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           Title: A Dissertation on Divine Justice
      Creator(s): Owen, John (1616-1683)
     Print Basis: The Banner of Truth Trust, Edinburgh, 1967.
   CCEL Subjects: All; Theology; Classic;
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   A

   dissertation on divine justice:

   or,

   the claims of vindicatory justice vindicated;

   wherein that essential property of the divine nature is demonstrated
   from the sacred writings, and defended against Socinians, particularly
   the authors of the Racovian Catechism, John Crellius, and F. Socinus
   himself;

   likewise the necessary exercise thereof;

   together with the indispensable necessity of the satisfaction of Christ
   for the salvation of sinners is established against the objections of
   certain very learned men, G. Twisse, G. Vossius, Samuel Rutherford, and
   others.

   By John Owen,

   Dean of Christ Church College, Oxford.
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   "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid: for then how
   shall God judge the world?" -- Rom. iii. 5, 6.

   Oxford: Thomas Robinson.
   1653.
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                                Prefatory note.

   This work is devoted to a refutation of the doctrine that sin could be
   pardoned by a mere volition on the part of God, without any
   satisfaction to his justice; or, to state the question in the abstract
   form which it chiefly assumes in the reasonings of Owen, that justice
   is not a natural attribute of the divine nature, but so much an act of
   the divine will, that God is free to punish or to refrain from
   punishing sin. Owen clearly saw that if such a doctrine were
   entertained, there could be no evidence for the necessity of the
   atonement, and a stronghold would be surrendered to the Socinian
   heresy. He was the more induced to engage in the refutation of it, as
   it was maintained by some divines of eminent worth and ability. Calvin
   has been cited in its favour; and Owen, without naming him, refers to
   the only passage in his writings which, so far as we are aware, conveys
   the obnoxious sentiment, when in the second chapter he speaks of the
   learned men who, along with Augustine, and amongst orthodox divines,
   held the view in question. The passage occurs in his commentary on John
   xv. 13:-- "Poterat nos Deus verbo aut nutu redimere, nisi aliter nostrâ
   causâ visum esset, ut proprio et unigenito Filio non parcens, testatum
   faceret in ejus personâ quantam habeat salutis nostræ curam." An
   isolated phrase, however, when the question was not specially under his
   review, is scarcely sufficient basis from which to infer that Calvin
   held the possibility of sin being forgiven without an atonement; and
   other parts of his works might be quoted, in which he speaks of the
   death of Christ as a satisfaction to divine justice, in such terms as
   almost to preclude the theory for which the sanction of his name has
   been pleaded. Dr William Twisse, the learned prolocutor of the
   Westminster Assembly, published in 1632 a large work, now almost fallen
   into oblivion, but which passed through several editions, and was
   justly held in high esteem, "Vindiciæ Gratiæ. Potestatis, ac
   Providentiæ Divinæ." In the midst of his discussions he inserts several
   digressions on special topics; and the eighth digression contains an
   argument to prove that God punishes sin, not by any necessity of
   nature, or under the promptings of justice, as essential to the
   perfection of his character, but simply in virtue of a decree,
   originating in a free act of his will, and regulating, in this
   subordinate sense, all his procedure towards our race. He was followed
   by Rutherford in his "Disputatio Scholastica de Divinâ Providentiâ,"
   1649; and in his work on "Christ Dying, and Drawing Sinners," etc. One
   extract from the latter gives a plausible and condensed statement of
   the whole theory:-- "If we speak of God's absolute power without
   respect to his free decree, he could have pardoned sin without a
   ransom, and gifted all mankind and fallen angels with heaven without
   any satisfaction of either the sinner or his surety; for he neither
   punisheth sin, nor tenders heaven to men or angels, by necessity of
   nature, -- as the fire casteth out heat, and the sun light, -- but
   freely."

   Owen, in one of the public disputations at Oxford, had asserted that
   the exercise of divine justice was necessary and absolute in the
   punishment of sin. Though his arguments were directed against
   Socinians, some divines in the university, it was found, held a
   different opinion from our author on this particular point, and, in
   full explanation of his views, in 1653 he published his Diatriba. "It
   is almost entirely," says Mr Orme, "of a scholastic nature discovering,
   indeed, much acuteness, and a profound acquaintance with the subject,
   but not likely now to be read with much interest." We concur in this
   criticism, but must take exception to the last remark. The work, in our
   judgment, at least deserves to be read with interest, as the conclusive
   settlement of a question of vital moment, one of the most vigorous
   productions of Owen's intellect, a specimen of controversy conducted in
   the best spirit, and displaying powers of thought which remind us of
   the massive theology of Edwards, while rich in the stores of a learning
   to which the great American could not lay claim. In the first part of
   it. Owen proves that "sin-punishing justice is natural, and its
   exercise necessary to God," by four leading arguments, -- 1. The
   statements of Holy Writ; 2. The consent of mankind; 3. The course of
   Providence; and, lastly, The attributes of God as revealed in the cross
   of Christ. Various subsidiary arguments of considerable importance
   follow. The second part refutes in succession the opposing arguments of
   the Socinians, Twisse, and Rutherford

   Thomas Gilbert, so great an admirer of Owen that he was employed to
   write his epitaph, nevertheless combated the views maintained in the
   Diatriba, in a work entitled, "Vindiciæ Supremi Dei Domini (cum Deo)
   Initæ," etc., 1665. Baxter, in a brief premonition to his treatise
   against infidelity, dissented from the doctrine of Owen on this
   subject.

   The Diatriba was published in Latin. We have compared Mr Hamilton's
   translation of it, which appeared in 1794, with the original, and have
   been constrained to make some serious changes on it, which we cannot
   but deem improvements. The title, page is more exactly and
   fully-rendered; a translation of the dedication to Cromwell is for the
   first time, inserted; passages which had been placed at the foot of the
   page are restored to their proper place in the body of the text;
   several passages altogether omitted are now supplied; minor errors have
   been corrected: and where the change was so extensive as to interfere
   with the translator's responsibilities, we have appended a different
   rendering in a note. -- Ed.
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                                 To the public.

   The numerous and valuable writings of Dr Owen have long ago secured his
   praise in all the churches as a first-rate writer upon theological
   subjects. Any recommendation, therefore, of the present work seems
   unnecessary. As the treatise, however, now offered to the public, has
   long been locked up in a dead language, it may not be improper to say,
   what will be granted by all competent judges, that the author discovers
   an uncommon acquaintance with his subject; that he has clearly
   explained the nature of divine justice, and demonstrated it to be, not
   merely an arbitrary thing, depending upon the sovereign pleasure of the
   supreme Lawgiver, but essential to the divine nature. In doing this, he
   has overthrown the arguments of the Socinians and others against the
   atonement of Christ, and proved that a complete satisfaction to the law
   and justice of God was necessary, in order that sinners might be
   pardoned, justified, sanctified, and eternally saved, consistently with
   the honour of all the divine perfections.

   Whoever makes himself master of the Doctor's reasoning in the following
   treatise will be able to answer all the objections and cavils of the
   enemies of the truth therein contended for. It is, therefore, earnestly
   recommended to the attention and careful perusal of all who wish to
   obtain right ideas of God, the nature and extent of the divine law, the
   horrid nature and demerit of sin, etc., but especially to the attention
   of young divines. The translation, upon the whole, is faithful. If it
   have any fault, it is perhaps its being too literal.

   That it may meet with that reception which it justly merits from the
   public, and which the importance of the subject demands, is the earnest
   prayer of the servants in the gospel of Christ,

   S. Stafford, D.D.
   J. Ryland, sen., M.A.
   Rob. Simpson.
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  To his illustrious highness Lord Oliver Cromwell, commander-in-chief of the
   parliamentary forces of the Commonwealth of England, the right honourable
            chancellor of the very celebrated university of Oxford.

   Had it not been almost a crime for me, holding my present place in this
   most celebrated university, under your appointment and auspices, to
   have inscribed any literary production with a dedication to any other
   name, I would not have held in such poor account the weight of business
   you sustain as to make an endeavour to divert your thoughts and
   attention, so constantly directed to the welfare of the commonwealth,
   to a little by-work of this kind. But since, according to the nature of
   my office, I am under frequent necessity to address your Highness in
   the name of literature and of learned men, the affability of your
   nature will not suffer me to remain under any anxiety but that you will
   condescend to examine even this humble production of ours. Perhaps the
   dedication of books to you (amid prevailing "wars and rumours of wars,"
   and the fury and commotion of parties bent with eagerness on mutual
   destruction) will seem unseasonable, and not unlike the celebrated
   abstraction of him who, amid the destruction of his country and the
   sack of the city to which he belonged, neglecting all concern about his
   personal safety, was so obstinately bent on learned trifles as to be
   slain by a soldier while persisting in those pursuits on account of his
   skill in which the commander had resolved to spare his life. But even
   Christian authors have their polemics; and these, alas! too much fitted
   to excite, increase, and promote bloody strife; -- such is the
   blindness, nay, the madness of most men. Even this small piece of ours
   is polemical, I confess; but it fights by means of weapons not
   offensive to peace, not imbued with hostility, but appropriate to
   truth, -- namely, by the word of God and reason. In this arena, in this
   fortress, within this list and limit, if all controversies on divine
   things took place, no longer, on account of seditions and wars, would
   religion herself, over all Christendom, be so evil spoken of. The cause
   I maintain will not be esteemed by many of such consequence that I
   should contend for it so earnestly. But of how much importance it is in
   war (for it is a war in which we are engaged, and that a sacred one,
   with the enemies of truth) to secure a citadel or breast-work, your
   Excellency knows right well; that it is so to the army of the living
   God, redeemed and purified by the blood of Christ, whose truth we have
   undertaken, according to our ability, to defend, any man on serious
   reflection will easily perceive. Surely we may be permitted to contend
   for the truth. Some there are who, under pretence of zeal for the
   gospel, delight to mingle of their own accord in wars, tumults,
   strifes, and commotion, sufficiently skilled


   "Ære ciere viros, Martemque accendere cantu."

   We pretend, however, to no such eloquence, nor have we so learned
   Christ. My hope is, that the Lord and Judge of all will find me
   intently occupied in preaching Christ and him crucified, in season and
   out of season, and wrestling in prayer with God our gracious Father,
   for the salvation of the little flock of his well-beloved Son. Not as
   if it were in our power to keep free from controversies, for He who
   declared himself to have been sent, according to his own and the
   Father's counsel, not to destroy but to save the lives of men (that is,
   spiritually and eternally), predicted, however, that from the innate
   malice of men perversely opposing themselves to heavenly truth, not
   love, not tranquillity and peace, but strife, hatred, war, and the
   sword, would ensue upon the promulgation of that truth. Peace, indeed,
   he bequeathed to his own; but it was that divine peace which dwells in
   the bosom of the Father, and in the inmost recesses of their own souls.
   In truth, while his disciples live mingled with other men, and are
   exposed to national disturbances, how can they but share, like a small
   boat attached to a ship, in the same tempest and agitation with the
   rest? But since we have it in command, "if it be possible, and as much
   as lieth in us, to live peaceably with all men," that contention is
   alone pleasing which is in defence of truth; and it is pleasing only
   because for the truth we are bound to contend. Therefore, we address
   ourselves to this work, however humble it may be, in the service of our
   beloved Saviour, to whom we know that a work of this kind, although
   feeble and imperfect, is pleasing and acceptable; in whom alone, also,
   we would find both an encouragement and an aim in the prosecution of
   our studies, not unwilling to undergo any risk or danger under the
   guidance of such a Leader. But seeing what is acceptable to him cannot
   displease your Highness, I dedicate with pleasure to your Excellency,
   in testimony of my gratitude, what I have accomplished in fulfilment of
   my duty to him. For what remains (since a reason must elsewhere be
   rendered to the reader for undertaking this work, and


   "? in publica commoda peccem,

   Si longo sermone morer tua tempora"),

   I bow before God, the best and greatest, beseeching him in Jesus Christ
   that he would continually direct, by his own Spirit, all the counsels,
   undertakings, and actions of your Highness; that he would turn all
   these to his own glory, and to the peace, honour, and advantage of the
   church, commonwealth, and university; and that he would preserve your
   spirit, in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, blameless
   unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be honour and glory
   for ever. This I write under ill health at Oxford, the last day of the
   year 1652.

   The devoted Servant of your Illustrious Highness, and your
   Vice-Chancellor in this famous University,

   John Owen
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                           The preface to the reader.

   As perhaps, learned reader, you will think it strange that I, who have
   such abundance of various and laborious employment of another kind,
   should think of publishing such a work as this, it may not be improper
   to lay before you a summary account of the reasons that induced me to
   this undertaking; and I do it the rather that this little production
   may escape free from the injurious suspicions which the manners of the
   times are but too apt to affix to works of this kind. It is now four
   months and upwards since, in the usual course of duty, in defending
   certain theological theses in our university, it fell to my lot to
   discourse and dispute on the vindicatory justice of God, and the
   necessity of its exercise, on the supposition of the existence of sin.
   Although these observations were directed, to the best of my abilities,
   immediately against the Socinians, yet it was understood that many very
   respectable theologians entertained sentiments on this subject very
   different from mine; and although the warmest opposers of what we then
   maintained were obliged to acknowledge that our arguments are quite
   decisive against the adversaries, yet there were not wanting some, who,
   not altogether agreeing with us, employed themselves in strictures upon
   our opinion, and accused it of error, while others continued wavering,
   and, in the diversity of opinions, knew not on which to fix. Much
   controversy ensuing in consequence of this, I agreed with some learned
   men to enter, both in writings and conversation, upon an orderly and
   deliberate investigation of the subject. And after the scruples of
   several had been removed by a more full consideration of our opinion
   (to effect which the following considerations chiefly contributed,
   namely, that they clearly saw this doctrine conduced to the
   establishment of the necessity of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, a
   precious truth, which these worthy and good men, partakers of the grace
   and gift of righteousness through means of the blood of Christ, not
   only warmly favoured, but dearly venerated, as the most honourable [1]
   treasure of the church, the seed of a blessed immortality, and the
   darling jewel of our religion), I was greatly encouraged in the
   conferences with these gentlemen to take a deeper view of the subject,
   and to examine it more closely, for the future benefit of mankind.

   Besides; several of those who had before examined and were acquainted
   with our sentiments, or to whom, in consequence of our short discourse
   in the university on the subject, they began to be more acceptable, --
   and these, too, considerable both for their number and rank, -- ceased
   not to urge me to a more close consideration and accurate review of the
   controversy; for in that public dissertation, it being confined,
   according to the general custom of such exercises in universities,
   within the narrow limits of an hour, I could only slightly touch on the
   nature of vindicatory justice, whereas the rules and limits of such
   exercises would not permit me to enter on the chief point, the great
   hinge of the controversy, -- namely, concerning the necessary exercise
   of that justice. This is the difficulty that requires the abilities of
   the most judicious and acute to investigate and solve. In this
   situation of matters, not only a more full view of the whole state of
   the controversy, but likewise of the weight of those arguments on which
   the truth of that side of the question which we have espoused depends,
   as also an explanation and confutation of certain subtilties whereby
   the opponents had embarrassed the minds of some inquirers after truth,
   became objects of general request. And, indeed, such were the
   circumstances of this controversy, that any one might easily perceive
   that a scholastic dissertation on the subject must take a very
   different turn, and could bear no farther resemblance, and owe nothing
   more to the former exercise, than the having furnished an opportunity
   or occasion for its appearance in public.

   Although, then, I was more than sufficiently full of employment
   already, yet, being excited by the encouragement of good men, and fully
   persuaded in my own mind that the truth which we embrace is so far from
   being of trivial consequence in our religion, that it is intimately
   connected with many, the most important articles of the Christian
   doctrine, concerning the attributes of God, the satisfaction of Christ,
   and the nature of sin, and of our obedience, and that it strikes its
   roots deep through almost the whole of theology, or the acknowledging
   of the truth which is according to godliness; -- fully persuaded, I
   say, of these facts, I prevailed with myself, rather than this doctrine
   should remain any longer neglected or buried, and hardly even known by
   name, or be held captive by the reasonings of some enslaving the minds
   of mankind, "through philosophy and vain deceit," to exert my best
   abilities in its declaration and defence.

   Several things, however, which, with your good leave, reader, I shall
   now mention, almost deterred me from the task when begun. The first and
   chief was, the great difficulty of the subject itself, which, among the
   more abstruse points of truth, is by no means the least abstruse: for
   as every divine truth has a peculiar majesty and reverence belonging to
   it, which debars from the spiritual knowledge of it (as it is in
   Christ) the ignorant and unstable, -- that is, those who are not taught
   of God, or become subject to the truth, -- so those points which dwell
   in more intimate recesses, and approach nearer its immense fountain,
   the "Father of lights," darting brighter rays, by their excess of light
   present a confounding darkness to the minds of the greatest men (and
   are as darkness to the eyes, breaking forth amidst so great light):--


   "Suntque oculis tenebræ per tantum lumen obortæ."

   For what we call darkness in divine subjects is nothing else than their
   celestial glory and splendour striking on the weak ball of our eyes,
   the rays of which we are not able in this life, which "is but a vapour"
   (and that not very clear), "which appeareth but for a little," to bear.
   Hence God himself, who is "light, and in whom there is no darkness at
   all," who "dwelleth in light inaccessible," and who "clotheth himself
   with light as with a garment," in respect of us, is said to have made
   "darkness his pavilion."

   Not, as the Roman Catholics say, that there is any reason that we
   should blasphemously accuse the holy Scriptures of obscurity; for "the
   law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the
   Lord is sure, making wise the simple: the statutes of the Lord are
   right, rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure,
   enlightening the eyes." Nor is there reason to complain that any one
   part of the truth hath been too sparingly or obscurely revealed: for
   even the smallest portion of the divine word is, by the grace of the
   Holy Spirit, assisting to dispose and frame either the subject or our
   hearts, so as to view the bright object of divine truth in its proper
   and spiritual light, sufficient to communicate the knowledge of truths
   of the last importance; for it is owing to the nature of the doctrines
   themselves and their exceeding splendour that there are some things
   hard to be conceived and interpreted, and which surpass our capacity
   and comprehension. Whether this article of divine truth which we are
   now inquiring into be not akin to those which we have now mentioned,
   let the learned judge and determine, especially those who shall reflect
   what a close connection there is between it and the whole doctrine
   concerning the nature of God, the satisfaction of Christ, the desert of
   sin, and every one of the dark and more abstruse heads of our religion.
   I have, therefore, determined to place my chief dependence on His aid
   "who giveth to all liberally, and upbraideth not." For those unhappy
   gentlemen only lose their labour, and may not improperly be compared to
   the artists who used more than common exertions in building Noah's ark,
   [2] and who, like bees, work for others and not for themselves in the
   search of truth, who, relying on their own abilities and industry, use
   every effort to ascertain and comprehend divine truths, while, at the
   same time, they continue utterly regardless whether "He who commanded
   the light to shine out of darkness hath hitherto shone in their hearts,
   to give them the light of the knowledge of his glory in the face of
   Jesus Christ;" for, after all, they can accomplish nothing more, by
   their utmost efforts, but to discover their technical or artificial
   ignorance. [3]

   Setting aside, then, the consideration of some phrases, and even of
   some arguments, as to what relates to the principal point of the
   controversy, I hold myself bound, in conscience and in honour, not even
   to imagine that I have attained a proper knowledge of any one article
   of truth, much less to publish it, unless through the Holy Spirit I
   have had such a taste of it in its spiritual sense, as that I may be
   able from the heart to say with the psalmist, "I have believed, and
   therefore have I spoken." He who, in the investigation of truth, makes
   it his chief care to have his mind and will rendered subject to the
   faith, and obedient to the "Father of lights," and who with attention
   waits upon Him whose throne is in the heavens; he alone (since the
   things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God) attains to true
   wisdom, -- the others walk in a "vain show." It has, then, been my
   principal object, in tracing the depths and secret nature of the
   subject in question, -- while I, a poor worm, contemplated the majesty
   and glory of Him concerning whose perfections I was treating, -- to
   attend and obey, with all humility and reverence, what the great God
   the Lord hath spoken in his word; not at all doubting but that,
   whatever way he should incline my heart, by the power of his Spirit and
   truth, I should be enabled, in a dependence on his aid, to bear the
   contradictions of a false knowledge, and all human and philosophical
   arguments.

   And, to say the truth, as I have adopted the opinion which I defend in
   this dissertation from no regard to the arguments of either one or
   another learned man, and much less from any slavish attachment to
   authority, example, or traditionary prejudices, and from no confidence
   in the opinion or abilities of others, but, as I hope, from a most
   humble contemplation of the holiness, purity, justice, right, dominion,
   wisdom, and mercy of God; so by the guidance of his Spirit alone, and
   power of his heart-changing grace, filling my mind with all the
   fullness of truth, and striking me with a deep awe and admiration of
   it, I have been enabled to surmount the difficulty of the research.
   Theology is the "wisdom that is from above," a habit of grace and
   spiritual gifts, the manifestation of the Spirit, reporting what is
   conducive to happiness. It is not a science to be learned from the
   precepts of man, or from the rules of arts, or method of other
   sciences, as those represent it who also maintain that a "natural man"
   may attain all that artificial and methodical theology, even though, in
   the matters of God and mysteries of the gospel, he be blinder than a
   mole. What a distinguished theologian must he be "who receiveth not the
   things of the Spirit of God!"

   But again, having sailed through this sea of troubles [4] and being
   ready to launch out upon the subject, that gigantic spectre, "It is
   everywhere spoken against," should have occasioned me no delay, had it
   not come forth inscribed with the mighty names of Augustine, Calvin,
   Musculus, Twisse, and Vossius. And although I could not but entertain
   for these divines that honour and respect which is due to such great
   names, yet, partly by considering myself as entitled to that "freedom
   wherewith Christ hath made us free," and partly by opposing to these
   the names of other very learned theologians, -- namely, Paræus,
   Piscator, Molinæus, Lubbertus, Rivetus, Cameron, Maccovius, Junius, the
   professors at Saumur, and others, -- who, after the spreading of the
   poison of Socinianism, have with great accuracy and caution
   investigated and cleared up this truth, I easily got rid of any
   uneasiness from that quarter.

   Having thus surmounted these difficulties, and begun the undertaking by
   devoting to it a few leisure hours stolen from other engagements, the
   work prospered beyond all expectation; and, by the favour of the
   "Father of lights," who "worketh in us both to will and to do of his
   good pleasure," in a few days it was brought to a conclusion.

   And now that the labour of composing was ended, I again entertained
   doubts, and continued for some time in suspense, whether, considering
   the manners of the times in which we live, it would not be more prudent
   to throw the papers, with some other kindred compositions on other
   subjects of divinity, into some secret coffers, there to be buried in
   eternal oblivion, than bring them forth to public discussion.

   For even all know with what vain arrogance, malice, party spirit, and
   eager lust of attacking the labours of others, the minds of many are
   corrupted and infected. Not only, then, was it necessary that I should
   anticipate and digest in my mind the contempt and scoffings which these
   bantering, saucy, dull-witted, self-sufficient despisers of others, or
   any of such a contemptible race, whose greatest pleasure it is to
   disparage all kinds of exertions, however praiseworthy, might pour out
   against me; but I likewise foresaw that I should have to contend with
   the soured tempers and prejudiced opinions of others, who, being
   carried away by party zeal, and roused by the unexpected state and
   condition of public affairs, [5] and who thinking themselves to be the
   men, and that wisdom was born and will die with them, look down with
   contempt upon all who differ from them; and not with these only, but I
   likewise knew that I had a more severe scrutiny to undergo from some
   learned men, to whom, it was easy to conjecture, this work, for many
   reasons, would not be acceptable, -- for there are some by whom all
   labour employed in the search of any more obscure or difficult truth is
   accounted as misemployed, nor do these want the ingenuity of assigning
   honourable pretences for their indolence. I should, however, be ashamed
   to enter into any serious argument with such, nor is it worth while to
   enter upon a review of their long declamations. And although these, and
   many other things of such a kind, may appear grievous and hard to be
   borne to your dainty gentlemen, who eagerly court splendour and fame,
   yet, ingenuously to say the truth, I am very fully persuaded that no
   man can either think or speak of me and my works with so much disregard
   and contempt as I myself, from my soul, both think and speak. And
   having in no respect any other expectation than that of contempt to
   myself and name, provided divine truth he promoted, all these
   considerations had long ago become not only of small consequence to me,
   but appeared as the merest trifles; for why should we be anxious about
   what shall become either of ourselves or our names, if only we "commit
   our souls to God in well-doing, as unto a faithful Creator," and by
   continuing in well-doing, stop the mouths of ignorant babblers? "God
   careth for us;" let us "cast our burdens upon him, and he will sustain
   us." Let but the truth triumph, vanquish, rout, and put to flight its
   enemies; let the word of the cross have "free course and be glorified;"
   let wretched sinners learn daily more and more of fellowship with
   Christ in his sufferings, of the necessity of satisfaction for sins by
   the blood of the Son of God, so that he who is "white and ruddy, and
   the chiefest among ten thousand," may appear so to them, "yea,
   altogether lovely," till, being admitted into the chambers of the
   church's husband, they drink "love that is better than wine," and
   "become a willing people in the day of his power, and in the beauty of
   holiness;" and I shall very little regard being "judged of man's
   judgment."

   Since, then, I not only have believed what I have spoken, but as both
   my own heart and God, who is greater than my heart, are witnesses that
   I have engaged in this labour for the truth under the influence of the
   most sacred regard and reverence for the majesty, purity, holiness,
   justice, grace, and mercy of God, from a detestation of that abominable
   thing which his soul hateth, and with a heart inflamed with zeal for
   the honour and glory of our dearest Saviour Jesus Christ, who is fairer
   than the sons of men and altogether lovely, whom with my soul and all
   that is within me I worship, love, and adore, whose glorious coming I
   wish and long for ("Come, Lord Jesus, come quickly"), for "whose sake I
   count all things but as loss and dung;" -- since, I say, I have engaged
   in this labour from these motives alone, I am under no anxiety or doubt
   but it will meet with a favourable reception from impartial judges,
   from those acquainted with the terror of the Lord, the curse of the
   law, the virtue of the cross, the power of the gospel, and the riches
   of the glory of divine grace.

   There are, no doubt, many other portions and subjects of our religion,
   of that blessed trust committed to us for our instruction, on which we
   might dwell with greater pleasure and satisfaction of mind. Such, I
   mean, as afford a more free and wider scope of ranging through the most
   pleasant meads of the holy Scripture and contemplating in these the
   transparent fountains of life and rivers of consolation; subjects
   which, unencumbered by the thickets of scholastic terms and
   distinctions, unembarrassed by the impediments and sophisms of an
   enslaving philosophy or false knowledge, sweetly and pleasantly lead
   into a pure, unmixed, and delightful fellowship with the Father and
   with his Son, shedding abroad in the heart the inmost loves of our
   Beloved, with the odour of his sweet ointment poured forth. This truth,
   [however, which is under our consideration], likewise has its uses, and
   such as are of the greatest importance to those who are walking in the
   way of holiness and evangelical obedience. A brief specimen and
   abstract [6] of them is added, for the benefit of the pious reader, in
   the end of the dissertation, in order to excite his love towards our
   beloved High Priest and Chief Shepherd, and true fear towards God, who
   is a "consuming fire," and whom we cannot serve "acceptably" unless
   with "reverence and godly fear."

   There can be no doubt but that many points of doctrine still remain, on
   which the labours of the godly and learned may be usefully employed:
   for although many reverend and learned divines, both of the present and
   former age, [from the time, at least, when God vouchsafed to our
   fathers that glorious regeneration, or time of reformation, of a purer
   religion and of sound learning, after a long reign of darkness,] have
   composed from the sacred writings a synopsis, or methodical body, of
   doctrine or heavenly truth, and published their compositions under
   various titles; and although other theological writings, catechetical,
   dogmatical, exegetical, casuistical, and polemical, have increased to
   such a mass that the "world can hardly contain the books that have been
   written;" yet such is the nature of divine truth, so deep and
   inexhaustible the fountain of the sacred Scriptures, whence we draw it,
   so innumerable the salutary remedies and antidotes proposed in these to
   dispel all the poisons and temptations wherewith the adversary can ever
   attack either the minds of the pious or the peace of the church and the
   true doctrine, that serious and thinking men can entertain no doubt but
   that we perform a service praise-worthy and profitable to the church of
   Christ, when, under the direction of "the Spirit of wisdom and
   revelation, we bring forward, explain, and defend the most important
   and necessary articles of evangelical truth.

   But to be more particular: how sparingly, for instance, yea, how
   obscurely, how confusedly, is the whole economy of the Spirit towards
   believers (one of the greatest mysteries of our religion, -- a most
   invaluable portion of the salvation brought about for us by Christ)
   described by divines in general! or rather, by the most, is it not
   altogether neglected? In their catechisms, common-place books, public
   and private theses, systems, compends, etc., even in their
   commentaries, harmonies, and expositions, concerning the indwelling,
   sealing testimony, unction, and consolation of the Spirit, -- Good God!
   concerning this inestimable fruit of the death and resurrection of
   Jesus Christ, this invaluable treasure of the godly, though copiously
   revealed and explained in the Scriptures, there is almost a total
   silence; and with regard to union and communion with Christ, and with
   his Father and our Father, and some other doctrines respecting his
   person, as the husband and head of the church, the same observation
   holds good.

   For almost from the very period in which they were capable of judging
   even of the first principles of religion, [7] the orthodox have applied
   themselves to clear up and explain those articles of the truth which
   Satan, by his various artifices, hath endeavoured to darken, pervert,
   or undermine. But as there is no part of divine truth which, since the
   eternal and sworn enmity took place between him and the seed of the
   woman, he hath not opposed with all his might, fury, and cunning; so he
   hath not thought proper wholly to entrust the success of his interest
   to instruments delegated from among mankind, -- though many of them
   seem to have discovered such a wonderful promptitude, alacrity, and
   zeal in transacting his business, that one would think they had been
   formed and fashioned for the purpose, -- but he hath reserved,
   according to that power which he hath over darkness and all kind of
   wickedness, a certain portion of his work, to be administered in a
   peculiar manner by himself. And as he has, in all ages, reaped an
   abundant crop of tares from that part of his [domain] which he hired
   out to be improved by man, though, from the nature of human affairs,
   not without much noise, tumult, blood, and slaughter; so from that
   which he thought proper to manage himself, without any delegated
   assistance, he has received a more abundant and richer crop of infernal
   fruit.

   The exertions of Satan against the truth of the gospel may be
   distinguished into two divisions. In the first, as the god of this
   world, he endeavours to darken the minds of unbelievers, "that the
   light of the glorious gospel of Christ may not shine unto them." With
   what success he exercises this soul-destroying employment we cannot
   pretend to say; but there is reason to lament that he hath succeeded,
   and still succeeds, beyond his utmost hope. In the other, he carries on
   an implacable war, an unremitting strife; not, as formerly, with
   Michael about the body of Moses, but about the Spirit of Christ, about
   some of the more distinguished articles of the truth, and the
   application of each of them in order to cultivate communion with God
   the Father, and with his Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, -- against the
   hearts of the godly and the new creature formed within them.

   In this situation of affairs, most Christian writers have made it their
   study to oppose that first effort of the devil, whereby, through means
   of his instruments, he openly endeavours to suppress the light, both
   natural and revealed; but they have not been equally solicitous to
   succour the minds of believers when wrestling, "not against flesh and
   blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the
   darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places,"
   and almost ready to sink under the contest. Hence, I say, a very minute
   investigation hath been set on foot by many of those articles of
   religion which he has openly, through the instrumentality of the slaves
   of error and darkness, attacked, and the vindication of them made clear
   and plain. But those which, both from their relation to practice and a
   holy communion, full of spiritual joy, to be cultivated with God, the
   old serpent hath reserved for his own attack in the hearts of
   believers, most writers, (partly either because they were ignorant of
   his wiles, or because they saw not much evil publicly arising thence,
   and partly because the arguments of the adversary were not founded on
   any general principle, but only to be deduced from the private and
   particular state and case of individuals,) have either passed over or
   very slightly touched upon.

   As to what pertains to theology itself, or that "knowledge of the truth
   which is according to godliness," wherewith being filled "we ourselves
   become perfect, and throughly furnished to every good work," and "able
   ministers of the new testament, not of the letter, but of the spirit,"
   -- "apt to teach, rightly dividing the word of truth;" that subject, I
   say, though a common and chief topic in the writings both of the
   schoolmen and others on religion, many have acknowledged, to their
   fatal experience, when too late, is treated in too perplexed and
   intricate a manner to be of any real and general service.

   For while they are warmly employed in disputing whether theology be an
   art or a science, and whether it be a speculative or practical art or
   science; and while they attempt to measure it exactly by those rules,
   laws, and methods which human reason has devised for other sciences,
   thus endeavouring to render it more plain and clear, -- they find
   themselves, to the grief and sorrow of many candidates for the truth,
   entangled in inextricable difficulties, and left in possession only of
   a human system of doctrines, having little or no connection at all with
   true theology. [8] I hope, therefore, -- "if the Lord will, and I
   live," -- to publish (but from no desire of gainsaying any one) some
   specimens of evangelical truth on the points before mentioned, as well
   as on other subjects. [9]

   As to the work that I have now in hand, the first part of the
   dissertation is concerning the cause of the death of Christ; and in the
   execution of which I have the greatest pleasure and satisfaction
   (though proudly defied by the adversaries, so conceited with themselves
   and their productions are they), because "I have determined to know
   nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified," -- at least, nothing that
   could divert my attention from that subject. [10]

   But now, learned reader, lest, as the saving is, "the gate should
   become wider than the city," if you will bear with me while I say a few
   things of myself, however little worthy of your notice, I shall
   immediately conclude the preface.

   About two years ago, the parliament of the commonwealth promoted me,
   while diligently employed, according to the measure of the gift of
   grace bestowed on me, in preaching the gospel, by their authority and
   influence, though with reluctance on my part, to a chair in the very
   celebrated university of Oxford. I mean not to relate what various
   employments fell to my lot from that period; what frequent journeys I
   became engaged in; not, indeed, expeditions of pleasure, or on my own
   or private account, but such as the unavoidable necessities of the
   university, and the commands of superiors, whose authority was not be
   gainsaid, imposed upon me. And now I clearly found that I, who dreaded
   almost every academical employment, as being unequal to the task (for
   what could be expected from a man not far advanced in years, who had
   for several years been very full of employment, and accustomed only to
   the popular mode of speaking; who, being altogether devoted to the
   investigation and explanation of the saving grace of God through Jesus
   Christ, had for some time taken leave of all scholastic studies; whose
   genius is by no means quick, and who had even forgot, in some measure,
   the portion of polite learning that he might have formerly acquired,
   and at a time, too, when I had entertained hope that, through the
   goodness of God, in giving me leisure, and retirement, and strength for
   study, the deficiency of genius and penetration might be made up by
   industry and diligence), was now so circumstanced that the career of my
   studies must be interrupted by more and greater impediments than ever
   before.

   For, to mention first what certainly is most weighty and important, the
   task of lecturing in public was put upon me; which would, strictly and
   properly, require the whole time and attention even of the most grave
   and experienced divine; and in the discharge of which, unless I had
   been greatly assisted and encouraged by the candour, piety, submission,
   and self-denial of the auditors, and by their respect for the divine
   institution and their love of the truth, with every kind of indulgence
   and kind attention towards the earthen vessel, which distinguish most
   academicians, of every rank, age, and description, beyond mankind in
   general, I should have long ago lost all hope of discharging that
   province, either to the public advantage or my own private satisfaction
   and comfort.

   And as most of them are endowed with a pious disposition and Christian
   temper, and well furnished with superior gifts, and instructed in
   learning of every kind, -- which, in the present imperfect and depraved
   state of human nature, is apt to fill the minds of men with prejudices
   against "the foolishness of preaching," and to disapprove "the
   simplicity that is in Christ," -- I should be the most ungrateful of
   mankind were I not to acknowledge that the humility, diligence, and
   alacrity with which they attended to and obeyed the words of the cross,
   indulging neither pride of heart, nor animosity of mind, nor itching of
   ears, though dispensed by a most unworthy servant of God in the gospel
   of his Son, have given, and still give me great courage in the
   discharge of the different duties of my office.

   The most merciful Father of all things shall, in his infinite wisdom
   and goodness, dispose of the affairs of our university. Reports,
   however, are everywhere spread abroad concerning the abolition and
   destruction of the colleges, and efforts for that purpose made by some
   who, being entire strangers to every kind of literature, or at least
   ignorant of every thing of greater antiquity than what their own memory
   or that of their fathers can reach, and regardless of the future,
   imagine the whole globe and bounds of human knowledge to be contained
   within the limits of their own little cabins, ignorant whether the sun
   ever shone beyond their own little island or not, -- "neither knowing
   what they say nor whereof they affirm;" and by others who are deeply
   sunk in the basest of crimes, and who would, therefore, wish all light
   distinguishing between good and evil entirely extinguished (for "evil
   doers hate the light, nor do they come to the light, lest their deeds
   should be reproved"), that they (mean lurchers hitherto) may "fill up
   the measure of their iniquity" with some kind of eclat. With this
   faction are combined those who, never having become candidates for
   literature themselves, yet, by pushing themselves forward, have
   unseasonably thrust themselves into such services and offices as
   necessarily require knowledge and learning. These, I say, like the fox
   which had lost his tail, would wish all the world deprived of the means
   of knowledge, lest their own shameful ignorance, despicable indolence,
   and total unfitness for the offices which they solicit or hold, should
   appear to all who have the least degree of understanding and sense. And
   lastly, too, [the same reports are spread] by a despicable herd of
   prodigal, idle fellows, eagerly gaping for the revenues of the
   university. I could not, therefore, but give such a public testimony,
   as a regard to truth and duty required from me, to these very
   respectable and learned men (however much these treacherous
   calumniators and falsifying sycophants may rail and show their teeth
   upon the occasion), the heads of the colleges, who have merited so
   highly of the church [and of the commonwealth], for their distinguished
   candour, great diligence, uncommon erudition, blameless politeness;
   [11] many of whom are zealously studious of every kind of literature;
   and many, by their conduct in the early period of their youth, gave the
   most promising hopes of future merit: so that I would venture to
   affirm, that no impartial and unprejudiced judge will believe that our
   university hath either been, for ages past, surpassed, or is now
   surpassed, either in point of a proper respect and esteem for piety,
   for the saving knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, manners
   orderly and worthy of the Christian vocation, or for a due regard to
   doctrines, arts, languages, and all sciences that can be ornamental to
   wise, worthy, and good men, appointed for the public good, by any
   society of men in the world.

   Relying, then, on the humanity, piety, and candour of such men (who may
   be "afflicted, but not straitened; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast
   down, but not destroyed;" who carry about with them the life and death
   of the Lord Jesus Christ), though destitute of all strength of my own,
   and devoting myself entirely to Him "who furnisheth seed to the sower,"
   and who "from the mouths of babes and sucklings ordaineth strength,"
   who hath appointed Christ a perpetual source of help, and who furnishes
   a seasonable aid to every pious effort, -- I have, in conjunction with
   my very learned colleague [12] (a very eminent man, and whose equal in
   the work of the gospel if the parliament of the commonwealth had
   conjoined with him, they would have attended to the best interests of
   the university), continued in the discharge of the duties of this
   laborious and difficult province.

   But not on this account alone would I have been reluctant to return,
   after so long an interval of time, to this darling university; but
   another care, another office, and that by far the most weighty, was, by
   the concurring voice of the senate of the university, and
   notwithstanding my most earnest requests to the contrary, entrusted and
   assigned to me, and by the undertaking of which I have knowingly and
   wittingly compounded with the loss of my peace and all my studious
   pursuits. [13]

   Such, candid reader, is the account of the author of the following
   little treatise, and of his situation when composing it; a man not wise
   in the estimation of others, -- in his own, very foolish; first called
   from rural retirement and the noise of arms to this university, and
   very lately again returned to it from excursions in the cause of the
   gospel, not only to the extremities of this island, but to coasts
   beyond the seas, and now again deeply engaged in the various and
   weighty duties of his station. Whether any thing exalted or refined can
   be expected from such a person is easy for any one to determine.

   With regard to our manner of writing, or Latin diction, as some are
   wont to acquire great praise from their sublimity of expression, allow
   me but a word or two. Know, then, reader, that you have to do with a
   person who, provided his words but clearly express the sentiments of
   his mind, entertains a fixed and absolute disregard for all elegance
   and ornaments of speech; for, --


   "Dicite, pontifices, in sacris quid facit aurum?"


   "Say, bishops, of what avail is glitter to sacred subjects?"

   In my opinion, indeed, he who, in a theological contest, should please
   himself with the idea of displaying rhetorical flourishes, would derive
   no other advantage therefrom but that his head, adorned with
   magnificent verbose garlands and pellets, would fall a richer victim to
   the criticisms of the learned.

   But whatever shall be the decision of the serious and judicious with
   respect to this treatise, if I shall any how stir up an emulation in
   others, on whom the grace of God may have bestowed more excellent
   gifts, to bring forward to public utility their pious, solid, and
   learned labours, and shall excite them, from their light, to confer
   light on the splendour of this university, I shall be abundantly
   gratified. Farewell, pious reader, and think not lightly of him who
   hath used his most zealous endeavours to serve thy interest in the
   cause of the gospel.

   John Owen.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [1] Hupertimion, invaluable, unspeakably precious. -- Ed.

   [2] Thereby hastening their own destruction. -- Tr.

   [3] The meaning is, "But to make a most elaborate display of their
   ignorance." -- Ed.

   [4] Vado isto enavigato, "Having cleared these shallows." -- Ed.

   [5] This treatise was written in the time of the Commonwealth. -- Tr.

   [6] [A few crumbs of these, by way of specimen are] added, etc.
   "Abstract" conveys a widely different idea from apospasmata, -- Ed.

   [7] "Ab ipsis ferè religionis nostræ cunis et primordiis." Surely the
   rendering above is a wide deviation from Owen's meaning, -- "From the
   infancy and origin of our religion," that is, the Christian religion.
   -- Ed.

   [8] The full sentence in the original runs in the following terms:--
   "Not a few wooers of truth having followed their guidance, grieve and
   lament how they have strayed in their whole course, after finding
   themselves pushed into inextricable difficulties, (like that old man in
   Terence who was directed by a villain of a slave backward and forward,
   by steeps, and precipices, and obscure corners, to land at length in a
   narrow alley with no thoroughfare,) and left in possession only of a
   human system of doctrine, having scarcely any thing in common with true
   theology." -- Ed.

   [9] See Owen on the Holy Spirit. [This note is by the translator. We
   apprehend that Owen alludes his work on "Communion with God." See vol.
   ii. of his works. -- Ed.]

   [10] This paragraph is neither correctly rendered nor consistent with
   fact. The whole paragraph stands thus in the original:-- "As to the
   work now in hand it is the first part of a dissertation concerning the
   causes of the death of Christ; to which I willingly apply because I
   have determined to know nothing but Jesus Christ, and him crucified:
   though sadly provoked to turn my thoughts in another direction by the
   insolent haughtiness of adversaries, who cannot think highly enough of
   themselves and their productions; -- a sort of persons than whom none
   are more silly, or held more cheap by wise and thoughtful men." Owen
   does not seem to have ever fulfilled his intention to complete this
   work on the causes of our Lord's agony. The subject is fully considered
   in the Exercitations xxix. and xxx., prefixed to his Exposition of the
   Epistle to the Hebrews. -- Ed.

   [11] "Inculpatæ politeias," -- rather, "Blameless administration." --
   Ed.

   [12] Mr T. Goodwin, president of Magdalen College.

   [13] In the year 1651 Dr Owen was settled in the deanery of Christ
   Church, and in 1652 chosen vice-chancellor of that university.
     __________________________________________________________________

   A dissertation on divine justice
     __________________________________________________________________

                                    Part I.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter I.

   The introduction -- The design of the work -- Atheists -- The prolepsis
   [14] of divine justice in general -- The divisions of justice,
   according to Aristotle -- The sentiments of the schoolmen respecting
   these -- Another division -- Justice considered absolutely; then in
   various respects.

   In this treatise we are to discourse of God and of his justice, the
   most illustrious of all the divine perfections, but especially of his
   vindicatory justice; [15] of the certainty of which I most firmly
   believe that all mankind will, one time or other, be made fully
   sensible, either by faith in it here, as revealed in the word, or by
   feeling its effects, to their extreme misery, in the world hereafter,
   Rom. ii. 8, 9, 12; 2 Thess. i. 7-9. But as the human mind is blind to
   divine light, and as both our understandings and tongues are inadequate
   to conceive of God aright and to declare him (hence that common and
   just observation, that it is an arduous thing to speak of God aright),
   [and much darkness rests upon divine things], [16] that we may handle
   so important a subject with that reverence and perspicuity wherewith it
   becomes it to be treated, we must chiefly depend on His aid who was
   "made the righteousness [17] of God for us," himself "God blessed for
   ever," 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 21; Rom. ix. 5. But whatever I have
   written, and whatever I have asserted, on this subject, whether I have
   written and asserted it with modesty, sobriety, judgment, and humility,
   must be left to the decision of such as are competent judges.

   We think proper to divide this dissertation into two parts. In the
   first part, which contains the body of our opinion, after having
   premised some general descriptions of divine justice, I maintain
   sin-punishing justice to be natural, and in its exercise necessary, to
   God. The truth of this assertion forms a very distinguished part of
   natural theology. The defence of it, to the best of my abilities, both
   against Socinians, who bitterly oppose it, as well as against certain
   of our own countrymen, who, in defiance of all truth, under a specious
   pretext, support the same pernicious scheme with them, shall be the
   subject of the latter part.

   In almost all ages there have existed some who have denied the being of
   a God, although but very few, and these the most abandoned. [18] And as
   mankind, for the most part, have submitted to the evidence of a divine
   existence, so there never has existed one who has ever preferred an
   indictment of injustice against God, or who hath not declared him to be
   infinitely just. [19] The despairing complaints of some in deep
   calamities, the unhallowed expostulations of others at the point of
   death, do not bespeak the real sentiments of the man, but the misery of
   his situation: as, for instance, that expostulation of Job, chap. x. 3,
   "Is it good unto thee that thou shouldest oppress?" and among the
   Gentiles, that of Brutus, "O wretched virtue! how mere a nothing art
   thou, but a name!" and that furious exclamation of Titus when dying,
   related by Suetonius, [20] "who, pulling aside his curtains, and
   looking up to the heavens, complained that his life was taken from him
   undeservedly and unjustly." Of the same kind was that late dreadful
   epiphonema [21] of a despairing Italian, related by Mersennus, [22]
   who, speaking of God and the devil, in dread contempt of divine
   justice, exclaimed, "Let the strongest take me."

   But as "the judgments of God are unsearchable, and his ways past
   finding out," Rom. xi. 33, those who have refused to submit to his
   absolute dominion and supreme jurisdiction (some monstrous human
   characters) have been hardy enough to assert that there is no God,
   rather than venture to call him unjust. Hence that common couplet:--


   "Marmoreo tumulo Licinus jacet, at Cato parvo,

   Pompeius nullo; credimus esse deos?"


   "Licinus lies buried in a marble tomb, Cato in a mean one,

   Pompey has none; -- can we believe that there are gods?"

   And hence Ulysses is introduced by Euripides, expressing his horror of
   the gormandizing of the man-devouring Cyclops, in these verses:-- [23]


   "O Jupiter, behold such violations of hospitality; for if thou
   regardest them not,

   Thou art in vain accounted Jupiter, for thou canst be no god."

   Beyond any doubt, the audacity of those abandoned triflers, who would
   wish to seem to act the mad part with a show of reason, is more akin to
   the madness of atheism than to the folly of ascribing [24] to the God
   whom they worship and acknowledge such attributes as would not only be
   unworthy but disgraceful to him. Protagoras, [25] therefore, not
   comprehending the justice of God in respect of his government, hath
   written, "With regard to the gods, I do not know whether they exist or
   do not exist." Yet, even among the Gentiles themselves, and those who
   were destitute of the true knowledge of the true God (for they, in some
   sense, were without God in the world), writers, of whom Seneca [26] and
   Plutarch were the most distinguished, have not been wanting who have
   endeavoured, by serious and forcible arguments, to unravel the
   difficulty respecting the contrary lots of good and bad men in this
   life. Our first idea, therefore, of the Divine Being, and the natural
   conceptions of all men, demand and enforce the necessity of justice
   being ascribed to God. [27] To be eloquent, then, in so easy a cause,
   or to triumph with arguments on a matter so universally acknowledged,
   we have neither leisure nor inclination. What, and of what kind, the
   peculiar quality and nature of sin-punishing justice is, shall now be
   briefly explained. And that we may do this with the greater perspicuity
   and force of evidence, a few observations seem necessary to be premised
   concerning justice in general, and its more commonly received
   divisions.

   The philosopher Aristotle, long ago, as is well known, hath divided
   justice into universal and particular. Concerning the former, he says
   that he might compare it to the celebrated saying, "In justice every
   virtue is summarily comprehended," Ethic. ad Nicom., lib. v. cap. 1, 2;
   and he affirms that it in no wise differs from virtue in general,
   unless in respect of its relation to another being.

   But he says that particular justice is a part thereof under the same
   name, which he again distinguishes into distributive and commutative.
   [28] The schoolmen, [29] too, agreeing with him (which is rather
   surprising), divide the divine justice into universal and particular;
   for that excellence, say they, is spoken of God and man by way of
   analogy. [30] Nor is it like that bird mentioned by Homer, which goes
   by a double name, by one among mortals, by another among the immortals,
   --


   "The gods call it Chalcis, but men Cumindis,"

   Hom.

   but is understood as existing in God principally, as in the first
   analogised [31] being. Nor do later divines dissent from them; nay, all
   of them who have made the divine attributes the subject of their
   contemplations have, by their unanimous voice, approved of this
   distinction, and given their suffrages in its favour. [32]

   But, farther, they assert that particular justice, in respect of its
   exercise, consists either in what is said or in what is done. That
   which is displayed in things said, in commands, is equity; in
   declarations, truth; -- both which the holy Scriptures [33] do
   sometimes point out under the title of Divine Justice. But the justice
   which respects things done is either that of government, or
   jurisdiction or judgment; and this, again, they affirm to be either
   remunerative or corrective, but that corrective is either castigatory
   or vindicatory. With the last member of this last distinction I begin
   this work; and yet, indeed, although the most learned of our divines,
   in later ages, have assented to this distribution of divine justice
   into these various significations, it seems proper to me to proceed in
   a manner somewhat different, and more suited to our purpose.

   I say, then, that the justice of God may be considered in a twofold
   manner:-- First, Absolutely, and in itself. Secondly, In respect of its
   egress and exercise.

   First, The justice of God, absolutely considered, is the universal
   rectitude and perfection of the divine nature; for such is the divine
   nature antecedent to all acts of his will and suppositions of objects
   towards which it might operate. This excellence is most universal; nor,
   from its own nature, as an excellence, can it belong [34] to any other
   being.

   Secondly, It is to be viewed with respect to its egress and exercise.
   And thus, in the order of nature, it is considered as consequent, or at
   least as concomitant, to some acts of the divine will, assigning or
   appointing to it a proper object. Hence, that rectitude, which in
   itself is an absolute property of the divine nature, is considered as a
   relative and hypothetical [35] attribute, and has a certain habitude to
   its proper objects.

   That is to say, this rectitude, or universal justice, has certain
   egresses towards objects out of itself, in consequence of the divine
   will, and in a manner agreeable to the rule of his supreme right and
   wisdom, -- namely, when some object of justice is supposed and
   appointed (which object must necessarily depend on the mere good
   pleasure of God, because it was possible it might never have existed at
   all, God, notwithstanding, continuing just and righteous to all
   eternity). And these egresses are twofold:--

   1. They are absolute and perfectly free, -- namely, in words.

   2. They are necessary, -- namely, in actions.

   For the justice of God is neither altogether one of that kind of
   perfections which create and constitute an object to themselves, as
   power and wisdom do, nor of that kind which not only require an object
   for their exercise, but one peculiarly affected and circumstanced, as
   mercy, patience, and forbearance do; but may be considered in both
   points of view, as shall be more fully demonstrated hereafter.

   1. For the first, it has absolute egresses in words (constituting, and,
   as it were, creating an object to itself); as, for instance, in words
   of legislation, and is then called equity; or in words of declaration
   and narration, and is then called truth. Both these [36] I suppose for
   the present to take place absolutely and freely. Whether God hath
   necessarily prescribed a law to his rational creatures, at least one
   accompanied with threats and promises, is another consideration.

   2. There are respective egresses of this justice in deeds, and
   according to the distinctions above mentioned; -- that is to say, it is
   exercised either in the government of all things according to what is
   due to them by the counsel and will of God, or in judgments rewarding
   or punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom; which also
   is the rule of equity in legislation, and of truth in the declarations
   annexed. In respect of these, [37] I call the egresses of the divine
   justice necessary, and such that they could not possibly be otherwise;
   which, by divine help, I shall prove hereafter: and this is the same as
   saying that vindicatory justice is so natural to God, that, sin being
   supposed, he cannot, according to the rule of his right, wisdom, and
   truth, but punish it. But antecedent to this whole exercise of the
   divine justice, I suppose a natural right, which indispensably requires
   the dependence and moral subjection of the rational creature, in God,
   all the egresses of whose justice, in words, contain an arrest of
   judgment till farther trial, in respect of the object.

   It now, then, appears that all these distinctions of divine justice
   respect it not as considered in itself, but its egresses and exercise
   only; to make which clear was the reason that I departed from the
   beaten track. Nay, perhaps it would be a difficult matter to assign any
   virtue to God but in the general, and not as having any specific ratio
   [38] of any virtue. But that which answers to the ratio of any
   particular virtue in God consists in the exercise of the same. For
   instance: mercy is properly attributed to God, so far as it denotes the
   highest perfection in the will of God, the particular ratio or quality
   of which, -- namely, a disposition of assisting the miserable, with a
   compassion of their misery, -- is found not altogether as to some, as
   to others altogether and only, in the exercise of the above-mentioned
   perfection; [39] but it is called a proper attribute of God, because by
   means of it some operation is performed agreeable to the nature of God,
   which, in respect of his other attributes, his will would not produce.
   This kind, therefore, of the divine attributes, because they have
   proper and formal objects, thence only derive their formal and specific
   ratios. But all these observations upon justice must be briefly
   examined and explained, that we may arrive at the point intended.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [14] This word commonly means a previous and concise view of a subject,
   or an anticipation of objections. In this treatise it means a natural
   or innate conception of divine justice. -- Tr. [See note on page 517.
   -- Ed.]

   [15] The Word in the original means either to claim and assert a right,
   or to punish the violation of it. By "vindicatory justice," then, we
   are to understand that perfection of the Deity which disposes him to
   vindicate his right by punishing its violators. It ought never to be
   translated vindictive, or understood as meaning revengeful. -- Tr.
   [Though Dr Owen uses the expression, "My book of the Vindictive Justice
   of God," see vol. xii., "Vindiciæ Evangelicæ," chap. xxx., he explains
   his meaning in different parts of his works: see vol. xi., "Saints'
   Perseverance," chap. vii.; vol. xii., chap. xxiii.; and vol. ii., "On
   Communion with God," chap. iii., digression ii., p. 84. -- Ed.]

   [16] Polus taragmos en te tois theois eni. --Eurip. Iphig. in Taur.
   572.

   [17] Or justice. -- Tr.

   [18] "Nullos unquam fuisse aut esse posse atheous proprie dictos et
   speculative, seu plene persuasos, agnoscunt pene omnes." -- Vid. Voet.
   Disp. de Atheismo. Ps. xiv. 1. "Non est potestas Dei in terris." --
   Chal. Par. "Eorum qui antiquitus horrendi criminis rei existimabantur
   vindicias instituerunt inulti." -- Vid. Vos. de Idol. li. cap. 1. Hos
   tou piein ge, kai phagein tou ph' hemeran, Zeus outos anthropoisi toisi
   sophrosi. --Eurip. in Cyclop 335.

   [19] "Veritatis argumentum est omnibus aliquid videri tanquam deos
   esse, quod omnibus de diis opinio insita sit, neque ulla gens usquam
   est, adeo extra leges moresque posita ut non aliquos Deos credat."
   --Seneca, Epist. iii.

   [20] Sueton. in Vitâ Titi, cap. x..

   [21] A sudden, unconnected exclamation. -- Tr.

   [22] Mersen. ad Deistas Gall.

   [23] Eurip. in Cyclop., verse 350.

   [24] A slight alteration seems needed to elicit the real meaning, --
   "than to folly, in ascribing," etc. Owen is speaking of "the audacity
   of these triflers" "in ascribing" unworthy attributes to God. -- Ed.

   [25] Diogen. Laert. in Protag., Ep. iii. 12.

   [26] "Cur bonis mala fiant, cum sit providentia." -- Sen.

   [27] "Illos qui nullum esse Deum dixerunt non modo philosophos, sed ne
   homines quidem esse dixerim, qui brutis simillimi solo corpere
   constiterunt, nihil omnino cernentes animo, sed ad sensum corporis
   cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabunt esse nisi quod oculis tuebuntur."
   --Lactan. de plur., lib. i., etc. cap. 8. "Quia rationem mali non
   intellexerunt, et natura ejus abscondita fuit, duo principia bonum et
   malum finxit tota ethnicorum (ante natum Marcionem) antiquitas." --
   Vid. Vos. de Idol., lib. i. cap. 5.

   [28] That which relates to fair exchange. -- Tr.

   [29] Lombard., lib. iv. dist. 46; Thom. ii. 2, ti. 51; Pesant. in
   Thom., 2. a. ti. 58, ar. 4; Suarez. Relec. de Just. Div.; Hom. Iliad,
   x. 291.

   [30] Analogy means a resemblance between things with regard to some
   qualities or circumstances, properties or effects, though not in all.
   -- Tr.

   [31] That is, the first being whose perfections have been explained by
   analogy, or by tracing a resemblance between these perfections and
   something like them in ourselves, in kind or sort, though differing
   infinitely with respect to manner and degree. -- Tr.

   [32] Zanch. de Nat. Dei., lib. i.; Ames. Cas. Consc. , lib. v. cap. 2;
   Armin. Disput., part iv. thes. 15; Voet. Dis. de Jure et Just.; Mares.
   Hyd. Socin., lib. i. c. 25, etc.

   [33] Rom. i. 17, iii. 21; Ezra ix. 15; Neh. ix. 8; Deut. iv. 8; Ps.
   cxix. 7; Heb. vi. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 8; 2 Thess. i. 5.

   [34] Or, have a respect to any other being. -- Tr.

   [35] Conditional. -- Tr.

   [36] Namely, the egresses in words of legislation and in words of
   declaration and narration. -- Tr.

   [37] Namely, the egresses in the government of things according to what
   is due to them by the counsel of his will; or in judgments rewarding or
   punishing, according to the rule of his right and wisdom.. -- Tr.

   [38] That is, any distinguishing sort or quality. -- Tr.

   [39] In the general sparing mercy of God, the particular quality of
   mercy, -- namely, a disposition of assisting the miserable, with a
   compassion of their misery, -- is not wholly found, because there are
   many of mankind towards whom this disposition of assisting is never
   effectually exerted; but, in the pardoning mercy of God to his people,
   it is fully and gloriously displayed. -- Tr.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter II.

   The universal justice of God -- The idle fancies of the schoolmen --
   The arguments of Durandus against commutative justice -- Suarez's
   censure of the scholastic reasonings -- His opinion of divine justice
   -- The examination of it -- A description of universal justice from the
   sacred writings -- A division of it in respect of its egress --
   Rectitude of government in God, what, and of what kind -- Definitions
   of the philosophers and lawyers -- Divisions of the justice of
   government -- A caution respecting these -- Vindicatory justice -- The
   opinions of the partisans -- An explication of the true opinion -- Who
   the adversaries are -- The state of the controversy farther considered.

   We are first, then, briefly to treat of the universal justice of God,
   or of his justice considered in itself and absolutely, which contains
   in it all the divine excellencies. The schoolmen, treading in the steps
   of the philosophers, who have acknowledged no kind of justice which has
   not naturally some respect to another object, are for the most part
   silent concerning this justice. And once, by the way, to take notice of
   these [hair-splitters], on this, as almost on every other subject, they
   are strangely divided. Duns Scotus, Durandus, and Paludamus deny that
   there is commutative justice in God. [40]

   For the Master of the Sentences himself calls God an impartial and just
   distributer, but says not a word of commutation. Thomas Aquinas [41]
   and Cajetan do the same; though the latter says "that some degree of
   commutative justice is discernible." So also Ferorariensis, on the same
   place; and Scotus, in the third book of his treatise, "Of Nature and
   Grace," chap. vii. Durandus, in particular, contends, with many
   arguments, that this kind of justice ought not to be assigned to God;
   -- first, Because that this justice observes an equality between the
   thing given and received, which cannot be the case between us and God;
   -- and, secondly, Because that we cannot be of any service to him
   (which he proves from Rom. xi. 35; Job xxii. 3, xxxv. 7; Luke xvii.
   10), whereby he can be bound to make an equality with us by virtue of
   commutation; -- and, thirdly, Because that we cannot make an equal
   return to God for benefits received; -- and, finally, That as there is
   no proper commutative justice between a father and his children,
   according to Aristotle's [42] opinion, much less can it subsist between
   God and us.

   But the same Durandus likewise denies to God distributive justice, [43]
   because he is not indebted to any one. He, however, acknowledges some
   mode of distributive justice, and Pesantius [44] follows his opinion.

   But Gabriel, on the same [45] distinction, asserts commutative justice
   to be inherent in God; for there is a certain equality, as he says,
   between God and man, from the acceptation of God the receiver. Proudly
   enough said, indeed!

   But what shall we say of these triflers? They resemble those advocates
   in Terence, whose opinion, after Demipho, embarrassed by the cheats of
   Phormio the sycophant, had asked, he exclaims, "Well done, gentlemen; I
   am now in a greater uncertainty than before!" so intricate were their
   answers, and resembling the practices of the Andabatæ. [46]

   Hence, Francis Suarez himself, after he had reviewed the opinions of
   the schoolmen concerning the justice of God, bids adieu to them all,
   declaring, "That the expressions of Scripture had greater weight with
   him than their philosophic human arguments," Opusc. vi. de Just. Div.
   sec. 1. But with much labour and prolixity he insists that both
   distributive and commutative justice are to be ascribed to God that so
   he might pave the way for that rotten fiction concerning the merits of
   Roman Catholics with God, -- a doctrine which, were even all his
   suppositions granted, appears not to follow, much less to be confirmed.
   [47] This opinion of Suarez concerning vindicatory justice, as it is
   deservedly famous in scholastic theology, we think proper to lay before
   you in few words.

   In his discourses concerning the justice of God, [48] he contends that
   the affection [49] of punishing, which he calls "a perfection elicitive
   [50] of the act of punishing," is properly and formally inherent in
   God; and it is so because it hath a proper object, namely, to punish
   the guilt of sin, which is honourable; nor does it include any
   imperfection; and, therefore, that some formal and proper divine
   attribute ought to correspond to that effect.

   He farther maintains that this affection of punishing is neither
   commutative nor distributive justice. His conclusions here I do not
   oppose, though I cannot approve of many of his reasonings and
   arguments. In fine, he contends that vindicatory justice in God is the
   same with universal, or legal, or providential justice, which we call
   the justice of government. But he makes a dishonourable and base
   conclusion from a distinction about the persons punished, namely, into
   such as are merely passive sufferers, and such as spontaneously submit
   themselves to punishment, that they may satisfy the punitory justice of
   God; reasoning in such a manner, that after he has forced the whole
   doctrine concerning the commutative and distributive justice of God to
   become subservient to that sacrilegious and proud error concerning the
   merits of man with God, and even of one from the supererogation of
   another, [51] he strenuously endeavours to establish a consistency
   between this doctrine of vindicatory justice and a fiction not less
   impious and disgraceful to the blood of Christ, which "cleanseth us
   from all sin," about penal satisfaction, to be performed by such ways
   and means as God hath never prescribed, or even thought of.


   "? Ut turpiter atrum

   Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne."

   Hor.

   Dismissing these bunglers (who know not the righteousness of God),
   then, from our dissertation, let us attend to the more sure word of
   prophecy. That word everywhere asserts God to be just, and possessed of
   such justice as denotes the universal rectitude and perfection of his
   divine nature. His essence is most wise, most perfect, most excellent,
   most merciful, most blessed; that, in fine, is the justice of God,
   according to the Scriptures, namely, considered absolutely and in
   itself. Nor would the holy Scriptures have us to understand any thing
   else by divine justice than the power and readiness of God to do all
   things rightly and becomingly, according to the rule of his wisdom,
   goodness, truth, mercy, and clemency. Hence the above-mentioned
   sophists agree that justice, taken precisely and in itself, and
   abstracting it from all human imperfections, simply means perfection
   without intrinsic imperfection; for it is not a virtue that rules the
   passions, but directs their operations.

   Hence it presides, as it were, in all the divine decrees, actions,
   works, and words, of whatsoever kind they be. There is no egress of the
   divine will, no work or exercise of providence, though immediately and
   distinctly breathing clemency, mercy, anger, truth, or wisdom, but in
   respect thereof God is eminently said to be just, and to execute
   justice. Hence, Isa. li. 6, he is said to be just in bringing
   salvation; Rom. iii. 25, 26, just in pardoning sin; Rev. xvi. 5, 6,
   just in avenging and punishing sin; Rom. iii. 5, 6, just in all the
   exercises of his supreme right and dominion, Job xxxiv. 12-14; Rom. ix.
   14, 15, 18, he is just in sparing according to his mercy; just in
   punishing according to his anger and wrath. In a word, whatsoever, by
   reason of his right, he doeth or worketh "according to the counsel of
   his will," whatever proceeds from his faithfulness, mercy, grace, love,
   clemency, anger, and even from his fury, is said to be done by,
   through, and because of his justice, as the perfection inducing to, or
   the cause effecting and procuring, such operations. It is evident,
   then, that justice, universally taken, denotes the highest rectitude of
   the divine nature, and a power and promptitude of doing all things in a
   manner becoming and agreeable to his wisdom, goodness, and right.

   The more solemn egresses of this justice, to which all particular acts
   may be easily reduced, have been already pointed out; but equity in
   legislation, fidelity and truth in threatenings and promises annexed to
   it, in which God is often said to be just, and to execute justice, I
   think may be passed over, as being too remote from our purpose. But as
   it appears that some light may be thrown on this subject which we are
   now treating of, from the consideration of the relation of rectitude
   and divine wisdom, that is, of universal justice, to government and
   judgment, we must say a few words on that head.

   But rectitude of government, to which that justice analogically
   corresponds, is that which philosophers and civilians unanimously agree
   to be the highest excellence, though they have variously described it.
   Aristotle calls it "a habit by which men are capable of doing just
   things, and by which they both will and do just things;" [52]
   attributing to it aptitude, will, and action. Cicero calls it "an
   affection of the mind, giving to every one his due;" [53] understanding
   by "affection" not any passion of the mind, but a habit. The civilians
   understand by it "a constant and perpetual will, assigning to every one
   his due." The propriety of their definition we leave to themselves.
   That "constant and perpetual will" of theirs is the same as the "habit"
   of the philosophers; which, whether it be the proper genus [54] of this
   virtue, let logicians determine. Again; as they constantly attribute
   three acts to right, which is the object of justice, -- namely, "to
   live honestly, to hurt nobody, and to give every one his due," -- how
   comes it to pass that they define justice by one act, when doubtless it
   respects all right? therefore it is, they say, that to give every one
   his due is not of the same extent in the definition of justice and in
   the description of the acts of right.

   But let them both unite in their sentiments as they please, neither the
   "habit" or "affection" of the philosophers, nor the "living honestly
   and hurting nobody" of the civilians, can be assigned to God; for in
   ascribing the perfection of excellencies to him, we exclude the ratio
   of habit or quality, properly so called, and every material and
   imperfect mode of operation. He must be a mortal man, and subject to a
   law, to whom these things apply.

   Moreover, those (I speak of our own countrymen) who divide this justice
   of government into commutative and distributive rob God entirely of the
   commutative, which consists in a mutual giving and receiving. For, "Who
   hath first given to him?" "Who maketh thee to differ from another?" "He
   giveth not account of any of his matters." But distributive, which
   belongs to him as the supreme governor of all things, who renders to
   every one his due, is proper to himself alone. This we have above
   asserted to be the justice of government or judgment. Of this justice
   of government frequent mention is made in the sacred writings. It is
   that perfection of the Divine Being whereby he directs all his actions
   in governing and administering created things, according to the rule of
   his rectitude and wisdom. But this excellence, or habitude for action,
   in no wise differs from universal justice, unless in respect of its
   relation to another being. But what is a law to us, in the
   administration of things, in God is his right, in conjunction with his
   most wise and just will; for God, as it is said, is a law unto himself.
   To this justice are these passages to be referred, Zeph. iii. 5; 2
   Chron. xii. 6; Ps. vii. 9; Jer. xii. 1; 2 Tim. iv. 8, with almost
   innumerable others. But in all the effects and egresses of this justice
   God is justified, not from the reason of things, but from his dominion
   and supreme right. Thus, Job xiv. 14, xxxiii. 12, xxxiv. 12-15. And
   this is the first egress of the divine rectitude in works.

   The other egress of this justice is in judgment, the last member of the
   divisions of which, above mentioned, -- namely, that by which God
   punishes the crimes of rational beings, to whom a law hath been given,
   according to the rule of his right, -- is the vindicatory justice of
   which we are treating.

   Here again, reader, I would wish to put you in mind that I by no means
   assert many species of universal justice, or, so to speak, particular
   or special justices, as distinct perfections in God, which others seem
   to do, but one only, -- namely, the universal and essential rectitude
   of the divine nature variously exercised; and therefore I maintain that
   this vindicatory justice is the very rectitude and perfection of the
   Deity.

   Some of the schoolmen, however, agree with me in opinion; for Cajetan
   [55] upon Thomas grants that vindicatory justice in a public person
   differs nothing from legal and universal justice; although he maintains
   that there is a peculiar species of justice in a private person, -- a
   position which, I confess, I do not understand, since punishment,
   considered as punishment, is not the right of a private person. God
   certainly does not punish us as being injured, but as a ruler and
   judge. But again, concerning this justice, another question arises,
   Whether it be natural to God, or an essential attribute of the divine
   nature, -- that is to say, such that, the existence of sin being
   admitted, God must necessarily exercise it, because it supposes in him
   a constant and immutable will to punish sin, so that while he acts
   consistently with his nature he cannot do otherwise than punish and
   avenge it, -- or whether it be a free act of the divine will, which he
   may exercise at pleasure? On this point theologians are divided. We
   shall consider what has been determined on the matter by the most
   notorious enemies of divine truth, and especially by those of our own
   times.

   1. Then, they own, "That such a kind of justice is applicable [56] to
   God, which were he always inclined to exercise, he might, consistently
   with right, destroy all sinners without waiting for their repentance,
   and so let no sin pass unpunished."

   2. "That he will not pardon any sins but those of the penitent." Nor do
   they deny, so far as I know, --

   3. "That God hath determined the punishment of sin by the rule of his
   right and wisdom." But they deny, --

   1. That perfection by which God punishes sins either to be his justice
   or to be so called in Scripture, but only anger, fury, or fierce
   indignation, -- expressions denoting in the clearest manner the freedom
   of the divine will in the act of punishing; although some of Socinus'
   followers, among whom is Crellius, have declared openly against him on
   this point. Again, they deny, --

   2. That there is any such attribute in God as requires a satisfaction
   for sins, which he is willing to forgive, but maintain that he is
   entirely free to "yield up his claim of right," as they phrase it, at
   pleasure; that, therefore, divine justice ought, by no means, to be
   reckoned among the causes of Christ's death. Nay more, say they, "Such
   a kind of justice may be found in the epistles of Iscariot to the
   Pharisees" (they are the words of Gitichius ad Luc.), "but is not to be
   found in the holy Scriptures."

   Such are the opinions of those concerning whom we are disputing at this
   present day, whether they be heretics because they are not Christians.
   Between their sentiments and ours on this point there is the widest
   difference; for we affirm the justice by which God punishes sin to be
   the very essential rectitude of Deity itself, exercised in the
   punishment of sins, according to the rule of his wisdom, and which is
   in itself no more free than the divine essence.

   This kind of justice Faustus Socinus opposes with all his might in
   almost all his writings, but especially in his Theological Lectures of
   the Saviour, book i. chap. 1, etc.; Moscorovius, also, on the Racovian
   Catechism, chap. viii. quest. 19; Ostorodius, a most absurd heretic, in
   his Institutions, chap. xxxi., and in his Disputations to Tradelius;
   Volkelius, of the True Religion, book v. chap. 21; also Crellius, the
   most acute and learned of all the adversaries, in that book which he
   wished to have prefixed to the Dissertations of Volkelius, chap.
   xxviii., and in his Vindications against Grotius, chap. i.; in a little
   work, also, entitled, "Of the Causes of the Death of Christ," chap.
   xvi. He pursued the same object in almost all his other writings, both
   polemical and dogmatical, and likewise in his commentaries; -- a very
   artful man, and one that employed very great diligence and learning in
   the worst of causes. Michael Gitichius has the same thing in view in
   his writings against Paræus, and in his dispute with Ludovicus Lucius
   in defence of his first argument; -- a most trifling sophist, a mere
   copyist of Socinus, and a servile follower of his master. Of mightier
   powers, too, rise up against us Valentinus Smalcius against Franzius;
   and (who is said to be still alive) the learned Jonas Schlichtingius.
   All these, with the rest of that herd, place all their hopes of
   overturning the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ in opposing this
   justice.

   But these are not the only adversaries we have to do with: there are
   others, pious, worthy, and very learned divines, who, respecting the
   point of Christ's satisfaction, are most strictly orthodox, and who,
   though they cannot find in their hearts directly to deny that such an
   attribute or power is essential to God, yet maintain all its egresses
   and its whole exercise respecting sin to be so free and dependent on
   the mere free motion and good pleasure of the divine will, that should
   not that oppose, God might by his nod, by his word, without any
   trouble, by other modes and ways besides the satisfaction of Christ, if
   it only seemed proper to his wisdom, take away, pardon, and make an end
   of sin, without inflicting any penalty for the transgression of his
   law; and this, it is said, was the opinion of Augustine. By which, I
   will say, rash and daring assertion, -- be it spoken without offence,
   for they are truly great men, -- by their nod and breath, they suspend
   and disperse the very strongest arguments by which the adversaries feel
   themselves most hardly pushed, and by which the belief of Christ's
   satisfaction is strongly supported, and deliver up our most holy cause,
   I had almost said defenceless, to be the sport of the Philistines. Nay,
   not very long ago, it has been discovered and lamented by the orthodox,
   that very considerable assistance has been imprudently given by a
   learned countryman of our own to these aliens, who defy the armies of
   the living God. "For if we could but get rid of this justice, even if
   we had no other proof," says Socinus, "that human fiction of Christ's
   satisfaction would be thoroughly exposed, and would vanish," Soc. of
   the Saviour, book iii. chap. 1, etc.

   Of our own countrymen, the only one I know is Rutherford, a Scotch
   divine, who roundly and boldly asserts "punitive justice to be a free
   act of the divine will." Nor is he content with the bare assertion,
   but, supported chiefly by his arguments to whom the schoolmen are so
   much indebted, he defends the fallacy against both Cameron and Voetius,
   those two thunderbolts of theological war; though, in my opinion,
   neither with a force of argument nor felicity of issue equal to his
   opponents. But both the one and the others grant that God hath decreed
   to let no sin pass unpunished without a satisfaction; but that decree
   being supposed, with a law given, and a sanction of the same by
   threatenings, that a satisfaction was necessary. But that punitive
   justice necessarily requires the punishment of all sins, according to
   the rule of God's right and wisdom, this is what they deny, and
   endeavour to overturn.

   But to me these arguments are altogether astonishing, -- namely, "That
   sin-punishing justice should be natural to God, and yet that God, sin
   being supposed to exist, may either exercise it or not exercise it."
   They may also say, and with as much propriety, that truth is natural to
   God, but, upon a supposition that he were to converse with man, he
   might either use it or not; or, that omnipotence is natural to God, but
   upon a supposition that he were inclined to do any work without
   himself, that it were free to him to act omnipotently or not; or,
   finally, that sin-punishing justice is among the primary causes of the
   death of Christ, and that Christ was set forth as a propitiation to
   declare his righteousness, and yet that that justice required not the
   punishment of sin, for if it should require it, how is it possible that
   it should not necessarily require it, since God would be unjust if he
   should not inflict punishment? Or farther, they might as well assert
   that God willed that justice should be satisfied by so many and such
   great sufferings of his Son Christ, when that justice required no such
   thing; nay more, that setting aside the free act of the divine will,
   sin and no sin are the same with God, and that man's mortality hath not
   followed chiefly as the consequence of sin, but of the will of God.
   These and such like difficulties I leave to the authors of this opinion
   (for they are very learned men) to unravel; as to myself, they fill me
   with confusion and astonishment.

   But this I cannot forbear to mention, that those very divines who
   oppose our opinion, when hard pushed by their adversaries, perpetually
   have recourse in their disputations to this justice as to their sacred
   anchor, [57] and assert that without satisfaction God could not pardon
   sin consistently with his nature, justice and truth. But as these are
   very great absurdities, it would have seemed strange to me that any men
   of judgment and orthodoxy should have been so entangled in some of
   these sophisms as to renounce the truth on their account, unless I had
   happened at one time myself to fall into the same snare; which, to the
   praise and glory of that truth, of which I am now a servant, I freely
   confess to have been my case.

   But to avoid mistakes as much as possible in discussing the nature of
   this justice, we will make the following observations:--

   1. There are some attributes of Deity which, in order to their
   exercise, require no determined object antecedent to their egress; of
   this kind are wisdom and power. These attributes, at least as to their
   first exercise, must be entirely free, and dependent on the mere good
   pleasure of God only; so that antecedent to their acting, the divine
   will is so indifferent as to every exercise of them, on objects without
   himself, that he might even will the opposite. But if we suppose that
   God wills to do any work without himself, he must act omnipotently and
   wisely.

   There are, again, some attributes which can in no wise have an egress
   or be exercised without an object predetermined, and, as it were, by
   some circumstances prepared for them. Among these is punitive justice,
   for the exercise of which there would be no ground but upon the
   supposition of the existence of a rational being and its having sinned;
   but these being supposed, this justice must necessarily act according
   to its own rule.

   2. But that rule is not any free act of the divine will, but a supreme,
   intrinsic, natural right of Deity, conjoined with wisdom, to which the
   entire exercise of this justice ought to be reduced. Those men entirely
   trifle, then, who, devising certain absurd conclusions of their own,
   annex them to a supposition of the necessity of punitive justice, as to
   its exercise: as, for instance, that God ought to punish sin to the
   full extent of his power, and that he ought to punish every sin with
   eternal punishment; and that, therefore, he must preserve every
   creature that sins to eternity, and that he cannot do otherwise. I say
   they trifle, for God does not punish to the utmost extent of his power,
   but so far as is just; and all modes and degrees of punishment are
   determined by the standard of the divine right and wisdom.

   Whether that necessarily require that every sin should be punished with
   eternal punishment, let those inquire who choose. "Nobis non licet esse
   tam disertis."

   3. But the existence of a rational creature, and the moral dependence
   which it has, and must have, upon God, being supposed, the first egress
   of this justice is in the constitution of a penal law; not as a law
   which, as was before observed, originates from the justice of
   government, but as a penal law.

   For if such a law were not made necessarily, it might be possible that
   God should lose his natural right and dominion over his creatures, and
   thus he would not be God; or, that right being established, that the
   creature might not be subject to him, which implies a contradiction not
   less than if you were to say that Abraham is the father of Isaac, but
   that Isaac is not the son of Abraham: for in case of a failure in point
   of obedience (a circumstance which might happen, and really hath
   happened), that dependence could be continued in no way but through
   means of a vicarious punishment, and there must have been a penal law
   constituted necessarily requiring that punishment. Hence arises a
   secondary right of punishing, which extends to every amplification of
   that penal law, in whatever manner made. But it has a second egress, in
   the infliction of punishment.

   4. And here it is to be remarked, that this justice necessarily
   respects punishment in general, as including in it the nature of
   punishment, and ordaining such a vindication of the divine honour as
   God can acquiesce in: not the time or degrees, or such like
   circumstances of punishment, yea, not this or that species of
   punishment; for it respects only the preservation of God's natural
   right and the vindication of his glory, both which may be done by
   punishment in general, however circumstanced. A dispensation,
   therefore, with punishment (especially temporary punishment), by a
   delay of time, an increase or diminution of the degree, by no means
   prejudiceth the necessity of the exercise of this justice, which only
   intends an infliction of punishment in general.

   5. But, again, though we determine the egresses of this justice to be
   necessary, we do not deny that God exercises it freely; for that
   necessity doth not exclude a concomitant liberty, but only an
   antecedent indifference. This only we deny, -- namely, that supposing a
   sinful creature, the will of God can be indifferent (by virtue of the
   punitive justice inherent in it) to inflict or not inflict punishment
   upon that creature, or to the volition of punishment or its opposite.
   The whole of Scripture, indeed, loudly testifies against any such
   indifference, nor is it consistent with God's supreme right over his
   creatures; neither do they who espouse a different side contend with a
   single word brought from the Scriptures. But that God punishes sins
   with a concomitant liberty, because he is of all agents the most free,
   we have not a doubt. Thus, his intellectual will is carried towards
   happiness by an essential inclination antecedent to liberty, and
   notwithstanding it wills happiness with a concomitant liberty: for to
   act freely is the very nature of the will; yea, it must necessarily act
   freely.

   Let our adversaries, therefore, dream as they please, that we determine
   God to be an absolutely necessary agent when he is a most free one, and
   that his will is so circumscribed, by some kind of justice which we
   maintain, that he cannot will those things which, setting the
   consideration of that justice aside, would be free to him; for we
   acknowledge the Deity to be both a necessary and free agent, --
   necessary in respect of all his actions internally, or in respect of
   the persons in the Godhead towards one another. The Father necessarily
   begets the Son, and loves himself. As to these and such like actions,
   he is of all necessary agents the most necessary. But in respect of the
   acts of the divine will which have their operations and effects upon
   external objects, he is an agent absolutely free, being one "who
   worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will." But of
   these acts there are two kinds; for some are absolute, and admit no
   respect to any antecedent condition.

   Of this kind is his purpose of creating the world, and in it rational
   creatures, properly adapted to know and obey the Creator, Benefactor,
   and Lord of all. In works of this kind God hath exercised the greatest
   liberty. His infinitely wise and infinitely free will is the fountain
   and origin of all things; neither is there in God any kind of justice,
   or any other essential attribute, which could prescribe any limits or
   measure to the divine will. But this decree of creating being supposed,
   the divine will undergoes a double necessity, so to speak, both in
   respect of the event and in respect of its manner of acting: for in
   respect of the event, it is necessary, from the immutability of God,
   that the world should be created; and in respect of the manner of doing
   it, that it should be done omnipotently, because God is essentially
   omnipotent, and it being once supposed that he wills to do any work
   without himself, he must do it omnipotently. Yet, notwithstanding these
   considerations, in the creation of the world God was entirely a free
   agent; he exercised will and understanding in acting, although the
   choice of acting or not acting, and of acting in one particular way or
   another, is taken away by his immutability and omnipotence.

   There is another kind of the acts of the divine will which could have
   no possible existence but upon a condition supposed.

   This kind contains the egresses and exercise of those attributes which
   could not be exercised but upon a supposition of other antecedent acts,
   of which we have treated before. Of this kind are all the acts of the
   divine will in which justice, mercy, etc., exert their energy. But
   these attributes of the divine nature are either for the purpose of
   preserving or continuing to God what belongs to him of right, supposing
   that state of things which he hath freely appointed, or for bestowing
   on his creatures some farther good. Of the former kind is vindicatory
   justice; which, as it cannot be exercised but upon the supposition of
   the existence of a rational being and of its sin, so, these being
   supposed, the supreme right and dominion of the Deity could not be
   preserved entire unless it were exercised. Of the latter kind is
   sparing mercy, by which God bestows an undeserved good on miserable
   creatures; for, setting aside the consideration of their misery, this
   attribute cannot be exercised, but that being supposed, if he be
   inclined to bestow any undeserved good on creatures wretched through
   their own transgression, he may exercise this mercy if he will. But
   again; in the exercise of that justice, although, if it were not to be
   exercised, according to our former hypothesis, God would cease from his
   right and dominion, and so would not be God, still he is a free and
   also an absolutely necessary agent; for he acts from will and
   understanding, and not from an impetus of nature only, as fire burns.
   And he freely willed that state and condition of things; which being
   supposed, that justice must necessarily be exercised. Therefore, in the
   exercise of it he is not less free than in speaking; for supposing, as
   I said before, that his will were to speak anything, it is necessary
   that he speak the truth. Those loud outcries, therefore, which the
   adversaries so unseasonably make against our opinion, as if it
   determined God to be an absolutely necessary agent, in his operations
   ad extra, entirely vanish and come to naught. But we will treat more
   fully of these things when we come to answer objections.

   Finally, let it be observed that the nature of mercy and justice are
   different in respect of their exercise: for between the act of mercy
   and its object no natural obligation intervenes; for God is not bound
   to any one to exercise any act of mercy, neither is he bound to reward
   obedience, for this is a debt due from his natural right, and from the
   moral dependence of the rational creature, and indispensably thence
   arising. But between the act of justice and its object a natural
   obligation intervenes, arising from the indispensable subordination of
   the creature to God; which, supposing disobedience or sin, could not
   otherwise be secured than by punishment. Nor is the liberty of the
   divine will diminished in any respect more by the necessary egresses of
   divine justice than by the exercise of other attributes; for these
   necessary egresses are the consequence, not of an absolute but of a
   conditional necessity, -- namely, a rational creature and its sin being
   supposed, and both existing freely in respect of God, but the necessary
   suppositions being made, the exercise of other perfections is also
   necessary; for it being supposed that God were disposed to speak with
   man, he must necessarily speak according to truth.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [40] Palud. on the Sent., book 4. dist. 46.

   [41] Thomas, first page of quest. 21, and Cajetan, ii. 2, q. 61, a. 4.

   [42] Ethics, book viii. chap. 8.

   [43] On dist. 46.

   [44] In ii. 2, Thomas.

   [45] A work to which he alludes. -- Tr.

   [46] A kind of fencers who fought on horseback hood-winked. -- Tr.

   [47] Suarez's Lectures of the Justice of God.

   [48] Sect. 5.

   [49] Or quality. -- Tr.

   [50] That is, inducing to, or drawing forth, the act of punishing. --
   Tr.

   [51] In the original, "Immo etiam ex condigno," "And that, too, of
   condignity." -- Ed.

   [52] Ethics, book v. chap. 1.

   [53] De Finibus.

   [54] Or class. -- Tr.

   [55] Quest. 2, 2, quest. 108, a 2.

   [56] Competere, "belongs." -- Ed.

   [57] The largest anchor in a vessel, used only in extreme danger, was
   so called. -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter III.

   A series of arguments in support of vindicatory justice -- First, from
   the Scriptures -- Three divisions of the passages of Scripture -- The
   first contains those which respect the purity and holiness of God --
   The second, those which respect God as the judge -- What it is to judge
   with justice -- The third, those which respect the divine supreme right
   -- A second argument is taken from the general consent of mankind -- A
   threefold testimony of that consent -- The first from the Scriptures --
   Some testimonies of the heathens -- The second from the power of
   conscience -- Testimonies concerning that power -- The mark set upon
   Cain -- The expression of the Emperor Adrian when at the point of death
   -- The consternation of mankind at prodigies -- The horror of the
   wicked, whom even fictions terrify -- Two conclusions -- The third
   testimony, from the confession of all nations -- A vindication of the
   argument against Rutherford -- The regard paid to sacrifices among the
   nations -- Different kinds of the same -- Propitiatory sacrifices --
   Some instances of them.

   These preliminaries being thus laid down, to facilitate our entrance on
   the subject, I proceed to demonstrate, by a variety of arguments, both
   against enemies and against friends from whom I dissent, that this
   punitive justice is natural to God, and necessary as to its egresses
   respecting sin. But because, since the entrance of sin into the world,
   God hath either continued or increased the knowledge of himself, or
   accommodated it to our capacities by four ways, -- namely, by the
   written word, by a rational conscience, by his works of providence,
   and, lastly, by the person of Jesus Christ, his only-begotten Son, and
   by the mystery of godliness manifested in him, -- we will show that by
   each of these modes of communication he hath revealed and made known to
   us this his justice.

   I. Our first argument, then, is taken from the testimony of the sacred
   writings, which, in almost numberless places, ascribe this vindicatory
   justice to God.

   The passages of holy Scripture which ascribe this justice to God may be
   classed under three divisions. The first contains those which certify
   that the purity and holiness of God hostilely oppose and detest sin.
   Whether holiness or purity be an attribute natural to God, and
   immutably residing in him, has not yet been called in question by our
   adversaries. They have not yet arrived at such a pitch of madness. But
   this is that universal perfection of God, which, when he exercises [it]
   in punishing the transgressions of his creatures, is called vindicatory
   justice; for whatever there be in God perpetually inherent, whatever
   excellence there be essential to his nature, which occasions his
   displeasure with sin, and which necessarily occasions this displeasure,
   this is that justice of which we are speaking.

   But here, first, occurs to us that celebrated passage of the prophet
   Habakkuk, chap. i. 13, "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and
   canst not look on iniquity." The prophet here ascribes to God the
   greatest detestation, and such an immortal hatred of sin that he cannot
   look upon it, but, with a wrathful aversion of his countenance,
   abominates and dooms it to punishment. But perhaps God thus hates sin
   because he wills to do so, and by an act of his will entirely free,
   though the state of things might be changed without any injury to him
   or diminution of his essential glory. But the Holy Spirit gives us a
   reason very different from this, namely, -- the purity of God's eyes:
   "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil." But there is no one who
   can doubt that the prophet here intended the holiness of God. The
   incomprehensible, infinite, and most perfect holiness or purity of God
   is the cause why he hates and detests all sin; and that justice and
   holiness are the same, as to the common and general notion of them, we
   have shown before.

   Of the same import is the admonition of Joshua in his address to the
   people of Israel, chap. xxiv. 19, "Ye cannot serve the Lord" (that is,
   he will not accept of a false and hypocritical worship from you): "for
   he is an holy God; he is a jealous God; he will not forgive your
   transgressions nor your sins." God, then, will not forgive
   transgressions, -- that is, he will most certainly punish them, --
   because he is most holy. But this holiness is the universal perfection
   of God, which, when exercised in punishing the sins of the creatures,
   is called vindicatory justice; that is, in relation to its exercise and
   effects, for in reality the holiness and justice of God are the same,
   neither of which, considered in itself and absolutely, differs from the
   divine nature, whence they are frequently used the one for the other.

   Moreover, it is manifest that God meant this holiness in that
   promulgation of his glorious name, or of the essential properties of
   his divine nature, made face to face to Moses, Exod. xxxiv. 5-7; which
   name he had also before declared, chap. xxiii. 7. That non-absolution
   or punishment denotes an external effect of the divine will is granted;
   but when God proclaims this to be his name, "The Lord, The Lord God,"
   etc, "that will by no means clear the guilty," he manifestly leads us
   to the contemplation of that excellence essentially inherent in his
   nature, which induces him to such an act. But that, by whatever name it
   be distinguished, in condescension to our capacities, is the justice
   that we mean.

   That eulogium of divine justice by the psalmist, Ps. v. 4-6, favours
   this opinion: "For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness:
   neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand in thy
   sight: thou hatest all workers of iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them
   that speak leasing: the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceitful man."
   But those who deny this hatred of sin and sinners, and the disposition
   to punish them, to be perpetually, immutably, and habitually inherent
   in God, I am afraid have never strictly weighed in their thoughts the
   divine purity and holiness.

   To the second class may be referred those passages of Scripture which
   ascribe to God the office of a judge, and which affirm that he judges,
   and will judge, all things with justice. The first which occurs is that
   celebrated expression of Abraham, Gen. xviii. 25, "Shall not the Judge
   of all the earth do right?" These are not the words of one who doubts,
   but of one enforcing a truth acknowledged and confessed among all; a
   truth upon which the intercession of this faithful friend of God for
   the pious and just inhabitants of Sodom is founded: for Abraham here
   ascribes to God the power and office of a just judge; in consequence of
   which character he must necessarily exercise judgment according to the
   different merits of mankind. This the words in the preceding clause of
   the verse, accompanied with a vehement rejection and detestation of
   every suspicion that might arise to the contrary, sufficiently
   demonstrate: "That be far from thee to do," -- namely, "to slay the
   righteous with the wicked." God, then, is a judge, and a just one; and
   it is impossible for him not to exercise right or judgment. But that
   justice wherewith he is now endowed, and by which he exerciseth right,
   is not a free act of his will, (for who would entertain such
   contemptible thoughts even of an earthly judge?) but a habit or
   excellence at all times inherent in his nature.

   But this supreme excellence and general idea which Abraham made mention
   of and enforced, the apostle again afterward supports and recommends:
   Rom. iii. 5, 6, "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid:
   for then how shall God judge the world?" Unless he were just, how shall
   he judge the world? Therefore, this most righteous of all judges
   exerciseth justice in judging the world "because he is just."

   For why should God so often be said to judge the world justly, and in
   justice, unless his justice were that perfection whence this righteous
   and just judgment flows and is derived? Acts xvii. 31, "He hath
   appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness
   by that man whom he hath ordained;" and in Rom. ii. 5, the day of the
   last judgment is called "the day of wrath and revelation of the
   righteous judgment of God."

   But, again, on this very account the justice of God is celebrated, and
   he himself, in an especial manner, is said to be just, because he
   inflicts punishment and exercises his judgments according to the
   demerits of sinners: Rev. xvi. 5, 6, "Thou art righteous, O Lord, which
   art, and wast, and shalt be, because thou hast judged thus. For they
   have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou hast given them
   blood to drink; for they are worthy."

   But all retaliation [58] for a crime proceeds from vindicatory justice;
   but that God exercises that justice, and is thence denominated just, is
   evident. The Holy Spirit establishes this truth in the plainest words,
   Ps. ix. 4, 5, where he gloriously vindicates this justice of God: "Thou
   hast maintained my right and my cause," says the psalmist; "thou satest
   in the throne judging right. Thou hast rebuked the heathen, thou hast
   destroyed the wicked, thou hast put out their name for ever and ever."
   God exerciseth justice and determines causes as he sits upon his
   throne, -- that is, as being endowed with supreme judiciary power, --
   and that as he is a judge of righteousness, or most righteous judge:
   Ps. cxix. 137, "Righteous art thou, O Lord, and upright are thy
   judgments."

   Thirdly, It now remains that we take a view of one or two of those
   passages of Scripture which, in consideration of this divine justice,
   assert the infliction of punishment for sin in itself, and as far as
   relates to the thing itself, to be just. To this purpose is that of the
   apostle to the Romans, chap. i. 32, "Who knowing the judgment," or
   justice, "of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of
   death." Whatever, or of what kind soever, that justice or right of God
   may be of which the apostle is speaking, it seems evident that the
   three following properties belong to it:--

   1. That it is universally acknowledged; nay, it is not unknown even to
   the most abandoned of mankind, and to those schools of every kind of
   wickedness which the apostle is there describing. Whence they derive
   this knowledge of the divine law and justice shall be made to appear
   hereafter.

   2. That, it is the cause, source, and rule of all punishments to be
   inflicted; for this is the right of God, "that those who commit sin are
   worthy of death." From this right of God it follows that "the wages of"
   every "sin is death."

   3. That, it is natural and essential to God: for although, in respect
   of its exercise, it may have a handle or occasion from some things
   external to the Deity, and in respect of its effects may have a
   meritorious cause, yet in respect of its source and root, it respects
   himself as its subject, if God be absolutely perfect. If belonging to
   any other being, it cannot agree to him. [59]

   You will say that this right of God is free; but I deny that any right
   of God which respects his creatures can, as a habit inherent in his
   nature, be free, though in the exercise of every right God be
   absolutely free. Neither can any free act of the divine will towards
   creatures be called any right of Deity; it is only the exercise of some
   right. But an act is distinguished from its habit or root.

   And now it appears evident that this right is not that supreme right or
   absolute dominion of God, which, under the primary notion of a Creator,
   must be necessarily ascribed to him; for it belongs not to the supreme
   Lord, as such, to inflict punishment, but as ruler or judge.

   The supreme dominion and right of God over his creatures, no doubt, so
   far as it supposes dependence and obedience, necessarily requires that
   a vicarious punishment should be appointed in case of transgression or
   disobedience: but the very appointment of punishment, as well as the
   infliction of it, flows from his right as the governor; which right,
   considered with respect to transgressors, is nothing else than
   vindicatory justice. The apostle, therefore, signifies that that is the
   justice always resident in God, as a legislator, ruler, and judge of
   all things; which, by common presumption, even the most abandoned of
   mankind acknowledge.

   To these may be added two other passages which occur in the writings of
   the same apostle: 2 Thess. i. 6, "Seeing it is a righteous thing with
   God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you." A recompense
   of tribulation is a real peculiar act of vindicatory justice; but that
   belongs to God as he is just. Thence the punishment of sin is called in
   Heb. ii. 2, "A just recompense of reward;" and by Jude, verse 7, "The
   vengeance," or justice, "of eternal fire;" because, namely, it follows
   from that justice of God that such crimes are justly recompensed by
   such a punishment.

   But we will not be farther troublesome in reciting particular proofs;
   from those already mentioned, and from others equally strong, we thus
   briefly argue:-- That to that Being whose property it is to "render
   unto every man according to his deeds," not to clear the guilty, to
   condemn sinners as worthy of death and to inflict the same upon them,
   to hate sin, and who will in no wise let sin pass unpunished, and all
   this because he is just, and because his justice so requires,
   sin-punishing justice naturally belongs, and that he cannot act
   contrary to that justice; but the passages of Scripture just now
   mentioned, with many others, assert that all these properties above
   recounted belong to and are proper to God, because he is just:
   therefore, this justice belongs to God, and is natural to him.

   It matters not what we affirm of vindicatory justice, whether that it
   be meant of God essentially, and not only denominatively, that it has
   an absolute name (for it is called "holiness" and "purity"), that we
   have it expressed both in the abstract and concrete; for, what is more
   than that, it is affirmed expressly, directly, and particularly,
   ofttimes, in the passages above mentioned, that it requires the
   punishment of sinners, that it implies a constant and immutable will of
   punishing every sin according to the rule of divine wisdom and right.
   [60] Impudent to a high degree indeed, then, must Socinus have been,
   who hath maintained that that perfection of Deity by which he punisheth
   sin is not called justice, but always anger or fury. Anger, indeed, and
   fury, analogically and effectively, belong to justice.

   So much for our first argument.

   II. The universal consent of mankind furnishes us with a second, from
   which we may reason in this manner: "What common opinion and the innate
   conceptions of all assign to God, that is natural to God; but this
   corrective justice is so assigned to God: therefore, this justice is
   natural to God."

   The major proposition is evident; for what is not natural to God
   neither exists in him by any mode of habit or mode of affection, but is
   only a free act of the divine will, and the knowledge of that can by no
   means be naturally implanted in creatures; for whence should there be a
   universal previous conception of an act which might either take place
   or never take place? No such thing was at the first engraven on the
   hearts of men, and the fabric of the world teaches us no such thing.

   But the minor proposition is established by a threefold proof:-- 1. By
   the testimony of the Scripture; 2. By the testimony of every sinner's
   conscience; and 3. By that of the public consent of all nations.

   First, The holy Scriptures testify that such an innate conception [61]
   is implanted by God in the minds of men. Thus the apostle to the
   Romans, chap. i. 32, "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which
   commit such things are worthy of death." He is here speaking of those
   nations that were the most forsaken by God, and delivered over to a
   reprobate mind; yet even to these he ascribes some remaining knowledge
   of this immutable right of God, which renders it necessary that "every
   transgression should receive its just recompense of reward," and that
   sinners should be deserving of death in such a manner that it would be
   unworthy of God not to inflict it. That is to say, although the
   operations of this observing and acknowledging principle should often
   become very languid, and be even almost entirely overwhelmed by
   abounding wickedness, -- for "what they know naturally, as brute
   beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves," -- yet that mankind
   must cease to exist before they can altogether lose this innate sense
   of divine right and judgment. Hence the barbarians concluded against
   Paul, then a prisoner and in bonds, seeing the viper hanging on one of
   his hands, that "no doubt he was a murderer, whom, though he had
   escaped the sea, yet vengeance suffered not to live." Here they argue
   from the effect to the cause; which, in matters relating to moral good
   or evil, they could not, unless convinced in their consciences that
   there is an inviolable connection between sin and punishment, which
   they here ascribe to Justice. [62]

   Justice among them, according to their fabulous theology, which was
   particularly favoured by the bulk of the people, was the daughter of
   Jupiter, whom he set over the affairs of mortals, to avenge the
   injuries which they should do to one another, and to inflict condign
   punishment on all those who should impiously offend against the gods.
   Hence Hesiod, speaking of Jupiter, says, --


   "He married a second wife, the fair Themis, who brought forth the
   Hours,

   And Eunomia, and Justice, etc.,

   Who should watch o'er the actions of mortal men."

   Hesiod in Theog. 901.

   Again, the same author says, --


   "Justice is a virgin, descended from Jupiter,

   Chaste, and honour'd by the heavenly deities;

   And when any one hath injured her with impious indignity,

   [Instantly she, seated beside her father, Saturnian Jupiter,

   Complains of the iniquity of men," etc.]

   Hesiod in Oper. 256.

   Also, Orpheus in the hymns, --


   "I sing the eye of Justice, who looketh behind her, and is fair,

   Who likewise sits upon the sacred throne of sovereign Jupiter

   As the avenger of the unjust."

   Hence, these common sayings, --


   "God hath an avenging eye;

   God hath found the transgressor."

   In all which, and in numberless other such passages, the wisest men in
   those times of ignorance have announced their sense of this vindicatory
   justice.

   And among the Latins, the following passages prove their sense of the
   same:--


   "Aspiciunt oculis superi mortalia justis."


   "The gods above behold the affairs of mortals with impartial eyes."


   "Raro antecedentem scelestum,

   Deseruit pede Poena claudo."

   "Seldom hath Punishment, through lameness of foot, left off pursuit of
   the wicked man, though he hath had the start of her."

   Horace.

   Also, that celebrated response of the Delphic oracle, recorded by
   Ælian:--


   "But divine Justice pursues those who are guilty of crimes,

   Nor can it be avoided even by the descendants of Jupiter;

   But it hangs over the heads of the wicked themselves, and over the
   heads of their Children; and one disaster to their race is followed by
   another."

   All which assert this vindicatory justice.

   This, then, as Plutarch says, is the "ancient faith of mankind;" or, in
   the words of Aristotle, "opinion concerning God," which Dion Prusæensis
   calls "a very strong and eternal persuasion, from time immemorial
   received, and still remaining among all nations."

   Secondly, The consciences of all mankind concur to corroborate this
   truth; but the cause which has numberless witnesses to support it
   cannot fail. Hence, not only the flight, hiding-place, and fig-leaf
   aprons of our primogenitors, but every word of dire meaning and evil
   omen, as terror, horror, tremor, and whatever else harasses guilty
   mortals, have derived their origin. Conscious to themselves of their
   wickedness, and convinced of the divine dominion over them, this idea
   above all dwells in their minds, that he with whom they have to do is
   supremely just, and the avenger of all sin. From this consideration
   even the people of God have been induced to believe that death must
   inevitably be their portion should they be but for once sisted in his
   presence. Not that the mass of the body is to us an obscure and dark
   prison, as the Platonists dream, whence, when we obtain a view of
   divine things, being formerly enveloped by that mass, it is immediately
   suggested to the mind that the bond of union between mind and body must
   be instantly dissolved.

   It must, indeed, be acknowledged, that through sin we have been
   transformed into worms, moles, bats, and owls; but the cause of this
   general fear and dismay is not to be derived from this source.

   The justice and purity of God, on account of which he can bear nothing
   impure or filthy to come into his presence, occurs to sinners' minds;
   wherefore, they think of nothing else but of a present God, of
   punishment prepared, and of deserved penalties to be immediately
   inflicted. The thought of the Deity bursting in upon the mind,
   immediately every sinner stands confessed a debtor, -- a guilty and
   self-condemned criminal. Fetters, prisons, rods, axes, and fire,
   without delay and without end, rise to his view. Whence some have
   judged the mark set upon Cain to have been some horrible tremor, by
   which, being continually shaken and agitated, he was known to all.
   Hence, too, these following verses:--


   "Whither fliest thou, Enceladus? Whatever coasts thou shalt arrive on,

   Thou wilt always be under the eye of Jupiter."

   And these:--

   "As every one's conscience is, so in his heart he conceives hope or
   fear, according to his actions.

   "This is the first [63] punishment, that ever in his own judgment no
   guilty person is acquitted.

   "Do you think that those have escaped whom a guilty conscience holds
   abashed, and lashes with its inexorable scourge, the mind, the
   executioner, shaking the secret lash?"

   See Voss. on Idol. book i. chap. 2.

   It is the saying of a certain author, that punishment is coeval with
   injustice, and that the horror of natural conscience is not terminated
   by the limits of human life:--


   "Sunt aliquid manes: lethum non omnia finit,

   Lucidaque evictos effugit umbra rogos."


   "The soul is something: death ends not at all,

   And the light spirit escapes the vanquished funeral pile."

   Hence the famous verses of Adrian, the Roman emperor, spoken on his
   death-bed:--


   "Animula vagula, blandula,

   Hospes comesque corporis,

   Quæ nunc abibis in loca?

   Pallidula, rigida, nudula,

   Nec, ut soles, dabis joca."

   "Alas! my soul, thou pleasing companion of this body, thou fleeting
   thing, that art now deserting it! whither art thou flying? to what
   unknown scene? All trembling, fearful, and pensive! What now is become
   of thy former wit and humour? Thou shalt jest and be gay no more." [64]

   "That which is truly evil," says Tertullian, "not even those who are
   under its influence dare defend as good. All evil fills nature with
   fear or shame. Evil doers are glad to lie concealed; they avoid making
   their appearance; they tremble when apprehended." Hence the heathens
   have represented Jove himself, when conscious of any crime, as not free
   from fear. We find Mercury thus speaking of him in Plautus:--


   "Etenim ille," etc.


   "Even that Jupiter, by whose order I come hither,

   Dreads evil no less than any of us:

   Being himself descended from a human father and mother,

   There is no reason to wonder that he should fear for himself."

   Hence, too, mankind have a dread awe of every thing in nature that is
   grand, unusual, and strange, as thunders, lightnings, or eclipses of
   the heavenly bodies, and tremble at every prodigy, spectre, or comet,
   nay, even at the hobgoblins of the night, exclaiming, like the woman of
   Zarephath upon the death of her son, "What have I to do with thee? art
   thou come unto me to call my sin to remembrance?" Hence, even the most
   abandoned of men, when vengeance for their sins hangs over their heads,
   have confessed their sins and acknowledged the divine justice.

   It is related by Suetonius, that Nero, that disgrace of human nature,
   just before his death, exclaimed, "My wife, my mother, and my father,
   are forcing me to my end." [65] Most deservedly celebrated, too, is
   that expression of Mauricius the Cappadocian, when slain by Phocas,
   "Just art thou, O Lord, and thy judgments are righteous!"

   But, moreover, while guilty man dreads the consequences of evil, which
   he knows he has really committed, he torments and vexes himself even
   with fictitious fears and bugbears. Hence these verses of Horace:--


   "Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,

   Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala finxit," [rides?] [66]

   -- ideas for the most part ridiculous, but, as the old proverb says,
   "?'Tis but reasonable that they should wear the fetters which
   themselves have forged." Hence the guilty trembling mob is imposed upon
   and cheated by impostors, by vagrant fortune-tellers and astrologers.
   If any illiterate juggler shall have foretold a year of darkness,
   alluding, namely, to the night-season of the year, the consternation is
   as great as if Hannibal were at the gates of the city. The stings of
   conscience vex and goad them, and their minds have such presentiments
   of divine justice that they look upon every new prodigy as final, or
   portentous of the final consummation. I pass over observing at present
   that if once a conviction of the guilt of any sin be carried home to
   the mind, this solemn tribunal cannot thoroughly be dislodged from any
   man's bosom either by dismal solitude or by frequent company, by
   affluence of delicacies or by habits of wickedness and impiety, nor, in
   fine, by any endeavours after the practice of innocence. The apostle in
   his epistle to the Romans, chap. ii., enters more fully into this
   subject. Two things, then, are to be concluded from what has been said,
   that mankind are guilty, and that they acknowledge, --

   1. That God hates sin, as contrary to himself, and that therefore it is
   impossible for a sinner with safety to appear before him. But if God
   hate sin, he does it either from his nature or because he so wills it.
   But it cannot be because he wills it, for in that case he might not
   will it; a supposition most absurd. And, indeed, that assertion of
   Socinus is every way barbarous, abominable, and most unworthy of God,
   wherein he says, "I maintain that our damnation derives its origin, not
   from any justice of God, but from the free-will of God;" Socinus de
   Serv. p. 3. cap. 8. But if God hate sin by nature, then by nature he is
   just, and vindicatory justice is natural to him.

   2. That our sins are debts, and therefore we shun the sight of our
   creditor. But I mean such a debt as, with relation to God's supreme
   dominion, implies in it a perpetual right of punishment.

   And such is the second proof of the minor proposition of the second
   argument; the third remains.

   Thirdly, The public consent of all nations furnishes the third proof of
   this truth. There are writers, indeed, who have affirmed (a thing by no
   means credible) that some nations have been so given up to a reprobate
   mind that they acknowledge no deity. Socinus hath written [67] that a
   certain Dominican friar, a worthy honest man, had related this much to
   himself of the Brazilians and other natives of America. But who can
   assure us that this friar has not falsified, according to the usual
   custom of travellers, or that Socinus himself has not invented this
   story (for he had a genius fertile in falsehoods) to answer his own
   ends? But let this matter rest on the credit of Socinus, who was but
   little better than an infidel. But nobody, even by report, hath heard
   that there exist any who have acknowledged the being of a God, and who
   have not, at the same time, declared him to be just, to be displeased
   with sinners and sin, and that it is the duty of mankind to propitiate
   him if they would enjoy his favour.

   But a respectable writer objects, -- namely, Rutherford on Providence,
   chap. xxii. p. 355, -- that this argument, that that which men know of
   God by the natural power of conscience must be naturally inherent in
   God, is of no weight. "For," says he, "by the natural power of
   conscience, men know that God does many good things freely, without
   himself; as, for instance, that he has created the world, that the sun
   rises and gives light; -- and yet in these operations God does not act
   from any necessity of nature."

   But this learned man blunders miserably here, as often elsewhere, in
   his apprehension of the design and meaning of his opponents; for they
   do not use this argument to prove that the egresses of divine justice
   are necessary, but that justice itself is necessary to God; which
   Socinians deny. What is his answer to these arguments? "Mankind
   acknowledge many things," says he, "which God does freely." To be sure
   they do, when he exhibits them before their eyes; but what follows from
   that? So, too, they acknowledge that God punishes sin, when he punishes
   it. But because all mankind, from the works of God and from the natural
   power of conscience, acknowledge God to be good and bountiful, we may,
   without hesitation, conclude goodness and bounty to be essential
   attributes of God: so likewise, because, from the natural power of
   conscience and the consideration of God's works of providence, they
   conclude and agree that God is just, we contend that justice is natural
   to God.

   But as mankind have testified this consent by other methods, so they
   have especially done it by sacrifices; concerning which Pliny says,
   "That all the world have agreed in them, although enemies or strangers
   to one another." But since these are plainly of a divine origin, and
   instituted to prefigure, so to speak, the true atonement by the blood
   of Christ, in which he hath been the Lamb slain from the foundation of
   the world, -- that is, from the promise made of the seed of the woman,
   and from the sacrifice of Abel which followed, -- the use of them
   descended to all the posterity of Adam: therefore, though afterward the
   whole plan and purpose of the institution was lost among by far the
   greatest part of mankind, and even the true God himself, to whom alone
   they were due, was unknown, and though no traces of the thing
   signified, -- namely, the promised seed, -- remained, yet still the
   thing itself, and the general notion of appeasing the Deity by
   sacrifices, hath survived all the darkness, impieties, dreadful
   wickedness, punishments, migrations of nations, downfalls and
   destructions of cities, states, and people, in which the world for
   these many ages hath been involved; for a consciousness of sin, and a
   sense of divine and avenging justice, have taken deeper root in the
   heart of man than that they can by any means be eradicated.

   There were four kinds of sacrifices among the Gentiles:-- First, the
   propitiatory or peace-making sacrifices; for by those they thought they
   could render the gods propitious or appease them, or avert the anger of
   the gods, and obtain peace with them. Hence these verses on that
   undertaking of the Greeks, in the exordium of Homer:--


   "But let some prophet or some sacred sage

   Explore the cause of great Apollo's rage:

   Or learn the wasteful vengeance to remove

   By mystic dreams; for dreams descend from Jove.

   If broken vows this heavy curse have laid,

   Let altars smoke and hecatombs be paid:

   So Heaven atoned shall dying Greece restore,

   And Phoebus dart his burning shafts no more."

   Pope's Homer.

   They were desirous of appeasing Apollo by sacrifices, who had inflicted
   on them a lamentable mortality. To the same purpose is that passage of
   Virgil, --


   "The prophet [68] first with sacrifice adores

   The greater gods; their pardon then implores."

   Dryden's Virgil

   Hence, too, that lamentation of the person in the Poenulus of Plautus,
   who could not make satisfaction to his gods:--

   "Unhappy man that I am," says he, "today I have sacrificed six lambs to
   my much-incensed gods, and yet I have not been able to render Venus
   propitious to me; and as I could not appease her, I came instantly
   off."

   And Suetonius, speaking of Otho, says, "He endeavours, by all kinds of
   piacular sacrifices, to propitiate the manes of Galba, by whom he had
   seen himself thrust down and expelled." And the same author affirms of
   Nero, "That he had been instructed that kings were wont to expiate the
   heavenly prodigies by the slaughter of some illustrious victim, and to
   turn them from themselves upon the heads of their nobles;" though this,
   perhaps, rather belongs to the second kind. But innumerable expressions
   to this purpose are extant, both among the Greek and Latin authors.

   The second kind were the expiatory or purifying sacrifices, by which
   sins were said to be atoned, expiated, and cleansed, and sinners
   purified, purged, and reconciled, and the anger of the gods turned
   aside and averted. It would be tedious, and perhaps superfluous, to
   produce examples; the learned can easily trace them in great abundance.
   The other kinds were the eucharistical and prophetical, which have no
   relation to our present purpose.

   In this way of appeasing the Deity, mankind, I say, formerly agreed;
   whence it is evident that an innate conception [69] of this
   sin-avenging justice is natural to all, and, therefore, that that
   justice is to be reckoned among the essential attributes of the divine
   nature; concerning which only, and not concerning the free acts of his
   will, mankind universally agree.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [58] "Compensatio" is the word in the original, and as "retaliation" is
   frequently used in a particular sense as connected with evil feeling,
   perhaps "retribution" would better express the meaning of Owen. -- Ed.

   [59] Here it is necessary to supply another translation: "Yet in
   respect of its source and root, so far as pertains to its subject, if
   God be absolutely perfect, it cannot be derived to him from any other
   source." -- Ed.

   [60] The sentence might be more intelligibly rendered: "There is
   nothing which we affirm of vindicatory justice, -- whether that it is
   meant of God essentially, and not only denominatively, that it has an
   absolute name (for it is called "holiness" and "purity"), that we have
   it expressed both in the abstract and concrete, that it requires the
   punishment of sinners, that it implies a constant and immutable will of
   punishing every sin, according to the rule of divine wisdom and right,
   -- but what is ofttimes affirmed expressly, directly, and particularly,
   in the passages above mentioned." -- Ed.

   [61] The Greek word prolepsis is employed in the original, for which
   perhaps it was difficult to find a precise rendering in one English
   word. It was a word employed in the canonics or psychology of Epicurus
   to denote the second of his conditions or criteria of truth, which
   related to ideas as distinguished from sensations or emotions, though,
   like them, derived from sensuous perception. It implied such a primary
   and absolute idea of a thing as existed in the mind antecedently to any
   objective presentation of it, and without which no mental act can take
   place regarding it, whether of naming, thinking, doubting, or
   inquiring. It is used by Owen to describe a principle in the human mind
   which is not created by the evidence of testimony or any course of
   training, which is naturally and essentially interwoven with our mental
   constitution, and is ready beforehand, by anticipation, as the word
   prolepsis simply means, to respond to the abstract idea of equity, or
   to confirm the concrete application of it in the common awards of good
   or evil. -- Ed.

   [62]

   Oimoxa kago pros teknon cheiroumenes.

   Nemei toi dikan theos hotan tuche.

   Schetlia men epathes, anosia d' eirgaso

   Talain' eunetan.
   Eurip. Elec., 1168.

   [63] Or, chief. -- Tr.

   [64] Translated thus by Pope:--

   "Ah! fleeting spirit! wandering fire,

   That long hast warm'd my tender breast,

   Must thou no more this frame inspire?

   No more a pleasing, cheerful guest?

   Whither, ah! whither art thou flying?

   To what dark undiscover'd shore?

   Thou seem'st all trembling, shiv'ring, dying,

   And wit and humour are no more."
   -- Tr.

   [65] His mother, Agrippina, had poisoned her last husband, the Emperor
   Claudius, to make way for his succession, and Nero rewarded her by
   causing her to be murdered. He likewise caused his wife, Octavia, and
   his tutor, Seneca, to lose their lives; and was in every respect,
   perhaps, one of the greatest monsters of wickedness that ever disgraced
   human nature. -- Tr.

   [66] Hor. Epis. ii. 2, 208.

   [67] Socin., de Authoritate Scripturæ; lib. edit. sub nomine Dominici
   Lopez, Soc. Jes.

   [68] Namely, Helenus, Æneid, book iii. -- Tr.

   [69] See note, p. 517.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter IV.

   The origin of human sacrifices -- Their use among the Jews, Assyrians,
   Germans, Goths, the inhabitants of Marseilles, the Normans, the Francs,
   the Tyrians, the Egyptians, and the ancient Gauls -- Testimonies of
   Cicero and Cæsar that they were used among the Britons and Romans by
   the Druids -- A fiction of Apion concerning the worship in the temple
   of Jerusalem -- The names of some persons sacrificed -- The use of
   human sacrifices among the Gentiles proved from Clemens of Alexandria,
   Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Porphyry, Philo, Eusebius, Tertullian,
   Euripides -- Instances of human sacrifices in the sacred Scriptures --
   The remarkable obedience of Abraham -- What the neighbouring nations
   might have gathered from that event -- Why human sacrifices were not
   instituted by God -- The story of Iphigenia -- The history of Jephthah
   -- Whether he put his daughter to death -- The cause of the difficulty
   -- The impious sacrifice of the king of Moab -- The abominable
   superstition of the Rugiani -- The craftiness of the devil --
   Vindications of the argument -- The same concluded.

   But it is strange to think what a stir was made by the ancient enemy of
   mankind to prevent any ray of light respecting the true sacrifice, that
   was to be made in the fullness of time, from being communicated to the
   minds of men through means of this universal ceremony and custom of
   sacrificing. Hence he influenced the most of the nations to the
   heinous, horrible, and detestable crime of offering human sacrifices,
   in order to make atonement for themselves, and render God propitious by
   such an abominable wickedness.

   But as it seems probable that some light may be borrowed from the
   consideration of these sacrifices, in which mankind, from the
   presumption of a future judgment, have so closely agreed, perhaps the
   learned reader will think it not foreign to our purpose to dwell a
   little on the subject, and to reckon up some examples. This
   abomination, prohibited by God under the penalty of a total
   extermination, was divers times committed by the Jews, running headlong
   into forbidden wickedness, while urged on by the stings of conscience
   to this infernal remedy. They offered their children as
   burnt-sacrifices to Moloch, -- that is, to the Saturn of the Tyrians;
   not to the planet of that name, not to the father of the Cretan
   Jupiter, but to the Saturn of the Tyrians, -- that is, to Baal or to
   the sun; and not by making them to pass between two fires for
   purification, as some think, but by burning them in the manner of a
   whole burnt-offering. Ps. cvi. 36-38, "And they served their idols:
   which were a snare unto them. Yea, they sacrificed their sons and their
   daughters unto devils, and shed innocent blood, even the blood of their
   sons and of their daughters, whom they sacrificed unto the idols of
   Canaan: and the land was polluted with blood." Almost the whole world,
   during the times of that ignorance which God winked at, were indebted
   to the devil. [70] Since, then, it is abundantly evident from these
   sacrifices by what a sense of vindicatory justice, horror of
   punishment, and consciousness of sin, mankind are constrained, we must
   enlarge a little on the consideration of them.

   Tacitus, speaking of the Germans, says, "Of the gods, they chiefly
   worship Mercury; to whom, on certain days, they hold it as an article
   of religion and piety to sacrifice human victims. Mars they have always
   been accustomed to appease by a most cruel worship; for his victims
   were the deaths of the captives." Jornandes affirms the same of the
   Goths. And thus Lucan writes in his siege of Marseilles:-- "Here the
   sacred rites of the gods are barbarous in their manner; altars are
   built for deadly ceremonies, and every tree is purified by human
   blood."

   And the same author, in the sixth book, from his Precepts of Magic, has
   these verses:--


   "Vulnere si ventris," etc.

   "If, contrary to nature, the child be extracted through a wound in the
   belly, to be served up on the hot altars."

   Virgil bears witness that such sacrifices were offered to Phoebus or
   the Sun, Æneid x.:--


   "Next Lycas fell; who, not like others born,

   Was from his wretched mother ripp'd and torn:

   Sacred, O Phoebus! from his birth to thee."

   Dryden's Virgil

   But Acosta asserts that infants are sacrificed even at this very time
   to the Sun, in Cuscum, the capital of Peru.

   And thus the Scriptures testify, 2 Kings xvii. 29-31, "Howbeit every
   nation made gods of their own, and put them in the houses of the high
   places which the Samaritans had made, every nation in their cities
   wherein they dwelt. And the men of Babylon made Succoth-benoth, and the
   men of Cuth made Nergal, and the men of Hamath made Ashima, and the
   Avites made Nibhaz and Tartak, and the Sepharvites burnt their children
   in fire to Adrammelech and Anammelech, the gods of Sepharvaim."

   Ditmarus, in his first book, testifies "That the Normans and Danes
   sacrificed yearly, in the month of January, to their gods, ninety-nine
   human creatures, as many horses, besides dogs and cocks." But what
   Procopius, on the Gothic war, writes, is truly astonishing, -- namely,
   "That the Francs made use of human victims in his time, even though
   they then worshipped Christ." Alas! for such a kind of Christianity.
   The practices of the Tyrians, [71] Carthaginians, and Egyptians, in
   this respect are known to every one. And Theodoret says, "That in
   Rhodes, some person was sacrificed to Saturn on the sixteenth of the
   calends of November, which, after having been for a long time observed,
   became a custom; and they used to reserve one of those who had been
   capitally condemned till the feast of Saturn."

   Porphyry, on "Abstinence from Animals," relates the customs of the
   Phoenicians concerning this matter. "The Phoenicians," says he, "in
   great disasters, either by wars, or commotions, or droughts, used to
   sacrifice one of their dearest friends or relations to Saturn, devoted
   to this fate by the common suffrages." They were called Phoenicians
   from the word phoinix, which signifies a red colour. Phoinix, according
   to Eustathius, is from phonos, which signifies blood; thence the colour
   called phoinikeos, or the purple colour. Hence the learned conjecture
   that the Phoenicians were the descendants of Esau or Edom, whose name
   also signifies red; and from whom, also, the Red Sea was named. Edom,
   then, phoinix, and eruthraios, mean the; same, -- namely, red. Why may
   we not, then, conjecture that the Phoenicians, or Idumæans, were first
   led to this custom from some corrupt tradition concerning the
   sacrificing of Isaac, the father of Esau, the leader and head of their
   nation? This, at least, makes for the conjecture, that while ether
   nations sacrificed enemies or strangers, Porphyry bears witness that
   they sacrificed one of their dearest friends or relations. But Isaac
   was not to Abraham one of the dearest, but the only dear one. From such
   corrupt traditions as these, it is not to be wondered that the
   consciences of men, struck with a fear of punishment, should have been
   encouraged to persevere in so cruel and superstitious a worship.

   Concerning the ancient Gauls, we have the most credible evidences, --
   Cicero and Julius Cæsar; the former of whom charges them with the
   practice of offering human sacrifices, as a horrid crime, and certain
   evidence of their contempt of Deity. The other, however, commends them
   on this very account, on the score of a more severe religion. "If at
   any time, induced by fear, they think it necessary that the gods should
   be appeased, they defile their altars and temples with human victims,
   -- as if they could not practice religion without first violating it by
   their wickedness; for who does not know that, even at this day, they
   retain that savage and barbarous custom of sacrificing human beings,
   thinking that the immortal gods can be appeased by the blood and
   wickedness of man?" Cicero pro Fonteio. But Cæsar, the conqueror of the
   Gauls, gives us a very different account of these kind of sacrifices.
   "This nation," says he, "of the Gauls, is most of all devoted to
   religious observances; and for that reason, those who labour under any
   grievous distemper, or who are conversant in dangers and battles,
   either sacrifice human victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them,
   and they employ the Druids as the conductors of such sacrifices; for
   they have an opinion that unless a human life be given for a human
   life, the heavenly deities cannot be appeased." These last words seem
   to me to acknowledge a persuasion, that must have arisen from some
   ancient tradition, about the substitution of the Son of Man in the
   stead of sinners as a propitiation for sin.

   No doubt can be entertained concerning the inhabitants of Britain but
   that they were guilty of the same practices; for from them came the
   Druids, the first promoters of that superstition, not only among the
   Gauls, but even in Italy and in the city of Rome itself. "The doctrine
   of the Druids," says Cæsar, "is thought to have been found in Britain,
   and brought thence into Gaul; and now such as are desirous to examine
   more particularly into that matter generally go thither for the sake of
   information," book vi. of the Wars in Gaul. But Tacitus informs us with
   what kind of sacrifices they performed their divine services there, in
   the fourteenth book of his Annals. "When the island of Anglesey was
   conquered by Paulinus, a guard," says he, "was placed over the
   vanquished, and the groves devoted to cruel superstitions were hewn
   down" (the same was done by Cæsar in the siege of Marseilles, Lucan,
   book iii.); "for it was an article of their religion to sacrifice their
   captives on the altars, and to consult their gods by human entrails."

   Hence that verse in Horace:--


   "Visam Britannos, hospitibus feros."


   "I will visit the Britons, cruel to strangers."

   At which remote place [72] the Britons used to sacrifice their guests
   for victims; yea, even in Rome itself, as Plutarch, in his Life of
   Marcellus, testifies, they buried, by order of the high priests, "a man
   and woman of Gaul, and a man and woman of Greece," alive in the cattle
   market, to avert some calamity by such a fatal sacrifice. Whether this
   was done yearly, as some think, I am rather inclined to doubt.

   Of the same kind was the religion of the Decii, devoting themselves for
   the safety of the city. Hence a suspicion arose, and was everywhere
   rumoured, among the Gentiles, concerning the sacred rites of the Jews,
   with which they were unacquainted, -- namely, that they were wont to be
   solemnized with human sacrifices: for although, after the destruction
   of the temple, it was manifest that they worshipped the God of heaven
   only, yet so long as they celebrated the secret mysteries appointed
   them by God, Josephus against Apion bears witness that they laboured
   under the infamy of that horrible crime, -- namely, of sacrificing
   human victims, among those who were unacquainted with the Jewish
   polity; where he also recites, from the same Apion, a most ridiculous
   fiction about a young Greek captive being delivered by Antiochus, when
   he impiously spoiled the temple, after having been fed there on a
   sumptuous diet for the space of a year, that he might make the fatter a
   victim.

   A custom that prevailed with some, not unlike this untruth about the
   young Greek kept in the temple, seems to have given rise to it; for
   thus Diodorus, in book v., writes of the Druids, "They fix up their
   malefactors upon poles, after having kept them five years" (it seems
   they fattened much slower than at Jerusalem), "and sacrifice them to
   their gods, and, with other first-fruits of the year, offer them on
   large funeral piles." Theodoret also mentions something of that kind
   concerning the Rhodians, in the first book of the "Greek Affections;"
   the words have been mentioned before.

   But that young Greek, destined for sacrifice, in Apion, has no name;
   that is, there never was any such person.


   "But, friend, discover faithful what I crave, --

   Artful concealment ill becomes the brave;

   Say what thy birth, and what the name you bore,

   Imposed by parents in the natal hour."

   Pope's [73] Homer's Odyssey, book viii.

   But, after having prepared the plot, he ought not to have shunned the
   task of giving names to the actors. We have the name of a Persian
   sacrificed even among the Thracians, in Herodotus, book ix. "The
   Thracians of Apsinthium," says he, "having seized Eobazus flying into
   Thrace, sacrificed him, after their custom, to Pleistorus, the god of
   the country."

   There is still remaining, if I rightly remember, the name of a Spanish
   soldier, a captive, with other of his companions, among the Mexicans,
   well-known inhabitants of America, who being sacrificed, on a very high
   altar, to the gods of the country, when his heart was pulled out (if we
   can credit Peter Martyr, author of the History of the West Indies),
   tumbling down upon the sand, exclaimed, "O companions, they have
   murdered me!" Clemens of Alexandria makes mention of Theopompus, a king
   of the Lacedæmonians, being sacrificed by Aristomenes the Messenian.
   His words, which elegantly set forth this custom of all the nations, we
   shall beg leave to trouble the reader with: "But now, when they had
   invaded all states and nations as plagues (he is speaking of demons),
   they demanded cruel sacrifices; and one Aristomenes, a Messenian, slew
   three hundred in honour of Ithometan Jupiter, thinking that he
   sacrificed so many hecatombs in due form, and of such a kind. Among
   these, too, was Theopompus, king of the Lacedemonians, an illustrious
   victim. But the inhabitants of Mount Taurus, who dwell about the Tauric
   Chersonese, instantly sacrifice whatever shipwrecked strangers they
   find upon their coasts to Diana of Taurus. Thence, ye inhospitable
   shores! Euripides again and again bewails in his scenes these your
   sacrifices," Clemens' Exhortations to the Greeks.

   But what he says concerning Euripides has a reference to the story of
   "Iphigenia in Tauris;" where, however, the poet signifies that she
   detested such kinds of sacrifices, for he introduces Iphigenia, the
   priestess of Diana, thus bewailing her lot: "They have appointed me
   priestess in these temples, where Diana, the goddess of the festival,
   is delighted with such laws, whose name alone is honourable; but I say
   no more, dreading the goddess. For I sacrifice (and it long hath been a
   custom of the state) every Grecian that arrives in this country," Eur.
   Iph. in Tauris, v. 34.

   Thus far Clemens, who also demonstrates the same thing of the
   Thessalians, Lycians, Lesbians, Phocensians, and Romans, from Monimus,
   Antoclides, Pythocles, and Demaratus. That deed, too, of Agamemnon,
   alluded to by Virgil, furnishes another proof:--


   "Sanguine placastis ventos, et virgine cæsâ."


   "O Grecians, when the Trojan shores you sought,

   Your passage with a virgin's blood was bought."

   Dryden's Virg.

   Tertullian also bears witness to this wickedness: "In Africa they
   openly sacrificed infants to Saturn, even down to the time of the
   proconsulate of Tiberius; and what is surprising, even in that most
   religious city of the pious descendants of Æneas, there is a certain
   Jupiter, whom, at his games, they drench with human blood."

   It is notoriously known, that in the sanguinary games of the Romans,
   they made atonement to the gods with human blood, -- namely, that of
   captives. But Eusebius Pamphilus (Præp. Evang. lib. iv. cap. 16) enters
   the most fully of any into this matter; for he shows from Porphyry,
   Philo, Clemens, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Diodorus Siculus, that
   this ceremony of offering human sacrifices was practised all over the
   world. Porphyry, indeed, shows at large who instituted this kind of
   worship in different places, and who put an end to it. Another very
   ingenious poet brings an accusation of extreme folly and madness
   against this rite in these verses. It is a Plebeian addressing
   Agamemnon:--


   "Tu quum pro vitula, statuis dulcem Aulide natam,

   Ante aras, spargisque mola caput, improbe, salsa,

   Rectum animi servas?"

   Hor., lib. ii. sat. iii. v. 199.


   "When your own child you to the altar led,

   And pour'd the salted meal upon her head;

   When you beheld the lovely victim slain,

   Unnatural father! were you sound of brain?"

   Agamemnon is introduced thus, apologizing for himself on account of the
   utility and necessity of the sacrifice:--


   "Verum ego, ut hærentes adverso littore naves

   Eriperem, prudens placavi sanguine divos."


   "But I, while adverse winds tempestuous roar,

   To loose our fated navy from the shore,

   Wisely with blood the powers divine adore."

   Francis' Horace.

   The Plebeian again charges him with madness:--


   "Nempe tuo furiose?"


   "What! your own blood, you madman?"

   But Philo, in his first book, relates that one Saturn (there were many
   illustrious persons of that name, as well as of the name of Hercules),
   when the enemies of his country were oppressing it, sacrificed at the
   altars his own daughter, named Leüdem; which among them, namely, the
   Tyrians, means only-begotten.

   I have little or no doubt but that this Saturn was Jephthah the
   Israelite; that their Hercules was Joshua, the celebrated Vossius has
   clearly proved, book i. of Idol.

   But as we have made mention of Jephthah, it will not be foreign to our
   purpose briefly to treat of those three famous examples of human
   sacrifices recorded in the sacred writings. The first is contained in
   that celebrated history concerning the trial of Abraham; an undertaking
   so wonderful and astonishing that no age hath ever produced or will
   produce its like. It even exceeds every thing that fabulous Greece hath
   presumed in story. A most indulgent and affectionate father, weighed
   down with age, [74] is ordered to offer his only son, the pillar of his
   house and family, the trust of Heaven, a son solemnly promised him by
   God, the foundation of the future church, in whom, according to the
   oracles of God, all the nations of the earth were to be blessed; this
   most innocent and most obedient son he is ordered to offer as a
   burnt-offering, -- a dreadful kind of sacrifice indeed! which required
   that the victim should be first slain, afterward cut in pieces, and
   lastly burnt, by the hands of a father! What though the purpose was not
   accomplished, God having graciously so ordained it, this obedience of
   the holy man is, notwithstanding, to be had in everlasting remembrance!
   And forasmuch as he began the task with a sincere heart and unfeigned
   faith, the Holy Spirit bears testimony to him as if he had really
   offered his son: Heb. xi. 17, "By faith Abraham, when he was tried,
   offered up Isaac; and he that had received the promises offered up his
   only-begotten." The fame of this transaction, no doubt, was spread in
   ancient times over many of the eastern nations. But that those who were
   altogether ignorant of the communion and friendship which Abraham
   cultivated with the Lord, and yet were convinced in their consciences
   that a more noble sacrifice than all cattle, and a more precious
   victim, was necessary to be offered to God (for if this persuasion had
   not been deeply impressed on their minds, the devil could not have
   induced them to that dreadful worship), assumed the courage of
   practising the same thing from that event, there is not any room to
   doubt. And, farther, if any report were spread abroad concerning the
   divine command and oracle which Abraham received, the eyes of all would
   be turned upon him as the wisest and holiest of men, and they would be
   led, perhaps, to conclude, falsely, that God might be propitiated by
   such kind of victims: for they did not this from any rivalship of
   Abraham, whom they respected as a wise and just man; but, being
   deceived by that action of his, and endeavouring at an expiation of
   their own crimes, they did the same thing that he did, but with a very
   different end, for the offering up of Isaac was a type of the sacrifice
   of Jesus Christ.

   But from that right and dominion which God naturally hath over all the
   creatures, or from that superior excellence and eminence wherewith he
   is endowed and constituted, he might, without any degree or suspicion
   of injustice or cruelty, exact victims as a tribute from man. But he
   hath declared his will to the contrary: Exod. xxxiv. 19, 20, "But the
   firstling of an ass thou shalt redeem with a lamb; and the first-born
   of thy sons thou shalt redeem;" -- partly, lest human blood, of which
   he has the highest care, should become of little account; but
   especially because all mankind in general being polluted with
   iniquities, a type of his immaculate Son could not be taken from among
   them.

   But this history the falsifying poets of the Greeks have corrupted by
   that fable of theirs concerning the sacrifice of Iphigenia, begun by
   her father Agamemnon, but who was liberated by the substitution of a
   doe. [75] Hence, in Euripides, these words are falsely applied to the
   virgin destined to be sacrificed, which (the proper changes being made)
   might with more propriety be spoken of Isaac, when acting in obedience
   to the command of God and of his father.


   ? o pater pareimi soi, etc.

   "O, father, I am here present; and I cheerfully deliver up my body for
   my country and for all Greece, to be sacrificed at the altar of the
   goddess, by those who now conduct me thither, if the oracle so
   require," Euripid. Iphigenia in Aulis, near the end, v. 1552.

   It is worth while to notice, by the way, the use of the word huper. The
   virgin to be sacrificed declared that she was willing to appease the
   anger of the gods, and suffer punishment in behalf of, or instead of,
   her country and all Greece; and but a little before she is introduced
   exulting in these words, --


   Elisset' amphi naon, etc.

   "Invoke to her temple, to her altar, Diana, queen Diana, the blessed
   Diana; for if it shall be necessary, by my blood and sacrifice I will
   obliterate the oracle," Ib. v. 1480.

   Justly celebrated, too, in the second place, is the history of
   Jephthah's sacrificing his only daughter, related by the Holy Spirit in
   these words: Judg. xi. 30, 31, 34, 39, "And Jephthah vowed a vow unto
   the Lord, and said, If thou shalt without fail deliver the children of
   Ammon into mine hands, then it shall be that whatsoever cometh forth of
   the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the
   children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer it up
   for a burnt-offering." But when he returned, "his daughter came out to
   meet him;" and "at the end of two months, he did with her according to
   his vow." If any passage ever puzzled both Jewish and Christian
   interpreters, ancient and modern, as well as all your disputants upon
   and patchers up of common-place difficulties, this one has. For, on the
   one hand, here it is supposed that all offering of human sacrifices is
   detested and abhorred by God; and to ascribe such a thing to a man of
   piety, and one celebrated by the Holy Spirit for his faith, many will
   not venture. But again, on the other hand, the words of the history,
   the circumstances, the grief and lamentation of the father, seem hardly
   capable of admitting any other meaning. But to me these things are
   ambiguous. [76]

   First, It is evident that a gross ignorance of the law, either in
   making the vow or in executing it, is by no means to be ascribed to
   Jephthah, who was, though a military man, a man of piety, a fearer of
   God, and well acquainted with the sacred writings. Now, then, if he
   simply made a vow, that a compensation and redemption, according to the
   valuation of the priests, ought to have been made, could not have
   escaped him; and therefore there was no reason why he should so much
   bewail the event of a vow by which he had engaged himself to the Lord,
   and to which he was bound, for he might both keep his faith and free
   his daughter, according to the words of the law, Lev. xxvii. 1-8.

   Or if we should conjecture that he was so grossly mistaken, and
   entirely unacquainted with divine matters, was there no priest or
   scribe among all the people, who, during that time which he granted to
   his daughter, at her own request, to bewail her virginity, could
   instruct this illustrious leader, who had lately merited so highly of
   the commonwealth, in the meaning of the law, so that he should neither
   vex himself, render his family extinct, nor worship God to no purpose,
   by a vain superstition? I have no doubt, then, but that Jephthah
   performed his duty in executing his vow, according to the precept of
   the law, however much he might have erred in his original conception of
   it.

   Nor is it less doubtful, in the second place, that Jephthah did not
   offer his daughter as a burnt-offering, as the words of the vow imply,
   according to the ceremony and institution of that kind of sacrifice;
   for as these sacrifices could be performed by the priest only by
   killing the victim, cutting it in pieces, and consuming it by fire upon
   the altar, -- offices in which no priest would have ministered or
   assisted, -- so also, such kind of sacrifices are enumerated among the
   abominations to the Lord, which he hateth: Deut. xii. 31, "Thou shalt
   not do so unto the Lord thy God; for every abomination to the Lord,
   which he hateth, have they done unto their gods; for even their sons
   and their daughters have they burnt in the fire to their gods."

   Thirdly, Nor does it seem probable that Jephthah had dedicated his
   daughter to God, that she should perpetually remain a virgin; for
   neither hath God instituted any such kind of worship, nor could the
   forced virginity of the daughter by any means ever be reckoned to the
   account of the father, as any valuable consideration, in place of a
   victim.

   As, then, there were two kinds of things devoted to God, the first of
   which was of the class of those which, as God did not order that they
   should be offered in sacrifice, it was made a statute that they should
   be valued by the priest at a fair valuation, and be redeemed, and so
   return again to common use. The law of these is delivered, Lev. xxvii.
   1, 2, etc., "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto the
   children of Israel, and say unto them, When a man shall make a singular
   vow, the persons shall be for the Lord by thy estimation, And thy
   estimation shall be of the male from twenty years old even unto sixty
   years old, even thy estimation shall be fifty shekels of silver, after
   the shekel of the sanctuary. And if it be a female, then thy estimation
   shall be thirty shekels," etc. And verse 8: "But if he be poorer than
   thy estimation, then he shall present himself before the priest, and
   the priest shall value him; according to his ability that vowed shall
   the priest value him."

   But the second kind of these were called Cherem, [77] concerning which
   it was not a simple vow ndr, of which there was no redemption or
   estimation to be made by the priest. The law respecting these is given
   in the 28th and 29th verses of the same chapter: "Notwithstanding no
   devoted thing, that a man shall devote unto the Lord of all that he
   hath, both of man and beast, and of the field of his possession, shall
   be sold or redeemed: every devoted thing is most holy unto the Lord.
   None devoted, which shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but
   shall surely be put to death."

   The question, to which of these two kinds the vow of Jephthah belonged,
   creates, if I mistake not, the whole difficulty of the passage.

   That it belonged not to the first is as clear as the day; because if we
   suppose that it did, he might easily have extricated himself and family
   from all grief on that account by paying the estimation made by the
   priest. It was, then, a cherem which by his vow Jephthah had vowed to
   the Lord, by no means to be redeemed, but accounted "most holy unto the
   Lord," as in verses 28, 29, before mentioned.

   But it is doubted whether a rational creature could be made a cherem;
   but, in fact, there can hardly remain any room for doubt. To the person
   who considers the text itself it will easily appear. The words are,
   "Every devoted thing is most holy unto the Lord. None devoted, which
   shall be devoted of men, shall be redeemed; but shall surely be put to
   death." It is evident from the foregoing verse that the words, "of
   men," point not at the efficient cause but the matter [78] of the vow;
   where the same words, in the original, cannot be otherwise rendered
   than by "of," or "touching man," or by "out of," or "from among mankind
   or men," or "of the class of men." And all those writers interpret the
   words in this sense (and there are not a few of them, both among Jews
   and Christians), who are of opinion that the passage ought to be
   explained as relating to the enemies of God, devoted to universal
   slaughter and destruction.

   As Jephthah, then, had devoted his daughter as a cherem, it seems
   hardly to admit of a doubt that the cause of his consternation and
   sorrow at meeting her was because that, according to the law, he had
   slain her, having devoted her to God in such a manner as not to be
   redeemed.

   It would be foreign to our purpose to agitate this question any
   farther. We shall only say, then, that after having maturely weighed
   all the circumstances of the text and of the thing itself, according to
   the measure of our abilities, we have gone into the opinion of those
   who maintain that Jephthah gave up his daughter to death, she being
   devoted to God in such a manner as, according to the law, not to be
   redeemed, that Supreme Being, who has the absolute right and power of
   life and death, so requiring [79] it. The theologians of both nations
   [80] who espouse this side of the question are both numerous and
   renowned. Peter Martyr testifies that almost all the more ancient
   rabbins agreed in this opinion. Josephus in his Antiquities follows
   them, although he hath not determined Jephthah to be free of blame. Of
   the fathers, it is sufficient (for the matter is not to be determined
   by votes) that Jerome in his epistle to Julian, Ambrose on Virginity,
   book iii., Augustine on the book of Judges; and of those in later
   times, Peter Martyr in his commentary on the 11th of Judges, and
   Ludovicus Cappellus in that excellent treatise of his concerning
   Jephthah's vow, have either approved, or at least have not dissented
   from, this opinion. What Epiphanius [81] relates concerning the
   deification of Jephthah's daughter favours this opinion. "In Sebaste,"
   says he, "which was formerly called Samaria, having deified the
   daughter of Jephthah, they yearly celebrate a solemn festival in honour
   of her." Yea, more, the most learned agree that the fame of this
   transaction was so spread among the Gentile nations, that thence Homer,
   Euripides, and others, seized the occasion of raising that fable about
   Agamemnon's sacrificing his daughter, and that there never was any
   other Iphigenia than Jephthegenia, nor Iphianassa [82] than Iphthianass
   [83] or Jephtheanassa.

   But this was a kind of human sacrifice by which, as God intended to
   shadow forth the true sacrifice of his Son, so the enemy of the human
   race, aping the Almighty, and taking advantage of and insulting the
   blindness of mankind and the horror of their troubled consciences,
   arising from a sense of the guilt of sin, influenced and compelled them
   to the performance of ceremonies of a similar kind.

   There is no need that we should dwell on the third instance of this
   kind of sacrifices that occurs in the sacred writings, -- namely, that
   of the king of Moab, during the siege of his city, offering up either
   his own son or the king of Edom's upon the wall, as he was a heathen
   and a worshipper of Saturn, according to the custom of the Phoenicians.
   Despairing of his situation, when it seemed to him that the city could
   no longer be defended, and when he had no hope of breaking through or
   of escaping, he offered his own son, in my opinion (for the king of
   Edom had no first-born to succeed him in the government, being himself
   only a deputy king), as a sacrifice to the gods of his country, to
   procure a deliverance. The three kings then departed from the city
   which they were besieging, God so directing it, either having entered
   into an agreement to that purpose, or because of the war not being
   successfully ended (for the conjectures on this point are by no means
   satisfactory), some indignation having broke out among the troops of
   the Israelites, who also themselves were idolaters. [84] See 2 Kings
   iii. 26, 27.

   We shall conclude this train of testimonies with that noted account of
   the Rugiani, certain inhabitants of an island of Sclavonia, related by
   Albertus Crantzius, from which we may learn the dreadful judgment of
   God against a late superstition of Christians.

   "Some preachers of the gospel of Christ" (who and what they were the
   historian shows) "converted the whole island of the Rugiani to the
   faith. Then they built an oratory in honour of our Lord and Saviour
   Jesus Christ, and in memory of St Vitus, patron of Corveia. But after,
   by divine permission, matters were changed, and the Rugiani fell off
   from the faith, having instantly expelled the priests and Christians,
   they converted their religion into superstition; [85] for they worship
   St Vitus, whom we acknowledge as a martyr and servant of Christ, as
   God. Nor is there any barbarous people under heaven that more dread
   Christians and priests; whence also, in peculiar honour of St Vitus,
   they have been accustomed to sacrifice yearly any Christian that may
   accidentally fall into their hands." A more horrible issue of
   Christianity sinking into superstition would, perhaps, be difficult to
   be found. But we are now tired of dwelling on such horrid rites and
   abominable sacrifices. Forasmuch, then, as we ourselves are the
   offspring of those who were wholly polluted with such sacrifices, and
   by nature not better or wiser than they, but only, through the rich,
   free, and unspeakable mercy of God, have been translated from the power
   of darkness, and the kingdom of Satan, into his marvellous light, it is
   most evident that, by every tie, we are bound to offer and devote
   ourselves wholly to Christ, our Deliverer and most glorious Saviour,
   "who hath loved us, and who gave himself for us, that he might redeem
   us from all iniquity, and purify to himself a peculiar people, zealous
   of good works." Thus the prophecies concerning the oblation of Christ
   being but badly understood, mankind were seduced, through the
   instigation of the devil, to pollute themselves with these inhuman and
   accursed sacrifices. Perhaps, too, that most artful seducer had it in
   view, by such sacrifices, to prejudice the more acute and intelligent
   part of mankind against that life-giving sacrifice that was to be
   destructive of his kingdom; for such now hold these atrocious
   sacrifices and detestable rites in abhorrence. However, to keep the
   minds of men in suspense and in subjection to himself, he did not fail,
   from another quarter, by words dubious, to spread abroad and send forth
   ambiguous oracles, as if such rites and sacrifices were of no avail for
   the expiation of sins. Thence these verses in Cato's Distichs:--


   "Cum sis ipse nocens, moritur cur victima pro te?

   Stultitia est morte alterius sperare salutem."

   "Since it is thyself that art guilty, why need any victim die for thee?
   It is madness to expect salvation from the death of another."

   I have no doubt but that this last verse is a diabolical oracle.

   By such deceitful practices, the old serpent, inflamed with envy, and
   being himself for ever lost, because he could not eradicate every sense
   of avenging justice (which is as a curb to restrain the fury of the
   wicked) from the minds of men, wished to lead them into mazes, that he
   might still keep them the slaves of sin, and subject to his own
   dominion.

   There have been, and still are, some of mankind, I confess it, who,
   from indulging their vices, are seared in their consciences, and whose
   minds are become callous by the practice of iniquity; who, flattering
   themselves to their own destruction, have falsely conceived either that
   God does not trouble himself about such things, or that he can be
   easily appeased, and without any trouble. Hence that profane wretch
   introduced by Erasmus, after having settled matters with the Dominican
   commissaries, to a jolly companion of his own, when he asked him,
   "Whether God would ratify the bargain?" answers, "I fear rather lest
   the devil should not ratify it, for God by nature is easy to be
   appeased." It is from the same idea that many of the barbarous natives
   of America, idly fancying that there are two gods, one good and another
   evil, say that there is no need to offer sacrifices to the good one,
   because, being naturally good, he is not disposed to hurt or injure any
   one. But they use all possible care, both by words, and actions, and
   every kind of horrible sacrifice, to please the evil one. Likewise
   those who are called by Mersennus Deists, exclaim, "That the bigots, or
   superstitiously religious, who believe in infernal punishments, are
   worse than Atheists, who deny that there is a God." So, too, some new
   masters among our own countrymen talk of nothing in their discourses
   but of the goodness of God. His supreme right, dominion, and
   vindicatory justice are of no account with them. But he himself knows
   how to preserve his glory and his truth pure and entire, in spite of
   the abilities, and without regard to the delicacy, of these fashionable
   and dainty gentlemen.

   But Rutherford on Providence answers, "That the Gentiles formerly
   borrowed their purgations and lustrations [86] from the Jews, and not
   from the light of nature." But he must be a mere novice in the
   knowledge of these matters into whose mind even the slightest thought
   of that kind could enter; for I believe there is no one who doubts the
   custom and ceremony of sacrificing among the Gentile nations to be much
   more ancient than the Mosaic institutions. Nor can any one imagine that
   this universal custom among all nations, tribes, and people, civilized
   and barbarous, unknown to one another, differently situated and
   scattered all over the world, could have first arisen and proceeded
   from the institutions of the Jews.

   "But," says he, "the light is dark, that a sinful creature could dream
   of being able to perform a satisfaction, and make propitiatory
   expiation, to an infinite God incensed, and such, too, as would be
   satisfactory for sin." Yea, I say, that a sinful creature could perform
   this is false, and a presumption only, arising from that darkness which
   we are in by nature. But, notwithstanding, it is true that God must be
   appeased by a propitiatory sacrifice, if we would that our sins should
   be forgiven us; and this much he hath pointed out to all mankind by
   that light of nature, obscure indeed, but not dark. Nor is it
   necessary, in order to prove this, that we should have recourse to the
   fabulous antiquities of the Egyptians, the very modest writer of which,
   Manetho, the high priest of Heliopolis, who lived in the time of
   Ptolemy Philadelphus, and took his history from the Seriadic
   hieroglyphical [87] obelisks, writes, that the Egyptian empire had
   endured to the time of Alexander the Great, through thirty-one
   dynasties, [88] containing a period of five thousand three hundred and
   fifty-three years. This is the sum of the years according to that
   writer, as Scaliger collects it, to which Vossius has added two years.
   But other Egyptians have been by no means satisfied with this period of
   time; for "from Osiris and Isis, to the reign of Alexander, who built a
   city of his own name in Egypt, they reckon more than ten thousand
   years, and, as some write, little less than twenty-three thousand
   years," says Diodorus: during which period of time they say that the
   sun had four times changed his course, for that he had twice risen in
   the west and set in the east; which things, though they may seem the
   dreams of madmen, strictly and properly understood, yet some very
   learned men entertain a hope, by means of the distinction of the years
   which the Egyptians used, and the description of their festivals, of
   reconciling them with the truth of the holy Scriptures.

   But passing over these things, it can hardly be doubted that
   Jupiter-ammon, among the Egyptians, was no other than Ham, the son of
   Noah, and Bacchus Noah himself; and that Vulcan, among other nations,
   was Tubal-cain: to all whom, and to others, sacrifices were offered
   before the birth of Moses. What, too, do they say to this, that Job,
   among the Gentiles, offered burnt-offerings before the institution of
   the Mosaic ceremonies? See chap. i. 5, xlii. 8. And Jethro, the priest
   of Midian, offered a burnt-offering and sacrifices to God even in the
   very camp of the Israelites in the wilderness, Exod. xviii. 12. Either,
   then, the sacrifice of Cain and Abel, or that of Adam himself and Eve,
   consisting of those beasts of whose skins coats were made to them by
   God, [89] and by whose blood the covenant was ratified, which could not
   have been made with them after their fall without shedding of blood,
   gave the first occasion to mankind of discharging that persuasion
   concerning the necessity of appeasing the offended Deity, which hath
   arisen from the light of nature, through this channel of sacrificing.
   Yea, it is evident that this innate notion concerning vindicatory
   justice, and the observation of its exercise and egress, have given
   rise to all divine worship. Hence that expression, "Primus in orbe deos
   fecit timor," "Fear first created gods." And hence these verses in
   Virgil, spoken by king Evander:--


   "? Non hæc solennia nobis," etc.

   Æn, viii. 185.


   "These rites, these altars, and this feast, O king!

   From no vain fears or superstition spring,

   Or blind devotion, or from blinder chance,

   Or heady zeal, or brutal ignorance;

   But saved from danger, with a grateful sense,

   The labours of a god we recompense."

   But I do not mention these things as if it were my opinion that
   sacrifices are prescribed by the law of nature. The most of the Romish
   clergy maintain this opinion, that so they may pave the way for
   establishing the blasphemous sacrifice of the mass. Thus Lessius on
   "Justice and Right," book ii. Suarez, however, is of a different
   opinion; "for," says he, "there is no natural precept from which it can
   be sufficiently gathered that a determination to that particular mode
   of worship is at all necessary to good morals," in p. 3 of his Theol.
   on quest. 8, distinct. 71, sect. 8. But from the agreement of mankind
   in the ceremony of sacrificing, I maintain that they have possessed a
   constant sense of sin and vindicatory justice, discovering to them more
   and more of this rite, from its first commencement, by means of
   tradition.

   But to return from this digression: it appears that such a presumption
   of corrective justice is implanted in all by nature, that it cannot by
   any means be eradicated. But since these universal conceptions by no
   means relate to what may belong or not belong to God at his free
   pleasure, it follows that sin-avenging justice is natural to God; the
   point that was to be proved.

   I shall only add, in one word, that an argument from the consent of all
   is by consent of all allowed to be very strong: for thus says the
   philosopher, "What is admitted by all, we also admit; but he who would
   destroy such faith can himself advance nothing more credible,"
   Aristotle, Nicom. iii.

   And Hesiod says, "That sentiment cannot be altogether groundless which
   many people agree in publishing." And, "When we discourse of the
   eternity of the soul," says Seneca, "the consent of mankind is
   considered as a weighty argument; I content myself with this public
   persuasion," Seneca, Ep. 117.

   And again, Aristotle says, "It is a very strong proof, if all shall
   agree in what we shall say." And in that observation another author
   concurs: "The things that are commonly agreed on are worthy of credit."
   And here endeth the second argument
     __________________________________________________________________

   [70] "Were initiated by the devil in the same abomination." -- Ed.

   [71] Concerning the Tyrians, see Curtius, book iv.; and concerning the
   Carthaginians, see Diodorus, book xx.:-- Tr.

   [72] Namely, Anglesey. -- Tr.

   [73] The words in the original apply much better to our author's
   meaning. See them, Odyss., lib. viii. v. 550. -- Tr.

   [74] Abraham is said to have been now a hundred and thirty-three years
   of age; for some are of opinion that Isaac, at the time he was to have
   been sacrificed, was thirty-three years old. Josephus says twenty-five;
   the Jews in Seder Olam, thirty-six. Nor is it any objection that he is
   called naar, for so Benjamin, the father of many children, is called,
   Gen. xliii. -- Tr.

   [75] Agamemnon, as the story runs, had killed one of Diana's stags, and
   the goddess would be appeased on no other terms than by the sacrifice
   of his daughter; but after she was laid on the pile, Diana, pitying the
   virgin, put a doe in her room, and made Iphigenia her priestess. -- Tr.

   [76] That is, the expressions relating to this subject are capable of
   more meanings than one, and to ascertain the right one is attended with
   difficulties. -- Tr. [This seems a mistake. It is a Greek word in the
   original, anamphisbeteta, and signifies" indisputable," or "beyond
   controversy." Had the word been amphisbeteta, it might have borne the
   meaning attached to it by the translator. -- Ed]

   [77] A thing or person so devoted as not to be redeemed. -- Tr.

   [78] That is, pointing not at the persons vowing, but at the object of
   their vow, or at the thing vowed or devoted by them. -- Tr.

   [79] The author here uses the words, "at least interpretatively,"
   before, so requiring it;" meaning thereby, as I understand him, that
   the just and proper interpretation of the passage wherein this history
   is recorded, and of the others quoted, relating to vows, had clearly
   determined him to adopt this opinion. -- Tr.

   [80] That is, both of the Jewish and Christian persuasion. -- Tr.

   [81] Patriarch of Constantinople in the year 520. -- Tr.

   [82] Iphianassa, as the story says, was daughter of Proetus, king of
   the Argives, who preferring herself in beauty to Juno, was struck with
   such a madness as to believe herself to be a cow, but was afterwards
   cured by Melampus, a famous physician, to whom she was given in
   marriage. -- Tr.

   [83] Or, than the daughter of Jephthah. For Iphigenia, see note on p.
   532.

   [84] Dr Gill agrees with our author that the king of Moab sacrificed
   his own son, and thinks that he might be induced to offer him thus
   publicly on the wall, that it might be seen by the camp of Israel, and
   move their compassion; but rather that he did it as a religious action,
   to appease the Deity by a human sacrifice; and that it was offered
   either to the true God, in imitation of Abraham, or to his idol
   Chemosh, the sun. It was usual with the heathens, particularly the
   Phoenicians, when in calamity and distress, to.offer up what was most
   dear and valuable to them. See p. 527. Dr Gill seems of opinion that
   the cause why the three kings broke up the siege was, that after this
   barbarous and shocking sacrifice the Moabites became quite desperate,
   and that the kings, seeing them resolved to sell their lives so dear,
   and to hold out to the last man, thought fit to raise the siege; a very
   natural explication of these words, "And there was great indignation
   against Israel," if the indignation be understood as applicable only to
   the Moabites. But the concluding sentence of our author on this subject
   seems to imply it to be his opinion, that there were also dissensions
   and indignation in the allied army; perhaps between the Edomites, the
   idolatrous Israelites, and the worshippers of the true God, arising
   from the horrid spectacle they had witnessed. This is only ventured as
   a conjecture, that may better account for the sudden departure of the
   kings. -- Tr.

   [85] Their religion at best had been contaminated with the
   superstitions of the church of Rome. -- Tr.

   [86] That is, their acts or ceremonies of cleansing or purifying
   themselves from guilt by sacrifice, or otherwise; the latter word more
   particularly means the operation of cleansing by water. -- Tr.

   [87] Hieroglyphics are emblems or pictures that were used in the first
   method of writing; but after characters were introduced, they became
   generally unintelligible, and contributed much to promote idolatry.
   They were used by the Egyptian priests to conceal the mysteries of
   their religion from the vulgar, and were thence called hieroglyphics;
   that is, sacred engravings or carvings. They were originally engraven
   or carved on walls and obelisks. -- Tr. [It is hardly needful to advert
   to modern discoveries, from Champollion to Wilkinson, according to
   which it appears that, instead of being subservient merely to the
   purpose of concealment, these mystic characters, now that the key to
   them has been discovered, contain a rich treasury of information in
   regard both to the history and customs of ancient Egypt. -- Ed.]

   [88] A dynasty in history means a succession of kings in the same line.
   -- Tr.

   [89] Gen. iii. 21, "Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God
   make coats of skins, and clothed them." -- Tr.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter V.

   The third argument -- This divine attribute demonstrated in the works
   of providence -- That passage of the apostle to the Romans, chap. i.
   18, considered -- Anger, what it is -- The definitions of the
   philosophers -- The opinion of Lactantius concerning the anger of God
   -- Anger often ascribed to God in the holy Scriptures -- In what sense
   this is done -- The divine anger denotes, 1. The effect of anger; 2.
   The will of punishing -- What that will is in God -- Why the justice of
   God is expressed by anger -- The manifestation of the divine anger,
   what it is -- How it is "revealed from heaven" -- The sum of the
   argument -- The fourth argument -- Vindicatory justice revealed in the
   cross of Christ -- The attributes of God, how displayed in Christ --
   Heads of other arguments -- The conclusion.

   III. [90] It remains, then, that we should now consider, in the third
   place, what testimony God has given, and is still giving, to this
   essential attribute of his in the works of providence. This Paul takes
   notice of, Rom. i. 18. "The wrath of God," says he, "is revealed from
   heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the
   truth in unrighteousness."

   The philosopher Aristotle says that "anger is a desire of punishing on
   account of an apparent neglect;" [91] a definition, perhaps, not
   altogether accurate. Seneca says that Aristotle's definition of anger,
   that it is "a desire of requiting pain," differs but little from his
   own, namely, that "anger is a desire of inflicting punishment," book 1.
   "Of Anger," chapter 3, where he discusses it with great elegance,
   according to the maxims of the Stoics. But Aristotle reckons aorgesian
   [92] among vices or extremes, Ethic. Nicom. lib. 2. cap. 7. But
   Phavorinus says that "anger is a desire to punish the person appearing
   to have injured you, contrary to what is fit and proper." But in
   whatever manner it be defined, it is beyond a doubt that it cannot,
   properly speaking, belong to God. Lactantius Firmianus, therefore, is
   lashed by the learned, who, in his book "Of the Anger of God," chapter
   4, in refuting the Stoics, who contend that anger ought not in any
   manner whatever to be ascribed to God, has ventured to ascribe to the
   Deity commotions and affections of mind, but such as are just and good.
   Suarez, however, excuses him, in his disputation "On Divine Justice,"
   sect. 5, and contends that the nature of anger is very specially
   preserved in the disposition of punishing offences.

   But however this matter be, certain it is that God assumes no affection
   of our nature so often to himself in Scripture as this; and that, too,
   in words which for the most part, in the Old Testament, denote the
   greatest commotion of mind. Wrath, fury, the heat of great anger,
   indignation, hot anger, smoking anger, wrathful anger, anger appearing
   in the countenance, inflaming the nostrils, rousing the heart, flaming
   and consuming, are often assigned to him, and in words, too, which
   among the Hebrews express the parts of the body affected by such
   commotions. [93]

   In fine, there is no perturbation of the mind, no commotion of the
   spirits, no change of the bodily parts, by which either the materiality
   or formality [94] (as they phrase it) of anger is expressed, when we
   are most deeply affected thereby, which he has not assumed to himself.

   But since with God, beyond all doubt, "there is no variableness,
   neither shadow of turning," it will be worth while strictly to examine
   what he means by this description of his most holy and unchangeable
   nature, so well accommodated to our weak capacities. Every material
   circumstance, such as in us is the commotion of the blood and gall
   about the heart, and likewise those troublesome affections of sorrow
   and pain with which it is accompanied, being entirely excluded, we
   shall consider what this anger of God means.

   First, then, it is manifest that, by the anger of God, the effects of
   anger are denoted: "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God
   forbid," Rom. iii. 5. And it is said, Eph. v. 6, "Because of these
   things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience;" that
   is, God will most assuredly punish them. Hence the frequent mention of
   "the wrath to come;" that is, the last and everlasting punishment.
   Thus, that great and terrible day, "in which God will judge the world
   by that man whom he hath ordained," is called "The day of his wrath,"
   because it is the day of "the revelation of the righteous judgment of
   God," Rom. ii. 5. And he is said to be "slow to wrath" because he
   oftentimes proceeds slowly, as it seems to us, to inflict punishment or
   recompense evil. But, perhaps, this difficulty is better obviated by
   Peter, who removes every idea of slowness from God, but ascribes to him
   patience and long-suffering in Christ towards the faithful. And of this
   dispensation even the whole world, in a secondary sense, are made
   partakers. "The Lord is not slack," says he, "concerning his promise"
   (the promise, namely, of a future judgment), "as some men count
   slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any
   should perish, but that all should come to repentance," 2 Pet. iii. 9.

   Nay, the threatening of punishment is sometimes described by the words
   "anger, fury, wrath," and "fierce wrath." Thus, Jonah iii. 9, "Who can
   tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger,
   that we perish not?" that is, "whether he may not, upon our humiliation
   and repentance, avert from us the grievous punishment denounced by the
   prophet."

   But, secondly, It denotes a constant and immutable will in God of
   avenging and punishing, by a just punishment, every injury,
   transgression, and sin. And hence that expression, Rom. ix. 22, "What
   if God, willing to show his wrath," -- that is, his justice, or
   constant will of punishing sinners; for when any external operations of
   the Deity are described by a word denoting a human affection that is
   wont to produce such effects, the holy Scripture means to point out to
   us some perfection perpetually resident in God, whence these operations
   flow, and which is their proper and next principle. [95]

   And what is that perfection but this justice of which we are
   discoursing? For we must remove far from God every idea of anger,
   properly so called, which, in respect of its causes and effects, and of
   its own nature, supposes even the greatest perturbation, change, and
   inquietude of all the affections in its subject; and yet we are under
   the necessity of ascribing to him a nature adapted to effect those
   operations which are reckoned to belong to anger. But since the
   Scriptures testify that God works these works as he is just, and
   because he is just (and we have proved it above), it plainly appears
   that that perfection of the divine nature is nothing else but this
   vindicatory justice; whence Thomas Aquinas asserts [96] that anger is
   not said to be in God in allusion to any passion of the mind, but to
   the judgment or decision of his justice. Nay, that "anger" may not only
   be reduced to "justice," but that the words themselves are synonymous,
   and that they are taken so in Scripture, is certain: Ps. vii. 6, 9,
   "Arise, O Lord, in thine anger, lift up thyself because of the rage of
   mine enemies: and awake for me to the judgment that thou hast
   commanded. Oh let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end; but
   establish the just: for the righteous God trieth the hearts and reins."
   To "judge in anger," or with "justice," are phrases of the same import:
   Ps. lvi. 7, "Shall they escape by iniquity? in thine anger cast down
   the people, O God;" or, "In justice cast them down, because of their
   iniquity." Thus, when he justly destroyed the people of Israel by the
   king of Babylon, he says it came to pass through his anger: 2 Kings
   xxiv. 20, "For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in
   Jerusalem and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that
   Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon."

   But the apostle says that this anger or punitory justice is "revealed
   from heaven." The apostle uses the same word here that is translated
   "revealed" in the preceding verse, when speaking of the manifestation
   or revelation of the righteousness of faith in the gospel. Therefore,
   some have been of opinion that the apostle here asserts that this very
   anger of God is again and again made known and manifested, or openly
   declared, in the gospel against unbelievers. But to what purpose, then,
   is there any mention made of "heaven," whence that manifestation or
   revelation is said to have been made? The apostle, therefore, uses the
   word in a different sense in Rom. i. 18, from that which it is used in
   the preceding. There it means a manifestation by the preaching of the
   word, here it signifies a declaration by examples; and therefore one
   might not improperly translate the word "is laid open," or "clearly
   appears," -- that is, is proved by numberless instances. Moreover, this
   verse is the principal of the arguments by which the apostle proves the
   necessity of justification by faith in the remission of sins through
   the blood of Christ, because that all have sinned, and thereby rendered
   God their open and avowed enemy.

   The apostle, then, affirms that God hath taken care that his anger
   against sin, or that his justice, should appear by innumerable examples
   of punishments inflicted on mankind for their sins, in his providential
   government of the world, and that it should appear in so clear a manner
   that there should be no room left for conjectures about the matter. Not
   that punishment is always inflicted on the wicked and impious while in
   this world, or, at least, that it appears to be so, for very many of
   them enjoy all the pleasures of a rich and flourishing outward estate;
   but besides that he exercises his anger on their consciences, as we
   proved before, and that the external good things of fortune, as they
   call them, are only a fattening of them for the day of slaughter, even
   in this life he ofttimes, in the middle of their career, exercises his
   severe judgments against the public enemies of Heaven, the monsters of
   the earth, the architects of wickedness, sunk in the mire and filth of
   their vices; and that, too, even to the entire ruin and desolation both
   of whole nations and of particular individuals, whom, by a remarkable
   punishment, he thinks proper to make an example and spectacle of to the
   world, both to angels and to men.

   Therefore, although "God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his
   power known," not in that way only, -- namely, by exercising public
   punishments in this life, -- of which we are now speaking, "endure with
   much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction," and
   though he should not instantly dart his lightnings against all and
   every individual of the abandoned and profane, yet mankind will easily
   discern [97] what the mind and thoughts of God are, what his right and
   pleasure, and of what kind his anger and justice are, with regard to
   every sin whatever. Therefore, the apostle affirms that the anger of
   God, of which he gives only some instances, is by these judgments
   openly declared against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men
   whatever, whether they fail in the worship and duty which they owe to
   God, or in the duties which it is incumbent on them to perform to one
   another; moreover, that the solemn revelation of this divine justice
   consists, not only in those judgments which, sooner or later, he hath
   exercised upon particular persons, but also in the whole series of his
   divine dispensations towards men: in which, as he gives testimony both
   to his goodness and patience, inasmuch as "he maketh his sun to rise on
   the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the
   unjust," and "leaveth not himself without witness, in that he doeth
   good, and giveth us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our
   hearts with food and gladness," Matt. v. 45; Acts xiv. 17; so also he
   gives equally clear signs and testimonies of his anger, severity, and
   indignation, or of his punitory justice. Hence, on account of the
   efficacy of the divine anger exercising its power and influence far and
   near, this visible world, as if the very fuel of the curse, is
   appointed as the seat and abode of all kinds of misery, grief,
   lamentation, cares, wrath, vanity, and inquietude. Why need I mention
   tempests, thunders, lightnings, deluges, pestilences, with many things
   more, by means of which, on account of the wickedness of man, universal
   nature is struck with horror? All these, beyond a doubt, have a respect
   to the revelation of God's anger or justice against the unrighteousness
   and the ungodliness of men.

   Moreover, the apostle testifies this revelation to be made from heaven.
   Even the most abandoned cannot but observe punishments of various kinds
   making havoc everywhere in the world, and innumerable evils brooding,
   as it were, over the very texture of the universe. But because they
   wish for and desire nothing more ardently than either that there were
   no God, or that he paid no regard to human affairs, they either really
   ascribe, or pretend to ascribe, all these things to chance, fortune,
   the revolutions of the stars and their influence, or, finally, to
   natural causes. In order to free the minds of men from this pernicious
   deceit of atheism, the apostle affirms that all these things come to
   pass "from heaven;" that is, under the direction of God, or by a divine
   power and providence punishing the sins and wickedness of men, and
   manifesting the justice of God. Thus, "The Lord rained upon Sodom and
   upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven," Gen.
   xix. 24: which cities, by that punishment inflicted on them from
   heaven, he hath set up as an example, in every future age, to all those
   who should afterward persevere in the like impieties. To these
   considerations add, that the apostle, from this demonstration of the
   divine anger from heaven against the sins of men, argues the necessity
   of appointing an atonement through the blood of Christ, Rom. iii.
   18-26; which would by no means follow but upon the supposition that
   that anger of God was such that it could not be averted without the
   intervention of an atonement.

   But not to be tedious, it is evident that God, by the works of his
   providence, in the government of this world, gives a most copious
   testimony to his vindicatory justice, not inferior to that given to his
   goodness, or any other of his attributes; which testimony concerning
   himself and his nature he makes known, and openly exhibits to all, by
   innumerable examples, constantly provided and appointed for that
   purpose. He, then, who shall deny this justice to be essential to God,
   may, for the same reason, reject his goodness and long-suffering
   patience.

   IV. The fourth argument shall be taken from the revelation of that
   name, glory, and nature, which God hath exhibited to us in and through
   Christ: John i. 18, "No man hath seen God at any time; the
   only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath
   declared him;" -- him who, though he be light itself, and dwelling in
   light inaccessible, yet in respect of us, who without Christ are
   naturally blinder than moles, is covered with darkness. In creation, in
   legislation, and in the works of providence, God, indeed, hath plainly
   marked out and discovered to us certain traces of his power, wisdom,
   goodness, justice, and long-sufferance. But, besides that there are
   some attributes of his nature the knowledge of which could not reach
   the ears of sinners but by Christ, -- such as his love to his peculiar
   people, his sparing mercy, his free and saving grace, -- even the
   others, which he hath made known to us in some measure by the ways and
   means above mentioned, we could have no clear or saving knowledge of
   unless in and through this same Christ; for "in him are hid all the
   treasures of wisdom and knowledge." In him God hath fully and clearly
   exhibited himself to us, to be loved, adored, and known; and that not
   only in regard of his heavenly doctrine, in which he hath "brought life
   and immortality to light through the gospel," [98] God finishing the
   revelation of himself to mankind by the mission and ministry of his
   Son, but also, exhibiting, both in the person of Christ and in his
   mediatorial office, the brightness of his own glory and the express
   image of his person, he glorified his own name and manifested his
   nature, to all those at least who, being engrafted into Christ and
   baptized into his Spirit, enjoy both the Father and Son. But in the
   whole matter of salvation by the Mediator, God-man, there is no
   excellence of God, no essential property, no attribute of his nature,
   the glory of which is the chief end of all his works, that he hath more
   clearly and eminently displayed than this punitory justice.

   It was for the display of his justice that he set forth Christ as a
   propitiation, through faith in his blood. He spared him not, but laid
   the punishment of us all upon him. It was for this that he was pleased
   to bruise him, to put him to grief, and to make his soul an offering
   for sin.

   The infinite wisdom of God, his inexpressible grace, free love,
   boundless mercy, goodness, and benevolence to men, in the constitution
   of such a Mediator, -- namely, a God-man, -- are not more illustriously
   displayed, to the astonishment of men and angels, in bringing sinful
   man from death, condemnation, and a state of enmity, into a state of
   life, of salvation, of glory, and of union and communion with himself,
   than is this punitory justice, for the satisfaction, manifestation, and
   glory of which this whole scheme, pregnant with innumerable mysteries,
   was instituted. But that attribute whose glory and manifestation God
   intended and accomplished, both in the appointment of his only-begotten
   Son to the office of mediator, and in his mission, must be natural to
   him; and there is no need of arguments to prove that this was his
   vindicatory justice. Yea, supposing this justice and all regard to it
   entirely set aside, the glory of God's love in sending his Son, and
   delivering him up to the death for us all, which the Scriptures so much
   extol, is manifestly much obscured, if it do not rather totally
   disappear; for what kind of love can that be which God hath shown, in
   doing what there was no occasion for him to do?

   We will not at present enter fully into the consideration of other
   arguments by which the knowledge of this truth is supported; among
   which that of the necessity of assigning to God (observing a just
   analogy) whatever perfections or excellencies are found among the
   creatures, is not of the least importance. These we pass, partly that
   we may not be tedious to the learned reader, partly because the truth
   flows in a channel already sufficiently replenished with proofs. It
   would be easy, however, to show that this justice denotes the highest
   perfection, and by no means includes any imperfection, on account of
   which it should be excluded from the divine nature. Neither, in the
   definition of it, does one iota occur that can imply any imperfection;
   but all perfection, simple or formal, simply and formally, is found in
   God. But when this perfection is employed in any operation respecting
   another being, and having for its object the common good, it
   necessarily acquires the nature of justice.

   I shall not be farther troublesome to my readers; if what has been
   already said amount not to proof sufficient, I know not what is
   sufficient. I urge only one testimony more from Scripture and conclude.
   It is found in Heb. x. 26, 27: "For if we sin wilfully after that we
   have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more
   sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and
   fiery indignation." "But perhaps God will pardon without any
   sacrifice." The apostle is of a contrary opinion. Where there is "no
   sacrifice for sin," he argues that, from the very nature of the thing,
   there must be "a looking for of judgment and fiery indignation;" -- the
   very point that was to be proved.

   I could heartily wish that some sinner whose conscience the hand of the
   omnipotent God hath lately touched, whose "sore ran in the night and
   ceased not," and whose "soul refused to be comforted," whose "grief is
   heavier than the sand of the sea," in whom "the arrows of the Almighty"
   stick fast, "the poison whereof drinketh up the spirit," [99] were to
   estimate and determine this difficult and doubtful dispute. Let us, I
   say, have recourse to a person, who, being convinced by the Spirit of
   his debts to God, is weighed down by their burden, while the sharp
   arrows of Christ are piercing the heart, Ps. xlv. 5, and let us inform
   him that God, with the greatest ease, by his nod, or by the light touch
   of his finger, so to speak, can blot out, hide, and forgive all sins.
   Will he rest satisfied in such a thought? will he immediately subscribe
   to it? Will he not rather exclaim, "I have heard many such things;
   miserable comforters are ye all;' [100] nay, ye are forgers of lies,
   physicians of no value.' The terrors of the Lord, which surround me,
   and beset me day and night, ye feel not. I have to do with the most
   just, the most holy, the supreme Judge of all, who will do right, and
   will by no means clear the guilty.' Therefore, my days are consumed
   like smoke, and my bones are burned as an hearth. My heart is smitten,
   and withered like grass; so that I forget to eat my bread. By reason of
   the voice of my groaning, my bones cleave to my skin.' [101] I am
   afflicted and ready to die from my youth up: while I suffer thy terrors
   I am distracted. Thy fierce wrath goeth over me; thy terrors have cut
   me off.' [102] I wish I were hid in the grave, yea, even in the pit,
   unless the Judge himself say to me, Deliver him from going down to the
   pit, I have found a ransom.' [103] Indeed, when the recollection of
   that very melancholy period comes into mind, when first God was pleased
   by his Spirit effectually to convince the heart of me, a poor sinner,
   of sin, and when the whole of God's controversy with me for sin is
   again presented to my view, I cannot sufficiently wonder what thoughts
   could possess those men who have treated of the remission of sins in so
   very slight, I had almost said contemptuous, a manner." But these
   reflections are rather foreign to our present business.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [90] See division, page 512.

   [91] Book viii. chapter 5, of his Topics.

   [92] A deprivation of irascibility.

   [93] Numb. xxv. 4; Deut. xiii. 17; Josh. vii. 26; Ps. lxxviii. 49; Isa.
   xiii. 9; Deut. xxix. 24; Judg. ii. 14; Ps. lxxiv. 1, lxix. 24; Isa.
   xxx. 30; Lam. ii. 6; Ezek. v. 15; Ps. lxxviii. 49; Isa. xxxiv. 2; 2
   Chron. xxviii. 11; Ezra x. 14; Hab. iii. 8, 12.

   [94] The materiality of anger is what is essentially necessary to
   constitute anger; the formality means its external marks and
   characters. -- Tr.

   [95] That is, the principle from which they immediately flow. -- Tr.

   [96] Quest. 47, art. 1.

   [97] Namely, from those instances of punishment which he is pleased in
   his wisdom sometimes openly and awfully to inflict upon the wicked. --
   Tr.

   [98] 2 Tim. i. 10.

   [99] Job vi. 2-4.

   [100] Job xiii. 4, xvi. 2.

   [101] Ps. cii. 3-5.

   [102] Ps. lxxxviii. 15, 16.

   [103] Job xxxiii. 24.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter VI.

   Another head of the first part of the dissertation -- Arguments for the
   necessary egress of vindicatory justice from the supposition of sin --
   The first argument -- God's hatred of sin; what -- Whether God by
   nature hates sin, or because he wills so to do -- Testimonies from holy
   Scripture -- Dr Twisse's answer -- The sum of it -- The same obviated
   -- The relation of obedience to reward and of sin to punishment not the
   same -- Justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise, different --
   The second argument -- The description of God in the Scriptures in
   respect of sin -- In what sense he is called a "consuming fire" --
   Twisse's answer refuted -- The fallacies of the answer.

   We have sufficiently proved, if I be not mistaken, that sin-punishing
   justice is natural to God. The opposite arguments, more numerous than
   weighty, shall be considered hereafter. We are now to prove the second
   part of the question, -- namely, that the existence and sin of a
   rational creature being supposed, the exercise of this justice is
   necessary. And, granting what appears from what we have already said
   concerning the nature of justice, especially from the first argument,
   our proofs must necessarily be conclusive. The first is this:--

   I. He who cannot but hate all sin cannot but punish sin; for to hate
   sin is, as to the affection, to will to punish it, and as to the
   effect, the punishment itself. And to be unable not to will the
   punishment of sin is the same with the necessity of punishing it; for
   he who cannot but will to punish sin cannot but punish it: for "our God
   is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he hath pleased," Ps. cxv.
   3. Now, when we say that God necessarily punishes sin, we mean, that on
   account of the rectitude and perfection of his nature, he cannot
   possess an indifference of will to punish; for it being supposed that
   God hates sin, he must hate it either by nature or by choice. If it be
   by nature, then we have gained our point. If by choice, or because he
   wills it, then it is possible for him not to hate it. Nay, he may even
   justly will the contrary, or exercise a contrary act about the same
   object; for those acts of the divine will are most free, namely, which
   have their foundation in the will only: that is to say, it is even
   possible for him to love sin; for the divine will is not so inclined to
   any object, but that, if it should be inclined to its contrary, that
   might, consistent with justice, be done. This reasoning Durandus agrees
   to, and this Twisse urges as an argument. The conclusion, then, must
   be, that God may love sin, considered as sin.


   "Credat Apella."


   "The sons of circumcision may receive

   The wondrous tale, which I shall ne'er believe."

   Francis' Horace.

   For "God hates all workers of iniquity," Ps. v. 5. He calls it "The
   abominable thing that he hateth," Jer. xliv. 4. Besides these, other
   passages of Scripture testify that God hates sin, and that he cannot
   but hate it: "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not
   look on iniquity," Hab. i. 13. On account of the purity of God's eyes,
   -- that is, of his holiness, an attribute which none hath ever ventured
   to deny, -- he "cannot look on iniquity;" that is, he cannot but hate
   it. "Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness," says the
   psalmist, Ps. v. 4, 5, -- that is, "Thou art a God who hatest all
   wickedness;" -- for "evil shall not dwell with thee, and the foolish
   shall not stand in thy sight; thou hatest all workers of iniquity." Is
   it a free act of the divine will that he here describes, which might or
   might not be executed without any injury to the holiness, purity, and
   justice of God; or the divine nature itself, as averse to, hating and
   punishing every sin? Why shall not the foolish stand in God's sight? Is
   it because he freely wills to punish them, or because our God to all
   workers of iniquity is a consuming fire? Not that the nature of God can
   wax hot at the sight of sin, in a natural manner, as fire doth after
   the combustible materials have been applied to it; but that punishment
   as naturally follows sin as its consequence, on account of the pressing
   demand of justice, as fire consumes the fuel that is applied to it.

   But it is not without good reason that God, who is love, so often
   testifies in the holy Scriptures his hatred and abomination of sin:
   "The wicked, and him that loveth violence, his soul hateth," Ps. xi. 5.
   Speaking of sinners, Lev. xxvi. 30, he says, "My soul shall abhor you."
   He calls sin "That abominable thing," 1 Kings xxi. 26; Ps. xiv. 1;
   Deut. xvi. 22. There is nothing that God hates but sin; and because of
   sin only other things are liable to his hatred. In what sense passions
   and affections are ascribed to God, and what he would have us to
   understand by such a description of his nature and attributes, is known
   to everybody. But of all the affections of human nature, hatred is the
   most restless and turbulent, and to the person who is under its
   influence, and who can neither divest himself of it nor give a
   satisfactory vent to its motions, the most tormenting and vexatious;
   for as it takes its rise from a disagreement with and dislike of its
   object, so that its object is always viewed as repugnant and offensive,
   no wonder that it should rouse the most vehement commotions and
   bitterest sensations. But God, who enjoys eternal and infinite
   happiness and glory, as he is far removed from any such perturbations,
   and placed far beyond all variableness or shadow of change, would not
   assume this affection so often, for our instruction, unless he meant
   clearly to point out to us this supreme, immutable, and constant
   purpose of punishing sin, -- as that monster whose property it is to be
   the object of God's hatred, that is, of the hatred of infinite
   goodness, -- to be natural and essential to him.

   The learned Twisse answers, "I cannot agree that God by nature equally
   punishes and hates sin, unless you mean that hatred in the Deity to
   respect his will as appointing a punishment for sin; in which sense I
   acknowledge it to be true that God equally, from nature and necessity,
   punishes and hates sin. But I deny it to be necessary that he should
   either so hate sin or punish it. If hatred be understood to mean God's
   displeasure, I maintain that it is not equally natural to God to punish
   sin and to hate it; for we maintain it to be necessary that every sin
   should displease God, but it is not necessary that God should punish
   every sin." The sum of the answer is this: God's hatred of sin is taken
   either for his will of punishing it, and so is not natural to God; or
   for his displeasure on account of sin, and so is natural to him: but it
   does not thence follow that God necessarily punishes every sin, and
   that he can let no sin pass unpunished.

   But, first, this learned gentleman denies what has been proved; nor
   does he deign to advance a word to invalidate the proof. He denies that
   God naturally hates sin, hatred being taken for the will of punishing:
   but this we have before demonstrated, both from Scripture and sound
   reason. It would be easy indeed to elude the force of any argument in
   this manner. Afterward, he acknowledges that every sin must necessarily
   be displeasing to God. This, then, depends not on the free will of God,
   but on his nature. It belongs, then, immutably to God, and it is
   altogether impossible that it should not displease him. This, then, is
   supposed, that sin is always displeasing to God, but that God may or
   may not punish it, but pardon the sin and cherish the sinner, though
   his sin eternally displease him; for that depends upon his nature,
   which is eternally immutable. Nor is it possible that what hath been
   sin should ever be any thing but sin. From this natural displeasure,
   then, with sin, we may with propriety argue to its necessary
   punishment; otherwise, what meaneth that despairing exclamation of
   alarmed hypocrites, "Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire?
   who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" [104]

   The learned doctor retorts, "Obedience must necessarily please God; but
   God is not bound by his justice necessarily to reward it." But the
   learned gentleman will hardly maintain that the relation of obedience
   to reward, and disobedience to punishment, is the same; for God is
   bound to reward no man for obedience performed, for that is due to him
   by natural right: Luke xvii. 10, "So likewise ye, when ye shall have
   done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable
   servants; we have done that which was our duty to do." Ps. xvi. 2, "My
   goodness extendeth not unto thee." But every man owes to God obedience,
   or is obnoxious to a vicarious punishment; nor can the moral dependence
   of a rational creature on its Creator be otherwise preserved: "The
   wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life," Rom. vi.
   23.

   Away, then, with all proud thoughts of equalling the relation of
   obedience to reward and sin to punishment. "Who hath first given to
   him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and
   through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever.
   Amen," Rom. xi. 35, 36. "What hast thou," O man, "that thou didst not
   receive? Now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou
   hadst not received it?" 1 Cor. iv. 7. God requireth nothing of us but
   what he hath formerly given us; and, therefore, he has every right to
   require it, although he were to bestow no rewards. What! doth not God
   observe a just proportion in the infliction of punishments, so that the
   degrees of punishment, according to the rule of his justice, should not
   exceed the demerit of the transgression. "Shall not the Judge of all
   the earth do right?" But beware, Dr Twisse, of asserting that there is
   any proportion between the eternal fruition of God and the
   inexpressible participation of his glory, in which he hath been
   graciously pleased that the reward of our obedience should consist, and
   the obedience of an insignificant reptile, almost less than nothing.
   Whatever dignity or happiness we arrive at, we are still God's
   creatures.

   It is impossible that he who is blessed forever and ever, and is so
   infinitely happy in his own essential glory that he stands in no need
   of us or of our services, and who, in requiring all that we are and all
   that we can do, only requires his own, can, by the receipt of it,
   become bound in any debt or obligation. For God, I say, from the
   beginning, stood in no need of our praise; nor did he create us merely
   that he might have creatures to honour him, but that, agreeably to his
   goodness, he might conduct us to happiness.

   But he again retorts, and maintains, "That God can punish where he does
   not hate; and, therefore, he may hate and not punish: for he punished
   his most holy Son, whom God forbid that we should say he ever hated."
   But, besides that this mode of arguing from opposites hardly holds good
   in theology, though God hated not his Son when he punished him,
   personally considered, he however hated the sins on account of which he
   punished him (and even himself, substitutively considered, with respect
   to the effect of sin), no less than if they had been laid to any
   sinner. Yea, and from this argument it follows that God cannot hate sin
   and not punish it; for when he laid sins, which he hates, to the charge
   of his most holy Son, whom he loved with the highest love, yet he could
   not but punish him.

   II. The representation or description of God, and of the divine nature
   in respect of its habitude [105] to sin, which the Scriptures furnish
   us with, and the description of sin with relation to God and his
   justice, supply us with a second argument. They call God a "consuming
   fire," "everlasting burnings," [106] a God who "will by no means clear
   the guilty." [107]

   They represent sin as "that abominable thing which he hateth," which he
   will destroy "as the fire devoureth the stubble, and the flame
   consumeth the chaff." [108] As, then, consuming fire cannot but burn
   and consume stubble, when applied to it, so neither can God do
   otherwise than punish sin, that abominable thing, which is consuming or
   destroying it, whenever presented before him and his justice.

   But the very learned Twisse replies, "That God is a consuming fire, but
   an intelligent and rational one, not a natural and insensible one. And
   this," says he, "is manifest from this, that this fire once burnt
   something not consumable, [109] namely, his own Son, in whom there was
   no sin; which," says he, "may serve as a proof that this fire may not
   burn what is consumable, when applied to it."

   But, in my opinion, this very learned man was never more unhappy in
   extricating himself; for, first, he acknowledges God to be "a consuming
   fire," though "a rational and intelligent one, not a natural and
   insensible one." But the comparison was made between the events of the
   operations, not the modes of operating. Nobody ever said that God acts
   without sense, or from absolute necessity and principles of nature,
   without any concomitant liberty. But although he acts by will and
   understanding, we have said that his nature as necessarily requires him
   to punish any sin committed, as natural and insensible fire burns the
   combustible matter that is applied to it. But the learned gentleman
   does not deny this; nay, he even confirms it, granting that with
   respect to sin God "is a consuming fire," though only "an intelligent
   and rational one."

   I am sorry that this very learned author should have used the
   expression, that "this fire burnt something not consumable," when he
   punished his most holy and well-beloved Son; for God did not punish
   Christ as his most holy Son, but as our mediator and the surety of the
   covenant, "whom he made sin for us, though he knew no sin." Surely, "he
   laid upon him our sins," before "the chastisement of our peace was upon
   him." But in this sense he was very susceptible of the effects of this
   fire, -- namely, when considered as bearing the guilt of all our sins;
   and therefore it was that by fire the Lord did plead with him. [110]
   Therefore, what this very learned man asserts in the third place falls
   to the ground; for the conclusion from such a very false supposition
   must necessarily be false. We go on to the third argument.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [104] Isa. xxxiii. 14.

   [105] Habitude means the state of a person or a thing with relation to
   something else. The habitude of the divine nature with respect to sin
   is a disposition to punish it. -- Tr.

   [106] Heb. xii. 29; Deut. iv. 24; Isa. xxxiii. 14.

   [107] Exod. xxxiv. 7.

   [108] Jer. xliv. 4; Isa. v. 24.

   [109] The word in the original is "combustible," meaning something that
   is susceptible of and consumable by fire. It must be evident to every
   one that the phrase is used in allusion to the metaphor which
   represents God as a consuming fire. The Son of God, then, was not,
   strictly and properly speaking, consumable, or susceptible of this
   fire, -- that is, he was by no means the object of divine anger or
   punishment, considered as the Son of God, and without any relation to
   mankind, -- but, on the contrary, was the beloved of his Father, with
   whom he was always well pleased. But he was liable to the effect of
   this fire, -- that is, of God's vindicatory justice, -- as our
   representative and federal head. And every sinner is consumable by this
   fire; that is, is properly and naturally the object of divine wrath and
   punishment. -- Tr.

   [110] Isa. lxvi. 16.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter VII.

   The third argument -- The non-punishment of sin is contrary to the
   glory of God's justice -- Likewise of his holiness and dominion -- A
   fourth argument -- The necessity of a satisfaction being made by the
   death of Christ -- No necessary cause or cogent reason for the death of
   Christ, according to the adversaries -- The objection refuted -- The
   use of sacrifices -- The end of the first part of the dissertation.

   III. Our third argument is this: It is absolutely necessary that God
   should preserve his glory entire to all eternity; but sin being
   supposed, without the infliction of the punishment due to it he cannot
   preserve his glory free from violation: therefore, it is necessary that
   he should punish it. Concerning the major proposition [111] there is no
   dispute; for all acknowledge, not only that it is necessary to God that
   he should preserve his glory, but that this is incumbent on him by a
   necessity of nature, for he cannot but love himself. He is Jehovah, and
   will not give his glory to another. [112] The truth of the assumption
   is no less clear; for the very nature of the thing itself proclaims
   that the glory of justice or of holiness, and dominion, could not
   otherwise be preserved and secured than by the punishment of sin. For,
   --

   First, The glory of God is displayed in doing the things that are just;
   but in omitting these it is impaired, not less than in doing the things
   that are contrary. "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that
   condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord." [113]
   "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" [114] or what is just?
   But "it is a righteous" or just "thing with God to recompense
   tribulation" to the disobedient, and to punish those who, on account of
   sin, are "worthy of death." [115] Suppose, then, that God should let
   the disobedient, whom it is a just thing for him to punish, go
   unpunished, and that those who are worthy of death should never be
   required to die, but that he should clear the guilty and the wicked,
   although he hath declared them to be an abomination to him, where is
   the glory of his justice? That it is most evident that God thus
   punishes because he is just, we have proved before. "Is God
   unrighteous," or unjust, "who taketh vengeance? God forbid: for then
   how shall God judge the world?" And he is "righteous," or just,
   "because he hath given them blood to drink, who were worthy of it,"
   [116] and would be so far unjust were he not to inflict punishment on
   those deserving it.

   Secondly, A proper regard is not shown to divine holiness, nor is its
   glory manifested, unless the punishment due to sin be inflicted.
   Holiness is opposed to sin; for "God is of purer eyes than to behold
   evil, and cannot look on iniquity," [117] and is the cause why he
   cannot let sin pass unpunished. "Ye cannot serve the Lord; for he is an
   holy God: he will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins," [118]
   said Joshua to the Israelites. For why? Can any thing impure and
   polluted stand before his holy Majesty? He himself declares the
   contrary; -- that he is "not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness;"
   that "evil shall not dwell with him;" that "the foolish shall not stand
   in his sight;" that "he hateth all workers of iniquity;" and that
   "there shall in no wise enter into the new Jerusalem any thing that
   defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination, or maketh a lie."
   [119] Nor can Jesus Christ present his church to his Father till it be
   "sanctified and cleansed with the washing of water by the word," and
   made "a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such
   thing, but holy and without blemish." [120] And we are enjoined to be
   holy, because he is holy. But all things are to be "purged with blood;
   and without shedding of blood is no remission." [121]

   Thirdly, We have sufficiently shown above that the natural dominion
   which God hath over rational creatures, and which they by sin renounce,
   could not otherwise be preserved or continued than by means of a
   vicarious punishment. And now let impartial judges decide whether it be
   necessary to God that he should preserve entire the glory of his
   justice, holiness, and supreme dominion, or not.

   IV. And which is a principal point to be considered on this subject,
   Were the opinions of the adversaries to be admitted, and were we to
   suppose that God might will the salvation of any sinner, it will be
   difficult, if not impossible, to assign any sufficient and necessary
   cause of the death of Christ. For let us suppose that God hath imposed
   on mankind a law, ratified by a threatening of eternal death, and that
   they, by a violation of that law, have deserved the punishment
   threatened, and consequently are become liable to eternal death; again,
   let us suppose that God in that threatening did not expressly intend
   the death of the sinner, but afterward declared what and of what kind
   he willed that the guilt of sin should be, and what punishment he might
   justly inflict on the sinner, and what the sinner himself ought to
   expect (all which things flow from the free determination of God), but
   that he might by his nod or word, without any trouble, though no
   satisfaction were either made or received, without the least diminution
   of his glory, and without any affront or dishonour to any attribute, or
   any injury or disgrace to himself, consistently with the preservation
   of his right, dominion, and justice, freely pardon the sins of those
   whom he might will to save; -- what sufficient reason could be given,
   pray, then, why he should lay those sins, so easily remissible, to the
   charge of his most holy Son, and on their account subject him to such
   dreadful sufferings?

   While Socinians do not acknowledge other ends of the whole of this
   dispensation and mystery than those which they assign, they will be
   unable, to all eternity, to give any probable reason why a most
   merciful and just God should expose a most innocent and holy man, --
   who was his own Son by way of eminence, and who was introduced by
   himself into the world in a preternatural manner, as they themselves
   acknowledge, -- to afflictions and sufferings of every kind, while
   among the living he pointed out to them the way of life, and at last to
   a cruel, ignominious, and accursed death.

   I very well know that I cannot pretend to be either ingenious or
   quick-sighted; but respecting this matter I am not ashamed to confess
   my dullness to be such, that I cannot see that God, [122] consistently
   with the preservation of his right and glory entire, could, without the
   intervention of a ransom, pardon sins, as if justice did not require
   their punishment, or that Christ had died in vain. For why? Hath not
   God set him forth to be a propitiation for the demonstration or
   declaration of his sin-punishing justice? But how could that justice be
   demonstrated by an action which it did not require, or if the action
   might be omitted without any diminution of it, -- if God would have
   been infinitely just to eternity, nor would have done any thing
   contrary and offensive to justice, though he had never inflicted
   punishment upon any sin? Could any ruler become highly famed and
   celebrated on account of his justice, by doing those things which, from
   the right of his dominion, he can do without injustice, but to the
   performance of which he is no way obligated by the virtue of justice?
   But if the adversaries suppose that when God freely made a law for his
   rational creatures, he freely appointed a punishment for transgression,
   freely substituted Christ in the room of transgressors; in fine, that
   God did all these things, and the like, because so it pleased him, and
   that therefore we are to acquiesce in that most wise and free will of
   his disposing all things at his pleasure; -- they should not find me
   opposing them. Unless God himself had taught us in his word that sin is
   "that abominable thing which his soul hateth," which is affrontive to
   him, which entirely casteth off all regard to that glory, honour, and
   reverence, which are due to him; and that to the sinner himself it is
   something evil and bitter, for "he shall eat of the fruit of his way,
   and be filled with his own devices;" and that God, with respect to
   sinners, is a "consuming fire," an "everlasting burning," in which they
   shall "dwell;" that "he will by no means clear the guilty;" that "he
   judgeth those who are worthy of death, and by his just judgment taketh
   vengeance on them; and that, therefore, "without the shedding of blood,
   there can be no remission," and that without a victim for sin, there
   remaineth to sinners nothing but "a fearful looking for of judgment and
   fiery indignation, that shall consume the adversaries;" and that he had
   appointed from the beginning his only-begotten Son, for the declaration
   and satisfaction of his justice, and the recovery of his glory, to open
   the way to heaven, otherwise shut, and to remain shut forever; -- if, I
   say, God had not instructed us in these and such-like truths from his
   word, I should not oppose them; but these being clearly laid down in
   the word, we solemnly declare our belief that no sinner could obtain
   the remission of his sins, provided that we are disposed to acknowledge
   God to be just, without a price of redemption. [123]

   Perhaps some one will say, "It doth not follow from the death of Christ
   that God necessarily punisheth sin; for Christ himself, in his agony,
   placeth the passing away of the cup among things possible. All things,'
   saith he, Father, are possible with thee. Let this cup pass from me.'?"

   I answer, It is well known that the word "impossibility" may be
   considered in a twofold point of view. The first is in itself absolute,
   which respects the absolute power of God, antecedent to any free act of
   the divine will: in this respect, it was not impossible that that cup
   should pass from Christ. The second is conditional, which respects the
   power of God, as directed in a certain order, that is determined, and
   (if I might so phrase it) circumscribed by some act of the divine will:
   and in this sense it was impossible; that is to say, it being supposed
   that God willed to pardon any sins to sinners, it could not be done
   without laying their punishment upon the surety. But we do not pursue
   this argument farther at present, because we intend to resume it again
   in the consideration of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction.

   There are yet many arguments very proper for establishing the truth on
   our side of the question, which we choose not to enter on largely and
   on set purpose, lest we should be tiresome to the reader. Perhaps,
   however, it will be judged worth while briefly to sketch out some heads
   of them, and annex them to the former arguments concerning justice and
   the exercise thereof. The first is to this purport:--

   1. A second act presupposes a first, and a constant manner of operating
   proves a habit; a sign also expresses the thing signified. Because God
   doeth good to all, we believe him to be good, and endowed with supreme
   goodness; for how could he so constantly and uniformly do good, unless
   he himself were good? Yea, from second acts the holy Scriptures
   sometimes teach the first; as, for instance, that God is the living
   God, because he giveth life to all, -- that he is good, because he
   doeth good. Why may we not also say that he is just, endowed with that
   justice of which we are treating, because "God perverteth not judgment,
   neither doth the Almighty pervert justice," but "the Lord is righteous,
   and upright are his judgments?" [124] A constant, then, and uniform
   course of just operation in punishing sin proves punitory justice to be
   essentially inherent in God. From his law, which is the sign [125] of
   the divine will, the same is evident; for the nature of the thing
   signified is, that it resembles the sign appointed for the purpose of
   expressing it. That the same thing may be said of the anger, fury, and
   severity of God hath been shown above, Rom. i. 18.

   2. It is not the part of a just judge, of his mere good pleasure, to
   let the wicked pass unpunished: "He that justifieth the wicked is an
   abomination to the Lord," and, "Woe to them that call evil good!" But
   God is a just judge. "But one who is not liable to render a reason,"
   you will say, "and who is by no means subject to a law." But the nature
   of God is a law to itself. He cannot lie, because he himself is truth;
   nor act unjustly, because he is just. Such as God is by nature, such is
   he in the acts of his will.

   3. The argument, from the immutable difference of things in themselves
   is of very considerable weight; for that which is sin, because it
   destroys that subjection of the creature which is due to the Creator,
   cannot, even by the omnipotence of God, be made to be not sin. To hate
   the supreme good implies a contradiction. But if, from the nature of
   the thing, sin be sin, in relation to the supreme perfection of God,
   from the nature of the thing, too, is its punishment. Yea, God hath
   ordered children to obey their parents, because this is right. [126]

   4. The adversaries acknowledge "That God cannot save the impenitent and
   obstinately wicked without injury to the glory, and holiness, and
   perfection of his nature." Why so? "The justice of God," say they,
   "will not suffer it." But what kind of justice is that, I ask, which
   can regard certain modes and relations of transgression or sin, and
   will not regard the transgression or sin itself?

   5. God punishes sin either because he simply wills it, or because it is
   just that sin should be punished. If because he simply wills it, then
   the will of God is the alone cause of the perdition of a sinful
   creature. But he himself testifies to the contrary, -- namely, that
   man's ruin is of himself: "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but
   in me is thine help." [127] Again; justice does not require that the
   things which God doeth of his mere good pleasure should come to pass,
   more than that they should not come to pass. But if it be not more just
   that sins should be punished than that they should not be punished, it
   is certain that the non-punishment or free pardon of sin is more
   agreeable to the goodness, grace, love, and compassion of God than the
   infliction of punishment; how, then, comes it to pass that,
   disregarding these attributes, he should freely will that which no
   essential property of his nature requires? If, then, sin be sin because
   God wills it, if the transgression of the law deserve punishment
   because God wills it, and the punishment be at length inflicted because
   God wills it, the order of things, or the condition which they are in
   by virtue of their respect and relation to the dominion and perfection
   of God, requiring no such thing, why, pray, should we either hate or
   abhor sin, when the bare will of God alone is to be considered, both in
   respect of the decree, which supposes that there is nothing in sin, and
   which implies no change of the state of things, and also in respect of
   its execution? But if God punish sin because, by virtue of his natural
   justice, it is just that it should be punished, then it is unjust not
   to punish it. But is God unjust? God forbid!

   I am truly ashamed of those divines who have nothing more commonly in
   their mouths, both in their disputations and discourses to the people,
   than "that God might by other means have provided for the safety and
   honour of his justice, but that that way by the blood of his Son was
   more proper and becoming." So said Augustine of old. But what then? Of
   that absolute power which they dream of, by which he might, without any
   intervening sacrifice, forgive sins, not the least syllable is
   mentioned in the whole sacred writings; nor am I afraid to affirm that
   a more convenient device to weaken our faith, love, and gratitude,
   cannot be invented. Away, then, with such speculations, which teach
   that the mystery of the love of God the Father, of the blood of Jesus
   Christ, of the grace of the Holy Spirit, are either indifferent, or at
   least were not necessary, for procuring and bestowing salvation and
   eternal glory on miserable sinners. But it is manifest that by such
   artifices Socinians endeavour to overthrow the whole healing and
   heavenly doctrine of the gospel. "My soul, come not thou into their
   secret!" But that God should institute so many typical expiatory
   sacrifices, and attended with so great labour and cost, with a sanction
   of severe punishments upon delinquents, with this view only, to
   communicate instruction, and to serve to lead us to Christ, though they
   could in no wise take away the guilt of sin; [128] that he should
   appoint his own Son, not only to death, but to a bloody, ignominious,
   accursed death, to be inflicted with such shame and disgrace as hath
   not been purged away through so many generations that have passed since
   that death, even to the present time; that Jehovah himself should have
   been pleased to bruise him, to put him to grief; that he made his own
   sword to awake against him, and forsook him; [129] -- that God, I say,
   should have done these and such like things, without being induced to
   it by any necessary cause, let those who can, comprehend and explain.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [111] Our author here speaks in the language, and reasons in the
   manner, of logicians; the prevalent mode of reasoning at the time when
   he wrote. For the sake of those unacquainted with that art, it may not
   be improper to observe that the above argument is what they call a
   syllogism, and that a syllogism consists of three propositions. The
   first is called the major, the second the minor, and the third the
   conclusion. In the above argument the major proposition is, "It is
   absolutely necessary that God should preserve his glory entire to all
   eternity." The minor is, "But sin being supposed, without any
   punishment due to it he cannot preserve his glory free from violation."
   The conclusion is, "Therefore, it is necessary that he should punish
   it." The minor is sometimes called the assumption, and sometimes the
   conclusion is so named. They are both included under this title by our
   author in the following sentence. -- Tr.

   [112] Isa. xlii. 8.

   [113] Prov. xvii. 15.

   [114] Gen. xviii. 25.

   [115] 2 Thess. i. 6; Rom. i. 32.

   [116] Rom. iii. 5, 6; Rev. xvi. 5-7.

   [117] Hab. i. 13.

   [118] Josh. xxiv. 19.

   [119] Ps. v. 4-6; Rev. xxi. 27.

   [120] Eph. v. 26, 27.

   [121] Heb. ix. 22.

   [122] The misprint of quia for quin has occasioned some confusion in
   the translation. It should run thus: "I cannot see but that Christ has
   died in vain, on the supposition that God could pardon sins without the
   intervention of a ransom, consistently with the preservation of his
   right and glory entire, justice not demanding their punishment." -- Ed.

   [123] Or ransom. -- Tr.

   [124] Job viii. 8; Ps. cxix. 137.

   [125] That is, which showeth what the divine will is. -- Tr.

   [126] In the original, "just." -- Tr.

   [127] Hos. xiii. 9.

   [128] Heb. x. 1. There the apostle argues for the necessity of the
   satisfaction of Christ, which he could not if the guilt of sin could
   have been taken away by any other way whatever. -- Tr.

   [129] Isa. liii. 10.
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                                    Part II.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter VIII.

   Objections of the adversaries answered -- The Racovian catechism
   particularly considered -- The force of the argument for the
   satisfaction of Christ from punitory justice -- The catechists deny
   that justice to be inherent in God; and also sparing mercy -- Their
   first argument weighed and refuted -- Justice and mercy are not
   opposite -- Two kinds of the divine attributes -- Their second and
   third arguments, with the answers annexed.

   It is now time to meet the objections of the adversaries, and so at
   length put an end to this dispute, as far as regards the subject-matter
   of it, already drawn out to such a length, and yet farther to be
   continued. We must first, then, encounter the Socinians themselves, on
   whose account we first engaged in this undertaking; and afterward we
   shall compare notes with a few learned friends. But as very lately the
   Racovian Catechism [130] of these heretics hath been repeatedly printed
   among us, we shall first consider what is to be met with there in
   opposition to the truth which we assert.

   The Socinians grant, in that catechism of theirs, the argument for the
   satisfaction of Christ, drawn from the nature of this punitory justice,
   to be "plausible in appearance;" yea, they must necessarily acknowledge
   it to be such as that they cannot, even in appearance, oppose it,
   without being guilty of the dreadful sacrilege of robbing God of his
   essential attributes, and, therefore, they deny either this justice or
   sparing mercy to be naturally inherent in God. And they endeavour to
   defend the robbery by a threefold argument. Their first is this:-- "As
   to mercy, that it is not inherent in God, in the manner that they
   think, [131] is evident from this consideration, that if it were
   naturally inherent in God, God would not wholly punish any sin; as, in
   like manner, if that justice were naturally inherent in God, as they
   think, God could forgive no sin: for God can never do any thing against
   what is naturally inherent in him. As, for instance, as wisdom is
   naturally inherent in God, God never doeth any thing contrary to it,
   but whatsoever he doeth, he doeth all things wisely. But as it is
   manifest that God forgives and punishes sins when he will, it appears
   that such a kind of mercy and justice as they think of is not naturally
   inherent in God, but is the effect of his own will." I answer, first,
   that we have laid it down as a fixed principle that mercy is essential
   to God; and that the nature of it in God is the same with justice we
   willingly grant. Rutherford alone [132] hath asserted that mercy is
   essential to God, but that this justice is a free act of the divine
   will. The falsity and folly of his assertion let himself be answerable
   for; the thing speaks for itself. To speak the truth, justice is
   attributed to God properly and by way of habit, mercy only analogically
   and by way of affection; and in the first covenant God paved no way for
   the display of his mercy, but proceeded in that which led straight to
   the glory of his justice: nevertheless, we maintain the one to be no
   less naturally inherent in God than the other. "But if it were
   naturally inherent in God," say the catechists, "God would not punish
   any sin." Why? I say; mention some plea. "Because," say they, "God
   cannot do any thing contrary to what is naturally inherent in him; but
   it is manifest that God punishes sin." But whose sins doth God punish?
   The sins of the impenitent, the unbelieving, the rebellious, for whose
   offences the justice of God hath never been satisfied. But is not this
   contrary to mercy? Let every just judge, then, be called cruel. The
   punishment of sin, then, is contrary to mercy, either in respect of the
   infliction of the punishment itself, or because it supposes in God a
   quality opposite to mercy. The contrariety is not in respect of the
   infliction of punishment, for between an external act of divine power
   and eternal attributes of Deity, no opposition can be supposed; -- nor
   can it be because punishment supposes some quality in God opposite to
   mercy, for that which is opposite to mercy is cruelty; but God is free
   from every suspicion of cruelty, yet he punishes the sins of the
   impenitent, as the Socinians themselves acknowledge.

   But, "That punitory justice," say they, "which you assign as the source
   of punishment, is opposite to mercy." How, I say, can that be? Punitory
   justice, essentially considered, is the very perfection and rectitude
   of God itself, essentially considered; and the essence of mercy, so to
   speak, is the same. But the essence of God, which is most simple, is
   not opposed to itself. Moreover, both have their actual egresses by
   means of the acts of the divine will, which is always one alone and
   self-consistent. Objectively considered, I acknowledge they have
   different but not contrary effects; for to punish the impenitent
   guilty, for whom no satisfaction hath been made, is not contrary to the
   pardoning of those who believe and are penitent, through the blood of
   the Mediator, which was shed for the remission of sins. In one word, it
   is not necessary that, though actions be contrary, the essential
   principles should also be contrary.

   But they again urge, "Wisdom is naturally inherent in God, and he never
   doeth any thing contrary to it; for whatsoever he doeth, he doeth all
   things wisely." We answer, It hath been proved before that the
   punishment of sin is not contrary to mercy. But they urge something
   farther, and insinuate that God not only cannot act contrary to his
   wisdom, but that in every work he exerciseth it: "Whatsoever he doeth,"
   say they, "he doeth wisely." But the nature of all the divine
   attributes, in respect of their exercise, is not the same: for some
   create and constitute an object to themselves, as power and wisdom,
   which God must necessarily exercise in all his works; some require an
   object constituted for their egress, and for these it is sufficient
   that no work be done that is opposite or derogatory to their honour; of
   this kind are mercy and justice, as was said before.

   Thus far concerning mercy.

   The objections that they bring against justice are easily answered. "If
   justice be naturally inherent in God," say they, "then he could let no
   sin pass unpunished." We readily grant that God passes by no sin
   unpunished, nor can do it. He forgives our sins, but he doth not
   absolutely let them pass unpunished. Every sin hath its just recompense
   of reward, either in the sinner or the surety; but to pardon sin for
   which justice hath been satisfied is no wise contrary to justice. That
   the nature of justice and mercy, in respect of their relation to their
   object, is different, hath been shown before. Such is their first
   argument; the second follows, which is this:--

   "That justice which the adversaries oppose to mercy," say they,
   "whereby God punisheth sins, the sacred Scriptures nowhere point out by
   the name of justice,' but call it the anger and fury of God.'?"

   We answer, in the first place, that it is a very gross mistake that we
   oppose justice to mercy. These catechists have need themselves to be
   catechised. In the second place, let those who shall please to consult
   the passages formerly mentioned and explained on this head, determine
   whether the sacred Scriptures call this justice [133] by its own proper
   name or not? In the third place, anger and fury are, in reality, as to
   their effects, reducible to justice; hence that which is called
   "wrath," or "anger," in Rom. i. 18, in the 32d verse is called
   "judgment." [134] Such is their second; and now follows the third
   argument:--

   "When God forgives sins, it is attributed in Scripture to his justice.
   If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins,
   and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness.' Being justified freely by
   his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath
   set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare
   his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the
   forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness:
   that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in
   Jesus.'?" [135] We answer, that we have already shown at great length
   that justice, universally taken, is the perfection and rectitude of
   God, and has various egresses, both in words and in deeds, according to
   the constitution of the objects about which it may be employed; hence
   effects distinct, and in some measure different, are attributed to the
   same divine virtue. But the justice on account of which God is said to
   forgive sins is the justice of faithfulness, which has the foundation
   of its exercise in this punitory justice: which being satisfied, God,
   who cannot lie, promises the forgiveness of sins through Jesus Christ;
   which promise, beyond all doubt, he will perform, because he is
   faithful and just. [136] And thus vanishes in smoke all that these
   unhappy catechists have scraped together against this divine truth.
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   [130] The Racovian Catechism is generally said to have been compiled by
   Smalcius, from the writings which Faustus Socinus left behind him at
   his death. Other authorities, who seem to have investigated this point
   with particular care, hold that a catechism under this name was in
   existence before Socinus repaired to Poland. The catechism of Smalcius
   is now, however, commonly regarded as the Racovian Catechism. An
   English translation of it was published by Biddle in 1652. It is fully
   reviewed and discussed in Owen's "Vindiciæ Evangelicæ," vol. xii. of
   his works. -- Ed.

   [131] Let the reader remember that the compilers of the Racovian
   Catechism are now speaking, and that the words "they think" allude to
   the sentiments of the orthodox. -- Tr.

   [132] De Provid., cap. xxii. assert. 6, p. 345.

   [133] This point is treated at great length, and clearly proved, in the
   third chapter. -- Tr.

   [134] The original word means a just sentence, or righteous judgment.
   -- Tr.

   [135] John i. 9; Rom. iii. 24-26.

   [136] The argument from 1 John i. 9, which would resolve justice simply
   into a modification of benevolent feeling, and confound it with a
   disposition to forgive, is sufficiently met by the considerations urged
   by our author. The reply to the inference founded on the words "just,"
   and "the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus," Rom. iii. 26, is
   not so clear. The question turns upon the import of dikaios. Two
   passages are quoted by Socinians in proof that it may denote clemency
   or mercy; and if in this sense exclusively the term were applicable to
   the Divine Being, no argument for the necessity of a proper atonement
   could be founded on the texts that speak of the justice of God. The
   passages urged by the Socinians with this view are Matt. i. 19 and Rom.
   iii. 26. Dikaios, however, in its primary meaning, signifies,
   "observant of rule and custom," "having a respect to order and
   decency;" as when Cheiron, in contrast with his ruder brethren (Il. xi.
   832), is described as dikaiotatos kentauron. In this sense, the term
   admirably befits the state of mind in which Joseph must have been when
   he discovered the condition of Mary, and before the truth was
   supernaturally explained to him. In its secondary meaning, dikaios
   signifies equal, just, fair, every shade of meaning it bears coming
   under the category of right or equity; and in no instance of which we
   are aware can it be rendered as expressive of clemency or mercy. In the
   two passages to which an appeal is made, the adversative force of kai
   is overlooked, "just, and yet not willing," "just, and yet the
   justifier." That kai frequently conveys this antithetic meaning might
   be proved from several passages, such as John vii. 19, Mark xii. 12,
   etc. See Winer's "Idioms of the Greek Language," part iii. chap. v. s.
   57. -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter IX.

   Crellius taken to task -- His first mistake -- God doth not punish sins
   as being endowed with supreme dominion -- The first argument of
   Crellius -- The answer -- The translation of punishment upon Christ, in
   what view made by God -- Whether the remission of sins, without a
   satisfaction made, could take place without injury to any one -- To
   whom punishment belongs -- Whether every one can resign his right --
   Right twofold -- The right of debt, what; and what that of government
   -- A natural and positive right -- Positive right, what -- A
   description also of natural right -- Concessions of Crellius.

   John Crellius treats this subject at great length, and with his usual
   artifice and acuteness, in his first book "Of the True Religion,"
   prefixed to the works of Volkelius on the same subject. [137]

   First, then, he asserts, "That God hath a power of inflicting and of
   not inflicting punishment, but that it is by no means repugnant to
   divine justice to pardon the sinner whom by his right he might punish."

   But here Crellius (which is a bad omen, as they say) stumbles in the
   very threshold, supposing punishment to be competent to God as he hath,
   or is endowed with, an absolute and supreme dominion over the
   creatures. God never punisheth, or is said to punish, as using that
   power. It is the part of a governor or judge to inflict punishment; and
   the Scriptures furnish sufficient evidence that both these relations
   belong to him in the infliction of punishment: "There is one Lawgiver,
   who is able to save and to destroy." "He maintaineth right, and sitteth
   in his throne judging right." He is "judge of all the earth." He is the
   supreme "judge." "He hath prepared his throne for judgment; and he
   shall judge the world in righteousness, he shall minister judgment to
   the people in righteousness." He is "judge of the earth," who will
   "render a reward to the proud." He is "Jehovah, our judge, our
   lawgiver, and our king;" and "God the judge of all." [138] In all the
   acts of his absolute dominion and supreme power God is most free; and
   this the apostle openly asserts with regard to his decrees making
   distinctions among mankind in respect of their last end, and the means
   thereto conducing, according to his mere good pleasure: see Rom. ix.
   Moreover, in some operations and dispensations of providence concerning
   mankind, both the godly and ungodly, I acknowledge that God frequently
   asserts the equity and rectitude of his government from that supreme
   right which he possesseth and may exercise. "Behold, God is greater
   than man. Why dost thou strive against him? for he giveth not account
   of any of his matters. Yea, surely God will not do wickedly, neither
   will the Almighty pervert judgment. Who hath given him a charge over
   the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world? If he set his heart
   upon man, if he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath; all
   flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust." [139]

   But that God punishes omissions and avenges transgressions, as the
   supreme Lord [140] of all, and not as the Ruler of the universe and
   Judge of the world, is an opinion supported by no probable reason and
   by no testimony of Scripture. But let us hear what Crellius himself has
   to say. He thus proceeds:--

   "He injures none, whether he punish or do not punish, if so be that the
   question is only respecting his right: for the punishment is not owing
   to the offending person, but he owes it, and he owes it to him upon
   whom the whole injury will ultimately redound; who in this matter is
   God. But if you consider the matter in itself, every one has it in his
   power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to prosecute it, or to
   yield up of it as much as he pleases; for this is the nature of a
   proper and sovereign right."

   Ans. It is easy to be seen that the former fallacy diffuses its fibres
   through the whole of this reasoning; for the right, a dispensation with
   which he maintains to be lawful, he affirms to be a sovereign right, or
   the right of a lord and master. But this right is not the subject in
   question. It is a ruler and judge to whom punishment belongs, and who
   repays it. I would not, indeed, deny that God's supreme and sovereign
   right has a place in the matter of the satisfaction made by Christ in
   our stead: for although to inflict punishment be the office of a ruler
   and judge (that both these relations, namely, of a ruler and judge, are
   to be assigned to God, the Scriptures amply testify, -- see chap.
   iii.), yet the very translation of guilt from us upon Christ,
   constituting him sin for us, is a most free act, and an act of supreme
   power; unless, perhaps, the acceptance of the promise made by the
   surety belong of right to him as ruler, and there be no other act to be
   assigned to God.

   But let us consider these arguments of Crellius severally. "He injures
   no one," says he, "whether he punish or not." But an omission of the
   infliction of punishment, where it is due, cannot take place without
   injury to that justice on which it is incumbent to inflict the
   punishment. [141] For "he that justifieth the wicked is abomination to
   the Lord;" and a heavy woe is pronounced equally on them that "call
   evil good, and good evil." [142] It is true that God neither injures
   nor can injure any one, either in what he hath done or might do; for
   "who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him
   again?" Nor is it less true that he will not, yea, that he cannot, do
   injury to his own justice, which requireth the punishment of every sin.
   An earthly judge may oftentimes spare a guilty person without injury to
   another, but not without injustice in himself. Yea, Crellius asserts
   that God cannot forgive the sins of some sinners, namely, the
   contumacious, without injury to himself; for this, as he says, would be
   unworthy of God. But we are sure that every sin, without exception,
   setting aside the consideration of the redemption by Christ, would be
   attended with contumacy forever. Were it not for that consideration,
   then, it would be unworthy of God to pardon the sins of any sinner.

   Crellius adds: "Punishment is not owing to the sinner, but he owes it,
   and owes it to him on whom all the injury will ultimately redound; who
   is God." But because punishment is not owing to the sinner, but he owes
   it to the ruler, it doth not follow that the ruler may not inflict that
   punishment. Punishment, indeed, is not so owing to the sinner that an
   injury would be done him were it not inflicted. The debt of a sinner is
   not of such a kind that he can ask or enforce the payment of it; and a
   debt, properly speaking, implies such a condition. [143] But the sinner
   hath merited punishment in such a manner that it is just he should
   suffer it. But, again, the infliction of punishment belongs not to God
   as injured, as Crellius signifies, but as he is the ruler of all and
   the judge of sinners, to whom it belongs to preserve the good of the
   whole, and the dependence of his creatures on himself.

   He thus proceeds: "But if you consider the thing in itself, every one
   has it in his power to prosecute his right, and likewise not to
   prosecute it, or to yield up of it as much as he pleases."

   Ans. As Socinus himself, in his third book "Of the Saviour," chap. ii.,
   hath afforded an opportunity to all our theologians who have opposed
   Socinianism of discussing this foolish axiom, "That every one may
   recede from his right," we shall answer but in few words to these
   positions of Crellius, and to the conclusions which he there draws as
   flowing from them.

   There is, then, a double right; -- in the first place, that of a debt;
   in the second place, that of government. What is purely a debt may be
   forgiven; for that only takes place in those things which are of an
   indifferent right, the prosecution of which neither nature nor justice
   obliges. There is also a debt, though perhaps improperly so called, the
   right of which it is unlawful to renounce; but our sins, in respect of
   God, are not debts only nor properly, but metaphorically [144] so
   called.

   The right of government, moreover, is either natural or positive. The
   positive right of government, so to speak, is that which magistrates
   have over their subjects; and he who affirms that they can recede
   wholly from this right must be either a madman or a fool. But this
   right, as far as pertains to its exercise in respect of the infliction
   of punishment, either tends to the good of the whole republic, as in
   ordinary cases, or, as in some extraordinary cases, gives place to its
   hurt; for it is possible that even the exaction of punishment, in a
   certain condition of a state, may be hurtful. In such a situation of
   things, the ruler or magistrate has a power not to use his right of
   government in respect of particular crimes, or rather, he ought to use
   it in such a manner as is the most likely to attain the end; for he is
   bound to regard principally the good of the whole, and the safety of
   the people ought to be his supreme law. But he who affirms that, in
   ordinary cases, a magistrate may renounce his right, when that
   renunciation cannot but turn out to the hurt of the public good, is a
   stranger to all right. The same person may also affirm that parents may
   renounce their right over their children, so as not to take any care at
   all about them; and that they might do so lawfully, -- that is,
   consistently with honour and decency. Yea, this is not a cessation from
   the prosecution of right, but from the performance of a duty; for the
   right of government supposes a duty: "For rulers are not a terror to
   good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power?
   do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he
   is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is
   evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the
   minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."
   [145] The question is not what magistrates do, but what, as the
   guardians and protectors of the law, they ought to do. See Ps. ci. 8.

   There is also a natural right of government; such is the divine right
   over the creatures. The right, I say, of God over rational creatures is
   natural to him; therefore immutable, indispensable, and which cannot by
   any means be derogated. Thence, too, the debt of our obedience is
   natural and indispensable; nor is there any other kind of obligation to
   punishment. God, from the very nature of the thing, has dominion over
   us; and our subjection to him is either by obedience or a vicarious
   punishment, which comes in place of any omission or transgression on
   our part, as Crellius himself acknowledges. Those, then, who say that
   it is free to God to use this right or not, as he pleaseth, may as well
   say that it is free to God to be our God and Lord or not; for the
   demand of obedience and the exaction of punishment equally belong to
   God. But the Judge of the universe exercises his right; and his
   perpetual right, whence sinners are accounted worthy of death, he
   cannot but preserve unimpaired and entire.

   The remaining objections, which are interspersed here and there in that
   book of his "Concerning God," against the vindicatory justice of God,
   either fall in with those which have been mentioned from the Racovian
   Catechism, or shall be reduced to the order of those which follow.

   We think proper, by way of conclusion, to annex some concessions of
   Crellius. "There is," says he, "a certain regard to honour, with which
   God himself cannot dispense." [146] Every transgression, then, of that
   regard hath a punishment coeval with itself, which, from the justice of
   God, must necessarily be inflicted. "Yea," says he, "neither the
   holiness nor majesty of God permits that his commands should, in any
   respect be violated with impunity." [147] But the holiness of God is
   natural to him; an essential, then, and necessary attribute of God
   requires the punishment of sinners. But he himself farther adds, "It is
   unworthy of God to let the wickedness of obstinate sinners pass
   unpunished; for this is the first and perpetual effect of divine
   severity, not to pardon those who do not repent." [148] But we know for
   certain that all sinners would continue obstinate to all eternity,
   unless God be pleased, for Christ's sake, to renew them by his
   omnipotent grace to repentance. Crellius, then, grants that it is
   unworthy of God to let the sins of those pass unpunished for whom
   Christ hath not made satisfaction. He again testifies, also, that God
   hates and abhors all sin; [149] and grants that the mode of conducting
   the punishment of sin is derived from the divine justice. [150] But the
   thing itself is from that same Being from whom the mode or manner of it
   is derived. If the mode of punishment be from divine justice, the
   punishment itself can flow from no other source.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [137] Chap. xxiii., title, "Of the Power of God," p. 181, etc.

   [138] James iv. 12; Ps. ix. 4; Gen. xviii. 25; Ps. l. 6, ix. 7, 8,
   xciv. 2; Isa. xxxiii. 22, Heb. xii. 23, etc.

   [139] Job xxxiii. 12, 13, xxxiv. 12-15.

   [140] As supreme Lord of the universe he exerciseth an uncontrolled
   dominion, doing "in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of
   the earth," whatsoever seemeth good unto him; but as the Ruler and
   Judge of the world he distributeth impartial justice, "giving to every
   one according to his works." The force of this argument, then, is this,
   -- That in viewing God as punishing sin, we are not to consider him as
   supreme Lord, who may exercise an absolute and uncontrolled will, but
   as a righteous Judge, bound by a law to administer justice, and by a
   law founded in his nature, necessarily requiring him so to do. -- Tr.

   [141] The translation of the last clause is ambiguous. The words in the
   original are, "Justitiæ illius, cui poenas irrogare incumbit," -- "That
   justice on which rests the obligation, which is bound, to inflict the
   punishment." -- Ed.

   [142] Prov. xvii. 15; Isa. v. 20.

   [143] The debt of a sinner is not any valuable consideration due to
   him, as a debt is to a creditor, but due by him as a debt is by a
   debtor; and in consequence of the failure of payment, punishment
   becomes due to him, -- i.e., is or may be inflicted in vindication of
   violated justice. But this is what he could not either claim or would
   wish to receive. -- Tr.

   [144] Sin is most accurately defined by our Westminster divines, in
   that inimitable compendium of sound doctrine, the Shorter Catechism, to
   be "any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God."
   -- Tr.

   [145] Rom. xiii. 3, 4.

   [146] Book i. chap. xxiii., p. 180, "Of the True Religion."

   [147] Chap. xxviii.

   [148] Chap. xxii. 186, and chap. xxviii.

   [149] Chap. xxx. 3, 9.

   [150] Chapt. i. p. 78, of his Answer to Grotius.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter X.

   The opinion of Socinus considered -- What he thought of our present
   question, [151] namely, that it is the hinge on which the whole
   controversy concerning the satisfaction of Christ turns -- His vain
   boasting, as if, having disproved this vindicatory justice, he had
   snatched the prize from his adversaries -- Other clear proofs of the
   satisfaction of Christ -- That it is our duty to acquiesce in the
   revealed will of God -- The truth not to be forsaken -- Mercy and
   justice not opposite -- Vain distinctions of Socinus concerning divine
   justice -- The consideration of these distinctions -- His first
   argument against vindicatory justice -- The solution of it -- The anger
   and severity of God, what -- Universal and particular justice, in what
   they agree -- The false reasoning and vain boasting of the adversary.

   We come now to Socinus himself. In almost all his writings he opposes
   this punitory justice. We shall consider what he hath written against
   Covetus, in that treatise of his entitled, "Of Jesus Christ the
   Saviour," and what he only repeats in other places, as occasion
   required. In the first book and first chapter, and also in the third
   book and first chapter, of that work, expressly, and of set purpose, he
   opposes himself vehemently and with all his might to the truth on this
   point. But because he very well understood that by the establishment of
   this justice a knife is put to the throat of his opinion, and that it
   cannot be defended (that is, that no reason can be given why Christ our
   Saviour is called Jesus Christ), he maintains that the whole
   controversy concerning the satisfaction of Christ hinges on this very
   question. The reader will perceive, from the arguments already used,
   that I am of the same opinion: for it being granted that this justice
   belongs to God, not even Socinus, though doubtless a man of a great,
   very artful, and fertile genius, could devise any way of obtaining
   salvation for sinners without a satisfaction; for had he either found
   out one, or even feigned it upon a supposition, he would not have
   wanted the effrontery of imposing it on the minds of the credulous and
   fanatic; which, however, he nowhere hath attempted.

   But, on the other hand, gallantly supposing that he had removed this
   justice out of the way, as if the business were entirely settled, and
   the strong tower of his adversaries destroyed, he highly glories in the
   triumphs acquired for himself and his followers; "for," says he,
   "having got rid of this justice, had we no other argument, that human
   fiction of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ must be thoroughly
   detected, and totally vanish." This vain boasting of his the learned
   and pious have long ago sufficiently checked by innumerable testimonies
   from Scripture.

   And forasmuch as the fact is abundantly clear that Christ bore our
   sins, God laying them upon him, and that by his satisfaction he
   purchased eternal salvation, though it had even pleased God to keep the
   causes and reasons of this infinitely wise transaction hid to all
   eternity in the abyss of his own goodness and wisdom, it would have
   been our duty to acquiesce in the infinite holiness and wisdom of his
   will. So, also, it is beyond any doubt that no helps of our faith are
   to be despised, and that no revelations of the divine nature and will
   are to be neglected, by which our merciful Father leads us into a more
   intimate and saving knowledge of this mystery of holiness.

   We, also, to whom the most sacred deposit of this divine truth hath
   been committed, would immediately judge ourselves unworthy of it should
   we spontaneously betray any one point or jot of it, much less so strong
   a pillar of our faith and hope, to its adversaries. Though, then, we
   have other unanswerable proofs of the satisfaction of Christ, which the
   gates of hell shall in vain oppose, and numberless testimonies of the
   God who cannot lie, so that we may suppose Socinus is only idly
   insulting those who grant that God might forgive sin without any
   intervention of a satisfaction, but that he would not, (an expression
   which I by no means approve), we however think it necessary that this
   bulwark of punitory justice, a point, beyond all doubt, of the last
   importance to the cause, however it shall be disposed of, should be
   defended from the insults of adversaries.

   In the first place, then, in the first chapter of the before-mentioned
   book, when going to dispute against this justice, he supposes that,
   according to our opinion, it is opposed to mercy, and that it is
   contrary to it, and builds upon this false supposition through the
   whole of his treatise, both in making his objections and answers. I
   acknowledge that he seized the opportunity of making this blunder from
   Covetus, against whom he is combating, who improperly and inaccurately
   hath said that this justice is opposed to mercy, because they have
   different effects; but we have formerly shown that they are neither
   essentially, nor actually, nor effectively opposite, as both of them
   are the very perfection of Deity itself, but that they are only
   distinguished as to their object, and not as to their subject. In all
   the sophisms, then, in which he afterward endeavours to prove that the
   Scripture acknowledges no such justice in God as is opposed to mercy,
   he trifles, through a perpetual mistake of the argument. But that
   justice which we mean, he says, is twofold in God. "The first," as he
   says, "is that by which he punishes and destroys the wicked and
   ungodly, -- that is, those who obstinately persevere in wickedness, and
   who are not led, from a repentance of their sins, to have recourse to
   God. The second is that by which even those whom, in his great
   goodness, he approves as just, were he so to will it, could not stand
   in his presence."

   But he again affirms, in the same chapter, "That the justice of God is
   twofold: that one kind he always uses when he punishes abandonedly
   wicked and obstinate sinners, sometimes, according to his law; the
   other kind, when he punishes sinners neither obstinate nor altogether
   desperate, but whose repentance is not expected." And of both these
   kinds of justice he brings some proofs from Scripture.

   That punitory justice is one alone and individual, we affirm; but that
   it is variously exercised, on account of the difference of the objects
   about which it is employed, we acknowledge; -- but this by no means
   proves it to be twofold; for he ought not, among men, to be said to be
   endowed with a twofold justice who renders different recompenses to
   those who merit differently. But his whole treatise, from beginning to
   end, is disgracefully built on a mistaken and falsely-assumed
   principle; for he supposes that "every sin shall not receive its just
   recompense of reward" from divine justice, but that God punishes some
   sins, and can punish others only if he please. From an exceeding desire
   to exclude all consideration of the satisfaction of Christ entirely in
   the matter of inflicting punishment for sins, he against this stone:
   for God most certainly will finally punish the impenitent to all
   eternity, because he is just, and because there is no sacrifice for
   their sins; nor is it less true that God casts out and destroys many
   who are strangers to the covenant of grace, not waiting for their
   repentance, but that he effectually leads others to repentance; -- not
   because he exerciseth a twofold justice, but because his justice hath
   been satisfied for the sins of the latter by Christ, whereas it is not
   so with regard to the former. See Rom. iii. 24, 25. But because he
   would not acknowledge the foundation for that distinction, which may be
   seen in the acts or exercises of the divine justice concerning sinners,
   to be laid in the blood of Christ, he hath feigned a twofold justice,
   and a twofold mercy opposed to it, of which there is not the most
   distant mention made in the sacred Scriptures, and which ought not by
   any means to be ascribed to the divine nature, which is in itself most
   simple.

   But coming to himself again, he denies that in the sacred writings
   there is any mention at all made of any kind of justice that is opposed
   to mercy. We, indeed, have never said that justice is opposed to mercy;
   but as it clearly appears that it is his wish to deny to God the whole
   of that kind of justice whence, in punishing sins, he is said, or may
   be said, to be just (which punishment is an effect different from the
   pardon of sin that flows from mercy), we choose not to contend about
   words. Let us see, then, what kind of arguments he produces to support
   his robbing God of this essential attribute. He says, "that the word
   justice,' when applied to God in the sacred writings, is never opposed
   to mercy,' but chiefly, and for the most part, means rectitude and
   equity."

   It hath been already several times shown that justice and mercy are not
   opposite. We have likewise demonstrated, by many proofs adduced before,
   that the rectitude or supreme perfection of the divine nature is often
   called "justice" in Scripture; but this, I am sure, is by no means of
   advantage, but of much hurt, to the cause of Socinianism. Let him
   proceed, then.

   "But that," says he, "which is opposed to mercy' is not named justice'
   by the sacred writers, but is called severity,' or anger,' or fury,' or
   vengeance,' or by some such name."

   But our opponent avails himself nothing by this assertion; for that
   which is false proves nothing. By that which, he says, is opposed to
   mercy, he understands that virtue in God by which he punishes sins and
   sinners according as they deserve. But that this is never called
   "justice" in Scripture, or that God is not thence said to be "just," is
   so manifestly false that nobody would dare to affirm it but one
   determined to say any thing in support of a bad cause. Let the reader
   but consult the passages adduced on this head in the third chapter, and
   he will be astonished at the impudence of the man. But all are agreed
   that anger, fury, and words denoting such troubled affections, ought
   not properly to be ascribed to God, but only in respect of their
   effects, -- though analogically and reductively [152] they belong to
   corrective justice, -- because, in exercising his judgments, God is
   said to use them, but they do not denote any perfection inherent in God
   any farther than they can be reduced to justice, but only a certain
   mode of certain divine actions; for God doth not punish sins because he
   is angry, but because he is just, although in the punishment of them,
   according to our conception of things, he discovers anger.

   He next proceeds to produce some passages, in order to prove that the
   justice of God in the sacred writings, -- namely, that universal
   justice which we have before described, -- is often used for the
   infinite rectitude of the divine nature (what nobody ever denied),
   where, in mentioning the justice of faithfulness and remunerative
   justice, agreeably to his faithfulness, which always hath respect to
   the covenant of grace ratified and established in the blood of Christ,
   God is said to pardon sins, and to reward those that believe, according
   to his justice; and thence he concludes, "that a justice opposed to
   mercy, by which God must punish sin, is not inherent in God." "For
   what," says he, "is more agreeable to the divine nature, and
   consequently more equitable and just, than to do good to the wretched
   and despised race of mankind, though unworthy, and freely to make them
   partakers of his glory?"

   This surely is trifling in a serious matter, if any thing can be so
   called; for even novices will not bear one to argue from a position of
   universal justice to a negation of particular justice; much less shall
   we readily assent to him, who maintain that that particular justice is
   by no means distinguished from the universal rectitude of the divine
   nature, but that that rectitude is so called in respect of the egresses
   that it has, in consequence of the supposition of sin. But it is
   consonant with sound doctrine, "that that which is agreeable to the
   divine nature should be considered also as righteous and just;" and
   this Socinus acknowledges. We agree that it is agreeable to the divine
   nature to do good to sinners, but at the same time we dare not deny
   that the right of God is, that those who transgress are worthy of
   death; both which properties of his nature he hath very clearly
   demonstrated in the satisfaction of Christ, "whom he hath set forth to
   be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his
   righteousness for the remission of sins;" whom, while the heretic
   rejecteth, he walketh in darkness, a stranger to the true and saving
   knowledge of God, and engaged wholly in his own vain imaginations.

   But Socinus, as if having achieved some great exploit, at length thus
   concludes: "That punitory justice is not a virtue inherent in God, or a
   divine quality or property, but the effect of his will; and that that
   justice by which God always punishes impenitent sinners is so called,
   not properly, but by accident, namely, because it is agreeable to true
   justice or rectitude." We have already considered the arguments that he
   has produced in support of this opinion; whether they be of such weight
   that they should induce us to deny this justice, and whether to punish
   sinners be essential and proper to God or only accidental, let the
   reader, from what hath been said on the subject, determine. So much for
   our first skirmish with Socinus.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [151] Namely, Whether vindicatory justice be essential and natural to
   God, and the exercise of it, or the punishment of sin, consequently
   necessary? -- Tr.

   [152] That is, by consequence. -- Tr.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XI.

   The arguments of Socinus against punitory justice weighed -- A false
   hypothesis of his -- Sins, in what sense they are debts -- The first
   argument of Socinus, in which he takes for granted what ought to have
   been proved -- A trifling supposition substituted for a proof --
   Whether that excellence by virtue of which God punishes sins be called
   justice in the Scriptures -- The severity of God, what -- Our
   opponent's second argument -- It labours under the same deficiency as
   the first -- It is not opposite to mercy to punish the guilty -- The
   mercy of God, what -- There is a distinction between acts and habits --
   Our opponent confounds them -- The mercy of God infinite, so also his
   justice -- A distinction of the divine attributes -- In pardoning sins
   through Jesus Christ, God hath exercised infinite justice and infinite
   mercy -- The conclusion of the contest with Socinus.

   In the third part and first chapter of his treatise, being determined
   to contend to his utmost against the satisfaction of Christ, he
   maintains "That God, consistently with his right, could pardon our sins
   without any real satisfaction received for them;" and he endeavours to
   support the assertion chiefly by the following argument, -- namely,
   "That God is our creditor, that our sins are debts which we have
   contracted with him, but that every one may yield up his right, and
   more especially God, who is the supreme Lord of all, and extolled in
   the Scriptures for his liberality and goodness." Hence, then, it is
   evident that God can pardon sins without any satisfaction received; and
   that he is inclined to do so, he uses his best endeavours afterward to
   prove.

   But because he foresaw that his first supposition, the foundation of
   his whole future reasoning, was too much exposed and obnoxious to the
   divine justice, he labours hard in the first chapter to remove that out
   of the way entirely. Let us attend, then, to his reasoning, and follow
   him step by step: for if he have not insuperably, and beyond all
   confutation, proved that God can forgive sins without a satisfaction,
   what he afterward argues concerning the will, liberality, and mercy of
   God will become of no weight or consideration; yea, the foundation
   being destroyed, the whole edifice or Babylonish tower must instantly
   tumble to the ground. He thus proceeds:--

   "But you will say, It is necessary that God should take care to satisfy
   his justice, which he cannot even himself renounce, unless he in a
   manner deny himself.'?"

   Ans. You are right, Socinus. We do affirm, agreeably to the holy
   Scriptures, that the justice of God is in such a manner natural to him,
   that if it be necessary that he should preserve the glory of his
   essential attributes undiminished, he cannot but indispensably exact
   the punishment of every sin and transgression of his law, and render a
   just recompense of reward to all sinners, or to their surety; and,
   therefore, we contend that without a satisfaction made no one could
   obtain the remission of sins and eternal salvation. Let us see,
   Socinus, what you have to oppose to this.

   "All along, from the beginning of this answer," says he, "I have
   sufficiently shown that that justice which you contend ought at all
   events to be satisfied is not inherent in God, but is the effect of his
   own will; for when God punishes sinners, that we may call this work of
   his by some worthy name, we say that he then exerciseth justice:
   wherefore, there is no need that God should either provide for the
   satisfaction of that justice or renounce it."

   Ans. We have already considered what Socinus says in the beginning of
   his treatise against the justice of God. If I mistake not, we have
   shown that the heretic has lost his labour, and that it is far beyond
   his power to dethrone the Deity; for "he sitteth in the throne judging
   righteously." [153] But we, diminutive beings, have not first, or of
   our own accord, maintained that God is just, and that he exerciseth
   justice in the punishment of sinners, "that we might call his work by
   some worthy name." But the Judge of all the earth himself, the God of
   truth, in almost innumerable places, gives this testimony of himself in
   the sacred records; and these ought always to be the only, as they are
   the infallible, guide of our judgments.

   Distrusting, then, what he had formerly asserted (or it being
   manifestly of no weight), he attempts again by other sophisms to
   establish the reasoning which he had formerly begun. And he thus
   proceeds:--

   "But besides the arguments which I have already used to prove that that
   justice is not inherent in God, it chiefly appears from this, that were
   it naturally resident in God, he could never pardon not even the least
   transgression to any one; for God never doth any thing, nor can do any
   thing, that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him. As, for
   instance, as wisdom and equity are naturally inherent in God, that
   justice never doth or can do any thing contrary to wisdom and equity,
   as we have seen above," etc.

   The intelligent reader can easily perceive that Socinus proves nothing
   by this argument, but that he even absurdly adds heap upon heap to his
   own supposition; or that with a bold effrontery, he takes for granted
   the thing to be determined. It is indeed our opinion, that God cannot
   pass the smallest sin unpunished; and that he cannot, because he can do
   nothing that is opposite to the qualities inherent in him. But this our
   opponent brings forward as a great absurdity, that must bear against us
   in support of his own cause; but without even any appearance of a
   proof. But we have before demonstrated the state of the matter to be
   thus, -- That God neither actually pardons any sin without a
   satisfaction made, nor can pardon it, without an infringement of his
   justice, by which he condemns sinners as worthy of death. So that as
   God never doth nor can do the things which are opposite to his equity
   and wisdom, so he neither doth nor can do those which are opposite to
   his justice. But to pardon the sins of believers on account of the
   satisfaction of Christ, "whom he hath set forth as a propitiation
   through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness," is not
   opposite to his justice. But these seem absurdities to Socinus. And why
   should they not? for "we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a
   stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness." But "the preaching
   of the cross is to them that perish foolishness." [154]

   Yea, in common equity, nothing could be mentioned more inequitable and
   unwise than this would be opposite to justice, -- namely, not to pardon
   those sins for which that justice hath been amply satisfied. And must,
   then, this heretic, not only for nothing, substitute his own most
   absurd, yea, execrable opinion, namely, "That Jesus Christ hath not
   made satisfaction for our sins, nor borne their punishment," -- that
   is, that he was not "made sin for us, that we might be made the
   righteousness of God in him," -- an opinion neither proved, nor that
   will ever be proved to all eternity; but also insinuate it as a proof
   of another error, which that alone, it is evident, first begot in his
   mind? Indeed, I cannot sufficiently wonder that some, by the sophisms
   of such disputants, are so easily "removed unto another gospel,"
   forsaking "him that called them into the grace of Christ."

   "But that justice," says Socinus, "which, as we have seen before, in
   the sacred writings is not called justice,' but severity' or
   vengeance,' or by some such name, so far as it is opposed to mercy is
   nothing else but to punish sins; but to punish sins and to pardon sins
   are entirely opposite to one another."

   A fine painter's show-board, but void of truth.

   Ans. What the adversary so often yelps out is totally without
   foundation, -- namely, that that justice is never called by its proper
   name in the Scriptures. It is not only called by its own name, but is
   also called "purity" and "holiness," which are essential attributes of
   the Deity. It is called "severity," "vengeance," and "anger," but only
   improperly and analogically, and in respect of the effects which it
   produceth. What he asserts, too, of this justice, namely, that it is
   nothing else but to punish sin, -- very improperly confounding a habit,
   an act, and an effect, -- is altogether without foundation, and most
   absurd. "The Lord is just, and his judgments are righteous. The Judge
   of all the earth doeth right." And, in fine, it is false that this
   justice is opposed to mercy; for it is beyond any doubt that different
   operations and effects may, in different views, be ascribed to one and
   the same righteous principle. To punish sins and to pardon sins, unless
   spoken in the same point of view, are not opposed to one another. God,
   indeed, pardons to us those sins which he punished in our surety: which
   "foolishness of God is wiser than men."

   Our opponent thus proceeds:-- "If that justice be inherent in God, --
   that is, if there be any property in God which is altogether inclined
   expressly to punish any sins of mankind whatsoever, whether penitent or
   impenitent, -- he neither spares nor can spare any one; for as to what
   your teachers in the church have devised, that according to this
   justice he can punish sin, even though the sinner should not be
   punished, that is quite inconsistent with this and every other kind of
   justice."

   Our opponent again idly fancies that we are hard pressed by this
   conclusion. We grant, yea, we solemnly believe and declare, that
   because of his justice God can never spare any sinner, unless he
   expressly punish his sins in another. But he artfully and shrewdly
   endeavours to load our opinion with prejudice, insinuating "that God
   then could not even spare the penitent." But we believe all repentance
   of sin to be founded in the satisfaction and blood of Christ; for "him
   hath God exalted with his right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for
   to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins." [155] God,
   then, both can spare the penitent, and, according to the promises of
   the gospel, most certainly will spare them, -- those, namely, for whose
   sins satisfaction hath been made through the blood of Christ, "who gave
   himself a ransom for them;" but that to punish sin, without the
   delinquents being punished, is neither contrary to this nor to any
   other kind of justice, absolutely considered, through divine help,
   shall be demonstrated in its proper place.

   Hitherto our opponent hath discovered nothing but mere fancies, vain
   repetitions, absurd allegations, and a shameful ignorance of the
   argument. He thus proceeds: "But should you say, that by the same
   reasoning it may be proved that mercy is not inherent in God; for if it
   were, he could never inflict punishment on any, as mercy is nothing
   else but to pardon those who have offended; -- I will answer, as I have
   slightly noticed before, that it is very true that mercy, so far as it
   is opposed to that justice, that is, to severity and vengeance, is not
   inherent in God, but is the effect of his will. When, then, the sacred
   Scriptures testify that God is merciful, they mean nothing more than
   that God very often and very easily pardoneth sin, if, at least, they
   speak of this mercy; for there is another kind of divine mercy, of
   which, according to the old translation, mention is frequently made in
   the sacred writings, which ought rather to be called goodness, and hath
   a more extensive signification, for it comprehends the whole divine
   beneficence, whether it be exercised in the pardon of sin or in
   communication of any other kind of benefit to mankind."

   It hath been shown already that it is not proved by such reasoning as
   this that justice is not inherent in God; nor from the force of such an
   argument will it easily appear that the divine mercy suffers any
   degradation. What he supposes, in the first place, is altogether
   without foundation, namely, "That the divine mercy is nothing else than
   to forgive offenders;" whereas in this an external effect of that mercy
   only is shown, which is itself an essential property of the divine
   nature, for he pardoneth sins because he is merciful. The supposition,
   also, is groundless, "That if mercy were inherent in God he could never
   inflict punishment on any;" for to inflict punishment on the
   impenitent, and those for whose sins the divine justice hath in no
   manner been satisfied, is not opposite to mercy. For mercy in God is
   not a sympathy or condolence with the miseries of others, with an
   inclination of assisting them, -- a virtue which ofttimes borders near
   upon vice, -- but is that supreme perfection of the divine nature
   whereby it is naturally disposed to assist the miserable, and which,
   the proper suppositions [156] being made, and the glory of his other
   perfections preserved, he willingly exerciseth, and is inclined to
   exercise. But this is not "opposed to the justice of God;" neither is
   it an "effect of his free will" (which expression, concerning the
   exercise of justice, our opponent foolishly wrests to the virtue
   itself), but a natural attribute of the Deity. What he adds concerning
   a twofold mercy of God are idle fancies: for the sparing mercy of which
   we are discoursing by no means differs from that benignity, grace, or
   goodness of God, of which he makes mention; for that very benignity,
   with respect to the special egresses which it hath towards miserable
   sinners, from the free-will of God, is that very mercy itself. That
   assertion of his, too, must also be noticed by the way, -- namely,
   "That God very easily pardoneth sin;" which as it is a very precious
   truth if a regard be had to the oblation and satisfaction of his Son,
   so, simply spoken of him who hath threatened death to every
   transgression, and whose right it is that sinners should be worthy of
   death, all, whosoever shall be cited before his tribunal, aliens and
   strangers to Christ, will find to be without foundation, and an
   absolute falsehood.

   "But it is evident," says he, "that neither the justice nor mercy of
   which we are treating is inherent in God, from what we read, namely,
   that he is The Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and
   abundant in goodness;' [157] which plainly shows that these two, --
   namely, his justice and mercy, -- are the effects of his will, the one
   of which is surpassed in greatness by the other, and they cannot
   consist with one another, and they are limited; whereas those qualities
   which are truly inherent in God have no limit, and are all consistent
   with one another, and, in respect of their greatness, are all
   absolutely equal."

   Our opponent again very improperly applies a comparison made between
   external acts to the internal habits themselves. That anger and
   compassion, which are only attributed to God effectively, are free
   effects of the divine will, limited as to their object, and unequal,
   which cannot be exercised about the same person, in their highest
   degree, we acknowledge; [158]

   But there is no reason that what is applicable to acts, or rather to
   effects, should also be applicable to the perfections whence these
   flow. But in that promulgation of the glory or name of God which we
   have in Exod. xxxiv. 6, he shows what and of what kind his disposition
   is towards those whom, namely, he hath purchased as his peculiar people
   through Jesus Christ, and what patience, long-suffering, and
   compassion, he is disposed to exercise towards them; [159] but in
   respect of all other sinners, he concludes that he "will by no means
   clear the guilty," or deliver them from the guilt of sin; which,
   indeed, strikes at the very root of Socinianism. But to conclude from
   this that the divine perfections are opposite one to another, unequal,
   or surpassing one another in greatness, is only the extreme folly of
   one ignorant of the righteousness or justice of God, and going about to
   establish a righteousness or justice of his own. He proceeds thus:--

   "Hence it is manifest how grievously they err who affirm both this
   justice and mercy of God to be infinite; for as to justice, being
   deceived by the appearance of the word, they see not that they say no
   more than this, that the severity and anger of God are infinite,
   contrary to the most express testimonies of the sacred Scriptures,
   which, as we have just now said, declare God to be slow to anger.' That
   divine justice which hath no limit is not this of which we are
   discoursing, but that which alone, as we have seen before, is
   distinguished by this illustrious name in Scripture, and which, by
   another name, may be called rectitude and equity. This, indeed, is
   inherent in God, and is most conspicuous in all his works; and by
   virtue of this alone, as we shall see hereafter, even if we had no
   other proof, that human fiction of the satisfaction of Christ would be
   thoroughly detected, and vanish."

   Our opponent here serves up again nothing but his old dish, variously
   dressed, and repeatedly refused. We declare justice to be infinite, not
   deceived by the show of a word, but being so taught by the express
   testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, and by the most convincing and
   unanswerable arguments, -- and we solemnly maintain it, not only with
   regard to that universal justice which may be called rectitude (though
   improperly), but also concerning that particular sin-avenging justice,
   which we deny to differ, either essentially or subjectively, [160] from
   the former, -- but that anger and severity, so far as they denote
   effects of divine justice, or punishment inflicted, are infinite only
   in duration: "Seeing it is a righteous thing with God to take vengeance
   on them who know him not, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord
   Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from
   the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." [161] But
   in respect of that divine excellence which they point out, we affirm
   them to be in every respect infinite.

   But it would be altogether superfluous here again to repeat what we
   have before clearly settled concerning this justice, or again to recite
   the texts of Scripture formerly adduced. The sum is this: Sin-avenging
   justice differs not in reality from that universal justice which our
   opponent does not deny to be perpetually inherent in God and a natural
   attribute. It is only distinguished from it in respect of its egress to
   its own proper object; for the egresses of justice against sin flow
   from the most holy perfection of Deity itself. But anger and severity,
   so far as they may be reduced to that justice which is manifested in
   them, are also infinite; in respect of their effects, they have their
   limits assigned them by the wisdom and justice of God. These things,
   however, have been proved before.

   But let the pious reader judge whether our opponent, who hath presumed
   to call the highest mystery of the gospel, the alone foundation of the
   salvation of sinners, the darling jewel of our religion, the greatest
   testimony of the divine love, our victory over the devil, death, and
   hell, "a human fiction," had sufficient cause to annex so dreadful an
   omission to the conclusion of this so long continued debate. He adds,
   in the last place, --

   "But as to mercy, that is, the pardon of sins, how dare they affirm
   that to be infinite, when it is evident from the whole of Scripture
   that God doth not always use it, but frequently exerciseth vengeance
   and severity? Why, but because they have so shockingly blundered, that
   they have not attended to this, that these are only different effects
   of the divine will, but are not any properties, and have persuaded
   themselves that both of them are inherent in God. But how could they
   ever entertain such a persuasion, when, as we have said, the one
   destroys the other? But this they deny, and maintain that God exercised
   both of them perfectly in the salvation procured for us by Christ;
   which will more clearly appear, from what follows, to be not only false
   but ridiculous. Meantime, let them tell us, pray, when God punishes the
   guilty, but especially when he doth not even grant them time to repent,
   what kind of mercy he exerciseth towards these? But if God do many
   things in which not even any trace of that mercy appears, although he
   be said to be merciful and full of compassion' in Scripture, must we
   not say that he doth many things in which that justice is by no means
   discernible, to which he is said to be exceeding slow? We must then
   conclude, according to our opinion, that there is no such justice in
   God as expressly dictates the necessary punishment of sin, and which he
   hath not a power to renounce. And since this is the case, it is
   abundantly evident that there is no reason why God cannot freely pardon
   the sins of whomsoever he may please, without any satisfaction
   received."

   Ans. On these heads a few observations shall suffice:-- 1. It is
   affirmed, without any show of reason, that mercy in God is not
   infinite, because sometimes he exerciseth severity; that is, that God
   cannot be called merciful, if he punish any guilty and impenitent
   sinners. To prove mercy to be an essential property of God, it is
   sufficient that he exercises it towards any: for in this very matter,
   that ought to be set down as a natural perfection in God which is the
   proper and immediate source and ground of that operation: which
   attributes (mercy and justice) have no egress but towards objects
   placed in particular circumstances; nor have they any effects without
   some free act of the divine will intervening. See Rom. ix. 13. Nor does
   it any more follow that the effects of mercy ought to be infinite if it
   be itself infinite, than that the works of God ought to be immense
   because immensity is an essential property of his nature.

   2. By what argument will our opponent prove that the relation between
   mercy and justice is in such a manner the same, that because God
   exerciseth no mercy towards some, -- that is, so as to pardon their
   sins, -- that therefore he should not account it necessary to exercise
   justice towards every sin? We have formerly mentioned in what view they
   are distinct, -- namely, that God is bound to exercise mercy to none,
   but that he cannot but exercise his justice towards sinners (provided
   he be inclined to be just), if he would preserve his natural right and
   dominion over his creatures, and the holiness and purity of his nature
   uninjured and entire; for disobedience would take away all dependence
   of the creature on God, unless a compensation were made to him by a
   vicarious punishment. But, according to the sacred Scriptures, we
   maintain that God exercised both the one and the other, both justice
   and mercy, in justly punishing Christ, in mercifully pardoning sins,
   which he laid upon him, to us, who deserved everlasting punishment;
   which things, though they may be ridiculous to Socinus (for "the things
   of the Spirit of God are foolishness" to him), no divine truth,
   however, of any kind whatever, is more frequently, more plainly, or
   more clearly declared in the sacred writings: "All have sinned, and
   come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace
   through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth
   to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his
   righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the
   forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness:
   that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in
   Jesus," Rom. iii. 23-26. But setting the consideration of Christ
   altogether aside, there is no doubt but that Socinus would carry off
   the prize in this contest. But while it is reckoned worth while to have
   any regard to him, it is easy to perceive that this heretic uses
   nothing but continued false reasonings and false conclusions; for it is
   made evident to us in Christ the Son, how and by what means God,
   infinitely merciful and infinitely just, -- acting on the principles of
   strict justice with some, and of mere grace with others, but in
   exercising both the one and the other, both justice and mercy, in and
   through the Mediator, the one, indeed, in his own proper person, and
   the other towards those for whom he was surety, -- hath declared
   himself.

   But while Socinus despised and set at nought him and his grace, is it
   to be wondered at if he "became vain in his imaginations," and that his
   "foolish heart was darkened?"

   For what need I say more? Doth not God exercise supreme and infinite
   mercy towards us, miserable and lost sinners, in pardoning our sins
   through Christ? Have we deserved any such thing, who, after doing all
   that we can do, even when roused and assisted by his grace, are still
   unprofitable servants? Did we appoint a sacrifice, that his anger might
   be averted, and that an atonement to his justice might be made from our
   own store-house, sheep-fold, or herd? Yea, when we were enemies to him,
   alienated from his life, without help and without strength, dead in
   trespasses and in sins, knowing of no such thing, wishing for or
   expecting no such thing, he himself "made Christ to be sin for us, who
   knew no sin," that he might "save us from the wrath to come;" that, an
   expiation being made for our sins, we might be presented blameless
   before him, to the praise and glory of his grace. But whether he showed
   the strictest justice and severity towards our surety, over whom he
   exercised a most gracious care, both on his own account [162] and for
   our sakes, and whom he did not spare, shall afterward be considered.

   Whether, then, when our opponent, relying on these subtleties of his,
   concludes, "That there is no justice in God which dictates the
   necessity of punishing sin, and that therefore there is no reason why
   God cannot freely pardon the sins of whomsoever he may please, without
   any satisfaction received," and then, as if he had accomplished a
   glorious achievement, triumphs over the cross of our Lord and Saviour
   Jesus Christ, be not acting the part of a most silly trifler and absurd
   heretic, let the reader determine. But, as all the arguments which he
   afterward uses against the satisfaction of Christ have their foundation
   in this most false supposition, which the Scriptures, as hath been
   shown, so often contradict, and on which he always depends in all his
   disputations, whether those have acted for the interest of the church
   of God who have voluntarily surrendered to him this impregnable tower
   of truth, which he hath in vain laid siege to, that he might with
   greater audacity carry on his attacks upon the gospel, is well known to
   God. We, as we hope, instructed by his word, entertain very different
   sentiments from theirs on this point.

   But when our opponent has come to the conclusion of this dispute, he
   introduces many fictions about the mere good-will of God in pardoning
   sins, about his ceasing from his right without injury to any one, about
   the injustice of the substitution of a surety in the room of sinners;
   -- all which arguments, as they depend on a false foundation, yea, on a
   most base error, it would be easy here to show how vain, false,
   inconclusive, and absurd they are, unless we had determined, with God's
   will, to explain the doctrine of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, the
   greatest treasure of the gospel, and to defend and vindicate it from
   the unjust calumnies of heretics, in the proper place and time.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [153] Ps. ix. 4.

   [154] 1 Cor. i. 18, 23, 24.

   [155] Acts v. 31.

   [156] That is, the existence and misery of a rational creature being
   supposed. -- Tr.

   [157] See Exod. xxxiv. 6; Numb. xiv. 18.

   [158] Omitted: "though it is plain from the holy Scriptures that God
   not unfrequently manifests some kind of anger, in his paternal
   chastisements, towards those who all the while are the objects of his
   supreme love and mercy." -- Ed.

   [159] See 2 Pet. iii. 9, etc.

   [160] That is, as it relates to God, who is the subject of it. -- Tr.

   [161] See 2 Thess. i. 6, 8, 9.

   [162] "Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul
   delighteth." -- Isa. xlii. 1. -- Tr.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XII.

   The progress of the dispute to the theologians of our own country --
   The supreme authority of divine truth -- Who they are, and what kind of
   men, who have gone into factions about this matter -- The Coryphæus of
   the adversaries, the very illustrious Twisse -- The occasion of his
   publishing his opinion -- The opinion of the Arminians -- The effects
   of the death of Christ, what -- Twisse acknowledges punitory justice to
   be natural to God -- The division of the dispute with Twisse --
   Maccovius' answers to the arguments of Twisse -- The plan of our
   disputation.

   We come now to those, and the consideration of their opinion, who,
   agreeing with us concerning the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, as
   revealed in the Scriptures, yet, it being supposed that God willed the
   salvation of sinners, contend that the whole necessity of it flowed
   from the most free will of God, though they by no means deny
   sin-avenging justice to be natural to God. [163]

   But those who maintain this opinion are so numerous and respectable,
   and men who have merited so highly of the church of God, that although
   the freeman of Christ, and taught to call no man on earth master in
   matters of religion, unless I had on my side not fewer and equally
   famous men, I should have a religious scruple publicly to differ from
   them. I acknowledge that every, even the least particle of divine truth
   is furnished from heaven with authority towards every disciple of Jesus
   Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life, of holding it fast in
   the love and admiration of it, and of enforcing its claim, defence, and
   declaration, even though the whole world should rise up against him;
   but, perhaps, it would be unbecoming in one who would cheerfully enter
   as a disciple to oppose such great, learned men, and those, too, so
   well trained to the field of dispute, unless supported by the dignity
   and suffrages of others not inferior even to those in merit.

   But if modesty must be violated, all will agree that it ought to be
   violated in the cause of truth, and especially as I perceive that the
   authority of some theologians is of so great weight with many of our
   countrymen, that, not having duly weighed and pondered the matter, but
   relying on this, they go into the opinion contrary to that which we
   have undertaken to defend. Considering it of importance to weigh the
   arguments which these very illustrious men have used, although I know
   myself not only unequal to the task, but that, in marshalling the line
   for such a controversy, I am not deserving of even a third or fourth
   place from the van, having been only accustomed to the popular mode of
   declaiming; however, I do not fear to engage in this undertaking,
   whatever it be, nothing doubting but that from my attempt, though weak,
   the readers will easily perceive that the truth might triumph
   gloriously, were any one furnished with better abilities to come
   forward in its defence.

   But here, first of all the antagonists, and who, indeed, is almost
   equal to them all, the very learned Twisse [164] opposes himself to us;
   concerning whose opinion in general a few things are to be premised
   before we come to the answers of objections.

   The consideration of Arminius' opinion concerning the efficacy of the
   death of Christ and its immediate bearing, gave occasion to this
   learned man of publishing his own sentiments. Arminius contends, "That
   Christ by his satisfaction only accomplished this much, that God now,
   consistently with the honour of his justice (as it had been satisfied),
   might pardon sinners if he willed so to do."

   This most absurd opinion, so highly derogatory to divine grace and the
   merit of the death of Christ, this illustrious man was inclined to
   differ from, so far that he maintained that that consideration, namely,
   "That God could forgive sins, his justice notwithstanding, as having
   been satisfied," had no place among the effects of Christ's death.

   But Arminius is the only one, so far as I know, among our opponents of
   this opinion; and he himself, in asserting it, is scarcely uniform and
   self-consistent. I may venture to affirm that of his followers there
   are none, unless it be some mean skulker, who swears by the words of
   his master. The opinion of Corvinus, which Twisse afterward discusses,
   is plainly different. Episcopius, likewise, after Arminius, the
   Coryphæus of that cause, and by far its most noble champion, defends
   this very sentiment of this learned man. The Pelagian tribe have become
   reconciled with the Socinians, rather than brandish any more that very
   sharp-pointed weapon which cut the throat of their own desperate cause.

   Nor can I at all see how this divine truth of ours should contribute to
   the support of Arminianism, as this illustrious writer seems to
   signify; for is he who says that Christ by his death and satisfaction
   effected this, that God might forgive sins, his justice not opposing,
   bound also to affirm that he accomplished nothing farther? God forbid.
   Yea, he who, without the consideration of the oblation of Christ, could
   not but punish sins, that oblation being made, cannot punish those sins
   for which Christ offered himself; [165] yea, that he is more bound, in
   strict right and in justice, in respect of Jesus Christ, to confer
   grace and glory on all those for whom he died, I have in its proper
   season elsewhere demonstrated.

   The learned Twisse grants that punitory or sin-avenging justice is
   natural to God, or that it is an essential attribute of the divine
   nature. This he very eloquently maintains; and several times, when it
   is introduced by the adversaries [166] whom he selected to refute, he
   gives his suffrage in its favour. But what else is that justice but a
   constant will of punishing every sin, according to the rule of his
   right? The learned gentleman, then, grants that an immutably constant
   will of punishing every sin is natural to God: how, then, is it
   possible that he should not punish it? for who hath opposed his will?

   There are two parts of the Twissian disputation. The first is contained
   in four principal arguments, supported by various reasons, in which he
   attacks this sentiment, -- namely, "That God cannot without a
   satisfaction forgive sin." In the second, he endeavours to answer the
   arguments of Piscator and Lubbertus in confirmation of this point; and
   he intersperses everywhere, according to his custom, a variety of new
   arguments on the subject. We shall briefly consider what this learned
   man hath done in both parts.

   As to what relates to the first or introductory part, perhaps our
   labour may appear superfluous. The judicious Maccovius hath, with great
   success, performed this task, giving by no means trifling, but rather,
   for the most part, very solid answers to those four arguments, which
   Twisse calls his principal, and in a very plain and perspicuous manner;
   as was his general custom in all his writings.

   But neither the plan of our work permits us to withdraw from this
   undertaking, though unequal to it, nor, perhaps, hath Maccovius
   satisfied his readers in every particular. Indeed, some things seem
   necessary to be added, that this controversy with Twisse may occasion
   no trouble to any one for the future. This veteran leader, then, so
   well trained to the scholastic field, going before and pointing us out
   the way, we shall, with your good leave, reader, briefly try these
   arguments by the rule of Scripture and right reason; and I doubt not
   but we shall clearly demonstrate, to all impartial judges of things,
   that this learned man hath by no means proved what he intended.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [163] They agree that the satisfaction by Christ is the way of
   salvation revealed in the Scriptures, but that it is so because God
   willed it should be so, and deny that there was any necessity for such
   a satisfaction arising from the nature of divine justice. -- Tr.

   [164] Twiss. Vind. Grat. lib. i. p. 2, sect. 25, digress. 8.

   [165] Rom. iii. 23-26.

   [166] Namely, Piscator and Lubbertus.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XIII.

   Twisse's first argument -- Its answer -- A trifling view of the divine
   attributes -- Whether God could, by his absolute power, forgive sins
   without a satisfaction -- To let sins pass unpunished implies a
   contradiction; and that twofold -- What these contradictions are --
   Whether God may do what man may do -- Whether every man may renounce
   his right -- Whether God cannot forgive sins because of his justice --
   The second argument -- Its answer -- Distinctions of necessity -- God
   doth no work without himself from absolute necessity -- Conditional
   necessity -- Natural necessity twofold -- God doth not punish to the
   extent of his power, but to the extent of his justice -- God always
   acts with a concomitant liberty -- An argument of the illustrious
   Vossius considered -- God "a consuming fire," but an intellectual one
   -- An exception of Twisse's -- Whether, independent of the divine
   appointment, sin would merit punishment -- In punishment, what things
   are to be considered -- The relation of obedience to reward and
   disobedience to punishment not the same -- The comparison between mercy
   and justice by Vossius improperly instituted.

   The first argument of this great man is this: "If God cannot forgive
   sins without a satisfaction, it is either because he cannot on account
   of his justice, or because he cannot by his power; but neither of these
   can be affirmed."

   Ans. That enumeration of the divine attributes, as to the present
   cause, is mere trifling: for what God cannot do in respect of one
   attribute, he can do in respect of none; or, in other words, that which
   cannot be done because of any one essential property, cannot be done
   because of them all. As, for instance, if there be any thing which God
   cannot do in respect of truth, he cannot do that in any manner or in
   any respect. In the acts of the divine will, purely free, the case is
   otherwise; for, in a divided sense, God may do any thing (that is, he
   may create new worlds), which if a decree of creating this and no other
   be supposed, he could not do. But the objects presented to any
   attribute of the divine nature admit not of various respects, but are
   in their own kind absolutely necessary; therefore, we deny the minor.
   Neither in respect of justice nor in respect of power can this be done.

   But our learned antagonist leads the proof of it through its parts;
   and, first, after a marginal animadversion on a certain oversight of
   Piscator, he affirms "That it cannot be maintained that God cannot
   forgive sins by his power, without a satisfaction."

   "For," says he, "if God by his might or absolute power cannot pardon
   sin, then it is absolutely impossible for sin to be pardoned, or not to
   be punished; therefore, not to pardon sin consists of contradictory
   terms. The contradiction, then, ought to be shown, as none appears from
   the formal terms. And, on the other hand, it is evident that man not
   only can pardon, but that it is his duty to pardon his enemies when
   they transgress against him."

   Ans. The non-punishment of sin implies a contradiction, -- not, indeed,
   formally and in the terms, but virtually and eminently in respect of
   the thing itself: for, in the first place, it implies that God is the
   Lord of mankind by a natural and indispensable right, but that mankind
   are not subject to him, neither as to obedience nor as to punishment,
   which would be the direct case if sin should pass with impunity; for
   that natural and necessary dependence being cut off (which, also, in
   another respect is moral) which accords to a rational creature in
   respect of its Creator and supreme Lord, which really comes to pass by
   means of sin, it cannot be renewed or made amends for but by
   punishment. In the second place, to hate sin, that is, to will to
   punish it, and not to hate sin, to will to let it pass unpunished, are
   manifestly contradictory.

   If you say that God hath it in his power not to hate sin, you say that
   he hath the contrary in his power, -- that is, that he can love sin;
   for if he hate sin of his free will, he may will the contrary, for "the
   divine will is not so determinately inclined towards any secondary
   object by any thing in itself that can justly oppose its inclination to
   its opposite." This Scotus maintains, and Twisse agrees with him. But
   to will good and to love justice are not less natural to God than to be
   himself. Here is, then, a double contradiction in that assertion of
   this very learned man, namely, "That God can forgive sin absolutely,
   without any satisfaction received."

   "But it is manifest," says he, "that man not only can pardon, but that
   it is his duty to pardon his enemies; and, therefore, this does not
   imply a contradiction."

   Ans. The supposition is denied, that God may do what man may do. That
   learned man raises this objection himself, that man may sin, which God
   cannot do, and at great length, and with much erudition, explains away
   this example. But as this instance of Twisse's is not quite
   satisfactory to us, we think proper to proceed in a different manner.

   I say, then, in the first place, that divine and human forgiveness are
   plainly of a different kind. The forgiveness of man only respects the
   hurt; the forgiveness of God respects the guilt. Man pardons sins so
   far as any particular injury hath been done himself; God pardons sin as
   the good of the universe is injured. Secondly, Neither is it in the
   power of every man to let sins pass unpunished, yea, of none absolutely
   to whom the right of punishing is competent; for although a private
   person may recede from his right, which for the most part is of
   charity, yet it is by no means allowed to a public person to renounce
   his right, which is a right of government, especially if that
   renunciation should in any way turn out to the hurt of the public. In
   the third place, then, I say that that instance is nothing to the
   purpose; for although a private person may, at certain times, renounce
   his right and dominion in certain cases, and ought to do so, it doth
   not follow from that that God, whose right and dominion is natural and
   indispensable, and which he cannot renounce unless he deny himself, can
   do the same. In the fourth place, the non-punishment of sin is an
   injury to the universe; for the glory of divine justice would be
   affronted with impunity.

   Our celebrated antagonist proceeds to the consideration of divine
   justice. "But neither," says he, "can it be consistently said that God
   cannot do this because of his justice, if it be supposed that he can do
   it by his power. But Scotus reasons with more judgment and accuracy on
   this point. The divine will is not so inclined towards any secondary
   object by any thing in itself,' says he, that can oppose its being
   justly inclined towards its opposite in the same manner, as without
   contradiction it may will its opposite; otherwise, it may will
   absolutely and not justly, which is inconsistent with divine
   perfection.'?"

   Ans. We maintain that God from his nature cannot do this, and,
   therefore, that he cannot either by his power or his justice; and as
   our learned antagonist produces no argument to prove that God can do it
   without resistance from his justice, but what flows from this false
   supposition, that he can do it by his power, it is not necessary to
   give ourselves any trouble on this head. But to Scotus we answer: The
   divine will may incline to things opposite, in respect of the egresses
   of all those divine attributes which constitute and create objects to
   themselves, but not in respect of those attributes which have no egress
   towards their objects but upon a condition supposed. As, for instance:
   God may justly speak or not speak with man; but it being supposed that
   he wills to speak, the divine will cannot be indifferent whether he
   speak truth or not. So much for his first principal argument.

   The second is this: "If God cannot let sin pass unpunished, then he
   must punish it from an absolute necessity; but this no one can maintain
   consistently with reason."

   This consequence the learned doctor supposes, without any argument to
   support it; but we deny the consequence, nor will he ever be able to
   prove that there is no other kind of necessity but an absolute
   necessity. There is also a necessity arising from a supposed condition,
   and which deprives not the agent of a concomitant liberty. God could
   not but create the world; but God did not create the world from an
   absolute necessity, although it was necessary upon a supposition that
   it should be created. It is necessary that God should speak truly, but
   he doth not speak from an absolute necessity; but it being supposed
   that he wills to speak, it is impossible that he should not speak
   truly. We say, therefore, that God cannot but punish sin, or that he
   necessarily punishes sin; not, however, from an absolute necessity of
   nature, as the Father begets the Son, but upon the suppositions [167]
   before mentioned, -- by a necessity which excludes an antecedent
   indifference but not a concomitant liberty in the agent, for in
   punishing sins he acts by volition and with understanding.

   "But that necessity," you will say, "of what kind soever it be, flows
   from the nature of God, not his will or decree; but all necessity of
   nature seems to be absolute." I acknowledge, indeed, that all necessity
   of nature, considered in the first act and thing signified, [168] is
   absolute in its kind; but in the second act, and in its exercise, it is
   not so. The reader will easily perceive now that our very learned
   antagonist had no reason for freely supposing that consequence; which I
   reckon the very lowest of all the devices he has fallen upon. "If,
   then," says he, "God must punish sin from a natural necessity, he must
   necessarily punish it to the extent of his power;" but this, with great
   accuracy, he shows to be absurd, by a variety of arguments.

   Ans. Maccovius hath, some time ago, very clearly answered this
   reasoning. We reject his consequence, as built upon a false
   supposition; for that necessity from which God punisheth sin does not
   require that he should punish it to the extent of his power, but so far
   as is just. We do not conceive God to be a senseless, inanimate agent,
   as if he acted from principles of nature, after a natural manner,
   without a concomitant liberty; for he doth all things freely, with
   understanding and by volition, even those things which by supposition
   he doth necessarily, according to what his most holy nature requires.

   The argument which the celebrated Vossius uses against our opinion is
   of no greater weight. [169] "Every agent," says that very learned man,
   "that acts naturally, acts upon an object naturally receptive of its
   action: wherefore, if to punish were natural, namely, in that
   acceptation which necessity carries with it, such action could not pass
   from the person of a sinner to another person."

   But this learned man is mistaken when he imagines that we affirm God to
   be such a natural agent as must, without sense and immediately, operate
   upon the object that is receptive of it, in a manner altogether
   natural, and without any concomitant liberty, -- that is, without any
   free act of understanding or volition; for although God be "a consuming
   fire," he is an intellectual one. Nor is a sinner alone an object
   properly receptive of the exercise of God's vindicatory justice, as he
   hath committed the transgressions in his own person; for antecedent to
   every act of that justice, properly so called, in respect of the elect,
   God appointed a surety, and this surety being appointed, and all the
   sins of the elect laid upon him, he in their room and stead is the
   proper object of this vindicatory justice, so far as relates to their
   sins. "For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we
   might be made the righteousness of God in him," 2 Cor. v. 21.

   But Twisse thus replies, "If God punish as far as he can with justice,
   -- that is, as far as sin deserves, -- then it must be either as far as
   sin deserves according to the free constitution of God, or without any
   regard to the divine constitution. If according to the divine
   constitution, this is nothing else but to assert that God punishes not
   so far as he can, but so far as he wills. If without any regard to the
   divine constitution, then without the divine constitution sin so
   deserves punishment that God ought to punish sin because of his
   justice. But I conclude this to be false in this manner: If
   disobedience deserve punishment in this manner, -- that is, without the
   divine constitution, -- therefore obedience will also, in like manner,
   deserve a reward without the divine constitution; for no reason can be
   shown that any one should maintain that even angels have merited, by
   their obedience, that God should reward them with celestial glory."

   But although these arguments are specious, yet, strictly considered,
   they have no greater weight than those already discussed; for in the
   punishment of sin two things are to be considered:-- 1. The punishment
   itself, so far as it is in its own nature something grievous and
   troublesome to the creature, and proper to recover the violated right
   of God. In this respect we say that sin merits punishment antecedently
   to every free act of the divine will, or to the divine constitution;
   or, if you would rather have it thus expressed, that it is just that
   God should inflict punishment, considered as such, on the transgressor,
   without regard to any free constitution: for if, without regard to such
   a constitution, sin be sin, and evil, evil, -- and unless it be so, to
   hate the greatest and best of Beings may be the highest virtue, and to
   love him the greatest vice, -- why may not punishment be due to it
   without regard to such a consideration? 2. In punishment, the mode,
   time, and degree are especially to be considered. In respect of these
   God punishes sin according to the divine constitution; for the justice
   of God only demanding punishment in general, as including in it the
   nature of punishment, nothing hinders but that God should freely
   appoint the mode and degree of it. He punishes them because it is just
   that he should do so, and consequently indispensably necessary. He
   punishes in one mode or in another, in one degree or in another,
   because, according to his wisdom, he hath determined freely so to do.
   What we understand by modes and degrees of punishment shall be
   afterward explained.

   "But," says our celebrated antagonist, "if disobedience thus deserve
   punishment, why should not obedience in like manner deserve a reward,
   for no reason to the contrary can be assigned?" I wish this learned man
   had not so expressed himself, for he will never be able to prove that
   the relation of obedience to reward and disobedience to punishment is
   the same; for between obedience and the reward there intervenes no
   natural obligation. God is brought under an obligation to no one for
   any kind of obedience; for "after we have done all, we are still
   unprofitable servants." But God's right that rational creatures should
   be subject to him, either by obedience or a vicarious punishment, is
   indispensable. In a word, obedience is due to God in such a manner,
   that from the nature of the thing he can be debtor to none in
   conferring rewards; but disobedience would destroy all dependence of
   the creature upon God, unless a recompense be made by punishment.

   The celebrated Vossius, again, reasons improperly, in the passage
   before quoted, from a comparison made between justice and mercy. "The
   question is not," says he, "whether it be just that a satisfaction be
   received? but whether it be unjust that it should not be received? for
   it doth not follow that if God be merciful in doing one thing or
   another, that he would be unmerciful in not doing it." I acknowledge
   that it does not follow: for although mercy be natural to God as to the
   habit, yet because there is no natural obligation between it and its
   proper object, it is as to all its acts entirely free; for the nature
   of the thing about which it is employed is not indispensable, as we
   have shown before to be the case with regard to justice. So much for
   the learned Twisse's second argument, with the consideration of it.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [167] Namely, That he willed to create a rational being, and to permit
   it to transgress the law of its creation. -- Tr.

   [168] "Actu primo et signato," -- "In its first and manifested act, its
   first act and manifestation." -- Ed.

   [169] At the end of the "Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione
   Christi," by Grotius, there is appended "G. J. Vossii Responsio ad
   Herm. Ravenspergeri Judicium de eodem." It is in this "Responsio" that
   the sentiments refuted by Owen occur. -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XIV.

   Twisse's third argument -- A dispensation with regard to the punishment
   of sin, what, and of what kind -- The nature of punishment and its
   circumstances -- The instance of this learned opponent refuted -- The
   considerations of rewarding and punishing different -- How long, and in
   what sense, God can dispense with the punishment due to sin -- God the
   supreme governor of the Jewish polity; also, the Lord of all -- The
   fourth argument of Twisse -- The answer -- Whether God can inflict
   punishment on an innocent person -- In what sense God is more willing
   to do acts of kindness than to punish -- What kind of willingness that
   assertion respects -- The conclusion of the answer to Twisse's
   principal arguments.

   The third argument is this: "God can inflict a milder punishment than
   sin deserves; therefore, he can by his absolute power suspend the
   punishment altogether."

   Ans. I answer, that the punishment which a sin deserves may be
   considered in a twofold point of view:-- 1. As by means of it God
   compels to order a disobedient creature, that hath cast off its
   dependence on his supreme and natural dominion, in such a manner that
   his will may be done with that creature, that is itself unwilling to do
   it; and in this point of view he cannot inflict a more mild punishment
   than sin deserves. Yea, properly speaking, in this respect it cannot be
   said to admit of degrees, either milder or more severe. And in this
   sense we simply deny the foregoing proposition. 2. It may be considered
   in this other point of view, -- namely, as God, for the greater
   manifestation of his glory, hath assigned to it modes, degrees, and
   other circumstances. But if punishment be considered in this view, we
   deny the sequel; [170] for though it be granted that he exerciseth
   liberty as to the modes and degrees, as these flow from the free
   appointment of God, it doth not follow that the punishment itself, so
   far as the nature of punishment is preserved in it, and which takes its
   rise from the natural justice of God, can be altogether dispensed with.

   What says our learned antagonist to this? He supposes the author of the
   supplement his opponent, and discusses his opinion in a variety of
   subtile reasonings, in his answer concerning the extent and different
   degrees of justice. But he confesses that these have no relation to
   Piscator; and as they are of no avail to the argument, we therefore
   pass over the consideration of them.

   But this learned gentleman has still something to oppose to our
   reasoning; for he thus proceeds, "God may reward beyond merit;
   therefore, he may punish less than what is merited." But this reason is
   evidently of no force; for besides that arguments from opposites do not
   hold always good in theology, as hath been shown in various instances
   by Maccovius, we have before demonstrated at large that the relation
   between remunerating grace and punitory justice is not the same. [171]
   Moreover, these considerations all along arise not from the nature of
   punishment, but from its degrees, about which we have no controversy,
   for we have never said that God in punishing sins acts without any
   concomitant liberty, which respects those degrees.

   But forasmuch as Socinians [172] argue from the divine dispensation
   with regard to the punishment of sins to the free pardon of them
   without any satisfaction, we must say a few things in reply to this
   argument of our learned antagonist, as it seems pretty near akin to
   them, and as they are so very eager in wresting every thing to favour
   their own side of the question.

   The divine dispensation, then, with the punishment of sins, respects
   either temporary or eternal punishment; but a temporary punishment may
   be considered either in respect of monitory threats or of a peremptory
   decree, and both in respect of the time of the infliction and of the
   degrees in the punishment to be inflicted. But God, as the avenger of
   sin, is considered in Scripture in a twofold point of view:-- 1. As the
   Legislator and supreme Lord of the Jews and their commonwealth; whose
   state, from that circumstance, Josephus calls a "theocracy:" or, 2. As
   the supreme Lord and just Judge of the universe. If these
   considerations be properly attended to, the subtleties of Crellius are
   easily dissolved: for God, as the Legislator and supreme Ruler of the
   Jewish republic, ofttimes dispensed with temporary punishments, as
   denounced in his threatenings, both as to the place, degree, and time
   of their execution; but God, as the supreme Lord and just Judge of the
   universe, doth not dispense with the eternal punishment of sin, to be
   inflicted at the proper and appointed time. The learned Twisse's fourth
   argument remains only to be considered.

   "God is able," says he, "to inflict any torture, however great, even an
   infernal one, upon any person, without the consideration of any
   demerit; therefore, he is also able, notwithstanding the greatest
   demerit, to suspend the greatest punishment whatever. The antecedent
   hath been proved; the consequence from it is notorious, as God is more
   willing to do good than to punish."

   Ans. 1. We have before observed that this mode of reasoning does not
   always hold good in theology; neither, however, in the second place,
   are these opposites, namely, to inflict torture and to suspend
   punishment, for torture and punishment are different. But to inflict an
   infernal punishment upon any innocent person is a thing impossible; for
   punishment supposes a transgression: and, therefore, not to inflict
   punishment upon a guilty person is also impossible; for transgression,
   from the very nature of the thing, requires punishment. But it is
   astonishing that this learned writer should insist on the proof of the
   sequel, namely, "That God is more willing to do good than to punish,"
   as he hath many times, by very strong arguments, disallowed the natural
   inclination of the Deity towards the good of the creature; nor will he
   ever be able to prove that God is inclined to bestow such kind of
   benefits on a sinful creature as are opposite to the punishment due to
   sin, without regard to Christ and his satisfaction. But that difference
   respects a will commanding and exhorting according to morality, not
   decreeing or acting naturally.

   And these are what this learned writer calls his "principal arguments;"
   in which he contends that God can let sin pass unpunished without any
   satisfaction. I hope that impartial judges, however great respect they
   may have for the name of Twisse, will not be offended that I have made
   these short answers to his arguments; as certainly they have been
   conducted without violence or sarcasm, and by no means from any weak
   desire of attacking so very illustrious a man, for whose many and great
   qualities none can have a greater respect. But I have engaged in this
   task from an earnest desire of preserving undiminished the glory of
   divine justice, and of establishing the necessity of the satisfaction
   of Christ, lest the Socinians should wrest to their purpose the
   arguments of this learned man, on the principal of which they place a
   principal dependence, and by which they acknowledge that they have been
   induced to adopt heretical opinions.

   Our very learned antagonist adds other arguments to these; some of
   which have been satisfactorily answered by Maccovius; others belong
   not, according to our view of it, to the present controversy; and
   others will come to be considered in our vindication of the arguments
   of Piscator and Lubbertus, impugned by this celebrated writer, of which
   we shall take a short review, and, therefore, shall not now enter into
   any particular consideration of them.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [170] Namely, That God, by his absolute power, can suspend the
   punishment of sin altogether. -- Tr.

   [171] That is, their relation to their objects, or their qualities
   considered in this point of view, is different. Divine justice
   necessarily operates towards its object to punish the sinner, otherwise
   it would not be justice; but as no creature can merit any thing of God,
   it depends on God's good pleasure whether he bestow rewards or not. --
   Tr.

   [172] Crellius, "Of the True Religion," p. 308.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XV.

   The defence of Sibrandus Lubbertus against Twisse -- The agreement of
   these very learned men in a point of the utmost importance -- A
   vindication of his argument from God's hatred against sin -- Liberality
   and justice different -- The opinion of Lubbertus undeservedly charged
   with atheism -- What kind of necessity of operation we suppose in God;
   this pointed out -- The sophistical reasoning of this learned writer --
   How God is bound to manifest any property of his nature -- The reasons
   of Lubbertus, and Twisse's objections to the same considered -- That
   passage of the apostle, Rom. i. 32, considered and vindicated -- His
   [173] mode of disputing rejected -- The force of the argument from Rom.
   i. 32 -- The "righteous judgment of God," what -- Our federal
   representative, and those represented by him, are one mystical body --
   An answer to Twisse's arguments, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7 -- The learned
   writer's answer respecting that passage -- A defence of the passage --
   Punitory justice a name of God -- Whether those for whom Christ hath
   made satisfaction ought to be called guilty -- Ps. v. 4-6, the sense of
   that passage considered -- From these three passages the argument is
   one and the same -- Lubbertus' argument from the definition of justice
   weighed -- How vindicatory justice is distinguished from universal --
   The nature of liberality and justice evidently different -- Punishment
   belongs to God -- In inflicting punishment, God vindicates his right --
   Will and necessity, whether they be opposite -- The end of the defence
   of Lubbertus.

   The learned Twisse, when about to reply to the arguments of Lubbertus,
   [174] brings forward two assertions of his, to the first of which he
   consents, but not to the latter. The first maintains "corrective
   justice to be essential to God," which he approves; and herein we
   congratulate this very learned man that thus far, at least, he assents
   to the truth, and in so doing hath given cause to the Socinians to
   grieve. But, that "it is natural to God to hate and punish sin," which
   is Lubbertus' second assertion, he denies. The nicety of his
   discrimination here is truly astonishing; for what is God's hatred
   against sin but this corrective justice? How, then, is it possible that
   that justice should be natural to God, and the hatred of sin not so
   likewise? I very well know that the learned man will not allow that
   there is any such affection as hatred in God, properly so called. What
   is it, then, else than the constant will of punishing sin? but that is
   the very vindicatory justice of which we treat. Besides, if to hate sin
   be not natural to God, then it is a thing free and indifferent to him;
   he may then not hate it; he may, according to the opinion of Scotus
   formerly mentioned, as approved by Twisse, will its contrary, -- that
   is, he may love and approve of sin, though "he be of purer eyes than to
   behold iniquity." But, with good reason, he farther maintains that
   "mercy is essential to God, and yet that it is not necessary that he
   should show mercy to any one; but of his free good pleasure he showeth
   mercy to whomsoever he showeth mercy." We have again and again before
   shown that justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise, are
   different. God is under no obligation to exercise mercy towards any
   one, but he owes it to himself to preserve his own natural right and
   dominion over his rational creatures; and the learned gentleman cannot
   show that there is any such obligation, arising from the nature of the
   thing itself, between remunerating justice and liberality, on which he
   next insists, and their objects, as there is between corrective justice
   and its objects.

   But he brings a grievous charge, no less than even that of atheism,
   against this sentiment of Lubbertus, and on a double account: for,
   first, he says that "hence it follows that God is a necessary and not a
   free agent;" and he calls that proposition a spreading gangrene. 1. But
   theologians agree, and without any risk of atheism, that God is, in
   respect of his operations within himself, a necessary agent. 2. If it
   be necessary that God should do any thing upon some condition supposed,
   is he therefore to be accounted a necessary and not a free agent?
   Perhaps never any one hath made God more a necessary agent than Twisse
   himself doth, for he everywhere maintains, that upon the supposition of
   a decree, it is necessary that God should do all things in conformity
   to it; which, however, I do by no means mention as finding fault with.
   Upon the supposition of a decree, for instance, God could not but
   create the world; but is he therefore to be called a necessary agent in
   the creation of the world? By no means. But you will say, "That
   necessity flows from the free will of God, but that which you dream of
   arises from the principles of his nature, and therefore how widely
   different!" I willingly grant, indeed, that the decree of creating the
   world flowed from the free will of God; but this being supposed, it was
   necessary to the divine nature, which is immutable, that it should be
   created. Nor do we ascribe any other kind of natural necessity to God
   in punishing sins. The decree of creating rational creatures bound to
   render him obedience, and so far liable to his right and dominion, and
   that he willed to permit these creatures to transgress the law of their
   creation, flowed merely from his free will; but these things being once
   supposed, it necessarily belongs to the divine nature, as it is just,
   to punish those who so transgress. But that God exerciseth a
   concomitant liberty in punishing them, we have several times allowed,
   and we have no doubt but, if this be atheism, it is also Christianity.

   Secondly, "Is God at all bound," says our very learned antagonist, "or
   in any manner obliged, to manifest his justice, more than to manifest
   his mercy, munificence, and liberality? It is evident that God is not
   bound to exercise any one property whatever more than another.
   Wherefore, either all things must be said to be necessarily performed
   by God, and even that the world was not made of his free will, but from
   a natural necessity; or that all things have been, and still are,
   freely done by God." But besides that this reasoning is sophistical, it
   injures not our cause. The whole matter may be clearly explained in one
   word: God is not absolutely bound to manifest any property of his
   nature, much less one more than another, for this respects the free
   purpose of God; but upon a condition supposed, God may be more bound to
   exercise one property than another, for this relates to its exercise.
   But none of us have said that it is necessary that God should punish
   sin because he is necessarily bound to demonstrate his justice: in this
   very thing he demonstrates his justice indeed; [175] but it is
   necessary that he should punish sin because he is just. The learned
   writer then confounds the decree of manifesting the glory of the divine
   properties, to which God is absolutely bound by none of his properties,
   with the exercise of these properties upon a condition supposed; which
   we have endeavoured to prove to be necessary with respect to
   vindicatory justice.

   In what sense all things are said to be done by God necessarily, though
   he be a free agent, hath been already explained. By these arguments,
   then, whereby he endeavours to weigh down our opinion with prejudices,
   it is evident that our antagonist hath nothing availed himself. Let us
   now see whether he hath been more successful in his replies to
   Lubbertus than in his system of opposition.

   He briefly states five arguments of Lubbertus, each of which he answers
   in order.

   That passage of the apostle to the Romans, chap. i. 32, "Who, knowing
   the judgment" (that is, the just right or righteous judgment) "of God,
   that they which commit such things are worthy of death," is quoted as a
   proof of this doctrine by Lubbertus. Twisse thus replies: "I
   acknowledge that they who commit such things are worthy of death. But
   it by no means follows from this that it is necessary that God should
   punish them; which I shall demonstrate by a twofold argument: For if
   that followed, it would follow that they who commit such things must
   necessarily be punished; but the elect, because of sin, are worthy of
   death, but they are not punished at all, much less necessarily. Will
   you say, because they who have committed such things are worthy of
   death, that therefore it is necessary, from an absolute necessity, that
   either they or others, -- that is, that either they themselves, who are
   deserving of death, or some one else on their account, though innocent,
   -- should be punished? Who can digest such a consequence as this?
   Again: If they are worthy of death, then they shall die the death;
   either, then, a temporal or eternal one. Beyond all doubt, he will
   answer an eternal death. It is necessary, therefore, that they should
   exist to all eternity, and by an absolute necessity, to the end that
   they may be punished to all eternity. And so, then, God cannot
   annihilate a creature."

   But, with this great man's good leave, neither his mode of disputing,
   -- namely, by substituting a double argument in the place of one solid
   and clear answer, -- is at all satisfactory, nor are these arguments of
   any service to his cause, the first of which is captious and not at all
   solid, the other too nice and curious. For, first, Lubbertus does not
   contend that God cannot pardon sin without satisfaction, because
   simply, by some reason or other, sinners are worthy of death; but for
   this reason only, because the righteous judgment or just right of God
   is, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, and that,
   therefore, it would be unjust in God not to inflict that punishment, --
   namely, because, according to the justice of God, which Twisse himself
   acknowledges to be natural and essential to him, they are worthy of
   death, and therefore necessarily to be punished. But the arguments of
   Twisse do not prove the contrary; for the elect themselves are worthy
   of death, and therefore necessarily to be punished, -- not from an
   absolute necessity in respect of the mode of acting in God the
   punisher, but in respect of a condition supposed, and which excludes
   not the liberty of the agent. That is to say, God may inflict the
   punishment due to one on another, after, -- in consequence of his own
   right and the consent of that other, -- he hath laid the sins upon that
   other on account of which he inflicts the punishment. He might punish
   the elect either in their own persons, or in their surety standing in
   their room and stead; and when he is punished, they also are punished:
   for in this point of view the federal head and those represented by him
   are not considered as distinct, but as one; for although they are not
   one in respect of personal unity, they are, however, one, -- that is,
   one body in mystical union, yea, one mystical Christ; [176] -- namely,
   the surety is the head, those represented by him the members; and when
   the head is punished, the members also are punished. Nor could even he
   himself be called a surety absolutely innocent: for although he was
   properly and personally innocent, he was imputatively and
   substitutively guilty; for "God made him to be sin for us;" He "laid on
   him the iniquity of us all." [177]

   The second argument which this learned writer uses to confute the
   conclusion of Lubbertus is of no greater weight. We are not in the
   counsels of God, so that we can precisely pronounce with regard to his
   judgments and his ways. That God is able absolutely to reduce to
   nothing any creature that he hath created out of nothing, no one can
   doubt; but it being supposed that that creature is guilty of sin, and
   that that sin, according to the right and justice of God, deserves
   eternal death, we with confidence maintain that God, who cannot deny
   himself, cannot reduce it to nothing. Neither is there anything absurd
   that can be inferred from this.

   To the second proof brought from the word of God, declaring himself by
   that name of his, "Who will by no means clear the guilty," Exod. xxxiv.
   6, 7, he answers: "It is true that God will by no means clear the
   guilty, yet it is evident that not a few are cleared by God. The
   guilty, then, whom he doth not clear, must be those who have neither
   repented nor believed in Christ. Hence it follows that every one hath
   either been punished or will be punished, either in himself or in
   Christ; which we do not at all deny. But it doth not at all follow
   hence that God doth this from a necessity of nature, for it is possible
   that it may proceed from the free will of God; neither doth it belong
   to him to exercise his mercy and bounty from a necessity of nature, but
   of his free will."

   But, 1. It is of no service to his cause to urge that God does not
   punish some guilty sinners in their own persons, but clears them, when
   this learned man grants, yea, contends, that they have all been
   punished in Christ their head, by whom justice was fully satisfied. 2.
   It hath been several times shown before how God, from a necessity of
   nature, punishes sin, and yet with a concomitant liberty of will; and
   the difference between justice and mercy, in respect of their exercise
   and egress towards their proper objects, hath been shown; so that we do
   not think it proper to insist farther on these at present. These
   considerations, then, being set aside, it is evident that this learned
   man has not attended to the force of the argument: for it does not
   amount to this, that in respect of the event God clears none
   unpunished, either in themselves or in their surety, -- an assertion
   which nobody but a Socinian speaks against; but rather to this, that as
   punitory justice is a natural attribute of God, a very considerable
   portion of his essential glory, yea, a well-known name of God, he can
   "by no means clear the guilty," unless he were to deny himself, and
   deliver up his glory to another, -- than which nothing is farther from
   God. But those for whom the divine justice hath been satisfied by
   Christ ought not, in respect of the demand of that justice, to be
   called guilty, for their obligation to punishment, namely, the guilt of
   sin, is taken away; so that it is just with God to deliver them from
   the wrath to come, although it be free to him at what time he may will
   that that deliverance, in respect of them, should take place and be
   manifested to their consciences, that so "being justified by faith,
   they may have peace with God."

   To those verses cited by Lubbertus from Ps. v. 4-6, he thus replies:
   "The prophet is testifying," says he, "that God hates all who work
   iniquity; however, it is sufficiently evident that God does not punish
   all who work iniquity, for he does not punish the elect. I acknowledge
   that God will in his own time destroy all the wicked out of Christ; but
   of his free will, and from no consideration of necessity, as he is an
   agent entirely free."

   I am not altogether satisfied with this assertion, "That God doth not
   punish all who work iniquity;" neither does the instance of the elect
   confirm it, for even the learned gentleman does not deny that all their
   sins have been punished in Christ. We maintain alone that God cannot
   but punish every sin, because he is just; but whether he choose to do
   this in their own persons or in their surety rests entirely with
   himself: therefore, it doth not derogate from his justice that he
   transferred the sins of some upon Christ, and punished them in him. But
   they themselves, though personally guilty before Christ took their
   guilt upon himself, are not, however, punished, nor can be accounted
   guilty in respect of the judgment of God, their sins not being imputed
   to them; or, they ought to be said to have been punished in Christ
   their head, with whom they are now closely united. In the second place,
   we have shown before, and the learned gentleman acknowledges it, that a
   free act of the will may be consistent with some regard to necessity.

   Allow me, then, from these three passages of Scripture cited by
   Lubbertus to collect one argument only; which, if I mistake not, no one
   of the various arguments of our very learned antagonist, nor even all
   of them, will be able to overthrow. It is to this purpose: If that just
   right or righteous "judgment of God" be essential, -- namely, that
   which is made manifest and known to all by nature; [178] if his
   avenging justice be such that he "will by no means clear the guilty;"
   [179] if as he hates sin, so he will "destroy all the workers of
   iniquity," [180] then it is natural to God to punish sin, and he cannot
   let it pass unpunished, for he can do nothing contrary to his natural
   attributes, exercised about their proper objects. But the former part
   of the argument is true; [181] so also must the latter.

   But Lubbertus likewise reasons by an argument taken from the common
   definition of justice, to which Twisse also refers. "Vindicatory
   justice," says he, "is the eternal will of God to give to every one his
   own; therefore, it belongs truly or naturally to God." Twisse cites
   these words from Lubbertus; for his writings against Vossius I have not
   by me at present. Now, although this justly celebrated man sometimes
   agrees to this conclusion, yet as he twitches [182] the argument
   various ways, we shall, as briefly as possible, bring it in regular
   order to a point. "First of all," says he, "allow me to put you in mind
   that that definition of justice holds good only with regard to justice
   in general, but not with regard to vindicatory justice in particular;
   for the whole of justice is employed in giving to every one his own." I
   have said before that that definition of the civilians was not quite
   agreeable to me, nor in every respect satisfactory. But the objection
   of Twisse is of no weight: for vindicatory justice is not distinguished
   from universal justice, or justice generally so called, as to its
   habit, but only in respect of its egress to its proper object; and,
   therefore, nothing ought to be included in the definition which is not
   found also in the thing itself. Although, then, the learned opponent
   throws obstacles in the way, he cannot deny that vindicatory justice is
   "a will to give to every one his own, or what is due to him."

   "But let Lubbertus bethink himself," says Twisse, "whether the divine
   bounty is not likewise the eternal will of the Deity to give to some
   beyond what is their own. Would it not, then, justly follow that it is
   necessary, and even from absolute necessity, that he should exercise
   his bounty towards some?"

   But neither is this comparison between things dissimilar of the
   smallest advantage to our adversary's cause: for, -- 1. The objects
   themselves about which these attributes are employed are very
   different; for who does not see that there cannot be any comparison
   formed between the giving to every one according to his right, and
   giving to some beyond their right? That to give to any one beyond his
   right is a most free act of the will, the thing itself declares; but to
   give to every one his own, or what is due to him, the very thing itself
   requires. All acknowledge that it depends on the mere good pleasure of
   the Deity whether he may will to be bounteous, towards any; but who but
   an impious wretch would be bold enough to dispute whether he may will
   to be just towards any? But besides; supposing a constant will in the
   Deity of giving to some beyond their right, or of bestowing on them
   more than they deserve, in what respect it would not be necessary (the
   question does not respect absolute necessity) to him to exercise that
   bounty towards these some, I absolutely do not comprehend. But with
   regard to the divine bounty, and in what sense that is ascribed to God,
   and what kind of habitude of the divine will it denotes, this is not
   the place to inquire.

   He again says: "If hence it follow that it is necessary that God should
   give to each his due, it will certainly be necessary that he should
   give to each of us eternal damnation."

   That punishment belongs not to us, but to God himself, the learned
   gentleman will afterward acknowledge. But God may give to every one his
   own, or what is due to every one, in the infliction of punishment,
   although he do not inflict it on the sinners themselves, but on their
   surety, substituted in their room and stead. Thus he gives glory to his
   justice, and does no injury to us: for no one can demand it as his
   right to be punished; for no one hath a right to require punishment,
   which is an involuntary evil, but rather becomes subject to the right
   of another.

   To these he replies: "If justice be only the will of giving to every
   one his own, it is not the necessity of giving it."

   But here the learned gentleman trifles; for will and necessity are not
   opposed, as a thing itself may be prior, and the mode or affection of
   it posterior, to some other things, either in the first or second act.
   [183] Neither hath any one defined the justice of God by necessity,
   although from his justice it is necessary that he should act justly.
   Though it be the will of God, namely, "to give every one what is his
   due," yet it is a constant and immutable will, which, as it differs not
   in any respect from the divine essence itself, must exist necessarily;
   and a proper object for its exercise being supposed, it must
   necessarily operate, though it act freely.

   In the last place, then, this celebrated writer denies that "punishment
   can properly be called ours, in such a sense that, from his will of
   giving to every one his own, it should be necessary that God should
   inflict it upon us sinners;" but he asserts that "it belongs to God, as
   having the full power either of inflicting or relaxing it." That
   punishment is ours, or belongs to us, cannot be said with propriety; it
   must be traced to the source whence it hath its rise, that is, whence
   it is just that it should be inflicted upon sinners; but this is the
   just right or righteous judgment of God, Rom. i. 32. Thus far, then, it
   may be reckoned among the things that belong to God, as it is his
   justice that requires it should be inflicted. But it does not follow
   that God has a full power of inflicting it or relaxing it, because in
   this sense it may be accounted among the things which belong to him.
   God owes it to himself to have a proper regard to the honour of all his
   own perfections.

   We choose not to enter any farther on the arguments which this learned
   writer advances, either in his disputations against Lubbertus, or in
   his answers to his arguments; partly as they coincide with those
   mentioned before, and have been considered in the vindication of the
   argument taken from the consideration of God's hatred against sin; and
   partly as they militate only against a natural and absolute necessity,
   which in the present case we do not assert.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [173] Namely, Twisse's. -- Tr.

   [174] A learned protestant divine, who was born in Friesland, and lived
   1556-1625. He wrote several works against Bellarmine, Socinus,
   Arminius, etc., but his best work is said to be "De Papâ Romanâ." --
   Ed.

   [175] Rom. i. 18.

   [176] See 1 Cor. xii. 12, etc., "For as the body is one, and hath many
   members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one
   body; so also is Christ," etc. -- Tr.

   [177] 2 Cor. v. 21; Isa. liii. 6.

   [178] Rom. i. 32.

   [179] See Exod. xxxiv. 7.

   [180] Ps. v. 4-6.

   [181] Being founded on the words of Scripture. -- Tr.

   [182] "Objects to the argument on various grounds, which we shall, as
   briefly as possible, consider in succession." -- Ed.

   [183] God's will of giving to every man his own was from everlasting,
   justice being an essential attribute of his unchangeable nature; but it
   is only after the supposition of a rational being that had sinned, that
   he must necessarily, -- that is, from the very principles of his
   nature, -- exercise that will towards sinners, and give them the wages
   of sin, namely, death. -- Tr. The Latin is: "Cum prior res ipsa sit,
   posterior aliquarum rerum, vel in actu primo vel secundo, modus seu
   affectio," -- "Since the former is the thing itself, the latter a mode
   or affection of some things," etc. -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XVI.

   Piscator's opinion of this controversy -- How far we assent to it --
   Twisse's arguments militate against it -- How God punishes from a
   natural necessity -- How God is a "consuming fire" -- God's right, of
   what kind -- Its exercise necessary, from some thing supposed -- Whence
   the obligation of God to exercise it arises -- Other objections of
   Twisse discussed.

   The consideration of what our justly celebrated antagonist hath
   advanced against Piscator, [184] whom he declares to hold the first
   place among the theologians of the present day, and to shine as far
   superior to the rest as the moon doth to the lesser stars, shall put an
   end to this dispute. He has chosen Piscator's notes upon his Collation
   of Vorstius, [185] as the subject of his consideration and discussion.
   In general we are inclined to give our voice in favour of the
   sentiments of Piscator; but as the disciples of Christ ought to call
   none on earth master in matters of religion, we by no means hold
   ourselves bound to support all the phrases, arguments, or reasons that
   he may have used in defence of his opinion. Setting aside, then, all
   anxious search after words, expressions, and the minutiæ of similes,
   which I could wish this distinguished writer had paid less attention
   to, we will endeavour to repel every charge brought against our common
   and principal cause, and to place this truth, which we have thus far
   defended, as we are now speedily hastening to a conclusion, beyond the
   reach of attacks and trouble from its adversaries.

   The first argument, then, of Piscator, to which he replies, is taken
   from that comparison made in Heb. xii. 29, between God in respect of
   his vindicatory justice and a "consuming fire." From this passage
   Piscator concludes, "That as fire, from the property of its nature,
   cannot but burn combustible matter when applied to it, and that by a
   natural necessity; so God, from the perfection of his justice, cannot
   but punish sin when committed, -- that is, when presented before that
   justice." What he asserts, with regard to a natural and absolute
   necessity, we do not admit; for God neither exerciseth nor can exercise
   any act towards objects without himself in a natural manner, or as an
   agent merely natural. He, indeed, is a fire, but rational and
   intelligent fire. Although, then, it be no less necessary to him to
   punish sins than it is to fire to bum the combustible matter applied to
   it, the same manner of operation, however, accords not to him as to
   fire, for he worketh as an intelligent agent; that is, with a
   concomitant liberty in the acts of his will, and a consistent liberty
   in the acts of his understanding. We agree, then, with Piscator in his
   conclusion, though not in his manner of leading his proof. [186] The
   objections made to it by the learned Twisse we shall try by the
   standard of truth.

   First, then, he maintains, and with many laboured arguments, that God
   doth not punish sin from a necessity of nature, which excludes every
   kind of liberty. But whom do these kinds of arguments affect? They
   apply not at all to us; for Piscator himself seems to have understood
   nothing else by a "natural necessity" than that necessity which we have
   so often discussed, particularly modified: for he says, that "God doth
   some things by a natural necessity, because by nature he cannot do
   otherwise." That is, sin being supposed to exist, from the strict
   demands of that justice which is natural to him, he cannot but punish
   it, or act otherwise than punish it; although he may do this without
   any encroachment on his liberty, as his intellectual will is inclined
   to happiness by a natural inclination, yet wills happiness with a
   concomitant liberty; for it would not be a will should it act
   otherwise, as freedom of action is the very essence of the will. But
   the arguments of Twisse do not oppose this kind of necessity, but that
   only which belongs to inanimate, merely natural agents, which entirely
   excludes all sorts of liberty, properly so called.

   Let us particularly examine some of this learned gentleman's arguments:
   "If," says he, "God must punish sin from a necessity of nature, he must
   punish it as soon as committed." Granted, were he to act by such a
   necessity of nature as denotes a necessary principle and mode of
   acting; but not if by a necessity that is improperly so called, because
   it is supposed that his nature necessarily requires that he should so
   act. As, for instance: suppose that he wills to speak, he must, by
   necessity of his nature, speak truly, for God cannot lie; yet he speaks
   freely when he speaks truly.

   Again: "If," says he, "God punished from a necessity of nature, then,
   as often as he inflicted punishment, he would inflict it to the utmost
   of his power, as fire burns with all its force; but this cannot be said
   without blasphemy."

   Here again this learned man draws absurd conclusions from a false
   supposition. The nature of God requires that he should punish as far as
   is just, not as far as he is able. It is necessary, sin being supposed
   to exist, that he should inflict punishment, -- not the greatest that
   he is able to inflict, but as great as his right and justice require;
   for in inflicting punishment, he proceeds freely, according to the rule
   of these. It is necessary that the glory of the divine holiness,
   purity, and dominion should be vindicated; but in what manner, at what
   time, in what degree, or by what kind of punishment, belongs entirely
   to God, and we are not of his counsels. But I am fully confident that
   the arguments last urged by this learned gentleman may be answered in
   one word. I say, then, God punishes according to what is due to sin by
   the rule of his right, not to what extent he is able. As, for instance:
   God does not use his omnipotence from an absolute necessity of nature;
   but supposing that he wills to do any work without himself, he cannot
   act but omnipotently. Neither, however, doth it hence follow that God
   acts to the utmost extent of his power, for he might have created more
   worlds. We do not, then, affirm that God is so bound by the laws of an
   absolute necessity that, like an insensible and merely natural agent,
   it would be impossible for him, by his infinite wisdom, to assign,
   according to the rule and demand of his justice, degrees, modes,
   duration, and extension of punishment, according to the degrees of the
   demerit or circumstances of the sin, or even to transfer it upon the
   surety, who has voluntarily, and with his own approbation, substituted
   himself in the room of sinners: but we only affirm that his natural and
   essential justice indispensably requires that every sin should have its
   "just recompense of reward;" and were not this the case, a sinful
   creature might emancipate itself from the power of its Creator and
   Lord. This very learned man having, according to his usual custom,
   introduced these preliminary observations, at length advances his
   answers to Piscator's argument, the nature and quality of which we
   shall particularly consider. That which he chiefly depends upon, which
   he forges from the Scripture, that asserts God, in respect of sin, to
   be a "consuming fire," we have examined in the proof of our second
   argument, and have shown of how little weight it is to invalidate the
   force of our argument.

   To that asseveration of Abraham, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth
   do right?" he thus answers, "He will do right certainly, but his own
   right, and will exercise it according to his own free appointment. But
   without the divine appointment I acknowledge no right to the exercise
   of which God can be influenced by any kind of necessity."

   Ans. That God exerciseth his right, or doeth right, according to his
   own free appointment, may be admitted in a sound sense; for in that
   exercise of his right he uses volition and understanding, or, more
   properly, he hath not appointed or determined so to act, for so to act
   is natural and essential to him concerning the things about which there
   is no free determination. It is, indeed, of the free determination of
   God that any right can be exercised, or any attribute manifested, for
   he freely decreed to create creatures, over which he hath a right, but
   he might not have decreed it so; and in every exercise of his right
   there are certain things, which we have mentioned before, which are not
   the objects of free determination. But that no right belongs to God
   without his divine appointment, to the exercise of which he is bound,
   is asserted without probability, and appears evidently false; for
   supposing that God willed to create rational creatures, does it depend
   upon his free determination that the right of dominion and the exercise
   of it should belong to him? If so, God might be neither the Lord nor
   God of his creatures, and a rational creature may be neither creature
   nor rational; for both its creation and reason suppose a dependence on
   and subjection to some Lord and Creator. If the right, then, of
   dominion depended on the free determination of God, then God might
   freely and justly determine that he would neither have nor exercise
   such right; for he might determine the contrary of that which he hath
   freely determined, without any injustice or any incongruity. From
   himself, then, and not from any one without himself, -- that is, from
   his own nature, -- he receives the obligation to exercise his right,
   both of dominion and of justice. Thus by nature he must speak truly, if
   he wills to speak.

   "But I cannot," says this renowned man, "sufficiently express my
   astonishment at this very grave divine's assertion, [187] -- namely,
   That God, without injury to his justice, may will evil antecedently to
   whomsoever he pleases;' for which I do not find fault with him, but
   that he does not assert that God, for the same or a better reason,
   might do good to a creature, notwithstanding its demerit, by pardoning
   its sin."

   If by "willing evil antecedently" be understood his willing to inflict
   evil without regard to the demerit of sin, it is a point too intricate
   for me to determine. If the evil refer to the infliction of it, I must
   differ from this learned doctor. If it refer to the willing, the
   assertion avails not his cause; for if we suppose that God, without
   doing injury to any one, without dishonouring any of his own
   attributes, without regard to sin, hath decreed to punish a creature
   for the sin that it was to commit, would it not thence follow that God
   might let sin pass unpunished, in despite both of his own glory, and to
   the entire destruction of the dependence of rational creatures. [188]
   Nor is the following comment of our celebrated opponent of any greater
   weight, -- namely, "That God would not be omnipotent if he necessarily
   punished sin, for thence it would follow that God cannot annihilate a
   sinful creature which he created out of nothing; which," says he, "is
   evidently contrary to omnipotence."

   But how many things are there which this learned gentleman himself
   acknowledges that God, with respect to his decree, cannot do, without
   any disparagement to his omnipotence! He could not break the bones of
   Christ; but the person must be deprived of reason who would assert that
   this is any diminution of the divine omnipotence. If, then, there be
   many things which God cannot do, without any the smallest detraction
   from his omnipotence, because by a free determination he hath decreed
   not to do them, is he to be thought less omnipotent, so to speak,
   because he cannot, on account of his justice, let sins committed pass
   unpunished? Is God not omnipotent because, on account of his nature, he
   cannot lie? Yea, he would not be omnipotent if he could renounce his
   right and justice; for to permit a sinful creature to shake off his
   natural dominion is not a mark of omnipotence but of impotence, than
   which nothing is more remote from God.

   After having brought the dispute thus far, and accurately weighed what
   remains of Dr Twisse's answer to Piscator, there seemed to me nothing
   that could occur to give any trouble to an intelligent reader. As there
   is no reason, then, either to give farther trouble to the reader or
   myself on this point, we here conclude the controversy; and this I do
   with entertaining the strongest hopes that no person of discretion, or
   who is unacquainted with the pernicious devices which almost everywhere
   abound, will impute it to me as a matter of blame, that I, a person of
   no consideration, and so very full, too, of employment, that I could
   devote only a few leisure hours to this disputation, should have
   attacked the theological digression of a man so very illustrious and
   renowned, not only among our own countrymen, but even in foreign
   nations, as the attack has been made in the cause of truth.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [184] A learned professor of divinity at Herborn. He was born at
   Strasburg 1546, and died 1626. He was the author of several
   commentaries, controversial treatises, and a translation of the Bible
   into German. -- Ed.

   [185] "In Collationem Vorstii." The translation is not very
   intelligible. Vorstius wrote work with this title, "Parasceue ad amicam
   collationem cum Jo. Piscatore," and Owen refers to Piscator's notes
   upon it. -- Ed.

   [186] It is not Piscator's reasoning, but the kind of necessity implied
   in the reasoning, to which Owen takes exception. The words "nature" and
   "natural" also occasion considerable ambiguity. Justice is natural and
   necessary, according to Owen, in so far as it is not an act of the will
   merely; but he does not hold it to be natural in Piscator's sense, as
   operating by a blind and physical necessity, apart from the exercise of
   intelligence and volition, and the existence of an object requiring the
   manifestation of it. We might render the passage above as follows: "To
   this extent, then, I adopt Piscator's conclusion, -- namely, in so far
   as he maintains the existence of a necessity, but not as regards the
   mode or kind of it." -- Ed.

   [187] Namely, Piscator's. -- Tr.

   [188] Because if he punished a creature for sin merely because he
   willed or determined so to do, and not because the nature of sin
   necessarily so required, he might as easily will the contrary; and,
   consequently, the subordination of the creature would be entirely
   subverted. -- Tr.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XVII.

   Rutherford reviewed -- An oversight of that learned man -- His opinion
   of punitory justice -- He contends that divine justice exists in God
   freely -- The consideration of that assertion -- This learned writer
   and Twisse disagree -- His first argument -- Its answer -- The
   appointment of Christ to death twofold -- The appointment of Christ to
   the mediatorial office an act of supreme dominion -- The punishment of
   Christ an act of punitory justice -- An argument of that learned man,
   easy to answer -- The examination of the same -- The learned writer
   proves things not denied -- Passes over things to be denied -- What
   kind of necessity we ascribe to God in punishing sins -- A necessity
   upon a condition supposed -- What the suppositions are upon which that
   necessity is founded -- A difference between those things which are
   necessary by a decree and those which are so from the divine nature --
   The second argument of that learned man -- His obscure manner of
   writing pointed out -- Justice and mercy different in respect of their
   exercise -- What it is to owe the good of punitory justice to the
   universe -- This learned man's third argument -- The answer -- Whether
   God could forbid sin, and not under the penalty of eternal death --
   Concerning the modification of punishment in human courts from the
   divine appointment -- The manner of it -- What this learned author
   understands by the "internal court" of God -- This learned author's
   fourth argument -- All acts of grace have a respect to Christ -- His
   fifth argument -- The answer -- A dissertation of the various degrees
   of punishment -- For what reason God may act unequally with equals --
   Concerning the delay of punishment, and its various dispensations.

   The consideration of the arguments advanced by Mr Samuel Rutherford
   [189] against this truth which we are now maintaining shall conclude
   this dissertation. He maintains, as I have observed before, "That
   punitory justice exists not in God by necessity of nature, but freely;"
   and he has said that Twisse hath proved this by a variety of arguments,
   one of which, in preference to the others, he builds on, as
   unanswerable.

   But, with this great man's leave, I must tell him that Twisse hath
   never even said, much less proved, "That punitory justice exists freely
   in God, and not from a necessity of nature;" nor, indeed, can it be
   said by any one, with any show of reason, for punitory justice denotes
   the habit of justice, nor is it less justice because it is punitory.
   But be assured the accurate Twisse hath never maintained that any habit
   exists in God freely, and not from a necessity of nature. We have
   before accounted in what sense habits are ascribed to God. Even the
   more sagacious Socinians do not fall into such a blunder; but they deny
   such a habit to exist in God at all, and entirely divest him of this
   justice. Twisse, indeed, maintains that the exercise of that justice is
   free to God, but grants that justice itself is a natural attribute of
   God; the Socinians, that it is only a free act of the divine will.
   Which party this learned author favours appears not from his words. If
   by justice he mean the habit, he sides with the Socinians; if the act
   and exercise, he is of the same opinion with Twisse, although he
   expresses his sentiments rather unhappily. But let us consider this
   learned writer's arguments:--

   The first, which he acknowledges to be taken from Twisse (the same
   thing may be said of most of his others), and which he pronounces
   unanswerable, is this: "God gave up his most innocent Son, our Lord
   Jesus Christ, to death, in consequence of his punitory justice, and it
   was certainly in his power not to have devoted him to death, for from
   no necessity of nature did God devote his Son to death; for if so, then
   God would not have been God, which is absurd, for of his free love he
   gave him up to death, John iii. 16; Rom. viii. 32."

   As there is no need of a sword to cut this "indissoluble knot," as he
   calls it, let us try by words what we can do to untie it. I answer,
   then, The devoting of Christ to death is taken in a twofold sense:-- 1.
   For the appointment of Christ to the office of surety, and to suffer
   the punishment of our sins in our room and stead. 2. For the infliction
   of punishment upon Christ, now appointed our surety, and our delivery
   through his death being now supposed.

   The devoting of Christ to death, considered in the first sense, we deny
   to be an act of punitory justice, or to have arisen from that justice;
   for that act by which God destined his Son to the work of mediation, by
   which, in respect of their guilt, he transferred from us all our sins
   and laid them upon Christ, are acts of supreme dominion, and breathe
   love and grace rather than avenging justice. But the punishment of
   Christ, made sin for us, is an act of punitory justice; nor, upon the
   supposition that he was received in our room as our surety, could it be
   otherwise. And although, in drawing such consequences, I think we ought
   to refrain as to what might be possible, I am not, however, afraid to
   affirm that God could not have been God, -- that is, just and true, --
   if he had not devoted to death his Son, when thus appointed our
   mediator.

   What shall we say? -- that even this learned man was aware of this
   twofold sense of the phrase, "The devoting of Christ to death?" He
   either had not thoroughly weighed that distinction, or else he is
   inconsistent with and shamefully contradicts himself; for in the
   beginning of the argument he asserts, that "the devoting of Christ to
   death had its rise from punitory justice," but in the end he says it
   was from "free love." But certainly punishing justice is not free love.
   He must, then, either acknowledge a twofold appointment of Christ to
   death, or he cannot be consistent with himself. But the passages of
   Scripture that he quotes evidently mean the appointment of Christ to
   death, as we have explained it in the first sense of the phrase.

   What reason this learned man had for so much boasting of this argument
   as unanswerable, let the reader determine; to me it appears not only
   very easily answerable, but far beneath many others that one disputing
   on such a subject must encounter.

   But he introduces some as making answers to his argument, who affirm
   "That Christ was not innocent, but a sinner by imputation, and made sin
   for us; and that it was necessary from the essential justice of God,
   and his authority, as enjoining that he should make atonement for sin
   in himself and in his own person." [190]

   I applaud the prudence of this learned man, who, from no kind of
   necessity, but freely, frames answers to his own arguments. Here he has
   exhibited such a one as nobody but himself would have dreamed of; for
   although what your crazy disputants, or this learned divine, fighting
   with himself, say be true, he must, however, be a fool who can believe
   that it has any relation to the present subject. To those adversaries
   who urge that "God freely punishes sin because he punished his Son who
   knew no sin," and who contend that "God may equally not punish the
   guilty as punish the innocent," we answer, that Christ, though
   intrinsically and personally innocent, yet as he was by substitution,
   and consequently legally, guilty, is no instance of the punishment of
   an innocent person; for he was not punished as the most innocent Son of
   God. Passing over these things, then, -- and indeed they are of no
   import to the present subject, -- he endeavours to prove, by several
   arguments, that God laid our sins upon Christ by constituting him
   surety, and from no necessity of nature. But even this effort is of no
   service to his cause, for this we by no means deny; so that his labour
   is entirely superfluous. At length, however, in the progress of the
   dispute, this learned gentleman advances some arguments that seem
   suitable to his purpose.

   "We readily grant," says he, "upon supposition that Christ was made our
   surety by the decree of God, that he could not be but punished by God,
   and yet freely, as God created the world of mere free will, though
   necessarily, in respect of his immutability; for it cannot be that a
   free action should impose on God a natural or physical necessity of
   doing any thing."

   We have shown before what kind of a necessity we ascribe to God in
   punishing sins. It is not an inanimate or merely physical necessity, as
   if God acted from principles of nature, in a manner altogether natural,
   -- that is, without any intervening act of understanding or will; for
   "he worketh all things according to the counsel of his will." But it is
   such a necessity as leaves to God an entire concomitant liberty in
   acting, but which necessarily, by destroying all antecedent
   indifference, accomplishes its object, -- namely, the punishment of
   sin, -- the justice, holiness, and purity of God so requiring. But this
   necessity, though it hindereth not the divine liberty, any more than
   that which is incumbent on God of doing any thing in consequence of a
   decree, from the immutability of his nature, yet it arises not from a
   decree, but from things themselves particularly constituted, and not as
   the other kind of necessity, from a decree only. And, therefore, in
   those things which God does necessarily, merely from the supposition of
   a decree, the decree respects the thing to be done, and affects it
   antecedently to the consideration of any necessity incumbent on him;
   but in those whose necessity arises from the demand of the divine
   nature, a decree only supposes a certain condition of things, which
   being supposed, immediately, and without any consideration of any
   respect to a decree, it is necessary that one or another consequence
   should follow. As, for instance: after God decreed that he would create
   the world, it was impossible that he should not create it, because he
   is immutable, and the decree immediately respected that very thing,
   namely, the creation of it. But the necessity of punishing sin arises
   from the justice and holiness of God, it being supposed that, in
   consequence of a decree, a rational creature existed, and was permitted
   to transgress; but he punishes the transgression which he decreed to
   permit because he is just, and not only because he decreed to punish
   it. The necessity, then, of creating the world arises from a decree;
   the necessity of punishing sin, from justice.

   "But it is impossible," says Rutherford, "that a free action can impose
   a natural or physical necessity of doing any thing upon God."

   But by a "free action" it can be proved that certain things may be
   placed in such a condition that God could not but exercise certain acts
   towards them, on account of the strict demand of some attribute of his
   nature, though not from a physical and insensible necessity, which
   excludes all liberty of action; for it being supposed that in
   consequence of a free decree God willed to speak with man, it is
   necessary from the decree that he should speak, but that he should
   speak truth is necessary from the necessity of his nature. Supposing,
   then, a free action, in which he hath decreed to speak, a natural
   necessity of speaking truth is incumbent on God, nor can he do
   otherwise than speak truth. Supposing sin to exist, and that God willed
   to do any thing with regard to sin (although perhaps this is not in
   consequence of a decree), it is necessary, by necessity of nature, that
   he should do justice, -- that is, that he should punish it; for the
   righteous judgment of God is, "That they which commit such things,"
   namely, who commit sin, "are worthy of death." There are certain
   attributes of the Deity which have no egress but towards certain
   objects particularly modified, for they do not constitute or create
   objects to themselves, as other divine attributes do; but these objects
   being once constituted by a free act of the divine will, they must
   necessarily, -- for such is their nature and manner, -- be exercised.

   What this learned writer farther adds in support of his argument is
   founded on a mistaken idea of the subject in question; for as the
   necessity of punishing sin arises from the right and justice of God, it
   is by no means necessary that he should punish it in one subject more
   than in another, but only that he should punish it, and that thereby
   his right may be restored and his justice satisfied.

   The second argument of this learned writer is this: "As God freely has
   mercy on whom he will, -- for he is under obligation to none, and yet
   mercy is essential to him, -- so God does not by any necessity of
   nature owe punishment to a sinner. Although, then, man owe obedience to
   God, or a vicarious compensation by means of punishment, from the
   necessity of a decree, yet those who say that God, by necessity of
   nature, owes the good of punitory justice to the universe, which were
   he not to execute he would not be God, -- those, I say, indirectly deny
   the existence of a God."

   Although any one may perceive that these assertions are unsubstantial,
   unfounded, and more obscure than even the books of the Sibyls, we
   shall, however, make a few observations upon them. In the first place,
   then, it must be abundantly clear, from what has been already said,
   that mercy and justice are different in respect of their exercise, nor
   need we now farther insist on that point. But how this learned man will
   prove that sparing mercy, -- which, as not only the nature of the thing
   itself requires, but even the Socinians with the orthodox agree, ought
   to be viewed in the same light as punitory justice, -- is essential to
   God, when he affirms punitory justice to exist in God freely, I cannot
   conjecture. But as there is no one who doubts but that God does all
   things for the glory and manifestation of his own essential attributes,
   why it should be more acceptable to him, in his administration
   respecting sin committed, to exercise an act of the will purely free,
   no excellence of his nature so requiring, than of an essential
   property, [191] to do in all respects whatsoever he pleaseth, and to
   spread abroad its glory, it will be difficult to assign a reason. God,
   I say, has a proper regard for the glory of his attributes; and as
   mercy earnestly and warmly urges the free pardon of sins, if no
   attribute of the divine nature required that they should be punished,
   it is strange that God, by an act of his will entirely free, should
   have inclined to the contrary. But we have shown before that the
   Scriptures lay a more sure foundation for the death of Christ.

   Secondly, God does not owe to the sinner punishment from a necessity of
   nature, but he owes the infliction of punishment on account of sin to
   his own right and justice, for thence the obligation of a sinner to
   punishment arises; nor is the debt of obedience in rational creatures
   resolvable into a decree in any other respect than as it is in
   consequence of a decree that they are rational creatures.

   In the third place, the conclusion of this argument would require even
   the Delian swimmer's abilities to surmount it. So very puzzling and
   harsh is the diction, that it is difficult to make any sense of it; for
   what means that sentence, "That God, by a necessity of nature, owes the
   good of punitory justice to the universe?" The good of the universe is
   the glory of God himself. To owe, then, "the good of punitory justice
   to the universe," is to owe the good of an essential attribute to his
   own glory. But, again, what is "the good of punitory justice?" Justice
   itself, or the exercise of it? Neither can be so called with any
   propriety. But if the learned author mean this, that God ought to
   preserve his own right and dominion over the universe, and that this is
   just, his nature so requiring him, but that it cannot be done,
   supposing sin to exist, without the exercise of punitory justice, and
   then that those who affirm this indirectly deny the existence of God,
   -- this is easy for any one to assert, but not so easy to prove.

   This learned author's third argument is taken from some absurd
   consequences, which he supposes to follow from our opinion; for he thus
   proceeds to reason: "Those who teach that sin merits punishment from a
   necessity of the divine nature, without any intervention of a free
   decree, teach, at the same time, that God cannot forbid sin to man
   without necessarily forbidding it under the penalty of eternal death.
   As if," says he, "when God forbids adultery or theft, in a human court
   he forbids them with a modification of the punishment, -- namely, that
   theft should not be punished with death, but by a quadruple
   restitution, -- he could not forbid them without any sanction of a
   punishment; and as he commands these to be punished by men because they
   are sins, why cannot he for the same reason manage matters so in his
   own internal court, [192] and suspend all punishment, and nevertheless
   forbid the same transgressions?"

   A fine show of reasoning; but there is no real solid truth in it, for
   all is false.

   In what sense sin deserves punishment from the necessity of the divine
   nature, we have already shown at large. Neither, however, do we think
   ourselves bound to teach that God could not forbid sin but under the
   penalty of eternal death; for we hold that not one or another kind of
   punishment is necessary, but that punishment itself is necessary, and
   the punishment, according to the rule of God's wisdom and justice, is
   death. Moreover, a rational creature, conscious of its proper
   subjection and obediential dependence, being created and existing, God
   did not account it at all necessary to forbid it to sin by a free act
   of his will, under one penalty or another; for both these follow from
   the very situation of the creature, and the order of dependence, --
   namely, that it should not transgress by withdrawing itself from the
   right and dominion of the Creator, and if it should transgress, that it
   should be obnoxious and exposed to coercion and punishment. But it
   being supposed that God should forbid sin by an external legislation,
   the appointment of punishment, even though there should be no mention
   made of it, must be coequal with the prohibition.

   "But God," says he, "in his human court forbids sin by a modification
   of the punishment annexed; as, for instance, theft, under the penalty
   of a quadruple restitution: why may he not do likewise in his own
   internal court, and consequently suspend all punishment?"

   There is no need of much disputation to prove that there is nothing
   sound or substantial in these arguments. The modification of punishment
   respects either its appointment or infliction. Punishment itself is
   considered either in respect of its general end, which is the
   punishment of transgression, and has a regard to the condition of the
   creatures with respect to God; or in respect of some special end, and
   has a respect to the condition of the creatures among themselves. But
   whatever modification punishment may undergo, provided it attain its
   proper end, by accomplishing the object in view, the nature of
   punishment is preserved no less than if numberless degrees were added
   to it. As to the establishment of punishment, then, in a human court,
   as it has not primarily and properly a respect to the punishment of
   transgression, nor a regard to the condition of the creatures with
   respect to God, but with respect to one another, that degree of
   punishment is just which is fit and proper for accomplishing the
   proposed end.

   The punishment, then, of theft by a quadruple restitution had in its
   appointment no such modification conjoined with it as could render it
   unfit and improper in respect of the end proposed, among that people to
   whom that law concerning retributions was given; but as the infliction
   of punishment, according to the sentence of the law, depended on the
   supreme Ruler of that people, it belonged to him to provide that no
   temporal dispensation with punishment exercised by him, in right of his
   dominion, should turn out to the injury of the commonwealth.

   But hence this learned writer concludes, "That in his own internal
   court God may modify and suspend punishment."

   We can only conjecture what he means by the "internal court" of God.
   From the justice of God the appointment of punishment is derived; but
   that is improperly called a court. How far God is at liberty, by this
   justice, to exercise his power in pardoning sins the Scriptures show.
   The just right of God is, "that they who commit sin are worthy of
   death." "But he may modify the punishment," says our author. But not
   even in a human court can any such modification be admitted as would
   render the punishment useless in respect of its end; nor, in respect of
   God, do we think any degree or mode of punishment necessary, but such
   as may answer the end of the punishment, so far as respects the state
   of the creatures with respect to God. Nor is any argument from a human
   court applied to the divine justice, nor from the modification to the
   suspension for a limited time, nor from a suspension to the total
   punishment, all which this learned author supposes, of any force.

   The sum of the whole is this, as we have laid it down, -- That God must
   necessarily, from his right and justice, inflict punishment on sin, so
   far as this punishment tends to preserve the state of the creature's
   dependence on its Creator and proper and natural Lord; so, whatever
   constitutions or inflictions of punishment, with any particular
   modification or dispensation, we have admitted, these do not, as the
   supreme judgment of all is reserved to the destined time, at all
   operate against our opinion.

   The other reasons advanced by this learned author in support of this
   argument are not of sufficient weight to merit attention. It hath been
   clearly proved already that the supposition of the pardon of sin,
   without an intervening satisfaction, implies a contradiction, though
   not in the terms, in the very thing itself. Nor does it follow that God
   can without any punishment forgive sin, -- to avoid which all rational
   creatures are indispensably bound from his natural right over them, --
   because any distinguished action among mankind, to the performance of
   which they are bound by no law, may be rewarded, there being no
   threatening of punishments for the neglect of it annexed, that has a
   respect to a privilege not due. [193] By such consequences, drawn from
   such arguments, the learned gentleman will neither establish his own
   opinion nor prejudice ours.

   He proceeds, in the fourth place: "God," says he, "worketh nothing
   without himself from a necessity of nature." This objection hath been
   already answered by a distinction of necessity into that which is
   absolute and that which is conditional, nor shall we now delay the
   reader by repeating what has been said elsewhere. "But to punish sin,"
   says he, "is not in any respect more agreeable to the divine nature
   than not to punish it; but this is an act of grace and liberty, -- that
   is, an act which God freely exerciseth."

   But, according to Rutherford, "it is much more disagreeable," to speak
   in his own words, "to the divine nature to punish sin than not to
   punish it; for not to punish it, or to forgive it, proceeds from that
   mercy which is essential, but to punish it from that justice which is a
   free act of the divine will. But such things as are natural and
   necessary have a previous and weightier influence with God than those
   which are free and may or may not take place." Our learned author
   means, that setting aside the consideration of his free decree, God is
   indifferent to inflict punishment or not inflict it. But by what
   argument will he maintain this absurd position? Does it follow from
   this, that God is said in Scripture to restrain his anger, and not to
   cut off the wicked? But surely he is not ignorant that such
   declarations of divine grace have either a respect to Christ, by whom
   satisfaction for sin was made, or only denote a temporal suspension of
   punishment, till the day of public and general retribution.

   In the fifth place, he maintains "That a natural necessity will admit
   of no dispensation, modification, or delay; which, however, it is
   evident that God either uses, or may use, in the punishment of sin."

   Ans. With respect to absolute necessity, which excludes all liberty,
   perhaps this is true; but with respect to that necessity which we
   maintain, which admits of a concomitant liberty in acting, it is
   altogether without foundation. Again: a dispensation with or delay of
   punishment regards either temporary punishment, with which we grant
   that God may freely dispense, when the immediate end of that punishment
   hath not a respect to the creatures in that state of subjection which
   they owe to God; or eternal punishment, and in respect of that, the
   time of inflicting it, etc., and freely to appoint it, belong entirely
   to God; -- but that he should inflict the punishment itself is just and
   necessary.

   Nor does that instance, brought from the various degrees of punishment,
   at all avail him, -- namely, "That if God can add or take away one
   degree of punishment, then he may two, and so annihilate the whole
   punishment:" for we are speaking of punishment as it includes in it the
   nature of punishment, and is ordained to preserve God's right and
   dominion over his creatures, and to avenge the purity and holiness of
   God; not of it as, in consequence of the divine wisdom and justice,
   being this or that kind of punishment, or consisting of degrees. For
   thus far extends that liberty which we ascribe to God in the exercise
   of his justice, that it belongs to him entirely to determine, according
   to the counsel of his will, with regard to the degrees, mode, and time
   to be observed in the infliction of punishment; and no doubt but a
   proportion of the punishment to the faults is observed, so that by how
   much one sin exceeds another in quality, by so much one punishment
   exceeds another punishment in degree; and in the infliction of
   punishment, God has a respect to the comparative demerit of sins among
   themselves. We acknowledge, indeed, that God acts differently with
   persons in the same situation, but not without a respect to Christ and
   his satisfaction. The satisfaction of Christ is not, indeed, the
   procatarctic cause of that decree by which he determined such a
   dispensation of things; but the mediation of Christ, who was made sin
   for those to whom their sins are not imputed, is the foundation for the
   actual administration of the whole of that decree, respecting that part
   of it which consists in the dispensation of free grace and sparing
   mercy. What this learned writer adds, namely, "That not to punish is
   sometimes an act of severe justice, and that therefore God does not
   punish from a necessity of nature," is grossly sophistical: for not to
   punish denotes either the total removal of punishment altogether, as is
   the case with the elect, for whom Christ died, which, so far from being
   an act of severe justice, this learned man will not deny to proceed
   from the highest grace and mercy; or it denotes only a suspension of
   some temporal punishment, and for a short time, to the end that sinners
   may fill up the measure of their iniquity. But this is not, properly
   speaking, not to punish, but to punish in a different manner, and in a
   manner more severe, than that to which it succeeds.

   What observations our learned author adds in the close of his arguments
   are either sophistical or very untheological. He says, namely, "That
   God, influenced by our prayers, averts even an eternal punishment after
   that we have deserved it." But what! is it to be imputed to our prayers
   that God averts from us the wrath to come? What occasion is there,
   pray, then, for the satisfaction of Christ? We have hitherto been so
   dull and stupid as to believe that the turning away from us of
   punishment, which has a respect to our faith and prayers, consisted in
   the dispensation of grace, peace, and the remission of the sins for
   which Christ made satisfaction, and that God averted from us no
   deserved punishment but what was laid upon Christ, "who hath redeemed
   us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us."

   In his proofs of the sixth argument, which this learned author adds to
   his former from Twisse, he says, "There is neither reason nor any
   shadow of reason in it, that the delay of punishment, or a dispensation
   with it, as to time and manner, can be determined by the free good
   pleasure of God, either one way or other, if to punish, or punishment
   in itself and absolutely considered, be necessary."

   We have explained before what were our sentiments as to what relates to
   the distinction between punishment simply considered, and attended with
   particular circumstances in the manner of its infliction. We affirm
   that a punishment proportioned to sin, according to the rule of the
   divine justice, from God's natural right, and from his essential
   justice and holiness, is necessarily inflicted, to vindicate his glory,
   establish his government, and preserve his perfections entire and
   undiminished: and God himself hath revealed to us that this just
   recompense of reward consists in death eternal; for "the righteous
   judgment of God is, that they who commit sin are worthy of death." It
   is just, then, and consequently necessary, that that punishment of
   death, namely, eternal, should be inflicted. But as God, though a
   consuming fire, is a rational or intellectual fire, who, in exercising
   the excellencies or qualities of his nature, proceeds with reason and
   understanding, it is free to him to appoint the time, manner, and
   suchlike circumstances as must necessarily attend that punishment in
   general, so as shall be most for his own glory and the more illustrious
   display of his justice. But when Rutherford says, somewhat
   dogmatically, that "there is neither any reason nor shadow of reason in
   this," let us see what solidity there is in the arguments by which he
   supports his assertion:--

   "The determination of an infernal punishment, as to its manner and
   time, and consequently as to its eternal duration, will then depend on
   the mere good pleasure of God; therefore, God can determine the end and
   measure of infernal punishment; and therefore he is able not to punish,
   and to will not farther to punish, those condemned to eternal torments:
   therefore, it is not of absolute necessity that he punishes." But here
   is nothing but dross, as the saying is, instead of a treasure. The time
   concerning which we speak is of the infliction of punishment, not of
   its duration. He who asserts that an end may be put to eternal
   punishments expressly contradicts himself. We say that God hath
   revealed to us that the punishment due to every sin, from his right and
   by the rule of his justice, is eternal; nor could the thing in itself
   be otherwise, for the punishment of a finite and sinful creature could
   not otherwise make any compensation for the guilt of its sin. But as it
   is certain that God, in the first threatening, and in the curse of the
   law, observed a strict impartiality, and appointed not any kind of
   punishment but what, according to the rule of his justice, sin
   deserved; and as the apostle testifies, that "the righteous judgment of
   God is, that they who commit sin are worthy of death;" and we
   acknowledge that death to be eternal, and that an injury done to God,
   infinite in respect of the object, could not be punished, in a subject
   in every respect finite, otherwise than by a punishment infinite in
   respect of duration; -- that the continuation or suspension of this
   punishment, which it is just should be inflicted, does not undermine
   [194] the divine liberty, we are bold to affirm, for it is not free to
   God to act justly or not. But we have shown before how absurd it is to
   imagine that the divine omnipotence suffers any degradation, because
   upon this supposition he must necessarily preserve alive a sinful
   creature to all eternity, and be unable to annihilate it.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [189] In his book on Providence, chapter xxii. page 345, assert. 6.

   [190] "Necessary from the essential justice of God that he should
   suffer the punishment due to sinners, either in his own proper person,
   or in that of a surety." -- Ed.

   [191] Namely, mercy. -- Tr.

   [192] "Et moderari et suspendere," -- "In his own internal court both
   mitigate and suspend," etc. -- Ed.

   [193] See Suarez de Legib. Priv.

   [194] "Dei libertati non subjacere," -- "is not subject to." -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________

Chapter XVIII.

   The conclusion of this dissertation -- The uses of the doctrine herein
   vindicated -- The abominable nature of sin -- God's hatred against sin
   revealed in various ways -- The dreadful effects of sin all over the
   creation -- Enmity between God and every sin -- Threatenings and the
   punishment of sin appointed -- The description of sin in the sacred
   Scriptures -- To what great miseries we are liable through sin -- The
   excellency of grace in pardoning sin through Christ -- Gratitude and
   obedience due from the pardoned -- An historical fact concerning
   Tigranes, king of Armenia -- Christ to be loved for his cross above all
   things -- The glory of God's justice revealed by this doctrine, and
   also of his wisdom and holiness.

   Let us at length put an end to this dispute; and as all "acknowledging
   of the truth" ought to be "after godliness," [195] we shall adduce such
   useful and practical evident conclusions as flow from this truth, which
   we have thus far set forth and defended, that we may not be thought to
   have spent our labour in vain.

   First, then, Hence we sinners may learn the abominable nature of sin.
   Whatever there is in heaven or in earth that we have seen, or of which
   we have heard, whatever declares the glory of the Creator, also exposes
   this disgraceful fall of the creature. The genuine offspring of sin are
   death and hell; for "sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death."
   [196] That the heavens cast out their native inhabitants, namely, "the
   angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own
   habitation," [197] etc; that the earth is filled with darkness,
   resentments, griefs, malediction, and revenge, -- is to be attributed
   entirely to this cankerous ulcer of nature. Hence "the wrath of God is
   revealed from heaven;" [198] -- the earth, lately founded by a most
   beneficent Creator, is "cursed." [199] Hence, the old world having but
   just emerged from the deluge, "the heavens and the earth which are now,
   by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day
   of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." [200]

   Yea, forasmuch as, in this state of things which we have described as
   being permitted by the will of God, "the creature was made subject to
   vanity," [201] there is none of the creatures which, by its confusion,
   vanity, and inquietude, does not declare this detestable poison, with
   which it is thoroughly infected, to be exceeding sinful. This is the
   source and origin of all evils to sinners themselves. Whatever
   darkness, tumult, vanity, slavery, fearful looking for of judgment and
   fiery indignation to consume the adversaries, oppresses, tortures,
   harasses, vexes, burns, corrupts, or kills; whatever from without,
   penal, grievous, sad, dire, dreadful, even the last unavoidable
   calamity itself, -- is all to be attributed to this prolific parent of
   miseries. Some one, perhaps, will wonder what this so great a plague
   is, which perverts the course of the creation; what crime, what kind of
   inexpiable wickedness, that it hath procured to creatures so very
   highly exalted, and created in the image of God to share in his glory,
   after being banished from heaven and paradise, an eternal deprivation
   of his glory, punishment to which no measure or end is appointed; what
   hath so incensed the mind of the most bountiful and merciful Father of
   all, and imbittered his anger, that he should bring eternal sorrows on
   the work of his own hands, and "kindle a fire that should burn to the
   lowest bottom, and inflame the foundations of the mountains." I will
   tell him in one word.

   Is it to be wondered at, that God should be disposed severely to punish
   that which earnestly wishes him not to be God, and strives to
   accomplish this with all its might? Sin opposes the divine nature and
   existence; it is enmity against God, and is not an idle enemy; it has
   even engaged in a mortal war with all the attributes of God. He would
   not be God if he did not avenge, by the punishment of the guilty, his
   own injury. He hath often and heavily complained, in his word, that by
   sin he is robbed of his glory and honour, affronted, exposed to calumny
   and blasphemy; that neither his holiness, nor his justice, nor name,
   nor right, nor dominion, is preserved pure and untainted: for he hath
   created all things for his own glory, and it belongs to the natural
   right of God to preserve that glory entire by the subjection of all his
   creatures, in their proper stations, to himself. And shall we not
   reckon that sin is entirely destructive of that order, which would
   entirely wrest that right out of his hands, and a thing to be
   restrained by the severest punishments? Let sinners, then, be informed
   that every the least transgression abounds so much with hatred against
   God; is so highly injurious to him, and as far as is in its power
   brands him with such folly, impotence, and injustice; so directly robs
   him of all his honour, glory, and power, -- that if he wills to be God,
   he can by no means suffer it to escape unpunished. It was not for
   nothing that on that day on which he made man a living soul, he
   threatened him with death, even eternal death; that in giving his law
   he thundered forth so many dread execrations against this fatal evil;
   that he hath threatened it with such punishment, with so great anger,
   with fury, wrath, tribulation, and anguish; that with a view to
   vindicate his own glory, and provide for the salvation of sinners, he
   made his most holy Son, who was "holy, harmless, undefiled, and
   separate from sinners," "sin" and a "curse," [202] and subjected him to
   that last punishment, the death of the cross, including in it the
   satisfaction due to his violated law. All these things divine justice
   required as necessary to the preservation of his honour, glory, wisdom,
   and dominion. Let every proud complaint of sinners, then, be hushed,
   for we know that "the judgment of God is according to truth against
   them that do evil." [203]

   But sin, in respect of the creature, is folly, madness, fury,
   blindness, hardness, darkness, stupor, giddiness, torpor, turpitude,
   uncleanness, nastiness, a stain, a spot, an apostasy, degeneracy, a
   wandering from the mark, a turning aside from the right path, a
   disease, a languor, destruction, -- death. In respect of the Creator,
   it is a disgrace, an affront, blasphemy, enmity, hatred, contempt,
   rebellion, -- an injury. In respect of its own nature, it is poison, a
   stench, dung, a vomit, polluted blood, a plague, a pestilence, an
   abominable, detestable, cursed thing; which, by its most pernicious
   power of metamorphosing, hath transformed angels into devils, light
   into darkness, life into death, paradise into a desert, a pleasant,
   fruitful, blessed world into a vain, dark, accursed prison, and the
   Lord of all into a servant of servants; which hath rendered man, the
   glory of God, an enemy to himself, a wolf to others, hateful to God,
   his own destroyer, the destruction of others, the plague of the world,
   a monster, and a ruin. Attempting to violate the eternal, natural, and
   indispensable right of God, to cut the thread of the creature's
   dependence on the Creator, it introduced with it this world of
   iniquity.

   First, then, to address you who live, or rather are dead, under the
   guilt, dominion, power, and law of sin, "how shall ye escape the
   damnation of hell?" The judgment of God is, that they who commit those
   things to which you are totally given up, and which you cannot refrain
   from, are "worthy of death." "It is a fearful thing to fall into the
   hands of the living God;" [204] since it is "a just thing with him to
   render to every one according to his works." And who shall deliver you
   out of his mighty hand? Wherewith can "the wrath to come" be averted?
   wherewithal can you make atonement to so great a judge? Sacrifices
   avail nothing; hence those words in the prophet, which express not so
   much the language of inquiry as of confusion and astonishment:
   "Wherewithal shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the
   high God? shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of
   a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with
   ten thousands of rivers of oil? shall I give my firstborn for my
   transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" [205]
   Would you attempt an obedience arduous and expensive beyond all
   credibility? By such dreadful propitiations, by such dire and accursed
   sacrifices, at the thought of which human nature shudders, would you
   appease the offended Deity? You are not the first whom a vain
   superstition and ignorance of the justice of God hath forced to turn
   away their ears from the sighs and cries of tender infants, breathing
   out their very vitals, your own blood, in vain. These furies, which now
   by starts agitate us within, will, by their vain attempts against the
   snares of death, torment us to all eternity: for God, the judge of all,
   will not accept of "sacrifice, or offering, or burnt-offerings for
   sin;" with these he is not at all delighted; for "the redemption of the
   soul is precious, and ceaseth for ever." [206] God cannot so lightly
   esteem or disregard his holiness, justice, and glory, to which your
   sins have done so great an injury, that he should renounce them all for
   the sake of hostile conspirators, unless there should be some other
   remedy quickly provided for us; -- unless the judge himself shall
   provide a lamb for a burnt-offering; unless the gates of a city of
   refuge shall be quickly opened to you, exclaiming and trembling at the
   avenging curse of the law; unless you can find access to the horns of
   the altar. If God be to remain blessed for ever, you must doubtless
   perish for ever. If, then, you have the least concern or anxiety for
   your eternal state, hasten, "while it is called To-day," to "lay hold
   on the hope that is set before you." Give yourselves up entirely to
   him; receive him "whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through
   faith in his blood, that he might declare his righteousness." But what
   and how bitter a sense of sin; how deep a humiliation, contrition, and
   dejection of heart and spirit; what self-hatred, condemnation, and
   contempt; what great self-indignation and revenge; what esteem, what
   faith in the necessity, excellence, and dignity of the righteousness
   and satisfaction of Christ, especially if God hath graciously
   condescended to bestow his holy Spirit, to convince men's hearts of
   sin, of righteousness, and of judgment (without whose effectual aid and
   heart-changing grace even the most apposite remedies applied to this
   disease will be in vain), and [207] to excite and work such sentiments
   concerning the transgression of the divine law, the nature of sin, or
   the disobedience of the creatures! A persuasion how fit and proper,
   those who have spiritual eyes will easily perceive.

   To those happy persons "whose sins are forgiven, and to whom God will
   not impute iniquity," because he hath laid their transgressions upon
   Christ, the knowledge of this divine truth is as a spur to quicken them
   to the practice of every virtue and to sincere obedience; for in what
   high, yea, infinite honour and esteem must God be held by him who,
   having escaped from the snares of death and the destruction due to him,
   through his inexpressible mercy, hath thoroughly weighed the nature of
   sin and the consequences of it, which we have mentioned before! for
   whosoever shall reflect with himself that such is the quality and
   nature of sin, and that it is so impiously inimical to God, that unless
   by some means his justice be satisfied by the punishment of another, he
   could not pardon it or let it pass unpunished, will ever acknowledge
   himself indebted to eternal love for the remission of the least
   transgression, because in inexpressible grace and goodness it hath been
   forgiven. And hence, too, we may learn how much beyond all other
   objects of our affection we are bound to love with our heart and soul,
   and all that is within us, our dear and beloved Deliverer and most
   merciful Saviour, Jesus Christ, "who hath delivered us from the wrath
   to come."

   When Tigranes, son of the king of Armenia, had said to Cyrus that he
   would purchase his wife's liberty at the price of his life, and she was
   consequently set free by Cyrus, while some were admiring and extolling
   one virtue of Cyrus, and some another, she being asked what she most
   admired in that illustrious hero, answered, "My thoughts were not
   turned upon him." Her husband again asking her, "Upon whom, then?" she
   replied, "Upon him who said that he would redeem me from slavery at the
   expense of his life." Is not He, then, to be caressed and dearly
   beloved, to be contemplated with faith, love, and joy, who answered for
   our lives with his own, -- devoted himself to punishment, and at the
   price of his blood, "while we were yet enemies," purchased us, and
   rendered us "a peculiar people to himself?" We, now secure, may
   contemplate in his agony, sweat, tremor, horror, exclamations, prayers,
   cross, and blood, what is God's severity against sin, what the
   punishment of the broken law and curse are. Unless God, the judge and
   ruler of all, after having thoroughly examined the nature, hearts,
   breasts, ways, and lives of us all, had thence collected whatever was
   contrary to his law, improper, unjust, and impure, -- whatever
   displeased the eyes of his purity, provoked his justice, roused his
   anger and severity, -- and laid it all on the shoulders of our
   Redeemer, and condemned it in his flesh, it had been better for us,
   rather than to be left eternally entangled in the snares of death and
   of the curse, never to have enjoyed this common air, but to have been
   annihilated as soon as born. "Wretched men that we are, who shall
   deliver us" from this most miserable state by nature? "Thanks be to
   God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." May we
   always, then, be "sick of love" towards our deliverer! may he always be
   our "beloved, who is white and ruddy, and the chiefest among ten
   thousand!"

   The acknowledging of this truth has a respect not only to the
   manifestation of his justice, but also of the wisdom, holiness, and
   dominion of God over his creatures: for that justice which, in respect
   of its effect and egress, we call vindicatory, which, as we have before
   demonstrated, is natural to God and essential, and therefore absolutely
   perfect in itself, or rather perfection itself, this very truth, which
   we have thus far defended, evidently illustrates; as also his supreme
   rectitude in the exercise of it, "when he sits on his throne judging
   righteously;" and how severe a judge he will be towards impenitent
   sinners, whose sins are not expiated in the blood of Christ! That
   justice is not a free act of the divine will, which God may use or
   renounce at pleasure; nor is sin only a debt of ours, which, as we were
   unable to pay, he might forgive by only freely receding from his right:
   for what reason, then, could be assigned why the Father of mercies
   should so severely punish his most holy Son on our account, that he
   might, according to justice, deliver us from our sins, when, without
   any difficulty, by one act of his will, and that too a most free and
   holy act, he could have delivered both himself and us wretched sinners
   from this evil? But it exists in God in the manner of a habit, natural
   to the divine essence itself, perpetually and immutably inherent in it,
   which, from his very nature, he must necessarily exercise in every work
   that respecteth the proper object of his justice; for sin is that
   ineffable evil which would overturn God's whole right over his
   creatures unless it were punished. As, then, the perfection of divine
   justice is infinite, and such as God cannot by any means relax, it is
   of the last importance to sinners seriously and deeply to bethink
   themselves how they are to stand before him.

   Moreover, the infinite wisdom of God, the traces of which we so clearly
   read in creation, legislation, and in the other works of God, is hereby
   wondrously displayed, to the eternal astonishment of men and angels;
   for none but an infinitely wise God could bring it about, that that
   which in its own nature is opposite to him, inimical, and full of
   obstinacy, should turn out to his highest honour, and the eternal glory
   of his grace. Yea, the divine wisdom not only had respect to God
   himself, and to the security of his glory, honour, right, and justice,
   but even provided for the good of miserable sinners, for their best
   interests, exaltation, and salvation, and from the empoisoned bowels of
   sin itself. "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong
   came forth sweetness." By interposing a surety and covenant-head
   between sin and the sinner, between the transgression of the law and
   its transgressor, he condemned and punished sin, restored the law, and
   freed the sinner both from sin and from the law. "He hath abounded
   toward us in all wisdom and prudence," Eph. i. 8, when he "made all men
   see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of
   the world hath been hid in God," chap. iii. 9; for "in Christ are hid
   all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," Col. ii. 2, 3.

   It will be for ever esteemed a miracle of God's providence, that he
   should have made the captivity or wicked sale of Joseph, by means of so
   many windings, perplexed mazes, and strange occurrences, issue at last
   in his own exaltation and the preservation of his brethren, who
   impiously sold him. But if any one, though endowed with the tongues of
   angels and of men, should attempt to describe this mystery of divine
   wisdom, whereby it is evident that God exalts his own name, and not
   only recovers his former honour, but even raises it, manifests his
   justice, preserves inviolable his right and dominion in pardoning sin,
   wherewith he is highly pleased and incredibly delighted (and unless
   this heavenly discovery, a truly God-like invention, had intervened, he
   could not have pardoned even the least sin), he must feel his language
   not only deficient, but the eye of the mind, overpowered with light,
   will fill him with awe and astonishment. That that which is the
   greatest, yea, the only disgrace and affront to God, should turn out to
   his highest honour and glory; that that which could not be permitted to
   triumph without the greatest injury to the justice, right, holiness,
   and truth of God, should find grace and pardon, to the eternal and
   glorious display of justice, right, holiness, and truth, -- was a work
   that required infinite wisdom, an arduous task, and every way worthy of
   God.

   Finally, Let us constantly contemplate in the mirror of this truth the
   holiness of God, whereby "he is of purer eyes than to behold evil," in
   "whose presence the wicked shall not stand," that we ourselves may
   become more pure in heart, and more holy in life, speech, and
   behaviour.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [195] Tit. i. 5.

   [196] James i. 15.

   [197] Jude 6.

   [198] Rom. i. 18.

   [199] Gen. iii. 17.

   [200] 2 Pet. iii. 7.

   [201] Rom. viii. 20.

   [202] Heb. vii. 26; 2 Cor. v. 21; Gal. iii. 13.

   [203] Rom. ii. 2.

   [204] Heb. x. 31.

   [205] Mic. vi. 6, 7.

   [206] Ps. xlix. 8.

   [207] From the figure of notation to the close of the paragraph, the
   sense of the author has been entirely misapprehended. Read, "must be
   excited and kept alive by such a fit and adequate view respecting the
   transgression of the divine law, the nature of sin, or the disobedience
   of the creature, -- those who have spiritual eyes will easily
   perceive." -- Ed.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

                                    Indexes
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Scripture References

   Genesis

   [1]3:17   [2]3:21   [3]18:25   [4]18:25   [5]18:25   [6]19:24   [7]43

   Exodus

   [8]18:12   [9]23:7   [10]34:5-7   [11]34:6   [12]34:6   [13]34:6-7
   [14]34:6-7   [15]34:7   [16]34:7   [17]34:19-20

   Leviticus

   [18]26:30   [19]27:1-2   [20]27:1-8   [21]27:8   [22]27:28
   [23]27:28-29   [24]27:28-29

   Numbers

   [25]14:18   [26]25:4

   Deuteronomy

   [27]4:8   [28]4:24   [29]12:31   [30]13:17   [31]16:22   [32]29:24

   Joshua

   [33]7:26   [34]24:19   [35]24:19

   Judges

   [36]2:14   [37]11:30-31   [38]11:34   [39]11:39

   1 Kings

   [40]21:26

   2 Kings

   [41]3:26-27   [42]17:29-31   [43]24:20

   2 Chronicles

   [44]12:6   [45]28:11

   Ezra

   [46]9:15   [47]10:14

   Nehemiah

   [48]9:8

   Job

   [49]1:5   [50]6:2-4   [51]8:8   [52]10:3   [53]13:4   [54]14:14
   [55]16:2   [56]22:3   [57]33:12   [58]33:12-13   [59]33:24
   [60]34:12-14   [61]34:12-15   [62]34:12-15   [63]35:7   [64]42:8

   Psalms

   [65]5:4-5   [66]5:4-6   [67]5:4-6   [68]5:4-6   [69]5:4-6   [70]5:4-6
   [71]5:5   [72]7:6   [73]7:9   [74]7:9   [75]9:4   [76]9:4   [77]9:4-5
   [78]9:7-8   [79]11:5   [80]14:1   [81]14:1   [82]16:2   [83]45:5
   [84]49:8   [85]50:6   [86]56:7   [87]69:24   [88]74:1   [89]78:49
   [90]78:49   [91]88:15-16   [92]94:2   [93]101:8   [94]102:3-5
   [95]106:36-38   [96]115:3   [97]119:7   [98]119:137   [99]119:137

   Proverbs

   [100]17:15   [101]17:15

   Isaiah

   [102]5:20   [103]5:24   [104]13:9   [105]30:30   [106]33:14
   [107]33:14   [108]33:22   [109]34:2   [110]42:1   [111]42:8
   [112]51:6   [113]53:6   [114]53:10   [115]66:16

   Jeremiah

   [116]12:1   [117]44:4   [118]44:4

   Lamentations

   [119]2:6

   Ezekiel

   [120]5:15

   Hosea

   [121]13:9

   Jonah

   [122]3:9

   Micah

   [123]6:6-7

   Habakkuk

   [124]1:13   [125]1:13   [126]1:13   [127]3:8   [128]3:12

   Zephaniah

   [129]3:5

   Matthew

   [130]1:19   [131]5:45

   Mark

   [132]12:12

   Luke

   [133]17:10   [134]17:10

   John

   [135]1:9   [136]1:18   [137]3:16   [138]7:19   [139]15:13

   Acts

   [140]5:31   [141]14:17   [142]17:31

   Romans

   [143]1:17   [144]1:17   [145]1:18   [146]1:18   [147]1:18   [148]1:18
   [149]1:18   [150]1:18   [151]1:18   [152]1:18   [153]1:32   [154]1:32
   [155]1:32   [156]1:32   [157]1:32   [158]1:32   [159]1:32   [160]1:32
   [161]1:32   [162]2   [163]2:2   [164]2:5   [165]2:5   [166]2:8-9
   [167]2:12   [168]3:5   [169]3:5-6   [170]3:5-6   [171]3:5-6
   [172]3:5-6   [173]3:18-26   [174]3:21   [175]3:23-26   [176]3:23-26
   [177]3:24-25   [178]3:24-26   [179]3:25-26   [180]3:26   [181]3:26
   [182]6:23   [183]8:20   [184]8:32   [185]9   [186]9:5   [187]9:13
   [188]9:14-15   [189]9:18   [190]9:22   [191]11:33   [192]11:35
   [193]11:35-36   [194]13:3-4

   1 Corinthians

   [195]1:18   [196]1:23   [197]1:24   [198]1:30   [199]4:7   [200]12:12

   2 Corinthians

   [201]5:21   [202]5:21   [203]5:21   [204]5:21

   Galatians

   [205]3:13

   Ephesians

   [206]1:8   [207]3:9   [208]5:6   [209]5:26-27

   Colossians

   [210]2:2-3

   2 Thessalonians

   [211]1:5   [212]1:6   [213]1:6   [214]1:6   [215]1:7-9   [216]1:8
   [217]1:9

   2 Timothy

   [218]1:10   [219]4:8   [220]4:8

   Titus

   [221]1:5

   Hebrews

   [222]2:2   [223]6:10   [224]7:26   [225]9:22   [226]10:1
   [227]10:26-27   [228]10:31   [229]11:17   [230]12:23   [231]12:29
   [232]12:29

   James

   [233]1:15   [234]4:12

   2 Peter

   [235]3:7   [236]3:9   [237]3:9

   1 John

   [238]1:9

   Jude

   [239]1:6   [240]1:7

   Revelation

   [241]16:5-6   [242]16:5-6   [243]16:5-7   [244]21:27
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Citations

     * Ambrose: On Virginity: [245]1
     * Ames, William: De Conscientia, ejus jure et Casibus: [246]1
     * Aquinas, Thomas: Summa Theologica: [247]1 [248]2 [249]3
     * Aristotle: Ethica: [250]1 [251]2
     * Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics: [252]1 [253]2 [254]3
     * Aristotle: Topics: [255]1
     * Arminius, Jacobus: Public Disputations: [256]1
     * Augustine: On Judges: [257]1
     * Cæsar, Julius: Gallic Wars: [258]1
     * Cajetan, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio Gaetani: Commentaria super
       tracatum de ente et essentia Thomae de Aquino: [259]1 [260]2
     * Cappellus, Ludovicus: Diatriba de voto Jephtæ: [261]1
     * Cato: Distichs: [262]1
     * Cicero: De Finibus: [263]1
     * Cicero: Pro Fonteio: [264]1
     * Clemens of Alexandria: Hortatory Discourse to the Greeks: [265]1
     * Crell, John: Of the Causes of the Death of Christ: [266]1
     * Crell, John: Of the True Religion: [267]1 [268]2 [269]3
     * Crell, John: Vindications against Grotius: [270]1 [271]2
     * Curtius: Historiæ Alexandri Magni: [272]1
     * Des Marets, Samuel: Hydra Socinism expurgnata: [273]1
     * Diodorus Siculus: Bibliotheca historia: [274]1 [275]2
     * Diogenes Laertius: Life of Protagoras: [276]1
     * Duns Scotus: Of Nature and Grace: [277]1
     * Durandus, William: Rationale divinorum officorum: [278]1
     * Euripides: Cyclops: [279]1 [280]2
     * Euripides: Electra: [281]1
     * Euripides: Iphigenia in Aulis: [282]1 [283]2
     * Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris: [284]1 [285]2 [286]3
     * Eusebius Pamphilus: Præperatio Evangelica: [287]1
     * Gilbert, Thomas: Vindiciæ Supremi Dei Domini (cum Deo) Initæ:
       [288]1
     * Gitichius, Michael: Ad Ludovicus Lucius: [289]1
     * Grotius, Hugo: Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione Christi
       adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem: [290]1
     * Herodotus: Histories: [291]1
     * Hesiod: Theogony: [292]1
     * Hesiod: Works and Days: [293]1
     * Homer: Iliad: [294]1 [295]2
     * Homer: Odyssey: [296]1
     * Horace: Epistulæ: [297]1
     * Horace: Satires: [298]1
     * Jerome: Epistle to Julian: [299]1
     * Josephus: Against Apion: [300]1 [301]2 [302]3
     * Josephus: Antiquities of the Jews: [303]1
     * Lactantius Firmianus: De Ira Dei: [304]1
     * Lactantius Firmianus: De plur.: [305]1
     * Lessius, Leonard: De Justitia et Jure: [306]1
     * Lombard, Peter: Sentences: [307]1
     * Lubbertus, Sibrandus: De Papa Romana: [308]1
     * Lucan: Precepts of Magic: [309]1
     * Lucan: Siege of Marseilles: [310]1 [311]2
     * Mersennus, Marin: Ad Deistas Gall.: [312]1
     * Moscorovius, Jerome: On the Racovian Catechism: [313]1
     * Ostrodius: Disputations to Tradelius: [314]1
     * Ostrodius: Institutions: [315]1
     * Owen, John: A Discourse concerning Communion with God: [316]1
       [317]2
     * Owen, John: Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews: [318]1
     * Owen, John: Pneumatologia: [319]1
     * Owen, John: The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and
       Confirmed: [320]1
     * Owen, John: Vindiciæ Evangelicæ: [321]1 [322]2
     * Paludamus: On the Sentences: [323]1
     * Pesantius: On Thomas: [324]1 [325]2
     * Peter Martyr: Commentary on Judges: [326]1
     * Peter Martyr: History of the West Indies: [327]1
     * Piscator, Johannes: Notes on Vorstius' Parasceue ad amicam
       collationem cum Jo. Piscatore: [328]1
     * Plutarch: Life of Marcellus: [329]1
     * Porphyry: Abstinence from Animals: [330]1
     * Procopius: On the Gothic War: [331]1
     * Racovian Catechism: [332]1 [333]2 [334]3 [335]4 [336]5
     * Rutherford, Samuel: Christ Dying, and Drawing Sinners to Himself:
       [337]1
     * Rutherford, Samuel: Disputatio Scholastica de Divina Providentia:
       [338]1 [339]2 [340]3 [341]4 [342]5
     * Seneca: Epistles: [343]1 [344]2
     * Seneca: Of Anger: [345]1
     * Smalcius, Valentinus: Adversus Franzius: [346]1
     * Socinus, Faustus: Concerning God: [347]1
     * Socinus, Faustus: De Auctoritate Scripturæ Sacræ Prælectiones
       theologicæ: [348]1
     * Socinus, Faustus: De Jesu Christo Servatore: [349]1 [350]2 [351]3
       [352]4 [353]5
     * Suárez, Francisco: De Legibus Priv.: [354]1
     * Suárez, Francisco: Lectures of the Justice of God: [355]1 [356]2
       [357]3 [358]4
     * Suárez, Francisco: Opusc. vi. de Just. Div.: [359]1
     * Suárez, Francisco: Theol.: [360]1
     * Suetonius: Life of Titus: [361]1
     * Tacitus: Annals: [362]1
     * Theodoret: Greek Affections: [363]1
     * Twisse, Dr William: Viniciæ Gratiæ. Potestatis, ac Providentiæ
       Divinæ: [364]1 [365]2
     * Virgil: Æneid: [366]1 [367]2 [368]3
     * Voetius, Gisbertus: De Atheismo: [369]1
     * Voetius, Gisbertus: Dis. De Jure et Just. Mares: [370]1
     * Volkelius, John: De Vera Religione: [371]1
     * Volkelius, John: Dissertations: [372]1
     * Vorst, Konrad: Parasceue ad amicam collationem cum Jo. Piscatore:
       [373]1
     * Vossius, Gerardus Joannes: De Theologia Gentili: [374]1 [375]2
       [376]3 [377]4
     * Vossius, Gerardus Joannes: Responsio ad Judicium Hermanni
       Ravenspergeri: [378]1
     * Westminster Shorter Catechism: [379]1
     * Winer, George Benedikt: Idioms of the Greek Language: [380]1
     * Zanchius, Jerome: De Natura Dei: [381]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Names

     * Acosta: [382]1
     * Aelian: [383]1
     * Agrippina: [384]1
     * Alexander the Great: [385]1 [386]2
     * Ambrose: [387]1
     * Ames, William: [388]1
     * Antiochus: [389]1
     * Antoclides: [390]1
     * Apion: [391]1
     * Aquinas, Thomas: [392]1 [393]2 [394]3
     * Aristomenes the Messenian: [395]1 [396]2
     * Aristotle: [397]1 [398]2 [399]3 [400]4 [401]5 [402]6 [403]7 [404]8
       [405]9 [406]10
     * Arminius, Jacobus: [407]1 [408]2 [409]3 [410]4 [411]5 [412]6
     * Augustine: [413]1 [414]2 [415]3 [416]4 [417]5
     * Baxter, Richard: [418]1
     * Bellarmine, Cardinal Robert: [419]1
     * Biddle, John: [420]1
     * Biel, Gabriel: [421]1
     * Brutus: [422]1
     * Cæsar, Julius: [423]1 [424]2 [425]3 [426]4 [427]5
     * Cajetan, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio Gaetani: [428]1 [429]2
     * Calvin, John: [430]1 [431]2 [432]3
     * Cameron, John: [433]1 [434]2
     * Cato: [435]1
     * Champollion, Jean François: [436]1
     * Cicero: [437]1 [438]2 [439]3 [440]4
     * Claudius, Emperor: [441]1
     * Clemens of Alexandria: [442]1 [443]2 [444]3 [445]4 [446]5
     * Corvinus, Johannes Arnoldus: [447]1
     * Covetus, Jacobus: [448]1 [449]2
     * Crantzius, Albertus: [450]1
     * Crell, John: [451]1 [452]2 [453]3 [454]4 [455]5 [456]6 [457]7
       [458]8 [459]9 [460]10 [461]11 [462]12 [463]13 [464]14 [465]15
       [466]16 [467]17 [468]18
     * Cromwell, Oliver: [469]1 [470]2
     * Curtius: [471]1
     * Cyrus: [472]1 [473]2 [474]3
     * Demaratus: [475]1
     * Des Marets, Samuel: [476]1
     * Diodorus Siculus: [477]1 [478]2 [479]3 [480]4
     * Diogenes Laertius: [481]1
     * Dion Prusæensis: [482]1
     * Dionysius of Halicarnassus: [483]1 [484]2
     * Ditmarus: [485]1
     * Du Moulin, Pierre: [486]1
     * Duns Scotus: [487]1 [488]2 [489]3 [490]4 [491]5 [492]6
     * Durandus, William: [493]1 [494]2 [495]3 [496]4 [497]5
     * Edwards, Jonathan: [498]1
     * Eobazus: [499]1
     * Epicurus: [500]1
     * Epiphanius: [501]1
     * Episcopius, Simon: [502]1
     * Erasmus, Desiderius: [503]1
     * Euripides: [504]1 [505]2 [506]3 [507]4 [508]5 [509]6 [510]7 [511]8
       [512]9 [513]10 [514]11
     * Eusebius Pamphilus: [515]1 [516]2
     * Eustathius: [517]1
     * Ferorariensis: [518]1
     * Gilbert, Thomas: [519]1
     * Gill, Dr John: [520]1 [521]2
     * Gitichius, Michael: [522]1 [523]2
     * Goodwin, Thomas: [524]1
     * Grotius, Hugo: [525]1
     * Hadrian, Emperor: [526]1 [527]2
     * Hamilton: [528]1
     * Hannibal: [529]1
     * Herodotus: [530]1
     * Hesiod: [531]1 [532]2 [533]3 [534]4
     * Homer: [535]1 [536]2 [537]3 [538]4 [539]5
     * Horace: [540]1 [541]2 [542]3 [543]4 [544]5 [545]6
     * Jerome: [546]1
     * Jornandes: [547]1
     * Josephus: [548]1 [549]2 [550]3
     * Junius: [551]1
     * Lactantius Firmianus: [552]1 [553]2 [554]3
     * Lessius, Leonard: [555]1
     * Lubbertus, Sibrandus: [556]1 [557]2 [558]3 [559]4 [560]5 [561]6
       [562]7 [563]8 [564]9 [565]10 [566]11 [567]12 [568]13 [569]14
       [570]15 [571]16 [572]17 [573]18 [574]19 [575]20 [576]21 [577]22
       [578]23
     * Lucan: [579]1 [580]2
     * Ludovicus Cappellus: [581]1
     * Ludovicus Lucius: [582]1
     * Maccovius, Johannes: [583]1 [584]2 [585]3 [586]4 [587]5 [588]6
       [589]7
     * Manetho, the high priest of Heliopolis: [590]1
     * Mauricius the Cappadocian: [591]1
     * Mersennus, Marin: [592]1 [593]2 [594]3
     * Monimus: [595]1
     * Moscorovius, Jerome: [596]1
     * Musculus: [597]1
     * Nero: [598]1 [599]2 [600]3
     * Octavia: [601]1
     * Orme, William: [602]1
     * Ostorodius: [603]1
     * Otho: [604]1
     * Owen, John: [605]1 [606]2 [607]3 [608]4 [609]5 [610]6 [611]7 [612]8
       [613]9 [614]10 [615]11 [616]12 [617]13 [618]14 [619]15 [620]16
       [621]17 [622]18 [623]19 [624]20 [625]21 [626]22 [627]23 [628]24
       [629]25
     * Paludamus: [630]1 [631]2
     * Paræus, David: [632]1 [633]2
     * Paulinus: [634]1
     * Pesantius: [635]1 [636]2
     * Peter Lombard: [637]1
     * Peter Martyr: [638]1 [639]2
     * Phavorinus: [640]1
     * Philo: [641]1 [642]2 [643]3
     * Phocas: [644]1
     * Piscator, Johannes: [645]1 [646]2 [647]3 [648]4 [649]5 [650]6
       [651]7 [652]8 [653]9 [654]10 [655]11 [656]12 [657]13 [658]14
       [659]15 [660]16 [661]17 [662]18 [663]19 [664]20 [665]21
     * Plautus: [666]1 [667]2
     * Pliny the Elder: [668]1
     * Plutarch: [669]1 [670]2 [671]3
     * Pope, Alexander: [672]1
     * Porphyry: [673]1 [674]2 [675]3 [676]4 [677]5
     * Procopius: [678]1
     * Protagoras: [679]1
     * Ptolemy Philadelphus: [680]1
     * Pythocles: [681]1
     * Rivet, André: [682]1
     * Rutherford, Samuel: [683]1 [684]2 [685]3 [686]4 [687]5 [688]6
       [689]7 [690]8 [691]9 [692]10 [693]11 [694]12
     * Ryland, J: [695]1
     * Scaliger, Julius Cæsar: [696]1
     * Schlichtingius, Jonas: [697]1
     * Seneca: [698]1 [699]2 [700]3 [701]4 [702]5 [703]6 [704]7
     * Simpson, Robert: [705]1
     * Smalcius, Valentinus: [706]1 [707]2 [708]3
     * Socinus, Faustus: [709]1 [710]2 [711]3 [712]4 [713]5 [714]6 [715]7
       [716]8 [717]9 [718]10 [719]11 [720]12 [721]13 [722]14 [723]15
       [724]16 [725]17 [726]18 [727]19 [728]20 [729]21 [730]22 [731]23
       [732]24 [733]25 [734]26 [735]27 [736]28 [737]29 [738]30 [739]31
       [740]32 [741]33 [742]34 [743]35
     * Stafford, S: [744]1
     * Suárez, Francisco: [745]1 [746]2 [747]3 [748]4 [749]5 [750]6 [751]7
       [752]8
     * Suetonius: [753]1 [754]2 [755]3 [756]4
     * Tacitus: [757]1 [758]2
     * Terence: [759]1
     * Tertullian: [760]1 [761]2 [762]3
     * Theodoret: [763]1 [764]2
     * Theopompus: [765]1 [766]2
     * Tiberius: [767]1
     * Tigranes, king of Armenia: [768]1 [769]2
     * Titus, Emperor: [770]1
     * Twisse, Dr William: [771]1 [772]2 [773]3 [774]4 [775]5 [776]6
       [777]7 [778]8 [779]9 [780]10 [781]11 [782]12 [783]13 [784]14
       [785]15 [786]16 [787]17 [788]18 [789]19 [790]20 [791]21 [792]22
       [793]23 [794]24 [795]25 [796]26 [797]27 [798]28 [799]29 [800]30
       [801]31 [802]32 [803]33 [804]34 [805]35 [806]36 [807]37 [808]38
       [809]39 [810]40 [811]41 [812]42 [813]43 [814]44 [815]45 [816]46
       [817]47 [818]48 [819]49 [820]50 [821]51 [822]52 [823]53 [824]54
       [825]55 [826]56 [827]57
     * Virgil: [828]1 [829]2 [830]3 [831]4
     * Voetius, Gisbertus: [832]1 [833]2 [834]3
     * Volkelius, John: [835]1 [836]2 [837]3
     * Vorst, Konrad: [838]1
     * Vossius, Gerardus Joannes: [839]1 [840]2 [841]3 [842]4 [843]5
       [844]6 [845]7 [846]8 [847]9 [848]10 [849]11
     * Wilkinson: [850]1
     * Winer, George Benedikt: [851]1
     * Zanchius, Jerome: [852]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Greek Words and Phrases

     * atheous: [853]1
     * amphisbeteta: [854]1
     * anamphisbeteta: [855]1
     * aorgesian: [856]1
     * apospasmata: [857]1
     * eruthraios: [858]1
     * Elisset' amphi naon: [859]1
     * Iphthianass: [860]1
     * huper: [861]1
     * Hupertimion: [862]1
     * o pater pareimi soi: [863]1
     * Hos tou piein ge, kai phagein tou ph' hemeran, Zeus outos
       anthropoisi toisi sophrosi.: [864]1
     * Oimoxa kago pros teknon cheiroumenes.: [865]1
     * Dikaios: [866]1
     * Nemei toi dikan theos hotan tuche.: [867]1
     * Polus taragmos en te tois theois eni: [868]1
     * Schetlia men epathes, anosia d' eirgaso: [869]1
     * Talain' eunetan.: [870]1
     * Phoinix: [871]1
     * dikaios: [872]1 [873]2
     * dikaiotatos kentauron: [874]1
     * kai: [875]1 [876]2
     * x: [877]1
     * politeias: [878]1
     * prolepsis: [879]1 [880]2
     * phonos: [881]1
     * phoinix: [882]1 [883]2
     * phoinikeos: [884]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

     * proprie dictos et speculative, seu plene persuasos, agnoscunt pene
       omnes.: [885]1
     * Ære ciere viros, Martemque accendere cantu.: [886]1
     * Ab ipsis ferè religionis nostræ cunis et primordiis.: [887]1
     * Actu primo et signato: [888]1
     * Animula vagula, blandula,: [889]1
     * Ante aras, spargisque mola caput, improbe, salsa,: [890]1
     * Aspiciunt oculis superi mortalia justis.: [891]1
     * Compensatio: [892]1
     * Competere: [893]1
     * Credat Apella.: [894]1
     * Cum prior res ipsa sit, posterior aliquarum rerum, vel in actu
       primo vel secundo, modus seu affectio: [895]1
     * Cum sis ipse nocens, moritur cur victima pro te?: [896]1
     * Cur bonis mala fiant, cum sit providentia.: [897]1
     * De Papâ Romanâ: [898]1
     * Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione Christi: [899]1
     * Dei libertati non subjacere: [900]1
     * Deseruit pede Poena claudo.: [901]1
     * Desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne.: [902]1
     * Diatriba: [903]1 [904]2 [905]3
     * Dicite, pontifices, in sacris quid facit aurum?: [906]1
     * Disputatio Scholastica de Divinâ Providentiâ: [907]1
     * Eorum qui antiquitus horrendi criminis rei existimabantur vindicias
       instituerunt inulti.: [908]1
     * Eriperem, prudens placavi sanguine divos.: [909]1
     * Et moderari et suspendere: [910]1
     * Etenim ille: [911]1
     * G. J. Vossii Responsio ad Herm. Ravenspergeri Judicium de eodem:
       [912]1
     * Hospes comesque corporis,: [913]1
     * Illos qui nullum esse Deum dixerunt non modo philosophos, sed ne
       homines quidem esse dixerim, qui brutis simillimi solo corpere
       constiterunt, nihil omnino cernentes animo, sed ad sensum corporis
       cuncta referentes, qui nihil putabunt esse nisi quod oculis
       tuebuntur.: [914]1
     * Immo etiam ex condigno: [915]1
     * In Collationem Vorstii.: [916]1
     * Inculpatæ: [917]1
     * Justitiæ illius, cui poenas irrogare incumbit: [918]1
     * Lucidaque evictos effugit umbra rogos.: [919]1
     * Marmoreo tumulo Licinus jacet, at Cato parvo,: [920]1
     * Nec, ut soles, dabis joca.: [921]1
     * Nempe tuo furiose?: [922]1
     * Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.: [923]1
     * Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala finxit: [924]1
     * Non est potestas Dei in terris.: [925]1
     * Non hæc solennia nobis: [926]1
     * Nullos unquam fuisse aut esse posse : [927]1
     * Pallidula, rigida, nudula,: [928]1
     * Parasceue ad amicam collationem cum Jo. Piscatore: [929]1
     * Pompeius nullo; credimus esse deos?: [930]1
     * Poterat nos Deus verbo aut nutu redimere, nisi aliter nostrâ causâ
       visum esset, ut proprio et unigenito Filio non parcens, testatum
       faceret in ejus personâ quantam habeat salutis nostræ curam.:
       [931]1
     * Primus in orbe deos fecit timor: [932]1
     * Quæ nunc abibis in loca?: [933]1
     * Quia rationem mali non intellexerunt, et natura ejus abscondita
       fuit, duo principia bonum et malum finxit tota ethnicorum (ante
       natum Marcionem) antiquitas.: [934]1
     * Raro antecedentem scelestum,: [935]1
     * Rectum animi servas?: [936]1
     * Responsio: [937]1
     * Sanguine placastis ventos, et virgine cæsâ.: [938]1
     * Si longo sermone morer tua tempora: [939]1
     * Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,: [940]1
     * Stultitia est morte alterius sperare salutem.: [941]1
     * Sunt aliquid manes: lethum non omnia finit,: [942]1
     * Suntque oculis tenebræ per tantum lumen obortæ.: [943]1
     * Tu quum pro vitula, statuis dulcem Aulide natam,: [944]1
     * Ut turpiter atrum: [945]1
     * Vado isto enavigato: [946]1
     * Veritatis argumentum est omnibus aliquid videri tanquam deos esse,
       quod omnibus de diis opinio insita sit, neque ulla gens usquam est,
       adeo extra leges moresque posita ut non aliquos Deos credat.:
       [947]1
     * Verum ego, ut hærentes adverso littore naves: [948]1
     * Vindiciæ Evangelicæ: [949]1 [950]2
     * Vindiciæ Gratiæ. Potestatis, ac Providentiæ Divinæ: [951]1
     * Vindiciæ Supremi Dei Domini (cum Deo) Initæ: [952]1
     * Visam Britannos, hospitibus feros.: [953]1
     * Vulnere si ventris: [954]1
     * in publica commoda peccem,: [955]1
     * pro Fonteio: [956]1
     * quia: [957]1
     * quin: [958]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Pages of the Print Edition

   [959]481  [960]482  [961]483  [962]484  [963]485  [964]486  [965]487
   [966]488  [967]489  [968]490  [969]491  [970]492  [971]493  [972]494
   [973]495  [974]496  [975]497  [976]498  [977]499  [978]500  [979]501
   [980]502  [981]503  [982]504  [983]505  [984]506  [985]507  [986]508
   [987]509  [988]510  [989]511  [990]512  [991]513  [992]514  [993]515
   [994]516  [995]517  [996]518  [997]519  [998]520  [999]521  [1000]522
   [1001]523  [1002]524  [1003]525  [1004]526  [1005]527  [1006]528
   [1007]529  [1008]530  [1009]531  [1010]532  [1011]533  [1012]534
   [1013]535  [1014]536  [1015]537  [1016]538  [1017]539  [1018]540
   [1019]541  [1020]542  [1021]543  [1022]544  [1023]545  [1024]546
   [1025]547  [1026]548  [1027]549  [1028]550  [1029]551  [1030]552
   [1031]553  [1032]554  [1033]555  [1034]556  [1035]557  [1036]558
   [1037]559  [1038]560  [1039]561  [1040]562  [1041]563  [1042]564
   [1043]565  [1044]566  [1045]567  [1046]568  [1047]569  [1048]570
   [1049]571  [1050]572  [1051]573  [1052]574  [1053]575  [1054]576
   [1055]577  [1056]578  [1057]579  [1058]580  [1059]581  [1060]582
   [1061]583  [1062]584  [1063]585  [1064]586  [1065]587  [1066]588
   [1067]589  [1068]590  [1069]591  [1070]592  [1071]593  [1072]594
   [1073]595  [1074]596  [1075]597  [1076]598  [1077]599  [1078]600
   [1079]601  [1080]602  [1081]603  [1082]604  [1083]605  [1084]606
   [1085]607  [1086]608  [1087]609  [1088]610  [1089]611  [1090]612
   [1091]613  [1092]614  [1093]615  [1094]616  [1095]617  [1096]618
   [1097]619  [1098]620  [1099]621  [1100]622  [1101]623  [1102]624
     __________________________________________________________________

            This document is from the Christian Classics Ethereal
               Library at Calvin College, http://www.ccel.org,
                   generated on demand from ThML source.

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  40. file:///ccel/o/owen/justice/cache/justice.html3?scrBook=1Kgs&scrCh=21&scrV=26#i.vii.vi-p4.3
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  45. file:///ccel/o/owen/justice/cache/justice.html3?scrBook=2Chr&scrCh=28&scrV=11#i.vii.v-p7.14
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  47. file:///ccel/o/owen/justice/cache/justice.html3?scrBook=Ezra&scrCh=10&scrV=14#i.vii.v-p7.15
  48. file:///ccel/o/owen/justice/cache/justice.html3?scrBook=Neh&scrCh=9&scrV=8#i.vii.i-p30.3
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