, and in the publicly-authorized
writings of the bishops and chief divines of the church of England, is, as
was said, the glory of the English Reformation. And it is somewhat strange
to me, that whilst one writes against original sin, another
preaches up justification by works, and scoffs at the
imputation of the righteousness of Christ to them that believe; yea,
whilst some can openly dispute against the doctrine of the
Trinity, the Deity of Christ, and the Holy Ghost;
whilst instances may be collected of some men’s impeaching all the articles
almost throughout, — there should be no reflection in the least on these
things. Only those
Some men’s guilt in this nature might rather mind them of pulling the beam out of their own eyes than to act with such fury to pull out the eyes of others for the motes which they think they espy in them. But hence is occasion given to pour out such a storm of fury, conveyed by words of as great reproach and scorn as the invention of any man, I think, could suggest, as is not lightly to be met withal. Might our author be prevailed with to mind the old rule, “Mitte male loqui, dic rem ipsam,” these things might certainly be debated with less scandal, less mutual offences and provocations.
Another account of the reasons of his intemperance in these reproaches, supplying him with an opportunity to increase them in number and weight, he gives us, pp. 6, 7 of his preface; which, because it may well be esteemed a summary representation of his way and manner of arguing in his whole discourse, I shall transcribe:—
“I know,” says he, “but one single instance in which zeal, or a high indignation, is just and warrantable, and that is when it vents itself against the arrogance of haughty, peevish, and sullen religionists, that, under higher pretences of godliness, supplant all principles of civility and good-nature; that strip religion of its outside, to make it a covering for spite and malice; that adorn their peevishness with a mark of piety, and shroud their ill-nature under the demure pretences of godly zeal, and stroke and applaud themselves as the only darlings and favourites of Heaven; and, with a scornful pride, disdain all the residue of mankind as a rout of worthless and unregenerate reprobates. Thus, the only hot fit of zeal we find our Saviour in was kindled by an indignation against the pride and insolence of the Jews, when he whipped the buyers and sellers out of the outward court of the temple; for though they bore a blind and superstitious reverence towards that part of it that was peculiar to their own worship, yet as for the outward court, the place where the Gentiles and proselytes worshipped, that was so unclean and unhallowed that they thought it could not be profaned by being turned into an exchange of usury. Now, this insolent contempt of the Gentiles, and impudent conceit of their own holiness, provoked the mild spirit of our blessed Saviour to such an height of impatience and indignation as made him, with a seeming fury and transport of passion, whip the tradesmen thence, and overthrow their tables.”
What truth, candour, or conscience, hath been attended unto
in the insolent reproaches here heaped up against his adversaries is left
to the judgment of God and all impartial men; yea, let judgment be made and
sentence be passed according to the ways, course of life, conversation,
usefulness amongst men, readiness to serve the common concerns of mankind,
in exercising loving-kindness in the earth, of those who are thus
injuriously traduced, compared with any in the approbation and commendation
of [those by] whom they are covered with these reproaches, and there lives
not that person who may not be admitted to pronounce concerning the equity
and righteousness, or iniquity, of these intemperances. However, it is
nothing with them with whom he hath to do to be judged in man’s day; they
stand at the judgment-seat of Christ, and have not so learned him as to
relieve themselves by false or fierce recriminations. The measure of the
covering provided for all these excesses of unbridled passion is that alone
which is now to be taken. The case expressed, it seems, is the only single
instance in which zeal is “just and warrantable.” How our author came to
be assured thereof, I know not; sure I am that it doth neither comprise in
it, nor hath any aspect on, the ground, occasion,
For what concerns the example of our blessed Saviour, particularly insisted on, I wish he had offended one way only in the report he makes of it; for let any sober man judge, in the first place, whether those expressions he useth, of the “hot fit of zeal” that he was in, of the “height of impatience” that he was provoked unto, the “seeming fury and transport of passion” that he acted withal, do become that reverence and adoration of the Son of God which ought to possess the hearts and guide the tongues and writings of men that profess his name. But whatever other men’s apprehensions may be, as it is not improbable but that some will exercise severity in their reflections on these expressions, for my part, I shall entertain no other thoughts but that our author, being engaged in the composition of an invective declamation, and aiming at a grandeur of words, yea, to fill it up with tragical expressions, could not restrain his pen from some extravagant excess when the Lord Christ himself came in his way to be spoken of.
However, it will be said the instance is pertinently
alleged, and the occasion of the exercise of the zeal of our blessed
Saviour is duly represented. It may be some will think so; but the truth
is, there are scarce more lines than mistakes in the whole discourse to
this purpose. What court it was of the temple wherein the action
remembered was performed is not here particularly determined; only it is
said to be the “outward court, wherein the Gentiles and proselytes
worshipped, in opposition to that which was peculiar to the worship of the
Jews.” Now, of old, from the first erection of the temple, there were two
courts belonging unto it, and no more: the inward court, wherein were the
brazen altar, with all those utensils of worship which the priests
made use of in their sacred offices; and the outward court, whither the
people assembled, as for other devotions, so to behold the priests
exercising their function, and to be in a readiness to bring in their own
especial sacrifices, upon which account they were admitted to the altar
itself. Into this outward court, which was a dedicated part of the temple,
all Gentiles who were proselytes of righteousness, — that is, who, being
circumcised, had taken upon them the observation of the law of Moses, and
thereby joined themselves to the people of God, — were admitted, as all the
Jewish writers agree. And these were all the courts that were at first
sanctified, and were in use when the words were spoken by the prophet which
are applied to the action of our Saviour, — namely, “My house shall be
called a house of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves.”
Afterward, in the days of the Herodians, another court was added, by the
immuring of the remainder of the hill, whereinto a promiscuous entrance was
granted unto all people. It was, therefore, the ancient outward court
whereinto the Jews thought that Paul had brought Trophimus the Ephesian,
whom they knew to be uncircumcised. I confess some expositors think that
it was this latter area from whence the Lord Christ cast out the buyers and
sellers, but their conjecture seems to be altogether groundless; for
neither was that court ever absolutely called “the temple,” nor was it
esteemed sacred, but common or profane, nor was it in being when the
prophet used the words mentioned concerning the temple. It was, therefore,
the other ancient outward court, common to the Jews and proselytes of the
Gentiles, that is intended; for as there the salt and wood were stored that
were daily used in their sacrifices, so the covetous priests, knowing that
many who came up to offer were wont to buy the beasts they sacrificed at
Jerusalem, to prevent the charge and labour of bringing them from far, to
further,
These things are not pleaded in the least to give countenance to any in their proud, supercilious censures and contempt of others; wherein if any person living have outdone our author, or shall endeavour so to do, he will not fail, I think, to carry away the prize in this unworthy contest. Nor is it to apologize for them whom he charges with extravagancies and excesses in this kind. I have no more to say in their behalf but that, as far as I know, they are falsely accused and calumniated, though I will not be accountable for the expressions of every weak and impertinent person. Where men, indeed, sin openly in all manner of transgressions against the law and gospel; where a spirit of enmity to holiness and obedience unto God discovers and acts itself constantly on all occasions; in a word, where men wear sin’s livery, — some are not afraid to think them sin’s servants. But as to that elation of mind in self-conceit wherewith they are charged, their contempt of other men upon the account of party, which he imputes unto them, I must expect other proofs than the bare assertion of this author before I join with him in the management of his accusations. And no other answer shall I return to the ensuing leaves, fraught with bitter reproaches, invectives, sarcasms, far enough distant from truth and all sobriety; nor shall I, though in their just and necessary vindication, make mention of any of those things which might represent them persons of another complexion. If this author will give those whom he probably most aims to load with these aspersions leave to confess themselves poor and miserable sinners in the sight of God, willing to bear his indignation against whom they have sinned, and to undergo quietly the severest rebukes and revilings of men, in that they know not but that they have a providential permissive commission from God so to deal with them; and add thereunto that they yet hope to be saved by Jesus Christ, and in that hope endeavour to give up themselves in obedience to all his commands, — it contains that description of them which they shall always, and in all conditions, endeavour to answer. But I have only given these remarks upon the preceding discourse to discover upon what feeble grounds our author builds for his own justification in his present engagement.
Page 13 of his preface, he declares his original
design in writing this discourse, — which was to “represent to the
world the lamentable folly and silliness of those men’s religion with whom
he had to do;” which he farther expresses and pursues with such a
lurry A
word occurring more than once in Owen’s writings, though not noticed in
such dictionaries as those of Webster and Richardson. It seems to mean “a
disturbance, or tumult.” See Halliwell’s “Dictionary of Archaic and
Provincial Words,” where he quotes Cotton using the word in this sense. —
Ed.
But in this main design he professeth himself
prevented by “the late learned and ingenious discourse, The Friendly
Debate;” The work to which Owen refers is entitled, “A Friendly Debate between a Conformist and a Nonconformist,
in two parts,” London, 1669. It is understood to have been written
by
For the present, his account of the excellencies and successes of that discourse minds me of the dialogue between Pyrgopolynices and Artotrogus:—
Although the particular instances he gives of the man’s
successes are prodigiously ridiculous, yet the casting up of the sum-total
to the completing of his victory sinks them all out of consideration. And
such is the account we have here of the Friendly Debate. This and that it
hath effected; which though unduly asserted as to the particular instances,
yet altogether comes short of that absolute victory and triumph which are
ascribed unto it. But I suppose that, upon due consideration, men’s
glorying in those discourses will be but as the crackling of thorns in the
fire, — noise and smoke, without any real and solid use or satisfaction.
The great design of the author, as is apparent unto all, was to render the
sentiments
And to this end his way of writing by dialogues is
exceedingly suited and accommodated; for although ingenious and learned
men, such as
An instance hereof we have in the case of Socrates. Sundry
in the city being weary of him, for his uprightness, integrity, and
continual pressing of them to courses of the like nature; some, also, being
in an especial manner incensed at him and provoked by him; amongst them
they contrived his ruin. That they might effect this design, they procured
Besides, do these men not know that if others would employ themselves in a work of the like kind, by way of retortion and recrimination, that they would find real matter, amongst some whom they would have esteemed sacred, for an ordinary ingenuity to exercise itself upon unto their disadvantage? But what would be the issue of such proceedings? who would be gainers by it? Every thing that is professed among them that own religion, all ways and means of their profession, being by their mutual reflections of this kind rendered ridiculous, what remains but that men fly to the sanctuary of atheism to preserve themselves from being scoffed at and despised as fools? On this account alone I would advise the author of our late Debates to surcease proceeding in the same kind, lest a provocation unto a retaliation should befall any of those who are so foully aspersed.
But, as I said, what will be the end of these things, namely, of mutual virulent reflections upon one another? Shall this “sword devour for ever? and will it not be bitterness in the latter end?” for, as he said of old of persons contending with revilings, —
Great store there are of such words and expressions on
every hand, and every provoked person, if he will not bind his passion to a
rule of sobriety and temperance, may at his pleasure take out and use what
he supposeth for his turn. And let not men please themselves with
imagining that it is not as easy, though perhaps not so safe, for others to
use towards themselves haughty and contemptuous expressions, as it is for
them to use them towards others. But shall this wrath
Is agreement in all other things, all love and forbearance, unless there be a centring in the same opinions absolutely, become criminal, yea detestable? Will this way of proceeding compose and satisfy the minds of men? If there be no other way for a coalescence in love and unity, in the bond of peace, but either that the Nonconformists do depose and change in a moment, as it were, their thoughts, apprehensions, and judgments, about the things in difference amongst us, which they cannot, which is not in their power to do; or that in the presence, and with a peculiar respect unto the eye and regard of God, they will act contrary unto them, which they ought not, which they dare not, no not upon the present instruction, — the state of these things is somewhat deplorable.
That alone which, in the discourses mentioned, seemeth to
me of any consideration, if it have any thing of truth to give it
countenance, is, that the Nonconformists, under pretence of preaching
mysteries and grace, do neglect the pressing of moral
duties, which are of near and indispensable concernment unto men in
all their relations and actions, and without which religion is but a
pretence and covering for vice and sin. A crime this is, unquestionably,
of the highest nature, if true, and such as might justly render the whole
profession of those who are guilty of it suspected. And this is again
renewed by our author, who, to charge home upon the Nonconformists, reports
the saying of
For their own discharge of the work of the ministry, they
endeavour to take their rule, pattern, and instruction, from the precepts,
directions, and examples of them who were first commissionated unto that
work, even the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ, recorded in the
Scripture, that they might be used and improved unto that end. By them are
they taught to endeavour the declaring unto men all the counsel of God
concerning his grace, their obedience, and salvation; and
By this dispensation of the gospel do they endeavour to ingenerate in the hearts and souls of men “repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ.” To prepare them also hereunto they cease not, by the preaching of the law, to make known to men “the terror of the Lord,” to convince them of the nature of sin, of their own lost and ruined condition by reason of it, through its guilt, as both original in their natures and actual in their lives; that they may be stirred up to “flee from the wrath to come,” and to” lay hold on eternal life.” And thus, as God is pleased to succeed them, do they endeavour to lay the great foundation, Jesus Christ, in the hearts of their hearers, and to bring them to an interest in him by believing. In the farther pursuit of the work committed unto them, they endeavour more and more to declare unto, and instruct their hearers in, all the mysteries and saving truths of the gospel; to the end that, by the knowledge of them, they may be wrought unto obedience, and brought to conformity to Christ, — which is the end of their declaration. And in the pursuit of their duty there is nothing more that they insist upon, as far as ever I could observe, than an endeavour to convince men that that faith or profession that doth not manifest itself, which is not justified by works, which doth not purify the heart within, that is not fruitful in universal obedience to all the commands of God, is vain and unprofitable; letting them know that though we are saved by grace, yet we are the “workmanship of God, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which he hath before ordained that we should walk in them,” — a neglect whereof doth uncontrollably evict men of hypocrisy and falseness in their profession: that, therefore, these things, in those that are adult, are indispensably necessary to salvation. Hence do they esteem it their duty continually to press upon their hearers the constant observance and doing of “whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report;” letting them know that those who are called to a participation of the grace of the gospel have more, higher, stronger obligations upon them to righteousness, integrity, honesty, usefulness amongst men, in all moral duties, throughout all relations, conditions, and capacities, than any others whatever.
For any man to pretend, to write, [to] plead that this they
do not, but indeed do discountenance morality and the duties of it, is to
take a liberty of saying what he pleases for his own purpose, when
thousands are ready from the highest experience to contradict him. And if
this false supposition should prove the soul that animates any discourses,
let men never so passionately admire them and expatiate in the commendation
of them, I know some that will not be their rivals in their ecstasies. For
the other things which those books are mostly filled withal, setting aside
frivolous, trifling exceptions about modes of carriage and common phrases
of speech, altogether unworthy the review or perusal of a serious person,
they consist
But to return: that the advantages mentioned are somewhat peculiar unto dialogues, we have a sufficient evidence in this, that our author having another special design, he chose another way of writing suited thereunto. He professeth that he hath neither hope nor expectation to convince his adversaries of their crimes or mistakes, nor doth endeavour any such thing. Nor did he merely project to render them contemptible and ridiculous (which to have effected, the writing of dialogues in his management would have been most accommodate); but his purpose was to expose them to persecution, or to the severity of penal laws from the magistrates, and if possible, it may be, to popular rage and fury. The voice of his whole discourse is the same with that of the Jews concerning St Paul, “Away with such fellows from the earth, for it is not fit that they should live.” Such an account of his thoughts he gives us, p. 253. Saith he, “The only cause of all our troubles and disturbances” (which what they are he knows not nor can declare), “is the inflexible perverseness of about a hundred proud, ignorant, and seditious preachers; against whom if the severity of the laws were particularly levelled, how easy would it be,” etc.
But I hope it will appear, before the close of this
discourse, that our author is far from deserving the reputation of
infallible in his polities, whatever he may be thought to do in his
divinity. It is sufficiently known how he is mistaken in his calculation
of the numbers of those whom he designs to brand with the blackest marks of
infamy, and whom he exposeth in his desires to the severities of law for
their ruin. I am sure it is probable that there are more than a hundred of
those whom he intends, who may say unto him as
who have been longer in the ministry than he in the world.
But suppose there were but a hundred of them, he knows, or may know, when
there was such a disparity in the numbers of them that contested about
religion, that it was said of them, “All the world against
But how came he so well acquainted with them all and every
one as to pronounce of them that they are “proud, ignorant, and seditious?”
Allow him the liberty, — which I see he will take whether we allow it him
or no, — to call whom he pleaseth “seditious,” upon the account of real or
supposed principles not compliant with his thoughts and apprehensions, yet
that men are “proud and ignorant,” how he can prove but by particular
instances from his own acquaintance with them, I know not. And if he
should be allowed to be a competent judge of knowledge and ignorance in the
whole compass of wisdom and science, — which, it may be, some will except
against, — yet unless he had personally conversed with them all, or were
But yet, let them be as ignorant as can be fancied, this
will not determine the difference between them and their adversaries. One
unlearned See
But to return from this digression: this being the design of our author, not so much to expose his adversaries to common contempt and laughter as to ruin and destruction, he diverted from the beaten path of dialogues, and betook himself unto that of rhetorical invective declamations; which is peculiarly suited to carry on and promote such a design. I shall, therefore, here leave him for the present, following the triumphal chariot of his friend, singing, “Io triumphe!” and casting reflections upon the captives that he drags after him at his chariot wheels; which will doubtless supply his imagination with a pleasing entertainment, until he shall awake out of his dream, and find all the pageantry that his fancy hath erected round about him to vanish and disappear.
His next attempt is upon atheists, wherein I have
no concern, nor his principal adversaries, the Nonconformists. For my
part, I have had this advantage by my own obscurity and small consideration
in the world, as never to converse with any persons that did or durst
question the being or providence of God, either really or in pretence. By
common reports and published discourses, I find that there are not a few in
these days who, either out of pride and ostentation or in a real compliance
with their own darkness and ignorance, do boldly venture to dispute the
things which we adore; and, if I am not greatly misinformed, a charge of
this prodigious licentiousness and impiety may, from pregnant instances, be
brought near the doors of some who on other occasions declaim against it.
For practical atheism, the matter seems to be unquestionable; many live as
though they believed neither God nor devil in the world but themselves.
With neither sort am I concerned to treat at present, nor shall I examine
the invectives of our author against them, though I greatly doubt whether
ever such a kind of defence of the being of God was written by any man
before him. If a man would make a judgment upon the genius and the way of
his discourse, he might possibly be tempted to fear that it is persons
rather than things that are the object of his indignation; and it may be
the fate of some to suffer under the infamy of atheism, as it is thought
It seems, also, that those who are here chastised do vent
their atheism in scoffing, drollery, and jesting, and such like
contemptible efforts of wit, that may take for a while amongst little and
unlearned people, and immediately evaporate. I am more afraid of those
who, under pretences of sober reason, do vent and maintain opinions and
principles that have a direct tendency to give an open admission unto
atheism in the minds of men, than of such fooleries. When others’ fury and
raving cruelties succeeded not, he alone prevailed “qui solus accessit sobrius ad perdendam
rempublicam.” One principle contended for as rational and true,
which, if admitted, will insensibly seduce the mind unto and justify a
practice ending in atheism, is more to be feared than ten thousand jests
and scoffs against religion, which, me-thinks, amongst men of any tolerable
sobriety, should easily be buried under contempt and scorn. And our author
may do well to consider whether he hath not, unwittingly I presume, in some
instances, so expressed and demeaned himself as to give no small advantage
to those corrupt inclinations unto atheism which abound in the hearts of
men. Are not men taught here to keep the liberty of their minds and
judgments to themselves, whilst they practice that which they approve not
nor can do so? which is directly to act against the light and conviction of
conscience. And yet an associate of his in his present design, in a modest
and free conference, tells us that “there is not a wider step to atheism
than to do any thing against conscience;” and informs his friend that
“dissent out of grounds that appear to any founded on the will of God is
conscience.” But against such a conscience, the light, judgment, and
conviction of it, are men here taught to practise; and thereby, in the
judgment of that author, are instructed unto atheism! And, indeed, if once
men find themselves at liberty to practice contrary to what is prescribed
unto them in the name and authority of God, as all things are which
conscience requires, it is not long that they will retain any regard of him
or reverence unto him. It hath hitherto been the judgment of all who have
inquired into these things, that the great concern of the glory of God in
the world, the interest of kings and rulers, of all governments whatever,
the good and welfare of private persons, lies in nothing more than in
preserving conscience from being debauched in the conducting principles of
it, and in keeping up its due respect to the immediate sovereignty of God
over it in all things. Neither ever was there a more horrid attempt upon
the truth of the gospel, all common morality, and the good of mankind, than
that which some of late years or ages have been engaged in, by suggesting,
in their casuistical writings, such principles for the guidance of the
consciences of men as in sundry particular instances might set them free,
as to practice, from the direct and immediately influencing authority of
God in his word. And yet I doubt not but it may be made evident that all
their principles in conjunction are scarce of so pernicious a tendency as
this one general theorem, that men may lawfully act in the worship of God,
or otherwise, against the light, dictates, or convictions of their own
consciences. Exempt conscience from an absolute, immediate, entire,
universal dependence on the authority, will, and judgment of God, according
to what conceptions it hath of them, and you disturb the whole harmony of
divine providence in the government of the world, and break the first link
of that great chain whereon all religion and government in the world
I shall not much reflect upon those expressions which our author is pleased to vent his indignation by, such as “religious rage and fury, religions villany, religious lunacies, serious and conscientious villanies, wildness of godly madness, men led by the Spirit of God to disturb the public peace, the world filled with a buzz and noise of the Divine Spirit, sanctified fury, sanctified barbarism, pious villanies, godly disobedience, sullen and cross-grained godliness,” with innumerable others of the like kind; which, although perhaps he may countenance himself in the use of, from the tacit respect that he hath to the persons whom he intends to vilify and reproach, yet in themselves, and to others who have not the same apprehensions of their occasion, they tend to nothing but to beget a scorn and derision of all religion and the profession of it, — a humour which will not find where to rest or fix itself, until it come to be swallowed up in the abyss of atheism.
We are at length arrived at the last act of this tragical preface; and as in our progress we have rather heard a great noise and bluster than really encountered either true difficulty or danger, so now I confess that weariness of conversing with so many various sounds of the same signification, the sum of all being “knaves, villains, fools,” will carry me through the remainder, of it with some more than ordinary precipitation, as grudging an addition in this kind of employment to those few minutes wherein the preceding remarks were written or dictated.
There are two or three heads which the remainder of this prefatory discourse may be reduced unto: First, a magnificent proclamation of his own achievements, — what he hath proved, what he hath done, especially in representing the “inconsistence of liberty of conscience with the first and fundamental laws of government.’’ And I am content that he please himself with his own apprehensions, like him who admired at the marvellous feats performed in an empty theatre; for it may be that, upon examination, it will be found that there is scarce in his whole discourse any one argument offered that hath the least seeming cogency towards such an end. Whether you take “liberty of conscience” for liberty of judgment, which himself confesseth uncontrollable, or liberty of practice upon indulgence, which he seems to oppose, an impartial reader will, I doubt, be so far from finding the conclusion mentioned to be evinced, as he will scarcely be able to satisfy himself that there are any premises that have a tendency thereunto. But I suppose he must extremely want an employment who will design himself a business in endeavouring to dispossess him of his self-pleasing imagination. Yea, he seems not to have pleaded his own cause absurdly at Athens, who, giving the city the news of a victory when they had received a fatal defeat, affirmed that public thanks were due to him for affording them two days of mirth and jollity before the tidings came of their ill success, which was more than they were ever likely to see again in their lives! And there being as much satisfaction in a fancied as a real success, though useless and failing, we shall leave our author in the highest contentment that thoughts of this nature can afford him. However, it may not be amiss to mind him of that good old counsel, “Let not him that girdeth on his armour boast himself as he that putteth it off.”
Another part of his oration is, to decry the folly of that
brutish apprehension, that men can possibly live peaceably and quietly if
they enjoy the liberty of their
But these things are but collateral to his principal design in this close of his declamation, and this is, the removal of an objection, that “liberty of conscience would conduce much to the improvement of trade in the nation.” It is known that many persons of great wisdom and experience, and who, as it is probable, have had more time to consider the state and proper interest of this nation, and have spent more pains in the weighing of all things conducing thereunto, than our author hath done, are of this mind and judgment. But he at once strikes them and their reasons dumb by drawing out his Gorgon’s head, that he hath proved it inconsistent with government, and so it must needs be a foolish and silly thing to talk of its usefulness to trade. “Verum, ad populum phaleras.” If great blustering words, dogmatical assertions, uncouth, unproved principles, accompanied with a pretence of contempt and scorn of all exceptions and oppositions to what is said, with the persons of them that make them, may be esteemed proofs, our author can prove what he pleaseth, and he is to be thought to have proved whatever he affirms himself so to have done. If sober reason, experience, arguments derived from commonly-acknowledged principles of truth, if a confirmation of deductions from such principles by confessed and commonly approved instances, are necessary to make up convincing proofs in matters of this nature and importance, we are yet to seek for them, notwithstanding any thing that hath been offered by this author, or, as far as I can conjecture, is likely so to be. In the meantime, I acknowledge many parts of his discourse to be singularly remarkable. His insinuation “that the affairs of the kingdom are not in a fixed and established condition, that we are distracted amongst ourselves with a strange variety of jealousies and animosities,” and such like expressions, as, if divulged in a book printed without licence, would, and that justly, be looked on as seditious, are the foundations that he proceedeth upon. Now, as I am confident that there is very little ground, or none at all, for these insinuations, so the public disposing of the minds of men to fears, suspicions, and apprehensions of unseen dangers by such means, becomes them only who care not what disadvantage they cast others, nay, their rulers under, so they may compass and secure their own private ends and concerns.
But yet, not content to have expressed his own real or
pretended apprehensions, he proceeds to manifest his scorn of those, or his
smiling at them, who “with mighty projects labour for the improvement of
trade;” which the council appointed, as I take it, by his majesty, thence
denominated, is more concerned in than the Nonconformists, and may do well
upon this information, finding themselves liable to scorn, to desist from
such a useless and contemptible employment. They may now know that to
erect and encourage trading combinations is only to build so many nests of
faction and sedition; for he says, “There is not any sort of people so
inclinable to seditious practices as the trading part of a nation,” and
that “their pride and arrogance naturally increase with the improvement of
their stock.” Besides,
It cannot be denied but that this modern policy runs contrary to the principles and experience of former ages. To preserve industrious men in a peaceable way of improving their own interests, whereby they might partake, in their own and family concerns, of the good and advantages of government, hath been by the weak and silly men of former generations esteemed the most rational way of inducing their minds unto peaceable thoughts and resolutions; for as the wealth of men increaseth, so do their desires and endeavours after all things and ways whereby it may be secured, that so they may not have spent their labour and the vigour of their spirits, with reference unto their own good and that of their posterity, in vain. Yea, most men are found to be of Issachar’s temper, who, when he saw that “rest was good, and the land pleasant,” wherein his own advantages lay, “bowed his shoulder to bear, and became a servant unto tribute.” “Fortes” and “miseri” have heretofore been only feared, and not such as found satisfaction to their desires in the increases and successes of their endeavours. And as Cæsar said he feared not those fat and corpulent persons, Antony and Dolabella, but those pale and lean discontented ones, Brutus and Cassius, so men have been thought to be far less dangerous or to be suspected in government who are well clothed with their own wealth and concerns, than such as have nothing but themselves to lose, and, by reason of their straits and distresses, do scarce judge them worth the keeping.
And hath this gentleman really considered what the meaning
of that word “trade” is, and what is the concernment of this nation in it?
or is he so fond of his own notions and apprehensions as to judge it meet
that the vital spirits and blood of the kingdom should be offered in
sacrifice unto them? Solomon tells us that the “profit of the earth is for
all, and the king himself is served by the field;” and we may truly in
England say the same of trade. All men know what respect unto it there is
in the revenues of the crown, and how much they are concerned in its growth
and promotion. The rents of all, from the highest to the lowest that have
an interest in the soil, are regulated by it, and rise and fall with it;
nor is there any possibility to keep them up to their present proportion
and standard, much less to advance them, without the continuance of trade
in its present condition at least, nay, without a steady endeavour for its
increase, furtherance, and promotion. Noblemen and gentlemen must be
contented to eat their own beef and mutton at home if trade decay; to keep
up their ancient and present splendour, they will find no way or means.
Corporations are known to be the most considerable and significant bodies
of the common people, and herein lies their being and bread. To diminish
or discountenance their trade is to starve them, and discourage all honest
industry in the world. It was a sad desolation that not long since befell
the great city by fire; yet, through the good providence of God, under the
peaceable government of his majesty, it is rising out of its ashes with a
new signal beauty and lustre. But that consumption and devastation of it
which the pursuit of this counsel will inevitably produce would prove fatal
and irreparable. And as the interests of all the several parts of the
commonwealth do depend on the trade of the people amongst ourselves, so the
honour, power, and security of the whole, in reference unto foreign
nations, are resolved also into the same principles: for as our soil is but
small in comparison of some of our neighbours’, and the numbers of our
people no way to be compared with theirs, so if we should forego the
advantages
No contents to the different sections of this treatise appear in the previous editions. We have prefixed a brief table of them to each section, as far as possible in the words of our author. — Ed.
The author of this discourse seems,
in this first chapter, to design the stating of the controversy which he
intendeth to pursue and handle (as he expresseth himself, p. 11); as also,
to lay down the main foundations of his ensuing superstructure. Nothing
could be more regularly projected, nor more suited to the satisfaction of
ingenious inquirers into the matters under debate; for those who have any
design in reading beyond a present divertisement of their minds or
entertainment of their fancies, desire nothing more than to have the
subject-matter which they exercise their thoughts about clearly and
distinctly proposed, that a true judgment may be made concerning what men
say and whereof they do affirm. But I fear our author hath fallen under
the misadventure of a failure in these projections, at least as unto that
certainty, clearness, and perspicuity in the declaration of his conceptions
and expression of his assertions and principles, without which all other
ornaments of speech, in
Thus, in the title of the book he asserts “the power of the magistrate over the consciences of men;” elsewhere [he] confines “the whole work and duty of conscience to the inward thoughts and persuasions of the mind, over which the magistrate hath no power at all.” “Conscience itself,” he sometimes says, “is every man’s opinion;” sometimes he calls it an “imperious faculty;” — which surely are not the same. Sometimes he pleads for “the uncontrollable power of magistrates over religion and the consciences of men;” sometimes asserts their “ecclesiastical jurisdiction” as the same thing, and seemingly all that he intends; — whereas, I suppose, no man ever yet defined “ecclesiastical jurisdiction” to be “an uncontrollable power over religion and the consciences of men.” The magistrate’s “power over religion” he asserts frequently, and denieth outward worship to be any part of religion, and at last pleads upon the matter only for his power over outward worship. Every particular virtue he affirms to be such, because it is “a resemblance and imitation of some of the divine attributes;” yet [he] also teacheth that there may be more virtues, or new ones that were not so, and that to be virtue in one place which is not so in another. Sometimes he pleads that the magistrate hath power to impose “any religion on the consciences of his subjects that doth not countenance vice or disgrace the Deity,” and then anon pleads for it in indifferent things and circumstances of outward worship only. Also, that the magistrate may” oblige his subjects’ consciences” to the performance of moral duties, and other duties in religious worship, under penalties, and yet “punisheth none for their crime and guilt, but for the example of others. And many other instances of the like nature may be given.
Now, whatever dress of words these things may be set off
withal, they savour rankly of crude and undigested notions, not reduced
unto such a consistency in his mind as to suffer him to speak evenly,
steadily, and constantly to them. Upon the whole matter, it may not be
unmeetly said of his discourses, what
The entrance of his discourse is designed to give an
account of the great difficulty which he intends to assail, of the
controversy that he will handle and debate, and of the difference which he
will compose. Here, if anywhere, accuracy, perspicuity, and a clear,
distinct direction of the minds of the reader unto a certain just
apprehension of the matter in question and difference, ought to be
expected; for if the foundation of discourses of this nature be laid in
terms general, ambiguous, loose, rhetorical, and flourishing, giving no
particular, determinate sense of the controversy (for so this is called by
our author), all that ensues in the pursuit of what is so laid down must
needs be of the same complexion. And such appears to be the declamatory
entrance of this chapter; for instead of laying a solid foundation to erect
his superstructure upon, the author seems in it only to have built a castle
in the air, that makes a goodly appearance and show, but is of no validity
or use. Can he suppose that any man is the wiser or the more intelligent,
in the difference about liberty of conscience, the power and duty of
magistrates in granting or denying an indulgence unto the exercise of it,
by reading an elegant parabolical discourse of “two supreme powers, the
magistrate and conscience, contesting for sovereignty, in and about” no man
knows what? What conscience is, what liberty of conscience, what it is
pleaded for to extend unto, who are concerned in it, whether its plea be
resolved absolutely into its own nature and constitution, or into that
respect which it hath to another common rule of the minds and conceptions
of men in and about the worship of God, is not declared; nor is it easily
discernible what he allows and approves of in his own discourse, and what
he introduceth to reflect upon, and so reject. Page 5, he tells us that
“conscience is subject and accountable to God alone, that it owns no
superior but the Lord of consciences;” and, p. 7, “that those who make it
accountable to none but God alone do in effect
What seems to be of real difficulty in this matter, which
is so rhetorically exaggerated, our blessed Saviour hath stated and
determined in one word. “Give,” saith he, “unto Cæsar the things that are
Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s;” and this he did when he
gave his disciples command not only to think, judge, and believe according
to what he should propose and reveal unto them, but also to observe and do
in outward practices whatever he should command them. As he requires all
subjection unto the magistrate in things of his proper cognizance, — that
is, all things necessary to public peace and tranquillity in this world,
the great end of his authority; so he asserts also that there are things of
God which are to be observed and practised, even all and every one of his
own commands, in a neglect whereof, on any pretence or account, we give not
unto God that which is his. And he doubted not but that these things,
these distinct respects to God and man, were exceedingly well consistent,
and together directive to the same end of public good. Wherefore, passing
through the flourishes of this frontispiece with the highest unconcernment,
we may enter the fabric itself, where, possibly, we may find him declaring
directly what it is that he asserts
I am sure our author will not be surprised, if, after he
hath reported the whole party whom he opposeth as a company of “silly,
foolish, illiterate persons,” one of them should so far acknowledge his own
stupidity as to profess that, after the consideration of this declaration
of his intention and mind, he is yet to seek for the direct and determinate
sense of his words, and for the principle that he designs the confirmation
of. I doubt not but that the magistrate hath all that power which is
absolutely necessary for the preservation of public peace and tranquillity
in the world; but if men may be allowed to fancy what they please to be
necessary unto that end, and thence to make their own measures of that
power which is to be ascribed unto him, no man knows what bounds will be
fixed unto that ocean wherein the leviathans they have framed in their
imaginations may sport themselves. Some will, perhaps, think it necessary
to this purpose that the magistrate should have power to declare and
determine whether there be a God or no; Whether, if there be, it be
necessary he should be worshipped or no; whether any religion be needful
in, or useful to, the world; and if there be, then to determine what all
subjects shall believe and practice from first to last in the whole of it.
And our author hopes that some are of this mind. Others may confine it to
lesser things, according as their own interest doth call upon them so to
do, though they are not able to assign a clear distinction between what is
subjected unto him and what may plead an exemption from his authority. He,
indeed, who is the fountain and original of all power hath both assigned
its proper end, and fully suited it to the attainment thereof; and if the
noise of men’s lusts, passions, and interests, were but a little silenced,
we should quickly hear the harmonious consenting voice of human nature
itself declaring the just proportion that is between the grant of power and
its end, and undeniably expressing it in all the instances of it: for as
the principle of rule and subjection is natural to us, concreated with us,
and indispensably necessary to human society, in all the distinctions it is
capable of, and the relations whence those distinctions arise; so nature
itself, duly attended unto, will not fail, by the reason of things, to
direct us unto all that is essential unto it and necessary unto its end.
Arbitrary fictions of ends of government,
But to let this pass; the authority here particularly
asserted is a “power in the supreme magistrate to govern and guide the
consciences of his subjects in affairs of religion.” Let any man duly
consider these expressions, and if he be satisfied by them as to the sense
of the controversy under debate, I shall acknowledge that he is wiser than
I, — which is very easy for any one to be. What are the “affairs of
religion” here intended, all or some; whether in religion or about it; what
are the “consciences of men,” and how exercised about these things; what it
is to “govern and conduct” them; with what “power,” by what means, this may
be done, — I am at a loss, for aught that yet is here declared. There is a
guidance, conduct, yea, government of the consciences of men, by
instructions and directions, in a due proposal of rational and spiritual
motives, for those ends, such as is that which is vested in and exercised
by the guides of the church, and that in subjection to and dependence on
Christ alone, as hath been hitherto apprehended, though some now seem to
have a mind to change their master, and to take up “præsente Numine,” who may be of more advantage to
them. That the magistrate hath also power so to govern and conduct the
consciences of his subjects in his way of administration, — that is, by
ordering them to be taught, instructed, and guided in their duty, — I know
none that doth deny: so did Jehoshaphat,
His general assertion is, as was observed, “That the
magistrate hath power over the consciences of his subjects in religion,” as
appears in the title of his book; here, p. 10, that power is said to be “to
govern and conduct their consciences in religious affairs;” p. 13, that
“religion is subject to his dominion, as well as all other affairs of
state;” p. 27, that “it is a sovereignty over men’s consciences in matters
of religion, and this universal, absolute, and uncontrollable.” Matters of
religion are as uncontrollably subject to the supreme power as all other
civil concerns: “He may, if he please, reserve the exercise of the
priesthood to himself,” p. 32; — that is, what now in religion corresponds
unto the ancient priesthood, as the ordering bishops and
This, therefore, seems to me, and to the most impartial
considerations of this discourse that I could bring unto it, to be the
doctrine or opinion proposed and advanced for the quieting and composing of
the great tumults described in its entrance, — namely, that the supreme
magistrate in every nation hath power to order and appoint what religion
his subjects shall profess and observe, or what he pleaseth in religion, as
to the worship of God required in it, provided that he” enjoineth nothing
that doth countenance vice or disgrace the Deity;” and thereby binds their
consciences to profess and observe that which is by him so appointed (and
nothing else are they to observe), making it their duty in conscience so to
do, and the highest crime or sin to do any thing to the contrary, and that
whatever the precise truth in these matters be, or whatever be the
apprehensions of their own consciences concerning them. Now, if our author
can produce any law, usage, or custom of this kingdom, any statute or act
of parliament, any authentic record, any acts or declarations of our kings,
any publicly-authorized writing, before or since the Reformation,
declaring, asserting, or otherwise approving, the power and authority
described to belong unto, to be claimed or exercised by, the kings of this
nation, I will faithfully promise him never to write one word against it,
although I am sure I shall never be of that mind. And, if I mistake
For the present be it granted that it is the duty and in the power of every supreme magistrate to order and determine what religion, what way, what modes in religion, shall be allowed, publicly owned, and countenanced, and by public revenue maintained in his dominions; — that is, this is allowed with respect to all pretensions of other sovereigns, or of his own subjects. With respect unto God, it is his truth alone, the religion by him revealed, and the worship by him appointed, that he can so allow or establish. The rule that holds in private persons with respect to the public magistrate holds in him with respect unto God. “Illud possumus quod jure possumus.” It is also agreed that no men, no individual person, no order or society of men, are, either in their persons or any of their outward concerns, exempted, or may be so, on the account of religion, from his power and jurisdiction; nor any causes that are liable unto a legal, political disposal and determination. It is also freely acknowledged that whatever such a magistrate cloth determine about the observances of religion, and under what penalties soever, his subjects are bound to observe what he doth so command and appoint, unless by general or especial rules their consciences are obliged to a dissent or contrary observation, by the authority of God and his word. In this case they are to keep their souls entire in their spiritual subjection unto God, and quietly and peaceably to bear the troubles and inconveniences which on the account thereof may befall them, without the least withdrawing of their obedience from the magistrate. And in this state of things, as there is no necessity or appearance of it that any man should be brought into such a condition as wherein sin on the one hand or the other cannot be avoided, so that state of things will probably occur in the world, as it hath done in all ages hitherto, that men may be necessitated to sin or suffer.
To wind up the state of this controversy, we say, that
antecedent to the consideration of the power of the magistrate, and all the
influence that it hath upon men or their consciences, there is a superior
determination of what is true, what false in religion, what right and what
wrong in the worship of God, wherein the guidance of the consciences of men
doth principally depend, and whereinto it is
Neither is there any difference, in these things, with respect unto the way or manner of the declaration of the will of God. Whether it be by innate common light or by revelation, all is one; the authority and will of God in all is to be observed. Yea, in command of God, made known by revelation (the way which is most contended about), may suspend, as to any particular instance, the greatest command that we are obliged unto by the law of nature in reference unto one another; as it did in the precept given to Abraham for the sacrificing of his son. And we shall find our author himself setting up the supremacy of conscience in opposition unto and competition with that of the magistrate (though with no great self-consistency), ascribing the pre-eminence and prevalency in obligation unto that of conscience, and that in the principal and most important duties of religion and human life. Such are all those moral virtues which have in their nature a resemblance of the divine perfections, wherein he placeth the substance of religion. With respect unto these, he so setteth up the throne of conscience as to affirm that if any thing be commanded by the magistrate against them, “to disobey him is no sin, but a duty.” And we shall find the case to be the same in matters of mere revelation; for what God commands, that he commands, by what way soever that command be made known to us; and there is no consideration that can add any thing to the obligatory power and efficacy of infinite authority. So that where the will of God is the formal reason of our obedience, it is all one how or by what means it is discovered unto us. Whatever we are instructed in by innate reason or by revelation, the reason why we are bound by it is neither the one nor the other, but the authority of God in both.
But we must return unto the consideration of the sentiments
of our author in this matter, as before laid down. The authority ascribed
to the civil magistrate being as hath been expressed, it will be very hard
for any one to distinguish between it and the sovereignty that the Lord
Christ himself hath in and over his church; yea, if there be any advantage
on either side, or a comparative pre-eminence, it will be found to be cast
upon that of the magistrate. Is the Lord Christ the lord of the souls and
consciences of men? hath he dominion over them, to rule them in the things
of the worship of God?
Thus far, then, Christ and the magistrate seem to stand on
even or equal terms. But there are two things remaining that absolutely
turn the scale, and cast the advantage on the magistrate’s side; for,
first, Men may do and practice many things in the worship of God which the
Lord Christ hath nowhere nor by any means required. Yea, to think that his
word, or the revelation of his mind and will therein, is “the sole and
adequate rule of religious worship,” is reported as an “opinion foolish,
absurd, and impious, and destructive of all government.” If this be not
supposed, not only the whole design of our author in this book is defeated,
but our whole controversy also is composed and at an end. But, on the
other hand, no man must do or practice any thing in that way but what is
prescribed, appointed,
As we formerly said, Nonconformists, who are unacquainted
with the mysteries of things of this nature, must needs desire to know
whether these be the avowed principles of the church of England, or whether
they are only inventions to serve a present turn of the pursuit of some
men’s designs. Are all the old pleas of the “jus divinum” of episcopacy, of example
and direction apostolical, of a parity of reason between the condition of
the church whilst under extraordinary officers and whilst under ordinary,
of the power of
But every age produceth not a
But, doubtless, it is the wisdom of sovereign princes to
beware of this sort of enemies, — persons who, to promote their own
interest, make ascriptions of such things unto them as they cannot accept
of without the utmost hazard of the displeasure of God. Is it meet that,
to satisfy the desires of any, they should invade the prerogative of God,
or set themselves down at his right hand, in the throne of his
only-begotten Son? I confess they are no way concerned in what others, for
their advantage’ sake, as they suppose, will ascribe unto them, which they
may sufficiently disown by scorn and silence; nor can their sin involve
them in any guilt. It was not the vain acclamation of the multitude unto
Herod, “The voice of a god, and not of a man,” but his own arrogant
satisfaction in that blasphemous assignation of divine glory to him, that
exposed him to the judgment and vengeance of God. When the princes of
Israel found, by the answer of the Reubenites, that they had not
transgressed against the law of God’s worship in adding unto it or altering
of it, which they knew would have been a provocation not to have been
passed over without
For my own part, such is my ignorance that I know not that
any magistrate from the foundation of the world, unless it were
If an edict were drawn up for the settlement of religion and religious worship in any Christian nation, according to the principles and directions before laid down, it may be there would be no great strife in the world by whom it should be first owned and espoused; for it must be of this importance:—
“Whereas we have a universal and absolute power over the consciences of all our subjects in things appertaining to the worship of God, so that, if we please, we can introduce new duties, never yet heard of, in the most important parts of religion (p. 80), and may impose on them, in the practice of religion and divine worship, what we please, so that, in our judgment, it do not countenance vice nor disgrace the Deity (p. 85): and whereas this power is naturally inherent in us; not given or granted unto us by Jesus Christ, but belonged to us or our predecessors before ever he was born; nor is expressed in the Scripture, but rather supposed; and this being such as that we ourselves, if we would, whether we be man or woman” (here France must be excepted by virtue of the Salique law, though the whole project be principally calculated for that meridian), “might exercise the special offices and duties of religion in our own person, especially that of the priesthood, though we are pleased to transfer the exercise of it unto others: and whereas all our prescriptions, impositions, and injunctions, in these things, do immediately affect and bind the consciences of our subjects, because they are ours, whether they be right or wrong, true or false, so long as in our judgment they neither, as was said, countenance vice nor disgrace the Deity, we do enact and ordain as followeth:”
(Here, if you please, you may intersert the scheme of religion given us by our author in his second chapter, and add unto it, “That because sacrifices were a way found out by honest men of old to express their gratitude unto God thereby, so great and necessary a part of our religious duty, it be enjoined that the use of them be again revived, seeing there is nothing in them that offends against the bounds prescribed to the power to be expressed, and that men in all places do offer up bulls and goats, sheep and fowls, to God,” with as many other institutions of the like nature as shall be thought meet.) Hereunto add, —
“Now, our express will and pleasure is, that every man may
and do think and judge what he pleaseth concerning the things enjoined and
enacted by us; for what have we to do with their thoughts and judgments?
They are under the empire and dominion of conscience, which we cannot
invade if we would. They may, if they please, judge
Now, as was said before, I suppose Christian princes will not be earnest in their contests who shall first own the authority intimated, and express it in a suitable exercise; and if any one of them should put forth his hand unto it, he will find that
There is one who lays an antecedent claim to a sole interest in this power, and that bottomed on other manner of pretensions than any which as yet have been pleaded in their behalf; for the power and authority here ascribed unto princes is none other but that which is claimed by the pope of Rome, with some few enlargements, and appropriated unto him by his canonists and courtiers. Only here “the old gentleman” (as he is called by our author) hath the advantage, in that, beside the precedency of his claim, it being entered on record at least six or seven hundred years before any proctor or advocate appeared in the behalf of princes, he hath forestalled them all in the pretence of infallibility: which, doubtless, is a matter of singular use in the exercise of the power contended about; for some men are so peevish as to think that thus to deal with religion and the consciences of men belongs to none but him who is absolutely, yea, essentially so, — that is, infallible. For, as we have now often said (as, contrary to their design, men in haste oftentimes speak the same things over and over), as to all ecclesiastical jurisdiction over persons and causes ecclesiastical, and the sovereign disposal of all the civil and political concernments of religion, which is vested in the imperial crown of this nation, and by sundry acts of parliament is declared so to be, I shall be always ready to plead the right of our kings, and all Christian kings whatever, against the absurd pleas and pretences of the pope; so, as to this controversy between him and such princes as shall think meet to contend with him about it, concerning the power over the consciences of men before described, I shall not interpose myself in the scuffle, as being fully satisfied they are contending about that which belongs to neither of them.
But what reason is there why this power should not be
extended unto the inward thoughts and apprehensions of men about the
worship
But it will be said that there will be no need hereof; for
let men think and judge what they please, whilst they are convinced and
satisfied that it is their duty not to practice any thing outwardly in
religion but what is prescribed by their rulers, it is not possible that
any public evil should ensue upon their mental conceptions only. We
observed before that the condition described is exceedingly uneasy; which,
I suppose, will not be denied by men who have seriously considered what it
is either to judge or practice any thing that lies before them with
reference unto the judgment of God. And that which should tie men up to
rest perpetually in such a restless state is, as it seems, a mere
conviction of their duty. They ought to be, and are supposed to be,
convinced that it is their duty to maintain the liberty of their minds and
judgments, but to submit in their outward practice universally to the laws
of men that are over them; and this sense and conviction of duty is a
sufficient security unto public tranquillity in all that contrariety and
opposition of sentiments unto established religion and forms of worship
that may be imagined. But if this be so, why will not the same conviction
and sense of duty restrain them who do peaceably exercise the worship of
God, according to the light and dictates of their consciences, from any
actings whatever that may tend to the disturbance of the public peace?
Duty, nakedly considered, is even, as such, the greatest obligation on the
minds of men; and the great security of others in their actings ariseth
from thence. But the more it is influenced and advantaged by outward
considerations, the less it is assaulted and opposed by things grievous and
perplexing in the way of the discharge of it, the more efficacious will be
its operations on the minds of men, and the firmer will be the security
unto others that thence ariseth. Now, these advantages lie absolutely on
the part of them who practice, or are allowed so to do, according to their
own light and persuasion in the worship of God, wherein they are at rest
and full satisfaction of mind; and not on theirs who all their days are
bound up to a perverse, distorted posture of mind and soul, in judging one
thing to be best and most pleasing unto God, and practising of the
contrary. Such a one is the man that, of all others, rulers have need, I
think, to be most jealous of; for what security can be had of him who hath
inured himself unto a continual contradiction between his faith and
It will be said, perhaps, that we need not look farther for the disturbance of public peace from them who practice outwardly any thing in the worship of God but what is prescribed, established, and enjoined, seeing that every such practice is such a disturbance itself. I say, this pretence is miserably ridiculous and contemptible, and contrary to the common experience of mankind. If this were so, the whole world for three hundred years lived in one continual disturbance and tumult upon the account of Christian religion, whose professors constantly practised and performed that in the worship of God which was so far from being established or approved by public authority, that it was proscribed and condemned under penalties of all sorts, pecuniary, corporeal, and sanguinary or capital; But we see no such matter ensued, nor the least disquietment unto the world, but what was given unto it by the rage of bloody persecutors, that introduced the first convulsions into the Roman empire, which were never well quieted, but ended in its dissolution. The experience, also, of the present and next preceding ages casts this frivolous exception out of consideration. And as such a practice, even against legal prohibitions, though it be by the transgression of a penal law, is yet in itself and [by] just consequence remote enough from any disturbance of government (unless we should suppose that every non-observance of a penal statute invalidates the government of a nation, which were to fix it upon such a foundation as will not afford it the steadiness of a weather-cock); so being allowed by way of exemption, it contains no invasion upon or intrusion into the rights of others, but, being accompanied with the abridgment of the privileges of none, or the neglect of any duty required to the good of the commonwealth, it is as consistent with, and may be as conducing to, public good and tranquillity, as any order of religious things in the world, as shall be elsewhere demonstrated.
It remains, therefore, that the only answer to this
consideration is, that men who plead for indulgence and liberty of
conscience in the worship of God, according to his word and the light which
he hath given them therein, have indeed no conscience at all, and so are
not to be believed as to what they profess against sinister and evil
practices. This flail I know no fence against but this only, that they
I acknowledge the notion insisted on, — namely, “That
whilst men reserve to themselves the freedom and liberty of judging what
they please, or what seems good unto them, in matters of religion and the
worship of God, they ought to esteem it their duty to practice in all
things according to the prescription of their rulers, though every way
contrary unto and inconsistent with their own judgments and persuasions,
unless it be in things that countenance vice or disgrace the Deity”
(whereof yet, it may be, it will not be thought meet that they themselves
should judge for themselves and their own practice, seeing they may extend
their conceptions about what doth so unto such minute instances as would
frustrate the whole design), — is exceedingly accommodated to the corrupt
lusts and affections of men, and suited to make provision for their
security in this world by an exemption from the indispensable command of
professing the truth communicated and known unto them; a sense of the
obligation whereof hath hitherto exposed innumerable persons in all ages to
great difficulties, dangers, and sufferings, yea, to death, the height and
sum of all: for whereas men have been persuaded that “with the heart man
believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto
salvation,” the latter clause is in many cases hereby sufficiently
superseded, and the troublesome duty seeming to be required in it is
removed out of the way. It will not, it may be, be so easy to prove that
in the religion of the Mohammedans there is any thing enjoined in practice
that will directly fall under the limitations assigned unto the compliance
with the commands of superiors contended for; and, therefore, let a man but
retain his own apprehensions concerning Jesus Christ and the gospel, it may
be lawful for him, yea, be his duty, to observe the worship enjoined by the
law of Mohammed, if his lot fall to live under the power of the Grand
Seignior or any sovereign prince of the same persuasion! But the case is
clear in the religion of the Papists, which is under the protection of the
greatest number of supreme magistrates in Europe. It will not be
pretended, I suppose, by our author, that
Now, as this casts a reflection of incredible folly and
inexpiable guilt upon all protestant martyrs, in casting away their own
lives and disobeying the commands of their lawful sovereigns, so it
exposeth all the Protestants in the world who are still in the same
condition of subjection to the severe censures of impiety and rebellion,
and must needs exasperate their rulers to pursue them to destruction, under
pretence of unwarrantable obstinacy in them: for if we wholly take off the
protection of conscience in this matter, and its subjection to the
authority of God alone, there is no plea left to excuse dissenting
Protestants from the guilt of such crimes as may make men justly cry out
against them, as the Jews did against St Paul, “Away with such fellows from
the earth; for it is not fit that they should live!” or, “Protestantes ad leones!” according to the old cry of
the Pagans against the primitive Christians. But if this should prove to
be a way of teaching and justifying the grossest hypocrisy and
dissimulation that the nature of man is capable of, a means to cast off all
regard unto the authority of God over the ways and lives of men, all the
rhetoric in the world shall never persuade me that God hath so moulded and
framed the order and state of human affairs that it should be any way
needful to the preservation of public peace and tranquillity. Openness,
plainness of heart, sincerity in our actions and professions, generous
honesty, and a universal respect in all things to the supreme Rector of
all, the great Possessor of heaven and earth, with an endeavour to comply
with his present revealed mind and future judgment, are far better
foundations for and ligaments of public peace and quietness. To make this
the foundation of our political superstructure, that “divisum imperium cum Jove Cæsar habet,” God hath
immediate and sole power over the minds and inward thoughts of men, but the
magistrate
But besides all this, I do not see how this hypothesis is
necessarily subservient to the principal design of the author, but it may
be as well improved to quite distant, yea, contrary ends and purposes. His
design, plainly, is to have one fabric of religion erected, one form of
external worship enacted and prescribed, which all men should be compelled
by penalties to the outward profession and observance of. These penalties
he would have to be such as should not fail of their end, — namely, of
taking away all professed dissent from his religious establishment; which,
if it cannot be effected without the destruction and death of multitudes,
they also are not to be forborne. Now, how this ensues from the
forementioned principle I know not; for a supreme magistrate, finding that
the minds of very many of his subjects are, in their judgments and
persuasions, engaged in a dissent unto the religion established by him, or
somewhat in it, or some part of it, especially in things of practical
worship, though he should be persuaded that he hath so far a power over
their consciences as to command them to practice contrary to their
judgment, yet, knowing their minds and persuasions to be out of his reach
and exempted from his jurisdiction, why may he not think it meet and
conducing to public tranquillity and all the ends of his government, even
the good of the whole community committed to his charge, rather to indulge
them in the quiet and peaceable exercise of the worship of God according to
their own light, than always to bind them up unto that unavoidable
disquietment which will ensue upon the conflict in their minds between
their judgments and their practices, if he should oblige them as is
desired? Certainly, as in truth and reality, so according to this
principle, he hath power so to do; for to fancy him [to have] such a power
over the religion and consciences of his subjects as that he should be
inevitably bound, on all occurrences, and in all conditions of affairs, to
impose upon them the necessary observation of one form of worship, is that
which would quickly expose him to inextricable troubles. And instances of
all sorts might be multiplied to show the ridiculous folly of such a
conception. Nay, it implies a perfect contradiction to what is disputed,
before; for if he be obliged to settle and impose such a form on all, it
must be because there was a necessity
This principle, therefore, indeed asserts his liberty to do what he judgeth meet in these matters, but contains nothing in it to oblige him to judge that it may not be meet and most conducing unto all the ends of his government to indulge unto the consciences of men peaceable (especially if complying with him in all the fundamentals of the religion which himself professeth) the liberty of worshipping God according to what they apprehend of his own mind and will. And let an application of this principle be made to the present state of this nation, wherein there are so great multitudes of persons peaceable, and not unuseful unto public good, who dissent from the present establishment of outward worship, and have it not in their power either to change their judgments or to practice contrary unto them; and as it is in the power of the supreme magistrate to indulge them in their own way, so it will prove to be his interest, as he is the spring and centre of public peace and prosperity.
Neither doth it appear that, in this discourse, our author
hath had any regard either to the real principles of the power of the
magistrate as stated in this nation, or to his own, which are fictitious,
but yet such as ought to be obligatory to himself. His principal assertion
is, “That the supreme magistrate hath power to bind the consciences of men
in matters of religion;” that is, by laws and edicts to that purpose. Now,
the highest and most obligatory way of the supreme magistrate’s speaking in
England is by acts of parliament; it is therefore supposed that what is so
declared in or about matters of religion should be obligatory to the
conscience of this author; but yet quite otherwise, page 59, he sets
himself to oppose and condemn a public law of the land, on no other ground
than because it stood in his way, and seemed incompliant with his
principles: for whereas the law of 2 and 3 Edward VI., which appointed two
weekly days for abstinence from flesh, had been, amongst other reasons,
prefaced with this, “That the king’s subjects having now a more clear light
of the gospel, through the infinite mercy of God” (such “canting” language
was then therein used), “and thereby the king’s majesty perceiving that one
meat of itself was not more holy than another,” etc., “yet considering that
due abstinence was a means to virtue, and to subdue men’s bodies to their
souls and spirits,” etc.; and it being after found (it should seem by a
farther degree of light) In allusion, doubtless, to
Moreover, on occasion hereof, we might manifest how some other laws of this land do seem carefully to avoid that imposition on conscience which, against law and reason, he pleadeth for. For instance, in that of 21 Jac., touching usury, and the restraint of it unto the sum therein established, it was provided, “That no words in this act contained shall be construed or expounded to allow the practice of usury in point of religion and conscience.” And why did not the supreme magistrate in that law determine and bind the consciences of men by a declaration of their duty in a point of religion, seeing whither way soever the determination had been made, neither would immorality have been countenanced nor the Deity disgraced? But, plainly, it is rather declared that he hath not Cognizance of such things with reference to the consciences of men, to oblige them or set them at liberty, but only power to determine what may be practised in order to public profit and peace. And, therefore, the law would neither bind nor set at liberty the consciences of men in such cases; which is a work for the supreme Lawgiver only.
Neither, as it hath been before observed, do the principles
here asserted and contended for either express or represent the supremacy
of the kings of this nation in matters ecclesiastical, as it is stated and
determined by themselves in parliament, but rather so as to give great
offence and scandal to the religion here professed, and advantage to the
adversaries thereof; for after there appeared some ambiguity in those words
of the oath, enacted 1 Eliz., of “testifying the queen to be supreme
governor, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as in
temporal,” and many doubts and scruples had ensued thereon, as though there
were assigned to her a power over the
I have yet laid the least part of that load upon this
principle, which, if it be farther pressed, it must expect to be burdened
withal, and that from the common suffrage of Christians in all ages. But
yet, that I may not transgress against the design of this short and hasty
discourse, I shall proceed no farther in the pursuit of it, but take a
little survey of what is here pleaded in its defence. Now, this is
undertaken and pursued in the first chapter, with the two next ensuing,
where an end is put to this plea: for if I understand any thing of his
words and expressions, our author in the beginning of his fourth chapter
cuts down all those gourds and wild vines that he had been planting in the
three preceding; for he not only grants but disputes also for an obligation
on the consciences of men antecedent and superior unto all human laws and
their obligation! His words are as followeth, p. 115: “It is not because
subjects are in any thing free from the authority of the supreme power on
earth, but because they are subject to a superior in heaven, and they are
only then excused from the duty of obedience to their sovereign when they
cannot give it without rebellion against God: so that it is not originally
any right of their own that exempts them from a subjection to the sovereign
power in all things; but it is purely God’s right of governing his own
creatures that magistrates then invade when they make edicts to violate or
control his laws. And those who will take off from the consciences of men
all obligations antecedent to those of human laws, instead of making the
power of princes supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable, they utterly
enervate all their
I know no men that pretend to exemption from the obligation of human laws but only on this plea, that God by his law requires them to do otherwise; and if this be so, the authority of such laws as to the consciences of men is superseded, by the confession of this author. Allow, therefore, but the principles here expressed, — namely, that men have a superior Power over them in heaven, whose laws and the revelation of whose will concerning them is the supreme rule of their duty, whence an obligation is laid upon their consciences of doing whatever is commanded, or not doing what is forbidden by him, which is superior unto, and actually supersedes, all human commands and laws that interfere therewith, — and I see neither use of nor place for that power of magistrates over the consciences of men which is so earnestly contended for. And our author, also, in his ensuing discourse in that chapter, placeth all the security of government in the respect that the consciences of men have to the will and command of God, and which they profess to have; which in all these chapters he pleads to be a principle of all confusion! But it is the first chapter which alone we are now taking a view of.
The only argument therein insisted on to make good the ascription unto the magistrate of the power over religion and the consciences of men before described, is “the absolute and indispensable necessity of it unto public tranquillity; which is the principal and most important end of government.” In the pursuit of this argument, sometimes, yea often, such expressions are used concerning the magistrate’s power as, in a tolerable construction, declare it to be what no man denies nor will contend about: but it is necessary that they be interpreted according to the genius and tenor of the opinion contended for; and, accordingly, we will consider them. This alone, I say, is that which is here pleaded, or is given in as the subject of the ensuing discourse. But, after all, I think that he who shall set himself seriously to find out how any thing here spoken hath a direct and rational cogency towards the establishment of the conclusion before laid down will find himself engaged in no easy undertaking. We were told, I confess, at the entrance (so as that we may not complain of a surprisal) that we must expect to have invectives twisted with arguments, and some such thing seems here to be aimed at; but if a logical chemist come and make a separation of the elements of this composition, he will find, if I mistake not, a heap of the drossy invective, and scarce the least appearance of any argument ore. Instead of sober, rational arguing,
But if the power and authority over religion and the consciences of men here ascribed unto supreme magistrates be so indispensably necessary to the preservation of public tranquillity as is pretended, a man cannot but wonder how the world hath been in any age past kept in any tolerable peace and quietness, and how it is anywhere blessed with those ends of government at this day; for it will not be an easy task for our author, or any one else, to demonstrate that the power mentioned hath ever been either claimed or exercised by any supreme magistrate in Christendom, or that it is so at this day. The experience of past and present ages is, therefore, abundantly sufficient to defeat this pretence, which is sufficiently asserted, without the least appearance of proof or argument to give it countenance or confirmation, or they must be very charitable to hire, or ignorant in themselves, who will mistake invectives for arguments. The remembrance, indeed, of these severities I would willingly lay aside, especially because the very mention of them seems to express a higher sense of and regret concerning them than I am in the least subject unto, or something that looks like a design of retaliation; but as these things are far from my mind, so the continual returns that almost in every page I meet with of high and contemptuous reproaches will not allow that they be always passed by without any notice or remark.
It is, indeed, indispensably necessary that public peace
and tranquillity be preserved; but that there is any thing in point of
government necessary hereunto, but that God have all spiritual power over
the consciences of men, and rulers political power over their actings,
wherein public peace and tranquillity are concerned, the world hath not
hitherto esteemed, nor do I expect to find it proved by this author. If
these things will not preserve the public peace, it will not be kept if one
should rise from the dead to persuade men unto their duty. The power of
God over the consciences of men I suppose is acknowledged by all who own
any such thing as conscience, or believe there is a God over all. That,
also, in the exercise of this authority, he requires of men all that
obedience unto rulers that is any way needful or expedient unto the
preservation of the ends of their rule, is a truth standing firm on the
same foundation of universal consent, derived from the law of creation; and
his positive commands to that purpose have an evidence of his will in this
matter
The pretence, indeed, is, that the placing of this authority over the consciences of men in the supreme ruler doth obviate and take away all grounds and occasions of any such actings on the account of religion as may tend unto public disturbance; for suppose conscience, in things concerning religion and the worship of God, subject to God alone, and the magistrate require such things to be observed in the one or the other as God hath not required, at least in the judgments and consciences of them of whom the things prescribed are required, and to forbid the things that God requires to be observed and done, in this case, it is said, they cannot or will not comply in active obedience with the commands of the magistrate. But, what if it so fall out? Doth it thence follow that such persons must needs rebel and be seditious, and disturb the public peace of the society whereof they are members? Wherefore is it that they do not do or observe what is required of them by the magistrate in religion or the worship of God, or that they do what he forbids? Is it not because of the authority of God over their minds and consciences in these things? and why should it be supposed that men will answer the obligations laid by God on their consciences in one thing and not in another, in the things of his worship and not of obedience unto civil power, concerning which his commands are as express and evident as they can be pretended to be in the things which they avow their obligation unto?
Experience is pretended to the contrary. It is said again
and again that “men, under pretence of their consciences unto God in
religion, have raised wars and tumults, and brought all things into
Authority, laws, privileges, and I know not what things, wherein private men, of whom alone we treat, have no pretence of interest, were pleaded in those affairs. He that would judge aright of these things must set aside all other considerations, and give his instance of the tumults and seditions that have ensued on the account of men’s keeping their consciences entire for God alone, without any just plea or false pretence of authority, and the interest of men in the civil concerns of nations.
However, it cannot be pretended that liberty of
conscience gave the least occasion unto any disorders in those days,
for indeed there was none but only that of opinion and judgment, which our
author placeth out of the magistrate’s cognizance and dispose, and
supposeth it is a thing wherein the public peace neither is nor can be
concerned. It is well if it prove so; but this liberty of judgment,
constantly pressed with a practice contrary to its own determinations,
will, I fear, prove the most dangerous posture of the minds of men, in
reference to public tranquillity, that they can be well disposed into.
However, we may take a little nearer view of the certain remedy provided
for all these evils by our author, and satisfy ourselves in some inquiries
about it. Shall, then, according to this expedient, the supreme magistrate
govern, rule, and oblige unto obedience the consciences of his subjects
universally in all things in religion and the worship of God, so that,
appoint what he please, forbid what he please, subjects are bound in
conscience to observe them and yield obedience accordingly? His answer, as
far as I can gather his meaning, is, that he may and must do so in all
things, taking care that what he commands shall neither countenance vice
nor disgrace the
Thus this author himself, in way of objection, supposeth a
case of a magistrate enjoining, as was said, a religion superstitious and
idolatrous. This he acknowledgeth to be an inconvenience, yet such as is
far beneath the mischiefs that ensue upon the exemption of the consciences
of men in religion from the power of the magistrate! which I confess I
cannot but admire at, and can give reasons why I do so admire it, which
also may be given in due season. But what, then, is to be done in this
case? He answers, “It is to be borne.” True, but how? Is it to be so
borne as to practice and observe the things so enjoined, though
superstitious and idolatrous? Though his words are dubious, yet I suppose
he will not plainly say so, nor can he, unless he will teach men to cast
off all respect unto the authority of God, and open such a door to atheism
as his rhetorical, prefatory
I know not any thing that remains in the first chapter
deserving our farther consideration; what seems to be of real importance,
or to have any aspect towards the cause in hand, may undergo some brief
remarks, and so leave us at liberty to a farther progress. In general, a
supposition is laid down, and it is so vehemently asserted as is evident
that it is accompanied with a desire that it should be taken for granted, —
namely, that if the consciences of men be not regulated, in the choice and
practice of religion, by the authority of the magistrate over them, they
will undoubtedly run into principles and practices inconsistent with the
safety of human society, and such as will lead them to seditions and
tumults; and hence (if I understand him, a matter I am continually jealous
about, from the looseness of his expressions, though I am satisfied I
constantly take his words in the sense which is received of them by the
most intelligent
But what says our author? “If for the present the minds of
men happen to be tainted with such furious and boisterous conceptions of
religion as incline them to stubbornness and sedition, and make them
unmanageable to the laws of government, shall not a prince be allowed to
give check to such unruly and dangerous persuasions?” I answer, That such
principles which, being professed and avowed, are in their own nature and
just consequence destructive to public peace and human society, are all of
them directly opposite to the light of human nature, that common reason and
consent of mankind wherein and whereon all government is founded, with the
prime fundamental
I shall only add, that the mormo here made use of is not
now first composed or erected; it hath, for the substance of it, been
flourished by the Papists ever since the beginning of the Reformation.
Neither did they use to please themselves more in or to dance more merrily
about any thing than this calf: “Let private men have their consciences
exempted from a necessary obedience to the prescriptions of the church, and
they will quickly run into all pernicious fancies and persuasions.” It is
known how this scare-crow hath been cast to the ground, and this calf
stamped to powder, by divines of the church of England. It is no pleasant
thing, I confess, to see this plea revived now with respect to the
magistrate’s authority, and not the pope’s; for I fear that when it shall
be manifested, and that by the consent of all parties, that there is no
pleadable argument to bottom this pretension for the power of the
magistrate upon, some, rather than forego it, will not be unwilling to
recur to the fountain from whence it first sprang, and admit the pope’s
plea as meet to be revived in this case. And, indeed, if we must come at
length, for the security of public peace, to deprive all private persons of
the liberty of judging what is right and wrong in religion in reference to
their own practice, or what is their duty towards God about his worship,
and what is not, there are innumerable advantages attending the design of
devolving the absolute determination of these things upon the pope, above
that of committing it to each supreme magistrate in his own dominions; for
besides the plea of at least better security in his determinations than in
that of any magistrate, if not his infallibility, which he hath so long
talked of, and so sturdily defended, as to get it a great reputation in the
world, the delivering up of the faith and consciences of all men unto him
will produce a seeming agreement, at least of incomparably a larger extent
than the remitting of all things of this nature to the pleasure of every
supreme magistrate, which may probably
That which alone remains seeming to give countenance to the assertions before laid down, is our author’s assignation of the priesthood by natural right unto the supreme magistrate, which in no alteration of religion he can be divested of, but by virtue of some positive law of God, as it was for a season in the Mosaical institution and government. But these things seem to be of no force; for it never belonged to the priesthood to govern or to rule the consciences of men with an absolute, uncontrollable power, but only in their name, and for them, to administer the holy things which by common consent were admitted and received amongst them. Besides, our author, by his discourse, seems not to be much acquainted with the rise of the office of the priesthood amongst men; as shall be demonstrated if farther occasion be given thereunto. However, by the way, we may observe what is his judgment in this matter. The magistrate, we are told, hath not his ecclesiastical authority from Christ, and yet this is such as that the power of the priesthood is included therein, the exercise whereof, “as he is pleased to transfer to others, so he may, if he please, reserve it to himself,” p. 32; whence it follows, not only that it cannot be given by Christ unto any other, for it is part of the magistrate’s power, which he hath not limited or confined by any subsequent law, nor can there be a coordinate subject of the same power of several kinds; so that all the interest or right any man or men have in or unto the exercise of it is but transferred to them by the magistrate; and therefore they act therein in his name and by his authority only; and hence the bishops, as such, are said to be “ministers of state,” p. 49. Neither can it be pretended that this was indeed in the power of the magistrate before the coming of Christ, but not since; for he hath, as we are told, all that he ever had, unless there be a restraint put upon him by some express prohibition of our Saviour, p. 41, — which will hardly be found in this matter. I cannot, therefore, see how, in the exercise of the Christian priesthood, there is (on these principles) any the least respect unto Jesus Christ or his authority: for men have only the exercise of it transferred to them by the magistrate, by virtue of a power inherent in him antecedent unto any concessions of Christ; and, therefore, in his name and authority they must act in all the sacred offices of their functions. It is well if men be so far awake as to consider the tendency of these things.
At length Scripture proofs for the confirmation of these
opinions are produced, pp. 35, 36; and the first pleaded is that promise,
that “kings shall be nursing fathers unto the church.” It is true this is
promised, and God accomplish it more and more! but yet
He asks farther, “What doth the Scripture mean when it
styles our Saviour the King of kings, and maketh princes his vicegerents
here on earth?” I confess, according to this gentleman’s principles, I
know not what it means in so doing. Kings, he tells us, have not their
authority in and over religion and the consciences of men from him, and
therefore in the exercise of it cannot be his vicegerents; for none is the
vicegerent of another in the exercise of any power and authority, if he
have not received that power and authority from him. Otherwise the words
have a proper sense, but nothing to our author’s purpose. It is his power
over them, and not theirs over the consciences of their subjects, that is
intended in the words. Of no more use, in this controversy is the
direction of the apostle, that we “should pray for kings, that under them
we may lead a quiet and peaceable life;” for no more is intended therein
but that, under their peaceable and righteous administration of human
affairs, we may live in that godliness and honesty which is required of us.
Wherefore, then, are these weak attempts made to confirm and prove what is
not? Those, or the most of them, whom our author in this discourse treats
with so much severity, do plead that
That which seems to have imposed on the mind of this author
is, that if the magistrate may make laws for the regulating of the outward
profession of religion, so as public peace and tranquillity may be kept,
added to what is his duty to do in the behalf of the truth, then he must
have the power over religion and the consciences of men by him ascribed
unto him; but there is no privity of interest between these things. The
laws which he makes to this purpose are to be regulated by the word of God
and the good of the community over which, in the name of God, he doth
preside; and whence he will take his warranty to forbid men the exercise of
their consciences in the duties of spiritual worship, whilst the principles
they profess are suited to the light of nature and the fundamental
doctrines of the gospel, with the peace of mankind, and their practices
absolutely consistent with the public welfare, I am yet to seek; and so, as
far as I can yet perceive, is the author of the discourse under
consideration.
The “penalties that he hath annexed to the final rejection of the gospel and disobedience thereunto” are pleaded by our author to justify the magistrate’s power of binding men to “the observation of his commands in religion on temporal penalties, to be by him inflicted on them.” Unto that is the discourse of this chapter arrived, which was designed unto another end. I see neither the order, method, nor projection of this procedure, nor know
However, the pretence itself is weak and impertinent. Man
was originally made under a law and constitution of eternal bliss or woe.
This state, with regard to his necessary dependence on God and respect to
his utmost end, was absolutely unavoidable unto him. All possibility of
attaining eternal happiness by himself he lost by sin, and became
inevitably obnoxious to eternal misery and the wrath to come. In this
condition the Lord Jesus Christ, the supreme Lord of the souls and
consciences of men, interposeth his law of relief, redemption and
salvation, the great means of man’s recovery, together with the profession
of the way and law hereof. He lets them know that those by whom it is
refused shall perish under that wrath of God which before they were
obnoxious unto, with a new aggravation of their sin and condemnation, from
the contempt of the relief provided for them and tendered to them. This he
applies to the souls and consciences of men, and to all the inward secret
actings of them in the first place, — such as are exempted not only from
the judicature of men, but from the cognizance of angels. This he doth by
spiritual means, in a spiritual manner, — with regard to the subjection of
the souls of men unto God, and with reference unto their bringing to him
and enjoyment of him, or their being eternally rejected by him. Hence to
collect and conclude that earthly princes, — who (whatever is pretended)
are not the sovereign lords of the souls and consciences of men, nor do any
of them, that I know of, plead themselves so to be; who cannot interpose
any thing by their absolute authority that should have a necessary respect
unto men’s eternal condition; who have no knowledge of, no acquaintance
with, nor can judge of, the principal things whereon it doth depend; from
whose temporal jurisdiction and punishment the things of the gospel and the
worship of God, as purely such, are by the nature of them
Of the like complexion is the ensuing discourse, wherein
our author, p. 43, having spoken contemptuously of the spiritual
institutions of the gospel, as altogether “insufficient for the
accomplishment of the ends whereunto they are designed,” — forgetting that
they respect only the consciences of men, and are His institutions who is
the Lord of their consciences, and who will give them power and efficacy to
attain their ends, when administered in his name and according to his mind,
and that because they are his, — would prove the necessity of temporal
coercions and penalties in things spiritual, from the extraordinary effects
of excommunication in the primitive times, in the “vexation and punishment
of persons excommunicate, by the devil.” This work the devil now ceasing
to attend unto, he would have the magistrate to take upon him to supply his
place and office, by punishments of his own appointment and infliction, and
so at last, to be sure of giving him full measure, he hath ascribed two
extremes unto him about religion, — namely, to act the part of God and the
devil! But as this inference is built upon a very uncertain conjecture, —
namely, that upon the giving up of persons to Satan in excommunication,
there did any visible or corporeal vexation of them by his power ensue, or
any other effects but what may yet be justly expected from an influence of
his terror on the minds of men who are duly and regularly cast out of the
visible kingdom of Christ by
To wind up this debate, I shall commit the umpirage of it
to the church, of England, and receive her determination in the words of
one who may be supposed to know her sense and judgment as well as any one
who lived in his days or since; and this is These Articles are well known by the name of the “Bloody
Statute,” 31 Henry VIII., cap. 14, entitled, “An Act for the Abolishing
Diversity of Opinions in certain Articles concerning Christian Religion.”
They affirmed transubstantiation, communion in one kind, clerical celibacy,
vows of chastity, private masses, and auricular confession — Ed.
Upon my first design to take a brief survey of this discourse, I had not the least intention to undertake the examination of any particular assertions or reasonings that might fall under controversy, but merely to examine the general principles whereon it doth proceed. But passing through these things “currente calamo,” I find myself engaged beyond my thoughts and resolutions; I shall therefore here put an end to the consideration of this chapter, although I see sundry things as yet remaining in it that might immediately be discussed with ease and advantage, as shall be manifest if we are called again to a review of them. I have neither desire nor design “serram reciprocare,” or to engage in any controversial discourses with this author; and I presume himself will not take it amiss that I do at present examine those principles whose novelty justifies a disquisition into them, and whose tendency, as applied by him, is pernicious and destructive to so many quiet and peaceable persons who dissent from him. And yet I will not deny but that I have that valuation and esteem for that sparkling of wit, eloquence, and sundry other abilities of mind which appear in his writing, that if he would lay aside the manner of his treating those from whom he dissents, with revilings, contemptuous reproaches, personal reflections, sarcasms, and satirical expressions, and would candidly and perspicuously state any matter in difference, I should think that what he hath to offer may deserve the consideration of them who have leisure for such a purpose. If he be otherwise minded, and resolved to proceed in the way and after the manner here engaged in, as I shall in the close of this discourse absolutely give him my “salve æternumque vale,” so I hope he will never meet with any one who shall be willing to deal with him at his own weapons.
The “summary” of this chapter must
needs give the reader a great expectation, and the chapter itself no less
of satisfaction, if what is in the one briefly proposed be in the other as
firmly established:
The design of this chapter, in general, is to confirm the
power of the magistrate over religion and the consciences of men, ascribed
unto him in the former, and to add unto it some enlargements not therein
insisted on. The argument used to this purpose is taken from “the power of
the magistrate over the consciences of men in matters of morality,” or with
respect unto moral virtue; whence it is supposed the conclusion is so
evident unto his “power over their
I must here wish again that our author had more perspicuously stated the things which he proposeth to debate for the subject of his disputation; but I find an excess of art is as troublesome sometimes as the greatest defect therein. From thence I presume it is that things are so handled in this discourse that an ordinary man can seldom discern satisfactorily what it is that directly and determinately he doth intend beyond reviling of Nonconformists; for in this proposition, — which is the best and most intelligible that I can reduce the present discourse unto, — “The supreme civil magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in morality, or with respect unto moral virtue,” excepting only the subject of it, there is not one term in it that may not have various significations, and those such as have countenance given unto them in the ensuing disputation itself. But “contenti sumus hoc Catone,” and make the best we can of what lies before us.
I do suppose that in the medium made use of in this argument, there is, or I am sure there may be, a controversy of much more importance than that principally under consideration. It, therefore, shall be stated and cleared in the first place; and then the concernment of the argument itself, in what is discoursed thereupon, shall be manifested. It is about moral virtue and grace, their coincidence or distinction, that we are in the first place to inquire; for without a due stating of the conception of these things, nothing of this argument nor what belongs unto it can be rightly understood. We shall, therefore, be necessitated to premise a brief explanation of these terms themselves, to remove as far as may be all ambiguity from our discourse.
First, then, the very name of virtue, in the sense
wherein it is commonly used and received, comes from the schools of
philosophy, and not from the Scripture. In the Old Testament we have
“uprightness, integrity, righteousness, doing good and eschewing evil,
fearing, trusting, obeying, believing in God, holiness,” and the like; but
the name of “virtue” doth not occur therein. It is true, we have
translated אֵשֶׁת חַיִל, “a virtuous
woman,” and once or twice the same word “virtuously,”
The word “moral” is yet far more exotic to the church and
Scripture. We are beholden for it, if there be any advantage in its use,
merely to the schools of the philosophers, especially of
Generally, moral virtues are esteemed to be the duties of
the second table: for although those who handle these matters more
accurately do not so straiten or confine them, yet it is certain that in
vulgar and common acceptation (which strikes no small stroke in the
regulating of the conceptions of the wisest men about the signification of
words) nothing else is intended by “moral virtues,” or “duties of
morality,” but the observation of the precepts of the second table; nor is
any thing else designed by those divines who, in their writings, so
frequently declare that it is not morality alone that will render
men acceptable to God. Others do extend these things farther, and fix the
denomination of moral firstly upon the law or rule of all those habits of
the mind and its operations which afterward thence they call moral. Now,
this moral law is nothing but the law of nature, or the law of our
creation, which the apostle affirms to lie equally obligatory on all men,
even all the Gentiles themselves,
But old
Thus we grant moral virtue to have been in the heathen of
old, for this is that alone whereby they were distinguished amongst
themselves: and he that would exclude them all from any interest in moral
virtue takes away all difference between
First, therefore, Grace in the Scripture is taken for the
free grace or favour of God towards sinners by Jesus Christ. By
this he freely pardoneth them their sins, justifieth and accepteth them, or
makes them “accepted in the Beloved.” This, certainly, is distinct from
moral virtue. Secondly, It is taken for the effectual working of the
Spirit of God in and upon the minds and souls of believers,
We are now, in the next place, to inquire into the mind of our author in these things; for, from his apprehensions about them, he frames a mighty difference between himself, and those whom he opposeth, and from thence takes occasion and advantage afresh to revile and reproach them.
First, therefore, He declares his judgment, that the moral virtues which he treats of do “consist of men’s observance of the law of nature, of the dictates of reason, and precepts thereof.” Secondly, That “the substance, yea, the whole of religion, consists in these virtues or duties, so that by the observation of them men may attain everlasting happiness” Thirdly, That “there is no actual concurrence of present grace enabling men to perform these duties, or to exercise these virtues, but they are called grace on another account.” Fourthly, That “his adversaries are so far from making virtue and grace to be the same, that they make them inconsistent.”
And these things shall we take into a brief examination, according as indeed they do deserve.
The first of them he plainly and more than once affirms,
nor shall I contend with him about it. So he speaks, p. 68: “The practice
of virtue consists in living suitably to the dictates of reason and nature;
and this is the substance and main design of all the laws of religion, to
oblige mankind to behave themselves in all their actions as becomes
creatures endowed with reason and understanding, and, in ways suitable to
rational beings, to prepare and qualify themselves for the state of glory
and immortality.” This is a plain description both of
Secondly, That the substance, yea, the
whole of religion, consists in these moral virtues he fully also
declares, p. 69: “Moral virtue having the strongest and most necessary
influence upon the end of all religion, namely, man’s happiness, it is not
only its most material and useful part, but the ultimate end of all its
other duties” (though I know not how the practice of virtue in this life
can be the ultimate end of other duties); “and all true religion can
consist in nothing else but either the practice of virtue itself or the use
of those means and instruments that contribute unto it.” So also, p. 70:
“All duties of devotion, excepting only our returns of gratitude, are not
essential parts of religion, but are only in order to it, as they tend to
the practice of virtue and moral goodness, and their goodness is derived
upon them from the moral virtues to which they contribute; and in the same
proportion they are conducive to the ends of virtue, they are to be valued
among the ministers of religion.” So, then, the whole duty of man consists
in being virtuous, and all that is enjoined beside is in order thereunto.
Hence we are told elsewhere that “outward worship is no part of religion.”
Again, p. 76: “All religion must of necessity be resolved into enthusiasm
or morality; the former is mere imposture, and therefore all that is true
must be reduced to the latter.” But we need not insist on particulars,
seeing he promoteth this to confirmation by the best of demonstrations, —
that is, an induction of all particulars, which he calls “a scheme of
religion;” wherein, yet, if any thing necessary be left out or omitted,
this best of demonstrations is quickly turned into one of the worst of
sophisms. Therefore we have here, no doubt, a just and full representation
of all that belongs to Christian religion; and it is as follows, p. 69:
“The whole duty of man refers either to his Creator, or his neighbour, or
himself. All that concerns the two last is confessedly of a moral nature,
and all that concerns the first consists either in praising of God or
praying to him. The former is a branch of the virtue of gratitude, and is
nothing but a thankful and humble temper of mind, arising from a sense of
God’s greatness in himself and his goodness to us: so that this part of
devotion issues from the same virtuous quality, — that is, the principle of
all other resentments and expressions of gratitude; only, those acts of it
that are terminated on God as their object are styled “religious;” — and
therefore gratitude and devotion are not diverse things, but only differing
“Cæterum ut sciatis cujus
sim religionis, quamvis id scripto meo quod habetis, ostenderim, tamen hic
breviter repetam. Et primum quidem doctrina de Messia, seu Rege illo
promisso, ad meam religionem nihil pertinet; nam Rex ille tantum Judæis
promissus erat, sicut et bona illa Canaan. Sic etiam circumcisio,
sacrificia, et reliquæ ceremoniæ Mosis ad me non pertinent, sed tantum
populo Judaico promissa, data, et mandata sunt. Neque ista fuerunt cultus
Dei apud Judæos, sed inserviebant cultui divino, et ad cultum deducebant
Judæos. Verus autem cultus Dei quem meam religionem appello est decalogus,
qui est æterna Dei voluntas; qui decalogus ideo ad me pertinet, quia etiam
mihi a Deo datus est, non quidem per vocem sonantem de cœlo sicut populo
Judaico, at per creationem insita est menti meæ. Quia autem insitus
decalogus, per corruptionem naturæ humanæ et pravis consuetudinibus, aliquâ
ex parte obscuratus est, ideo ad illustrandum eum adhibeo vocalem
decalogum, qui vocalis decalogus ideo etiam ad me, ad omnes populos
pertinet, quia cum insito nobis decalogo consentit, imo idem
That is, “But that you may know of what religion I am,
although it is expressed in that writing which you have already, yet I will
here briefly repeat it. And, first of all, the doctrine of the Messiah or
King that was promised doth not belong to my religion; for that King was
promised to the Jews only, as was the good land of Canaan. So in like
manner circumcision, sacrifices, and the rest of the ceremonies of Moses,
belong not to me, but were promised, given, and granted unto the people of
the Jews alone. Neither were they the worship of God among the Jews, but
were only subservient unto divine worship, and led the Jews unto it” (the
same opinion is maintained by our author concerning all exterior worship).
“But the true worship, which I call my religion, is the decalogue; which is
the eternal and immutable will of God” (and here also he hath the consent
and concurrence of our author): “which decalogue doth therefore belong unto
me, because it is given by God to me also; not, indeed, by a voice sounding
from heaven, as he gave it to the people of the Jews, but it is implanted
in my mind by nature. But because this implanted decalogue, by reason of
the corruption of human nature and through depraved customs, is in some
measure obscured, for the illustration of it I make use of the vocal
decalogue; which therefore also belongs unto me and all people, because it
consenteth with the decalogue written in our hearts, yea, is the same law
with it. This is my opinion concerning the Messiah or the promised King,
and this is my religion, which I freely acknowledge before you.” So he.
This is plain dealing. He saw clearly that if all religion and the worship
of God consisted in morality only, there was neither need nor use
of Christ nor the gospel; and accordingly, having no outward advantage by
them, he discarded them. But setting aside his bold renunciation of Christ
as promised, I see not any material difference between the religion of this
man and that now contended for. The poor deluded souls among ourselves,
who, leaving the Scripture, pretend that they are guided by the light
within them, are, upon the matter, of the same religion: for that light
being nothing but the dictates of reason and a natural conscience, it
extends not itself beyond morality; which some of them understanding, we
know what thoughts and apprehensions they have had of Christ and his
gospel, and the worship of God instituted therein; for hence it is (and not
as our author pretends, with a strange incogitancy concerning them and the
Gnostics, that they assert the Scripture to be the only rule of religious
worship) that they are fallen into these fond imaginations. And these are
the effects which this principle doth
First, then, This scheme seems to represent religion unto us as suited to the state of innocency, and that very imperfectly also; for it is composed to answer the former assertion of confining religion to moral virtues, which are granted to consist in our conformity unto and expression of the dictates of reason and the law of nature. Again, the “whole duty of man” is said to refer “either to his Creator, or his neighbour, or himself.” Had it been said to God absolutely, another interpretation might have been put upon the words; but being restrained unto him as our Creator, all duties referring to our Redeemer are excluded, or not included, which certainly have some place in Christian religion. Our obedience therein is the “obedience of faith,” and must answer the special objects of it, And we are taught in the church catechism to believe in God the Father, who made us and all the world; and in God the Son, who redeemed us and all mankind; and in God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifies us and all the elect people of God. Now, these distinct acts of faith have distinct acts of obedience attending them; whereas none here are admitted, or at least required, but those which fall under the first head. It is also very imperfect as a description of natural religion, or the duties of the law of nature: for the principal duties of it, such as fear, love, trust, affiance of and in God, are wholly omitted, nor will they be reduced unto either of the heads which all religion is here distributed into; for gratitude unto God hath respect formally and directly to the benefits we ourselves are made partakers of; but these duties are eternally necessary on the consideration of the nature of God himself, antecedent unto the consideration, of his communicating of himself unto us by his benefits. Prayer proceeds from them, and it is an odd method, to reduce the cause under the head of its effect; and prayer itself is made at length not to be so much a moral virtue as somewhat instrumental to the virtues of morality.
Secondly, I cannot think we have here a complete
representation of Christian religion, nor an induction of all its
particulars, because we have neither supposition nor assertion of sin, or a
Redeemer, or any duty with respect unto them. Gratitude and prayer, I
confess, are two heads whereunto sundry duties of natural religion, without
respect unto these things, may be reduced; but since the fall of Adam,
there was never any religion in the world accepted with God that was not
built and founded on the supposition of them, and whose principal duties
towards God did not respect them. To prescribe now unto us a religion, as
it respects God, without those duties which
Thirdly, The most important duties of Christian religion are here not only omitted but excluded. Where shall we find any place here to introduce repentance, and, as belonging thereunto, conviction of sin, humiliation, godly sorrow, conversion itself to God? For my part, I will never be of that religion where these duties towards God have no place. Faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, with all that is necessary to it, preparatory for it, included in it, and consequential on it, are in like manner cast out of the verge of religious duties here schematized. An endeavour to flee from the wrath to come, to receive Jesus Christ, to accept of the atonement, to seek after the forgiveness of sins by him (that we may cant a little), and to give up our souls in universal obedience to all his commands, belong also to the duties of that religion towards God which the Scripture prescribeth unto us; but here they appear not in the least intimation of them. No more do the duties which, though generally included in the law of loving God above all, yet are prescribed and determined in the gospel alone; such are self- denial, readiness to take up the cross, and the like. Besides, all the duties wherein our Christian conflict against our spiritual adversaries doth consist, and, in especial, the whole of our duty towards God in the mortification of sin, can be of no consideration, there where no supposition of sin is made or allowed.
But there would be no end, if all exceptions of this
nature, that readily offer themselves, might here have admittance. If this
be the religion of our adversaries in these things, if this be a perfect
scheme of its duties towards God and induction of all its particulars, let
our author insult over and reproach them whilst he pleaseth who blame it as
insufficient without grace and godliness, I would not be in the condition
of them who trust their eternal concernment to mere observance of it, as
knowing that there is no name under heaven given unto men whereby they may
be saved, but only the name of Jesus Christ. It will be in vain pretended
that it is not a description of Christian religion, but of religion as
religion in general, that is here attempted; for besides that it is
Christian religion, and that as used and practised by Christians, which is
alone under consideration,
I can easily supply another scheme of religion in
the room of this, which though it have not any such contexture of method,
nor is set out with such gaudy words as those which our author hath at his
disposal, yet I am confident, in the confession of all Christians, shall
give a better account than what is here offered unto us both of the
religion we profess and of the duties that God requires therein, — and this
taken out of one epistle of St Paul, namely, that to the Romans; and I
shall do it as things come to mind in the haste wherein I am writing. He,
then, gives us his scheme to this purpose: as, first, That all men sinned
in Adam, came short of the glory of God, and rendered themselves liable to
death and the whole curse of the law; then, that they do all, as left to
themselves, accumulate their original sin and transgression with a world of
actual sins and provocations of God; that against men in this condition God
testifies his wrath and displeasure, both in his works and by his word.
Hence it necessarily follows that the first duty of man towards God is to
be sensible of this condition, of the guilt of sin, with a fear of the
wrath and judgment due to them. Then he informs us that neither the Jews
by the law, nor the Gentiles by the light of nature, could disentangle
themselves from this state, or do that which is pleasing unto God, so as
they might obtain forgiveness of sin and acceptation with him. This
bespeaks unto all the great duty towards God of their acknowledgment unto
him of their miserable and helpless condition, with all those affections
and subordinate duties wherewith it is attended. In this state he declares
that God himself, in his infinite wisdom, goodness, and grace, provided a
remedy, a way of relief, on which he hath put such an impression of his
glorious excellencies as may stir up the hearts of his creatures to
endeavour a
The third is, That there is no actual work of present grace, either to fit the persons of whom these duties of moral virtues are required unto the performance of them or to work and effect them in them; for although they are called “graces,” and the “graces of the Spirit,” in the Scripture, yet that is upon another account, as he declares himself, p. 72: “All that the Scripture intends by the ‘graces of the Spirit’ are only virtuous qualities of the soul; that are therefore styled ‘graces,’ because they are derived purely from God’s free grace and goodness, in that, in the first ages of Christianity, he was pleased, out of his infinite concern for its propagation, in a miraculous manner to inspire its converts with all sorts of virtue.”
“Virtuous qualities of the soul” is a very ambiguous
expression. Take these virtuous qualities for a new principle of spiritual
life, consisting in the habitual disposition, inclination, and ability of
mind unto the things required of us in the will of God, or unto the acts of
religious obedience, and it may express the graces of the Spirit; which are
yet far enough from being so called upon the account here mentioned. But
these virtuous qualities are to be interpreted according to the tenor of
the preceding discourses that have already passed under examination. Let
now our author produce any one writer of the church of God, from first to
last, of any repute or acceptation, from the day that the name of Christian
was known in the world unto this wherein we live, giving us this account
why the fruits of the Spirit, the virtuous or gracious qualities of the
minds of believers, are called “graces” that here he gives, and I will give
him my thanks publicly for his discovery; for if this be the only reason
why any thing in believers is called “grace,” why virtues are graces, —
namely, because God was pleased in the first ages of Christianity
miraculously to inspire its converts with all sorts of virtue, — then there
is no communication of grace unto any, no work of grace in and upon any, in
an ordinary way, through the ministry
Are these things, then, so indeed, that God did, from his
free grace and goodness, miraculously inspire the first converts of
Christianity with all sorts of virtues, but that he doth not still continue
to put forth in any actually the efficacy of his grace, or make them
gracious, holy, believing, obedient to himself, and to work in them all
suitable actings towards himself and others? Then farewell Scripture, the
covenant of grace, the intercession of Christ, yea, all the ancient
fathers, councils, schoolmen, and most of the Jesuits themselves! Many
have been the disputes amongst Christians about the nature of grace, the
rule of its dispensation, the manner and way of its operation, its
efficacy, concurrence, and cooperation in the wills of men; but that there
is no dispensation of it, no operation but what was miraculous in the first
converts of the gospel, was, I think, until now undiscovered. Nor can it
be here pretended that the virtuous qualities of our minds and their
exercise, — by which is intended all the obedience that God requireth of
us, in principle and practice, that we may please him and come to the
enjoyment of him, — are not said to be called graces only on the account
mentioned; for as in respect of us they are not so termed at all, so if the
term “only” be not understood, the whole discourse is impertinent and
ridiculous: for those other reasons and accounts that may be taken in will
render that given utterly useless unto our author’s intention, and, indeed,
are altogether inconsistent with it, and he hath given us no reason to
suppose that he talks after such a weak and preposterous rate. This, then,
is that which is here asserted: The qualities of our minds and their
exercise, wherein the virtues pleaded about and affirmed to contain the
whole substance of religion do consist, are not wrought in us by the grace
or Spirit of God through the preaching of the gospel, but are only called
“graces,”as before. Now, though here be a plain contradiction to what is
delivered but two pages before, namely, “that we pray for some or other
virtuous qualities,” — that is, doubtless, to be wrought in us by the grace
of God, — yet this present discourse is capable of no other interpretation
but that given unto it. And, indeed, it seems to be the design of some men
to confine all real gifts and graces of the Spirit of God to the first ages
of the gospel, and the miraculous operations in it; which is to overthrow
the whole gospel, the church, and the ministry of it, as to their use and
But to return: in the sense that mortal virtue is here
taken, I dare boldly pronounce that there is no villany in the religion
of those men who distinguish between virtue and grace, — that is,
there is not in their so doing, — this being the known and avowed religion
of Christianity. It is granted that wherever grace is, there is virtue;
for grace will produce and effect all virtues in the soul whatever. But
virtue, on the other side, may be where there is no grace; which is
sufficient to confirm a distinction between them. It was so in sundry of
the heathen of old; though now it be pretended that grace is nothing but an
occasional denomination of virtue, not that it is the cause or principle of
it. But the proofs produced by our author are exceedingly incompetent unto
the end whereunto they are applied. For that place of the apostle,
And indeed his quotation of this place is pretty odd. He
doth not in the print express the words as he useth, and as he doth those
of another scripture immediately, in a different character, as the direct
words of the apostle, that no man may charge him with a false allegation of
the text; yet he repeats all the words of it which he intends to use to his
purpose, somewhat altering the expressions. But he hath had, I fear, some
unhappiness in his explanations. By “joy” he would have “cheerfulness”
intended; but what is meant by cheerfulness is much more uncertain than
what is intended by joy. Mirth, it may be, in conversation is aimed at, or
somewhat of that nature; but how remote this is from that spiritual joy
which is recommended unto us in the Scripture, and is affirmed to be
“unspeakable and full of glory,” he that knows not is scarce meet to
paraphrase upon St Paul’s epistles. Neither is that “peace with God
through our Lord Jesus Christ,” which is wrought in the hearts of believers
by the Holy Ghost, who “creates the fruit of the lips, peace, peace, unto
them,” a matter of any more affinity with a moral peaceableness of mind and
affections. Our faith also in God, and our faithfulness in our duties,
trusts, offices, and employments, are sufficiently distinct. So palpably
must the Scripture be corrupted and wrested to be made serviceable to this
presumption! He yet adds another proof to the same purpose, — if any man
know distinctly what that purpose is, — namely,
Our last inquiry is into what he ascribes unto his adversaries in this matter, and how he deals with them thereupon. This, therefore, he informs us, p. 71: “‘It is not enough,’ say they, ‘to be completely virtuous, unless ye have grace too.’” I can scarce believe that ever he heard any one of them say so, or ever read it in any of their writings: for there is nothing that they are more positive in than that men cannot, in any sense, be completely virtuous unless they have grace; and so they cannot suppose them to be so who have it not. They say, indeed, that moral virtues, as before described, so far as they are attainable by, or may be exercised in the strength of, men’s own wills and natural faculties, are not enough to please God and to make men accepted with him; so that virtue as it may be without grace, and some virtues may be so for the substance of them, is not available unto salvation. And I had almost said, that he is no Christian that is of another mind. In a word, virtue is or may be without grace, in all or any of the acceptations of it before laid down. Where it is without the favour of God and the pardon of sin, where it is without the renewing of our natures and the endowment of our persons with a principle of spiritual life, where it is not wrought in us by present efficacious grace, it is not enough, nor will serve any man’s turn with respect unto the everlasting concernments of his soul.
But he gives in his exceptions, p. 71: “But when,” saith
he, “we have set aside all manner of virtue, let them tell me what remains
to be called grace, and give me any notion of it distinct from all
morality, that consists in the right order and government of our actions in
all our relations, and so comprehends all our duty; and therefore if grace
be not included in it, it is but a phantasm and an imaginary thing.” I
say, first, Where grace is, we cannot set aside virtue, because it will and
doth produce and effect it in the minds of men; but virtue may be where
grace is not, in the sense so often declared. Secondly, Take moral virtue
in the notion of it here received and explained by our author, and I have
given sundry instances before of gracious duties that come not within the
verge or compass of the scheme given us of it. Thirdly, The whole aimed at
lies in this: That virtue that governs our actions in all our duties may be
considered either as the duty we owe to the law of nature for the ends of
it, to be performed in the strength of nature, and by
But he renews his charge, p. 73: “So destructive of all
true and real goodness is the very religion of those men that are wont to
set grace at odds with virtue, and are so far from making them the same
that they make them inconsistent; and though a man be exact in all the
duties of moral goodness, yet if he be a graceless person (that is, void of
I know not what imaginary godliness) he is but in a cleaner way to hell,
and his conversion is more hopeless than the vilest and most notorious
sinner’s; and the morally righteous man is at a greater distance from grace
than the profane; and better be lewd and debauched than live an honest and
virtuous life, if you are not of the godly party,” — with much more to this
purpose. For the “men that are wont to set grace at odds with virtue, and
are so far from making them the same that they make them inconsistent,” I
wish our author would discover them, that he might take us along with him
in his detestation of them. It is not unlikely, if all be true that is
told of them, but that the Gnostics might have some principles not unlike
this; but beside them, I never heard of any that were of this mind in the
world. And, in truth, the liberty that is taken in these discourses is a
great instance of the morality under consideration. But the following
words will direct us where these things are charged; for some say that if
“a man be exact in all the duties of moral goodness, yet if he be a
graceless person, void of I know not what imaginary godliness, he is but in
a cleaner way to hell.” I think I know both what and who are intended, and
that both are dealt withal with that candour we have been now accustomed
unto. But, first, you will scarce find those you intend over-forward in
granting that men may be “exact in all the duties of moral goodness,” and
yet be “graceless persons:” for taking moral virtues to comprehend, as you
do, their duties towards God, they will tell you such persons cannot
perform one of them aright, much less all of them exactly; for they can
neither believe in God, nor trust him, nor fear him, nor glorify him, in a
due manner. [Secondly,] Take the duties of moral goodness for the duties of
the law between man and man, and the observation of the outward duties of
God’s worship, and they say, indeed, that they may be so performed as that
in respect of them men may be blameless, and yet be graceless; for that
account, if they mistake not, the apostle Paul gives of himself,
It is farther added, that the “conversion of such a one is
more hopeless than the vilest and most notorious sinner’s; and the morally
righteous man, etc. Setting aside the invidious expression of what is here
reflected upon, there is nothing more openly taught in the gospel. The
Pharisees were a people morally righteous, whereon they “trusted
in themselves that they were righteous;” and, yet our Lord Jesus Christ
told them that “publicans and harlots,” the vilest and most notorious of
sinners, entered before them into the kingdom of God. And where men trust
to their own righteousness, their own duties, be they moral or what they
will, there are no men farther from the way of the gospel than they; nay,
our Saviour lets us know that, as such, the gospel is not concerned in
them, nor they in it. “I came not,” he says, “to call the righteous, but
sinners to repentance,” — not men justifying or lifting up themselves in a
conceit of their moral duties, but those who are burdened and laden with a
sense of their sins; and so, in like manner, that “the whole have no need
of a physician, but the sick.” And St Paul declares what enemies they were
to the righteousness of God who went about to set up their own
righteousness,
These things, though not direct to the argument in hand, and which on that account might have been neglected, yet supposing that the author placed as much of his design in them as in any part of his discourse, I could not wholly omit the consideration of; not so much out of a desire for their vindication who are unduly traduced in them, as to plead for the gospel itself, and to lay a foundation of a farther defence of the truths of it, if occasion shall so require. And we have also here an insight into the judgment of our author, or his mistake in this matter. He tells us that it is better to tolerate debaucheries and immoralities than liberty of conscience for men to worship God according to their light and persuasion! Now, all religion, according to him, consisting in morality, to tolerate immoralities and debaucheries in conversation is plainly to tolerate atheism; which, it seems, is more eligible than to grant liberty of conscience unto them who differ from the present establishment only as to some things belonging to the outward worship of God!
These things being premised, the argument itself pleaded in
this chapter is capable of a speedy despatch. It is to this purpose: “The
magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference to morals or
moral virtues, which are the principal things in religion; and therefore
much more hath so in reference to the worship of God, which is of less
importance.” We have complained before of the ambiguity of these general
terms, but it is to no purpose to do so any more, seeing that we are not
like to be relieved in this discourse. Let us, then, take things as we
find them, and satisfy ourselves on the intention of the author by that
declaration which he makes of it up and down the chapter. But yet here we
are at a loss also. When he speaks, or seems to speak, to this purpose,
whether in the confirmation of the proposition, or the inferences whereof
his arguments consist, what he says is cast into such an intertexture with
invectives and reproaches, and expressed in such a
Again; lesser things may be exempted from that power and authority, by especial privilege or law, which hath the disposal of greater committed unto it, and intrusted with it; as the magistrate amongst us may take away the life of a man, which is the greatest of his concernments, the name of his all, for felony, but cannot take his estate or inheritance of land, which is a far less concernment unto him, if it be antecedently settled by law to other uses than his own. And if it cannot be proved that the disposal of the worship of God, as to what doth really and truly belong unto it, and all the parts of it, is exempted from all human power by special law and privilege, let it be disposed of as whoso will shall judge meet.
Nor is the latter consideration suggested to enforce this
consequent of any more validity, — namely, “that there is more danger of
the magistrate’s erring or mistaking about moral virtue than about rites of
worship,” because that is of most concernment in religion; for it is true,
that suppose a man to walk on the top of a high house or
But the assertion itself which is the foundation of these
consequences is utterly remote from accuracy and truth. It is said that
“the magistrate hath power over the consciences of men in reference unto
moral duties, which are the principal parts of religion.” Our first and
most difficult inquiry is after the meaning of this proposition; the
latter, after its truth. I ask, then, first, Whether he hath power over
the consciences of men with respect unto moral virtue, and over moral
virtue itself as virtue and as a part of religion, or on some other
account? If his power respect virtue as a part of religion, then it
equally extends itself to all that is so, by virtue of a rule which will
not be easily everted. But it doth not appear that it so extends itself as
to plead an obliging authority in reference unto all duties; for let but
the scheme of moral duties, especially those whose object is God, given us
by our author, be considered, and it will quickly be discerned how many of
them are exempted from all human cognizance and authority, and that from
and by their nature, as well as their use in the world. And it is in vain
to ascribe an authority to
Hence it sufficiently appears that the authority of the
magistrate
Secondly, It may be inquired, What is the power and
authority over moral virtues which is here ascribed unto the civil
magistrate, and over the consciences of men with respect unto them? Is it
such as to make that to be virtue which was not virtue before, or which was
vice, and oblige men in conscience to practice it as virtue? This would go
a great way indeed, and answer somewhat of what is, or, as it is said, may
be, done in the worship of God, when that is made a part of it which was
not so before. But what name shall these new virtues be called by? A new
virtue, both as to its acts and objects, will as much fly the imaginations
of men as a sixth sense doth. It may be our author will satisfy us as to
this inquiry; for he tells us, p. 80, that “he hath power to make that a
particular of the divine law that God hath not made so.” I wish he had
declared himself how and wherein; for I am afraid this expression, as here
it lies, is offensive. The divine law is divine, and so is every
particular of it; and how a man can make a thing divine that is not so of
itself, nor by divine institution, is hard to find out. It may be that
only the subject-matter of the law, and not the law itself formally, is
intended; and to make a thing a particular of the divine law is no more but
to make the divine law require that in particular of a man which it did not
require of him before. But this particular refers to the nature, essence,
and being of the thing, or to the acting and occasion
But somewhat else seems to be intended from the ensuing discourse: “They are fully empowered to declare new instances of virtue and vice, and to introduce new duties in the most important parts of religion.” And yet I am still at the same loss; for by his “declaring new instances of virtue and vice,” I suppose he intends an authoritative declaration, such as that they have no other foundation, nor need none to make them what they are. They are new instances of virtue and vice, because so declared. And this suits unto the “introducing of new duties in the most important parts of religion,” — made duties by that introduction. I wish I could yet learn what these “new instances of virtue and vice” are or mean; whether they are new as virtues and vices, or as instances. For the first, would I could see a new practice of old virtues! but, to tell you the truth, I care not for any of the new virtues that I have lately observed in the world, nor do I hope ever to see any better new ones.
If it be the instances that are new, I wish again
I knew what were more in them than the actual and occasional exercise of
old duties. Pages 79, 80, conduce most to extricate us out of these
ambiguities. There we are informed that “the laws of every nation do
distinguish and settle men’s rights and properties, and that distinctly;
with respect whereunto justice, that prime natural virtue, is in particular
instances to be exercised. And, p. 84, it is farther declared, that “in
the administration of justice there may be great difference in the
constitution of penalties and execution of them.” This, it seems, is that
which is aimed at: The magistrate, by his laws, determines whether Titius
have set his hedge upon Caius’ ground, and whether Sempronius have rightly
conveyed his land or house to his son or neighbour; whereby what is just
and lawful in itself is accommodated to the use of political society. He
determines, also, how persons guilty of death shall be executed, and by
whom, and in what manner. Whence it must needs follow, that he hath power
to assign new particulars of the divine law, to declare new bounds or
hedges of right and wrong, which the law of God neither doth nor can limit,
or hath power over the consciences of men with respect to moral virtues;
which was to be demonstrated. Let us lay aside these swelling expressions,
and we shall find that all that can be ascribed unto the civil magistrate
in this matter is no more than to preserve
Having made some inquiry into the terms of “moral virtue”
and the “magistrate’s power,” it remains only that we consider what respect
this case hath unto the consciences of men, with reference unto them; and I
desire to know whether all mankind be not obliged in conscience to the
observation of all moral virtues antecedently to the command or authority
of the magistrate, who doth only inspect their observation of them as to
the concerns of public peace and tranquillity? Certainly, if all moral
virtues consist in “living suitably to the dictates of reason,” as we are
told, — and in a sense rightly, if the rule of them all and every one,
which gives them their formal nature, be the law of our creation, which all
mankind enter the world under an indispensable obligation unto, — it cannot
be denied but that there is such an antecedent obligation on the
consciences of men as that inquired after. But the things mentioned are
granted by our author; nor can by any be denied without offering the
highest outrage to Scripture, reason, and the common consent of mankind.
Now, if this obligation be thus on all men, unto all virtue as virtue, and
this absolutely, from the authority of God over them and their consciences,
how comes an inferior authority to interpose itself between that of God and
their consciences, so as immediately to oblige them? It is granted that
when the magistrate commandeth and requireth the exercise of any moral
duty, in a way suited unto public good and tranquillity, he is to be obeyed
for conscience’ sake, because he who is the Lord of conscience doth require
men to be obedient unto him, whereon they are obliged in conscience so to
be: but if the things required of them be in themselves moral duties, as
they are such, their consciences are obliged to observe and exercise them
from the command of God; and other obligation unto them, as such, they
neither have nor can have. But the direction and command for the exercise
of them in these and those circumstances, for the ends of public good
whereunto they are directed, belongs unto the magistrate, who is to be
obeyed: for as in things merely civil, and which have nothing originally of
morality in them, but secondarily only, as they tend to the preservation
and welfare of human society, which is a thing morally good, the magistrate
is to be obeyed for conscience’ sake, and the things themselves, as far as
they partake of morality, come directly under the command of God, which
affects the conscience; — so in things that have an inherent and
inseparable morality, and so respect God in the first place, when they come
to have a civil sanction in reference to their exercise unto public
political good, that sanction is to be obeyed out of conscience; but the
antecedent obligation that was upon the conscience unto a
I know what is said, but I find not as yet what is proved, from these things, concerning the uncontrollable and absolute power of the supreme magistrate over religion and the consciences of men. Some things are added indeed here, up and down, about circumstances of divine worship, and the power of ordering them by the magistrate; which though there may be some different conceptions about, yet they no way reach the cause under debate. But as they are expressed by our author, I know not of any one writer in and of the church of England that hitherto has so stated them as they are by him; for he tells us, p. 85, that “all rituals, ceremonies, postures, and manners of performing the outward expressions of devotion, that are not chargeable with countenancing vice or disgracing the Deity, are capable of being adopted into the ministries of divine service, and are not exempted from being subject to the determinations of human power.” Whether they are so or no, the magistrate, I presume, is to judge, or all this flourish of words and concessions of power vanish into smoke. His command of them binds the consciences of men to observe them, according to the principle under consideration. Hence it must be absolutely in the power of every supreme magistrate to impose on the Christian subjects a greater number of ceremonious observances in the worship of God, and those of greater weight, than ever were laid upon the Jews; for who knows not that under the names of “rituals, ceremonies, postures, manners of performing all divine service,” what a burdensome heap of things are imposed in the Roman church? whereunto, as far as I know, a thousand more may be added, not chargeable in themselves with either of the crimes which alone are allowed to be put in in bar or plea against them. And whether this be the liberty whereunto Jesus Christ hath vindicated his disciples and church, is left unto the judgment of sober men. Outward religious worship, we know, is to be performed by natural actions. These have their circumstances; and those ofttimes, because of the public concernment of the exercise of religion, of great importance. These may be ordered by the power and according to the wisdom of those in authority; but that they should make so many things as this assertion allows them to make to belong unto and to be parts of the worship of God, whereof not one is enjoined or required by him, and the consciences of men be thereby obliged unto their observance, I do not believe, nor is it here at all proved.
To close this discourse about the power of obliging the
consciences of men; I think our author grants that conscience is
immediately obliged to the observation of all things that are good in
themselves,
The third chapter entertains us
with a magnificent grant of liberty of conscience. The very first
paragraph asserts a “liberty of conscience in mankind over all their
actions, whether moral or strictly religious.” But lest this should prove
a bedlam concession, that might mischief the whole design in hand, it is
delivered to the power of a keeper; who yet, upon examination, is no less
wild and extravagant than itself is esteemed absolutely to be. This is,
“That they have it as far as concerns their judgments, but not their
practice;” — that is, they have liberty of conscience over their
actions but not their practices, or over their
practices but not over their practices! for, upon trial,
their actions and practices will prove to be the same. And I do not as yet
well understand what is this liberty of conscience over men’s actions. Is
it to do or not to do, as their consciences dictate
Let us search after an explication of these things in the paragraph itself, whose contents are represented in the words mentioned. Here we are told that this liberty consists in “men’s thinking of things according to their own persuasion, and therein asserting the freedom of their judgments.” I would be loath to think that this liberty of men’s consciences over all their moral actions should, at first dash, dwindle into a liberty in speculations, — that men may think what they will, opine as they please, in or about things that are not to be brought into practice; but yet, as far as I can perceive, I must think so, or matters will come to a worse issue.
But these things must be a little farther examined, and
that very briefly. Here is mention of “liberty of conscience;” but what
conscience is, or what that liberty is, is not declared. For conscience,
it is called sometimes “the mind,” sometimes “the understanding,” sometimes
“opinion,” sometimes described by the “liberty of thinking,”sometimes
termed an “imperious faculty;” which things, without much
discourse and more words than I can now afford to use, are not reconcilable
among themselves. Besides, liberty is no proper affection of the mind or
understanding. Though I acknowledge the mind and its actings to be
naturally free from outward compulsion or coaction, yet it is capable of
such a determination from the things proposed unto it, and the manner of
their proposal, as to make necessary the elicitation of its acts. It
cannot but judge that two and three make five. It is the will that is the
proper seat of liberty; and what some suppose to be the ultimate
determination of the practical understanding is indeed an act of the
will. It is so if you speak of liberty naturally and morally, and not
of state and condition, which are here confounded. But suppose what you
will to be conscience, it is moral actions or duties that are here supposed
to be the objects of its actings. Now, what are or can be the thoughts or
actings of the mind of man about moral actions, but about their virtue or
their vice, their moral good or evil? Nor is a conclusion of what is a
man’s own duty in reference
To state this matter a little more clearly, let us take
conscience in the most usual acceptation of it, and that which answers the
experience of every man that ever looks into the affairs and concerns
within; and so it is the practical judgment that men make of themselves and
of their actions, or what they are to do and what they are not to do, what
they have done or what they have omitted, with reference unto the judgment
of God, at present declared in their own hearts and in his word, and to be
fully executed at the last day: for we speak of conscience as it is amongst
Christians, who acknowledge the word of God, and that for a double end;
first, as the rule of conscience itself; secondly, as the declaration of
the will of God, as to his approbation or rejecting of what we do or omit.
Suppose, then, that a man make a judgment in his conscience, regulated by
the word of God, and with respect unto the judgment of God concerning him,
that such and such a thing is a duty, and whose performance is required of
him, I desire to know whether any obligation be upon him from thence to act
according? It is answered, that “the territory of conscience is confined
unto men’s thoughts, judgments, and persuasions, and these are free” (Yea,
no doubt); “but for outward actions there is no remedy, but they must be
subject to the cognizance of human laws,” p. 9. Who ever doubted of it? He
that would have men so have liberty from outward actions as not to have
those actions cognoscible by the civil power as to the end of public
tranquillity, but to have their whole station firmed absolutely in the
world upon the plea of conscience, would, no doubt, lay a foundation for
confusion in all government. But what is this to the present inquiry,
Whether conscience lay an obligation on men, as regulated by the word of
God, and respecting him, to practice according to its dictates? It is true
enough, that if any of its practices do not please or satisfy the
magistrate, their authors must, for aught I know, stand to what will follow
or ensue on them to their prejudice; but this frees them not from the
obligation that is upon them in conscience unto what is their duty. This
is that which must be here proved, if any thing be intended unto the
purpose of this author, — namely, that notwithstanding the judgment of
conscience concerning any duty, by the interposition of the authority of
the magistrate to the contrary, there is no obligation ensues for the
performance of that duty. This is the answer that ought plainly
This, therefore, is the state of the present case applied unto religious worship: Suppose the magistrate command such things in religion as a man in his conscience, guided by the word and respecting God, doth look upon as unlawful and such as are evil, and sin unto him if he should perform them, and forbid such things in the worship of God as he esteems himself obliged in conscience to observe as commands of Christ; if he practice the things so commanded, and omit the things so forbidden, I fear he will find himself within doors continually at confession, saying, with trouble enough, “I have done those things which I ought not to have done, and I have left undone those things which I ought to have done, and there is no health in me;” unless this author can prove that the commands of God respect only the minds of men, but not their outward actions, which are left unto the authority of the magistrate alone. If no more be here intended, but that whatever conscience may require of any, it will not secure them but that, when they come to act outwardly according to it, the civil magistrate may and will consider their actions, and allow them or forbid them, according to his own judgment, it were surely a madness to deny it, as great as to say the sun shineth not at noonday. If conscience to God be confined to thoughts, and opinions, and speculations about the general notions and notices of things, about true and false, and unto a liberty of judging and determining upon them what they are, whether they are so or no, the whole nature and being of conscience, and that to the reason, sense, and experience of every man, is utterly overthrown. If conscience be allowed to make its judgment of what is good or evil, what is duty or sin, and no obligation be allowed to ensue from thence unto a suitable practice, a wide door is opened unto atheism, and thereby the subversion of all religion and government in the world.
This, therefore, is the sum of what is asserted in this
matter: Conscience, according to that apprehension which it hath of the
will of God about his worship (whereunto we confine our discourse),
obligeth men to act or forbear accordingly. If their apprehensions are
right and true, just and equal, what the Scripture, the great rule of
conscience, doth declare and require, I hope none, upon second thoughts,
From the liberty of conscience a proceed is made to
Christian liberty, which is said to be “a duty or privilege founded upon
the” (chimerical) “liberty of conscience” before granted. But these things
stand not in the relation imagined. Liberty of conscience is of natural
right, Christian liberty is a gospel privilege, though both may be pleaded
in unwarrantable impositions on conscience. But these things are so
described by our author as to be confounded: for the Christian liberty
described in this paragraph is either restrained to matters of pure
speculation, wherein the mind of man is left entirely free to judge of the
truth and falsehood of things; or as it regards things that fall under laws
and impositions, wherein men are left entirely free to judge of them, as
they are objects of mere opinion. Now, how this differs from the liberty
of conscience granted before I know not. And that there is some mistake in
this description of
It is true that a good part of our Christian liberty
consists in our deliverance from the yoke of Mosaical institutions; but
that this “is not so much a new favour granted in the gospel as the
restoration of the mind of man to its natural privilege,” is an assertion
that runs parallel with many others in this discourse. This privilege, as
all others of the gospel are, is spiritual, and its outward concerns and
exercise are of no value where the mind is not spiritually made free by
Christ. And it is uncertain what is meant by the “restoration of the mind
to its natural privilege.” If the privilege of the mind in its natural
purity is intended, as it was before the entrance of sin, it is false; if
any privilege [which] the mind of man, in its corrupt, depraved condition,
is capable of, be designed, it is no less untrue. In things of this nature
the mind in that condition is in bondage, and not capable of any liberty;
for it is a thing ridiculous to confound the mere natural liberty of our
wills, which is an affection inseparable from that faculty, with a moral or
spiritual liberty of mind relating unto God and his worship. But this
whole paragraph runs upon no small mistake, — namely, that the yoke of
Mosaical institutions consisted in their impositions on the minds and
judgments of men, with an opinion
From this discovery here made of the nature of Christian
liberty, our author makes some deductions, pp. 98, 99, concerning the
nature of religious worship; wherein he tells us that “the whole substance
of religious worship is transacted within the mind of man, and dwells in
the heart and thoughts, the soul being its proper seat and temple, where
men may worship their God as they please without offending their prince;
and that external worship is no part of religion itself.” I wish he had
more clearly and distinctly expressed his mind in this matter, for his
assertions, in the sense the words seem to bear, are prodigiously false,
and such as will open a door to atheism, with all the villany and confusion
in the world; for who would not think this to be his intention: Let men
keep their minds
It is true, indeed, that natural, moral, or internal
worship, consisting in faith, love, fear, thankfulness, submission,
dependence, and the like, hath its constant seat and residence in the souls
and minds of men; but that the ways whereby these principles of it are to
be outwardly exercised and expressed, by God’s command and appointment, are
not also indispensably necessary unto us, and parts of his worship, is
utterly false. That which principally in the Scripture comes under the
notion of the worship of God, is the due observance of his outward
institutions; which divines have, upon unquestionable grounds, contended to
be commanded and appointed in general in the second commandment of the
decalogue, whence all particular institutions in the several seasons of the
church are educed, and resolved into the authority of God therein
expressed. And that account which we have here given us of outward
worship, — namely, that it is “no part of religion itself, but only an
instrument to express the inward generation of the mind by some outward
action or posture of the body,” — as it is very difficultly to be
accommodated unto the sacrifices of old or the present sacraments of the
church, which were and are parts of outward worship, and, as I take it, of
religion; so the being an instrument, unto the purpose mentioned, doth not
exclude any thing from being also a part of religion and worship itself, if
it be commanded by God to be performed in his
But upon the whole matter our author affirms, “That in all
ages of the world, God hath left the management of his outward worship unto
the discretion of men, unless when to determine some particulars hath been
useful to some other purpose, p. 100. “The management of outward worship”
may signify no more but the due performance of it; and so I acknowledge
that though it be not left unto men’s discretion to observe or not observe
it, yet it is, too, their duty and obedience, which are their discretion
and their wisdom. But the management here understood is opposed to God’s
own determination of particular forms, — that is, his especial
institutions; and hereof I shall make bold to say, that it was never in any
age so left to the discretion of men. To prove this assertion, sacrifices
are singled out as an instance. It is known and granted that these were
the most solemn part of the outward worship of God for many ages, and that
there was a general consent of mankind unto the use of them, so that
however the greatest part of the world apostatized from the true, only, and
proper object of all religious worship, yet they retained this mode and
medium of it. These sacrifices, we are told, p. 101, “did not owe their
original unto any divine institution, but were made choice of by good men
as a fit way of imitating the
Besides, no tolerable colour can be given to the assertion
that they were the “invention of good men.” The first notice we have of
them is in those of Cain and Abel, whereof one was a bad man and of the
evil one, and yet must be looked on as the principal inventor of
sacrifices, if this fiction be allowed. Some of the ancients, indeed,
thought that Adam sacrificed the beasts to God whose skins his first
garments were made of; and if so, he was very pregnant and sudden in his
invention, if he had no direction from God. But more than
Again, the apostle tells us, Abel offered his sacrifice by
faith,
In the close of this chapter an application is made of what
hath been before argued, or rather dictated, upon a particular controversy
about “significant ceremonies.” I am not willing to engage in any contests
of that nature, seeing to the due handling of them a greater length of
discourse would be necessary than I think meet at present to draw forth
this survey unto. Only, seeing a very few words may serve to manifest the
looseness of what is here discoursed, to that purpose I shall venture on
the patience of the reader with an addition of them. We have, therefore,
in the first place, a reflection on “the prodigious impertinency of the
clamour against the institution of significant ceremonies, when it is the
only use of ceremonies, as of all other outward expressions of religion, to
be significant,” I do somewhat admire at the temper of this author, who
cannot express
The comparing of the ceremonies and their,
signification, with words and their signification, will not
relieve our author in this matter. Some things are naturally significant
of one another: so effects are of causes; so is smoke of fire; and such
were the signs of the weather mentioned by our Saviour,
In the fourth chapter we have no concern. The hypothesis whose confutation he hath undertaken, as it is in itself false, so it is rather suited to promote what he aims at than what he opposeth; and the principles which himself proceedeth on do seem to some to border on, if not to be borrowed from his, and those which are here confuted. And thence it is that the foundations which he lays down in the entrance of this discourse are as destructive of his own pretensions as of those against which they are by himself improved: for it is granted and asserted by him that there are actions and duties in and about which the consciences of men are not to be obliged by human authority, but have an antecedent obligation on them from the authority of God himself; “so that disobedience unto the contrary commands of human authority is no sin, but an indispensable duty.” And although he seems at first to restrain things of this nature unto things natural, and of an essential rectitude, — that is, to the prime dictates of the law of nature, — yet he expressly extends it in instances unto the belief of the truth of the gospel, which is a matter of mere and pure revelation. And hereon he adds the formal and adequate reason of this exemption of conscience from human authority, and its obligation unto duty, before its consideration without it and against it; “which is, not because subjects are in any thing free from the authority of the supreme power on earth, but because they are subject to a superior in heaven; and they are then only excused from the duty of obedience to their sovereign, when they cannot give it without rebellion against God: so that it is not originally any right of their own that exempts them from a subjection to the sovereign power in all things, but it is purely God’s right of governing his own creatures that magistrates then invade when they make edicts to violate or control his laws.”
It is about religion and the worship of God that we are
discoursing. Now, in these things no man ever thought that it was
originally a right of subjects, as subjects, abstracting from the
consideration of the authority of God, that should exempt them from a
subjection to the sovereign power; for though some of the ancients
discourse at large that it is of natural right and equity that every one
should worship God as he would himself, yet they founded this equity in the
nature of God and the authority of his commands. This exemption, then,
ariseth merely, as our author observes, because they are subject to a
superior power in heaven, which excuseth them See vol. xiv., p. 204 of
The fifth chapter is at such
variance with itself and what is elsewhere dictated in the treatise, that
it would require no small labour to make any tolerable composition of
things between them. This I shall not engage in, as not being of my
present concernment. What seems to tend unto the carrying on of the design
of the whole may be called unto some account. In the beginning of it he
tells us that “a belief of the indifferency, or rather imposture, of all
religions is made the most effectual, not to say the most fashionable,
argument for liberty of conscience,” For my part, I never read, I never
heard of this pretence or argument, to be used to that purpose. It wants
no such defence. Nay, the principle itself seems to me to be suited
directly to oppose and overthrow it: for if there be no such thing in
reality as religion in the world, it is certainly a very foolish thing to
have differences perpetuated amongst men upon the account of conscience;
which, without a supposition of religion, is nothing but a vain and empty
name. But hence our author takes occasion to discourse of the use of
religion and conscience in the government of affairs in the world; and
proves in many words that “conscience unto God,
Nor can I find much of that importance in the third and
fourth paragraphs of this declamatory invective. It is evident whom he
regards and reflects upon, and with what false, unmanly, unchristian
revilings he endeavours to traduce them. He would have the world believe
that there is a generation of men whose principles of religion teach them
to be proud, peevish, malicious, spiteful, envious, turbulent, boisterous,
seditious, and whatever is evil in the world; when others are all for
candour, moderation, and ingenuity, — amongst whom, no doubt, he reckons
himself for one, and gives in this discourse in evidence thereof. But what
are those doctrines and articles of men’s belief, which dispose them
inevitably to all the villanies that our author could find names for? A
catalogue of them he gives us, pp. 147, 148. Saith he, “What if they
believe that princes are but the executioners of the decrees of the
presbytery; and that in case of disobedience to their spiritual governors
they may be excommunicated, and by consequence deposed? What if they
believe that dominion is founded in grace, and therefore all wicked kings
forfeit their crowns, and that it is in the power of the people of God to
bestow them where they please? And what if others believe that to pursue
their successes in villany and rebellion is to follow providence?” All the
world knows what it is that hath given him the advantage of providing a
covering for these monstrous fictions, and an account thereof hath been
given elsewhere. And what, now, if those intended
Let it be granted, as it must and ought to be, that all principles of the minds of men, pretended to be from apprehensions of religion, that are in themselves inconsistent with any lawful government, in any place whatever, ought to be coerced and restrained; for our Lord Jesus Christ, sending his gospel to be preached and published in all nations and kingdoms of the world, then and at all times under various sorts of governments, all for the same end of public tranquillity and prosperity, did propose nothing in it but what a submission and obedience unto might be consistent with the government itself, of what sort soever it were. He came, as they used to sing of old, “to give men a heavenly kingdom, and not to deprive them or take from them their earthly temporal dominions.” There is, therefore, nothing more certain than that there is no principle of the religion taught by Jesus Christ which either in itself, or in the practice of it, is inconsistent with any righteous government on the earth. And if any opinions can truly and really be manifested so to be, I will be no advocate for them nor their abettors. But such as these our author shall never be able justly to affix on them whom he opposeth, nor the least umbrage of them, if he do but allow the gospel and the power of Christ to institute those spiritual ordinances, and require their administration, which do not, which cannot, extend unto any thing wherein a magistrate, as such, hath the least concernment in point of prejudice; for if, on a false or undue practice of them, any thing should be done that is not purely spiritual, or that, being done, should be esteemed to operate upon may of the outward concerns, relations, interests, or occasions of men, they may be restrained by the power of him who presides over public good.
But besides these pretences, our author, I know not how,
chargeth
For to what purpose is it to consider the frequent
occasions he takes to discourse about the ill tempers and humours of men,
or of inveighing against them for being “morose and ungentle, unsociable,
peevish, censorious,” with many other terms of reproach that do not at
present occur to my memory, nor are, doubtless, worth the searching after?
Suppose he hath the advantage of a better natural temper, have more sedate
affections, a more compliant humour, be more remote from giving or
receiving provocations, and have learned the ways of courtly deportment,
only was pleased to veil them all and every one in the writing of this
discourse, is it meet that they should be persecuted and destroyed, be
esteemed seditious, and I know not what, because they are of a natural
temper not so disposed to affability and sweetness of conversation as some
others are? For my part, I dislike the humour and temper of mind
characterized by our author,
Sect. v. pp. 155, 156, he inveighs against the events that
attend the permission of different sects of religion in a
commonwealth; and it is not denied but that some inconveniences may ensue
thereon. But, as himself hath well observed in another place, we do not in
these things inquire what is absolutely best, and what hath no
inconvenience attending it; but what is the best which, in our present
condition, we can attain unto, and what in that state answers the duty that
God requireth of us. Questionless, it were best that we should be all of
one mind in these things of God, and it is no doubt also our duty on all
hands to endeavour so to be; but seeing, “de facto,” this is not so, nor is it in the power of
men, when and how they will, to depose those persuasions of their minds and
dictates of their consciences from whence it is not so, on the one part or
the other (although in some parts of our differences some may do so and
will not, namely, in things acknowledged to be of no necessity antecedent
to their imposition, and some would do so and cannot), it is now inquired,
What is the best way to be steered in for the accomplishment of the desired
end of peace and tranquillity for the future, and maintaining love,
quietness, and mutual usefulness at present amongst men? Two ways are
proposed to this purpose. The one is, to exercise mutual forbearance to
each other whilst we are inevitably under the power of different
persuasions in these things, producing no practices that are either
injurious unto private men in their rights, or hurtful unto the state as to
public peace; endeavouring, in the meantime, by the evidence of truth, and
a conversation suited unto it, to win upon each other to a consent and
agreement in the things wherein we differ. The other is, by severe laws,
penalties, outward force, as imprisonments, mulcts, fines, banishments, or
capital punishments, to compel all men out of hand to a uniformity of
practice, whatever their judgments be to the contrary. Now, as the state
of things is amongst us, which of these ways is most suitable to the law of
our being and creation, the best principles of the nature of man, and those
which have the most evident resemblance
In the meantime, if men will make declamations upon their own surmises, jealousies, and suspicions of things which are either so indeed, that is, really surmised, or pretended to be so, for some private interests or advantages of their own, which no man can answer or remove; if they may fancy at their pleasure ghosts, goblins, fiends, walking sprights, seditions, drums, trumpets, armies, bears and tigers; every difference in religion, be it never so small, be the agreement amongst them that differ never so great; be it the visible, known, open interest of them that dissent from what is established to live quietly and peaceably, and to promote the good of the commonwealth wherein they live; do they profess that it is their duty, their principle, their faith and doctrine, to obey constantly their rulers and governors in all things not contrary to the mind of God, and pretend no such commands of his as should interfere in the least with their power in order to public tranquillity; do they offer all the security of their adherence to such declared principles as mankind is necessitated to be contented and satisfied with in things of their highest concernment; do they avow an especial sense of the obligation that is put upon them by their rulers when they are protected in peace; have they no concernment in any such political societies, combinations, interests as might alone give countenance unto any such disturbance; — all is one, every different opinion is press-money, and every sect is an army, although they be all and every one of them Protestants, of whom alone we do discourse, Other answer, therefore, I shall not return unto this part of our author’s arguing than what he gave of old, —
Only, I may add, that sundry of the instances our author
makes use of are false and unduly alleged; for what is here charged on
differences in and about religion, in reference unto public tranquillity,
might have been, yea, and was, charged on Christian religion for
three hundred years, and is so by many still on Protestancy, as
such; and that it were a very easy and facile task to set out the
pernicious evils of a compelled agreement in the practice of religion, and
those
An inquiry in this invective, tending to evince its reasonableness, is offered in p. 158, — namely, “Where there are divided interests in religion in the same kingdom, it is asked, how shall the prince behave himself towards them?” The answer thereunto is not, I confess, easy, because it is not easy to be understood what is intended by “divided interests in religion.” We will, therefore, lay that aside, and consider what really is amongst us, or may be, according to what we understand by these expressions. Suppose, then, that in the same profession of protestant religion, some different ways and observances in the outward worship of God should be allowed, and the persons concerned herein have no other, cannot be proved to have any other interest, with respect unto religion, but to “fear God and honour the king,” it is a very easy thing to return an answer to this inquiry: for, not entering into the profound political speculation of our author about “balancing of parties, or siding with this or that party,” where the differences themselves constitute no distinct parties, in reference to civil government and public tranquillity, let the prince openly avow, by the declaration of his judgment, his constant practice, his establishing of legal rights, disposing of public favours in places and preferments, that way of religion which himself owns and approves; and let him indulge and protect others of the same religion, for the substance of it, with what himself professeth, in the quiet and peaceable exercise of their consciences in the worship of God, keeping all dissenters within the bounds allotted to them, that none transgress them to the invasion of the rights of others; — and he may have both the reality and glory of religion, righteousness, justice, and all other royal virtues; which will render him like to Him whose vicegerent he is; and he will undoubtedly reap the blessed fruits of them in the industry, peaceableness, and loyalty of all his subjects whatever.
There are sundry things, in the close of this chapter,
objected against such a course of procedure, but those such as are all of
them resolved into a supposition that they who in any place or part of the
world desire liberty of conscience for the worship of God have indeed no
conscience at all; for it is thereon supposed, without farther evidence,
that they will thence fall into all wicked and unconscientious practices.
I shall make, as I said, no reply to such surmises. Christianity suffered
under them for many ages; Protestancy hath done so in sundry places for
many years; and those who now may do so must, as they did, bear the effects
of them as well as they are able. Only I shall say, first, Whatever is of
real inconvenience in this pretension, on the supposition of liberty of
conscience, is no way removed by taking away all
he is God, and not man.
Secondly, It is granted that the magistrate may and ought
to restrain all principles and outward practices that have any natural
tendency unto the disturbance of the peace; which being granted, and all
obligations upon dissenting parties being alone put upon them by the
supreme legislative and executive power of the kingdoms and nations of the
world, public tranquillity is, and will be, as well secured on that respect
as such things are capable of security in this world. All the longsome
discourse, therefore, which here ensues, — wherein all the evils that have
been in this nation are charged on liberty of conscience, from whence not
one of them did proceed, seeing there was no such thing granted until, upon
other civil and political accounts, the flood-gates were set open unto the
following calamities and confusions, — is of no use, nor unto any purpose
at all: for until it can be demonstratively proved that those who do
actually suffer, and are freely willing so to do (as far as the foregoing
otherwise lawful advantages, open unto them as well as others, may be so
called), and resolved to undergo what may farther, to their detriment, yea,
to their ruin, be inflicted on them, to preserve their consciences entire
unto some commands of God, have no respect unto others of as great evidence
and light to be his (as are those which concern their obedience unto
magistrates, compared with those which they avow about the worship of God);
and that private men, uninterested in, and incapable of, any pretence unto
public authority of any sort, do always think themselves warranted to do
such things as others have done, pleading right and authority for their
warranty; and until it be made manifest, also, that they have any other or
greater interest than to enjoy their particular conditions and estates in
peace, and to exercise themselves in the worship of God according as they
apprehend
And I could desire if these controversies must be farther debated, that our author would omit the pursuit of those things which are really ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, and, according to the ancient custom, attend ἄνευ προοιμίων καὶ παθῶν, without rhetorical prefaces or unreasonable passions, unto the merit of the cause. To this purpose I suppose it might not be amiss for him to consider a few sheets of paper lately published under the title of “A Case Stated,” etc, wherein he will find the main controversy reduced to its proper heads, and a modest provocation unto an answer to what is proposed about it.
The sixth chapter in this
discourse, — which is the last that at the present I shall call to any
account, as being now utterly wearied with the frequent occurrence of the
same things in various dresses, — is designed to the confutation of a
principle which is termed the “foundation of all Puritanism,” and that
wherein “the mystery of it” consisteth. Now this is, “That nothing ought
to be established in the worship of God but what is authorized by some
precept or example in the word of God, which is the complete and adequate
rule of worship.” Be it so that this principle is by some allowed, yea,
contended for, it will not be easy to affix a guilt upon them on the
account of its being so; for lay aside prejudices, corrupt interests, and
passions, and I am persuaded that at the first view, it will not seem to be
foreign unto what is in a hundred places declared and taught in the
Scripture. And certainly a man must be master of extraordinary projections
who can foresee all the evil, confusion, and desolation in the world, which
our author hath found out as inevitable consequences of its admittance. It
hath, I confess, been formerly disputed with colourable arguments,
pretences, and instances,
What then, I say, is the true sense and importance of that
which our author designs to oppose, according to the mind of them who
assert it? How impotent his attempts against it are for its removal shall
briefly be declared. In the meantime, I cannot but in the first place tell
him, that if by any means this principle, truly stated, as to the
expressions wherein it is before laid down, and the formal terms whereof it
consisteth, should be shaken or rendered dubious, yet that the way will not
be much the plainer or clearer for the introduction of his pretensions.
There are yet other general maxims
1. That whatever the Scripture hath indeed prescribed and
appointed to be done and observed in the worship of God and the government
of the church, that is indeed to be done and observed. This, they suppose,
will not be opposed; at least, they do not yet know, notwithstanding any
thing spoken or disputed in this discourse, any pretences on which it may
honestly so be. It is also, as I think, secured,
2. That nothing in conjunction with, nothing as an addition or supplement unto, what is so appointed ought to be admitted, if it be contrary either to the general rules or particular preceptive instructions of the Scripture. And this also, I suppose, will be granted; and if it be not freely, some are ready by arguments to extort the confession of it from them that shall deny it.
3. That nothing ought to be joined with or added unto what in the Scripture is prescribed and appointed in these things without some cogent reason, making such conjunction or addition necessary. Of what necessity may accrue unto the observation of such things by their prescription, we do not now dispute, but at present only desire to see the necessity of their prescription; and this can be nothing but some defect, in substance or circumstance, matter or manner, kind or form, in the institutions mentioned in the Scripture, as to their proper ends. Now, when this is discovered, I will not, for my part, much dispute by whom the supplement is to be made. In the meantime, I do judge it reasonable that there be some previous reasons assigned unto any additional prescriptions in the worship of God unto what is revealed in the Scripture, rendering the matter of those prescriptions antecedently necessary and reasonable.
4. That if any thing or things in this kind shall be found necessary to be added and prescribed, then that and those alone be so which are most consonant unto the general rules of the Scripture given us for our guidance in the worship of God, and the nature of those institutions themselves wherewith they are conjoined or whereunto they are added. And this also I suppose to be a reasonable request, and such as will be granted by all men who dare not advance their own wills and wisdom above or against the Will and wisdom of God.
Now, if, as was said, the general principle before
mentioned should by any means be duly removed, or could be so, or if
entangled or rendered dubious, yet, as far as I can learn, the
Nonconformists
The sum, in general, of what this author opposeth with so much clamour is, That divine revelation is the sole rule of divine religious worship; an assertion that, in its latitude of expression, hath been acknowledged in and by all nations and people. The very heathen admitted it of old, as shall be manifested, if need require, by instances sufficient; for though they framed many gods, in their foolish, darkened imaginations, yet they thought that every one of them would be worshipped according to his own mind, direction, and prescription. So did, and I think do, Christians generally believe. Only, some have a mind to pare this generally-avowed principle, to curb it, and order it so, by distinctions and restrictions, that it may serve their turn and consist with their interest; for an opposition unto it nakedly, directly, and expressly, few have had the confidence yet to make. And the Nonconformists need not go one step farther in the expression of their judgments and principles in this matter; for who shall compel them to take their adversaries’ distinctions (which have been invented and used by the most learned of them) of “substantial and accidental, proper and reductive, primitive and accessary, direct and consequential, intrinsic and circumstantial worship,” and the like, for the most part, unintelligible terms, in their application unto the state of the question? If men have a mind, let them oppose this thesis as laid down; if not, let them let it alone: and they who shall undertake the confirmation of it will no doubt carry it through the briers of those unscriptural distinctions. And that this author may be the better instructed in his future work, I shall give him a farther account of the terms of the assertion laid down.
Revelation is either ἐνδιάθετος or προφορικός, and containeth every discovery or
declaration that God hath made of himself or of his mind and will unto men.
Thus it is comprehensive of that concreated light which is in all men
concerning him and his will; for although we say that this is natural, and
is commonly contradistinguished
Hence, whatever is certainly from God, by the light of nature and instinct thereof declared so to be, is no less a certain rule of worship and obedience, so far forth as it is from him and concerneth those things, than any thing that comes from him by express vocal revelation. And this casts out of consideration a vain exception wherewith some men please themselves, as though the men of this opinion denied the admittance of what is from God, and by the light of nature discovered to be his mind and will. Let them once prove any thing in contest between them and their adversaries to be required, prescribed, exacted, or made necessary, by the light of nature, as the will of God revealed therein, and I will assure them that, as to my concern, there shall be an end to all difference about it. But yet, that I may add a little farther light into the sense of the Nonconformists in this matter, I say, —
1. That this inbred light of reason guides unto nothing at all in or about the worship of God, but what is more fully, clearly, and directly taught and declared in the Scripture. And this may easily be evinced, as from the untoward mixture of darkness and corruption that is befallen our primogenial, inbred principles of light and wisdom by the entrance of sin, so also from the end of the Scripture itself, which was to restore that knowledge of God and his mind which was lost by sin, and which might be as useful to man in his lapsed condition as the other was in his pure and uncorrupted estate. At present, therefore, I shall leave this assertion, in expectation of some instance, in matters great or small, to the contrary, before I suppose it be obnoxious to question or dispute.
2. As there can be no opposition nor contradiction between
the light of nature and inspired vocal or scriptural revelation, because
they are both from God, so if in any instance there should appear any such
thing unto us, neither faith nor reason can rest in that which is pretended
to be natural light, but must betake themselves for their resolution unto
express revelation. And the reason hereof is evident, — because nothing is
natural light but what is common to all men, and where it is
denied, it is frustrated as to its ruling efficacy. Again; it is mixed, as
we said before, and it is not every man’s work to separate the chaff from
the wheat, or what God hath implanted in the mind of man when he made him
upright, and what is since soaked into the principles of his nature from
his own inventions.
3. Our inquiry in our present contest is solely about instituted worship, which we believe to depend on supernatural revelation. The light of nature can no way relieve or guide us in it or about it, because it refers universally to things above and beyond that light; but only with reference unto those moral, natural circumstances, which appertain unto those actings or actions of men whereby it is performed, which we willingly submit unto its guidance and direction.
Again, vocal revelation hath come under two considerations:— First, As it was occasional. Secondly, As it became stated.
First, As it was occasional. For a long time God was pleased to guide his church in many concerns of his worship by fresh occasional revelations, even from the giving of the first promise unto Adam unto the solemn giving of the law by Moses; for although men had, in process of time, many stated revelations, that were preserved by tradition among them, as the first promise, the institution of sacrifices, and the like, yet as to sundry emergencies of his worship, and parts of it, God guided them by new occasional revelations. Now, those revelations being not recorded in the Scripture, as being only for present or emergent use, we have no way to know them but by what those to whom God was pleased so to reveal himself did practice, and which, on good testimony, found acceptance with him. Whatever they so did, they had especial warranty from God for; which is the case of the great institution of sacrifices itself, It is a sufficient argument that they were divinely instituted, because they were graciously accepted.
Secondly, Vocal revelation, as the rule of worship, became
stated and invariable in and by the giving and writing of the law. From
thence, with the allowances before mentioned, we confine it to the
Scripture, and so unto all succeeding generations. I confess, many of our
company, who have kept to us hitherto in granting divine revelation to be
the sole principle and rule of religious worship, now leave us, and betake
themselves to paths of their own. The postmisnical The reference is to the
Mishna, or the collection of oral traditions, which profess to be a comment
on the laws of Moses. The collection of them is ascribed to
By “religious worship,” in the thesis above, we understand, as was said before, instituted worship only, and not that which is purely moral and natural; which, in many instances of it, hath a great coincidence with the light of nature, as was before discoursed.
We understand also the solemn or stated worship of the church of God. That worship, I say, which is solemn and stated for the church, the whole church, at all times and seasons, according to the rules of his appointment, is that which we inquire after. Hence, in this matter we have no concernment in the fact of this or that particular person which might be occasionally influenced by necessity, as David’s eating of the shew-bread was, and which how far it may excuse or justify the persons that act thereon, or regulate their actions directly, I know not, nor am any way engaged to inquire.
This is the state of our question in hand, the mind of the assertion, which is here so hideously disguised and represented in its pretended consequences. Neither do I think there is any thing needful farther to be added unto it; but yet, for the clearing of it from mistakes, something may be discoursed which relates unto it. We say, then, —
Secondly, By “all the concernments of religious worship,” which any affirm that they must be directed in by divine revelation or regulated by the Scripture, they intend all that is religious, or whatever belongs to the worship of God, as it is divine worship; and not what belongs unto the actions wherein and whereby it is performed, as they are actions.
Thirdly, That when any part of worship is instituted in special, and general rules are given for the practice of it, “hic et nunc,” there the warranty is sufficient for its practice at its due seasons; and for those seasons, the nature of the thing itself, with what it hath respect unto, and the light of the general Scripture rules, will give them an acceptable determination.
And these few observations will abundantly manifest the
impertinency of those who think it incumbent on any, by virtue of the
principle before laid down, to produce express warranty in words of
Scripture for every circumstance that doth attend and belong unto
the actions whereby the worship of God is performed, which as they require
not, so no such thing is included in the principle as duly stated. For
particular circumstances that have respect to good order, decency, and
external regulation of divine worship, they are all of them either
circumstances of the actions themselves whereby divine
I know there are usually sundry exceptions put in to this thesis, as before stated and asserted, and instances to the contrary are pretended, some whereof are touched upon by our author, p. 181, which are not now particularly and at large to be considered. But yet, because I am, beyond expectation, engaged in the explication of this principle, I shall set it so far forth right and straight unto farther examination as to give in such general observations as, being consistent with it and explanatory of it, will serve to obviate the most of the exceptions that are laid against it; as, —
1. Wherever in the Scripture we meet with any religious duty that had a preceding institution, although we find not expressly a consequent approbation, we take it for granted that it was approved; and so, on the contrary, where an approbation appears, an institution is concealed.
2. The question being only about religious duties, or things pertaining to or required in or about the worship of God, no exception against the general thesis can take place but such as consists in things directly of that nature. Instances in and about things civil and belonging merely to human conversation, or things natural, as signs and memorials one of another, are in this matter of no consideration.
3. Things extraordinary in their performance, and which, for aught we know, may have been so in their warranty or rule, have no place in our debate: for we are inquiring only after such things as may warrant a suitable practice in us without any farther authority, which is the end for which instances against this principle are produced; this actions extraordinary will not do.
4. Singular and occasional actions, which may be variously influenced and regulated by present circumstances, are no rule to guide the ordinary stated worship of the church. David’s eating of the shew-bread, wherein he was justified because of his hunger and necessity, was not to be drawn into example of giving the shew-bread promiscuously to the people. And sundry instances to the same purpose are given by our Saviour himself.
5. There is nothing of any dangerous or bad consequence in
this whole controversy, but what lies in the imposition on men’s practices
of the observation of uncommanded rites, making them necessary unto them in
their observation. The things themselves are said in their own nature,
antecedent to their injunction for practice, to be
6. Where things are instituted of God, and he himself makes an alteration in or of his own institutions, those institutions may be lawfully practised and observed until the mind of God for their alteration and abolition be sufficiently revealed, proposed, and confirmed unto them that are concerned in them; for as the making of a law doth not oblige until and without the promulgation of it, so as that any should offend in not yielding obedience unto it, so upon the abrogation of a law, obedience may be conscientiously and without sin yielded unto that law, until the abrogation, by what act soever it was made, be notified and confirmed. An instance hereof we have in the observation of Mosaical rites, in the forbearance of God, after the law of their institution was enervated and the obligation of it unto obedience really dissolved, at least the foundation of it laid, for the actual dissolution of it depended on the declaration of the fact wherein it was founded.
7. There may be a coincidence of things performed by sundry
persons at the same time and in the same place, whereof some may have
respect unto religious worship directly, and so belong unto it, and others
only occasionally, and so not at all belong thereunto; as if, when the
Athenians had been worshipping at their altars, St Paul had come, and
reading the inscription of one of them, and thence taking occasion and
advantage to preach “the unknown God” unto
8. Many things which are mere natural circumstances, requisite unto the performance of all actions whatever in communities, and so to be ordered by prudence according unto general rules of the word of God, may seem to be adjuncts of worship, unless they are followed to their original, which will discover them to be of another nature.
9. Civil usages and customs observed in a religious manner, — as they are all to be by them that believe, and directed by them unto moral ends, — may have a show and appearance of religious worship, and so, according to the principle before stated, require express institution; but although they belong unto our living unto God in general, as do all things that we do, seeing “whether we eat or drink, we are to do all to the glory of God,” and therefore are to be done in faith, yet they are, or may be, no part of instituted worship, but such actions of life as in our whole course we are to regulate by the rules of the Scripture, so far as they afford us guidance therein.
10. Many observances in and about the worship of God are
recorded in the Scripture without especially reflecting any blame or crime
on them by whom they were performed (as many great sins are historically
only related, and left to be judged by the rule of the word in other
places, without the least remark of displeasure on the persons guilty of
them), and that by such whose persons were accepted of God; yea, it may be
in that very service wherein, less or more, they failed in their
observation, God being merciful to them, though not in all things prepared
according to the preparation of the sanctuary; and yet the things
themselves not to be approved or justified, but condemned of God. Such was
the fact of
This little search have I made into this “great mystery,”
as it is called, “of Puritanism,” after which so mighty an outcry is raised
by this author; and if it might be here farther pursued, it would, as
stated by us in these general rules and explications, be fully manifested
to be a principle in general admitted, until of late, by all sorts of men,
some few only having been forced sometimes to corrupt it for the security
of some especial interest of their own. And it were an easy thing to
confirm this assertion by the testimonies of the most learned protestant
writers that have served the church in the last ages. But I know how with
many amongst us they are regarded, and that the citation of some of the
most reverend names among them is not unlikely to prejudice and
disadvantage the cause wherein
Neither is this opinion of so late a date as our author and
others would persuade their credulous followers. The full sense of it was
spoken out roundly of old. So speaks the great
First, therefore, pp. 174, 175, he reviles it as “a pretence wild and humorsome, which men must be absurd if they believe, or impudent if they do not, seeing it hath not the least shadow or foundation either from Scripture or reason;” though it be expressly asserted, either in its own terms, or confirmed by direct deductions, in and from above forty places of Scripture. And so much for that part of the assault.
The next chargeth it with infinite follies and mischiefs in those which allow it, and it is said that “there can never be an end of alterations and disturbances in the church whilst it is maintained;” the contrary whereof is true, confirmed by experience and evidence of the thing itself. The admittance of it would put an end to all disturbances; for let any man judge whether, if there be matters in difference, as in all these things there are and ever were, the bringing them to an issue and settled stability be not likelier to be effected by all men’s consenting unto one common rule, whereby they may be tried and examined, than that every party should be left at liberty to indulge to their own affections and imaginations about them. And yet we are told, p. 178, “that all the pious villanies that ever have disturbed the Christian world have sheltered themselves in this grand maxim, that Jesus Christ is the only lawmaker to his church.” I confess I could heartily desire that such expressions might be forborne; for let what pretence men please be given to them and colour put upon them, they are full of scandal to Christian religion. The maxim itself here traduced is as true as any part of the gospel; and it cannot be pretended that it is not the maxim itself, but the abuse of it (as all the principles of the gospel, through the blindness and lusts of men, have been abused), that is reflected on, seeing the design of the whole discourse is to evert the maxim itself. Now, whatever apprehensions our author may have of his own abilities, I am satisfied that they are no way competent to disprove this principle of the gospel, as will be evident on the first attempt he shall make to that purpose; let him begin the trial as soon as he pleaseth.
But this principle is farther charged with “mischief equal
to its folly;” which is proved by instances in sundry uninstituted
observances, both in the Jewish and primitive Christian churches, as also
in protestant churches abroad. I answer, that if this author will consent
to umpire these differences by either the Old or New Testament, or by any
protestant church in the world, we shall be nearer an end of them than, as
far as I can see, yet otherwise we are. If he will not be bound neither to
the example of the church of the Jews, nor of the churches of the New
Testament, nor of the present protestant churches, it must be confessed
that their names are here made use of only for a pretence and an advantage.
Under the Old Testament we find that all that God required of his church
was, that they should “remember the law of Moses his servant, which he
commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel, with the statutes and
judgments,”
A removal of the argument taken from the perfection of the Scripture, and its sufficiency to instruct us in the whole counsel and will of God, concerning his worship and our obedience unto him, is nextly attempted; but with no engines but what have been discovered to be insufficient to that purpose a hundred times. It is alleged, “That what the Scripture commands in the worship of God is to be observed, that what it forbids is to be avoided;” which if really acknowledged, and a concernment of the consciences of men be granted therein, is sufficiently destructive of the principal design of our author. But, moreover, I say that it commands and forbids things by general rules, as well as by particular precepts and inhibitions; and that if what is so commanded be observed, and what is so forbidden be avoided, there is a direct rule remaining in it for the whole worship of God.
But this is said here to be of “substantial duties, but not of external circumstances;” and if it be so even of substantial duties, it perfectly overthrows all that our author hath been pleading in the first three chapters of his discourse. For external circumstances, of what nature those are which are disposable by human authority and prudence hath been now often declared, and needs not here to be repeated.
Once more, therefore; what is commanded in the worship of God is lawful, yea, is our duty to observe. All particular instances of this sort that are to have actual place in the worship of God were easily enumerated, and so expressly commanded; and why, among sundry things that might equally belong thereunto, one should be commanded, and another left at liberty without any institution, no man can divine. Of particular things not to be observed there is not the same reason. It is morally impossible that all instances of men’s inventions, all that they can find out to introduce into the worship of God, at any time, in any age, and please themselves therein, should be beforehand enumerated and prohibited in their particular instances. And if, because they are not so forbidden, they may lawfully be introduced into divine worship, and imposed upon the practice of men, ten thousand things may be made lawful and be so imposed. But the truth is, although a particular prohibition be needful to render a thing evil in itself, a general prohibition is enough to render any thing unlawful in the worship of God. So we grant that what is not forbidden is lawful, but withal say that every thing is forbidden that should be esteemed as any part of divine worship that is not commanded; and if it were not, yet for want of such a command or divine institution, it can have neither use nor efficacy with respect to the end of all religious worship.
Our author speaks with his wonted confidence in this
matter; yea, it seems to rise to its highest pitch, as also doth his
contempt of his adversaries or whatever is or may be offered by them in the
justification of this principle. “Infinite certainty” on his own part, p.
193, “baffled and intolerable impertinencies, weak and puny arguments,
cavils of a few hot-headed and brain-sick people,” with other opprobrious
expressions of the like nature, filling up a great part of his leaves, are
what he can afford unto those whom he opposeth. But yet I am not, for all
this bluster, well satisfied, much less “infinitely certain,” that he doth
in any competent measure understand aright the controversy about which he
treats with all this wrath
Section 6, from the concession that the “magistrate may
take care that the laws of Christ be executed,” — that is, command and
require his subjects to observe the commands of Christ in that way and by
such means as those commands, from the nature of the things themselves, and
according to the rule of the gospel, may be commanded and required, — he
infers that he hath himself power of making laws in religion! But why so?
and how doth this follow? Why, saith he, “It is apparently implied,
because whoever hath a power to see that laws be executed cannot be without
a power to command their execution.” Very good: but the conclusion should
have been, “He cannot be without a power to make laws in the matter about
which he looks to the execution;” which would be good doctrine for justices
of the peace to follow. But what is here laid down is nothing but
repeating of the same thing in words a little varied; as if it had been
said, “He that hath power to see the laws executed, or a power to command
their execution, he hath power to see the laws executed, or a power to
command their execution;” which is very true. And this we acknowledge the
magistrate hath, in the way before declared. But that, because he may do
this, he may also make laws of his own in religion, it doth not at all
follow from hence, whether it be true or no. But this is farther confirmed
from “the nature of the laws of Christ, which have only declared the
substance and morality of religious worship, and therefore must needs have
left the ordering of its circumstances to the power and wisdom of lawful
authority.” “The laws of Christ” which are intended are those which he
hath given concerning the worship of God. That these have “determined the
morality of religious worship,” I know not how he can well allow, who makes
the law of nature to be the measure of morality and all moral religious
worship. And for “the substance of religious worship,” I wish it were well
declared what is
But to institute mystical rites and fixed forms of sacred administrations, whereof nothing in the like kind doth necessarily attend the acting of instituted worship, is not to determine circumstances, but to ordain new parts of divine worship; and such injunctions are here confessed by our author, p. 191, to be “new and distinct commands by themselves,” and to enjoin something that the Scripture nowhere commands: which when he produceth a warranty for, he will have made a great progress towards the determining of the present controversy.
Page 192, he answers an objection, consisting of two
branches, as by him proposed, whereof the first is, “That it cannot stand
with the love and wisdom of God not to take order himself for all things
that immediately concern his own worship and kingdom.” Now, though I doubt
not at all but that God hath so done, yet I do not remember at present that
I have read [of] any imposing the necessity hereof upon him in answer to
his love and wisdom. I confess
The other part of the objection which he proposeth to
himself is laid down by him in these words: “If Jesus Christ have not
determined all particular rites and circumstances of religion, he hath
discharged his office with less wisdom and fidelity than Moses, who ordered
every thing appertaining to the worship of God, even as far as the pins or
nails of the tabernacle.” And hereunto in particular he returns in answer
not one word, but only ranks it amongst idle and impertinent reasonings.
And I dare say he wants not reasons for his silence; whether they be
pertinent or no I know not: for setting aside the advantage that, it is
possible, he aimed to make in the manner and terms of the proposal of this
objection to his sentiments, it will appear that he hath not much to offer
for its removal. We dispute not about the “rites and circumstances of
religion, which are terms ambiguous, and, as hath been declared, may be
variously interpreted, no more than we do about the “nails of the
tabernacle,” wherein there were none at all; but it is about the worship of
God, and what is necessary thereunto. The ordering hereof, — that is, of
the house of God and all things belonging thereunto, — was committed to
Jesus Christ, “as a Son over his own house,”
Section 7, an account is given of the great variety of circumstances which do attend all human actions, whence it is impossible that they should be all determined by,divine prescription. The same we say also; but add withal, that if men would leave these circumstances free, under the conduct of common prudence, in the instituted worship of God, as they are compelled so to do in the performance of moral duties, and as he himself hath left them free, it would be as convenient for the reasons and consciences of men as an attempt to the contrary. Thus, we have an instance given us by our author in the moral duty of charity, which is commanded us of God himself; but the times, seasons, manner, objects, measures of it are left free, to be determined by human prudence upon emergencies and occasions. It may be now inquired whether the magistrate, or any other, can determine those circumstances by a law? or whether they are not, as by God, so by all wise men, left free, under the conduct of their reason and conscience who are obliged to do the duty itself by the command of God? And why may not the same rule and order be observed with respect to the circumstances that attend the performance of the duties of instituted worship? Besides, there are general circumstances that are capable of a determination, — such are time and place as naturally considered, — without such adjuncts as might give them a moral consideration, or render them good or evil; these the magistrate may determine: but for particular circumstances attending individual actions, they will hardly be regulated by a standing law. But none of these things have the least interest in our debate. To add things necessarily to be observed in the worship of God, no way naturally related unto the actions wherewith prescribed worship is to be performed, and then to call them circumstances thereof, erects a notion of things which nothing but interest can digest and concoct.
His eighth section is unanswerable. It contains such a
strenuous reviling of the Puritans, and contemptuous reproaches of their
writings, with such encomiums of their adversaries, as there is no dealing
with it; and so I leave it. And so likewise I do his ninth, wherein, as he
saith, he “upbraids the men of his contest with their shameful overthrows,
and dares them to look those enemies in the face that have so lamentably
cowed them by so many absolute triumphs and victories:” which kind of
juvenile exultations on feigned suppositions will, I suppose, in due time
receive an alloy from his own more advised thoughts and considerations.
The instance wherewith he countenanceth himself in his triumphant
acclamations unto the victory of his party is the book of
The next sections treat concerning superstition,
will-worship, and Popery; which, as he saith, having been
charged by some on the church unduly, he retorts the crime of them upon the
authors of that charge. I love not to strive, nor will I contend about
words that may have various significations fixed on them. It is about
things that we differ. That which is evil is so, however you call it, and
whether you can give it any special name or no. That which is good will
still be so, call it what and how men please. The giving of a bad or
odious name to any thing doth not make itself to be bad or odious. The
managing, therefore, of those appellations, either as to their charge or
recharge, I am no way concerned in. When it is proved that men believe,
teach, or practice otherwise than in duty to God they ought to do, then
they do evil; and when they obey his mind and will in all things, then they
do well, and in the end will have the praise thereof. In particular, I
confess superstition, as the word is commonly used, denotes a vicious habit
of mind with respect unto God and his worship, and so is not a proper
denomination for the worship itself, or of any evil or crime in it; but
yet, if it were worth contending about, I could easily manifest that,
according to the use of the word by good authors, in all ages men have been
charged with that crime from the kind and nature of the worship itself
observed by them. And when St Paul charged the Athenians with an excess in
superstition, it was from the multiplication of their gods, and thronging
them together, right or wrong, in the dedication of their altars. But
these things belong not at all to our present design. Let them who enjoin
things unto an indispensable necessary observation in the worship of God,
which are not by him prescribed therein, take care of their own minds that
they be free from the vice of superstition, and they shall never be judged
or charged by me therewith; though I must say that a multiplication of
instances in this kind, as to their own observation, is the principal if
not the only way whereby men who own the true and proper object of
religious worship
And the whole question in this matter is not, Whether, as it is here phrased, “God hath tied up his creatures to nice and pettish laws, laying a greater stress upon a doubtful or indifferent ceremony than upon the great duty of obedience?” but merely, Whether men are to observe in the worship of God what they apprehend he hath enjoined them, and to abstain from what he doth forbid, according to all the light that they have into his mind and will? which inquiry, as I suppose, may be [thus] satisfied, — that they are so to practice and so to abstain, without being liable to the charge of superstition. No man can answer for the minds of other men, nor know what depraved, vicious habits and inclinations they are subject unto. Outward actions are all that we are, in any case, allowed to pass judgment upon, and of men’s minds as those actions are indications of them. Let men, therefore, observe and do in the worship of God whatever the Lord Christ hath commanded them, and abstain from what he hath forbidden, whether in particular instances or by general directive precepts and rules, — by which means alone many things are capable of falling under a prohibition, without the least thought of placing any worship of God in their abstinence from this or that thing in particular, — and I think they need not much concern themselves in the charge of superstition given in or out by any against them.
For what is discoursed, section 11, about will-worship, I
cannot so far agree with our author as I could in what passed before about
superstition; and that partly because I cannot discern him to be herein at
any good agreement with himself: for “superstition,” he tells us, “consists
in the apprehensions of men, when their minds are possessed with weak and
uncomely conceits of God,” p. 201; here, that “will-worship consists in
nothing else than in men’s making their own fancies and inventions
necessary parts of religion,” which outward actings are not coincident with
the inward frame and habit of mind before described. And I do heartily
wish that some men could well free themselves from the charge of
will-worship, as it is here described by
The ensuing paragraphs about “Christian liberty, adding to
the commands of God, and Popery,” are of the same nature with those
preceding about superstition and will-worship. There is nothing new in
them but words, and they may be briefly passed through. For the charge of
Popery, on the one side or other, I know nothing in it, but that when any
thing is enjoined or imposed on men’s practice in the worship of God, which
is known to have been invented in and by the papal church during the time
of its confessed apostasy, it must needs beget prejudices against it in the
minds of them who consider the ways, means, and ends of the fatal defection
of that church, and are jealous of a sinful compliance with it in any of
those things. The recharge on those who are said “to set up a pope in
every man’s conscience, whilst they vest it with a power of countermanding
the decrees of princes,” — if no more be intended by “countermanding’’ but
a refusal to observe their decrees and yield obedience to them in things
against their consciences, which is all that can be pretended, — if it fall
not on this author himself, as in some cases it doth, and which, by the
certain conduct of right reason, must be extended
The same is to be said concerning Christian liberty. No
man, that I know of, makes “things indifferent to be sinful,” as is
pretended, nor can any man in his right wits do so; for none can
The close of this chapter is designed to the removal of an
objection, pretended to be weighty and difficult, but indeed made so merely
by the novel opinions advanced by this author; for, laying aside all
respect unto some uncouth principles broached in this discourse, there is
scarce a Christian child of ten years old but can resolve the difficulty
pretended, and that according to the mind of God: for it is supposed that
the magistrate may “establish a worship that is idolatrous and
superstitious,” and an inquiry is made thereon what the subject shall do in
that case? Why, where lies the difficulty? “Why,” saith he, “in this case
they must be either rebels or idolaters. If they obey, they sin against
God; if they disobey, they sin against their sovereign.” According to the
principles hitherto received in Christian religion, any one would reply and
say, No: for it is certain that men must obey God, and not contract the
guilt of such horrible sins as idolatry and superstition; but in so doing
they are neither rebels against their ruler nor do sin against him. It is
true, they must quietly and patiently submit to what they may suffer from
him, but they are in so doing guilty of no rebellion or sin against him.
Did ever any Christian yet so much as call it into question whether the
primitive Christians were rebels, and sinned against their rulers, because
they would not obey those edicts whereby they established idolatrous
worship? or did any one ever think that they had a difficult case of
conscience to resolve in that matter? They were, indeed, accused by the
Pagans as rebels against the emperors; but no Christian ever yet thought
their case
But our author hath elsewhere provided a full solution of
this difficulty, chap. viii. p. 308, where he tells us, “That in cases and
disputes of a public concern, private men are not properly ‘sui juris;’ they have no power over their actions;
they are not to be directed by their own judgments, or determined by their
own wills, but by the commands and determinations of the public conscience;
and if there be any sin in the command, he that imposed it shall answer for
it, and not I, whose duty it is to obey. The commands of authority will
warrant my obedience; my obedience will hallow or at least excuse my
action, and so secure me from sin, if not from error, because I follow the
best guide and most probable direction I am capable of; and though I may
mistake, my integrity shall preserve my innocence; and in all doubtful and
disputable cases, it is better to err with authority than to be in the
right against it.” When he shall produce any one divine writer, any of the
ancient fathers, any sober schoolmen or casuists, any learned modern
divines, speaking at this rate,
Besides, suppose men should be willing to accept of this
condition of renouncing their own understandings and judgments from being
their guides as to their moral actions, I fear it will be found that indeed
they are not able so to do. Men’s understandings and their consciences are
placed in them by him who made them, to rule in them and over their actions
in his name, and with respect unto their dependence on him; and let men
endeavour it whilst they please, they shall never be able utterly to cast
off this yoke of God and destroy this order of things, which is by him
inlaid in the principles of all rational beings. Men, whilst they are men,
in things that have a moral good or evil in them or adhering to them, must
be guided and determined by their own understandings whether they will or
no; and if by any means they stifle the actings of them at present, they
will not avoid that judgment which, according to them, shall pass upon them
at the last day. But these things may elsewhere be farther pursued. In
the meantime, the reader may take this case as it is determined by the
learned prelate before mentioned, in his dialogue about subjection and
obedience, against the Papists, whose words are as follow. Part iii. p. 297:— “
Philand. If the prince establish any religion, whatever it be, you
must by your oath obey it. Theoph. We must not rebel and take arms
against the prince, but with reverence and humility serve God before the
prince; and that is nothing against our oath. Philand. Then is not
the prince supreme. Theoph. Why so? Philand. Yourselves are
superior, when you serve whom you list. Theoph. As though to serve
God according to his will were to serve whom we list, and not whom princes
and all others ought to serve. Philand. But you will be judges when
God is well served, and when not. Theoph. If you can excuse us
before God when you mislead us, we will serve him as you shall appoint us;
otherwise, if every man shall answer for himself, good reason he be master
of his own conscience in that which toucheth him so near, and no man shall
excuse him for. Philand. This is to make every man supreme judge of
religion. Theoph. The
The sole inquiry remaining is, Whether the magistrate,
having established such a religion as is idolatrous or superstitious, may
justly and lawfully punish and destroy his subjects for their
non-compliance therewithal? This is that which, if I understand him, our
author would give countenance unto, contrary to the common sense of all
Christians, yea, of common sense itself; for whereas he interweaves his
discourse with suppositions that men may mistake in religion and abuse it,
all such interpositions are purely sophistical, seeing the case proposed to
resolution, which ought in the whole to be precisely attended unto, is
about the refusal to observe and practise a religion idolatrous or
superstitions. Of the like nature is that argument which alone he makes
use of here and elsewhere to justify his principles, — namely, the
necessity of government, and how much better the worst government is and
the most depraved in its administration than anarchy or confusion; for as
this by all mankind is unquestioned, so I do not think there is any one
among them who can tell how to use this concession to our author’s purpose.
Doth it follow that because magistrates cannot justly or righteously
prescribe an idolatrous religion, and compel their subjects to the
profession and obedience of it, and because the subjects cannot nor ought
to yield obedience therein, because of the antecedent and superior power of
God over them, therefore anarchy or confusion must be preferred before such
an administration of government? Let the magistrate command; what he will
in religion, yet, whilst he attends unto the ends of all civil government,
that government must needs be every way better than none, and is by private
Christians to be borne with and submitted unto, until God in his providence
shall provide relief. The primitive Christians lived some ages in the
condition described, refusing to observe the religion required by law, and
exercising themselves in the worship of God, which was strictly forbidden;
and yet neither anarchy, nor confusion, nor any disturbance of public
tranquillity did ensue thereon. So did the Protestants here in England in
the days of
But our author proceeds to find out many pretences on the
account whereof persons whom he acknowledgeth to be innocent and guiltless
may be punished; and though their “apprehensions in religion be not,” as he
saith, “so much their crime as their infelicity, yet there is no remedy,
but it must expose them to the public rods and axes,” p. 219. I have heard
of some wise and righteous princes, who have affirmed that they had rather
let twenty guilty persons go free than punish or destroy one that was
innocent. This seems to render them more like Him whose vicegerents they
are than to seek out colourable reasons for the punishment of them whom
they know to be innocent; which course is here suggested unto them. Such
advice might be welcome to him whom men called πηλὸν αἵματι πεφυραμένον, — “clay mingled and leavened
with blood;” others, no doubt, will abhor it and detest it. But what
spirit of meekness and mercy our author is acted by he discovereth in the
close of this chapter, p. 223; for, saith he, “it is easily imaginable how
an honest and well-meaning man may, through mere ignorance, fall into such
errors, which, though God will pardon, yet governors must punish. His
integrity may expiate the crime, but cannot prevent the mischief of his
error. Nay, so easy is it for men to deserve to be punished for their
consciences, that there is no nation in the world in which (were government
rightly understood and duly managed) mistakes
But I find myself, utterly beside and beyond my intention,
engaged in particular controversies; and finding, by the prospect I have
taken of what remains in the treatise under consideration, that it is of
the same nature and importance with what is past, and a full continuation
of those opprobrious reproaches of them whom he opposeth, and open
discoveries of earnest desires after their trouble and ruin, which we have
now sufficiently been inured unto, I shall choose rather here to break off
this discourse than farther to pursue the ventilation of those differences,
wherein I shall not willingly or of choice at any time engage. Besides,
what is in the whole discourse of especial and particular controversy may
be better handled apart by itself, as probably ere long it will be, if this
new representation of old pretences, quickened by invectives, and improved
beyond all bounds and measures formerly fixed or given unto them, be judged
to deserve a particular consideration. In the meantime, this author is
more concerned than I to consider whether those bold incursions that he
hath made upon the ancient boundaries and
To close up this discourse: The principal design of the
treatise thus far surveyed is, to persuade or seduce sovereign princes or
supreme magistrates unto two evils, that are indeed inseparable, and
equally pernicious to themselves and others. The one of these is, to
invade or usurp the throne of God; and the other, to behave themselves
therein unlike him; — and where the one leads the way, the other will
assuredly follow. The empire over religion, the souls and consciences of
men in the worship of God, hath hitherto been esteemed to belong unto God
alone, to be a peculiar jewel in his glorious diadem; neither can it spring
from any other fountain but absolute and infinite supremacy, such as
belongs to him, as he hath alone, who is the first cause and last end of
all. All attempts to educe it from or resolve it into any other principle
are vain, and will prove abortive. But here the sons of men are enticed to
say, with him of old, “We will ascend into heaven; we will exalt our throne
above the stars of God; we will sit upon also the mount of the
congregation, in the sides of the north; we will ascend above the heights
of the clouds; we will be like the Most High.” For wherein can this be
effected? What ladders have men to climb personally into heaven? and who
shall attend them in their attempt? It is an assuming of a dominion over
the souls and consciences of men in the worship of God wherein and whereby
this may be pretended, and therein alone. And all this description of the
invasion of the throne of God, whence he who did so is compared to Lucifer,
who sought supremacy in heaven, is but the setting up of his power in and
over the church in its worship, which was performed in the temple, the
mount of the congregation, and in Zion, on the north of the city of
Jerusalem,
Power, they say, is a liquor that, let it be put into what
vessel you will, is ready to overflow; and as useful as it is, — as nothing
is more to mankind in this world, — yet when it is not accompanied with a
due proportion of wisdom and goodness, it is troublesome, if not
pernicious, to them concerned in it. The power of God is infinite, and his
sovereignty absolute; but the whole exercise of these glorious, dreadful
properties of his nature is regulated by wisdom and goodness, no less
infinite than themselves. And as he hath all power over the souls and
consciences of men, so he exercises it with that goodness, grace, clemency,
patience, and forbearance, which I hope we are all sensible of. If there
be any like him, equal unto him, in these things, I will readily submit the
whole of my religion and conscience unto him, without the least hesitation.
And if God, in his dominion and rule over the souls and consciences of
men, do exercise all patience, benignity, long-suffering, and mercy, — for
“it is of his compassion that we are not consumed,” — doth he not declare
that none is meet to be intrusted with that power and rule but they who
have these things like himself; at least, that in what they are or may be
concerned in it, they express and endeavour to answer his example? Indeed,
sovereign princes and supreme magistrates are God’s vicegerents, and are
called gods on the earth, to represent his power and authority unto men in
government, within the bounds prefixed by himself unto them, which are the
most extensive that the nature of things is capable of; and in so doing, to
conform themselves and their actings to him and his, as he is the great
monarch, the prototype of all rule and the exercise of it, in justice,
goodness, clemency, and benignity, that so the whole of what they do may
tend to the relief, comfort, refreshment, and satisfaction of mankind,
walking in the ways of peace and innocency, in answer unto the ends of
their rule, — is their
Those, therefore, who can prevail with magistrates to take
the power of God over religion, and the souls of men in their observance of
it, need never fear that when they have so done they will imitate him in
his patience, clemency, meekness, forbearance, and benignity; for they are
no way capable of these things in a due proportion to that power which is
not their own, however they may be eminently furnished for that which is
so. Thus have we known princes (such as
Magistrates need not fear but that the open wickedness and
bloody crimes of men will supply them with objects to be examples and
testimonies of their justice and severity. And methinks it should not be
judged an unequal petition by them who rule in the stead and fear of God,
that those who are innocent in their lives, useful in their callings and
occasions, peaceable in the Lord, might not be exposed to trouble only
because they design and endeavour, according to their light, which they are
invincibly persuaded to be from God himself, to take care that they perish
not eternally. However, I know I can mind them of advice which is ten
thousand times more their interest to attend unto than to any that is
tendered in the treatise we have had under consideration, and it is that
given by a king unto those that should partake of the like royal authority
with himself:
And what is it that we treat about? What is it that a
little truce
However, a work of reformation was carried on in the world,
and succeeded in many places; in none more eminently than in this nation
wherein we live. That the end aimed at, which was professedly the
reduction of religion to its ancient beauty and glory in truth and worship,
But to return, for these things may better elsewhere be
complained of, seeing they relate only to particular persons: That what is
done in reformation be established, that any farther public work of the
same nature attempted, or the retrievement of what is done to its original
condition and estate, belongs to the determination of the supreme
magistrate, and to that alone. Private persons have no call, no warrant to
attempt any thing unto these purposes. However, many there are who dislike
some ecclesiastical constitutions and modes of outward worship, which have
been the matter of great contests from the first reformation, but much more
dislike the degeneracy from the spirit, way, and principles of the first
reformers before mentioned, which in some at present they apprehend. And,
therefore, though many seem to be at a great distance from the present
established forms of the church of England, yet certainly all who are
humble and peaceable, when they shall see the ministry of the church, as in
former days, in some measure acted rightly and zealously towards the known
ends of it, and such as are undeniably by all acknowledged, — namely, the
conviction of the world, the conversion of souls, and the edification of
them that do believe; and the discipline of it exercised in a conformity at
least to the rule of the discipline of the secular powers of the earth, —
“Not to be a terror to the good, but to them that do evil;” and in these
things a demonstration of the meekness, humility, patience, forbearance,
condescension to the weakness, mistakes, errings and wanderings of others,
which the gospel doth as plainly and
Now, in these things, in their principle, or in their
management of it, it may be they are mistaken, it may be they are in an
error, or under many mistakes and errors; but from their integrity they
know themselves innocent, even in their mistakes. And it is in the nature
of men to think strange of sedate violences, that befall them without their
demerit, and of suffering by law without any guilt. Their design of
reducing themselves in worship and conversation to the primitive pattern,
they openly avow; nor dare any directly condemn that design, nor can they
be convinced of insincerity in what they profess. And shall they be
destroyed if they miss it in some matters of smaller concernment? which,
whatever some may boast of, is not hitherto tolerably proved. Shall now
their dissent in religious observances on this occasion, and those and that
about things mostly and chiefly, if not only, that appear neither name nor
thing in the Scripture, be judged a crime not to be expiated but by their
ruin? Are immoralities or vicious debaucheries rather to be tolerated, or
exempted from punishment, than such a dissent? What place of Scripture in
the Old or New Testament, which of the ancient fathers of the church, do
speak at this rate? Opinions inconsistent with public tranquillity, with
the general rules of moral duties in all relations and conditions,
practices of any tendency in themselves to political disturbances, are by
none pleaded for. Mere dissent itself, with different observances in the
outward worship of God, is by some pretended, indeed, to be a civil
disturbance; it hath always been so by some, even by those whose own
established ways have been superstitious and idolatrous. But wise men
begin to smile when they hear private interest pleaded as public good, and
the affections which it begets as the common reason of things. And these
pretences have been by all parties, at one time or another, refuted and
discarded. Let the merit of the cause be stated and considered, which is
truly as above proposed, and no other; set aside prejudices, animosities,
advantages from things past and bygone in political disorders and tumults,
wherein it hath no concern, — and it will quickly appear how little it is,
how much, if possible, less than nothing, that is or can be pleaded for the
countenancing of external severity in this case. Doth it suit the spirit
of the gospel [of Christ] or his commands, to destroy good wheat,
for standing, as is supposed, a little out of order, who would not
have men pluck up the tares, but to let them stand quietly in the field
until harvest? Doth it answer his mind to destroy his disciples,
who profess to love and obey him, from the earth, who blamed his disciples
of old for desiring to destroy the Samaritans, his enemies, with fire from
heaven? We
I know not, therefore, whence it is come to pass that this
sort of men do principally, if not only, stir up magistrates and rulers to
laws, severities, penalties, coercions, imprisonments, and the like outward
means of fierce and carnal power, against those who in any thing dissent
from them in religion. Generally, abroad, throughout Christendom, those in
whose hands the civil powers are, and who may be supposed to have
inclinations unto the severe exercise of that power which is their own,
such as they think, possibly, may become them as men and governors, would
be inclinable to moderation towards dissenters, were they not excited,
provoked, and wearied, by them who pretend to represent Jesus Christ to the
world, — as if any earthly potentate had more patience, mercy, and
compassion than he. Look on those Lutheran countries where they persecute
the Calvinists. It is commonly declared and proved that the
magistrates, for the most part, would willingly bear with those dissenters,
were they not stirred up continually to severities by them whose duty it
were to persuade them to clemency and moderation, if in themselves they
were otherwise inclined. And this hath ruined the interest of the
protestant religion in Germany, in a great measure. Do men who destroy no
more than they can, nor punish more than they are able, and cry out for
assistance where their own arm fails them, render themselves hereby like to
their heavenly Father? Is this spirit from above? Doth that which is so
teach men to harass the consciences of persons, their brethren and
fellow-servants, on every little difference in judgment and practice about
religious things? Whom will such men fulfil the commands of patience,
forbearance, waiting, meekness, condescension, that the gospel abounds
with, towards? Is it only towards them who are of the same mind with
themselves? They stand in no need of them; they stand upon the same terms
of
Once more; what name of sin or wickedness will they find to
affix to these errors? “Nullum criminis
nomen, nisi nominis crimen.” No man errs willingly, nor ought to be
thought to tempt or seduce his own will, when his error is to his
disadvantage; and he is innocent whose will is not guilty. Moreover, those
pretended errors in our case are not in matters of faith; nor, for the most
part, in or about the worship of God, or that which is acknowledged so to
be; but in or about those things which some think it convenient to add unto
And I no way doubt but that all generous, noble, and heroic spirits, such as are not concerned in the empaled peculiar interest and advantages of some, and do scorn the pedantic humours of mean and emulous souls, when once a few more clouds of prejudices are scattered, will be willing to give up to God the glory of his sovereignty over the consciences of men, and despise the thought of giving them disquietment for such things as they can no way remedy, and which hinder them not from being servants of God, good subjects to the king, and useful in their respective lots and conditions.
And now, instead of those words of Pilate, “What I have
written I have written,” — which, though uttered by him maliciously and
despitefully, as was also the prophecy of Caiaphas, were, by the holy, wise
providence of God, turned into a testimony to the truth, — I shall shut up
this discourse with those of our Saviour, which are unspeakably more our
concernment to consider,
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