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STREET.
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CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.
1860.
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1859, by
GOULD AND LINCOLN,
In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
ELECTROTYPED
AND PRINTED
BY W. F. DRAPER, ANDOVER, MASS.
THE OBJECTIONS MADE TO FAITH ARE BY NO MEANS AN EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE, BUT PROCEED RATHER FROM IGNORANCE OF WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS.
BISHOP BERKELEY.
NO DIFFICULTY EMERGES IN THEOLOGY, WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY EMERGED IN PHILOSOPHY.
SIR W. HAMILTON.
. . . . “I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and singular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the manner following:
“I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter
Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads of Colleges only, and by no others,
in the room adjoining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in the morning
and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following,
at St. Mary’s in Oxford, between
“Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two months after they are preached, and one copy shall be given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue, before they are printed.
“Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons twice.”
The work, here offered to the American public, has been received
with the most marked attention in England, and has already reached a third edition,
though but few months have elapsed since the issue of the first. It is believed
that its great merits will command for it a like attention wherever it is known;
the rare learning and metaphysical ability with which it discusses problems, no
less profound in their philosophical nature than practical in their religious applications;
the devout reverence for the authority of the Bible, and the truly Christian spirit
with which it is imbued, must gain for it a cherished place in the minds and hearts
of all who wish well to a sound philosophy, and a pure, and we may add, a real,
Christianity. In its more immediate aspect, it is eminently a work for the present
times; so closely is it connected with the higher thinking of the present generation,
and so boldly and triumphantly does it carry the Christian argument through the
entire course of recent, and especially German, speculation. But rightly viewed,
these Lectures of Mr. Mansel have a far wider scope than this; for, in unfolding
his great theme, the author aims to lay the foundations of a sound religious philosophy
in the laws of the human mind, and in the general conditions to which it is thereby
necessarily subject in the attainment of all truth and knowledge; his work therefore
belongs, in its principles and applications,
But without enlarging upon the general merits of this work, the Publishers have only to mention the single change of any importance, which it has undergone in the present reprint. This change is the translation in the author’s learned Notes—a most valuable portion of his work—of the numerous passages from foreign writers, Greek, Latin, French, and German, which in the English edition appear in the original languages. It has been thought best to translate these passages, in order to bring them within the reach of all general readers; and it is hoped that this proceeding will be regarded by scholars with indulgence at least, if not with entire approval.
The translations have been made by Prof. John L. Lincoln, of Brown University, whose reputation as a scholar is deemed by the Publishers a sufficient guaranty for the execution of the work. It has been the translator’s endeavor to reproduce the original with as much fidelity as possible; and to make only such departures, even in the form of the thought, as the English idiom seemed to require. The difficulties belonging to the task of translating isolated passages from so many and so different writers, will doubtless be best understood by those who are most familiar with the languages in which they are written, and with the abstruse subjects which they discuss.
An Index of the Authors, quoted in the work, has been also prepared for the American edition, which will be of great service to readers, and will indicate the wide and various range of Mr. Mansel’s studies.
Boston, April 20, 1859.
THE various Criticisms to which these Lectures have been subjected since the publication of the last Edition, seem to call for a few explanatory remarks on the positions principally controverted. Such remarks may, it is hoped, contribute to the clearer perception of the argument in places where it has been misunderstood, and are also required in order to justify the republication, with little more than a few verbal alterations, of the entire work in its original form.
On the whole, I have no reason to complain of my Critics. With
one or two exceptions, the tone of their observations has been candid, liberal,
and intelligent, and in some instances more favorable than I could have ventured
to expect. An argument so abstruse, and in some respects so controversial, must
almost inevitably call forth a considerable amount of opposition; and such criticism
is at least useful in stimulating further inquiry, and in pointing out to an author
those among
At present, I must confine myself to those explanations which appear to be necessary to the right appreciation of the main purposes of the work, on the supposition that its fundamental principles may be admitted as tenable. To reargue the whole question on first principles, or to reply minutely to the criticisms on subordinate details, would require a larger space than can be allotted to a preface, and would be at least premature at the present stage of the controversy, while the work has in all probability not yet completed the entire course of criticism which a new book is destined to undergo if it succeeds in attracting any amount of public attention.
In the first place, it may be desirable to obviate some misapprehensions
concerning the design of the work as a whole. It should be remembered, that to answer
the objections which have been urged against Christianity, or against any religion,
is not to prove the religion to be true. It only clears the ground for the production
of the proper evidences. It shows, so far as it is successful, that the religion
may be true, notwithstanding the objections by which it has been assailed; but it
When, therefore, a critic objects to the present argument, that
“the presence of contradictions is no proof of the truth of a system;” that “we
are not entitled to erect on this ethereal basis a superstructure of theological
doctrine, only because it, too, possesses the same self-contradictions;” that “the
argument places all religions and philosophies on precisely the same level;”—he
merely charges it with accomplishing the very purpose which it was intended to accomplish.
So far as certain difficulties are inherent in the constitution of the human mind
itself, they must of necessity occupy the same position with respect to all religions,—the
false no less than the true. It is sufficient if it can be shown that they have
not, as is too often supposed, any peculiar force against Christianity alone. No
sane man dreams of maintaining that a religion is true because of the difficulties
which it involves: the utmost that can reasonably be maintained is that it may be
true in spite of them. Such an argument of course requires, as its supplement, a
further consideration of the direct evidences of Christianity; and this requirement
is pointed out in the concluding Lecture. But it formed no part of my design to
exhibit in detail the evidences themselves;—a task which the many excellent works
already existing on that subject would have rendered
But granting for the present the main position of these Lectures,
namely, that the human mind inevitably and by virtue of its essential constitution,
finds itself involved in self-contradictions whenever it ventures on certain courses
of speculation; it may be asked, in the next place, what conclusion does this admission
warrant, as regards the respective positions of Faith and Reason in determining
the religious convictions of men. These Lectures have been charged with condemning,
under the name of Dogmatism, all Dogmatic Theology; with censuring, “the exercise
of Reason in defence and illustration of the truths of Revelation;” with including
“schoolmen and saints and infidels alike” in one and the same condemnation. Such
sweeping assertions are surely not warranted by anything that is maintained in the
Lectures themselves. Dogmatism and Rationalism are contrasted with each other, not
as employing reason for opposite purposes, but as employing it in extremes. The
contrast was naturally suggested by the historical connection between the Wolfian
philosophy and the Kantian, the one as the stronghold of Dogmatism, the other of
Rationalism. The religious philosophy of Wolf and his followers, whose system, and
not that of either “’schoolmen or saints,” is cited as the chief specimen of Dogmatism,
was
All Dogmatic Theology is not Dogmatism, nor all use of Reason
Rationalism, any more than all drinking is drunkenness. The dogmatic or the rational
method may be rightly or wrongly employed, and the question is to determine the
limits of the legitimate or illegitimate use of each. It is expressly as extremes
that the two systems are contrasted: each is described as leading to error in its
exclusive employment, yet as being, in its utmost error, only a truth abused. If
reason may not be
What, then, is the practical lesson which these Lectures are designed
to teach concerning the right use of reason in religious questions? and what are
the just claims of a reasonable faith, as distinguished from a blind credulity?
In the first place, it is obvious that, if there is any object whatever of which
the human mind is unable to form a clear and distinct conception, the inability
equally disqualifies us for proving or disproving a given doctrine, in all cases
in which such a conception is an indispensable condition of the argument. If, for
example, we can form no positive notion of the Nature of God as an Infinite Being,
we are not entitled either to demonstrate the mystery of the Trinity as a necessary
property of that Nature, or to reject it as necessarily inconsistent therewith.
Such mysteries clearly belong, not to Reason, but to Faith; and the preliminary
inquiry which distinguishes a reasonable from an unreasonable belief, must be directed,
not to the premises by which the doctrine can be proved or disproved as reasonable
or unreasonable, but to the nature of the authority on which it rests, as revealed
or unrevealed. The brief summary of Christian Evidences contained in my concluding
Lecture, See below, p. 214.
In the second place, a caution is needed concerning the kind of
evidence which reason is competent to furnish within the legitimate sphere of its
employment. If we have not such a conception of the Divine Nature as is sufficient
for the a priori demonstration of religious truth,
our rational conviction in any particular case must be regarded, not as a certainty,
but as a probability. We must remember the Aristotelian rule, to be content
with such evidence as the nature of the object-matter allows. A single infallible
criterion of all religious truth can be obtained only by the possession of a perfect
Philosophy of the Infinite. If such a philosophy is unattainable; if the infinite
can only be apprehended under finite symbols, and the authority of those symbols
tested by finite evidences,—there is always room for error, in consequence of the
inadequacy of the conception to express completely the nature of the object. In
other words, we must
These considerations are no less applicable to moral than to speculative
reasonings. The moral faculty, though furnishing undoubtedly some of the most important
elements for the solution of the religious problem, is no more entitled
The assertion that human morality contains in it a temporal and
relative element, and cannot, in its highest manifestation, be regarded as a complete
measure of the absolute Goodness of God, has been condemned by one critic as
“rank Occamism,” It is in fact the very reverse of the doctrine usually attributed
to Occam, which admits of no distinction between absolute and relative morality,
but maintains that, as all distinction of right and wrong depends upon obedience
or disobedience to a higher authority, therefore the Divine Nature must be morally
indifferent, and all good and evil the result of God’s arbitrary Will. The above
assertion, on the other hand, expressly distinguishes absolute from relative morality,
and regards human virtue and vice as combining an eternal and a temporal element,—the
one an absolute principle grounded in the immutable nature of God; the other a relative
application, dependent upon the created constitution of human nature. But I am by
no means sure that the “Invincible Doctor” has been quite fairly dealt with in this
matter.
Those who believe, with the Scriptures, that the Almighty has,
at certain times in the world’s history, manifested Himself to certain nations or
individuals in a supernatural manner, distinct from His ordinary government of the
world by the institutions of society, will scarcely be disposed to admit the assumption,
that God could not on such occasions justify by His own authority such acts as are
every day justified by the authority of the civil magistrate whose power is delegated
from Him. To assert, with one of my critics, that upon this principle, “the deed
which is criminal on earth may be praiseworthy in heaven,” is to distort the whole
doctrine and to beg the whole question. For we must first answer the previous inquiry:
Does not a deed performed under such circumstances cease to be criminal at all,
even upon earth? The question, so far as moral philosophy is concerned, is simply
this: Is the moral quality of right or wrong an attribute so essentially adhering
to acts as acts, that the same act can never vary in its character according to
the motives by which it is prompted, or the circumstances under which it is committed?
If we are compelled, as every moralist is compelled, to answer this question in
the negative, we must then ask, in the second place, whether the existence of a
direct command from the supreme Governor of the world, supposing such a command
ever to have been given, is one of the circumstances which can in any degree affect
the character of an act. On this question, to judge merely by the
It remains to make some remarks on another of the opinions maintained
in the following Lectures, on which, to judge by the criticisms to which it has
been subjected, a few words of explanation may be desirable. It has been objected
by reviewers of very opposite schools. that to deny to man a knowledge of the Infinite
is to make Revelation itself impossible, and to leave no room for evidences on which
reason can be legitimately employed. The objection would be pertinent, if I had
ever maintained that Revelation is or can be a direct manifestation of the Infinite
Nature of God. But I have constantly asserted the very reverse. In Revelation, as
in Natural Religion, God is represented under
But it is a great mistake to suppose, as some of my critics have
supposed, that if the Infinite, as an object, is inconceivable, therefore the language
which denotes it is wholly without meaning, and the corresponding state of mind
one of complete quiescence. A negative idea by no means implies a negation of all
mental activity. See Sir W. Hamilton’s Discussions, p. 602.
It is thus manifest that, even granting that all our positive
consciousness is of the Finite only, it may still be possible for men to speculate
and reason concerning the Infinite, without being aware that their language represents,
not thought, but its negation. They attempt to separate the condition of finiteness
from their conception of a given object; and it is not till criticism has detected
the self-contradiction involved in the attempt, that we learn at last that all human
efforts to conceive the infinite are derived from the consciousness, not of what
it is, but only of what it is not. A critic in the National Review is
of opinion that “relative apprehension is always and necessarily of two terms together;” and
“if of the finite, then also of the infinite.” This is true as regards the meaning
of the words; but by no means as regards the conception of the corresponding objects.
If extended to the latter, it should in consistency be asserted that the conception
of that which is conceivable involves also the conception of that which is inconceivable;
that the consciousness of anything is also a consciousness of nothing; that the
intuition of space and time is likewise an intuition of the absence of both.
Whatever value may be attached, in different psychological theories,
to that instinct or feeling of our nature which compels us to believe in the existence
of the Infinite, it is clear that, so long as it remains a mere instinct or feeling,
it cannot be employed for the purpose of theological criticism. The communication
of mental phenomena from man to man must always be made in the form of thoughts
conveyed through the medium of language. So long as the unbeliever can only say,
“I feel that this doctrine is false, but I cannot say why;” so long as the believer
can only retort, “I feel that it is true, but I can give no reason for my
feeling,”—there
is no common ground on which either can hope to influence the other. So long as
a man’s religion is a matter of feeling only, the feeling, whatever may be its influence
on himself, forms no basis of argument for or against the truth of what he believes.
But as soon as he interprets his feelings into thoughts, and proceeds to make those
thoughts the instruments of criticism constructive or destructive, he is bound to
submit them to the same logical criteria to which he himself subjects the religion
on which he is commenting. In this relation, it matters not what may be
The distinction between speculative and regulative truths, which
has also been a good deal misapprehended, is one which follows inevitably from the
abandonment of the philosophy of the Absolute. If human thought cannot be traced
up to an absolutely first principle of all knowledge and all existence; if our highest
attainable truths bear the marks of subordination to something higher and unattainable,—it
follows, if we are to act or believe at all, that our practice and belief must be
based on principles which do not satisfy all the requirements of the speculative
reason. But it should be remembered that this distinction is not peculiar to the
evidences of religion. It is shown that in all departments of human knowledge alike,—in
the laws of thought, in the movement of our limbs, in the perception
The above are all the explanations which, so far as I can at present
judge, appear to be desirable, to obviate probable misapprehensions regarding the
general principles advocated in these pages. Had I thought it worth while to enter
into controversy on minute questions of detail, or to reply to misapprehensions
which are due solely to the inadvertence of individual readers, A writer in the Christian Observer has actually mistaken
the positions against which the author is contending for those which he maintains,
and on the strength of this mistake has blundered through several pages of vehement
denunciation of the monstrous consequences which follow from the assumption that
the philosophical conception of the absolute is the true conception of God. The
absolute and the infinite, he tells us (in opposition to the Lecturer!!!), “are
names of God unknown to the Scriptures:” “The conception of infinity is plainly
negative:” “the absolute and infinite, as defined in the Lectures after the leaders
of German metaphysics, is no synonym for the true and living God:” and “a philosophy
of the so-called absolute is a spurious theology.” Est il possible? The same critic denounces, as “radically and thoroughly untrue,” the distinction between speculative and regulative truths, and the consequent assertion
that action, and not knowledge, is man’s destiny and duty in this life, and that
his highest principles, both in philosophy and in religion, have reference to this
end. “On the contrary,” he says, “all right action depends on right knowledge.”
As if this were not the very meaning of a regulative truth,—knowledge for the sake
of action. Another critic asserts that the author “sweeps down schoolmen
and saints and infidels alike, with the assertion that dogmatism and rationalism
equally assign to some superior tribunal the right of determining what is essential
to religion and what is not.” Had he looked a second time at the page which he quotes,
he would have seen that this is said of rationalism alone.
The sentence occurs at p. 76, in the following words: “‘What kind
of an Absolute Being is that,’ says Hegel, ‘which does not contain in itself all
that is actual, even evil included?’ We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation;
but the reasoning is unassailable. If the Absolute
This passage has been censured by more than one critic, as involving the skeptical admission that a false conclusion can be logically deduced from true premises. The concluding words may explain the real meaning. The whole argument is designed to show that to speak of a conception of the Absolute implies a self-contradiction at the outset, and that to reason upon such a conception involves ab initio a violation of the laws of human thought. That reasoning based on this assumption must end by annihilating itself, is surely no very dangerous concession to the skeptic. Suppose that an author had written such a sentence as the following:
“A circular parallelogram must have its opposite sides and angles equal, and must also be such that all lines drawn from the centre to the circumference shall be equal to each other. The conclusion is absurd; but the reasoning is unassailable, supposing that a circular parallelogram can be conceived at all.”
Would such a statement involve any formidable consequences either to geometry or to logic?
It remains only to say a few words on a question of fact,
The point, indeed, on which the Reviewer lays the most stress, is one in which there was little room for originality, either in myself or in my supposed teacher. That Revelation is accommodated to the limitations of man’s faculties, and is primarily designed for the purpose of practical religion, and not for those of speculative philosophy, has been said over and over again by writers of almost every age, and is indeed a truth so obvious that it might have occurred independently to almost any number of thinkers. Doubtless there is no truth, however trite and obvious, which may not assume a new and striking aspect in the hands of a great and original writer; and in this, as in other respects, a better acquaintance with Dr. Newman’s works might have taught me a better mode of expressing many arguments to which my own language may have done but imperfect justice. Even at this late hour, I am tempted to subjoin, as a conclusion to these observations, one passage of singular beauty and truth, of which, had I known it earlier, I would gladly have availed myself, as pointing out the true spirit in which inquiries like these should be pursued, and the practical lesson which they are designed to teach.
“And should any one fear lest thoughts such as these should tend
to a dreary and hopeless skepticism, let him take into account the Being and Providence
of God, the Merciful and True; and he will at once be relieved of
University Sermons,
p. 351.
Oxford, February 18th, 1859.
Dogmatism and Rationalism as methods of religious philosophy—meaning
of these terms—errors of the respective systems denoted by each; the one forcing
reason into agreement with revelation, the other forcing revelation into agreement
with reason.—Both methods may be regarded as attempts, from opposite sides, to produce
exact coincidence between belief and thought.—Instances of each exhibited and examined.—Human
conceptions are unavoidable in Theology; but there is need of some principle to
determine their proper place in it.—Such a principle can only be gained by an investigation
of the Limits of Human Thought.—The proper object of criticism is not religion,
but the human mind in its relation to religion.—A direct criticism of religion as
a representation of God can only be accomplished by the construction of a Philosophy
of the Infinite.—It is therefore necessary to inquire whether such a philosophy
is possible; and this can only be ascertained by an examination of the laws of human
thought in general, which will determine those of religious thought in particular.—Analogous
difficulties may be expected in philosophy and in religion, arising from the limitations
of
Statement of the two opposite methods by which a Philosophy of
Religion may be attempted; the Objective or Metaphysical, based on a supposed knowledge
of the nature of God, and the Subjective or Psychological, based on a knowledge
of the mental faculties of man.—Relation of these methods respectively to the Criticism
of Revelation—dependence of the former method upon the latter.—Further examination
of the Objective or Metaphysical method. Two different modes in which man may be
supposed to be capable of attaining to a knowledge of God—specimen of each—insufficiency
of both to found a Rational Theology.—Examination of the fundamental ideas of Rational
Theology,—the Absolute—the Infinite—the First Cause—mutual contradictions involved
in these three ideas—conception of an eternal Causation incompatible with the Absolute—conception
of a temporal Causation incompatible with the Infinite.—The Absolute cannot be conceived
as a necessary and unconscious cause,—nor as a voluntary and conscious cause,—nor
as possessing’ consciousness at all,—nor as containing within itself any kind of
relation,—nor as one and simple, out of all relation. Effect of these counter impossibilities
on the conceptions of Theology—apparent contradictions in the conception of the
Divine Attributes as absolute and infinite.—Further contradictions involved in the
coexistence of the Relative with the Absolute, and of the Finite with the Infinite.
Pantheism avoids these contradictions by denying the
Recapitulation of the results of the last Lecture.—Necessity of
examining the Philosophy of Religion from the Subjective or Psychological side,
as dependent upon a knowledge of the laws of the human mind.—General
conditions of all human Consciousness.—First condition of Consciousness, Distinction between
one Object and another—such a distinction necessarily implies Limitation—consequent
impossibility of conceiving the Infinite.—Explanation of the contradictions involved
in the idea of the Infinite—this idea inadmissible as the basis of a
scientific Theology.—Second condition of Consciousness, Relation between Subject and Object—consequent
impossibility of conceiving the Absolute.—Explanation of the contradictions involved
in the idea of the Absolute.—Impossibility of a partial knowledge of the
Infinite and Absolute.—Third condition of Consciousness, Succession and Duration in Time—hence
all objects are conceived as finite—consequent impossibility of conceiving Creation,
and counter impossibility of conceiving finite existence as uncreated.—Attempt to
evade this limitation in Theology by the hypothesis of the existence of God out
of Time—this hypothesis untenable in philosophy and unavailable in
theology.—Fourth
condition of Consciousness, Personality—Personality a limitation and a relation,
and
Analysis of the religious Consciousness, reflective and intuitive.—Relation
of the reflective Consciousness to Theology; its reasonings sufficient to correct
our conception of a Supreme Being, but not to originate it—examination of some current
theories on this point—statement of the value of the reflective faculties within
their proper limits.—Reflection, as well as intuition necessary to distinct consciousness;
but intuition is first in the order of nature, though not in that of time.—Two principal
modes of religious intuition—the Feeling of Dependence and the Conviction of Moral
Obligation, giving rise respectively to Prayer and Expiation.—Examination of these
two modes of Consciousness.—Dependence implies a Personal Superior; hence our conviction
of the Power of God—Moral Obligation implies a Moral Lawgiver; hence our conviction
of the Goodness of God.—Limits of the Religious Consciousness—Sense of Dependence
not a consciousness of the Absolute and Infinite—opposite theory of Schleiermacher
on this point—objections to his
Distinction between Speculative and Regulative Truth further pursued.—In
Philosophy, as well as Religion, our highest principles of thought are regulative
and not speculative.—Instances in the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity; Unity and
Plurality as implied in the conception of any object; Commerce between Soul and
Body; Extension, as implied in external perception; and Succession, as implied in
the entire consciousness.—Illustration thus afforded for determining the limits
of thought- distinction between legitimate and illegitimate thought, as determined
by their relation to the inexplicable
Result of the previous inquiries—religious ideas contain two elements,
a Form, common to them with all other ideas, as being human thoughts; and a Matter,
peculiar to themselves, as thoughts about religious objects—hence there may exist
two possible kinds of difficulties; the one formal arising from the universal laws
of human thought; the other material arising from the peculiar nature
Philosophical parallel continued with regard to the supposed moral
objections to Christian doctrines.—Error of the moral theory of Kant.—Moral convictions
how far necessary and trustworthy, how far contingent and fallible—parallel in this
respect between moral and mathematical science, as based on the formal conditions
of experience—possibility of corresponding errors in both.—Human morality not absolute,
but relative.—The Moral Law cannot be conceived as an absolute principle, apart
from its temporal manifestations—parallel in the idea of Time and its relations.—Morality,
as conceived by us, necessarily contains a human and positive element; and therefore
cannot be the measure of the Absolute Nature of God.—Application of the above principles
to Christian Theology.—The Atonement—weakness of the supposed moral objections to
this doctrine-such objections equally applicable to any conceivable scheme of Divine
Providence.—Predestination and Free Will—Predestination, as a determination of the
Absolute Mind, is speculatively inconceivable, and therefore cannot be known to
be incompatible with human Freedom—parallel in this respect between Predestination
in Theology and Causation in Philosophy.—Eternal Punishment—rashness and ignorance
of rationalist criticisms of this doctrine—the difficulties of the doctrine are
not peculiar to Theology, but common to all Philosophy, and belong to the general
Right use of Reason in religious questions—Reason entitled to judge
of a Religion in respect of its evidences, as addressed to men, but not in respect
of its correspondence with philosophical conceptions of the Absolute Nature of God.—No
one faculty of the human mind is entitled to exclusive preference as the criterion
of religious truth—the true criterion is to be found in the general result of many
and various Evidences—practical neglect of this rule by different writers.—Comparative
value of internal and external evidences of religion, the former as negative, the
latter as positive.—Cautions as requisite in the use of the negative argument from
internal evidence—external and internal evidence can only be estimated in conjunction
with each other.—Distinction between the proper and improper use of the Moral Sense
in questions of religious evidence.—Application of this distinction to facts recorded
in Sacred History.—Analogy between physical and moral laws as regards miraculous
interventions.—Probable and partial character of the moral argument; error of supposing
it to be demonstrative and complete; possibility of mistakes in its application.—General
YE SHALL NOT ADD UNTO THE WORD WHICH I COMMAND
YOU, NEITHER SHALL YE DIMINISH AUGHT FROM IT.—
DOGMATISM and Rationalism are the two extremes between which religious
philosophy perpetually oscillates. Each represents a system from which, when nakedly
and openly announced, the well regulated mind almost instinctively shrinks back;
yet which, in some more or less specious disguise, will be found to underlie the
antagonist positions of many a theological controversy. Many a man who rejects isolated
portions of Christian doctrine, on the ground that they are repugnant to his reason,
would hesitate to avow broadly and unconditionally that reason is the supreme arbiter
of all religious truth; thiough at the same time he would find it hard to point
out any particular in which the position of reason, in relation to the truths which
he still retains, differs from that which it occupies in relation to those which
he rejects. And on the other hand, there are many who, while they would by no means
construct a dogmatic system on the assumption that the conclusions of reason may
always be
In using the above terms, it is necessary to state at the outset
the sense in which each is employed, and to emancipate them from the various and
vague associations connected with their ordinary use. I do not include under the
name of Dogmatism the mere enunciation of religious truths, as resting upon
authority and not upon reasoning. The Dogmatist, as well as the Rationalist, is
the constructor of a system; and in constructing it, however much the materials
upon which he works may be given by a higher authority, yet in connecting them together
and exhibiting their systematic form, it is necessary to call in the aid of human
ability. Indeed, whatever may be their actual antagonism in the field of religious
controversy, the two terms are in their proper sense so little exclusive of each
other, that both were originally employed to denote the same persons;—the name
Dogmatists or Rationalists being indifferently given to those medical
theorists who insisted on the necessity of calling in the aid of rational principles,
to support or correct the conclusions furnished by experience.(1)
A like signification is to be found in the later language of philosophy, when the
term Dogmatists was used to denote those philosophers who endeavored
In relation to the actual condition of religious truth, as communicated
by Holy Scripture, Dogmatism and Rationalism may be considered as severally representing,
the one the spirit which adds to the word of God, the other that which diminishes
from it. Whether a complete system of scientific Theology could or could not have
been given by direct revelation, consistently with the existing laws of human thought
and the purposes which Revelation is designed to answer, it is at least certain
that such a system is not given in the Revelation which we possess, but, if it is
to exist at all, must be constructed out of it by human interpretation. And it is
in attempting such a construction that Dogmatism and Rationalism exhibit their most
striking contrasts. The one seeks to build up a complete scheme of theological doctrine
out of the unsystematic materials furnished by Scripture, partly by the more complete
development of certain leading ideas; partly by extending the apparent import of
the Revelation to ground which it does not avowedly occupy, and attempting by inference
and analogy to solve problems which the sacred volume may indeed suggest, but which
it does not directly answer. The other aims at the same end by opposite means. It
strives to attain to unity and completeness of system, not by filling up supposed
deficiencies, but by paring down supposed excrescences. Commencing with a preconceived
theory of the purpose of a revelation and
The two methods thus contrasted may appear at first sight to represent
the respective claims of Faith and Reason, each extended to that point at which
it encroaches on the domain of the other. But in truth the contrast between Faith
and Reason, if it holds good in this relation at all, does so merely by accident.
It may be applicable in some instances to the disciples of the respective systems,
but not to the teachers; and even as regards the former, it is but partially and
occasionally true. The disciples of the Rationalist are not necessarily the disciples
of reason. It is quite as possible to receive with unquestioning submission a system
of religion or philosophy invented by a human teacher, as it is to believe, upon
the authority of Revelation, doctrines which no human reason is competent to discover.
The so-called freethinker is as often as any other man the slave of some self-chosen
master; and many who scorn the imputation of believing anything merely because it
is found in the Bible, would find it hard to give any better reason for their own
unbelief than the ipse dixit of some infidel philosopher.
But when we turn from the
In fact the two systems may be considered as both aiming, though
in different ways, at the same end; that end being to produce a coincidence between
what we believe and what we think; to remove the boundary which separates
Thus, to select one example out of many, the revealed doctrine
of Christ’s Atonement for the sins of men has been alternately defended and assailed
by some such arguments as these. We have been told, on the one hand, that man’s
redemption could not have been brought about by any other means(6):—that
God could not, consistently with his own attributes, have suffered man to perish
unredeemed, or have redeemed him by any inferior sacrifice(7):—that
man, redeemed from death, must become the servant of him who redeems him; and that
it was not meet that he should be the servant of any other than God(8):—that
no other sacrifice could have satisfied divine justice(9):—that
no other victim could have endured the burden of God’s wrath.(10)
These and similar arguments have been brought forward, as one of the greatest of
their authors avows, to defend the teaching of the Catholic
I quote these arguments only as specimens of the method in which
Christian doctrines have been handled by writers on opposite sides. To examine them
more in detail would detain me too long from my main purpose. I shall not therefore
at present consider whether the conclusions actually arrived at, on the one side
or on the other, are in themselves reasonable or unreasonable, orthodox or heretical.
I am concerned only with the methods respectively employed, and the need of some
rule for their employment. May reason be used without restriction in defence or
refutation of religions doctrines? And if not, what are the conditions of its legitimate
use? It may be that this man has defended, on reasonable grounds, none but the most
essential articles of the Christian Faith: but has he pointed out any rule which
can hinder the same or similar reasoning from being advanced by another in support
of the most dangerous errors? It may be that that man has employed the test of reasonableness,
only in the refutation of opinions concerning which the church has pronounced no
positive judgment: but has he fenced his method round with any cautions to prevent
its being used for the overthrow of Christianity itself? If we can find no other
ground than the arbitrary will of the man himself, why he
Thus, we find a late lamented writer of our own day, and at that
time of our own church, defending the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ, on
the metaphysical assumption of the real existence of an abstract humanity. “This,” he tells us,
“is why the existence of human nature is a thing too precious to be
surrendered to the subtleties of logic, because, upon its existence depends that
real manhood of Christ, which renders him a copartner with ourselves.” And again:
“To the reality of this work, the existence of that common nature is indispensable,
whereby, as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He Himself took part
of the same. Else, how would the perfect assumption of humanity have consisted with
His retaining that divine personality which it was impossible that He should surrender?
Since it was no new person which He took, it can only have been the substratum,
in which personality has its existence.”(16)
In this case, our belief in the undeniable truth of the doctrine defended may dispose
us to overlook the questionable character of the defence. But if we are inclined
for a moment to acquiesce in this unnatural union of metaphysical premises and theological
conclusions, we are recalled to ourselves by the recollection of the fearful consequence
which Occam deduces from the same hypothesis, of the assumption by Christ of a “substratum
in which personality has its existence;”—a consequence drawn in language which
we shudder to read, even as it is employed by its author, merely for the purpose
of
There is an union of Philosophy with Religion in which each contributes
to the support of the other; and there is also an union which, under the appearance
of support, does but undermine the foundations and prey upon the life of both. To
which of these two the above argument belongs, it needs but a bare statement of
its assumption to determine. It tells us that our belief in the doctrine of God
manifest in the flesh, indispensably depends upon our acceptance of the Realist
theory of the nature of universal notions. Philosophy and Theology alike protest
against such an outrage upon the claims, both of Reason and of Revelation, as is
implied in this association of one of the most fundamental truths of the Christian
Faith with one of the most questionable speculations of mediaeval metaphysics. What
does Theology gain by this employment of a weapon which may, at any moment, be turned
against her? Does it make one whit clearer to our understandings that mysterious
two-fold nature of one Christ, very God, and very Man? By no means. It was a truth
above human comprehension before; and it remains a truth above human comprehension
still. We believe that Christ is both God and Man; for this is revealed to us. We
know not how He is so; for this is not revealed; and we can learn it in no other
way. Theology gains nothing; but she is in danger of losing everything. Her most
precious truths are cut from the anchor which held them firm, and cast upon the
waters of philosophical speculation, to float hither and thither with the ever-shifting
waves of thought. And what does Philosophy gain? Her just domains are narrowed,
and her free limbs cramped in their onward course. The problems
But if the tendency of Dogmatism is to endanger the interests of religious truth, by placing that which is divine and unquestionable in too close an alliance with that which is human and doubtful, Rationalism, on the other hand, tends to destroy revealed religion altogether, by obliterating the whole distinction between the human and the divine. Rationalism, if it retains any portion of revealed truth as such, does so, not in consequence of, but in defiance of, its fundamental principle. It does so by virtually declaring that it will follow reason up to a certain point, and no further; though the conclusions which lie beyond that point are guaranteed by precisely the same evidence as those which fall short of it. We may select a notable example from the writings of a great thinker, who has contributed, perhaps, more than any other person to give a philosophical sanction to the rationalizing theories of his countrymen, yet from whose speculative principles, rightly employed, might be extracted the best antidote to his own conclusions, even as the body of the scorpion, crushed upon the wound, is said to be the best cure for its own venom.
Kant’s theory of a rational religion is based upon the
The origin of such theories is of course to be traced to that
morbid horror of what they are pleased to call Anthropomorphism, which poisons the
speculations of so many modern philosophers, when they attempt to be wise above
what is written, and seek for a metaphysical exposition of God’s nature and attributes.(22)
They may not, forsooth, think of the unchangeable God as if Ile were their fellow
man, influenced by human motives, and moved by human supplications. They want a
truer, a juster idea of the Deity as He is, than that under which He has been pleased
to reveal Himself; and they call on their reason to furnish it. Fools, to dream
that man can escape from himself, that
Surely downright idolatry is better than this rational worship of a fragment of humanity. Better is the superstition which sees the image of God in the wonderful whole which God has fashioned, than the philosophy which would carve for itself a Deity out of the remnant which man has mutilated. Better to realize the satire of the Eleatic philosopher, to make God in the likeness of man, even as the ox or the horse might conceive gods in the form of oxen or horses, than to adore some half-hewn Hermes, the head of a man joined to a misshapen block.(24) Better to fill down before that marvellous compound of human consciousness whose elements God has joined together, and no man can put asunder, than to strip reason of those cognate elements which together furnish all that we can conceive or imagine of conscious or personal existence, and to deify the emptiest of all abstractions, a something or a nothing, with just enough of its human original left to form a theme for the disputations of philosophy, but not enough to furnish a single ground of appeal to the human feelings of love, of reverence, and of fear. Unmixed idolatry is more religious than this. Undisguised atheism is more logical.
Throughout every page of Holy Scripture God reveals himself, not
as a Law, but as a Person. Throughout the
Yet surely there is a principle of truth of which this philosophy
is the perversion. Surely there is a sense in which we may not think of God as though
He were man; as there is also a sense in which we cannot help so thinking of Him.
When we read in the same narrative, and almost in two consecutive verses of Scripture,
“The Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for He is not a man that He should
repent;” and again, “The Lord repented that He had made Saul king over Israel:”
What limits then can we find to determine the legitimate provinces
of these two opposite methods of religious thought, each of which, in its exclusive
employment, leads to errors so fatal; yet each of which, in its utmost error, is
but a truth abused? If we may not, with the Dogmatist, force Philosophy into unnatural
union with Revelation, nor yet, with the Rationalist, mutilate Revelation to make
it agree with Philosophy, what guide can we find to point out the safe middle course?
what common element of both systems can be employed to mediate between them? It
is obvious that no such element can be found by the mere contemplation of the objects
on which religious thought is exercised. We can adequately criticize that only which
we know as a whole. The objects of Natural Religion are known to us in and by the
ideas which we can form of them; and those ideas do not of themselves constitute
a whole, apart from the remaining phenomena of consciousness. We must not examine
them by themselves alone: we must look to their origin, their import, and their
relation to the mind of which they are part. Revealed Religion, again, is not by
itself a direct object of criticism: first, because it is but a part of a larger
scheme, and that scheme one imperfectly comprehended; and secondly, because Revelation
implies an accommodation to the mental constitution of its human receiver; and we
must know what that constitution is, before we can pronounce how far the accommodation
extends. But if partial knowledge must not be
There is one point from which all religious systems must start,
and to which all must finally return; and which may therefore furnish a common ground
on which to examine the principles and pretensions of all. The primary and proper
object of criticism is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in
its relation to Religion. If the Dogmatist and the Rationalist have heretofore
contended as combatants, each beating the air in his own position, without being
able to reach his adversary; if they have been prevented from taking up a common
ground of controversy, because each repudiates the fundamental assumptions of the
other; that common ground must be sought in another quarter; namely, in those laws
and processes of the human mind, by means of which both alike accept and elaborate
their opposite systems. If human philosophy is not a direct guide to the attainment
of religious truth (and its entire history too truly testifies that it is not),
may it not serve as an indirect guide, by pointing out the limits of our faculties,
and the conditions of their legitimate exercise? Witnessing, as it does, the melancholy
spectacle of the household of humanity divided against itself, the reason against
the feelings and the feelings against the reason, and the dim half-consciousness
of the shadow of the infinite frowning down upon both, may
A criticism of the human mind, in relation to religions truth, was one of the many unrealized possibilities of philosophy, sketched out in anticipation by the far-seeing genius of Bacon. “Here therefore,” he writes, “I note this deficiency, that there hath not been, to my understanding, sufficiently enquired and handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, ‘Quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex?’ the other sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction, ‘Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis, Modicum, et non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me?’”(26)
An examination of the Limits of Religious Thought is an indispensable
preliminary to all Religious Philosophy. And the limits of religious thought are
but a special manifestation of the limits of thought in general. Thus the Philosophy
of Religion, on its human side, must be subject to those universal conditions which
are binding upon Philosophy in general. It has ever fared ill, both with Philosophy
and with Religion, when this caution has been neglected. It was an evil hour for
both, when Fichte
If it can be shown that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are the same; that corresponding difficulties occur in both, and, from the nature of the case, must occur, the chief foundation of religious Rationalism is cut away from under it. The difficulties which it professes to find in Revelation are shown to be not peculiar to Revelation, but inherent in the constitution of the human mind, and such as no system of Rationalism can avoid or overcome. The analogy, which Bishop Butler has pointed out, between Religion and the constitution and course of Nature, may be in some degree extended to the constitution and processes of the human mind. The representations of God which Scripture presents to us may be shown to be analogous to those which the laws of our minds require us to form; and therefore such as may naturally be supposed to have emanated from the same author. Such an inquiry occupies indeed but a subordinate place among the direct evidences of Christianity; nor is it intended to usurp the place of those evidences. But indirectly it may have its use, in furnishing an answer to a class of objections which were very popular a few years ago, and are not yet entirely extinguished. Even if it does not contribute materially to strengthen the position occupied by the defenders of Christianity, it may serve to expose the weakness of the assailants. Human reason may, in some respects, be weak as a supporter of Religion; but it is at least strong enough to repel an attack founded on the negation of reason.
“We know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which
is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. For now we see
through a glass,
“Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear
what we shall be: but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him;
for we shall see Him as He is. And every man that hath this hope in him purifieth
himself, even as He is pure.”
KEEP THAT WHICH IS COMMITTED TO THY TRUST, AVOIDING
PROFANE AND VAIN BABBLINGS, AND OPPOSITIONS OF SCIENCE FALSELY SO CALLED; WHICH
SOME PROFESSING HAVE ERRED CONCERNING THE FAITH.—
A PHILOSOPHY of Religion may be attempted from two opposite points
of view, and by two opposite modes of development. It may be conceived either as
a Philosophy of the Object of Religion; that is to say, as a scientific exposition
of the nature of God; or as a Philosophy of the Subject of Religion; that is to
say, as a scientific inquiry into the constitution of the human mind, so far as
it receives and deals with religious ideas. The former is that branch of Metaphysics
which is commonly known by the name of Rational Theology. Its general aim, in common
with all metaphysical inquiries, is to disengage the real from the apparent, the
true from the false: its special aim, as a Theology, is to exhibit a true representation
of the Nature and Attributes of God, purified from foreign accretions, and displaying
the exact features of their Divine Original. The latter is a branch of Psychology,
which at its outset at least, contents itself with investigating the phenomena presented
to it, leaving their relation to further realities to be determined at a later stage
of the inquiry. Its primary concern is with the operations and laws of the human
mind; and its special purpose is to ascertain the nature, the origin, and the limits
of the religious element
As applied to the criticism of Revelation, the first method, supposing its end to be attained, would furnish an immediate and direct criterion by which the claims of any supposed Revelation to a divine origin might be tested; while at the same time it would enable those possessed of it to dispense with the services of any Revelation at all. For on the supposition that we possess an exact idea of any attribute of the Divine Nature, we are at liberty to reject at once any portion of the supposed Revelation which contradicts that idea; and on the supposition that we possess a complete idea of that Nature as a whole, we are at liberty to reject whatever goes beyond it. And as, upon either supposition, the highest praise to which Revelation can aspire is that of coinciding, partially or wholly, with the independent conclusions of Philosophy, it follows that, so far as Philosophy extends, Revelation becomes superfluous.(1) On the other hand, the second method of philosophical inquiry does not profess to furnish a direct criticism of Revelation, but only of the instruments by which Revelation is to be criticized. It looks to the human, not to the divine, and aspires to teach us no more than the limits of our own powers of thought, and the consequent distinction between what we may and what we may not seek to comprehend. And if, upon examination, it should appear that any portion of the contents of Revelation belongs to the latter class of truths, this method will enable us to reconcile with each other the conflicting claims of Reason and Faith, by showing that Reason itself, rightly interpreted, teaches the existence of truths that are above Reason.
Whatever may be the ultimate use of the first of these methods
of criticism, it is obvious that the previous question,
A Philosophy which professes to elicit from its own conceptions
all the essential portions of religious belief, is bound to justify its profession,
by showing that those conceptions themselves are above suspicion. The ideas thus
exalted to the supreme criteria of truth must bear on their front unquestionable
evidence that they are true and sufficient
Such a conviction may be possible in two different ways. It may
be the result of a direct intuition of the Divine Nature; or it may be gained by
inference from certain attributes of human nature, which, though on a smaller scale,
are known to be sufficiently representative of the corresponding properties of the
Deity. We may suppose the existence in man of a special faculty of knowledge, of
which God is the immediate object,—a kind of religious sense or reason, by which
the Divine attributes are apprehended in their own nature:(2)
or we may maintain that the attributes of God differ from those of man in degree
only, not in kind; and hence that certain mental and moral qualities, of which we
are immediately conscious in ourselves, furnish at the same time a true and adequate
image of the infinite perfections of God.(3)
The first of these suppositions professes to convey a knowledge of God by direct
apprehension, in a manner similar to the evidence of the senses: the second professes
to convey the same knowledge by a logical process, similar to the demonstrations
of science. The former is the method of Mysticism, and of that Rationalism which
agrees with Mysticism, in referring the knowledge of divine things to
On the former supposition, a system of religious philosophy or criticism may be constructed by starting from the divine and reasoning down to the human: on the latter, by starting from the human and reasoning up to the divine. The first commences with a supposed immediate knowledge of God as He is in his absolute nature, and proceeds to exhibit the process by which that nature, acting according to its own laws, will manifest itself in operation, and become known to man. The second commences with an immediate knowledge of the mental and moral attributes of man, and proceeds to exhibit the manner in which those attributes will manifest themselves, when exalted to the degree in which they form part of the nature of God. If, for example, the two systems severally undertake to give a representation of the infinite power and wisdom of God, the former will profess to explain how the nature of the infinite manifests itself in the forms of power and wisdom; while the latter will attempt to show how power and wisdom must manifest themselves when existing in an infinite degree. In their criticisms of Revelation, in like manner, the former will rather take as its standard that absolute and essential nature of God, which must remain unchanged in every manifestation; the latter will judge by reference to those intellectual and moral qualities, which must exist in all their essential features in the divine nature as well as in the human.
Thus, for example, it has been maintained by a modern philosopher,
that the absolute nature of God is that of a
Within certain limits, both these arguments may have their value;
but each is chiefly useful as a check upon the exclusive authority of the other.
The philosophy which reasons downwards from the infinite, is but an exaggeration
of the true conviction that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts, nor His ways our
ways:
There are three terms, familiar as household words, in the vocabulary of Philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of Metaphysical Theology. To conceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause, is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being.(14) By the Infinite, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity.
The Infinite, as contemplated by this philosophy, cannot be regarded
as consisting of a limited number of attributes, each unlimited in its kind. It
cannot be conceived, for example, after the analogy of a line, infinite in length,
but not in breadth; or of a surface, infinite in two dimensions of space, but bounded
in the third; or of an intelligent being, possessing some one or more modes of consciousness
in an infinite degree, but devoid of others. Even if it be granted, which is not
the case, that such a
But these three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute,
Meanwhile, to return for a moment to the supposition of a true
causation. Supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it operates
by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived
as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby
limited by a superior power; and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature
a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must, therefore, be voluntary;
and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness, again, is
only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscrious
The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the
Absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else; but
it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential
relation within itself; as a whole, for instance, composed of parts, or as a substance
consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object.(26)
For if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation
of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other
hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality
of relatives.(27) The almost unanimous voice
of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute
The fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology being thus self-destructive,
we may naturally expect to find the same antagonism manifested in their special
applications. These naturally inherit the infirmities of the principle from which
they spring. If an absolute and infinite consciousness is a conception which contradicts
itself, we need not wonder if its several modifications mutually exclude each other.
A mental attribute, to be conceived as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every
possible object: otherwise it is potential only with regard to those on which it
is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality is a limitation. Hence every infinite
mode of consciousness must be regarded as extending over the field of every other;
and their common action involves a perpetual antagonism. How, for example, can Infinite
Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil?
How can infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet Infinite
Mercy pardon the
Let us however suppose for an instant that these difficulties
are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony
of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause:
we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative,
the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state
than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily,
has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection;
and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior
state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original
perfection.(32) There remains only the supposition
that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference.
But this supposition annihilates the unity, of the absolute, or it annihilates itself.
If the act of
Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent, is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the Creator.(33)
The whole of this web of contradictions (and it might be extended,
if necessary, to a far greater length) is woven from one original warp and woof;—namely,
the impossibility of conceiving the coexistence of the infinite and the finite,
and the cognate impossibility of conceiving a first commencement of phenomena, or
the absolute giving birth to the relative. The laws of thought appear to admit of
no possible escape from the meshes in which thought is entangled, save by destroying
one or the other of the cords of which they are composed. Pantheism or Atheism are
Pantheism thus failing us, the last resource of Rationalism is
to take refuge in that which, with reference to the highest idea of God, is speculative
Atheism, and to deny that the Infinite exists at all.(36)
And it must be admitted that, so long as we confine ourselves to one side only of
the problem, that of the inconceivability of the Infinite, this is the only position
logically tenable by those who would make man’s power of thought the exact measure
of his duty of belief. For the infinite, as inconceivable, is
To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception
of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed
with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to
What we have hitherto been examining, be it remembered, is not
the nature of the Absolute in itself, but only our own conception of that nature.
The distortions of the image reflected may arise only from the inequalities of the
mirror reflecting it. And this consideration leads us naturally back to the second
of the two methods of religious philosophy which were mentioned at the beginning
of the present Lecture. If the attempt to grasp the absolute nature of the Divine
Object of religious thought
In one respect, indeed, I have perhaps departed from the customary
language of the pulpit, to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary;—namely,
in dealing with the ideas common to Theology and Metaphysics in the terms of the
latter, rather than in those of the former. But there is a line of argument, in
which the vague generalities of the Absolute and the Infinite may be more reverently
and appropriately employed than the sacred names and titles of God. For we almost
instinctively shrink back from the recklessness which thrusts forward, on every
occasion, the holiest names and things, to be tossed to and fro, and trampled under
foot, in the excitement of controversy. We feel that the name of Him whom we worship
may not lightly be held up as a riddle for prying curiosity to puzzle over: we feel
that the Divine Personality of our Father in Heaven is not a thing to be pitted
in the arena of disputation, against the lifeless abstractions and sophistical word-jugglings
of Pantheism.
The metaphysical difficulties which have been exhibited in the
course of this Lecture almost suggest of themselves the manner in which they should
be treated. We must begin with that which is within us, not with that which is above
us; with the philosophy of Man, not with that of God. Instead of asking, what are
the facts and laws in the constitution of the universe, or in the Divine Nature,
by virtue of which certain conceptions present certain
AND HE SAID, THOU CANST NOT SEE MY FACE; FOR THERE
SHALL NO MAN SEE ME, AND LIVE. AND THE LORD SAID, BEHOLD, THERE IS A PLACE BY ME,
AND THOU SHALT STAND UPON A ROCK: AND IT SHALL COME TO PASS, WHILE MY GLORY PASSETH
BY, THAT I WILL PUT THEE IN A CLEFT OF THE ROCK, AND WILL COVER THEE WITH MY HAND
WHILE I PASS BY: AND I WILL TAKE AWAY MINE HAND, AND THOU SHALT SEE MY BACK PARTS;
BUT MY FACE SHALL NOT BE SEEN.—
MY last Lecture was chiefly occupied with an examination of the
ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite,—ideas which are indispensable to the foundation
of a metaphysical Theology, and of which a clear and distinct consciousness must
be acquired, if such a Theology is to exist at all. I attempted to show the inadequacy
of these ideas for such a purpose, by reason of the contradictions which to our
apprehension they necessarily involve from every point of view. The result of that
attempt may be briefly summed up as follows. We are compelled, by the constitution
of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being,—a belief
which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative
and the finite. But the instant we attempt to analyze the ideas thus suggested to
us, in the hope of attaining to an intelligible conception of them, we are on every
side involved in inextricable confusion and contradiction. It is no matter from
what point of view we commence our examination;—whether, with the Theist, we
In the present Lecture, it will be my endeavor to offer some explanation of the singular phenomenon of human thought, which is exhibited in these results. I propose to examine the same ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite from the opposite side, in order to see if any light can be thrown on the anomalies which they present to us, by a reference to the mental laws under which they are formed. Contradiction, whatever may be its ultimate import, is in itself not a quality of things, but a mode in which they are viewed by the mind; and the inquiry which it most immediately suggests is, not an investigation of the nature of things in themselves, but an examination of those mental conditions under which it is elicited in thought. Such an examination, if it does not enable us to extend the sphere of thought beyond a certain point, may at least serve to make us more distinctly conscious of its true boundaries.
The much-disputed question, to what class of mental phenomena
the religious consciousness belongs, must be postponed to a later stage of our inquiry.
At present, we are concerned with a more general investigation, which the answer
to that question will in nowise affect. Whether
Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness,
in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between
one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something;
and that something can only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished
from that which it is not.(1) But distinction
is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,
it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it must not possess
some form which the other has. But it is obvious that the Infinite cannot be distinguished,
as such, from the Finite, by the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses;
for such absence would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence
of an attribute which the Finite has not; for, as no finite part can be a constituent
of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must itself be infinite;
and must at the same time have nothing in common with the finite. We are thus thrown
back upon our former impossibility; for this second infinite will be distinguished
from the finite by the
This contradiction, which is utterly inexplicable on the supposition
that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for,
when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought. If all thought is limitation,—if
whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, regarded as
finite,—the
infinite, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those
conditions under which thought is possible. To speak of a Conception of the Infinite
is, therefore, at once to affirm those conditions and to deny them. The contradiction,
Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself, when it refuses
to attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which we can
conceive it, implies limitation and change,—the perception of one object out of
many, and a comparison of that object with others. To be always conscious of the
same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be conscious at all;(5)
and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no conception of what consciousness
is. Viewed on the side of the object of consciousness, the same principle will carry
us further still. Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought,
is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some particular manner.
Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes
literally true;—pure being is pure nothing.(6)
We have no conception of existence which is not existence in some particular manner;
and if we abstract from the manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence.
Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy,
refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human
consciousness,
A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only possible
in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, or person conscious,
and an Object, or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness
without the union of these two factors; and, in that union, each exists only as
it is related to the other.(8) The subject is
a subject, only in so far as it is conscious of an object: the object is an object,
only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either
is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness
of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. To be conscious
of the Absolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given in relation
to our consciousness, is identical with one which exists in its own nature, out
of all relation to consciousness. But to know this identity, we must compare the
two together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We are in fact required
to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious;
the comparison itself being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the
consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, even if we could be
conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly know that it is the absolute: and,
as we can be conscious of an object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is,
this is equivalent to an admission that we cannot be conscious of the absolute at
This contradiction, again, admits of the same explanation as the former. Our whole notion of existence is necessarily relative; for it is existence as conceived by us. But Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways in which objects are presented to our consciousness,—a general term, embracing a variety of relations. The Absolute, on the other hand, is a term expressing no object of thought, but only a denial of the relation by which thought is constituted. To assume absolute existence as an object of thought, is thus to suppose a relation existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation. The Conception of the Absolute thus implies at the same time the presence and the absence of the relation by which thought is constituted; and our various endeavors to represent it are only so many modified forms of the contradiction involved in our original assumption. Here, too, the contradiction is one which we ourselves have made. It does not imply that the Absolute cannot exist; but it implies, most certainly, that we cannot conceive it as existing.(9)
Philosophers who are anxious to avoid this conclusion have sometimes
attempted to evade it, by asserting that we may have in consciousness a partial,
but not a total knowledge of the infinite and the absolute.(10)
But here again the supposition refutes itself. To have a partial knowledge of an
object, is to know a part of it, but not the whole. But the part of the infinite
which is supposed to be known must be itself either infinite or finite. If it is
infinite, it
It would be possible, did my limits allow, to pursue the argument at length, through the various special modifications which constitute the subordinate forms of consciousness. But with reference to the present inquiry, it will be sufficient to notice two other conditions, under which all consciousness is necessarily manifested; both of which have a special bearing on the relation of philosophy to theological controversy.
All human consciousness, as being a change in our mental state,
is necessarily subject to the law of Time, in its two manifestations of
Succession and Duration. Every object, of whose existence we can be in any
way conscious, is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some former
object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a certain portion of time. In the
former point of view, it is manifest, from what has been said before, that whatever
succeeds something else, and is distinguished from it, is necessarily apprehended
as finite; for distinction is itself a limitation. In the latter point of view,
it is no less manifest that whatever is conceived as having a continuous existence
in time is equally apprehended as finite. For continuous existence is necessarily
conceived as divisible into successive moments. One portion has already gone
As a necessary consequence of this limitation, it follows, that
an act of Creation, in the highest sense of the term,—that is to say, an
absolutely first link in the chain of phenomena, preceded by no temporal antecedent,—is
to human thought inconceivable. To represent in thought the first act of the first
cause of all things, I must conceive myself as placed in imagination at the point
at which temporal succession commences, and as thus conscious of the relation between
a phenomenon in time and a reality out of time. But the consciousness of such a
relation implies a consciousness of both the related members; to realize which,
the mind must be in and out of time at the same moment. Time, therefore, cannot
be regarded as limited; for to conceive a first or last moment of time would be
to conceive a consciousness into which time enters, preceded or followed by one
from which it is absent. But, on the other hand, an infinite succession in time
is equally inconceivable; for this succession also cannot be bounded by time, and
therefore can only be apprehended by one who is himself free from the law of conceiving
in time. From
The limited character of all existence which can be conceived
as having a continuous duration, or as made up of successive moments, is so far
manifest, that it has been assumed, almost as an axiom, by philosophical theologians,
that in the existence of God there is no distinction between past, present, and
future. “In the changes of things,” says Augustine, there is a past and a future:
in God there is a present, in which neither past nor future can be.”(13)
“Eternity,” says Boethius, “is the perfect possession of interminable life, and
of all that life at once:”(14) and Aquinas,
accepting the definition, adds, “Eternity has no succession, but exists all together.”(15)
But, whether this assertion be literally true or not (and this we have no means
of ascertaining), it is clear that such a mode of existence is altogether inconceivable
by us, and that the words in which it is described represent not thought, but the
refusal to think at all. It is impossible that man, so long as he exists in time,
should contemplate an object in whose existence there is no time. For the thought
by which he contemplates it must be one of his own mental states: it must have a
beginning and an end: it must
The command, so often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians
of various ages and schools, “In contemplating God, transcend time,”(18)
if meant for anything more than a figure of rhetoric, is equivalent to saying, “Be
man no more; be thyself God.” It amounts to the admission that, to know the infinite,
the human mind must itself be infinite; because an object of consciousness, which
is in any way limited by the conditions of human thought, cannot be accepted as
a representation of the unlimited. But two infinites cannot be conceived as existing
together; and if the mind of man must become infinite to know God, it must itself
be God.(19) Pantheism, or self-acknowledged
falsehood, are thus the only alternatives possible under this precept. If the human
mind, remaining in reality finite, merely fancies itself to be infinite in its contemplation
of
Subordinate to the general law of Time, to which all consciousness is subject, there are two inferior conditions, to which the two great divisions of consciousness are severally subject. Our knowledge of body is governed by the condition of space; our knowledge of mind by that of personality. I can conceive no qualities of body, save as having a definite local position; and I can conceive no qualities of mind, save as modes of a conscious self. With the former of these limitations our present argument is not concerned; but the latter, as the necessary condition of the conception of spiritual existence, must be taken into account in estimating the philosophical value of man’s conception of an infinite Mind.
The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence,
Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example—can be conceived by us only as existing in
a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any one
of his attributes, but the common subject of them all; in one word, in a Person.
But Personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation.(20)
Our own personality is presented to us as relative and limited; and it is from that
presentation that all our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality
is presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various modes
of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought without a thinker:
But are we therefore justified, even on philosophical grounds,
in denying the Personality of God? or do we gain a higher or a truer representation
of Him, by asserting, with the ancient or the modern Pantheist, that God, as absolute
and infinite, can have neither intelligence nor will?(22)
Far from it. We dishonor God far more by identifying Him with the feeble and negative
impotence of
It is from the intense consciousness of our own real existence
as Persons, that the conception of reality takes
If there is one dream of a godless philosophy to which, beyond
all others, every moment of our consciousness gives the lie, it is that which subordinates
the individual to the universal, the person to the species; which deifies kinds
and realizes classifications; which sees Being in generalization, and Appearance
in limitation; which regards the living and conscious man as a wave on the ocean
of
It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists any where but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction, in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend the boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits to man’s power of thought; and it proves no more.
The preceding considerations are equally conclusive against both
the methods of metaphysical theology described in my last Lecture,—that which commences
with the divine to reason down to the human, and that which commences with the human
to reason up to the divine.
There remains but one subterfuge to which Philosophy can have
recourse, before she is driven to confess that the Absolute and the Infinite are
beyond her grasp. If consciousness is against her, she must endeavor to get rid
of consciousness itself And, accordingly, the most distinguished representatives
of this philosophy in recent times, however widely differing upon other questions,
agree in maintaining that the foundation for a knowledge of the
The results, to which an examination of the facts of consciousness
has conducted us, may be briefly summed up as follows. Our whole consciousness manifests
itself as subject to certain limits, which we are unable, in any act of thought,
to transgress. That which falls within these limits, as an object of thought is
known to us as relative and finite. The existence of a limit to our
powers of thought is manifested by the consciousness of contradiction, which
implies at the same time an attempt to think and an inability to accomplish that
attempt. But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation between something within
and something without itself; and thus the consciousness of a limit of thought implies,
though it does not directly present to us, the existence
I have now concluded that portion of my argument in which it was
necessary to investigate in abstract terms the
There is also another consideration, which may justify the Christian
preacher in examining, at times, the thoughts and language of human philosophy,
apart from their special application to religious truths. A religious association
may sometimes serve to disguise the real character of a line of
But who that enters upon this course of mistrust shall dare to
say that such will be the end of it? Far better is it to learn at the outset the
nature of that unstable surface on which we would tread, without being tempted by
the phantom of religious promise, which shines delusively over it. He who hath ordered
all things in measure and number and weight,
O THOU THAT HEAREST PRAYER, UNTO THEE SHALL ALL
FLESH COME.—
THAT the Finite cannot comprehend the Infinite, is a truth more
frequently admitted in theory than applied in practice. It has been expressly asserted
by men who, almost in the same breath, have proceeded to lay down canons of criticism,
concerning the purpose of Revelation, and the truth or falsehood, importance or
insignificance, of particular doctrines, on grounds which are tenable only on the
supposition of a perfect and intimate knowledge of God’s Nature and Counsels.(1)
Hence it becomes necessary to bring down the above truth from general to special
statements;—to inquire more particularly wherein the limitation of man’s faculties
consists, and in what manner it exhibits itself in the products of thought. This
task I endeavored to accomplish in my last Lecture. To pursue the conclusion thus
obtained to its legitimate consequences in relation to Theology, we must next inquire
how the human mind, thus limited, is able to form the idea of a relation between
man and God, and what is the nature of the conception of God which arises from the
consciousness of this relation. The purpose of our inquiry is to ascertain the limits
of religious thought; and, for this purpose, it is necessary to proceed from the
limits of thought and of human consciousness in general, to those particular forms
of consciousness which, in
Reasonings, probable or demonstrative, in proof of the being and attributes of God, have met with a very different reception at different periods. Elevated at one time, by the injudicious zeal of their advocates, to a certainty and importance to which they have no legitimate claim, at another, by an equally extravagant reäction, they have been sacrificed in the mass to some sweeping principle of criticism, or destroyed piecemeal by minute objections in detail. While one school of theologians has endeavored to raise the whole edifice of the Christian Faith on a basis of metaphysical proof,(2) others have either expressly maintained that the understanding has nothing to do with religious belief, or have indirectly attempted to establish the same conclusion by special refutations of the particular reasonings.(3)
An examination of the actual state of the human mind, as regards
religious ideas, will lead us to a conclusion intermediate between these two extremes.
On the one hand, it must be allowed that it is not through reasoning that men obtain
the first intimation of their relation to the Deity; and that, had they been left
to the guidance of their intellectual faculties alone, it is possible that no such
intimation might have taken place; or at best, that it would have been but as one
guess, out of many equally plausible and equally natural. Those who lay exclusive
stress on the proof of the existence of God from the marks of design in the world,
or from the necessity of supposing a first cause of all phenomena, overlook the
fact that man learns to pray before he learns to reason,—that he feels within him
the consciousness of a Supreme Being, and the instinct of worship, before he can
argue from effects to causes, or estimate the traces of wisdom and benevolence scattered
through the
We may therefore, without hesitation, accede to the argument of
the great critic of metaphysics, when he tells us that the speculative reason is
unable to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, but can only correct our conception
of such a Being, supposing it to be already obtained.(4)
But, at the same time, it is necessary to protest against the pernicious extent
to which the reaction against the use of the reason in theology has in too many
instances been carried. When the same critic tells us that we cannot legitimately
infer, from the order and design visible in the world, the omnipotence and omniscience
of its Creator, because a degree of power and wisdom short of the very highest might
possibly be sufficient to produce all the effects which we are able to discern;(5)
or when a later writer, following in the same track, condemns the argument from
final causes, because it represents God exclusively in the aspect of an artist;(6)
or when a third writer, of a different school, tells us that the processes of thought
have nothing to do with the soul, the organ of religion;(7)—we
feel that systems which condemn the use of reasoning in sacred things may be equally
one-sided and extravagant with those which assert its Supreme authority. Reasoning
Taking, then, as the basis of our inquiry, the admission
But, notwithstanding this necessary coöperation of thought in every manifestation of human consciousness, it is not to the reflective faculties that we must look, if we would discover the origin of religion. For, to the exercise of reflection, it is necessary that there should exist an object on which to reflect; and though, in the order of time, the distinct recognition of this object is simultaneous with the act of reflecting upon it, yet, in the order of nature, the latter presupposes the former. Religious thought, if it is to exist at all, can only exist as representative of some fact of religious intuition,—of some individual state of mind, in which is presented, as an immediate fact, that relation of man to God, of which man, by reflection, may become distinctly and definitely conscious.
Two such states may be specified, as dividing between them the
rude material out of which Reflection builds up the edifice of Religious Consciousness.
These are the Feeling of Dependence and the Conviction of Moral Obligation.
To these two facts of the inner consciousness may be traced, as to their
sources, the two great outward acts by which religion in various forms has been
manifested among men;—Prayer, by which they seek to win God’s blessing upon the future,
and Expiation, by which they strive to atone for the offences of the past.(8)
The feeling of Dependence is the instinct which urges us to pray. It is the feeling
that our existence and welfare are in the hands of a superior Power;—not of an inexorable
Fate or
But the mere consciousness of dependence does not of itself exhibit
the character of the Being on whom we depend. It is as consistent with superstition
as with religion;—with the belief in a malevolent, as in a benevolent Deity: it
is as much called into existence by the severities, as by the mercies of God; by
the suffering which we are unable to avert, as by the benefits which we did not
ourselves procure.
But these two elements of the religious consciousness, however
real and efficient within their own limits, are subject to the same restrictions
which we have before noticed as binding upon consciousness in general. Neither in
the feeling of dependence, nor in that of obligation, can we be directly conscious
of the Absolute or the Infinite, as such. And it is the more necessary to notice
this limitation, inasmuch as an opposite theory has been maintained by one whose
writings have had perhaps more influence than those of any other man, in forming
the modern religious philosophy of his own country; and whose views, in all their
essential features, have been ably maintained and widely diffused among ourselves.
According to Schleiermacher, the essence of Religion is to be found in a feeling
of absolute and entire dependence, in which the mutual action and reaction of subject
and object upon each other, which constitutes the ordinary consciousness of mankind,
gives way to a sense of utter, passive helplessness,—to a consciousness that our
entire personal agency is annihilated in the presence of the infinite energy of
the Godhead. In our intercourse with the world, he tells us, whether in relation
to nature or to human society, the feeling of freedom and that of dependence are
always present in mutual operation upon each other; sometimes in equilibrium; sometimes
with a vast preponderance of the one or the other feeling; but never to the entire
exclusion of either. But in our communion with God, there is always an accompanying
consciousness that the whole activity is absolutely and entirely dependent upon
Him; that, whatever amount of freedom may be apparent in the individual moments
of life, these are but detached and isolated portions of a passively dependent whole.(13)
The theory is carried still further, and expressed in more positive terms, by an
English disciple, who says that,
Of this theory it may be observed, in the first place, that it
contemplates God chiefly in the character of an object of infinite magnitude.
The relations of the object to the subject, in our consciousness of the world, and
in that of God, differ from each other in degree rather than in kind. The Deity
is manifested with no attribute of personality: He is merely the world magnified
to infinity: and the feeling of absolute dependence is in fact that of the annihilation
of our personal existence in the Infinite Being of the Universe. Of this feeling,
the intellectual exponent is pure Pantheism; and the infinite object is but the
indefinite abstraction of Being in general, with no distinguishing characteristic
to constitute a Deity. For the distinctness of an object of consciousness is in
the inverse ratio to the intensity of the passive affection. As the feeling of dependence
becomes more powerful, the knowledge of the character of the object on which we
depend must necessarily become less and less; for the discernment of any object
as such is a state of mental energy and reaction of thought upon that object.
In the second place, the consciousness of an absolute dependence in which our activity is annihilated, is a contradiction in terms; for consciousness itself is an activity. We can be conscious of a state of mind as such, only by attending to it; and attention is in all cases a mode of our active energy. Thus the state of absolute dependence, supposing it to exist at all, could not be distinguished from other states; and, as all consciousness is distinction, it could not, by any mode of consciousness, be known to exist.
In the third place, the theory is inconsistent with the duty
of Prayer. Prayer is essentially a state in which man is in active relation
towards God; in which he is intensely conscious of his personal existence and
its wants; in which he endeavors by entreaty to prevail with God. Let any one
consider for a moment the strong energy of the language of the Apostle: “Now I
beseech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the love of the
Spirit, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me;”
But, lastly, there is another fatal objection to the above theory. It makes our moral and religious consciousness subversive of each other, and reduces us to the dilemma that either our faith or our practice must be founded on a delusion. The actual relation of man to God is the same, in whatever degree man may be conscious of it. If man’s dependence on God is not really destructive of his personal freedom, the religious consciousness, in denying that freedom, is a false consciousness. If, on the contrary, man is in reality passively dependent upon God, the consciousness of moral responsibility, which bears witness to his free agency, is a lying witness. Actually, in the sight of God, we are either totally dependent, or, partially at least, free. And as this condition must be always the same, whether we are conscious of it or not, it follows, that, in proportion as one of these modes of consciousness reveals to us the truth, the other must be regarded as testifying to a falsehood.(17)
Nor yet is it possible to find in the consciousness of moral obligation
any immediate apprehension of the Absolute and Infinite. For the free agency of
man, which in the feeling of dependence is always present as a subordinate element,
becomes here the centre and turning-point of the whole. The consciousness of the
Infinite is necessarily excluded; first, by the mere existence of a relation between
two distinct agents; and, secondly, by the conditions under which each must necessarily
be conceived in its relation to the other. The moral consciousness of man, as subject
to law, is, by that subjection, both limited and related; and hence it cannot in
itself be regarded as a representation of the Infinite. Nor yet can such a representation
Yet along with all this, though our positive religious consciousness
is of the finite only, there yet runs through the whole of that consciousness the
accompanying conviction that the Infinite does exist, and must exist;—though of
the manner of that existence we can form no conception; and that it exists along
with the Finite;—though we know not how such a coëxistence is possible. We cannot
be conscious of the Infinite; but we can be and are conscious of the limits of our
own powers of thought; and therefore we know that the possibility or impossibility
of conception is no test of the possibility or impossibility of existence. We know
that, unless we admit the existence of the Infinite, the existence of the Finite
is inexplicable and self-contradictory; and yet we know that the conception of the
Infinite itself appears to involve contradictions no less inexplicable. In this
impotence of Reason, we are compelled to take refuge in Faith, and to believe that
an Infinite Being exists, though we know not how; and that He is the same with that
Being who is made known in consciousness as our Sustainer and our Lawgiver. For
We are thus compelled to acquiesce in at least one portion of
Bacon's statement concerning the relation of human knowledge to its object: “Natura
percutit intellectum radio directo; Deus autem, propter medium inæquale (creaturas
scilicet), radio refracto.”(18) To have
sufficient grounds for believing in God is a very different thing from having sufficient
grounds for reasoning about Him. The religious sentiment, which compels men to believe
in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of His existence, but not an exhibition
of His nature. It proves that God is, and makes known some of His relations
to us; but it does not prove what God is in His own Absolute Being.(19)
The natural senses, it may be, are diverted and colored by the medium through which
they pass to reach the intellect, and present to us, not things in themselves, but
things as
One feature deserves especial notice, as common to both of those
modes of consciousness which primarily exhibit our relation towards God. In both,
we are compelled to regard ourselves as Persons related to a Person. In the
feeling of dependence, however great it may be, the consciousness of myself,
the dependent element, remains unextinguished; and, indeed, without that element
there could be no consciousness of a relation at all. In the sense of moral obligation,
I know myself as the agent on whom the law is binding: I am free to choose
and to act, as a person whose principle of action is in himself. And it is important
to observe that it is only through this consciousness of personality that we have
any ground of belief in the existence of a God. If we admit the arguments by which
this personality is annihilated, whether on the side of Materialism or on that of
Pantheism, we cannot escape from the consequence to which those arguments inevitably
lead,—the annihilation of God himself. If, on the one hand, the spiritual element
within me is merely dependent on the corporeal,—if myself is a result of
my bodily organization, and may be resolved into the operation of a system of material
agents,—why should I suppose it to be otherwise in the great world beyond me? If
I, who deem myself a spirit distinct from and superior to matter, am but the accident
and product of that which I seem to rule, why may not all other spiritual existence,
if such there be, be dependent upon the constitution of the material universe?(21)
Or if, on the other hand, I am not a distinct substance, but a mode of the infinite,—a
shadow passing over the face of the universe,—what is that universe which you would
have me acknowledge a God? It is, says the Pantheist, the One and All.(22)
By no means: it is the Many, in which is neither All nor One. You have
The result of the preceding considerations may be summed up as
follows. There are two modes in which we may endeavor to contemplate the Deity:
the one negative, based on a vain attempt to transcend the conditions of human thought,
and to expand the religious consciousness to the infinity of its Divine Object;
the other positive, which keeps within its proper limits, and views the object in
a manner accommodated to the finite capacities of the human thinker. The first aspires
to behold God in His absolute nature: the second is content to view Him in those
relations in which he has been pleased to manifest Himself to his creatures. The
first aims at a speculative knowledge of God as He is; but, bound by the
conditions of finite thought, even in the attempt to transgress them,
“O Thou that hearest prayer, unto Thee shall all flesh come.”
Sacrifice, and offering, and burnt-offerings, and offering for sin, Thou requirest
no more; for He whom
And, apart from the fact of its having been God’s good pleasure
so to reveal Himself, there are manifest, even to human understanding, wise reasons
why this course should have been adopted, benevolent ends to be answered by this
So should it be during this transitory life, in which we see through
a glass, darkly;
FOR AFTER THAT IN THE WISDOM OF GOD THE WORLD
BY WISDOM KNEW NOT GOD, IT PLEASED GOD BY THE FOOLISHNESS OF PREACHING TO SAVE THEM
THAT BELIEVE. FOR THE JEWS REQUIRE A SIGN, AND THE GREEKS SEEK AFTER WISDOM: BUT
WE PREACH CHRIST CRUCIFIED, UNTO THE JEWS A STUMBLINGBLOCK, AND UNTO THE GREEKS
FOOLISHNESS; BUT UNTO THEM WHICH ARE CALLED, BOTH JEWS AND GREEKS, CHRIST TI1E POWER
OF GOD, AND THE WISDOM OF GOD.—
“THOUGH it were admitted,” says Bishop Butler, “that this opinion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present life. For the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as if we were free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded that, since the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration whether we are or not.”(1)
That this observation has in any degree settled the speculative
difficulties involved in the problem of Liberty and Necessity, will not be maintained
by any one who is acquainted with the history of the controversy. Nor was it intended
by its author to do so. But, like many
The very first Law of Thought, and, through Thought, of all Consciousness,
by which alone we are able to discern objects as such, or to distinguish them one
from another, involves in its constitution a mystery and a doubt, which no effort
of Philosophy has been able to penetrate:—How can the One be many, or the Many
one?(3) We are compelled to regard ourselves
and our fellow-men as persons, and the visible world around us as made up
of things: but what is personality, and what is reality, are
questions which the wisest have tried to answer, and have tried in vain. Man, as
a Person, is one, yet composed of many elements;—not identical with any one of them,
nor yet with the aggregate of them all; and yet not separable from them by any effort
of abstraction. Man is one in his thoughts, in his actions, in his feelings, and
in the responsibilities which these involve. It is I who think, I
who act, I who feel; yet I am not thought, nor action,
As it is with the first law of Thought, so it is with the first
principle of Action and of Feeling. All action, whether free or constrained, and
all passion, implies and rests upon another great mystery of Philosophy,—the Commerce
between Mind and Matter. The properties and operations of matter are known only
by the external senses: the faculties and acts of the mind are known only by the
internal apprehension. The energy of the one is motion: the energy of the other
is consciousness. What is the middle term which unites these two? and how c8n their
reciprocal action, unquestionable as it is in fact, be conceived as possible in
theory?(4) How can a contact between body and
body produce consciousness in the immaterial soul? How can a mental self-determination
The very perception of our senses is subject to the same restrictions.
“No priestly dogmas,” says Hume, “ever shocked common sense more than the infinite
divisibility of extension, with its consequences.”(8)
He should have added, that the antagonist assumption of a finite divisibility is
equally incomprehensible; it being as impossible to conceive an ultimate unit, or
least possible extension, as it is to conceive the process of division carried on
to infinity. Extension is presented to the mind as a relation between parts exterior
to each other, whose reality cannot consist merely in their juxtaposition. We are
thus compelled to believe that extension itself is dependent upon
The difficulty which meets us in these problems may help to throw
some light on the purposes for which human thought is designed, and the limits within
which it may be legitimately exercised. The primary fact of consciousness, which
is accepted as regulating our practice, is in itself inexplicable, but not
inconceivable. There is mystery; but there is not yet contradiction.
Thought is baffled, and unable to pursue the track of investigation; but it does
not grapple with an idea and destroy itself in the struggle. Contradiction does
not begin till we direct our thoughts, not to the fact itself, but to that which
it suggests as beyond itself. This difference is precisely that which exists between
following the laws of thought, and striving to transcend them;—between leaving the
mystery of Knowing and Being unsolved, and making unlawful attempts to solve it.
The facts,—that all objects of thought are conceived as wholes composed of parts;
that mind
The conclusion which this condition of human consciousness almost
irresistibly forces upon us, is one which equally exhibits the strength and the
weakness of the human intellect. We are compelled to admit that the mind, in its
contemplation of objects, is not the mere passive recipient of the things presented
to it; but has an activity and a law of its own, by virtue of which it reäcts upon
the materials existing without, and moulds them into that form in which consciousness
is capable of apprehending them. The existence of modes of thought, which we are
compelled to accept as at the same time relatively ultimate and absolutely derived,—as
limits beyond which we cannot penetrate, yet which themselves proclaim that there
is
It is thus strictly in analogy with the method of God’s Providence
in the constitution of man’s mental faculties, if we believe that, in Religion also,
He has given us truths which are designed to be regulative, rather than speculative;
intended, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice; not to tell us what
God is in His absolute nature, but how He wills that we should think of Him in our
present finite state.(11) In my last Lecture,
I endeavored to show that our knowledge of God is not a consciousness of the Infinite
as such, but that of the relation of a Person to a Person;—the conception of personality
being, humanly speaking, one of limitation. This amounts to the admission
that, in natural religion at least, our knowledge of God does not satisfy the conditions
of speculative philosophy, and is incapable of reduction to an ultimate and absolute
truth. And this, as we now see, is in accordance with the analogy which the character
of human philosophy in other provinces would naturally lead us to expect.(12)
It is reasonable also that we should expect to find, as part of the same analogy,
that the revealed manifestation of the Divine nature and attributes should also
carry on its face the marks of subordination to some higher truth, of which it indicates
the existence, but does not make known the substance. It is to be expected that
our apprehension of the revealed Deity should involve mysteries inscrutable and
doubts insoluble by our present faculties: while, at the same time, it inculcates
the true spirit in which such doubts should be dealt with; by warning us, as plainly
as such a warning is possible, that we see a part only, and not the whole; that
we behold effects only, and not causes; that our knowledge of God, though revealed
by Himself, is revealed in relation to human faculties, and subject to the limitations
and imperfections inseparable from the constitution
We may indeed believe, and ought to believe, that the knowledge
which our Creator has permitted us to attain to, whether by Revelation or by our
natural faculties, is not given to us as an instrument of deception. We may believe,
and ought to believe, that, intellectually as well as morally, our present life
is a state of discipline and preparation for another; and that the conceptions which
we are compelled to adopt, as the guides of our thoughts and actions now, may indeed,
in the sight of a higher intelligence, be but partial truth, but cannot be total
falsehood. But in thus believing, we desert the evidence of Reason, to rest on that
of Faith; and of the principles on which Reason itself depends, it is obviously
impossible to have any other guarantee. But such a Faith, however well founded,
has itself only a regulative and practical, not a speculative and theoretical application.
It bids us rest content within the limits which have been assigned to us; but it
cannot enable us to overleap those limits, nor exalt to a more absolute character
the conclusions obtained by finite thinkers under the conditions of finite thought.
But, on the other hand, we must beware of the opposite extreme,—that of mistaking
the
The testimony of Scripture, like that of our natural
faculties, is plain and intelligible, when we ale content to accept it as a fact
intended for our practical guidance: it becomes incomprehensible, only when we
attempt to explain it as a theory capable of speculative analysis. We are
distinctly told that there is a mutual relation between God and man, as distinct
agents;—that God influences man by His grace, visits him with rewards or
punishments, regards him with love or anger;—that man, within his own limited
sphere, is likewise capable of “prevailing with God;”
Action, and not knowledge, is man’s destiny and duty in this life;
and his highest principles, both in philosophy and in religion, have reference to
this end. But it does not follow, on that account, that our representations are
untrue, because they are imperfect. To assert that a representation is untrue,
because it is relative to the mind of the receiver, is to overlook the fact that
truth itself is nothing more than a relation. Truth and falsehood are not
That the true conception of the Divine Nature, so far as we are
able to receive it, is to be found in those regulative representations which exhibit
God under limitations accommodated to the constitution of man; not in the unmeaning
abstractions which, aiming at a higher knowledge, distort, rather than exhibit,
the Absolute and the Infinite; is thus a conclusion warranted, both deductively,
from the recognition of the limits of human thought, and inductively, by what we
can gather from experience and analogy concerning, God’s general dealings with mankind.
There remains
In no respect is the Theology of the Bible, as contrasted with
the mythologies of human invention, more remarkable, than in the manner in which
it recognizes and adapts itself to that complex and self-limiting constitution of
the human mind, which man’s wisdom finds so difficult to acknowledge. To human reason,
the personal and the infinite stand out in apparently irreconcilable antagonism;
and the recognition of the one in a religious system almost inevitably involves
the sacrifice of the other. The Personality of God disappears in the Pantheism of
India; His Infinity is lost sight of in the Polytheism of Greece.(19)
In the Hebrew Scriptures, on the contrary, throughout all their variety of Books
and Authors, one method of Divine teaching is constantly manifested, appealing alike
to the intellect and to the feelings of man. From first to last we hear the echo
of that first great Commandment: “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord:
and thou shalt love thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy might.”
But if this is the lesson taught us by that earlier manifestation
in which God is represented under the likeness of human attributes, what may we
learn from that later and fuller revelation which tells us of One who is Himself
both God and Man? The Father has revealed Himself to
The doctrine of a personal Christ, very God and very Man, has
indeed been the great stumblingblock in the way of those so-called philosophical
theologians who, in their contempt for the historical and temporal, would throw
aside the vivid revelation of a living and acting God, to take refuge in the empty
abstraction of an impersonal idea. And accordingly, they have made various elaborate
attempts to substitute in its place a conception more in accordance with the supposed
requirements of speculative philosophy. Let us hear on this point, and understand
as we best may, the language of the great leader of the chief modern school of philosophical
rationalists. “To grasp rightly and definitely in thought,” says Hegel, “the nature
of God as a Spirit, demands profound speculation. These propositions are first of
all contained therein: God is God only in so far as He knows Himself: His own self-knowledge
is moreover His self-consciousness in man, and man’s knowledge of God, which
is developed into man’s self-knowledge in God.” . . . “The Form
of the Absolute Spirit,” he continues, “separates itself from the Substance, and
in it the different phases of the conception part into separate spheres or elements,
in each of which the Absolute Substance exhibits itself, first as an eternal substance,
abiding in its manifestation with itself; secondly, as a distinguishing of the eternal
Essence from its manifestation, which through this distinction becomes the world
of appearance, into which the substance of the absolute Spirit enters; thirdly,
as an endless return and reconciliation of the world thus projected with the eternal
Essence, by which that Essence goes back from appearance into the unity of its fulness.”(23)
The remainder of the passage carries out this metaphysical caricature of Christian
doctrine into further details, bearing on my present
What is the exact meaning of this profound riddle, which the author
has repeated in different forms in various parts of his writings;(24)—whether
he really means to assert or to deny the existence of Christ as a man;—whether he
designs to represent the Incarnation and earthly life of the Son of God as a fact,
or only as the vulgar representation of a philosophical idea,—is a point which has
been stoutly disputed among his disciples, and which possibly the philosopher himself
did not wish to see definitely settled.(25)
But there is another passage, in which he has spoken somewhat more plainly, and
which, without being quite decisive, may be quoted as throwing some light on the
tendency of his thought. “Christ,” says this significant passage, “has been called
by the church the God-Man. This monstrous combination is to the understanding a
direct contradiction; but the unity of the divine and human nature is in this respect
brought into consciousness and certainty in man; in that the Diversity, or, as we
may also express it, the Finiteness, Weakness, Frailty of human nature, is not incompatible
with this Unity, as in the eternal Idea Diversity in nowise derogates from the Unity
which is God. This is the monstrosity whose necessity we have seen. It is therein
implied that the divine and human nature are not in themselves different. God in
human form. The
The dark sentences of the master have been, as might naturally
be expected, variously developed by his disciples. Let us hear how the same theory
is expressed in the language of one who is frequently commended as representing
the orthodox theology of this school, and who has striven hard to reconcile the
demands of his philosophy with the belief in a personal Christ. Marheineke assures
us, that “the possibility of God becoming Man shows in itself that the divine and
human nature awe in themselves not separate:” that, “as the truth of the human nature
is the divine, so the reality of the divine nature is the human.”(27)
And towards the conclusion of a statement worthy to rank with that of his master
for grandiloquent obscurity, he says, “As Spirit, by renouncing Individuality, Man
is in truth elevated above himself, without having abandoned the human nature: as
Spirit renouncing Absoluteness, God has lowered Himself to human nature, without
having abandoned his existence as Divine Spirit. The unity of the divine and human
nature is but the unity in that Spirit whose existence is the knowledge of the truth,
with which the doing of good is identical. This Spirit, as God in the human nature
and as Man in the divine nature, is the God-Man. The man wise in divine holiness,
and holy in divine wisdom, is the God-Man. As a historical fact,” he continues,
“this union of God with man is manifest and real in the Person of Jesus Christ:
in Him the divine manifestation has become perfectly human. The conception of the
God-Man in the historical Person of Jesus Christ, contains in itself two phases
in one; first, that God is manifest only through man; and in this relation Christ
is as yet placed on an equality with all other men: He is
But this kind of halting between two opinions, which endeavors
to combine the historical fact with the philosophical theory, was not of a nature
to satisfy the bolder and more logical minds of the same school. In the theory of
Strauss, we find the direct antagonism between the historical and the philosophical
Christ fairly acknowledged; and the former is accordingly set aside entirely, to
make way for the latter. And here we have at least the advantage, that the trumpet
gives no uncertain sound;—that we are no longer deluded by a phantom of Christian
doctrine enveloped in a mist of metaphysical obscurity; but the two systems stand
out sharply and clearly defined, in their utter contrariety to each other. “In an
individual, a God-Man,” he tells us, “the properties and functions which the church
ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea of the race, they perfectly
agree. Humanity is the union of the two natures—God become Man, the infinite manifesting
itself in the finite, and the finite Spirit remembering its infinitude: it is the
child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit: it is the
worker of miracles, in so far as in the course of human history the spirit more
and more completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies
before him as the inert matter on which he exercises his active power: it is the
sinless one, for the course of its development is a blameless one; pollution cleaves
to the individual
These be thy gods, O Philosophy: these are the Metaphysics of
Salvation.(30) This is that knowledge of things
divine and human, which we are called upon to substitute for the revealed doctrine
of the Incarnation of the eternal Son in the fulness of time. It is for this philosophical
idea, so superior to all history and fact,—this necessary process of the unconscious
and impersonal Infinite,—that we are to sacrifice that blessed miracle of Divine
Love and Mercy, by which the Son of God, of His own free act and will, took man’s
nature upon Him for man’s redemption. It is for this that we are to obliterate from
our faith that touching picture of the pure and holy Jesus, to which mankind for
eighteen centuries has ever turned, with the devotion of man to God rendered only
more heartfelt by the sympathy of love between man and man: which from generation
to generation has nurtured the first seeds of religion in the opening mind of childhood,
by the image of that Divine Child who was cradled in the manger of Bethlehem, and
was subject to His parents at Nazareth: which has checked the fiery
Let Philosophy say what she will, the fact remains unshaken. It
is the consciousness of the deep wants of our human nature, that first awakens God’s
presence in the soul; it is by adapting His Revelation to those wants that God graciously
condescends to satisfy them. The time may indeed come, though not in this life,
when these various manifestations of God, “at sundry times and in divers
manners,”
FOR WHAT MAN KNOWETH THE THINGS OF A MAN, SAVE
THE SPIRIT OF MAN WHICH IS IN HIM? EVEN SO THE THINGS OF GOD KNOWETH NO MAN, BUT
THE SPIRIT OF GOD.—
THE conclusion to be drawn from our previous inquiries is, that
the doctrines of Revealed Religion, like all other objects of human thought, have
a relation to the constitution of the thinker to whom they are addressed; within
which relation their practical application and significance is confined. At the
same time, this very relation indicates the existence of a higher form of the same
truths, beyond the range of human intelligence, and therefore not capable of representation
in any positive mode of thought. Religious ideas, in short, like all other objects
of man’s consciousness, are composed of two distinct elements,—a Matter, furnished
from without, and a Form, imposed from within by the laws of the mind itself. The
latter element is common to all objects of thought as such: the former is the peculiar
and distinguishing feature, by which the doctrines of Revelation are distinguished
from other religious representations, derived from natural sources; or by which,
in more remote comparison, religious ideas in general
There are two methods by which such an examination of objections
may be conducted. We may commence by an analysis of thought in general, distinguishing
the Form, or permanent element, from the Matter, or variable element; and then,
by applying the results of that analysis to special instances, we may show, upon
deductive grounds, the formal or material character of this or that class of objections.
Or we may reverse the process, commencing by an examination of the objections themselves;
and, by exhibiting them in their relation to other doctrines besides those of Revelation,
we may arrive at the same conclusion as to their general or special applicability.
The former method is perhaps the most searching and complete, but could hardly be
adequately carried out within my present limits, nor without the employment of a
language more technical than would be suitable on this occasion. In selecting the
latter method, as the more appropriate, I must request my hearers to bear in mind
the general principles which it is proposed to exhibit in one or two special instances.
These are, first, that there is no rational difficulty in Christian Theology which
has not its corresponding difficulty in human Philosophy: and, secondly, that, therefore
we may reasonably conclude that the stumblingblocks
But, before applying this method to the peculiar doctrines of the Christian revelation, it will be desirable to say a few words on a preliminary condition, on which our belief in the possibility of any revelation at all is dependent. We must justify, in the first instance, the limitations which have been assigned to human reason in relation to the great foundation of all religious belief whatsoever: we must show how far the same method warrants the assertion which has been already made on other grounds; namely, that we may and ought to believe in the existence of a God whose nature we are unable to comprehend; that we are bound to believe that God exists; and to acknowledge Him as our Sustainer and our Moral Governor: though we are wholly unable to declare what He is in His own Absolute Essence.(1)
Many philosophical theologians, who are far from rejecting any
of the essential doctrines of revelation, are yet unwilling to ground their acceptance
of them on the duty of believing in the inconceivable. “The doctrine of the incognizability
of the Divine essence,” says the learned and deep-thinking Julius Müller, “with
the intention of exalting God to the highest, deprives Him of the realities, without
which, as it is itself obliged to confess, we cannot really think of Him. That this
negative result, just as decidedly as the assumption of an absolute knowledge of
God, contradicts the Holy Scriptures, which especially teach that God becomes revealed
in Christ, as it does that
“God is ineffable;
more easily do we tell what He is not, than what He is. You think of earth; this
is not God: of the sea; this is not God: of all things that are on the earth, men
and animals; these are not God: of all that are in the sea, that fly through the
air; these are not God: of whatever shines in heaven, stars, sun, and moon; these
are not God: the heaven itself; this is not God. Think of Angels, Virtues, Powers,
Archangels, Thrones, Seats, Dominations; these are not God, And what is He? This
only can I tell, what He is not.
From the fundamental doctrine of Religion in general, let us pass on to that of Christianity in particular. “The Catholic Faith is this: that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.” How, asks the objector, can the One be Many, or the Many One? or how is a distinction of Persons compatible with their perfect equality?(9) It is not a contradiction to say, that we are compelled by the Christian Verity to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord; and yet are forbidden by the Catholic Religion to say, There be three Gods, or three Lords.(10)
To exhibit the philosophical value of this objection, we need
only make a slight chance in the language of the doctrine criticized. Instead of
a plurality of persons in the Divine Unity, we have only to speak of a plurality
of Attributes in the Divine Essence. How can there be a variety of Attributes, each
infinite in its kind, and yet all together constituting but one Infinite? or how,
on the other hand, can the Infinite be conceived as existing without diversity at
all? We know, indeed, that various attributes exist in man constituting in their
plurality one and the same conscious self. Even here, there is a mystery which we
cannot explain; but the fact is one which we are compelled, by the direct testimony
of consciousness, to accept without explanation. But in admitting, as we are compelled
to do, the coexistence of many attributes in one person, we can conceive those attributes
only as distinct from each other, and as limiting each other. Each mental attribute
is manifested as a separate and determinate mode of consciousness, marked off and
limited, by the very fact of its manifestation as such. Each is developed in activities
and operations from which the others are excluded. But this type of the conscious
existence fails us altogether, when we
“If Shape it might be called, that shape had none
Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb,
Or Substance might be called, that Shadow seemed,
For each seemed either.”(11)
The objection, “How can the One be Many, or the Many One?” is
thus so far from telling with peculiar force against the Catholic doctrine of the
Holy Trinity, that it has precisely the same power or want of power, and may be
urged with precisely the same effect, or want of effect, against any conception,
theological or philosophical, in which we may attempt to represent the Divine Nature
and Attributes as infinite, or, indeed, to exhibit the Infinite at all. The same
argument applies with equal force to the conception of the Absolute. If the Divine
Nature is conceived as being nothing more than the sum of the Divine Attributes,
it is not
The same principle may be also applied to another portion of this
great fundamental truth. The doctrine of the Son of God, begotten of the Father,
and yet coeternal with the Father, is in nowise more or less comprehensible by human
reason, than the relation between the Divine Essence and its Attributes.(13)
In the order of Thought, or of Nature, the substance to which attributes belong
has a logical priority to the attributes which exist in relation to it. The Attributes
are attributes of a Substance. The former are conceived as the dependent
and derived; the latter as the independent and original existence. Yet in the order
of Time (and to the order of Time all human thought is limited), it is as impossible
to conceive the Substance existing before its Attributes, as the Attributes before
the Substance.(14) We cannot conceive a being
originally simple, developing itself in the course of time into a complexity of
attributes; for absolute simplicity cannot be conceived as containing within itself
a principle of development, nor as differently related to different periods of time,
so as to commence its development at any particular moment.(15)
Nor yet can we conceive the attributes as existing prior to the substance; for the
very conception of an attribute implies relation to a substance. Yet the third hypothesis,
that of their coexistence in all time, is equally incomprehensible; for this is
to merge the Absolute and Infinite in an eternal relation and difference. We cannot
conceive God as first
I should not for an instant dream of adducing this metaphysical
parallel as offering the slightest approach to a proof of the Christian doctrine
of the Trinity in Unity. What it really illustrates is, not God’s Nature, but man’s
ignorance. Without an Absolute Knowing there can be no comprehension of Absolute
Being.(16) The position of human reason, with
regard to the ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite, is such as equally to exclude
the Dogmatism which would demonstrate Christian Doctrine from philosophical premises,
and the Rationalism which rejects it on the ground of philosophical difficulties,
as well as that monstrous combination of both, which distorts it in pretending to
systematize it. The Infinite is known to human reason, merely as the negation of
the Finite: we know what it is not; and that is all. The conviction, that
an Infinite Being exists, seems forced upon us by the manifest incompleteness of
our finite knowledge; but we have no rational means whatever of determining what
is the nature of that Being.(17) The mind is
thus perfectly blank with regard to any speculative representation of the Divine
Essence; and for that very reason, Philosophy is not entitled, on internal evidence,
to accept any, or to reject any. The only question which we are reasonably at liberty
to ask in this matter, relates to the
Let us pass on to the second great doctrine of the Catholic Faith,—that which asserts the union of two Natures in the Person of Christ. “The right Faith is, that we believe and confess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man: God of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of His Mother, born in the world.”(18)
Our former parallel was drawn from the impossibility of conceiving,
in any form, a relation between the Infinite and the Infinite. Our present parallel
may be found in the equal impossibility of conceiving, by the natural reason, a
relation between the Infinite and the Finite;—an impossibility equally insurmountable,
whether the two natures are conceived as existing in one Being, or in divers. Let
us attempt, if we can, to conceive, at any moment of time, a finite world coming
into existence by the fiat of an Infinite Creator. Can we conceive that the amount
of existence is thereby increased,—that the Infinite and the Finite together contain
more reality than formerly existed in the Infinite alone? The supposition annihilates
itself; for it represents Infinite Existence as capable of becoming greater still.
But, on the other hand, can we have recourse to the opposite alternative, and conceive
the Creator as evolving the world out of His own Essence; the amount of Being remaining
as before, yet the Infinite and the Finite both
Let Religion begin where it will, it must begin with that
which is above Reason. What then do we gain by that parsimony of belief, which
strives to deal out the Infinite in infinitesimal fragments, and to erect the
largest possible superstructure of deduction upon the smallest possible
foundation of faith? We gain just this: that we forsake an incomprehensible
doctrine, which rests upon the word of God, for one equally incomprehensible,
which rests upon the word of man. Religion, to be a relation between God and man
at all, must rest on a belief in the Infinite, and also on a belief in the
Finite; for if we deny the first, there is no God; and if we deny the second,
there is no Man. But the coexistence of the Infinite and the
Having thus endeavored to exhibit the limits of human reason in relation to those doctrines of Holy Scripture which reveal to us the nature of God, I shall next attempt briefly to apply the same argument to those representations which more directly declare His relation to the world.
The course of Divine Providence,
in the government of the world, is represented in Scripture under the twofold aspect
of General Law and Special Interposition. Not only is God the Author of the universe,
and of those regular laws by which the periodical recurrence of its natural phenomena
is determined;
Now here, as in the objections previously noticed, the
rationalist mistakes a general difficulty of all human thought for a special
difficulty of Christian belief. The really insoluble problem is, how to conceive
God as acting at all; not how to conceive Him as acting in this way, rather
May we not then repeat our author’s objection in another form? How can a Being of Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, without an act of self-deterioration, change the laws which have governed His own solitary existence in the far Eternity when the world was not? Or rather, may we not ask what these very phrases of “changeless laws” and “far Eternity” really mean? Do they not represent God’s existence as manifested under the conditions of duration and succession,—conditions which necessarily involve the conception of the imperfect and the finite? They have not emancipated the Deity from the law of Time: they have only placed Him in a different relation to it. They have merely substituted, for the revealed representation of the God who from time to time vouchsafes His aid to the needs of His creatures, the rationalizing representation of the God who, throughout all time, steadfastly refuses to do so.(22)
If, then, the condition of Time is inseparable from
all human conceptions of the Divine Nature, what advantage do we gain, even in philosophy,
by substituting the supposition of immutable order in time for that of special interposition
in time? Both of these representations are doubtless speculatively imperfect: both
depict the Infinite God under finite symbols. But for the regulative purposes of
human conduct in this life, each is equally necessary: and who may dare, from the
depths of his own ignorance, to say that each may not have its prototype in the
ineffable Being of God?(23) We are sometimes told that it gives us a more elevated
idea of the Divine Wisdom and Power, to regard the Creator as having finished His
work once for all, and then abandoned it to its own unerring laws, than to represent
Him as interfering, from time to time, by the way of direct personal superintendence;—just as it implies higher mechanical skill to make an engine which shall go on
perpetually by its own motion, than one which requires to be continually regulated
by the hand of its maker.(24) This ingenious simile fails only in the important
particular, that both its terms are utterly unlike the objects which they profess
to represent. The world is not a machine; and God is not a mechanic. The world is
not a machine; for it consists, not merely of wheels of brass, and springs of steel,
and the fixed properties of inanimate matter; but of living and intelligent and
free-acting persons, capable of personal relations to a living and intelligent
and free-acting Ruler. And God is not a mechanic; for the mechanic is separated
from his machine by the whole diameter of being; as mind, giving birth to material
results; as the conscious workman, who meets with no reciprocal consciousness in
his work. It may be a higher evidence of mechanical skill, to abandon brute
But if such
conclusions are not justified by our a priori knowledge
of the Divine nature, are they borne out empirically by the actual constitution
of the world? Is there any truth in the assertion, so often put forth as an undeniable
discovery of modern science, “that cause and effect are indissolubly chained together,
and that one follows the other in inevitable succession?” There is just that amount
of half-truth which makes an error dangerous; and there is no more. Experience is
of two kinds, and Philosophy is of two kinds;—that of the world of matter, and that
of the world of mind,—that of physical succession, and that of moral action. In
the material world, if it be true that the researches of science tend towards (though
who can say that they will ever reach?) the establishment of a system of fixed
and orderly recurrence; in the mental world, we are no less confronted, at every
instant, by the presence of contingency and free will.(26) In the one we are conscious
of a chain of phenomenal effects; in the other of self, as an acting and originating
cause. Nay, the very conception of the immutability of the law of cause and effect,
is not so much derived from the positive evidence of the former, as from the negative
evidence of the latter. We believe the succession to be necessary, because nothing
but mind can be conceived as interfering with the successions of matter; and, where
mind is excluded, we are unable to imagine contingence.(27)
But what right has this so-called philosophy
Even within the domain of Physical Science, however much analogy may lead us to conjecture the universal prevalence of law and orderly sequence, it has been acutely remarked, that the phenomena which are most immediately important to the life and welfare of man, are precisely those which he never has been, and probably never will be, able to reduce to a scientific calculation.(28) The astronomer, who can predict the exact position of a planet in the heavens a thousand years hence, knows not what may be his own state of health to-morrow, nor how the wind which blows upon him will vary from day to day. May we not be permitted to conclude, with a distinguished Christian philosopher of the present day, that there is a Divine Purpose in this arrangement of nature; that, while enough is displayed to stimulate the intellectual and practical energies of man, enough is still concealed to make him feel his dependence upon God?(29)
For man’s training in this life,
the conceptions of General Law and of Special Providence are both equally necessary;
the one, that he may labor for God’s blessings, and the other, that he may pray
for them. Ile sows, and reaps, and gathers in his produce, to meet the different
seasons, as they roll their unchanging course: he acknowledges also that “neither
is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the
increase.”
Subordinate to the Conception of Special Providence,
and subject to the same laws of thought in its application, is that of Miraculous
Agency. I am not now going to waste an additional argument in answer to that shallowest
and crudest of all the assumptions of unbelief, which dictatorially pronounces that
Miracles are impossible;—an assumption which is repudiated by the more philosophical
among the leaders of Rationalism itself;(31) and which implies, that he who maintains
it has such a perfect and intimate acquaintance with the Divine Nature and Purposes,
as to warrant him in asserting that God cannot or will not depart from the ordinary
course of His Providence on any occasion whatever. If, as I have endeavored to show,
the doctrine of Divine Interposition is not in itself more opposed to reason than
that of General Law; and if the asserted immutability of the laws of nature is,
at the utmost, tenable only on the supposition that material nature alone is spoken
of,—we are not warranted, on any ground, whether of deduction from principles or
of induction from experience, in denying the possible suspension of the Laws of
Matter by the will of the Divine Mind. But the question on which it may still be
desirable to say a few words, before concluding this portion of my argument, is
one which is disputed, not necessarily between the believer and the unbeliever,
but
Which of these representations, or whether either of them, is the
true one, when such occurrences are considered in their relation to the Absolute
Nature of God, our ignorance of that Nature forbids us to determine. Speculatively,
to human understanding, it appears as little consistent with the nature of the Absolute
and Infinite, to be subject to universal law, as it is to act at particular moments.
But as a regulative truth, adapted to the religious wants of man’s constitution,
the more natural representation, that of a departure from the general law, seems
to be also the more accurate. We are liable, in considering this question, to confound
together two distinct notions under the equivocal name of Law. The first is a positive
notion, derived from the observation of facts, and founded, with various modifications,
upon the general idea of the periodical recurrence of phenomena. The other is a
merely negative notion, deduced from a supposed apprehension of the Divine Nature,
and professing to be based on the idea of the eternal Purposes of God. Of the former,
the ideas of succession and repetition form an essential part. To the latter, the
idea of Time, in any form, has no legitimate application; and it is thus placed
beyond the sphere of human thought. Now, when we speak of a Miracle as the possible
result of some
I have thus far endeavored
to apply the principle of the Limits of Religious Thought to some of these representations
which are usually objected to by the Rationalist, as in apparent opposition to the
Speculative Reason of Man. In my next Lecture, I shall attempt to pursue the same
argument, in relation to those doctrines which are sometimes regarded as repugnant
to man’s Moral Reason. The lesson to be derived from our present inquiry may be
given in the pregnant sentence of a great philosopher, but recently taken
YET YE SAY, THE WAY OF THE LORD IS NOT EQUAL. HEAR NOW, O HOUSE OF
ISRAEL; IS NOT MY WAY EQUAL? ARE NOT YOUR WAYS UNEQUAL?-
“IF I build again the things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor.”
Amid much that is true and noble in this teaching when confined within its proper limits, its fundamental weakness as an absolute criterion of religious truth is so manifest as hardly to need exposure. The fiction of a moral law binding in a particular form upon all possible intelligences, acquires this seeming universality, only because human intelligence is made the representative of all. I can conceive moral attributes only as I know them in consciousness: I can imagine other minds only by first assuming their likeness to my own. To construct a theory, whether of practical or of speculative reason, which shall be valid for other than human intelligences, it is necessary that the author should himself be emancipated from the conditions of human thought. Till this is done, the so-called Absolute is but the Relative under another name: the universal consciousness is but the human mind striving to transcend itself.
The very characteristics of Universality
and Necessity, with which our moral obligations are invested, point to an origin
the very reverse of that which the above theory supposes. For these characteristics
are in all cases due to the presence of the formal and personal element in the phenomena
of consciousness, and appear most evidently in those conceptions in which the matter
as well as the manner of thinking is drawn from the laws or formal conditions of
experience. Of these conditions, I have in a former Lecture enumerated three—Time,
Space, and Personality; the first as the condition of human consciousness in general:
the second and third as the conditions of the same consciousness in relation to
the phenomena of matter and of mind respectively.(8) From these are derived three
corresponding systems of necessary truths in the highest human sense of the term:
the science of Numbers being connected. with
That there is an Absolute Morality, based upon, or rather identical with, the Eternal Nature of God, is indeed a conviction forced upon us by the same evidence as that on which we believe that God exists at all. But what that Absolute Morality is, we are as unable to fix in any human conception, as we are to define the other attributes of the same Divine Nature. To human conception it seems impossible that absolute morality should be manifested in the form of a law of obligation; for such a law implies relation and subjection to the authority of a lawgiver. And as all human morality is manifested in this form, the conclusion seems unavoidable, that human morality, even in its highest elevation, is not identical with, nor adequate to measure, the Absolute Morality of God.(10)
A like conclusion is forced upon
us by a closer examination of human morality itself. To maintain the immutability
of moral principles in the abstract is a very different thing from maintaining the
immutability of the particular acts by which those principles are manifested in
practice. The parallel between the mathematical and the moral sciences, as systems
of necessary truth, holds good in this respect also. As principles in the abstract,
the laws of morality are as unchangeable as the axioms of geometry. That duty ought
in all cases to be followed in preference to inclination, is as certain a truth
as that two straight lines
God did not create Absolute Morality: it is coëternal
with Himself;
and it were blasphemy to say that there ever was a time when God was and Goodness
was not. But God did create the human manifestation of morality, when He created
the moral constitution of man, and placed him in those circumstances by which the
eternal principles of right and wrong are modified in relation to the present life.(12) For it is manifest, to take the simplest instances, that the sixth Commandment
of the Decalogue, in its literal
In so far,
then, as Morality, in its human character, depends upon conditions not coëternal
with God, but created along with man, in so far we are not justified in regarding
the occasional suspension of human duties, by the same authority which enacted
them, as a violation of the immutable principles of morality itself. That there
are limits, indeed, within which alone this rule can be safely applied;—that there
are doctrines and practices which carry on their front convincing proof that they
cannot have been revealed or commanded by God;—that there are systems of religion
which by this criterion may be shown to have sprung, not from divine appointment,
but from human corruption,—is not for an instant denied. In my concluding Lecture,
I shall endeavor to point out some of the conditions under which this kind of evidence
is admissible. For the present, my argument is concerned, not with special and occasional
commands, but with universal and perpetual doctrines; not with isolated facts recorded
in sacred history, but with revealed truths, forming an integral portion of religious
belief: In this point of view, I propose to apply the principle hitherto maintained,
of the Limits of Religious Thought, to the examination of those doctrines of the
Christian Faith
The Atoning Sacrifice of Christ has been the mark assailed by various attacks of this kind; some of them not very consistent with each other, but all founded on some supposed incongruity between this doctrine and the moral attributes of the Divine Nature. By one critic, the doctrine is rejected because it is more consistent with the infinite mercy of God to pardon sin freely, without any atonement whatsoever.(14) By another, because, from the unchangeable nature of God’s laws, it is impossible that sin can be pardoned at all.(15) A third maintains that it is unjust that the innocent should suffer for the sins of the guilty.(16) A fourth is indignant at the supposition that God can be angry;(17) while a fifth cannot see by what moral fitness the shedding of blood can do away with sin or its punishment.(18) The principle which governs these and similar objections is, that we have a right to assume that there is, if not a perfect identity, at least an exact resemblance between the moral nature of man and that of God; that the laws and principles of infinite justice and mercy are but magnified images of those which are manifested on a finite scale;—that nothing can be compatible with the boundless goodness of God, which is incompatible with the little goodness of which man may be conscious in himself.
The value of this principle, as an absolute
criterion of religious truth, may be tested by the simple experiment of applying
the same reasoning to an imaginary revelation constructed on the rational principles
of some one of the objectors. Let us suppose, then, that, instead of the Christian
doctrine of the Atonement, the Scriptures had told us of an absolute and unconditional
pardon of sin, following upon the mere repentance of the sinner. It is easy to imagine
It is obvious indeed, on a moment’s reflection, that the duty of man to forgive the trespasses of his neighbor, rests precisely upon those features of human nature which cannot by any analogy be regarded as representing an image of God.(21) Man is not the author of the moral law: he is not, as man, the moral governor of his fellows: he has no authority, merely as man, to punish moral transgressions as such. It is not as sin, but as injury, that vice is a transgression against man: it is not that his holiness is outraged, but that his rights or his interests are impaired. The duty of forgiveness is imposed as a check, not upon the justice, but upon the selfishness of man: it is not designed to extinguish his indignation against vice, but to restrain his tendency to exaggerate his own personal injuries.(22) The reasoner maintains, “it is a duty in man to forgive sins, therefore it must be morally fitting for God to forgive them also,” overlooks the fact that this duty is binding upon man: on account of the weakness and ignorance and sinfulness of his nature; that he is bound to forgive, as one who himself needs forgiveness; as one whose weakness renders him liable to suffering; as one whose self-love is ever ready to arouse his passions and pervert his judgment.
Nor yet would the advocates
of the Moral Reason gain anything in Theology by the substitution of a rigid system
of reward and punishment, in which nothing is forgiven, but every act meets with
its appropriate recompense. We have only to suppose that this were the doctrine
of Revelation, to imagine the outcry with which it would be assailed. “It is moral,” the objector might urge,
“only in the harsher and less amiable features of human
morality: it gives us a God whom we may fear, but whom we cannot love;
The
endless controversy concerning Predestination and Free Will, whether viewed in
its speculative or in its moral aspect, is but another example of the hardihood
of human ignorance. The question, as I have observed before, has its philosophical
as well as its theological aspect: it has no difficulties peculiar to itself: it
is but a special form of the fundamental mystery of the coëxistence of the Infinite
and the Finite. Yet, with this mystery meeting and baffling human reason at every
turn, theologians have not scrupled to trace in their petty channels the exact flow
and course of Infinite wisdom; one school boldly maintaining that even Omniscience
itself has no knowledge of contingent events; another asserting, with equal confidence,
that God’s knowledge must be a restraint on man’s freedom.(26) If philosophy offers
for the moment an apparent escape from the dilemma, by suggesting that God’s knowledge
is not properly foreknowledge, as having no relation to time;(27)
the suggestion itself is one which can neither be verified as a truth, nor even
intelligibly exhibited as a thought; and the
But the problem, be its difficulties and their origin what they may, is not peculiar to Theology, and receives no additional complication from its position in Holy Writ. The very same question may be discussed in a purely metaphysical form, by merely substituting the universal law of causation for the universal knowledge of God. What is the meaning and value of that law of the human mind which apparently compels us to think that every event whatever has its determining cause? And how is that conviction reconcilable with a liberty in the human will to choose between two alternatives? The answer is substantially the same as before. The freedom of the will is a positive fact of our consciousness: as for the principle of causality, we know not whence it is, nor what it is. We know not whether it is a law of things, or a mode of human representation; whether it denotes an impotence or a power; whether it is innate or acquired. We know not in what the causal relation itself consists; nor by what authority we are warranted in extending its significance beyond the temporal sequence which suggests it and the material phenomena in which that sequence is undisturbed.
And is not the same
conviction of the ignorance of man, and of his rashness in the midst of ignorance,
forced upon us by the spectacle of the arbitrary and summary decisions of human
reason on the most mysterious as well as the
Against this it is urged that
sin cannot forever be triumphant against God.(35) As if the whole mystery of iniquity
were contained in the words for ever! The real riddle of existence—the problem which
confounds all philosophy, aye, and all religion too, so far as religion is a thing
of man’s reason—is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it exists for a longer
or a shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? and
does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God
to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated
to make room for His perfections to expand? Does the infinity of His eternal nature
ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery?
Against this immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy
have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought, and have
retired broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn
rock, without softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface.(36) We may
be told that evil is a privation, or a negation, or a partial aspect of the universal
good, or some other equally unmeaning abstraction; whilst all the while our own
hearts bear testimony to its fearful reality, to its direct antagonism to every
possible form of good.(37) But this mystery, vast and inscrutable as it is, is
but one aspect of a more general problem; it is but the moral form of the ever-recurring
secret of the Infinite. How the Infinite and the Finite, in any form of antagonism
or other relation, can exist together;
The reflections which this great and terrible mystery of Divine Judgment
have suggested, receive perhaps some further support when we contemplate it in another
aspect, and one more legitimately within the province of human reason; that is to
say, in its analogy to the actual constitution and course of nature. “The Divine
moral government which religion teaches us,” says Bishop Butler, “implies that
the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous
judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall take effect by His appointment,
is necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be supposed that we are
made acquainted with all the ends or reasons, for which it is fit future punishment
should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent misery should
follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in what manner it shall
follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what means,—there
is no absurdity in supposing
And if we may be permitted to extend the same analogy from the constitution of external nature to that of the human mind, may we not trace something not wholly unlike the irrevocable sentence of the future, in that dark and fearful, yet too certain law of our nature, by which sin and misery ever tend to perpetuate themselves; by which evil habits gather strength with every fresh indulgence, till it is no longer, humanly speaking, in the power of the sinner to shake off the burden which his own deeds have laid upon him? In that mysterious condition of the depraved will, compelled, and yet free,—the slave of sinful habit, yet responsible for every act of sin, and gathering deeper condemnation as the power of amendment grows less and less,—may we not see some possible foreshadowing of the yet deeper guilt and the yet more hopeless misery of the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched? The fact, awful as it is, is one to which our every (lay’s experience bears witness: and who shall say that the invisible things of God may not, in this as in other instances, be shadowed forth to us in the things that are seen?
The same argument from analogy is indeed applicable
to every one of the difficulties which Rationalism professes to discover in the
revealed ways of God’s dealings with man. The Fall of Adam, and the inherited corruption
of his posterity, find their parallel in the liability to sin which remains unextinguished
throughout man’s moral progress; and in that mysterious, though certain dispensation
of Providence, which ordains that not only bodily taints and infirmities, but even
moral dispositions and tendencies should, in many instances, descend from father
to son; and which permits the child of sinful parents to be depraved by evil example,
before he knows how, by his own reason, clearly to discern between right and wrong;
before lie has strength, of his own will, to refuse the evil and choose the good.(39) There is a parallel, too, in that strange, yet too familiar fact, of vice persisted
in, with the clearest and strongest conviction of its viciousness and wretchedness;
and the skepticism which denies that man, if created sinless, could so easily have
fallen from innocence, finds its philosophical counterpart in the paradox of the
ancient moralist, who maintained that conscious sin is impossible, because nothing
can be stronger than knowledge.(40) Justification by faith through the merits of
Christ is at least in harmony with that course of things established by Divine Providence
in this world; in which so many benefits, which we cannot procure for ourselves
or deserve by any merit of our own, are obtained for us by the instrumentality of
others; and in which we are so often compelled, as an indispensable condition of
obtaining the benefit, to trust in the power and good-will of those whom we have
never tried, and to believe in the efficacy of means whose manner of working we
know not.(41) The operations of Divine Grace, influencing, yet
The warning which his great work contains
against “that idle and not very innocent employment of forming imaginary models
of a world, and schemes of governing it,”(43) is as necessary now as then, as applicable
to moral as to speculative theories. Neither with regard to the physical nor to
the moral world, is man capable of constructing a Cosmogony; and those Babels of
Reason, which Philosophy has built for itself, under the names of Rational Theories
of Religion, and Criticisms of every Revelation, are but the successors of those
elder children of chaos and night, which, with no greater knowledge, but with less
presumption, sought to describe the generation. of the visible universe. It is no
disparagement of the value and authority of the Moral Reason in its regulative capacity,
within its proper sphere of human action,
In His Moral Attributes, no less than in the rest of His Infinite Being, God’s
judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.
THE WORKS WHICH THE FATHER HATH GIVEN ME TO FINISH, THE SAME WORKS
THAT I DO, BEAR WITNESS OF ME, THAT THE FATHER HATH SENT ME.—
TO
construct a complete Criticism of any Revelation, it is necessary that the Critic
should be in possession of a perfect Philosophy of the Infinite. For, except on
the supposition that we possess an exact knowledge of the whole Nature of God,
such as only that Philosophy can furnish, we cannot know for certain what are the
purposes which God intends to accomplish by means of Revelation, and what are the
instruments by which those purposes may be best carried out. If then it can be shown,
as I have attempted to show in the previous Lectures, that the attainment of a Philosophy
of the Infinite is utterly impossible under the existing laws of human thought,
it follows that it is not by means of philosophical criticism that the claims of
a supposed Revelation can be adequately tested. We are thus compelled to seek another
field for the right use of Reason in religious questions; and what that field is,
it will not be difficult to determine. To Reason, rightly employed, within its proper
limits and on its proper objects, our Lord himself and his Apostles openly appealed
in proof of their divine mission; and the same proof has been unhesitatingly claimed
by the defenders of Christianity in all subsequent ages. In other words, the legitimate
object of
At first sight it may appear as if this distinction involved no real difference; for the contents of a revelation, it might be objected, are included among its evidences. In one sense, no doubt they are; but that very inclusion gives them a totally different significance and weight from that to which they lay claim when considered as the basis of a philosophical criticism. In the one case, they are judged by their conformity to the supposed nature and purposes of God; in the other, by their adaptation to the actual circumstances and wants of man. In the one case they are regarded as furnishing a single and a certain criterion; for on the supposition that our reason is competent to determine, from our knowledge of the Divine Nature, what the characteristics of a true Revelation ought to be, we are entitled, by virtue of that criterion alone, to reject without hesitation whatever does not satisfy its requirements. In the other case, they are regarded as furnishing only one probable presumption out of many;—a presumption which may confirm and be confirmed by coinciding testimony from other sources, or, on the contrary, may be outweighed, when we come to balance probabilities, by conflicting evidence on the other side.
The practical conclusion, which may be
deduced from the whole previous survey of the Limits of Religious Thought, is this:
that if no one faculty of the human mind is competent to convey a direct knowledge
of the Absolute and the Infinite, no one faculty is entitled to claim preëminence
over the rest, as furnishing especially the criterion of the truth or falsehood
of a supposed Revelation. There are presumptions to be drawn from the internal character
of the doctrines which the revelation contains:
A truth so obvious as this may be thought hardly worth announcing as the result of an elaborate inquiry. But the whole history of religious controversy bears witness that, however evident in theory, there is no truth m6re liable to be neglected in practice. The defenders of Christianity are not altogether free from the charge of insisting exclusively or preëminently upon some one alone of its evidences: the assailants, under the influence of a still more exclusive reäction, have assumed that a method which fails to accomplish everything has succeeded in accomplishing nothing; and, flying at once to the opposite extreme, have in their turn appealed to some one infallible criterion, as constituting a royal road to philosophical unbelief.
In the present day we are feeling the pernicious effects of a reaction
of this kind. Because the writings of Paley and his followers in the last generation
laid a principal stress on the direct historical evidences of Christianity, we meet
now with an antagonist school of writers, who perpetually assure us that history
has nothing whatever to do with religion;(1) that an external revelation of religious
truth is impossible;(2) that we may learn all that is essential to the Gospel by
inward and spiritual evidence only.(3) In the spirit of the Pharisees of old, who
said, “This man
The evidence
derived from the internal character of a religion, whatever may be its value within
its proper limits, is, as regards the divine origin of the religion, purely negative.
It may prove in certain cases (though even here the argument requires much caution
in its employment) that a religion has not come from God; but it is in no case
sufficient to prove that it has come from Him.(7)
For the doctrines revealed must either be such as are within the power of man's
natural reason to verify, or such as are beyond it. In the former case, the
reason which is competent to verify may also be competent to discover: the
doctrine is tested by its conformity to the conclusions of
And even the negative argument, which concludes from the character of the contents
of a religion that it cannot have come from God, however legitimate within its
proper limits, is one which requires considerable caution in the application. The
lesson to be learnt from an examination of the Limits of Religious Thought, is not
that man’s judgments are worthless in relation to divine things, but that they
are fallible; and the probability of error in any particular case can never be
fairly estimated, without giving their full weight to all collateral considerations.
We are indeed bound to believe that a Revelation given by God can never contain
anything that is really unwise or unrighteous; but we are not always capable of
estimating
“The human mind,” says a writer of the present day, “is
competent to sit in moral and spiritual judgment on a professed
revelation; and to decide, if the case seems to require it, in the following
tone: This doctrine attributes to God, that which we should all call harsh,
cruel, or unjust in man: it is therefore intrinsically inadmissible.” . . .
“In fact,” he continues, “all Christian
apostles and missionaries, like the Hebrew prophets, have always refuted Paganism
by direct attacks on its immoral and unspiritual doctrines; and have appealed to
the consciences of heathens, as competent to decide in the controversy.”(9) Now,
an appeal of this kind may be legitimate or not, according to the purpose for
which it is made, and the manner in which it is applied. The primary and proper
employment of
Thus, for example, it
is one thing to condemn a religion on account of the habitual observance of licentious
or inhuman rites of worship, and another to pronounce judgment on isolated acts,
historically recorded as having been done by divine command, but not perpetuated
in precepts for the imitation of posterity. The former are condemned for their regulative
character, as contributing to the perpetual corruption of mankind; the latter are
condemned on speculative grounds, as inconsistent with our preconceived notions
of the character of God. “There are some particular precepts in Scripture,” says
Bishop Butler, “given to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be
There is indeed
an obvious analogy between these temporary suspensions of the laws of moral obligation
and that corresponding suspension of the laws of natural phenomena
Even within its own legitimate province, an argument of this kind may
have more or less weight, varying from the lowest presumption to the highest moral
certainty, according to the nature of the offence which we believe ourselves to
have detected, and the means which we possess of estimating its character or consequences.
It is certain that we are not competent judges of the Absolute Nature of God: it
is not certain that we are competent judges, in all cases, of what is best fitted
for the moral discipline of man. But granting to the above argument
Here then is the issue, which the wavering disciple is bound
seriously to consider. Taking into account the various questions whose answers,
on the one side or the other, form the sum total of Evidences for or against the
claims of the Christian Faith;—the genuineness and authenticity of the documents;
the judgment and good faith of the writers; the testimony to the actual occurrence
of prophecies and miracles, and their relation to the religious teaching with which
they are connected; the character of the Teacher Himself, that one protrait, which,
in its perfect purity and holiness and beauty, stands alone and unapproached in
human history or human fiction; those rites and ceremonies of the elder Law, so
significant as typical of Christ, so strange and meaningless without Him; those
predictions of the promised Messiah, whose obvious meaning is rendered still more
manifest by the futile ingenuity which strives to pervert them;(11)
the history of the rise and progress of Christianity, and its comparison with
that of other religions; the ability or inability of human means to bring about
the results which it actually accomplished; its antagonism to the current ideas
of the age and country of its origin; its effects as a system on the moral and
social condition of subsequent generations of mankind; its fitness to satisfy
the wants and console the sufferings of human nature; the character of those by
whom it was first promulgated and received; the sufferings which attested the
sincerity of their convictions; the comparative trustworthiness of ancient
testimony and modern conjecture; the mutual contradictions of conflicting
theories of unbelief, and the inadequacy of all of them to explain the facts for
which they are bound to account;—
Many who would shrink with horror
from the idea of rejecting Christ altogether, will yet speak and act as if they
were at liberty to set up for themselves an eclectic Christianity; separating the
essential from the superfluous portions of Christ’s teaching; deciding for themselves
how much is permanent and necessary for all men, and how much is temporary and
designed only for a particular age and people.(12) Yet if Christ is indeed God
manifest in the flesh, it is surely scarcely less impious to attempt to improve
His teaching, than to reject it altogether. Nay, in one respect it is more so; for
it is to acknowledge a doctrine as the revelation of God, and at the same time to
proclaim that it is interior to the wisdom of man. That it may indeed come, and
has come, within the purposes of God’s Providence, to give to mankind a Revelation
partly at least designed for a temporary purpose, and for a limited portion of mankind;—a
Law in which something was permitted
In one respect, indeed, this semi-rationalism, which admits the authority of Revelation up to a certain point and no further, rests on a far less reasonable basis than the firm belief which accepts the whole, or the complete unbelief which accepts nothing. For whatever may be the antecedent improbability which attaches to a miraculous narrative, as cornpared with one of ordinary events, it can affect only the narrative taken as a whole, and the entire series of miracles from the greatest to the least. If a single miracle is once admitted as supported by competent evidence, the entire history is at once removed from the ordinary calculations of more or less probability. One miracle is sufficient to show that the series of events, with which it is connected, is one which the Almighty has seen fit to mark by exceptions to the ordinary course of His Providence: and this being once granted, we have no a priori grounds to warrant us in asserting that the number of such exceptions ought to be larger or smaller. If any one miracle recorded in the Gospels—the Resurrection of Christ, for example—be once admitted as true, the remainder cease to have any antecedent improbability at all, and require no greater evidence to prove them than is needed for the most ordinary events of any other history. For the improbability, such as it is, reaches no further than to show that it is unlikely that God should work miracles at all; not that it is unlikely that He should work more than a certain number.
Our right to criticize
at all depends upon this one question: “What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?”
Beyond question, every doubt
which our reason may suggest in matters of religion is entitled to its due place
in the examination of the evidences of religion; if we will treat it as a part only
and not the whole; if we will not insist on a positive solution of that which, it
may be, is given us for another purpose than to be solved. It is reasonable to believe
that, in matters of belief as well as of practice, God has not thought fit to annihilate
the free will of man; but has permitted speculative difficulties to exist as the
trial and the discipline of sharp and subtle intellects, as he has permitted moral
temptations to form the trial and the discipline of strong and eager passions.(17)
Our passions are not annihilated when we resist the temptation to sin: why
should we expect that our
It would of course be impossible now to enter upon any detailed examination of the
positive Evidences of Christianity. The purpose of the foregoing Lectures will have
been answered; if they can only succeed in clearing the way for a candid and impartial
inquiry; by showing what are the limits within which it must be confined, and what
kind of reasoning is inadmissible, as transgressing those limits. The conclusion,
which an examination of the conditions of human thought unavoidably forces upon
us, is this: There can be no such thing as a positive science of Speculative Theology;
for such a science must necessarily be based on an apprehension of the Infinite;
and the Infinite, though we are compelled to believe in its existence, cannot be
positively apprehended in any mode of
But, on the other hand, there is an opposite caution no
less needed, in making use of the counter-theory, which regards the doctrines of
Revelation as truths accommodated to the finite capacities of man; as serving for
regulative, not for speculative knowledge; and as not amenable to any criticism
based on human representations of the Infinite. This theory is useful, not as explaining
the difficulties involved in religious thought, but as showing why we must leave
them unexplained; not as removing the mysteries of revelation, but as showing why
such mysteries
This is no doubt a portion of the meaning; but is
it the whole? Does Scripture intend merely to assert a resemblance in the effects
and none at all in the causes? If so, it is difficult to see why the natural rule
of accommodation should have been reversed; why a plain and intelligible statement
concerning the Divine Acts should have been veiled under an obscure and mysterious
image of the Divine Attributes. If God’s Anger means no more than His infliction
of punishments; if His Love means no more
It is obvious indeed that the theory of an adaptation of divine truths
to human faculties, entirely changes its significance, as soon as we attempt to
give a further adaptation to the adapted symbol itself; to modify into a still lower
truth that which is itself a modification of a higher. The instant we undertake
to say that this or that speculative or practical interpretation is the only real
meaning of that which Scripture represents to us under a different
The adaptation for which I contend is one which admits of no such
explanation. It is not an adaptation to the ignorance of one man, to be seen through
by the superior knowledge of another; but one which exists in relation to the whole
human race, as men, bound by the laws of man’s thought; as creatures of time, instructed
in the things of eternity; as finite beings, placed in relation to and communication
with the Infinite. I believe that Scripture teaches, to each and all of us, the
lesson which it was designed to teach, so long as we are men upon earth, and not
as the angels in heaven.(23) I believe that
“now we see through a glass darkly,”—in
an enigma;—but that now is one which encompasses the whole race of mankind, from
the cradle to the grave, from the creation to the day of judgment: that dark enigma
is one which no human wisdom can solve; which Reason is unable to penetrate; and
which Faith can only rest content with here, in hope of a clearer vision to be granted
hereafter. If there be any who think that the Laws of Thought themselves may change
with the changing knowledge of man; that the limitations of Subject and Object,
of Duration and Succession, of Space and Time, belong to the vulgar only, and not
to the philosopher;—if there be any who believe that they can think without the
consciousness
The intellectual difficulties which Rationalism discovers in
the contents of Revelation (I do not now speak of those which belong to its external
evidences) are such as no system of Rational Theology can hope to remove; for they
are inherent in the constitution of Reason itself. Our mental laws, like our moral
passions, are designed to serve the purposes of our earthly culture and discipline;
both have their part to perform in moulding the intellect and the will of man through
the slow stages of that training here, whose completion is to be looked for hereafter.
Without the possibility of temptation, where would be the merit of obedience? Without
room for doubt, where would be the righteousness of faith?(24) But there is no
temptation which taketh us, as Christians, but such as is
Know thyself in the various elements of thy intellectual
and moral being: all alike will point reverently upward to the throne of the Invisible;
but none will scale that throne itself, or pierce through the glory which conceals
Him that sitteth thereon. Know thyself in thy powers of Thought, which, cramped
and confined on every side, yet bear witness, in their very limits, to the
Illimitable beyond. Know thyself in the energies of thy Will, which, free and
yet bound, the master at once and the servant of Law, bows itself under the
imperfect consciousness of a higher Lawgiver, and asserts its freedom but by the
permission of the
Note I., p. 46.
SEE Galen, De Sectis, c. I. In this sense, the Dogmatists or Rationalists were distinguished from the Empirics. For the corresponding philosophical sense of the term, see Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. § 1-3.
Note II., p. 47.
“Dogmatism has its name from this,—that it professes to demonstrate, i. e. to establish dogmatically, as a causal nexus, the relation between things per se and phenomena; and maintains that things per se contain the ground of all that we observe in man and in the world of nature.”—Poelitz, Kant’s Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik. Einleitung, p. xxi.
Note III., p. 47.
Of the theological method of Wolf, the leader of philosophical
dogmatism in the eighteenth century, Mr. Rose observes: “He maintained that philosophy
was indispensable to theology, and that, together with biblical proofs, a mathematical
or strictly demonstrative dogmatical system, according to the principles of reason,
was absolutely necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, and after
the first clamors against them had subsided, his opinions gained more attention,
and it was not long before he had a school of vehement admirers who far outstripped
him in the use of his own principles. We find some of them not content with applying
demonstration to the truth of the system, but endeavoring to establish each separate
dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the Redeemer, the Incarnation, the eternity of
punishment, on philosophical, and, strange as it may appear, some of those truths
on mathematical grounds.” State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 54.
Second edition.
The language of Wolf himself may be quoted as expressing
exactly the relation between Scripture and human reason mentioned in the text. “Sacred
Scripture serves as an aid to natural theology. For in the Scripture those things
also are taught concerning God, which can be demonstrated from principles of reason;
a thing which no one denies, who is versed in the reading of Scripture. It therefore
furnishes natural theology with propositions, which ought to be demonstrated; consequently
the philosopher is bound, not to invent, but to demonstrate them.” Theologia
Naturalis, Pars Prior, § 22.
The writings of Canz, a disciple of the Wolfian philosophy, are mentioned by Mr. Rose and by Dr. Pusey (Historical Inquiry, p. 116), as exemplifying the manner in which this philosophy was applied to doctrinal theology. The following extracts from his attempted demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity may be interesting to the reader, not only on account of the extreme rarity of the work from which they are taken, but also as furnishing a specimen of the dogmatic method, and showing the abuse to which it is liable in injudicious hands.
“Since the character of every substance lies in some power of action, we must form our judgment of God from a power of action infinite and general. This power being infinite, embraces all perfections, and therefore, does not lie in a bare faculty, which sometimes ceases from activity; for that would imply imperfection; nor in the power of doing this thing only, or only that, for that in like manner would betray limitations; but in an ever-during act of working all things whatsoever in the most perfect and therefore the wisest manner. He is therefore a substance entirely singular.
“Moreover, since God is pure actuality, working all in all, it follows that finite things, which may be and may not be, do not find the ground of their existence in themselves, but in Him who works all things, i. e. in God. There is therefore in God—and this we observe in the first place—an infinite Creative Power. “But since all created things relate to one another as means and ends, yet are themselves, in the ultimate scope, referred to the glory of God, it is plain that there is in God an infinite Faculty of Wisdom. . . . . .
“Finally, inasmuch as there is infinite good in created things, and God, who works all, must be judged to have furnished forth all this good; it is not difficult to understand that there is in God an infinite Power of Love. For he loves, who increases, as far as possible, with various blessings, the happiness of others.
* * * * * * * * *
“That which exists, is said to subsist, when it has reached its own full completion, and proceeds no farther. . . .
“Whatever in this way, in its existence, proceeds no farther, is called by Metaphysicians ὑφιστάμενον, and if to this be added the gift of intelligence or reason, then there exists a Person (persona).
“These things premised, let us see what there is in the nature of God that justifies the designation of Three Persons. There is certainly in God a boundless power of action, and therefore evidence of His being a wholly singular Substance. We can also discover a triple activity, which completes that power; a triple activity, which not only exists, as it presupposes a power of action, but subsists also, as it is neither a part, nor an adjunct, nor an operation of anything else.
“And now there belongs to this triple unlimited activity, by which the Divine power is completed, a consciousness of itself, and a sense alike of the past and the future. It is therefore intelligent, and therefore a Person.
“Since there are three activities of this kind in God, or in the Divine Nature, which is an unlimited power of action, it follows that there are in it Three Persons, which by a threefold unlimited operation complete and exercise that unlimited power.
“Since in every created being, endowed with intelligence, the power of working, understanding, loving, cannot be completed except by one operation, or by one activity; it follows, that in every finite being there can only be one person.
“There is therefore a Trinity of Persons in God, which proceeds
from his Infinite Nature as such: which was the thing proposed for demonstration.” Philosophia
Wolfianæ Consensus cum Theologia, Francofurti et Lipsiæ, 1737. This volume forms
the third part of the Philosophiæ Leibnitianæ et Wolfianæ usus in Theologia,
of which the first part was published in 1728, and the second in 1732. The third
part is extremely rare. The two former parts were reprinted in 1749.
Note IV., p. 48.
Kant defines Rationalism, as distinguished from Naturalism and
Supernaturalism, in the following terms: “He who interprets natural religion as
morally necessary, i. e. as Duty, may also be called (in matters of faith)
Rationalist. When such an one denies the reality of all supernatural Divine
revelation, he is called Naturalist; if now he allows this, but maintains
that to know it and accept it as real is not a necessary requisite to Religion,
he could be called a pure Rationalist; but if he holds a faith in the same
to be necessary to all Religion, he would have to be called, in matters of faith,
a pure Suspernaturalist.” Religion innerlhalb der Grenzen der blossen
Vernunft (Werke, ed. Rosenkranz, x. p. 185). For different senses in
which the term Rationalist has been used, see Wegscheider, Instit. Theol.
§ 10; Rose, State of Protestantism in Germany, Introd. p. xvii. second edition;
Kahnis, Internal History of German Protestantism, p. 169, Meyer’s translation. Geschichte
der Philosophie (Werke, XIII. p. 96). Christliche Glaube,
§ 97, 99.
The so-called Spiritualism of the present day is again only Rationalism disguised; for feeling or intuition is but an arbitrary standard, resting solely on the personal consciousness, and moreover must be translated into distinct thought, before it can be available for the purposes of religious criticism.
Note V., p. 48.
Thus Wegscheider represents the claim of the Rationalists. “They
claim for sound reason the power of deciding upon any religious doctrine
Note VI., p. 51.
“Wherefore if it is not fitting in God to do anything contrary to justice or good order, it does not pertain to His freedom or goodness or will to let the sinner go unpunished, who does not pay to God, that of which he has robbed Him.”—Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, i. 12. “For the voluntary satisfaction of sin, and (or) the exaction of punishment from him who makes no satisfaction, hold in the same universe their own place and fair order. And if the Divine wisdom should not make application of these, where sin is striving to disturb right order, the orderly beauty of that very universe which God ought to control, would be violated and disfigured, and God would seem to be deficient in his own administration. These two (suppositions) being as impossible as they are contrary to the fitness of things, either satisfaction or punishment is the necessary consequence of sin.” Ibid. i. 15. “If therefore, as is evident, it is from men that the celestial state is to be made complete,—and this cannot be done unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which none can make but God, and none ought, but man,—then, as a necessary consequence, it must be made by Godman.”—Ibid. ii. 6. Compare Alex. ab Ales. Summa Theologiæ, p. iii. Memb. 7, where the same argument is concisely stated.
Note VII., p. 51.
Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 1. ii. c. 16.
Note VIII., p. 51.
Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 1. i. c. 5.
Note IX., p. 51.
“God is in such way mercifiul, that He is also at the same time
just; mercy does not exclude, in Him, the eternal rule of justice, but there is
in Him a perfect and admirable mingling of mercy and justice; therefore, without
an equivalent price, sin could not, in the judgment of God, have been remitted to
man, and the Divine justice have been unimpaired.
Note X., p. 51.
“Because a mere creature could not have endured the immense weight of God’s wrath, due to the sins of the whole world.”—Chemnitz, De duabus Naturis in Christo, c. 11.
Note XI., p. 52.
Such is the demand of Anselm's interlocutor, which he himself
undertakes to satisfy. “That I may understand on the ground of a reasonable
necessity that all those things ought to be, which the Catholic faith teaches us
to believe concerning Christ.”—Cur Deus Homo, L. I. c. 25. To arguments founded on
this principle the judicious remarks of Bishop Butler may be applied: “It may be
needful to mention that several questions, which have been brought into the subject
before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here: questions which
have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways.
For instance, whether God could have saved the world by other means than the death
of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government.” Analogy,
Part II. Ch. 5.
Note XII., p. 52.
“In what did this satisfaction consist? Was it that God was angry, and needed to be propitiated like some heathen deity of old? Such a thought refutes itself by the very indignation which it calls up in the human bosom.”—Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, vol. ii. p. 472. “Neither can there be any such thing as vicarious atonement or punishment, which, again, is a relic of heathen conceptions of an angered Deity, to be propitiated by offerings and sacrifices.”—Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. “The religion of types and notions can travel only in a circle from whence there is no escape. It is but an elaborate process of self-confutation. After much verbiage it demolishes what it created, and having begun by assuming God to be angry, ends, not by admitting its own gross mistake, but by asserting Him to be changed and reconciled.”—Mackay, Progress of the Intellect, vol. ii. p. 504. Compare Wegscheider, Inst. Theol. § 141.
Note XIII., p. 52.
“For what is more unjust, than that an innocent one be punished instead of the guilty, especially when the guilty are themselves before the tribunal, and can themselves he punished? “—F. Socinus, Prælect. Theol., c. xviii. “That each should have his exact due is just—is the best for himself. That the consequence of his guilt should be transferred from him to one that is innocent (although that innocent one be himself willing to accept it), whatever else it be, is not justice.”—Froude, Nemesis of Faith, p. 70. Compare Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 92; Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. A similar objection is introduced, and apparently approved, by Mr. Maurice, Theological Essays, p. 139.
Note XIV., p. 52.
“There is no one who cannot, with the utmost justice, pardon and remit injuries done to himself, and debts contracted to himself, without having received any real satisfaction. Therefore, unless we mean to allow less to God than is allowed to men themselves, we must confess that God might justly have pardoned our sins without having received any real satisfaction for them.”—F. Socinus, Prælect. Theol. c. xvi.
“Now it is certainly required of us, that if our brother only repent, we should forgive him, even though he should repeat his offence seven times a day. On the same generous maxim, therefore, we cannot but conclude that the Divine being acts towards us.”—Priestley, History of Corruptions, vol. i. p. 151. “Every good man has learnt to forgive, and when the offender is penitent, to forgive freely—without punishment or retribution: whence the conclusion is inevitable, that God also forgives, as soon as sin is repented of.’—Newman, The Soul, pp. 99, 100. “Was it that there was a debt due to Him, which must be paid ere its consequences could be done away? But even ‘a man’s’ debt may be freely forgiven.”- Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, vol. ii. p. 472. Compare also Maurice, Theol. Essays, p. 138, and Garve, quoted by Röhr, Briefe über den Rationalismus, p. 442.
Note XV., p. 52.
“Pecuniary penalties, therefore, can be paid for another, because
one person’s money can be made another’s; as when any one pays money, as a penalty,
for some other person, then he for whom it is paid is tacitly, in reality, first
presented with the money, and is considered to have paid It himself. But the death,
or any bodily distress, of one person, cannot be
Note XVI., p. 53.
Wilberforce, Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp. 44, 45; 4th edition. The germ of this theory may perhaps be found in Damascenus, De Fide Orthod. lib. iii. c. 6. See Dorner, Lehre von der person Christi, p. 115. It also partially appears, in a form more adapted to the realistic controversy, in Anselm, particularly in his treatise De Fide Trinitatis et de lncarnatione Verbi, written to refute the theological errors of the nominalist Roscelin. In modern times, a similar theory has found favor with those philosophers of the Hegelian school, who, in opposition to the development represented by Strauss, have undertaken the difficult task of reconciling the philosophy of their master with historical Christianity. In this point of view it has been adopted by Schaller in his “Der historische Christus und die Philosophie,” and by Göschel in his “Beiträge zur Speculativen Philosophie von Gott und dem Menschen und von dem Gottmenschen.” For an account of these theories see Dorner, p, 462, 477. A similar view is maintained by Marheineke, Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 338, and by Dorner himself, Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 527.
Note XVII., p. 54.
“Item sequitur quod aliquid de essentia Christi erit miserum et damnatum, quia illa natura communis existens realiter in Christo et in damnato erit damnatum, quia in Juda.”—Occam, Logica, P. l. c. 15.
Note XVIII., p. 56.
“Religion is (subjectively considered) the acknowledgment of all our duties as divine commands.”—Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 184. ed. Rosenkranz. In the same spirit, Fichte says, “Since all religion sets forth God only as a moral lawgiver, all that is not commanded by the moral law within us, is not His, and there is no means of pleasing Him, except by the observance of this same moral law.”—Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Werke, v. p. 127). This is exactly the theory of Religion which is refuted in anticipation by Bishop Butler (Analogy, P. II. ch. 1.), as the opinion of those who hold that the “only design” of Revelation “must be to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue.”
Note XIX., p. 56.
Kant, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, pp. 184, 186.
Note XX., p. 56.
“Prayer, as an inward formal worship of God, and on that account considered as a means of grace, is a superstitious delusion.”— Ibid., p. 235.
Note XXI., p. 56.
“A hearty wish to please God in all our
conduct,—i. e.
the disposition, accompanying all our actions, to do them as in the service of God,—is
the spirit of prayer, which can and ought to be in us ‘without ceasing.’
But to clothe this wish in words and forms (be it only inwardly, even), can, at
the utmost, only carry with it the value of a means for the repeated quickening
of that disposition in ourselves, but can have no immediate relation to the divine
favor; also on that account cannot be a universal duty, because a means can only
be prescribed to him who needs it for certain ends.”—Kant, Religion u. s. w.
p. 235.—Cf. Fichte, Kritik aller Offenbarung, p. 127. For an account of a
similar view advocated in Scotland in the last century, by Dr. Leechman and others,
see Combe’s Constitution of Man, ch. ix. Subsequent writers have repeated
the above theory in various forms, and in various spirits, but all urging the same
objection, from the supposed unchangreable nature of God. See Schleiermacher,
Christliche Glaube, § 147, and his sermon “Die Kraft des Gebetes,” Predigten,
I. p. 24; Strauss, Glaubenslehre, II. p. 387; Foxton, Popular Christianity,
Note XXII., p. 56.
Thus Fichte lays it down, as one of the tests of a true Revelation,
that it must not countenance an objective Anthropomophism of God. In illustration
of this canon, he says, “If we can really determine God by our feelings, can move
him to sympathy, to compassion, to joy, then is He not the Unchangeable, the Only-sufficient,
the Only-blessed, then is He determinable by something else than by the moral law;
then can we hope to move Him, by moaning and contrition, to proceed otherwise with
us, than the degree of our morality may have deserved. All these sensuous representations
of divine attributes must not, therefore, be pronounced objectively valid; it must
not be left doubtful, whether such be essentially the nature of God (Gott
an sich), or whether he is willing to allow us so to think of it, in
behoof of our sensuous needs.” Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung
(Werke, V. p. 135). Versuch
einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Werke, V. p. 136, 137). Ibid.,
p. 109. Baur, Christliche Gnosis,
p. 705. Gerichtliche Verantwortung
(Werke, V. p. 267). In like manner, Herder says, “Therefore when we speak
of God, better (have) no images! In philosophy, as in the law of Moses, this is
our first commandment”—Gott. Einige Gespräche über Spinoza’s System. (Werke,
VIII. p. 228.) Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. ii.
p. 404. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 282, ed. Rosenkranz.
Compare the remarkable words of Jacobi (Von den göttlichen Dingen. Werke,
III. p. 418, 422). “We confess, accordingly, to an Anthropomorphism inseparable
from the conviction that man bears in him the image of God; and maintain that besides
this Anthropomorphism, which has always been called Theism, is nothing but Atheism
or Fetichism.” Annotationes quædam
Theologicæ, p. 10. Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 100.
Note XXIII., p. 58.
This remark may seem at first sight not so appropriate in relation
to Kant as to some other advocates of a similar theory, such, for instance, as Mr.
Greg, whose remarks on prayer are quoted in Lecture VI. p. 147. For Kant, in language
at least, expressly denies that any temporal consecution can be included in the
conception of God. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft,
p. 57, ed. Rosenkranz.
Note XXIV., p. 58.
Xenophanes, apud Clem. Alex. Stromata, V. p. 601:
“But if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and fingers,
Then would horses like unto horses, and oxen to oxen,
Paint and fashion their god-forms, and give to them bodies
Of like shape to their own, as they themselves too are fashioned.”
[As translated in Morrison’s Ritter’s Hist. Anc. Phil., vol. I., p. 431.]
Note XXV., p. 62.
Plato, Republic, IV. p. 433.
Note XXVI., p. 62.
Advancement of Learning. (Works, ed. Montagu, vol. ii. p. 303.)
Note XXVII., p. 63.
Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung, Königsberg, 1792,
2d Ed. 1793. (Fichte’s Werke, V. p. 9.) A few specimens of the criticisms
hazarded in this work will be sufficient to show the arbitrary character of the
method on which it proceeds. The author assumes that God is determined entirely
and solely by the moral law as conceived by man; and that Religion, therefore, must
consist solely in moral duties. Werke, V. pp. 42, 55.
There must have been a moral necessity for it at the time of its publication (p. 113).
It must not draw men to obedience by any other motive than reverence for God’s holiness. Hence it must not contain any prospect of future reward or punishment (p. 115).
It must not communicate any knowledge attainable by the natural reason (p. 122).
It must contain only such moral rules as may be deduced from the principle of the practical reason (p. 124).
It must not promise any supernatural aids to men in the performance of their duty (p. 129).
Kant’s own work, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen
Vernunft,
Werke, X. p. 228. Ibid. p. 122. Ibid. p. 184. Ibid. pp. 98. 130.
The narrowness of Kant’s fundamental assumption, even as regards the human side of religion only, is pointed out by Willm, Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, vol. ii. p. 47: “By regarding religion as chiefly a means of promoting morality, Kant has too much limited its divine mission; he has forgotten that religion must besides be a source of consolation and of hope, in the midst of the ills of the present life; and that by powerful motives and lofty meditations it must come to the succor of frail humanity, that it must serve as a support in the double struggle that we have to sustain against temptation to evil and against suffering.” See also Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 264, who adopts a similar ground of criticisin.
Note XXVIII., p. 65.
“In the exposition of the pure conception it has yet further been
declared, that it is the absolute divine conception itself; so that in truth there
would not be the relation of an application, but the logical process is the
immediate exhibition of God’s self-determination to Being.”—Hegel, Logik.
(Werke, V. p. 170.) In like manner his disciple Marheineke says, “Only as
subsumed into this Idea. and sublated [“This sublating has the
double meaning of tollere and of
conservare, and indicates the taking up and the
retaining under a higher point of view, etc.”—Chalybaeus’s Hist. of Speculative Philosophy,
transl. by Edersheim, p. 351: Edinburgh, 1854.]—Trans. Grundlehren der Christlichen Dognmatik,
§ 21. In another passage of the same work (§ 84) he says, “As God in the knowledge
of Himself does not have Himself extra se, and as
the self-knowing is no other than the known, but rather the Spirit, unity and essence
of both, so is the idea of the Absolute the absolute idea, and as such the stand-point
of all knowledge and all science.” Discussions,
p. 787.
Note XXIX., p. 65.
“Besides God there exists, truly and in the proper sense
of the word, nothing at all but knowledge; and this knowledge is the divine
Existence itself, absolutely and immediately, and in so far as we are knowledge,
are we, in the deepest root of our being, the divine Existence.”—Fichte, Anweisungen
zum seligen Leben (Werke, V. p. 448). “Man, rational being in general,
is ordained to be a complement of the phenomenal world; out of him, out of his activity,
is to develop itself all that is wanting to the totality of the revelation of God,
since nature receives, indeed, the whole divine substance, but only in the Real:
rational being is to express the image of the same divine Nature, as it is in itself,
accordingly, in the Ideal.”—Schelling, Vorlesungen über die Methode des Academischen
Studium, p. 18. “God is infinite, I finite—these are false expressions, forms
not fitted to the idea, to the nature of the case. . . . . . . God is the movement
to the finite, and thereby as sublation of the same to himself; in the I
as the self-sublating as finite, God regresses to himself, and is only God as
this regress.”—Hegel, Vorlesungen, über die Philosophie der Religion (Werke,
XI. p. 194). “Man’s knowledge of God is, according to the essential communion, a
common knowledge; i. e., man has knowledge of God, only in so far as God
has knowledge of Himself; this knowledge is God's self-consciousness; but just
so is it, too, His knowledge of man; and God's knowledge of man is man's
knowledge of God.”—Ibid. XII. p. 496. “Rational knowledge of truth is, first of all,
as a knowledge of God, knowledge through God, knowledge in his Spirit and through
it. By finite, relative thinking, God, who is nothing finite and relative, cannot
be thought and known. On the contrary, in the knowledge, the I is out beyond
Rationalism here takes up a common ground with Mysticism, and the logical process of the Hegelians becomes identical with the ecstatic intuition of the Neo-Platonists. Compare the language of Plotinus, Enn. VI. L. ix. c. 9. “It (the soul) may then see itself . . . . . . becoming God, or rather being God.” In the same strain sings the “Cherubic Wanderer,” Angelus Silesius:
“In God is nothing known: He is the only One: Cherubinischer Wandersmann,
I. 285. Quoted by Strauss, Christliche Glaubenslehre, I. p. 531.
What we in Him do know, that we ourselves must be.”
For an exactly similar doctrine, asserted in the Hindu Vedas, see Dr. Mill’s Observations on the application of pantheistic principles to the criticism of the Gospel, p. 159.
Note XXX., p. 65.
Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, thus interprets
the history of Christ. “The truth. . . . . . which men have reached
in this entire history is this: that the idea of God has for them a certainty; that
the Human is immediate, present God; and indeed, in such wise, that in this history,
as the spirit apprehends it, the exhibition of the process pertains to that, which
constitutes man, the spirit.” Werke, XII. p. 307. See
Ewerbeck, Qu’est ce que la Religion d’après la nouvelle Philosophie Allemande,
pp 271, 390, 413. Essays (Orr’s Edition, 1851), p. 511. Ibid., p.
125.
Another form of this deification of humanity is that of M. Comte,
who agrees with Strauss and Feuerbach, in finding God only in the human race. This
discovery is announced as the grand consummation of Positive Philosophy. “This final
estimation condenses l’ensemble of positive conceptions
in the single notion of one Being immense and eternal, Humanity, whose sociological
destinies develop themselves always under the necessary preponderance of biological
and cosmological fatalities. Around this veritable Great-Being, the immediate mover
of every existence, individual or collective, our affections centre as spontaneously
as our thoughts and our actions.” Catechisme Positiviste, p. 19. Catechisme Positiviste,
p. 31. Thus, under the auspices of the positive philosophy, we return once more
to the worship of the ibis, the ichneumon, and the cat. The Egyptians had the
same reverence for their “dignes auxiliares animaux.” “They deified
no beast, but for some utility which they might get from it.”—(Cicero, De Natura
Deorum, I. 36.) This
exquisite passage must be quoted in the original to be properly appreciated. “En
appliquant aussitôt ce principe evident, je devais spontanément choisir l’angélique
interlocutrice, qui, après une seule année d’influence objective se trouve, depuis
plus de six ans, subjectivement associée à toutes mes pensées comme à tous mes sentiments.
C’est par elle qui je suis enfin devenu, pour l’Humanité, un organe vraiment double,
comme quiconque a dignement subi l’ascendant féminin. Sans elle, je n’aurais jamais
pu faire activement succéder le carrière de St. Paul à celle d’Aristote, en fondant
la religion universelle sur la saine philosophie, après avoir tiré celle-ci de la
science réelle.”—Preface, p. xxii.
Note XXXI., p. 66.
“The object of religion as of philosophy, is eternal truth in its very objectivity, God, and nothing but God, and the unfolding of God.”—Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XI. p. 21).
Note XXXII., p. 66.
“Thus is religion the divine Spirit’s knowledge of Himself through the mediation of the finite Spirit.”—Hegel, Werke, XI. p. 200. “Religion we have defined as the self-consciousness of God.”—Ibid. XII. p. 191. Compare Marheineke, Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 420. “Religion is, accordingly, nothing at all but the existence of the divine Spirit in the human; but an existence, which is life, a life which is consciousness, a consciousness which, in its truth, is knowledge. This human knowledge is essentially divine; for it is, first of all, the divine Spirit’s knowledge, and religion in its absoluteness.”
Note XXXIII., p. 66.
“Logic is consequently to be conceived as the system of the pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm is truth unveiled and absolute. We may therefore say, that it contains in itself the exhibition of God, as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite spirit.”—Hegel, Logik (Werke, III. p. 33).
Note XXXIV., p. 66.
Clemens Alex. Stromata, i. 2. Πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ καὶ ἄχρηστος εἴη φιλοσο· φία, εἰ εὔχρηστος ἡ τῆς ἀχρηστίας βεβαίωσις, εὔχρηστος.
Note I., p. 69.
“Unless we have independent means of knowing that God knows the truth, and is disposed to tell it to us, his word (if we be ever so certain that it is really his word) might as well not have been spoken. But if we know, independently of the Bible, that God knows the truth, and is disposed to tell it to us, obviously we know a great deal more also. We know not only the existence of God, but much concerning his character. For, only by discerning that he has Virtues similar in kind to human Virtues, do we know of his truthfulness and his goodness. Without this a priori belief, a book-revelation is a useless impertinence.”—F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 58. With this a priori belief, it is obvious that a book-revelation is, as far as our independent knowledge extends, still more impertinent; for it merely tells us what we knew before. See an able criticism of this theory in the Eclipse of Faith, p. 73 sqq.
Note II., p. 71.
“Furthermore, since, for us, that falls under the sphere of the
understanding, which a great many philosophers before us have declared to be within
the province of the reason, we shall have for the highest kind of intelligence a
position unattained by them; and we shall define it as that by which finite and
infinite are seen in the eternal, but not the eternal in the finite or in the infinite.”—Schelling,
Bruno, p. 163. (Compare p. 69.) “But there are still other spheres, which
can be observed,—not merely those which are confined to a relativity of finite to
finite, but those, too, wherein the divine in its absoluteness is in the consciousness.”—Hegel,
Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XI. p. 196). In like manner, Mr.
Newman speaks of the Soul as “the organ of specific information to us,” respecting
things spiritual; The Soul, p. 3. Discourse of Matters pertaining
to Religion, p. 130.
Note III., p. 71.
“This substance, simple, primitive, must comprise the perfections
in eminent degree, contained in the derivative substances, which are its
Note IV., p. 72.
Compare Wegscheider’s definition of Mysticism, Instit. Theol. § 5.—”A near approach to superstition, or rather a species of it, is mzysticisnm; or a belief in a particular faculty of the soul, . . . . . by which it may reach even in this world an immediate intercourse with the Deity or with celestial natures, and enjoy immediately a knowledge of divine things.”
Note V., p. 73.
Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. (Werke,
V. pp. 40, 115.)—The following remarks of Mr. Parker are another application of
the same principle, substituting, however, as if on purpose to show the contradictory
conclusions to which such a method of reasoning may lead, the conception of perfect
love and future compensation, for that of a moral nature with no affections and
no future promises. “This we know, that the Infinite God must be a perfect Creator,
the sole and undisturbed author of all that is in Nature. . . . . Now, a perfect
Motive for creation,—what will that be? It must be absolute Love, producing a desire
to bless
Note VI., p. 73.
The nature of the case implies that the human mind is competent to sit in moral and spiritual judgment on a professed revelation, and to decide (if the case seem to require it) in the following tone. ‘This doctrine attributes to God that which we should all call harsh, cruel, or unjust, in man: it is, therefore, intrinsically inadmissible.’”—Newman, The Soul, p. 58. For an able refutation of this reasoning, see the Defence of the Eclipse of Faith, p. 38.
Note VII., p. 73.
“To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things; is to suppose God’s Knowledge to be inconsistent with itself.”—Edwards, On the Freedom of the Will, part 2 sect. 12.
Note VIII., p. 73.
“Let us suppose a great prince governing a wicked and rebellious people. lie has it in his power to punish: he thinks fit to pardon them. But he orders his only and well-beloved son to be put to death, to expiate their sins, and to satisfy his royal vengeance. Would this proceeding appear to the eye of reason, and in the unprejudiced light of nature, wise, or just, or good?”—Bolingbroke, Fragments or Minutes of Essays (Works, vol. v. p. 289, ed. 1754). Compare Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 92. See also above Lecture I., Note 13.
Note IX., p. 73.
“Intellectually, we of necessity hold that the highest human perfection is the best type of the Divine. . . . . Every good man has learnt to forgive, and when the offender is penitent, to forgive freely,—without punishment or retribution: whence the conclusion is inevitable, that God also forgives, as soon as sin is repented of.”—Newman, The Soul, p. 99. “It may be collected from the principles of Natural Religion, that God, on the sincere repentance of offenders, will receive them again into favour, and render them capable of those rewards naturally attendant on right behaviour.”—Warburton, Divine Legation, b. ix., ch. 2. Compare, on the other side, Magee on the Atonement, notes iv. and xxiv. See also above, Lecture I., Note 14.
Note X., p. 73.
“A divine command is pleaded in vain, except it can be shown that
the thing supposed to be commanded is not inconsistent with the law of nature; which,
if God can dispense with in any one case, he may in all.”—Tindal, Christianity
as old as the Creation, p. 272, quoted and answered by Waterland, Scripture
Vindicated, on
Note XI., p. 74.
Kant, Streit der Facultäten, p. 321, ed. Rosenkranz. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 150. Parker, Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 84.
Note XII., p. 74.
Tindal, apud Waterland l. c. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 151.
Note XIII., p. 74.
Newman, The Soul, p. 60. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 8.
Note XIV., p. 75.
“The Absolute is that which is free from all necessary
relation, that is, which is free from every relation as a condition of existence;
but it may exist in relation, provided that relation be not a necessary condition
of its
Note XV., p. 76.
“The absolutely infinite is what contains everything, or
every perfection, which can exist or be conceived; that you are wont to call
infinite in perfection. Infinite, e. g. predicated of extension, means
what embraces all existing or conceivable extension.”—Werenfels, DeFinibus Mundi
Dialogus (Dissertationes, 1716, vol. ii., p. 192). In the latter sense,
Clarke speaks of the error of “imagining all Infinites to be equal, when in things
disparate they manifestly are not so; an infinite Line being not only
not equal to, but infinitely less than an infinite Surface, and
an infinite Surface than Space infinite in all Dimensions.” Demonstration
of the Being and Attributes of God, Prop. I. See Spinoza, Epist. XXIX, Ethica,
P. I. Prop. xv.; and Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. 1. A curious psychological
discrepancy may be observed in relation to this controversy. Spinoza maintains that
quantity as represented in the imagination is finite, but that as conceived by the
intellect it is infinite. Werenfels, on the contrary, asserts that the imagined
quantity is infinite, the conceived finite. The truth is, that in relation to Space,
which is not a general notion containing individuals under it, conception and imagination
are identical; and the notions of an ultimate limit of extension and of an unlimited
extension, are both equally self-contradictory from every point of view.
Note XVI., p. 76.
“By the Deity I understand a Being absolutely infinite, i. e., a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. I say infinite absolutely, but not in its kind, for whatever is infinite in its kind only, of that we cannot affirm infinite attributes; but to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite, there pertains whatever expresses essence and involves no negation.”—Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Def. VI.
Note XVII., p. 76.
See Spinoza l. c.; Wolf, Theologia Naturalis, P. II. § 15; Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 450. ed. Rosenkranz; Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik, ed. Poelitz, p. 276; Schelling, Vom Ich, § 10. The assumption ultimately annihilates itself; for if any object of conception exhausts the universe of reality, it follows that the mind which conceives it has no existence. The older form of this representation is criticized by Hegel, Encyclopädie, § 36. His own conception of God, however, virtually amounts to the same thing. A similar view is implied in his criticism of Aristotle, whom he censures for regarding God as one object out of many. See Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 283.
Note XVIII., p. 76.
Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XV. p. 275. See also, Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 24. Encyklopädie, § 19, 20, 21. Compare Schelling, Philosophie und Religion, p. 35, quoted by Willm, Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande, vol. iii. p. 301. Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 89) is compelled in like manner to assert that God must be in some manner the author of evil; an opinion which is also maintained by Mr. Parker, Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 119.
Note XIX., p. 76.
“A thing is said to be finite in its kind, which can be limited by another of the same nature; e. g. a body is called finite, because we always conceive of one greater.”—Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Def. II.
Note XX., p. 76.
See Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. II. Art. 3; Qu. IX. Art.
1. “Actus simplicissimus,” says Hobbes contemptuously, “signifieth
nothing.” Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, Animadversions,
No. XXIV. See, on the other side, Bramhall, Works, vol. IV. p. 524. Demonstration, Prop IV. See,
on the other side, Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 290.
Note XXI., p. 76.
See Plato, Republic, II. p. 381; Aristotle, Metaph. VIII. 8, 15; Augustine, Enarrattio in Ps. IX. ii. De Trinitate, XV. c. 15; Hooker, E. P. b. I. c. 5; Descartes, Meditatio Tertia, p. 22. ed. 1685; Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Prop. xvii. Schol.; Hartley, Observations on Man, Prop. cxv.; Herder, Gott, Werke, VIII. p. 180; Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 54; Hegel, Werke, XIV. p. 290; Marheineke, Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 195. The conclusion, that God actually does all that he can do; and, consequently, that there is no possibility of free action in any finite being, can only bhe avoided by the admission, which is ultimately forced upon us, that our human conception of the infinite is not the true one. Müller (Christliclhe Lehre von der Sünde, II. p. 251, third edit. ) endeavors to meet this conclusion by a counter-argument. Hr shows that it is equally a limitation of the divine Nature to suppose that God is compelled of necessity to realize in act everything which he has the power to accomplish. This argument completes the dilemma, and brings into full view the counter-impotences of human thought in relation to the infinite. We cannot conceive an Infinite Being as capable of becoming that which he is not; nor, on the other hand, can we conceive him as actually being all that he can be.
Note XXII., p. 77.
“Now it is sufficiently manifest, that a thing existing absolutely
(i. e. not under relation), and a thing existing absolutely as a cause,
are contrydictory.
Note XXIII., p. 77.
That a belief in creation is incompatible with a philosophy of
the Absolute, was clearly seen by Fichte, who consistently denounces it, as a Jewish
and Heathenish notion and the fundamental error of all false Metaphysics. He even
goes so far as to maintain that St. John, the only teacher of true Christianity,
did not believe in the Creation, and that the beginning of his Gospel was designed
to contradict the Mosaic narrative. See his Anweisung zum seligen Leben (Werke,
v. p. 479). Compare Schelling, Bruno, p. 60, who regards the finite as necessarily
coeternal with the infinite. So also Rothe, Theologische Ethik, § 40, asserts
that the doctrine of a creation in time is inconsistent with the essential nature
of God, as unchangeable and necessarily creative. Spinoza’s attempted demonstration
that one substance cannot be produced from another, Ethica, P. I. Prop.
vi. Church History, English translation, Vol. II. p. 281,
Bohn’s edition.
Note XXIV., p. 78.
Arist. Metaph. XIV. 9. [Ed. Gul. Duval, Paris, 1629.] “If
it have aught as the object of intelligence, and something other than itself be
thus superior
Note XXV., p. 78.
Plotinns, Enn., III. 1. IX. c. 3. “The Intelligence is now twofold, and objectifies itself; and it is wanting in somewhat because it has ‘the Well’ (τὸ εὖ) in the act of intelligence, not in the substance.” Enn. V. 1. VI. c. 2. “Being a duality it will not be the first, . . . . . in itself it will properly be neither the intelligent nor the intelligible; for what is intelligible is so relatively to another.” Enn. V. 1. VI. c. 6. “Therefore there will again be a duality in the conscious intelligence; but that (the first or the Absolute) is nowise a duality.” Cf. Porphyr. Sent. XV. “But if there be plurality in the intelligible, since there is a plurality, not unity, in the objects of the conscious intelligence, then of necessity there must be plurality in the essence of the intelligence. But unity (the One) is prior to plurality, so that of necessity it is prior to the intelligence.” “The Absolute, as absolutely universal, is absolutely one; absolute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of plurality and difference; the Absolute, and the Knowledge of the Absolute, are therefore identical. But knowledge, or intelligence, supposes a plurality of terms—the plurality of subject and object. Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, cannot therefore be identified with the Absolute, whose essence is unity; and if known, the Absolute, as known, must be different from the Absolute, as existing; that is, there must be two Absolutes—an Absolute in knowledge and an Absolute in existence: which is contradictory.”—Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 32.
Note XXVI., p. 78.
Clem. Alex. Strom. V. 12. p. 587. “Nor, indeed, would any
one rightly call it a whole, for the whole is predicated of magnitude . . . . .
nor can it be said to have parts, for the One is indivisible.” Plotinus, Enn.
V. 1. VI. c. 5. “For of a thing that is absolutely one, how can you predicate the
coming to itself, or the want of consciousness?” On this point, the earlier and
later forms of Pantheism are divided against each other. Spinoza (Eth. P.
I. Def. 6) defines the Deity as composed of an infinite
Werke, XII. p. 419. See also Encyklopädie,
§ 28 (Werke, VI. p. 62).
Note XXVII., p. 78.
That the Absolute cannot be conceived as composed of a plurality
of attributes, but only as the one substance conceived apart from all plurality,
is shown by Plotinus, Enn. V. 1. VI., c. 3. “If it be said that nothing hinders
this same (i. e. the First) being the Many, the answer must be, that these
Many have an underlying One (One Subject, ὑποκείμενον);
for the Many cannot exist, except there exist the One from which the Many must be
derived, and in which the Many must exist . . . . . . and this One must be taken
as in itself the only One.”. . . . Compare Proclus, Inst. Theol. c. 1.
“All
plurality in some way partakes of Unity (or the One), for if not, then neither will
the whole be One, nor each one of the many which make up the plurality; but of certain
entities each will be a plurality, and this on to an infinite, and of these
infinites each again will be an infinite plurality.” To the same effect is the reasoning
of Augustine, De Trinitate, vi. c. 6. 7. “In every body magnitude is one
thing, color another, figure another. For the magnitude diminished, the color may
remain the same, and the figure the same; and the figure changed, the body may be
just as large and of just the same color; and whatever other things are predicated
of the body, may exist together, and may be changed without change on the part of
the rest. And thus the nature of the body is proved to be manifold, but in nowise
simple. . . . . . But also in the soul since it is one thing to be ingenious, another
to be dull, another to be acute, another to have a good memory; since desire is
one thing, fear another, joy another, sorrow another; and since there can be found
in the nature of the soul
Note XXVIII., p. 79.
See Plato, Republic, II. p. 380, VI. p. 511, VII. p. 517; Timæus, p. 31. Aristotle, Metaph. XI. 8, 18: 10, 14; Eth. Nic. VII. 14, 8. Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. I. 29; De Nat. Deor. II. 11. Plotinus, Enn. II. 9, 1, III. 9, 3. V. 4. 1, VI. 5, 1: 9, 6. Proclus, Inst. Theol. c. i. xxli. lix. cxxxiii. Clemens Alex., Strom. V. p. 587. Origen, De Princ. I. 1, 6. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, VIII. 6: De Trinitate, VI. 6, VII. 1, XV. 5, 13. Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. III. Art. 7, Qu. VII. Art. 2. Qu. XI. Art. 3. Leibnitz, Monadologie, § 39, 40, 47. Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. vi. vii. Schelling, Vom Ich, § 9; Bruno, p. 185. Rothe, Theol. Ethik, § 8.
Note XXIX., p. 79.
“Hence, therefore, it is evident, that nothing is called one or unique, except after some other has been conceived, which agrees with it. But since the existence of God belongs to his own essence, and of his essence we cannot form a universal idea, it is certain that he who calls God one or unique, can have no idea of God, or speaks improperly of Him.”—Spinoza, Epist. L. Compare Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 56.
Note XXX., p. 80.
“For the expression, ‘if it be possible,’ referred not
merely to the power of God, but also to his justice; for, as to the power of God,
all things are possible, whether just or unjust; but as to his justice, He being
not only powerful, but just, not all things are possible, but only those which are
just.”—Origen in St. Matt. xxvi. 42; compare c. Celsum, Ill. 70.
Origen speaks still more strongly in a remarkable fragment of the De Principiis,
Note XXXI., p. 80.
Thus Spinoza (Ethica, P. I. Prop. 26) says, “A thing which was determined to the doing of somewhat, was necessarily so determined by God;” and, carrying the same theory to its inevitable consequence, he consistently maintains (P. IV. Prop. 61) that the notion of evil only exists in consequence of the inadequacy of our ideas. Hegel in like manner (Encykl. § 35) reduces evil to a mere negation, which may be identified with good in the absolute. See also above, Note 18, p. 231.
Note XXXII., p. 80.
Plato, Rep. II. p. 381. “Does He, then, change Himself
into something better and nobler, or into something worse and baser than Himself?
Necessarily, said he, into something better, for we cannot say that God is wanting
in any good or noble quality. Exactly so; and that being the case, does it seem
to you, that any one, whether God or man, would voluntarily make himself worse in
any respect?” Compare Augustine, In Joannis Evangelium, Tract. XXIII. 9.
“You do not find in God any changeableness, anything which is different now, from
what it was a little while ago. For where you find difference, there has taken place
a kind of death; for that is death, the not being what (one) was. Whatever therefore,
Note XXXIII., p. 81.
“What,” says Sir W. Hamilton, “is our thought of creation? It
is not a thought of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the contrary,
creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the evolution of existence
from possibility into actuality, by the fiat of the Deity. . . . . And what is true
of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of annihilation. We can think no
real annihilation,—no absolute sinking of something into nothing. But as creation
is cogitable by us, only as a putting forth of Divine power, so is annihilation
by us only conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All that is now actually
existent in the universe, this we think and must think, as having, prior to creation,
virtually existed in the Creator; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated,
we can only conceive this, as the retractation by the Deity of an overt energy into
latent power. In short, it is impossible for the human mind to think what it thinks
existent, lapsing into absolute non-existence, either in time past or in time future.” Discussions,
p 620. Compare a remarkable passage in Herder’s Gott (Werke VIII.
p. 241) where the author maintains a similar view of the impossibility of conceiving
creation from or reduction to notling. But Herder is speaking as a professed defender
of Spinoza. Sir W. Hamilton’s system is in all its essential features the direct
antagonist of Spinoza; and even in the present passage the apparently pantheistic
hypothesis is represented as the result not of thought, but of an inability to think.
Still it is to be regretted that the distinguished author should have used language
liable to be misunderstood in this respect, especially as it scarcely accords with
the general principles of his own system.
Note XXXIV., p. 83.
“Pantheism teaches that all is good, for all is only one; and
that every appearance of what we call wrong is only an empty delusion. Hence its
disturbing influence upon the life; for here,—turn about language as we may, and
attach ourselves as we will to the faith that everywhere comes forth through the
voice of conscience,—yet at bottom, if we remain true to the destructive principle
of the pantheistic doctrine, we must do away with and declare null and void, the
eternal distinction between good and evil, between right and wrong.”—F. Schlegel,
Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier, b. III. c. 2. (Werke, VIII. p.
324). “If it is God who thinks in me, my thought is absolute; not only am I unable
to think otherwise than I do think, . . . but I can make no choice in my conceptions,
approve or search after some, reject and shun others, all being necessary and perfect,
all being divine; in fine, I become a machine for thinking, an intelligent machine,
but irresponsiblle.”—Bartholmèss, Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la philosophie
moderne, Introduction, p. xxxvii. These necessary consequences of Pantheism
are fully exhibited by Spinoza, Ethica, P. I. Prop. 26; P. II. Props. 32,
33, 34, 35; P. IV. Prop. 64. Hegel (Werke, XI. pp. 95, 208, 390) endeavors,
not very successfully, to defend his own philosophy from the charge of Pantheism
and its consequences. His defence amounts to no more than the assertion that God
cannot be identified with the universe of finite objects, in a system in which finite
objects have no real existence. Thus explained, the system is identical with Pantheism
Note XXXV., p. 83.
“The dialectic intellect, by the exertion of its own powers exclusively, can lead us to a general affirmation of the supreme reality of an absolute being. But here it stops. It is utterly incapable of communicating insight or conviction concerning the existence or possibility of the world, as different from Deity. It finds itself constrained to identify, more truly to confound, the Creator with the aggregate of his creatures, and, cutting the knot which it cannot untwist, to deny altogether the reality of all finite existence, and then to shelter itself from its own dissatisfaction, its own importunate queries, in the wretched evasion that of nothings no solution can be required: till pain haply, and anguish, and remorse, with bitter scoff and moody laughter inquire,—Are we then indeed nothings?—till through every organ of sense nature herself asks,—How and whence did this sterile and pertinacious nothing acquire its plural number?—Unde, quæso, hæc nihili in nihila tam portentosa transnihilatio?—and lastly:—What is that inward mirror, in and for which these nothings have at least relative existence? “—Coleridge, The Friend, vol. III. p. 213.
Note XXXVI., p. 83.
The limitation, speculative Atheism, is necessary; for the denial of the Infinite does not in every case constitute practical Atheisin. For it is not under the form of the Infinite that the idea of God is distinctly presented in worship; and it is possible to adore a superior Being, without positively asking how far that superiority extends. It is only when we are able to investigate the problem of the relation between the infinite and the finite, and to perceive that the latter cannot be regarded as expressing the true idea of the Deity, that the denial of the infinite becomes atheism in speculation. On the alternative between Christianity and Atheism, some excellent remarks will be found in the Restoration of Belief, p. 248.
Note XXXVII., p. 84.
“Much stress is wont to be laid upon the limits of thought, and
it is asserted that the limit cannot be transcended. In this assertion lies the
unconsciousness, that even in fixing somewhat as limit, it has already been transcended.
For a determination, a bound, is determined as limit, only
Note XXXVIII., p. 84.
These opposite limitations fall under the general law of the Conditioned
enunciated by Sir W. Hamilton. “The mind is astricted to think in certain forms;
and, under these, thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two
unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable,
but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the other is necessarily
true.” Discussions, p. 618.
Note XXXIX., p. 84.
“Every finite is, by virtue of its notion, bounded by its opposite; and absolute finiteness is a self-contradictory notion.”—Fichte, Grundlage der gesamnmten Wissenschaftslehre (Werke, I., p. 185).
Note XL., p. 87.
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p.
98, 122, 137. For the influence of Kant on the rationalist theology, see Rosenkranz,
Geschichte
Note XLI., p. 87.
Paulus, in the preface to his Leben Jesu, expressly adopts,
though without naming the author, Kant’s theory, that miracles are indifferent to
religion, and that the whole essence of Christianity consists in morality. Consistently
with these principles, he maintains (§ 2) that the historical inquirer can admit
no event as credible which cannot be explained by natural causes. The entire details
of the evangelical narrative are explained by this method. The miracles of healing
were performed by medical skill, which Christ imparted to his disciples, and thus
was enabled to heal, not by a word, but by deputy. Thus he coolly translates the
words of the centurion,
Note XLII., p. 87.
Wegscheider, though he expressly rejects Kant’s allegorizing interpretations of Scripture (see Institutiones Theologiæ, § 25), agrees with him in maintaining the supreme authority of reason in all religious questions, and in accommodating all religious doctrines to Ethical precepts (Præf. p. viii. ix.). Accordingly, in the place of the allegory, he adopts the convenient theory of adaptation to the prejudices of the age; by which a critic is enabled at once to set aside all doctrines which do not harmonize with his theory. Among the doctrines thus rejected, as powerless for the true end of religion, and useless or even prejudicial to piety, are those of the Trinity, the Atonement, the Corruption of human nature, Justification, and the Resurrection of the body. See § 51.
Note XLIII., p. 87.
See his Grund-und-Glaubens-Sätze der Evangelisch-Protestantischen Kirche, p. 70 (2nd edition). This work of Röhr was principally directed against the Lutheran Symbolical books; but the Catholic Creeds are also included in his sweeping condemnations. Of the Apostles’ Creed he observes: “Our age needs a more logically correct, and a more comprehensive survey of the pure evangelical faith than is afforded by the so-called Apostles’ Creed, which is good for its immediate and ordinary purpose, but too short, too aphoristic, and too historical for that which is here proposed.” (p. 49.) Of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds he remarks in a note: “The Niceno-Constantinopolitan and the pseudo-Athanasian Creeds, with their decidedly anti-scriptural dogmas, are here altogether out of the question, however much they were admitted by the reformers, in all honesty and faith, as truly scriptural.” Röhr agrees with Kant in separating the historical facts of Christianity from the religion itself (p. 157), and in maintaining that morality is the only mode of honoring God (p. 56). His proposed creed, from which everything “historical” is studiously excluded, runs as follows:
“There is one true God, proclaimed to us by his only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ. To this God, as the most perfect of all Beings, as the Creator, Sustainer, and Governor of the world, and as the Father and Instructor of men and of all rational spirits, the deepest veneration is due. This veneration is best rendered by active striving after virtue and righteousness, by zealous control of the inclinations and passions of our sensual and evilly-disposed nature, and by honest, entire fulfilment of our duty, according to the exalted example of Jesus, whereby we may assure ourselves of the aid of his divine Spirit. In the consciousness of the filial relation into which we thereby enter with him, we may, in earthly need, reckon with confidence on his fatherly help, in the feeling of our moral weakness and unworthiness, upon his grace and mercy assured to us through Christ, and in the moment of death be assured that we shall continue to exist immortally, and receive a recompense in a better life.”
The celebrated Briefe über den Rationalismus, by the same author, have at least the merit of being an honest and logical exposition of Rationalist principles and their consequences, without disguise or compromise. The commendation, however, to which in this respect the work is partly entitled, cannot be extended to the concluding letter, in which the author endeavors to establish, for himself and his fellow rationalists, the right to discharge the spiritual functions, and subscribe to the confessions, of a church whose doctrines they disbelieve; and even to make use of their position to unsettle the faith of the young committed to their instruction.
Note XLIV., p. 87.
The character of Hegel’s philosophy in this respect is sufficiently shown by Strauss, Streitschriften, Heft III. p. 57, sqq.
Note XLV., p. 87.
Vatke’s Religion des Alten Testamentes, forms the first
part of his Biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt; Berlin, 1835.
In the Introduction (§ 7, 12, 13) the author lays down a law of the development
of religion as a process of the infinite spirit in self-revelation, according to
the principles of the Hegelian philosophy. As a consequence of this law he maintains
that it is impossible for an individual to raise himself, even by the aid of divine
revelation, above the spiritual position of his age, or for a nation to rise or
fall from its normal stage of religious cultivation (pp. 87, 181). By this canon
the entire narrative of Scripture is made to stand or fall. The account of a primitive
revelation and subsequent alienation from God, must be rejected, because the human
consciousness must attain to perfection through a succession of progressive stages
(p. 102). The book of Genesis has no historical value; and we cannot decide whether
the patriarchs before Moses had any knowledge of the one true God (pp. 180, 181).
Moses himself, as represented in the scriptural account, is altogether inconceivable;
for he appears at a period when, according to the laws of historical development,
the time was not yet ripe for him (p. 183). Much of the history of Moses must be
regarded as a mythus, invented by the priests at a later period (p. 186). The political
institutions attributed to him could not possibly have been founded by him (p. 211).
The ceremonial laws are such as could neither have been discovered by an individual
nor made known by divine revelation (p. 218). The Passover was originally
a feast of the sun, in celebration of his entering into the sign Aries; which fully
accounts for the offering of a male lamb (p. 492). As regards the decalogue, the
second commandment must be considered as an interpolation of a later date; for it
implies a hither degree of abstraction than could have been reached in the Mosaic
age (p. 234). The lapses into idolatry recorded in the book of Judges, are highly
improbable; for a whole people cannot fall back from a higher to a lower state of
religious culture (p. 181). The books of Samuel betray their legendary origin by
the occurrence of round numbers, and by the significant names of the first three
kings (p. 289). The wisdom attributed to Solomon is irreconcilable with his subsequent
idolatry; and the account must therefore be regarded as legendary (p. 309). Such
are a few of the results of
Note XLVI., p. 87.
The Hegelian element of Strauss’s Leben Jesu is briefly
exhibited at the end of the book (§ 150). The body of the work is mainly occupied
with various cavils, some of them of the very minutest philosophy, designed to invalidate
the historical character of the Gospel narratives. Among these precious morsels
of criticism, we meet with such objections as the following. That the name of the
angel Gabriel is of Hebrew origin (§ 17). That the angel, instead of inflicting
dumbness on Zacharias, ought to have merely reprimanded him (ibid.). That
a real angel would not have proclaimed the advent of the Messiah in language so
strictly Jewish (§ 25). That the appearance of the star to the magi would have strengthened
the popular belief in the false science of astrology (§ 34). That John the Baptist,
being an ascetic, and therefore necessarily prejudiced and narrow-minded, could
not have considered himself inferior to one who did not practise similar mortifications
(§ 36). That Jesus could not have submitted to the rite of baptism, because that
rite symbolized a future Messiah (§ 49). That if there is a personal devil, he cannot
take a visible form (§ 54). That it is improbable that Jesus, when he read in the
synagogue, should have lighted on an apposite passage of the prophet Isaiah (§ 58).
That Jesus could not have known that the woman of Samaria had had five husbands,
because it is not probable that each of them had left a distinct image in her mind,
and because a minute knowledge of the history of individuals is degrading to the
prophetic dignity (§ 60). That it is impossible to understand “how he, whose vocation
had reference to the depths of the human heart, should be tempted to occupy himself
with the fish-frequented depths of the waters” (§ 71). That Jesus could not have
ridden into Jerusalem on an ass whereon never man sat, because unbroken asses are
difficult to manage (§ 110). That the resurrection of the dead is impossible, because
the inferior principles, whose work is corruption, will not be inclined to surrender
back the dominion of the body to its former master, the soul (§ 140). That the ascension
of Christ
Stromata,
I. ii. p. 296. Discussions, p. 787 [696, ed. 1852]. Life and Letters of B. G. Niebuhr vol. II. p. 123.
Niebuhr did not live to witness the publication of the Leben Jesu; but the above passage is as appropriate as if it had been part of an actual review of that work.
Note XLVII., p. 87.
With Feuerbach’s Wesen des Christenthums I am only acquainted
through the French translation by M. Ewerbeck, which forms the principal
Note XLVIII., p. 89.
“Christ, who taught his disciples, and us in them, how to pray, propounded not the knowledge of God, though without that he could not hear us; neither represented he his power, though without that he cannot help us; but comprehended all in this relation, When ye pray, say, Our Father.”—Pearson on the Creed, article I.
Note I., p. 93.
“Whatever is for us something is so only so far as it is
not something else; all position is possible only by negation;
as indeed the word itself define means nothing else but limit.”—Fichte,
Gerichtliche Verantwortung (Werke, V. p. 265). “The Finite exists
in relation to its Other (the other of it, alterum),
which is its negation, and puts itself there as its limit.” “Hegel, Encykl.
§ 28 (Werke, VI. p. 63). Compare Plotinus, Enn. V. 1. III. c. 12.
“But that is the One itself, without the Something (i. e. not some one thing);
for if it were the some one thing, then it would not be the One itself;
for the One itself is prior to the Something.”—Enn. VI. 1. VII. c. 39.
“For
the Intelligence, if it is to exercise intelligence, must always apprehend difference
and identity.” . . . . . .—Spinoza, Epist. 50. “This determination, therefore,
does not belong to the (or a) thing In its own esse,
but, on the contrary, belongs to its non-esse.” The canon, undeniable from
a human point of view, that all consciousness is limitation, seems to have had some
influence on modern philosophical theories concerning the Divine Nature. Thus Hegel
maintains that God must become limited to be conscious of himself, Werke,
XI. p. 193. Ibid., p. 200.
Note II., p. 94.
“For being limited (finite) ourselves, it would be absurd for
us to make some determination of the infinite, and thus endeavor to limit it, as
it were, and comprehend it.”—Descartes, Principia, I. 26. “The second reason
of our short and imperfect notions of the Deity is, the Infinity of it. For
this we must observe, That we can perfectly know and comprehend nothing, but as
it is represented to us under some certain Bounds and Limitations. . . . Upon which
account, what a loss must we needs be at, in understanding or knowing the Divine
Nature, when the very way of our knowing seems to carry in it something opposite
to the thing known. For the way of knowing is by defining, limiting, and determining;
and the thing known is that of which there neither are, nor can be, any Bounds,
Limits, Definitions, or Determinations.”—South, Animadvrersions upon Sherlock,
ch. II. p. 55. ed. 1693. “All our thinking is a limiting; and exactly in this respect
Note III., p. 94.
The opposite sides of this contradiction are indicated in the
following passages. Aristotle, Phys. III. 6, [10,] 13: “The Infinite . .
. . is the whole potentially, but not actually.” . . . . Compare Metaph.
viii. [ix. Ed. Gul. Duval, Paris, 1629] 8, 16: “That, therefore, which is capable
of being, may both be and not be; the same thing, therefore, is capable both of
being and of not being. But that, which is capable of not being, may not be; and
that, which may not be, is corruptible. . . . . Nothing, therefore, of things simply
incorruptible, is potentially simply being.” For a full discussion of the distinction
between potentiality and actuality (the
δύναμις and ἐντελέχεια
or ἐνέργεια of Aristotle), see Trendelenburg
on Arist. De Anima, p. 295. Compare Arist. Metaph. viii. [ix. Ed.
Gul. Duval.] 6, 2: “It is actuality when a thing is really so, not as when
we say potentially. For we say potentially as (of) the Hermes in the
wood, and the half in the whole, because it might be taken out; and so, too, a learned
man, of one who is not really versed in learning, if he have the capacity for learning.”.
. . . This distinction plays a part in the controversy between Bramhall and Hobbes,
the former of whom says, “The nearer that anything comes to the essence of God,
the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we, therefore, make potentialities
and successive duration, and former and latter, or a part without a part (as they
say), to be in God? Because we are not able to understand clearly the Divine perfection,
we must not therefore attribute any imperfection to Him.” Works, vol.
IV. p. 158. Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. V. p. 342. Works,
vol. IV. p. 425. Works, ed. Molesworth, vol. IV. p. 299. In
Arist. de Anima, p. 295.
But to go from the word to the thing. The contradiction thus involved
in the notion of the Infinite has given rise to two opposite representations of
it; the one, as the affirmation of all reality; the other, as the negation of all
reality. The older metaphysicians endeavored to exhaust the infinite by an endless
addition of predicates; hence arose the favorite representation of God, as the
Ens perfectissimum, or sum of all realities, which
prevailed in the Wolfian Philosophy, and was accepted by Kant. See Wolf,
Theologia Naturalis, Pars II. § 6, 14; Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
p. 450, ed. Rosenkranz. See Werke, III. p. 73; IV. p. 26, 27; V. p. 70; VI. p. 63. See
Werke, VI. p. 65; XI. p. 31, 153; XII. p. 229, 418.
Note IV., p. 95.
“The adding infinity to any idea or conception necessarily finite, makes up no other than a curious contradiction for a divine attribute. . . . You make up an attribute of knowledge or wisdom infinitely finite; which is as chimerical and gigantic an idea as an infinite human body.”—Bp. Browne, Divine Analogy, p. 77. “Discovering conditions of the Unconditioned, inventing a possibility for the absolutely Necessary, and the being willing to construct it in order to be able to conceive of it, must immediately and most obviously appear to be an absurd undertaking.”-Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza (Werke, IV. Abth. II. p. 153). “Thou art different from the finite, not only in degree, but in kind. They only make Thee by that upward gradation a greater man, and ever still only a greater man; but never God, the Infinite, the Immeasurable.”—Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen (Werke, II. p. 304).
Note V., p. 95.
“For, if we should suppose a man to be made with clear eyes, and all the rest of his organs of sight well disposed, but endued with no other sense; and that he should look only upon one thing, which is always of the same color and figure, without the least appearance of variety, lie would seem to me, whatsoever others might say, to see, no more than I seem to myself to feel the bones of my own limbs by my organs of feeling; and yet those bones are always, and on all sides, touched by a most sensible membrane. I might perhaps say he were astonished, and looked upon it; but I should not say he saw it; it being almost all one for a man to be always sensible of one and the same thing, and not to be sensible at all.” Hobbes, Elem. Phil. (Eng. Works), Sect. I. P. IV. c. 25, 5.
Note VI., p. 95.
The paradox of Hegel, if applied, where alone we have any data
for applying( it, to the necessary limits of human thought, becomes no paradox at
all, but an obvious truth, almost a truism. Our conceptions are limited to the finite
and the determinate; and a thought which is not of any definite object, is but the
negation of all thinking. Hegel’s error consists in mistaking an impotence of thought
for a condition of existence.
Note VII., p. 96.
Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung
(Werke, V. p. 186). In a subsequent work written in defence of this opinion,
Fichte explains himself as meaning that existence, as a conception of sensible origin,
cannot be ascribed to God. Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage
des Atheismus (Werke, V. p. 220). Republic, VI p. 509. Justin,
Dial. c. Tryph. c. 4. “Who is above all existence; unspeakable, ineffab!e,
but the only Noble and Good.”—Athanasius c. Gentes. c. 2. “Who is superior to all
existence, and human intelligence, seeing that He is good and surpassing in moral
beauty.” Compare Damascenus, De Fide Orthod. I. 4. “He is none of the things that
are; not so as not to be, but to be above all things that are, above being itself.” Enn. V.
1. 10. τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος τὸ ἒν. Compare Proclus,
Inst. Theol. c. 115. “It is manifest that every god is above all the things
mentioned, existence, and life, and mind.” Bruno, p 57. “The
Absolute we have now defined as essentially neither ideal nor real, neither thinking
nor being.”
Note VIII., p. 96.
Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII. 311. “If the subject that knows is the whole, then there will be no object that is known; and it belongs to the most irrational of things, that there be that which knows, and there be not, that which is known.”—Plotinus, Enn. V. III. 10. “It must be, then, that that which has intelligence, be in duality when it exercises intelligence, and that either one of the two be outside it, or that both be in it, and that intelligence always have to do with alterity (difference).”—Compare Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XI. p. 167). “In the consciousness, so far as I have knowledge of an object, I know it as my Other (or the Other of me), and hence myself limited by it and finite.—”Marheineke, Grundlehren, § 84. “But this comes to pass thus: in the absolute idea, in which science takes its stand-point, the subject is not different from the object, but just as it (i. e. the absolute idea) is the idea of the Absolute, as object, so also is the object in it, as the absolute idea, subject, and therefore the absolute idea is not different from God Himself.”
Note IX., p. 97.
In exhibiting the two universal conditions of human consciousness, that of difference between objects, and that of relation between object and subject, I have considered each with reference to its more immediate and obvious application; the former being viewed in connection with the Infinite, and the latter with the Absolute. But at the same time it is obvious that the two conditions are so intimately connected together, and the ideas to which they relate so mutually involved in each other, that either argument might be employed with equal force in the other direction. For difference is a relation, as well as a limit; that which is one out of many being related to the objects from which it is distinguished. And the subject and object of consciousness, in like manner, are not only related to, but distinguished from, each other; and thus each is a limit to the other: while, if either of them could be destroyed, a conception of the infinite by the finite would be still impossible; for either there would be no infinite to be conceived, or there would be no finite to conceive it.
The three Laws of Thought, commonly acknowledged by logicians, those of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, are but the above two conditions viewed in relation to a given notion. For in the first place, every definite notion, as such, is discerned in the two relations of identity and difference, as being that which it is, and as distinguished from that which it is not. These two relations are expressed by the Laws of Identity and Contradiction. And in the second place, a notion is distinguished from all that it is not (A from not-A), by means of the mutual relation of both objects to a common subject, the universe of whose consciousness is constituted by this distinction. This mutual relation is expressed by the Law of Excluded Middle.
Note X., p. 97.
“Though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the
infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being
absolutely perfect; such a one as is nostro modulo conformis,
‘agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling;’ as we may approach near
to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round,
and enclasp it within our arms.”—Cudworth, Intellectual System, ch. 5 (vol.
II. p. 518, ed. Harrison). “We grant that the mind is limited, but does it thence
follow that the object of thought must be limited? We think not. We grant that the
mind cannot embrace the Infinite, but we nevertheless consider that the mind may
have a notion of the Infinite. No more do we believe that the mind, as finite, can
only recognize finite objects, than we believe that the eve, because limited in
its power, can only recognize those objects whose entire extension comes within
the range of vision. As well tell us that because a mountain is too large for the
eye of a mole, therefore the mole can recognize no mountain: as well tell us that
because the world is too large for the eye of a man, therefore man can recognize
no world,—as tell us that because the Infinite cannot be embraced by the finite
mind, therefore the mind can recognize no Infinite.”—Calderwood, Philosophy of
the Infinite, p. 12. The illustrations employed by both authors are unfortunate.
The part of the mountain touched by the hand of the man, or seen by the eye of the
mole, is, ex hypothesi, as a part of a larger object,
imperfect, relative, and finite. And the world, which is confessedly too large for
the eye of a man, must, in its unseen portion, be apprehended, not by sight, but
by some other faculty. If, therefore, the Infinite is too large for the mind of
man, it can only be recognized by some other mind, or by some faculty in man which
is not mind. But no such faculty is or
Divine Analogy, p. 37.
The author is speaking of our knowledge in a future state; but his arguments are
more properly applicable to our present condition.
Note XI., p. 100.
The brevity with which this argument is necessarily expressed in the text, may render a few words of explanation desirable. Of course it is not meant that no period of time can be conceived, except in a time equally long; for this would make a thousand years as inconceivable as an eternity. But though there is nothing inconceivable in the notion of a thousand years or any other large amount of time, such a notion is conceivable only under the form of a portion of time, having other time before and after it. An infinite duration, on the other hand, can only be conceived as having no time before or after it, and hence as having no relation or resemblance to any amount of finite time, however great. The mere conception of an indefinite duration, bounding every conceivable portion of time, is thus wholly distinct from that of infinite duration; for infinity can neither bound nor be bounded by any duration beyond itself.
This distinction has perhaps not been sufficiently observed by
an able and excellent writer of the present day, in a work, the principal portions
of which are worthy of the highest commendation. Dr. McCosh argues in behalf of
a positive conception of infinity, in opposition to the theory of Sir W. Hamilton,
in the following manner: “To whatever point we go out in imagination, we are sure
that we are not at the limits of existence; nay, we believe that, to whatever farther
point we might go, there would be something still farther on.” “Such,” he continues,
“seems to us to be
Method of the
Divine Government, p. 534, 4th edition.
In the second place, even if we could positively perceive this further duration as going on forever, we should still be far removed from the conception of infinity. For such a duration is given to us as bounding and bounded by our original conception of a thousand years; it is limited at its nearer extremity, though unlimited at the other. If this be regarded as infinite, we are reduced to the self-contradictory notion of infinity related to a time beyond itself. Is a thousand years, plus its infinite boundary, greater than that boundary alone, or not? If it is, we have the absurdity of a greater than the infinite. If it is not, the original conception of a thousand years, from relation to which that of infinity is supposed to arise, is itself reduced to a nonentity, and cannot be related to anything. This contradiction may be avoided, if we admit that Oour conception of time, as bounded, implies an apprehension of the indefinite, but not of the infinite.
But possibly, after all, the difference between Dr. McCosh’s view
and that of Sir W. Hamilton, may be rather verbal than real. For the subsequent
remarks of the former are such as might be fully accepted by the most uncompromising
adherent of the latter. “The mind seeks in vain to embrace the infinite in a positive
image, but is constrained to believe, when its efforts fail, that there is a something
to which no limits can be put.” All that need practically be contended for by the
supporters
Note XII., p. 100.
For the antagonist theories of a beginning of time itself, and
of an eternal succession in them, see Plato, Timæus, p. 37, 38, and Aristotle,
Phys. VIII. 1. The two theories are ably contrasted in Prof. Butler’s
Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. II. p. 185 sqq. Plato does
not appear to regard the beginning of time as the beginning of material existence,
but only of the sensible phenomena of matter. The insensible substratum of the phenomena
seems to have been regarded by him as coeternal with the Deity. See Timæus,
p 49-53. Plato’s opinion however has been variously represented. For some account
of the controversies on this point, see Mosheim’s Dissertation, De Creatione
ex Nilhilo, translated in Harrison’s edition of Cudworth, vol. III. p. 140;
Brucker, Historia Philosophiæ, vol. p. 676. Compare also Professor Thompson’s
note, in Butler’s Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. II.
p. 189. See Mosheim’s Note in Harrison’s
Cudworth, vol. II. p. 551.
Note XIII., p. 100.
In Joann. Evang. Tract. XXXVIII. 10. “Discuss the changes of things, and you will find a past and a future; think of God, and you will find a present, in which neither past nor future is possible.”—Compare Confess. XI. c. ii.; Enarr. in Ps. II. 7; De Civ. Dei, XI. 21. See also Cudworth, vol. II. p. 529, ed. Harrison; Herder, Gott, Werke, VIII. p. 139.
Note XIV., p. 100.
De Consol. Philos. L. V.
Note XV., p. 100.
Summa, P. I. Qu. X. Art. 1. “In this way, therefore, eternity is made klnown by two things. First, by this, that what is in eternity is interminable, i. e., without beginning and without end. Second by this, that eternity is without succession, existing at once in totality.”-Compare Plotinus, Enn. III. 1. viii. c. 2. . . . . . “Always having the whole present, but not this thing now, and then another, but all at once.”—Proclus Inst., Theol. c. 52. “All which is eternal exists at once in totality.” Several historical notices relating to this theory are given by Petavius, Theologica Dogmata, De Deo, 1. III. c. 4.
Note XVI., p. 101.
. . . . “Nor can eternity be defined by time, or have any relation to time.”—Spinoza, Ethica, P. V. Prop. 23. “Eternity, in the pure sense of the word, can be explained by no duration of time, even supposing we take this as endless (indefinite). Duration is an undetermined continuation of existence, which in every moment bears with it a measure of transientness, of the future as of the past.”—Herder, Gott (Werke, VIII. p. 140). “In so far as the I is eternal, it has no duration at all. For duration is thinkable only in relation to objects. We speak of an eternity [sempiternity] of duration (æviternitas) i. e. of an existence in all time, but eternity in the pure sense of the word (æternitas) is Being in no time.” Schelling, Vom Ich, § 15. Cognate to, or rather identical with, these speculations, is the theory advocated by Mr. Maurice (Theological Essays, p. 422 sqq.), “that eternity is not a lengthening out or continuation of time; that they are generically different.”
Note XVII., p. 101.
In the acute and decisive criticism of Schelling by Sir W. Hamilton,
this objection is urged with great effect. “We cannot, at the same moment, be in
the intellectual intuition and in common consciousness; we must therefore be able
to connect them by an act of memory—of
Note XVIII., p. 101.
See Augustine, In Joann. Evang. Tract. XXXVIII. 10.
“Think
of God, you will find a present (an Is) in which the past and future cannot
be. In order, therefore, that you also may be, transcend time. But
who shall transcend time by his own powers? He will raise you to it, who said to
the Father, “I will that they also be with me where I am.” This precept has
found great favor with mystical theologians. Thus Eckart, in a sermon published
among those of Tauler, says, “Nothing hinders the soul so much in its knowledge
of God as time and place. Time and place are parts, and God is one; therefore, if
our soul is to know God, it must know him above time and place.” Life and
Sermons of Dr John Tauler, translated by Susanna Winkworth, p. 190. Theologia
Germanica, translated by Susanna Winkworth, p. 20. English translation, p. 27.
“Mensch, wo du deinen
Geist schwingst über Ort und Zeit, Cherubinischer Wandersmann,
I. 12. Quoted by Strauss, Glaubenslehre, II. p. 738.
So kannst du jeden Blick sein in der Ewigkeit.”
The modern German mysticism is in this respect nowise behind
the earlier. Schelling says of his intuition of the Absolute, “The pure self- System des Transcendentalen
Idealismus, p. 59 (Werke, III. p. 375). Bruno,
p. 58. Das Ende aller Dinge (Werke,
VII. p. 422).
Note XIX., p. 101.
This is directly admitted by Fichte, who says, in his earliest
work, “How the infinite Mind may contemplate its existence and its attributes, we
cannot know, without being the infinite Mind ourselves.” Versuch einer Kritik
aller Offenbarung (Werke, V. p. 42).
Note XX., p. 102.
“Look into the dictionaries for the usage of the words Person,
personality, etc., . . . . all say, that these words designate something
peculiar or special under a certain appearance; a subordinate idea, which does
not belong to the Infinite.”. . . . Herder, Gott (Werke, VIII. p. 199).
“What
then do you call personality and consciousness? that certainly which you have found
in yourselves, which you have become acquainted with in yourselves, and have designated
with this name. But the least attention
Werke,
I. pp. 269, 280.
Note XXI., p. 103.
De Trinitate, XV. c. 5. “Therefore if we say, eternal, immortal, incorruptible, wise, powerful, just, good, happy, spirit; of all these, the last only seems to be significant of substance, but the others qualities of this substance; but not so is it in that ineffable and simple nature. For what there seems to be said of qualities must be understood of substance or essence. For God is far from being called Spirit as to substance, and good as to quality; but both of these as to substance . . . . although in God justice is one with goodness, with happiness, and the being Spirit is one with being just and good and happy.”—lbid. VI. c. 4. Compare Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. XL. Art. I: . . . . “Because the divine simplicity excludes the composition of form and matter, it follows, that in divine things, the abstract and the concrete is one with the Deity and God. And because the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that the attributes of God are one with his essential being; and therefore wisdom and virtue are identical in God, because both are in the divine essence.” See also above, Lecture II. Note 27.
Note XXII., p. 103.
Plotinus, Enn. VII. 1. ix. c. 6. “Whatever may be said
to be wanting, is wantilmg in “the Well” (i. e., in perfectness of
condition); . . . . so that oodness, so that will, is not predicable of the One;
for the One transcends goodness; . . . . nor intelligence . . nor motion, for it
is prior to intelligence, to motion.” . . . . Spinoza, Eth. P. I. Prop. 17.
Schol. “If intelligence belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be, as our intelligence,
Note XXIII., p. 104.
Ansem, Monolog. c. 66. “Without doubt, in all investigations
into the essential being of the Creator, the deeper knowledge is reached, the greater
the likeness to Him of the created thing, by which the investigation is made. .
. . . Manifestly, therefore, as the rational mind alone among all created things
can rise to the investigation of this essential being, this alone can avail to the
discovery of it.” Compare Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. XXIX. Art. 3. “Person
signifies that which is most perfect in all nature, or a subsistence in a rational
nature. Hence, since all which belongs to perfection, must be attributed to God
because his essence contains in itself all perfection,—it is fitting that this name
person, be used of God, yet not in the same way in which it is used of creatures,
but in a more excellent way; just as other names are ascribed to God, which are
put by us upon created beings.” And Jacobi, at the conclusion of an eloquent denunciation
of the Pantheism of his own day, truly observes, “A being without self-being is
entirely and universally impossible. But a self-being without consciousness, and
again a consciousness without self-consciousness, without substantiality and at
least an implied personality, is just as impossible; the one as well as the other
is but empty words. And so God is not in being, He is, in the highest sense, the
Not-being, if He is not a Spirit; and He is not a Spirit, if he is wanting
in the fundamental quality of Spirit, self-consciousness, substantiality and personality.” Ueber
eine Weissagung Lichtenberg’s (Werke, III. p. 240). Compare also the
Preface to Vol. IV. p. xlv. Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne,
Introduction, p. xli. McCosh, Method of the Divine Government p.
461 (4th edition).
Note XXIV., p. 104.
Pensées, P. I. Art. IV. § 6. In like manner, in another
passage, Pascal says, “All bodies, the firmament, the stars, the earth, kingdoms,—are
not equal to the most insignificant spirit; for such a spirit knows all these, and
itself; but the body, nothing.” Pensées P. II. Art X. § 1.
The following spirited translation of Jacobi Von den göttlichen
Dingen (Werke, III. p. 425).
Note XXV., p. 105.
Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, P. IV., Principia, P. I. § 7. That the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum, is not intended as a syllogism, in which thought and existence are two distinct attributes, but as a statement of the fact, that personal existence consists in consciousness, has been sufficiently shown by M. Cousin, in his Essay “Sur le vrai sens du cogito, ergo sum.” The same view has been well stated by Mr. Veitch, in the introduction to his translation of the Discours de la Méthode, p. xxii. M. Bartholmèss (Histoire des doctrines religieuses, I. p. 23) happily renders ergo by c’est-à-dire. It must be remembered, however, that the cogito of Descartes is not designed to express the phenomena of reflection alone, but is coëxtensive with the entire consciousness. This is expressly affirmed in the Principia, P. I. § 9. “By the word cogitatio I understand all the objects of our consciousness. And so not only to understand, to will, to imagine, but also to perceive,—all are meant by cogitare.” The dictum, thus extended, may perhaps be advantageously modified by disengaging the essential from the accidental features of consciousness; but its main principle remains unshaken; namely, that our conception of real existence, as distinguished from appearance, is derived from, and depends upon, the distinction between the one conscious subject and the several objects of which he is conscious. The rejection of consciousness, as the primary constituent of substantive existence, constitutes Spinoza’s point of departure from the principles of Descartes, and, at the same time, the fundamental error of his system. Spinoza in fact transfers the notion of substance, which is originally derived from the consciousness of personality, and has no positive significance out of that consciousness, to the absolute, which exists and is conceived by itself,—an object to whose existence consciousness bears no direct testimony, and whose conception involves a self-contradiction.
Note XXVI., p. 105.
“I am, that I am. This decisive utterance establishes all.
Its echo in the human soul is the revelation of God in it. What makes man man, i.
e.,
Note XXVII., p. 106.
For notices of Schelling’s philosophy in this respect, see Bartholmèss
Histoire des doctrines religieuses, II. p. 116, and Willm, Histoire de
la Philosophie Allemande, III. p. 318. “The school of Schelling,” says Mme
de Stael, “supposes that the individual perishes in us, but that the inward qualities,
which we possess, reënter into the grand whole of the eternal creation. This immortality
has a terrible resemblance to death.” De l’Allemagne, Partie III. ch.
7. Phänomnenologie
des Geistes, Vorrede (Werke, II. p. 22). See Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme
der Philosophie, II. p. 638. Strauss, in his Christliche Glaubenslehre,
§ 106-110, gives an instructive account of some of the speculations of recent German
writers on this question; his own commentary being not the least significant portion.
“Thereby indeed,” he says “the Ego makes known its
will to carry on to all eternity (i. e. not to take a step out from its own finiteness)
not only its subjectivity in general, but the particular relations of this subjectivity.”
And again: “Only the nature of the species is infinite and inexhaustible; that of
the individual can be only finite.” His inquiry concludes with the well-known words,
“The other world is, in all forms, the one foe, but in its form as the world to
come, the last foe, which speculative criticism has to combat and if possible to
overcome.” And Feuerbach, another “advanced” disciple of the Hegelian school, has
written an essay on Death and Immortality, for the purpose of showing that a belief
in personal annihilation is indispensable to sound morality and true religion; that
the opposite belief is connected with all that is “satanic” and “bestial;” and that
temporal death is but an image of God, the “great objective negation:” and has
indicated significantly, in another work, the philosophical basis of his theory,
by an aphorism the direct contradictory to that of Descartes, “Cogitans nemo sum.
Cogito, ergo omnes sum homines.” Letters
on the Laws of Man’s Nature and Development, p. 189. Catéchisme Positiviste, p. 169. Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung, II. p. 484, 487, 511. Ibid.,
p. 482, 498. Ibid., p. 494. Ibid., p. 489, 617. lbid., p. 487. Life of Jesus
Christ, p. 399. (Bohn’s edition.)
Note XXVIII., p. 106.
We have great reason to find fault with the strange manner of some men, who are ever vexing themselves with the discussion of ill-conceived matters. They seek for that which they know, and know not that for which they seek.”—Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, L. II. Ch. 21. § 14.
Note XXIX., p. 106.
See the acute criticism of the Kantian distinction between
things and phenomena, by M. Willm, in his Histoire de la Philosophie
Allemande, Vol. I. p. 177. “It is not necessary to admit, that what interposes
between the objects and the reason alters and falsifies, so to say, the view of
the objects; and it may be that the laws of the mind are at the same time the laws
of things as they are. Hegel has justly said, that it were quite possible, that
after having penetrated behind the scene, which is open before us, we should find
nothing there; we may add, that it is possible, that this veil—which seems to cover
the picture, and which we are striving to lift—may be the picture itself.” Kant
unquestionably went too far, in asserting that things in themselves are not
as they appear to our faculties: the utmost that his premises could warrant him
in asserting is, that we cannot tell whether they are so or not. And even this degree
of skepticism, though tenable as far as external objects are concerned, cannot legitimately
be extended to the personal self. I exist as I am conscious of existing; and this
conscious self is itself the Ding an sich, the standard
by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion
of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived. To this extent
Jacobi’s criticism of Kant is just and decisive. “All our philosophizing is a struggle
to get behind the form of the thing; i. e., to get to the thing itself; but how
is this possible, since then we
Ueber
das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, (Werke III. p. 176).
Note XXX., p. 108.
The Intellectual Intuition of Schelling has been noticed above.
See notes 16, 17, 18, pp. 77 sqq. The method of Hegel, in its aim identical with
that of Schelling, differs from it chiefly in making thought, instead of intuition,
the instrument of reaching the Absolute. As Schelling assumes the possibility of
an intuition superior to time and difference, so Hegel postulates the existence
of a logical process emancipated from the laws of identity and contradiction. The
Understanding and the Reason are placed in sharp antagonism to each other. The one
is a faculty of finite thinking, subject to the ordinary laws of thought: the other
is a faculty of infinite thinking, to which those laws are inapplicable. Hence the
principles of Identity, of Contradiction, and of Excluded Middle are declared to
be valid merely for the abstract understanding, from which reason is distinguished
by the principle of the Identity of Contradictories. See Logik, B. II.
c. 2; Encyklopädie, § 28, 115, 119, Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XV.
p. 598. See also his attempt to rescue speculative philosophy from the assaults
of skepticism, Werke, XIV. p. 511, 512. He charges the skeptic with first
making reason finite, in order to overthrow it by the principles of finite thought.
The defence amounts to no more than this: “The laws of thought are against me; but
I refuse to be bound by their authority.”
But this great thinker has rendered one invaluable service to philosophy. He has shown clearly what are the only conditions under which a philosophy of the Absolute could be realized; and his attempt has done much to facilitate the conclusion, to which philosophy must finally come, that the Absolute is beyond the reach of human thought. If such a philosophy were possible at all, it would be in the form of the philosophy of Hegel. And Hegel’s failure points to one inevitable moral. All the above inconsistency and division of the human mind against itself, might be avoided by acknowledging the supreme authority of the laws of thought over all human speculation; and by recognizing the consequent distinction between positive and negative thinking,—between the lawful exercise of the reason within its own province, and its abortive efforts to pass beyond it. But such an acknowledgment amounts to a confession that thought and being are not identical, and that reason itself requires us to believe in truths that are beyond reason. And to this conclusion speculative philosophy itself leads us, if in no other way, at least by the wholesome warning of its own pretensions and failures.
Note XXXI., p. 108.
Tertullian, De Carne Christi, c. 5. “The Son of God was born; that awakens no shame, precisely because it is shameful; and the Son of God died; it is thoroughly credible, because it is absurd; He was buried and then rose again; it is certain, because it is impossible.”
Note XXXII., p. 110.
See above, Lecture II., Note 37.
Note XXXIII., p. 113.
Hooker, E. P. B. I. ch. ii. § 2. Compare the words of Jacobi, An Fichte (Werke, III., p. 7). “A God, who could be known, were no God at all.”
Note I., p. 114.
Thus Wegscheider, after expressly admitting (Instit. Theol. § 52) that the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite, and that its idea can only be represented by analogy and symbol, proceeds to assert, with the utmost confidence, that the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience do not truly represent the internal nature of God (§ 69); that a plurality of persons in the Godhead is manifestly repugnant to reason, and that the infinite God cannot assume the nature of finite man (§ 92); that the fall of man is inconsistent with the divine attributes (§ 117); that repentance is the only mode of expiating sin reconcilable with the moral nature of God (§ 138); that the doctrine of Christ’s intercession is repugnant to the divine nature (§ 143).
By a somewhat similar inconsistency, Mr. Newman, while fully acknowledging that we cannot have any perfect knowledge of an infinite mind, and that infinity itself is but a negative idea, yet thinks it necessary to regard the soul as a separate organ of specific information, by which we are in contact with the infinite; and dogmatizes concerning the similarity of divine and human attributes, in a manner which nothing short of absolute knowledge can justify. (See The Soul, pp. 1, 3, 34, 54, 58.) He compares the infinite to the “illimitable haziness” which bounds the sphere of distinct vision. The analogy would be serviceable to his argument, if we possessed two sets of eyes, one for clearness and one for haziness; one to be limited, and the other to discern the limitation. The hypothesis of a separate faculty of consciousness, whether called soul, reason, or intellectual intuition, to take cognizance of the infinite, is only needed for those philosophers who undertake to develop a complete philosophy of the infinite as such. But the success of the various attempts in this province has not been such as to give any trustworthy evidence of the existence of such a faculty.
Note II., p. 115.
See above, Lecture I., Note 3.
Note III., p. 115.
See Mr. Rose’s remarks on the reaction against the Wolfian demonstrative method. State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 206 (second edition).
Note IV., p. 116.
See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 497. ed. Rosenkranz. This admission, rightly understood, need not be considered as detracting from the value of the speculative arguments as auxiliaries. All that is contended for is, that the foundation must be laid elsewhere, before their assistance, valuable as it is, can be made available. Thus understood, this view coincides with that expressed by Sir W. Hamilton, in the second of the Lectures on Metaphysics, shortly to be published, “that the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation,—that the study of the external world, taken with and in subordination to that of the internal, not only loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us.” The atheistic tendency is perhaps too strongly stated; as the same phenomena may be surveyed, by different individuals, in different spirits and with different results; but the main position, that the belief in God is primarily based on mental, and not on material phenomena, accords with the view taken in the text.
Note V., p. 116.
Kant, Kritik der r. V., p. 488. Compare Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part V. Kant’s argument is approved by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke, XII. p. 37). The objection which it urges is of no value, unless we admit that man possesses an adequate notion of the infinite, as such. Otherwise the notion of power indefinitely great, which the phenomena certainly suggest, is, both theoretically and practically, undistinguishable from the infinite itself. This has been well remarked by a recent writer. See Selections from the Correspondence of R. E. H. Greyson, Am. Ed., p. 550.
Note VI., p. 116.
Jowett, Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. II. p. 406. Professor
Jowett considers the comparison between the works of nature and those of art as
not merely inadequate, but positively erroneous. He says, “As certainly as the man
who found a watch or piece of mechanism on the seashore would conclude, ‘here are
marks of design, indications of an
This argument is substantially
the same with that of Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Part II.
“If we see a house, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect
or builder . . . But surely you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance
to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause.”
Note VII., p. 116.
“When the spiritual man (as such) cannot judge, the question is
removed into a totally different court from that of the Soul, the court of the critical
understanding.. The processes of thought have nothing to quicken the conscience
or affect the soul.” F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 245 (second edition).—Yet
he allows in another place (not quite consistently) that “pure intellectual error,
depending on causes wholly unmoral, may and does perpetuate moral
illusions, which are of the deepest injury to spiritual life.” p. 169. Similar in
principle, though not pushed to the same extreme consequences, is the theory of
Mr. Morell, who says, “Reason up to a God, and the best you can do is to hypostatize
and deify the final product of your own faculties; but admit the reality of an intellectual
intuition (as the mass of mankind virtually do), and the absolute stands before
us in all its living reality.” Philosophy of Religion, p. 39. Ibid.,
p. 173, 174. Philosophy
of Religion, p. 193.
Note VIII., p. 119.
In acknowledging Expiation as well as Prayer to be prompted by
the natural feelings of men, I have no intention of controverting the opinion, so
ably maintained by Archbishop Magee and Mr. Faber, of the divine origin of the actual
rite of sacrifice. That the religious instincts of men should indicate the need
of supplication and expiation, is perfectly consistent with the belief that the
particular mode of both may have been first taught by a primitive revelation. That
religion, in both its constituent elements, was communicated to the parents of the
human race by positive revelation, seems the most natural inference from the Mosaic
narrative. Even Mr. Davison, who contends for the human origin of the patriarchal
sacrifices, which he regards as merely eucharistic and penitentiary, expressly admits
the divine appointment of expiatory offerings. See his Inquiry into the Origin
of Primitive Sacrifice ( Remains, p. 121).
Note IX., p. 121.
That the mere feeling of dependence by itself is not necessarily
religion, is shown by Hegel, Philosophie der Religion (Werke XII.
p. 173). Speaking of the Roman worship of evil influences, Angerona, Fames, Robigo,
etc., he rightly remarks that in such representations all conception of Deity is
lost, though the feeling of fear and dependence remains. To the same effect is his
sarcastic remark that, according to Schleiermacher’s theory, the dog is the best
Christian. See Rosenkranz, Hegel’s Leben, p. 346.
Note X., p. 121.
See Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Abschn. II. (pp. 61, 71. ed. Rosenkranz.) His theory has been combated by Julius Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, B. I. c. 2. Compare also Hooker, E. P. I. ix. 2. Some excellent remarks to the same effect will be found in McCosh’s Method of the Divine Government, p. 298 (fourth edition), and in Bartholmèss, Histoire des doctrines religieuses de la philosophic moderne, vol. i. p. 405.
Note XI., p. 122.
The theory which regards absolute morality as based on the immutable nature of God, must not be confounded with that which places it in his arbitrary will. The latter view, which was maintained by Scotus, Occam, and others among the schoolmen, is severely criticized by Sir James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, section III., and by Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, B. I. c. 3. The former principle is adopted by Cudworth as the basis of his treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality. See B. I. c. 3. B. IV. c. 4.
Note XII., p. 122.
On the universality of expiatory rites, see Magee on the Atonement, Note V. On their origin, see the same work, notes XLI., XLVI. to LI., LIV. to LVIII., and Mr. Faber’s Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice.
Note XIII., p. 123.
Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, § 4.
Note XIV., p. 124.
Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p. 75. Mr. Morell here
goes beyond the theory of his master, Schleiermacher. The latter (Christliche
Glaube, § 4) admits that this supposed feeling of absolute dependence can never
be
Note XV., p. 125.
That this is the legitimate result of Schleiermacher’s theory, may be gathered from a remarkable passage in the Christliche Glaube, § 8, in which the polytheistic and monotheistic feelings of piety are compared together. The former, he says, is always accompanied by a sensible representation of its object, in which there is contained a germ of multiplicity; but in the latter, the higher consciousness is so separated from the sensible, that the pious emotions admit of no greater difference than that of the elevating or depressing tone of the feeling. This seems to imply that, in Schleiermacher’s opinion, to worship a God of many attributes, is equivalent to worshipping a plurality of Gods. And to those philosophers who make the Infinite in itself a direct object of religious worship, this identification is natural; for a God of many attributes cannot be conceived as infinite, and therefore in one sense partakes of the limited divinity of Polytheism. But, on the other hand, a God of no attributes is no God at all; and the so-called monotheistic piety is nothing but an abortive attempt at mystical self-annihilation. Some acute strictures on Schleiermacher’s theory from this point of view will be found in Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 84.
Note XVI., p. 126.
Schleiermacher himself admits (Christliche Glaube, § 33) that the theory of absolute dependence is incompatible with the belief that God can be moved by any human action. He endeavors, however, to reconcile this admission with the duty of prayer, by maintaining (§ 147) that the true Christian will pray for nothing but that which it comes within God’s absolute purpose to grant. This implies something like omniscience in the true Christian, and something like hypocrisy in every act of prayer.
Note XVII., p. 126.
Schleiermacher (Chr. Glaube, § 49) attempts, not very successfully, to meet this objection, by maintaining that even our free acts are dependent upon the will of God. This is doubtless true; but it is true as an article of faith, not as a theory of philosophy: it may be believed, but cannot be conceived, nor represented in any act of human consciousness. The apparent contradiction implied in the coexistence of an infinite and a finite, will remain unsolved; and is most glaring in the theories of those philosophers, who, like Schleiermacher (§ 54), maintain that God actually does all that he can do. The only solution is to confess that we have no true conception of the infinite at all. Schleiermacher himself is unable to avoid the logical consequence of his position. He admits (§ 89) that God’s omnipotence is limited if we do not allow him to be the author of sin; though he endeavors to soften this monstrous admission by taking it in conjunction with the fact that God is also the author of grace.
Note XVIII., p. 128.
De Augmentis Scientiarum, L. III. c. 1. Compare Theophilus
of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, I. 5. “As the soul in the human body is not seen,
being invisible to men, but is made known through the movement of the body, so God
cannot be seen by human and bodily eyes, but is discovered to human intelligence
by His providence and His works.” Compare a similar argument in Bishop Berkeley,
Minute Philosopher, Dial. IV. § 4.
Note XIX., p. 128.
Justin. Mart. Apol. I. c. 6. “Indeed, Father, and
God, and Lord, and Master, are not names, but only appellatives,
derivatives from His benefits and His works.”—Basil. Adv. Eunom. I. 12.
“As to the conceit of having found out the very essential being of God,—what arrogance
and pride
Note XX., p. 129.
Advancement of Learning, p. 128. ed. Montagu. Compare De Augmentis, III. 2.
Note XXI., p. 130.
This argument is excellently drawn out in Sir W. Hamilton’s forthcoming Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture II. So Mr. F. W. Newman observes, acutely and truly, “Nothing but a consciousness of active originating Will in ourselves suggests, or can justify, the idea of a mighty Will pervading Nature; and to merge the former in the latter, is to sacrifice the Premise to the glory of the Conclusion.” The Soul, p. 40 (second edition).
Note XXII., p. 130.
Arist. Metaph. 1. 5. “Xenophanes was the first . . . who,
on surveying the universe, said that the One was God.”—Cicero, Acad. Quæst.
IV. 37. “Xenophanes said that the One was All, and that that was not changeable,
Note XXIII., p. 132.
Clemens Alex. Stromata, V. 11. “If therefore . . . . we should in some way draw nigh to the intelligence of the Omnipotent, we should come to know, not what He is, but what He is not.”—Augustin. Enarr. in Psalm lxxxv. 12. “God is ineffable; we more easily say what He is not, than what He is.”—Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen (Werke, II. p. 305). “Thou willest,—for thou wilt, that my free obedience have consequences unto all eternity; the act of Thy Will I do not apprehend, and only know, that it is not like my own.”
Note XXIV., p. 132.
The distinction between speculative and regulative
knowledge holds an important place in the philosophy of Kant; but his mode of applying
it is the exact reverse of that adopted in the text. According to Kant, the idea
of the absolute or unconditioned has a regulative, but not a speculative value:
it cannot be positively apprehended by act of thought; but it serves to give unity
and direction to the lower conceptions of the understanding; indicating the point
to which they tend, though they never actually reach it. But the regulative character
thus paradoxically assigned, not to thought, but to its negation, in truth belongs
to the finite conceptions as actually apprehended, not to any unapprehended idea
of the infinite beyond them. Every object of positive thought, being conceived as
finite, is necessarily regarded as limited by something beyond itself; though this
something is not itself actually conceived. The true purpose of this manifest incompleteness
of all human thought, is to point out the limits which we cannot pass; not, as Kant
maintains, to seduce us into vain attempts to pass them. If there is but one faculty
of thought, that which Kant calls the Understanding, occupied with the finite only,
there is an obvious end to be answered in making us aware of its limits, and warning
us that the
Note XXV., p. 132.
“The purport of these remarks is only this . . . . that, in the further progress of the investigations, the question cannot be, what and how God is constituted in Himself, but only how we have to think of Him in relation to ourselves and the whole morally-natural world. For by our faith it is not that the being of God is theoretically known, but only His existence, in the special relation to the moral design of the world, is revealed for us, as morally constituted beings; and this is in a double sense a purely relative knowledge, first by being limited to a determined nature of the subject that knows, and secondly by the determined relation of the object that is known. Hence it follows, that there is nothing to be said here of the knowledge of the essence, the quality of a Being, but only of a nearer determination of the idea of God, as we have to form it, from our point of view; in other words, we are to think of God only by means of relations.” Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 189.—”The Scripture intimates to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being: but conveying them to us by the medium of language, it only brings them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God;—for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice;—it is altogether inadequate in point of Science.” Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 54 (second edition).—”We should rather point out to objectors that what is revealed is practical, and not speculative;—that what the Scriptures are concerned with is, not the philosophy of the Human Mind in itself, nor yet the philosophy of the Divine Nature in itself, but (that which is properly Religion) the relation and connection of the two Beings;—what God is to us,—what He has done and will do for us,—and what we are to be and to do, in regard to Him.” Whately, Sermons, p. 56 (third edition).—Compare Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. VII. § II.
Note I., p. 136.
Analogy, Part I. Ch. VI.
Note II., p. 137.
“When he (the Skeptic) awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself; and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections which may be raised against them.” Hume, Essay on the Academical Philosophy, Part II.
Note III., p. 137.
See Plato, Parmenides, p. 129, Philebus, p. 14, Sophistes, p. 251, Republic, VII. p. 524. The mystery is insoluble, because thought cannot explain its own laws; for the laws must necessarily be assumed in the act of explanation. Every object of thought, as being one object, and one out of many, all being related to a common consciousness, must contain in itself a common and a distinctive feature; and the relation between these two constitutes that very diversity in unity, without which no thought is possible.
Note IV., p. 138.
“The commerce between soul and body is a reciprocal dependence of determination. Accordingly we ask in the first place, how is such a commerce possible between a thinking being and a body? . . . The foundation of the difficulty seems to lie here: The soul is an object of the inward sense, and the body an object of the outward. . . . . Now by no reason do we come to understand, how that which is an object of the internal sense, is to be a cause of that which is an object of the outward.” Kant’s Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik, (1821), p. 224.
Note V., p. 139.
“When we examine the idea which we have of all finite minds, we see no necessary connection between their volition and the movement of any body whatsoever; we see, on the contrary, that there is none at all, and can be none.”—Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, L. VI. Part II. Ch. 3. “Man is, to himself, the most astonishing oblject of nature; for he cannot conceive what body is, and still less what is spirit, and least of all can he conceive how a body can be united with a spirit. That is the acme of his difficulties; and yet that is his own being.”—Pascal, Pensées, Partie I. Art vi. § 26. “I am, to be sure, compelled to believe,—that is, to act as if I thought, that my tongue, my hand, my foot, can be put in motion by my will; but how a mere breath, a pressure of the intelligence upon itself, such as the will is, can be the principle of motion in the heavy earthly mass,—of that not only can I have no conception, but the mere assertion is, before the tribunal of the reflecting intelligence, nothing but sheer unintelligence.”—Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen, (Werke, II. p. 290.)—Spinoza, Ethica, III. 2, denies positively that such commerce can take place. “Neither can the body determine the mind to thought, nor the mind the body to motion, or to quiet, or to anything else.”
Note VI., p. 139.
The theory of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes was partially
hinted at by Descartes, and more completely elaborated by his followers, De La Forge
and Malebranche. See Descartes, Principia, L. II. § 36. De La Forge, Traité
de l’esprit de l’homme, Ch. XVI. Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité,
L. VI. P. II. Ch. 3; Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, Ent. VII. Cf. Hegel,
Geschichte der Phil. (Werke, XV. p. 330.) For Leibnitz’s theory of
a Prëestablishled Harmony, see his Systême nouveau de la Nature, § 12-15,
Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 197; Troisième Eclaircissement, lbid. p. 134;
Théodicée, §, 61, Ibid. p. 520. A brief account of these two
systems, together with that of Physical Influx, which is rather a statement of the
phenomenon, than a theory to account for it, is given by Euler, Lettres à une
Princesse d’Allemagne, Partie II. Lettre 14. ed. Cournot; and by Krug, Philos.
Lexikon; Art. Gemeinschaft der Seele and des Leibes. The hypothesis,
that the commerce of soul and body is effected by means of a Plastic Nature in the
soul itself, is suggested by Cudworth, Intellectual System, B. I. Ch. III.
§ 37, and further developed by Leclere, Bibliothèque Cloisie, II. p. 113,
who supposes this plastic nature to be an intermediate principle, distinct from
both soul and body. See Mosheim’s Note in Harrison’s edition
Note VII., p. 139.
These two analogies between our natural and spiritual knowledge are adduced in a remarkable passage of Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium, Orat. XII. Of the soul, and its relation to the body, he says: . . . . “We live in ignorance of all things, of ourselves first of all, and then of all other things. For who is there, that has come to a comprehension of his own soul? Who has a knowledge of its essence? whether it is material or immaterial? Whether purely incorporeal, or whether there be something corporeal in it? how it comes into being, how it is regulated? whence it enters the body, how it departs?” etc. (Opera, Paris. 1615. Vol. II. p. 321.) Of body as distinguished from its attributes, he says: “For if any one were to analyze, into its component parts, what appears to the senses, and, having stripped the subject of all its attributes, should strive to get a knowledge of it, as it is in itself, I do not see what would be left for the mind to contemplate at all. For once take away color, figure, weight, size, motion, relativity, each one of which is not of itself the body, and yet all of them belong to the body,—what will be left to stand for the body? Whoever, therefore, is ignorant of himself, how is he to have knowledge of things above himself?” Ibid. p. 322.
Note VIII., p. 139.
Essay on the Academical Philosophy, (Philosophical Works, Vol. IV. p. 182.)
Note IX., p. 140.
The difficulty is ingeniously stated by Pascal, Pensées, Partie I. Art II. “For is there anything more absurd, than to pretend, that in dividing ever a space, we come finally to such a division, that in dividing it in two, each of the halves remains invisible, and without any extension? I would ask those, who have this idea, if they clearly conceive how two invisibles touch each other; if everywhere, then they are only one thing, and consequently the two together are indivisible; and if not everywhere, then it is only in a part that they come in contact; then they have parts, and therefore they are not indivisible.”
Note X., p. 142.
Kant’s theory, that we know phenomena only, not things in themselves, is severely criticized by Dr. McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 536 (4th edition). I have before observed that Kant has, in two points at least, extended his doctrine beyond its legitimate place; first, in maintaining that our knowledge of the personal self is equally phenomenal with that of external objects; and secondly, in dogmatically asserting that the thing in itself does not resemble the phenomenon of which we are conscious, Against the first of these statements it may he fairly objected, that my personal existence is identical with my consciousness of that existence; and that any other aspect of my personality, if such exists in relation to any other intelligence, is in this case the phenomenon to which my personal consciousness furnishes the real counterpart. Against the second, it may be objected, that if, upon Kant’s own hypothesis, we are never directly conscious of the thing in itself, we have no ground for saying that it is unlike, any more than that it is like, the object of which we are conscious; and that, in the absence of all other evidence, the probability is in favor of that aspect which is at least subjectively true. But when these deductions are made, the hypothesis of Kant, in its fundamental position, remains unshaken. It then amounts to no more than this; that we can see things only as our faculties present them to us; and that we can never be sure that the mode of operation of our faculties is identical with that of other intelligences, embodied or spiritual. Within these limits, the theory more nearly resembles a truism than a paradox, and contains nothing that can be regarded as formidable, either by the philosopher or by the theologian.
In the same article, Dr. McCosh criticizes Sir William Hamilton’s
cognate theory of the relativity of all knowledge. With the highest respect for
Dr. McCosh’s philosophical ability, I cannot help thinking that he has mistaken
the character of the theory which he censures, and that the objection which he urges
is hardly applicable. He attempts to avail himself of Sir W. Hamilton’s own theory
of the veracity of consciousness. He asks, “Does not the mind in sense-perception
hold the object to be a real object?” Undoubtedly; but reality in this sense is
not identical with absolute. existence unmodified by the laws of the percipient
mind. Man can conceive reality, as he conceives other objects, only as the laws
of his faculties permit; and in distinguishing reality from appearance, he is not
distinguishing the related from the unrelated. Both appearance and reality must
be given in consciousness, to be apprehended at all; and the distinction is only
between some modes of consciousness, such as those of a dream, which are regarded
as delusive, and others, as in a waking state,
Dr. McCosh, in the above criticism, also classes Professor Ferrier
as a representative of the same school with Kant and Hamilton. This classification
is, at least, questionable. Professor Ferrier’s system more nearly approaches to
the Philosophy of the Absolute than to that of the Relative. He himself distinctly
announces that he undertakes “to lay down the laws, not only of our thinking and
knowing, but of all possible thinking and knowing.” Institutes of Metaphysic,
p. 55.
Note XI., p. 143.
See above, Lecture IV. Note 25.
Note XII., p. 143.
“It is the same with other mysteries, where, for well regulated minds, there is always to be found an explanation, sufficient for faith, but never as much as is necessary for comprehension. The what it is (τί ἐστι) is sufficient for us; but the how (πῶς) is beyond our comprehension, and is not at all necessary for us.”—Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, §.56.
Note XIII., p. 144.
“It is plain, that, in any communication from an Infinite Being to creatures of finite capacities, one of two things must happen. Either the former must raise the latter almost to His own level; or else He must suit the form of His communication to their powers of apprehension. . . . . If we turn to Scripture, however, we shall see how this matter is decided. In God’s dealings with men we find ‘wrath,’ ‘jealousy,’ ‘repentance,’ and other affections, ascribed to the Divine Being. He is described as ‘sitting on a throne;’ His ‘eyes’ are said ‘to behold the children of men;’ not to mention other instances, which must suggest themselves to every one, in which God condescends to convey to us, not the very reality indeed, but something as near the reality as He sees it expedient for us to know.” Professor Lee, The Inspiration of Holy Scripture, pp. 63, 61 (second edition).
Note XIV., p. 146.
Plato, Sophistes, p. 242. “But our Eleatic sect, from Xenophanes, and yet earlier, go through with their views, as if what we call all were in irellity only one.”—Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. I. 225. “Xenophanes laid down the doctrine . . . . that the All was One.”—Arist. Metaph. II. 4. 30. “For whatever is different from that which is, (entity), is not; so that, according to the view of Parmenides, it must of necessity be the case, that all things that are, are one, and that this is that which is (entity).”—Plato, Panmenides, p. 127. “How is it, Zeno, did you mean this, that if the things in being are many, then that these many must be like and unlike, and that this is impossible . . . . . did you not say so? Exactly so, said Zeno.”—Arist. Soph. Elench. 10. 2. . . . . “Zeno thought that all things are one . . . . “—Arist. De Cœlo III. 1. 5. “For some of these did away altogether with the idea of generation and of dissolution; for they maintained that none of the things in existence really came into being, and perished, but that all this only appeared so to us.”—Diog. Laert. ix. 24 (De Melisso). “It seemed to him, that the All was infinite, and unchangeable, and immovable, and one, like itself, and complete; and that motion was not real, but only apparent.” Cf. Plato, Theætebus, p). 183. Compare Karsten, Parmenidis Reliquiæ, p. 157, 194. Brandis, Commentationes Eleaticæ, p. 213, 214.
Note XV., p. 146.
Plato, Theæt. p. 152. “I will tell you,—and this is no
trifling talk,—that nothing is an independent unity, and that you can rightly attribute
to nothing any quality whatsoever; but if you call a thing great, it will at once
appear small, if heavy, light, and so in like manner of all, so that nothing is
one or somewhat or of any quality soever; but, that by motion, change, mixture,
all things together are only becoming, while we say wrongly that they are;
for nothing ever really is, but all things are ever becoming; and herein
are the philosophers agreed, Parmenides excepted.”—Diogenes Laert. ix. 51.
“He
said (Protagoras) that the soul was nothing but perceptions.”—Aristot. De Xenophane,
Zenone et Gorgia, c. 5. (De Gorgia.) “He said that there was nothing in existence;
and if there were anything, that it was not an object of knowledge; and that if
there were anything in existence and an object of knowledge, it could not be made
known to others.” . . . . “What we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or
collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed,
though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Hume,
Treatise of Human Nature, Part IV. sect. 2.—“‘Tis confessed by the
Note XVI., p. 146.
“We must come now to the great question, which M. Bayle has lately brought upon the tapis,—namely, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can be subject to insolvable objections. . . . . He thinks that, in Theology, the doctrine of Predestination is of this nature, and in Philosophy that of Continuity (the Contiunum) in space. These are in fact the two labyrinths, which have tried theologians and philosophers of all times. Libertus Fromodus, a theologian of Louvain, who has studied much the subject of Grace, and has also written a book, entitled Labyrinthus de compositione Continui, has well expressed the difficulties of each; and the famous Ochin has well represented what he calls the Labyrinths of Predestination.” Leibnitz, Théodicée, Discours de la conformité de la Foi avec la Raison, § 24. Compare Sir W. Hamilton’s Discussions, p. 632.
Note XVII., p. 147.
See Bishop Browne’s criticism of Archbishop King, Procedure
of the Understanding, p. 15. “He hath unwarily dropped some such shocking expressions
as these, The best representations we can make of God are infinitely short of
Truth. Which God forbid, in the sense his adversaries take it; for then all
our reasonings concerning Him would be groundless and false. But the saying is evidently
true in a favorable and qualified sense and meaning; namely, that they are infinitely
short of the real, true, internal Nature of God as He is in himself.” Compare
Divine Analogy, p. 57. “Though all the Revelations of God are true, as coming
from Him who is Truth itself; yet the truth and substance of them doth not consist
in this, that they give us any new set of ideas, and express them in a language
altogether unknown before; or that both the conceptions and terms are so immediately
and properly adapted to the true and real nature of the things revealed,
that they could not without great impropriety and even profaneness be ever applied
to the things of this world. But the truth of them consists in this; that
whereas the terms and conceptions made use of in those Revelations
are strictly proper to things worldly and obvious;
Note XVIII., p. 147.
Augustin. Confess. 1. XIII. c. 16. “For as Thou altogether art, so Thou alone knowest,—Thou, who art unchangeably, and knowest unchangeably, and wiliest unchangeably. And Thy essence knoweth and willeth unchanegeably, and Thy knowledge is and willeth unchangeably, and Thy will is, and knoweth unchangeably. Nor doth it seem right in Thy sight, that, as the Light unchangeable knoweth itself, so It be known by the changeable being, that is enlightened by It.”
Note XIX., p. 148.
See Hegel, Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. pp. 238,
298; Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 356, XII. p. 119. Schleiermacher
substantially admits the same facts, though he attempts to connect them with a different
theory. Reden über Religion, (Werke, I. pp. 401, 441.)
Note XX., p. 150.
“And the Father, who, indeed, in respect of us, is invisible and
indeterminable, is known by His own Word; and being indeclarable, is declared
Note XXI., P. 150.
“We who believe that God lived upon the earth, and that He took upon Him the lowliness of human form for the sake of man’s salvation, are far from the opinion of those who think that God has no care for anything.” Tertullian, Adv. Marc. II. 16.
Note XXII., p. 150.
It is only a natural consequence of their own principles, when
the advocates of a philosophy of the Absolute maintain that the Incarnation of Christ
has no relation to time. Thus Schelling says: “The theologians also expound, in
like empiric manner, the Incarnation of God in Christ,—that God took upon Him human
nature in a definite momentum of time, a thing impossible of conception,
as God is eternally out of all time. The Incarnation of God is therefore an incarnation
from eternity (a becoming’ manifest in the flesh’ from all eternity) . . . .” Vorlesungen
über die Methode des Academischen Studium, p. 192. Fitche speaks to the same
effect, Anweisung zum seligen Leben (Werke, V. p. 482). Werke, IX. p. 388. For a criticism of these pantheistic
perversions of Christianity, see Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie,
p. 247. The consummation of the pantheistic view may be found in Blasche, Philosophische
Unsterblichkeitlehre, § 51-53. Here the eternal Incarnation of God is exhibited
as the perpetual production of men, as phenomenal manifestations of the absolute
unity.
Note XXIII., p. 151.
Encyklopädie, §§ 564, 566. For the benefit of any reader who may be disposed to play the part of Œdipus, I subjoin the entire passage in the original. The meaning may perhaps, as Professor Ferrier observes of Hegel’s philosophy in general, be extracted by distillation, but certainly not by literal translation.
“Was Gott als Geist ist,—Dies richtig und bestimmt
im Gedanken zu fassen, dazu wird gründliche Speculation erfordert. Es sind zunächst
die
Der absolute Geist in der aufgehobenen Unmittelbarkeit und Sinnlichkeit der Gestalt und des Wissens, ist dem Inhalte nach der an-und-für-sich-seyende Geist der Natur und des Geistes, der Form nach ist er zunächst für das subjective Wissen der Vorstellung. Diese giebt den Momenten seines Inhalts einerscits Selbstständigkeit und macht sie gegen einander zu Voraussetzungen, and zu einander folgenden Erscheinungen und zu einem Zusammenhang des Geschehens nach endlichen Reflexionsbestimmungen; anderseits wird solche Form endlicher Vorstellungsweise in dem Glauben an den Einen Geist und in der Andacht des Cultus aufgchoben.
In diesem Trennen scheidet sich die Form von dem Inhalte, und in jener die unterschiedenen Momente des Begriffs zu besondern Sphären oder Elementen ab, in deren jedem sich der absolute Inhalt darstellt,—α) als in seiner Manifestation bei sich selbst bleibender, Ewiger Inhalt;—β) als Unterscheidung des ewigen Wesens von seiner Manifestation, welche durch diesen Unterschied die Erscheinungswelt wird, in die der Inhalt tritt;—γ) als unendliche Rückkehr und Versöhnung der entäusserten Welt mit denm ewigen Wesen, das Zurückgehen desselben aus der Erscheinung in die Einheit seiner Fülle.”
The passage which, though perhaps bearing more directly on my
argument, I have not ventured to attempt to translate, [After what has been
said by the author, both here and in the Lecture, on page 152, it were certainly
unbecoming to attempt a translation for the American edition.—Transl.]
Görres, in the preface to the second edition of his Athanasius,
p. ix., exhibits a specimen of a new Creed on Hegelian principles, to be drawn up
by a general council composed of the more advanced theologians of the day. The qualifications
for a seat in the council are humorously described,
Note XXIV., p. 152.
See especially Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 557; Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 387; Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 247; Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XIV. p. 222, XV. p. 88.
Note XXV., p. 152.
The indecision of Hegel upon this vital question is satisfactorily accounted for by his disciple, Strauss. To a philosophy which professes to exhibit the universal relations of necessary ideas, it is indifferent whether they have actually been realized in an individual case or not. This question is reserved for the Critic of History. See Streitschriften, Heft III. p. 68. Dorner too, while pointing out the merits of Hegel’s Christology, admits that the belief in a historical Christ has no significance in his system; and that those disciples who reject it carry out that system most fully. See Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 409.
Note XXVI., p. 153.
Philosophie der Religion, Werke, XII. p. 286. In another passage of the same work, p. 281, the Atonement is explained in the following language: “Therein only is the possibility of the atonement—that the essential oneness of the divine and the human nature becomes known; that is the necessary basis; man can know himself taken up into God, so far as God is not somewhat foreign to him, somewhat external, accidental, but when he, according to his essential being, his freedom and subjectivity, is taken up into God; but this is possible, only in so far as this subjectivity of human nature is in God Himself.” Compare also p. 330, and Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. pp. 544, 572. Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 405. Geschichte der Philosophie, Werke, XV. p. 100.
Note XXVII., p. 153.
Grundlehren der Christlichen Dogmatik, § 319, 320.
Note XXVIII., p. 154.
Ibid. §§ 325, 326. A similar theory is maintained, almost in the same language, by Rosenkranz, Encyklopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften, § 26, 27. The substance of this view is given by Hegel himself, Werke, IX. pp. 394, 457; XV. p. 89. Some valuable criticisms on the principle of it may be found in Dr. Mill’s Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles to the Criticism of the Gospel, pp. 16, 42.
Note XXIX., p. 155.
Leben Jesu, § 151. English Translation, Vol. III. p. 437. The passage has also been translated by Dr. Mill in his Observations on the application of Pantheistic Principles, etc. p. 50. I have slightly corrected the former version by the aid of the latter. A sort of anticipation of the theory may be found in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke, II. p. 569.
Note XXX., p. 155.
“Only the Metaphysical, but in nowise the Historical, makes our salvation.” Fichte, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, (Werke, V. p. 485). With this may be compared the language of Spinoza, Ep. XXI. “I say that it is not at all necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh; but of that eternal Son of God, the eternal Wisdom of God, which has manifested itself in all things, and especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, we must have a far different opinion.”
Note I., p. 161.
See above, Lecture IV. p. 104 and Note 19.
Note II., p. 162.
Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, II. p. 156, third edition,
(English Translation, II. p. 126.) The doctrine that the Divine Essence is speculatively
made known through Christ, is a common ground on which theologians
See Neander, vol. iv. p. 60, ed.
Bohn.
Note III., p. 162.
See L. Ancillon, in the Mémoires de l’Académie de Berlin, quoted by Bartholmèss, Histoire des Doctrines religieuses, I. p. 268. On the parallel between the mystery of Causation and those of Christian doctrines, compare Magee on the Atonement, Note XIX. See also Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 19, and the review of the same work, by Professor Fraser, Essays in Philosophy, p. 274.
Note IV., p. 162.
Seven different theories of the causal nexus, and of the mode of our apprehension of it, are enumerated and refuted by Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 611. His own, which is the eighth, can hardly be regarded as more satisfactory. For he resolves the causal judgment itself into the inability to conceive an absolute commencement of phenomena, and the consequent necessity of thinking that what appears to us under a new form had previously existed under others. But surely a cause is as much required to account for the change from an old form to a new, as to account for an absolute beginning. On the defects of this theory I have remarked elsewhere. See Encyclopædia Britannica, eighth edition, vol. XIV. p. 601. It has also been criticized by Dr. McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, p. 529, fourth edition; by Professor Fraser, Essays in Philosophy, p. 170 sqq.; and by Mr. Calderwood, Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 139 sqq.
Note V. p. 163.
That Causation implies something more than invariable sequence,
though what that something is we are unable to determine, is maintained, among others,
by M. Cousin, in his eloquent Lectures on the Philosophy of Locke. “Solely because
one phenomenon succeeds another, and succeeds it constantly,—is it the cause of
it? Is this the whole idea, which you form to yourself, of cause? When you say,
when you think that the fire is the
Memoires de l’Académie
de Berlin, quoted by Maine de Biran, Nouvelles Considérations, p. 23.
Note VI., p. 163.
That the first idea of Causation is derived from the consciousness
of the exercise of power in our own volitions, is established, after a hint from
Locke, Essay, B. II. Ch. 21 §§ 4, 5. A similar view is taken by Jacobi,
David Hume, oder Idealismus und Realismus, (Werke, II. p. 201.) See De Biran, Oeuvres Philosophiques,
IV. p. 241, 273, Cousin, Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie, Deuxième
Série, Leçon 19. Fragments Philosophiques, vol. IV.; Préface de la Premiere
Edition.
And even within the sphere of our own volitions, though we are immediately conscious of the exercise of power, yet the analysis of the conception thus presented to us, carries us at once into the region of the incomprehensible. The finite power of man, as an originating cause within his own sphere, seems to come into collision with the infinite power of God, as the originating Cause of all things. Finite power is itself created by and dependent upon God; yet, at the same time, it seems to be manifested as originating and independent. Power itself acts only on the solicitation of motives; and this raises the question, which is prior? does the motive bring about the state of the will which inclines to it; or does the state of the will convert the coincident circumstances into motives? Am I moved to will, or do I will to be moved? Here we are involved in the mystery of endless succession. On this mystery there are some able remarks in Mr. Mozley’s Augustinian theory of Predestination, p. 2, and in Professor Fraser’s Essays in Philosophy, p. 275.
Note VII., p. 163.
De Ordine, II. 18. Compare Ibid. II. 16. “of that Supreme God, who is better known by not knowing.”
Note VIII., p. 163.
Enarratio in Psalmum LXXXV. 12. Compare De Trinitate, VIII. c. 2.
Note IX., p. 164.
F. Socinus, Tractatus de Deo, Christo, et Spiritu Sancto.
(Opera, 1656, vol. I. p. 811). “But even from that alone, that God is openly
taught to be one, it can justly be concluded, that he can be neither three nor two.
For the One and the Three, or the One and the Two are opposed to each other. So
that if God be three or two, he cannot be one.”—Priestley, Tracts in Controversy
with Bishop Horsley, p. 78. “They are therefore both one and many
in the same respect, viz., in each being perfect God. This is certainly as
much a contradiction as to say that Peter, James, and John, having each of them
every thing that is requisite to constitute a complete man, are yet, all together,
not three men, but only one man.”—F. W. Newman,
Note X., p. 164.
Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 171), has some objections against the Catholic Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, conceived in the thorough spirit of Rationalism. In the same spirit Strauss observes (Glaubenslehre, I. p. 460), “Whoever has sworn to the Symbolum Quicunque has forsworn the laws of human thought.” The sarcasm comes inconsistently enough from a disciple of Hegel, whose entire philosophy is based on an abjuration of the laws of thought. In one respect, indeed, Hegel is right; namely, in maintaining that the laws of thought are not applicable to the Infinite. But the true conclusion from this concession is not, as the Hegelians maintain, that a philosophy can be constructed independently of those laws; but that the Infinite is not an object of human philosophy at all.
Note XI., p. 165.
Paradise Lost, B. II. 667.
Note XII., p. 166.
Compare Anselm, De Fide Trinitatis, c. 7. “But if he denies that three can be predicated of one, and one of three, . . . . . let him allow that there is something in God, which his intellect cannot penetrate, and let him not compare the nature of God, which is above all things, free from all condition of place and time and composition of parts, with things, which are confined to place and time, or composed of parts; but let him believe that there is something, in that nature, which cannot be in those things, and let him acquiesce in christian authority, and not dispute against it.”
Note XIII., p. 166.
See the objections raised against this doctrine by Mr. F. W. Newman,
Phases of Faith, p. 84. “The very form of our past participle (begotten),” he tells us,
“is invented to indicate an event in the past time.” The true
Note XIV., p. 166.
The parallel here pointed out may be exhibited more fully by consulting Bishop Pearson’s Exposition of this Doctrine, On the Creed, Art. I., and the authorities cited in his notes.
Note XV., p. 166.
On this ground is established a profound and decisive criticism of Hegel’s System, by Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, c. 2. “Pure being,” he says, “is quiescence; so also is the Nothing (das Nichts); how is the active Becoming (active reality) the result of the union of two quiescent conceptions?” M. Bartholmèss in like manner remarks, “In turning thus the abstraction to reality, this system tacitly ascribes to abstract being virtues and qualities which belong only to a concrete and individual being; that is, to a simple being capable of spontaneous and deliberate action, of intelligence and of will. It accords all this to it, at the same time that it represents it, and with reason, as an impersonal being. This abstract being produces concrete beings, this impersonal being produces persons; it produces the one and the other, because thus the system directs!” Histoire des Doctrines Religieuses, II p. 277.
Note XVI., p. 167.
Schelling, Bruno, p. 168. “In the Absolute, all is absolute; if, therefore, the perfection of His Nature appears in the real as infinite Being, and in the ideal as infinite Knowing, the Being in the absolute is, even as the Knowing, absolute; and each, being absolute, has not, out of itself, an opposite in the other, but the absolute Knowing is the absolute Nature, and the absolute Nature the absolute Knowing.”
Note XVII., p. 167.
Aquinas, Summa, P. I. Qu. XXXII. Art. 1. “It is impossible,
by means of natural reason, to reach the knowledge of the Trinity of the Divine
Persons. For it has been shown above, that a man can, by natural reason,
Philosophie
der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 402.
Note XVIII., p. 168.
For the objection, see Catech. Racov. De Persona Christi, Cap. 1. (Ed. 1609. p. 43.) “It is repugnant to sound reason. In the first place, because two substances, opposite in their properties, cannot unite so as to form one person; . . . . then, too, because two natures, each constituting a person, cannot come together so as to constitute one person.”—Spinoza, Epist. XXI. “As to the additional view, given by some churches, that God assumed human nature, I have expressly declared, that I know not what they say; nay, to confess the truth, they seem to me to talk no less absurdly than if any one should say that a circle has assumed the nature of a square.” Similar objections are urged by F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 116, and by Theodore Parker, Critical and Miscellaneous Writings, p. 320, Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion, p. 234.
Note XIX., p. 169.
One half of this dilemma has been exhibited by Sir W. Hamilton,
Discussions, p. 609. sqq. It is strange however that this great thinker should
not have seen that the second alternative is equally inconceivable; that it is as
impossible to conceive the creation as a process of evolution from the being of
the Creator, as it is to conceive it as a production out of nothing. This double
impossibility is much more in harmony with the philosophy of the conditioned, than
the hypothesis which Sir W. Hamilton adopts.
Note XX., p. 169.
Pensées, Partie II. Art. I. § 1.
Note XXI., p. 171.
Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 248. sqq. Compare the cognate passages from other Authors, quoted above, Lecture I. Note 21.
Note XXII., p. 172.
For some remarks connected with this and cognate theories, see above, Lecture I. notes 21, 22, 23, Lecture III. notes 16, 18.
Note XXIII., p. 173.
“For since in general it is one thing to understand the impossibility of a thing, and a far different thing not to understand its possibility; so especially in those matters of which we are utterly ignorant, such as those which are not exposed to sense, the things are by no means forthwith impossible, the possibility of which we do not thoroughly understand. Therefore it does not become the philosopher to deny universally Divine efficiency in the created world, or to maintain as certain, that God Himself contributes nothing (immediately) either to the consecutive order of natural things,—as for instance the keeping up of each part or species, embraced in a genus of animals or of plants,—or to moral changes,—as for instance, the improvement of the human soul,—or to assert that it is altogether impossible for a revelation or any other extraordinary event to be brought about by Divine agency.” Storr, Annotationes quædam Theologicæ, p. 5.
Note XXIV., p. 173.
“For since the force and power of nature, is the very force and
power of God, and its laws and rules are the very decrees of God, it is in general
a thing to be believed, that the power of nature is infinite, and that its laws
are so made, as to extend to all things which are conceived by the
Lehrbuch zur
Einleitung in die Philosophie, § 155 (Werke, I. p. 278). Epistles of St. Paul, vol. II. p. 412.
Note XXV., p. 174.
“The reason why, among men, an artificer is justly esteemed so
much the more skilful, as the machine of his composing will continue longer to move
regularly without any further interposition of the workman, is
Note XXVI., p. 174.
“'I do not believe,” says Theodore Parlker, “there ever was a miracle, or ever will be; every where I find law,—the constant mode of operation of the infinite God.”—Some account of my Ministry, appended to Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 263. Compare the same work, pp. 113, 188; and Atkinson, Man’s Nature and Development, p. 241. The statement is not at present true, even as regards the material world: it is false as regards the world of mind- and were it true in both, it would prove nothing regarding the “infinite God.” For the conception of law is, to say the least, quite as finite as that of miraculous interposition. Professor Powell, in his latest work, though not absolutely rejecting miracles, yet adopts a tone which, compared with such passages as the above, is at least painfully suggestive. “It is now perceived by all inquiring minds, that the advance of true scientific principles, and the grand inductive conclusions of universal and eternal law and order, are at once the basis of all rational theology, and give the death-blow to superstition.” Christianity without Judaism, p. 11.
Note XXVII., p. 174.
This point has been treated by the author at greater length in the Prolegomena Logica, p. 135, and in the article Metaphysics, in the eighth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. XIV. p. 600.
Note XXVIII., p. 176.
See McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, pp. 162, 166.
The quotations which the author brings forward in support of this remark, from Humboldt
and Comte, are valuable as showing the concurrence of the highest scientific authorities
as to the facts stated. The religious application
Note XXIX., p. 176.
“There are domains of nature in which man’s foresight is considerably extended and accurate, and other domains in which it is very limited, or very dim and confused. Again, there are departments of nature in which man’s influence is considerable, and others which lie altogether beyond his control, directly or indirectly. Now, on comparing these classes of objects, we find them to have a cross or converse relation to one another. Where man’s foreknowledge is extensive, either he has no power, or his power is limited; and where his power might be exerted, his foresight is contracted. . . . . . He can tell in what position a satellite of Saturn will be a hundred years after this present time, but he cannot say in what state his bodily health may be an hour hence. . . . . We are now in circumstances to discover the advantages arising from the mixture of uniformity and uncertainty in the operations of nature. Both serve most important ends in the government of God. The one renders nature steady and stable, the other active and accommodating. Without the certainty, man would waver as in a dream, and wander as in a trackless desert; without the unexpected changes, he would make his rounds like the gin-horse in its circuit, or the prisoner on his wheel. Were nature altogether capricious, man would likewise become altogether capricious, for he could have no motive to steadfast action: again, were nature altogether fixed, it would make man’s character as cold and formal as itself.” McCosh, Method of the Divine Government, pp. 172, 174 (fourth edition).
Note XXX., p. 177.
The solution usually given by Christian writers of the difficulty
of reconciling the efficacy of prayer with the infinite power and wisdom of God,
I cannot help regarding, while thoroughly sympathizing with the purpose of its advocates,
as unsatisfactory. That solution may be given
Lettres
à une Princesse d’ Allemagne, vol. I. p. 357, ed. Cournot. Compare McCosh,
Method of the Divine Government, p 222.
Note XXXI., p. 177.
Kant, though he attaches no value to miracles as evidences of
a moral religion, yet distinctly allows that there is no sufficient reason for denying
their possibility as facts or their utility at certain periods of the history of
religion. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 99,
edit. Rosenkranz. Instit. Theol. § 12. Leben Jesu,
§ 16.
Note XXXII., p. 178.
See, on the one side, Babbage, Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, ch. 8; Hitchcock, Religion of Geology, p. 290. The same view is also suggested as probable by Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 4. On the other side, as regards the limitations within which the idea of law should be applied to the course of God’s Providence, see McCosh, Method of Divine Government, p. 155. Kant, Religion innerhalb, u. s. w. p. 102, maintains, with reason, that from a human point of view, a law of miracles is unattainable.
Note XXXIII., p. 180.
Sir William Hamilton, Discussions, p. 625.
Note I., p. 182.
THE Moral and Religious Philosophy of Kant, which is here referred to, is chiefly contained in his Metaphysik der Sitten, first published in 1785, his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in 1788, and his Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, in 1793. For Kant’s influence on the rationalist theology of Germany, see Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie, p. 323. sqq. Amand Saintes, Histoire du Rationalisme en Allemagne, L. II. ch. xi. Rose, State of Protestantism in Germany, p. 183 (2nd edition), Kahnis, History of German Protestantism, pp. 88, 167 (Meyer’s Translation).
Note II., p. 183.
See Metaphysik der Sitten, pp. 5, 31, 52, 87, 92; Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, p. 224 (ed. Rosenkranz).
Note III., p. 183.
A similar view of the superiority of the moral consciousness over
other phenomena of the human mind, as regards absolute certainty, seems to
Epistles of St. Paul, Vol. II. p. 468.
Note IV., p. 183.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 631. ed. Rosenkranz. Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 31. Religion innerhalb u. s. w. p. 123.
Note V., p. 183.
Religion u. s. w. p. 123.
Note VI., p. 183.
Ibid. pp. 122,184.
Note VII., p. 183.
Ibid. pp. 123, 133. Compare Streit der Facultäten, p. 304.
Note VIII., p. 184.
See above, Lecture III, p. 74.
Note IX., p. 185.
On the existence of necessary truths in morals, comparable to those of mathematics, see Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay VI. ch. 6 (pp. 453, 454. ed. Hamilton).
Note X., p. 186.
Compare Jacobi, An Fichte, Werke, III. pp. 35, 37. “Just as certainly as I possess reason, so certainly do I not possess along with it the perfection of life, I do not possess the fulness of the good and the true; and just as certainly as I do not possess this, and know it, just so certainly do I know there is a higher Being, and in Him I have my origin . . . . . I acknowledge, then, that I do not know the Good in itself, the True in itself, also that I have only a remote foreboding of it.” That the moral providence of God cannot be judged by the same standard as the actions of men, see Leibnitz, Théodicée, De la Conformité, etc. § 32 (Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 489).
Note XI., p. 187.
“Wherefore, inasmuch as our actions are conversant about things beset with many circumstances, which cause men of sundry wits to be also of sundry judgments concerning that which ought to be done; requisite it cannot but seem the rule of divine law should herein help our imbecility, that we might the more infallibly understand what is good and what evil. The first principles of the Law of Nature are easy; hard it were to find men ignorant of them. But concerning the duty which Nature’s law doth require at the hands of men, in a number of things particular, so far hath the natural understanding even of sundry whole nations been darkened, that they have not discerned, no not gross iniquity to be sin.—Hooker, E. P., I. xii. 2.
Note XII., p. 187.
This corresponds to the distinction drawn by Leibnitz, between eternal and positive truths of the reason. See Théodicée, Discours de la Conformité, etc. § 2 (Opera, Erdmann, p. 480). The latter class of truths, he allows, may be subservient to Faith, and even opposed by it, but not the former.
Note XIII., p. 189.
That it is impossible to conceive the Divine Will as absolutely indifferent, is shown by Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, I. p. 128. But on the other hand, we are equally unable to conceive it as necessarily determined by the laws of the Divine Nature. We cannot therefore conceive absolute morality either as dependent on, or as independent of, the Will of God. In other words, we are unable to conceive absolute morality at all.
Note XIV., p. 190.
See above, Lecture I, Note 14.
Note XV., p. 190.
“Sin contains its own retributive penalty, as surely and as naturally as the acorn contains the oak. . . . . It is ordained to follow guilt by God—not as a Judge, but as the Creator and Legislator of the universe. . . . We can be redeemed from the punishment of sin only by being redeemed from its commission. Neither can there be any such thing as vicarious atonement or punishment. . . . If the foregoing reflections are sound, the awful, yet wholesome conviction presses on our minds, that there can be no forgiveness of sins.”- Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 265. “I believe God is a just God, rewarding and punishing us exactly as we act well or ill. I believe that such reward and punishment follow necessarily from His will as revealed in natural law, as well as in the Bible. I believe that as the highest justice is the highest mercy, so He is a merciful God. That the guilty should suffer the measure of penalty which their guilt has incurred, is justice.”—Froude, Nemesis of Faith, p. 69.
Note XVI., p. 190.
See above, Lecture I, Note 13.
Note XVII., p. 190.
See above, Lecture I, Note 12.
Note XVIII., p. 190.
See Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 8. Compare Wegscheider, Instit. Theol. § 141.
Note XIX., p. 191.
Mr. Rigg justly observes of the theory of immediate forgiveness,
as substituted for the Christian Atonement, “Let all men be told that ‘God cannot
be angry with any,’ and that whatever may have been a man’s sins, if he will but
repent, there is no hindrance to God’s freely forgiving him all, without the infliction
of any punishment whatever, and without the
Modern Anglican
Theology, p. 317.
Note XX., p. 191.
Such is, in fact, the theory of Kant. See Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, p. 84. He does not, however, carry his principle consistently out, but admits a kind of vicarious suffering in a symbolical sense; the penitent being morally a different individual from the sinner. Even this metaphorical conceit is utterly out of place according to the main principles of his system.
Note XXI., p. 192.
Some excellent remarks on this point will be found in McCosh’s Method of the Divine Government, p. 475 (4th edition).
Note XXII., p. 192.
“This natural indignation is generally moderate and low enough in mankind, in each particular man, when the injury which excites it doth not affect himself, or one whom he considers as himself. Therefore the precepts to forgive and to love our enemies, do not relate to that general indignation against injury and the authors of it, but to this feeling, or resentment, when raised by private or personal injury.”—Butler, Sermon IX, On Forgiveness of Injuries.
Note XXIII., p. 193.
Thus Mr. Froude exclaims, “He! to have created mankind liable
to fail—to have laid them in the way of a temptation under which He knew
Note XXIV., p. 193.
Aristotle Eth. Nic. V. 10. “For of a thing, which is not limited, the rule is also unlimited, like the plumb-rule of Lesbian house-building, changing according to the form of the stone, and not remaining the same rule.”
Note XXV., p. 193.
On this spirit of universal criticism, Augustine remarks: “But they are foolish, who say, 'Could not the wisdom of God otherwise deliver men, than by assuming human nature, and being born of a woman, and suffering all those things from sinners?' To whom, we say He could, but if He were to do otherwise, He would in like manner be displeasing to your folly.”—De Agone Christiano, c. 11.
The following passage from the Eclipse of Faith, p. 125,
is an excellent statement of the versatility of the “moral reason,” or “spiritual
insight,” when set up as a criterion of religious truth. “Even as to that fundamental
position,—the existence of a Being of unlimited power and wisdom (as to his unlimited
goodness, I believe that nothing but an external revelation can absolutely
certify us), I feel that I am much more indebted to those inferences from design,
which these writers make so light of, than to any clearness in the imperfect
intuition; for if I found—and surely this is the true test—the traces of design
less conspicuous in the external world, confusion there as in the moral, and in
both greater than is now found in either, I extremely doubt whether the faintest
surmise of such a Being would have suggested itself to me. But be that as it may;
as to their other cardinal sentiments,—the nature of my relations to this Being—his
placability if offended,—the terms of forgiveness, if any,—whether, as these gentlemen
affirm, he is accessible to all, without any atonement or mediator:—as to all this,
I solemnly declare, that apart from external instruction, I cannot by interrogating
my racked spirit, catch even a murmur.
What, then, am I to think of this all-sufficient revelation from within?”
Note XXVI., p. 193.
For the Socinian theory of a limited foreknowledge in God, see Müller, Christliche Lehre con der Sünde, II. pp. 276, 288; Davison, Discourses on Prophecy, pp. 360, 367. A similar view is held by Rothe, Theol. Ethik, Vol. I. p. 118; and by Drobisch, Grundlehren der Religionsphilosophie, p. 209. For the opposite necessitarian theory, see Calvin, Inst. L. II. ch. 4. § 6; Edwards, On the Freedom of the Will, Part II. Sect. xii. quoted above, Lect. II. Note 7; and in the authorities cited by Wegscheider, Inst. Theol., § 65.
Note XXVII., p. 193.
That God’s knowledge is not properly foreknowledge, as
not being subject to the law of time, is maintained by Augustine, De Civ. Dei,
XI. 21, De Div. Quæst ad Simpl. 4. If. Qu. 2. § 2, and by Boethius, De
Consol. Phil. L. V.
Note XXVIII., p. 194.
Wegscheider (Inst. Theol. § 50) denies the possibility of prophecy, on the ground that a prediction of human events is destructive of freedom. In this he follows Kant, Anthropologie, § 35.
Note XXIX., p. 194.
“As it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man’s will, or impose any necessity upon it, men’s actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may be well looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us.”—Cudworth, Intellectual System, ch. V. (Vol. III. p. 19. ed. Harrison). “We may be unable to conceive how a thing not necessary in its nature can be foreknown—for our foreknowledge is in general limited by that circumstance, and is more or less perfect in proportion to the fixed or necessary nature of the things we contemplate: . . . but to subject the knowledge of God to any such limitation is surely absurd and unphilosophical, as well as impious.”—Copleston, Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, p. 46.
Note XXX., p. 194.
Origen. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. VI. 11. 36. And if we
must say, that foreknowledge is not the cause of events, we will say what, though
more
Note XXXI., p. 195.
See above, Lecture VI, p. 150, and Note 27.
Note XXXII., p. 196.
This question is discussed at some length by Euler, Lettres á une Princesse d’Allemagne, Vol. I. p. 360. ed., Cournot.
Note XXXIII., p. 196.
“Sins are finite; between the finite and the infinite there is
no proportion; therefore punishments also ought to be finite.”—Sonerus apud Leibnitz.
Præf. Published by Lessing. in his tract, Leibnitz von den ewigen Strafen
(Lessing’s Schriften, ed. Lachmann, Vol. IX. p. 154).
Note XXXIV., p. 197.
Thus Leibnitz replies to the objection of Sonerus: “Even, therefore,
if we should concede that no sin is of itself infinite, yet it can with truth be
said, that the sins of the damned are infinite in number; for they persist in sinning,
through all eternity.” The same argument is repeated in the
Note XXXV., p. 197.
Thus Mr. Newman says, “I saw that the current orthodoxy made Satan
eternal conqueror over Christ. In vain does the Son of God come from heaven and
take human flesh and die on the cross. In spite of him the devil carries off to
hell the vast majority of mankind, in whom not misery only, but Sin, is triumphant
for ever and ever.” Phases of Faith, p. 78. Some Account of my Ministry. See Theism, Atheism,
etc., p. 261. Christliche Lehre
von der Sünde, II. p. 599.
Note XXXVI., p. 197.
See a short treatise by Kant, Ueber das Misslingen aller Philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicée (Werke, VII. p. 385). For a more detailed account of various theories, see Müller, Christliche Lehre von der Sünde, B. II. An able review of the difficulties of the question will be found in Mr. Mozley’s Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 262 seq.
Note XXXVII., p. 197.
The theory which represents evil as a privation or a negation—a theory adopted by theologians and philosophers of almost every shade of opinion, in order to reconcile the goodness of God with the apparent permission of sin, can only be classed among the numerous necessarily fruitless attempts of metaphysicians to explain the primary facts of consciousness, by the arbitrary assumption of a principle of which we are not and cannot be conscious, and of whose truth or falsehood we have therefore no possible guarantee. Moral evil, in the only form in which we are conscious of it, appears as the direct transgression of a law whose obligation we feel within us; and thus manifested, it is an act as real and as positive as any performed in the most rigid compliance with that law. And this is the utmost point to which human research can penetrate. Whether, in some absolute mode of existence, out of all relation to human consciousness, the phenomenon of moral evil is ultimately dependent on the addition or the subtraction of some causative principle, is a question the solution of which is beyond consciousness, and therefore beyond philosophy. To us, as moral agents, capable of right and wrong acts, evil is a reality, and its consequences are a reality. What may be the nature of the cause which produces this unquestionably real fact of human consciousness, is a mystery which God has not revealed, and which man cannot discover.
Note XXXVIII., p. 199.
Analogy, Part II. ch. 5. In another significant passage (Part I. ch. 2), Butler exhibits the argument from analogy as bearing on the final character of punishment. “Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character; at least in good measure; yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree. . . . So that many natural punishments are final to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal capacity.”—Compare Bishop Browne, Procedure of the Understanding, p. 351. “The difficulty in that question, What proportion endless torments can bear to momentary sins? is quite removed, by considering that the punishments denounced and threatened are not in themselves sanctions entirely arbitrary, as it is in punishments annexed to human laws; but they are withal so many previous warnings or declarations of the inevitable consequence and natural tendency of Sin in itself, to render us miserable in another world.”
Note XXXIX., p. 200.
Kant (Religion, u. s. w., Werke, X. p. 45) objects to the doctrine of inherited corruption, on the ground that a man cannot be responsible for any but his own acts. The objection is carried out more fully by Wegscheider, who says, “Neither can the goodness of God allow, that by one man's sin, universal human nature be corrupted and depraved; nor can His wisdom suffer, that God's work, furnished from the beginning with surpassing endowments, be transformed in a little while, for the slightest cause, to quite another and a worse condition.”—Inst. Theol. § 117. The learned critic does not seem to be aware that the principle of one of these arguments exactly annihilates that of the other; for if we concede to the first, that every man is born in the state of pristine innocence, we must admit, in opposition to the second, that God’s work is destroyed by slight causes, not once only, but millions of times, in every man that sins. The only other supposition possible is, that sin itself is part of God’s purpose—in which case we naced not trouble ourselves to establish any argument on the hypothesis of the divine wisdom or benevolence.
Note XL., p. 200.
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VII. 2. “But one may be at a loss to understand how a person, who takes a right estimate of things, can live without moral self-control. Some, therefore, say that a person, who had knowledge, could not live in such manner; for (as Socrates thought), if knowledge were within him, he could not be controlled by something else, and dragged about by it, like a slave.”
Note XLI., p. 200.
For sundry rationalist objections to the doctrine of Justification by Faith, see Wegscheider, § 154, 155. He declares the whole doctrine to be the result of the anthropopathic notions of a rude age.
Note XLII., p. 201.
“Or notion of freedom does not, it is true, exclude motives of
conscious action; but motives are not compulsory, but are always effectual only
through the will; motives for the human will can therefore proceed from God, without
man’s being thereby forced, without his losing his freedom, and becoming a blind
instrument of the higher power.”—Drobisch,
Mr. Mozley has thrown considerable light on the true bearings
of the predestinarian controversy; and his work is especially valuable as vindicating
the supreme right of Scripture to be accepted in all its statements, instead of
being mutilated to suit the demands of human logic. But it cannot be denied that
his own theory, however satisfactory in this respect, leaves a painful void on the
philosophical side, and apparently vindicates the authority of revelation by the
sacrifice of the laws of human thought. He maintains that where our conception of
an object is indistinct, contradictory propositions may be accepted as both equally
true; and lie carries this theory so far as to assert of the rival doctrines of
Pelagius and Augustine, “Both these positions are true, if held together, and both
false, if held apart.” P. 77. To the same effect are his criticisms on Aquinas,
p. 260, in which he says, “The will as an original spring of action is irreconcilable
with the Divine Power, a second first cause in nature being inconsistent with there
being only cue First Cause.” This assumes that we have a sufficient conception of
the nature of Divine Power and of the action of a First Cause; an assumption which
the author himself in another passage repudiates, acknowledging that “As an unknown
premiss, the Divine Power is no contradiction to the fact of evil; for we must know
what a truth is before we see a contradiction in it to another truth” (p. 276).
This latter admission, consistently carried out, would have considerably modified
the author’s whole theory.
Should we not rather say that the very indistinctness of conception
prevents the existence of any contradiction at all? I can only know two ideas to
be contradictory by the distinct conception of both; and, where
The contradictory propositions which Mr. Mozley exhibits, as equally
guaranteed by consciousness, are in reality by no means homogeneous. In each pair
of contradictories, we have a limited and individual fact of immediate perception,—such
as the power of originating an action,—opposed to a universal maxim, not perceived
immediately, but based on some process of general thought,—such as that every event
must have a cause. To establish these two as contradictory of each other, it should
be shown that in every single act we have a direct consciousness of being coerced,
as well as of being free; and that we can gather from each fact a clear and distinct
conception. But this is by no means the case. The principle of causality, whatever
may be its true import and extent, is not derived from the immediate consciousness
of our volition being determined by antecedent causes; and therefore it may not
be applied to human actions, until, from an analysis of the mode in which this maxim
is gained, it can be distinctly shown that these are included under it. I
am happy to be able to refer, in support of this view, to the able criticism of
Professor Fraser, in his review of Mr. Mozley's work. “The coexistence,” he
says, “of a belief in causality with a belief in moral agency, is indeed
incomprehensible; but is it so because the two beliefs are known to be
contradictory, and not rather because causality and Divine Power cannot be
fathomed by finite intelligence?”—Essays
in Philosophy, p. 271.
By applying to Mr. Mozley’s theory the principles advanced in the preceding Lectures, it may, I believe, be shown that, in every case, the contradiction is not real, but apparent; and that it arises front a vain attempt to transcend the limits of human thought.
Note XLIII., p. 201.
Analogy, Introduction, p. 10.
Note I., p. 206.
F. W. Newman, Phases of Faith, p. 199; Reply to the Eclipse of Faith, p. 11.
Note II., p. 206.
“Christianity itself has thus practically confessed, what is theoretically clear, that an authoritative external revelation of moral and spiritual truth is essentially impossible to man.”—F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 59.
Note III., p. 206.
“In teaching about God and Christ, lay aside the wisdom of the wise; forswear History and all its apparatus; hold communion with the Father and the Son in the Spirit; from this communion learn all that is essential to the Gospel, and still (if possible) retain every proposition which Paul believed and taught. Propose them to the faith of others, to be tested by inward and spiritual evidence only; and you will at least be in the true apostolic track.”—F. W. Newman, The Soul, p. 250.
Note IV., p. 207.
“This question of miracles, whether true or false, is of no religious
significance. When Mr. Locke said the doctrine proved the miracles, not the miracles
the doctrine, he admitted their worthlessness. They can be useful only to such as
deny our internal power of discerning truth.”— Parker, Discourse of matters
pertaining to Religion, p. 170. Pascal, with far sounder judgment, says, on
the other hand, “we must judge of the doctrine by the miracles, we must judge of
miracles by the doctrine. The doctrine shows what the miracles are, and the miracles
show what the doctrine is. All this is true, and not contradictory. . . .
. . Jesus Christ cured the man who was born blind, and did many other miracles
on the sabbath day; whereby he blinded the Pharisees, who said, that it was necessary
to judge of miracles by the doctrine. . . . . . The Pharisees said:
This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the sabbath day. The others
said: How can a man that is a sinner, do such miracles? Which is the
Pensées, Partie II. Art. xvi. § i. 5, 10. Whatever may be
thought of the evidence in behalf of the particular miracle on the occasion of which
these remarks were written, the article itself is worthy of the highest praise,
as a judicious statement of the religious value of miracles, supposing their actual
occurrence to be proved by sufficient testimony. Evidence of Natural and Revealed
Religion, Prop. xiv. Notes on the Miracles
of our Lord, p. 94 (fifth edition).
Note V., p. 207.
Foxton, Popular Christianity, p. 105. On the other hand,
the profound author of the Restoration of Belief, with a far juster estimate
of the value of evidence, observes, “Remove the supernatural from the Gospels, or,
in other words, reduce the evangelical histories, by aid of some unintelligible
hypothesis (German-born), to the level of an inane jumble of credulity, extravagance,
and myth-power (whatever this may be), and then Christianity will go to its place,
as to any effective value, in relation to humanizing and benevolent influences and
enterprises;—a place, say, a few degrees above the level of some passages in Epictetus
and M. Aurelius. . . .
Note VI., p. 207.
Parker, Some Account of my Ministry, appended to Theism, Atheism, and the Popular Theology, p. 258.
Note VII., p. 207.
“All these criteria are the moral conditions under which alone it were possible for such a manifestation to be realized, conformably to the conception of a revelation; but by no means conversely—the conditions of an effect which could be realized only by God conformably to such a conception. In the latter case, they would—to the exclusion of the causality of all other beings—justify the conclusion, that is revelation; but, as it is, only this conclusion is justified; that can be a revelation.”—Fichte, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (Werke V. p. 146).
Note VIII., p. 208.
“These . . . were the outer conditions of
the life of Christ, under which his public ministry and his personal character reached
their destined development. It is not in that development alone, but in that
development under these conditions, that the evidence will be found of his
True
The able and impressive argument of this little work
is well worthy of the perusal of those who would see what is the real force of the
Christian evidences, even upon the lowest ground to which skepticism can attempt
to reduce them. Though far from representing the whole strength of the case, it
is most valuable as showing what may be effected in behalf of Christianity, on the
principles of its opponents.
Note IX., p. 209.
Newman, The Soul, p.58.
Note X., p. 211.
Analogy, Part II. ch. 3.
Note XI., p. 214.
“Although some circumstances in the description of God’s Firstborn
and Elect, by whom this change is to be accomplished, may primarily apply to collective
Israel [many others will admit of no such application. Israel surely was not the
child whom a virgin was to bear; Israel did not make his grave with the wicked,
and with the rich in his death; Israel scarcely reconciled that strangely blended
variety of suffering and triumph, which was predicted of the Messiah].”—R. Williams,
Rational Godliness, p. 56. In a Note to this passage, the author adds, “I
no longer feel confident of the assertion in brackets; but now believe that all
the prophecies have primarily an application nearly contemporaneous.” As a specimen
of this application, we may cite a subsequent passage from the same volume, p. 169.
“The same Isaiah sees that Israel, whom God had called out of Egypt, and whom the
Eternal had denominated his first-born, trampled, captive, and derided; he sees
the beauty of the
There are few unprejudiced readers who will not think the author’s first thought on this subject preferable to his second. In the interpretation of any profane author, the perverse ingenuity which regards the Fifty-Third chapter of Isaiah (to say nothing of the other portions of the prophecy, which Dr. Williams has divorced from their context), as a description of the contemporaneous state of the Jewish people and priesthood, would be considered as too extravagant to need refutation. That such an interpretation should have found favor with thoroughgoing rationalists, determined at all hazards to expel the supernatural from Scripture, is only to be expected; and this may explain the adoption of this and similar views by a considerable school of expositors in Germany. But that it should have been received by those who, like Dr. Williams, hold fast the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God, is less easily to be accounted for. If this greatest of all miracles be once conceded,—if it be allowed that “when the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth His Son, made of a woman;”—what marvel is it, that, while the time was still incomplete, a prophet should have been divinely inspired to proclaim the future redemption? Once concede the possibility of the supernatural at all, and the Messianic interpretation is the only one reconcilable with the facts of history and the plain meaning of words. The fiction of a contemporaneous sense, whether with or without a subsequent Messianic application, is only needed to get rid of direct inspiration; and nothing is gained by getting rid of inspiration, so long as a fragment of the supernatural is permitted to remain. It is only when we assume, a priori, that the supernatural is impossible, that anything is gained by forcing the prophetic language into a different meaning.
Note XII., p. 215.
Of this Eclectic Christianity, of which Schleiermacher may be
considered as the chief modern representative, a late gifted and lamented writer
has truly observed: “He could not effect the rescue of Christianity on these
Essays and Remains of the Rev.
Robert Alfred Vaughan, Vol. I. p. 93.
Note XIII., p. 216.
For the objections of modern Pantheism against the immortality
of the soul, See Lecture III., Note 27. Of the resurrection of the body in particular, Wegscheider observes:
“The resurrection of the body is so far from being reconcilable
with the precepts of sound reason, that it is embarrassed with very many and the
gravest difficulties. For, in the first place, it cannot be doubted that
this opinion derived its origin from the lame and imperfect conceptions of men of
defective culture; for such persons, being destitute of a just idea of the Divine
being, are wont to imagine to themselves a life after death, solely after the nature
of the earthly life. Hence it comes to pass, that, among barbarous nations, and
also in the system of
Institutiones Theologicæ, § 195. P. 363. That is to
say, it is boldly maintained that our Lord, in order to humor the prejudices of
the Jews of that day, consented to lend his authority to the dissemination of a
religious falsehood for the deception of posterity. This monstrous assertion is
stated more plainly by Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Polit. c 2. “Indeed
He accommodated His forms of thought to every one’s principles and opinions. For
instance, when He said to the Pharisees, And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided
against himself, how then can his kingdom stand? he meant only to convict the
Pharisees on their own principles, not to teach the doctrine of demons.” In like
manner, Schleiermacher (Christliche Glaube, § 42) asserts that Christ and
his Apostles possibly adopted the popular representations, as we speak of fairies
and ghosts. On the other side, it is justly urged by Storr (Doctrina Ciristiana,
§ 52), that our Lord employed the same language privately with his disciples. as
well as publicly with the people; e. g. Pp. 372, 373. Christlichle Glaubenslehre, § 49.
To the same effect are his remarks on Evil Spirits § 54 Among the earlier rationalists,
the same view is taken by Röhr, Briefe über den Rationalismus, p. 35. Discourse
of matters pertaining. to Religion, p 176.
Note XIV., p. 216.
Greg, Creed of Christendom, Preface, p. xii.
Note XV., p. 216.
The theory which represents the human race as in a constant state
of religious progress, and the various religions of antiquity as successive steps
in the education of mankind, has been a favorite with various schools of modern
philosophy. Hegel, as might naturally be expected, propounds a theory of the necessary
development of religious ideas, as determined by the movements of the universal
Spirit. See Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke, IX. p. 14. Philosophie
der Religion, Werke, XI. p. 76, 78. See his Philosophie der Religion,
Werke, XI. p. 82. XII. p. 45. The superiority of the Greek religion appears
to consist in its greater acknowledgment of human freedom, and perhaps in being
a step in the direction of Pantheism. See Werke, XlI 92, 125. Of the Roman
religion, he says that it contained in itself all the elements of Christianity,
and was a necessary step to the latter. Its evils sprang from the depth of its spirit
(XII pp. 181, 184). The best commentary on this assertion may be found in Augustine,
De Civ. Dei, Lib. VI. Among the imperfections
of Judaism, Hegel includes the fact that “it did not make men conscious of the identity
of the human soul with the Absolute and its absorption therein (die
Anschauung und das Bewusstseyn von der Einlheit der Seele mit dem Absoluten, oder
von der Aufnahme der Seele in den Schooss des Absoluten ist noch nicht erwacht,
Werke, Xl. p. 86). In another place (p. 161) he speaks of it as the religion
of obstinate, dead understanding. Vatke (Biblische Theologie, p. 115) carries
the absurdity of theory to its climax, by boldly maintaining that the later Judaism
had been elevated by its conflict with the religions of Greece and Rome,
and thus prepared to become the precursor of Christianity. The Hegelian theory is
also adopted by Baur, as representing the law of development of Christian doctrines.
The historical aspects of the doctrine are to be regarded as phases of a process,
in which the several forms are determined one by another, and all are united together
in the totality of the idea. See especially his Christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung,
p. 11, and the preface to the same work, p. vi. Cours
de Philosophie Positive, Leçons, 52, 53, 54. Compare Catechisme Positiviste,
pp. 31, 184, 243.
The previous question is clearly stated by Theodore Parker. “From
what point did the human race set out,—from civilization and the true worship of
one God, or from cannibalism and the deification of nature? Has the human race fallen
or risen? The question is purely historical, and to be answered by historical witnesses.
But in the presence, and still more in the absence, of such witnesses, the
a priori doctrines of the man’s philosophy affect his
decision. Reasoning with no facts is as easy as all motion in cacao. The analogy
of the geological formation of the earth—its gradual preparation, so to say, for
the reception of plants and animals, the ruder first, and then the more complex
and beautiful, till at last she opens her bosom to man,—this, in connection with
many similar analogies, would tend to show that a similar order was to be expected
in the affairs of men—development from the lower to the higher, and not the
Discourse of Matters pertaining to Religion,
p. 68. 69. A similar view is advocated by Mr. Newman, Phases of Faith, p
223, and by Mr. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 71. Mr. Parker does not distinctly
adopt this view as his own. but he appears to regard it as preferable to the antagonist
theory, which he speaks of as supported by a “party consisting more of poets and
dogmatists than of philosophers.”
It is to be regretted that Professor Jowett has partially given
the sanction of his authority to a theory which it is to be presumed he would not
advocate to the full extent of the above statement. “The theory of a primitive religion
common to all mankind,” he tells us, “has only to be placed distinctly before the
mind, to make us aware that it is the baseless fabric of a vision; there is one
stream of revelation only—the Jewish. But even if it were conceivable, it would
be inconsistent with facts. The earliest history tells nothing of a general religion,
but of particular beliefs about stocks and stones, about places and persons, about
animal life, about the sun, moon, and stars, about the divine essence permeating
the world, about gods in the likeness of men appearin- in battles and directing
the course of states, about the world below, about sacrifices, purifications, initiations,
magic, mysteries. These were the true religions of nature, varying with different
degrees of mental culture or civilization.” Epistles of St. Paul, Vol.
II. p. 395. Ibid.,
p. 386.
It would be unfair to press these words to a meaning which they
do not necessarily bear. We will assume that by the “earliest history,” profane
history alone is meant, in opposition to the Jewish Revelation; and that the author
does not intend, as some of his critics have supposed, to deny the historical character
of the Book of Genesis, and the existence of a primitive revelation coeval with
the creation of man. Even with this
Parker, Theism, Atheism, and
the Popular Theology, p. 103, 104. Parker, Discourse of Religion, p 214. Newman, Phases of
Faith, p. 150. Parker,
Discourse, p. 87. Newman, Phases, p. 151. Parker, Discourse,
p. 204, 223. Greg, Creed of Christendom, p. 75.
We must believe, indeed, that in the darkest ages of idolatry,
God “left not himself without witness;” we must believe that the false religions
of the world, like its other evils, are overruled by God to the purposes of His
good Providence. But this does not make them the less evils and abominations in
the sight of God. Those who speak of the human race as under a law of vegetable
development, forget that man has, what vegetables have not, a moral sense and a
free will. It is indeed impossible, in our present state of knowledge, to draw exactly
the line between the sins and the misfortunes of individuals, to decide how much
of each man’s history is due to his own will, and how much to the circumstances
in which he is placed. But though Scripture, like philosophy, offers no complete
Note XVI., p. 219.
“It is an obvious snare, that many, out of such abundance of knowledge, should be tempted to forget at times this grand and simple point that all vital truth is to be sought from Scripture alone. Hence that they should be tempted rather to combine systems for themselves according, to some proportion and fancy of their own, than be content neither to add nor diminish anything from that which Christ and his Apostles have enjoined; to make up, as it were, a cento of doctrines and of precepts; to take from Christ what pleases them, and from other stores what pleases them (of course the best from each, as it appears to their judgment, so as to exhibit the most perfect whole); taking e. g. the blessed hope of everlasting life from Jesus Christ, but rejecting his atonement; or honoring highly his example of humanity, but disrobing Him of his divinity; or accepting all the comfortable things of the dispensation of the Spirit, but refusing its strictness and self-denials; or forming any other combination whatsoever, to the exclusion of the entire Gospel: thus inviting Christian hearers, not to the supper of the king’s son, but to a sort of miscellaneous banquet of their own; ‘using their liberty,’ in short, ‘as an occasion’ to that natural disposition, which Christ came to correct and to repair.
“Now that by such methods, enforced by education and strengthened by the best of secondary motives, men may attain to an excellent proficiency in morals, I am neither prepared nor disposed to dispute. I am not desirous of disputing that they may possess therein an excellent religion, as opposed to Mahometanism or Paganism. But that they possess the true account to be given of their stewardship of that one talent, the Gospel itself, I do doubt in sorrow and fear. I do doubt whether they ‘live the life that now is,’ as St. Paul lived it, ‘by the faith of the Son of God;’ by true apprehension of the things that He suffered for us, and of the right which He has purchased to command us in all excellent qualities and actions; and further, of the invisible but real assistance which he gives us towards the performance of them.” Müller, Bampton Lectures. p. 169 (third edition).
Note XVII., p. 219.
“Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties.” Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 6.
Note XVIII., p. 221.
I do not mean by these remarks to deny the possibility of any
progress whatever in Christian Theology, such for instance, as may result from the
better interpretation of Holy Writ, or the refutation of unauthorized inferences
therefrom. But all such developments of doctrine are admissible only when confined
within the limits so carefully laid down in the sixth Article of our Church. “Holy
Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not
read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that
it should be believed as an Article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary
to salvation.” Within these limits, the most judicious theologians have not hesitated
to allow the possibility of progress, as regards at least the definite statement
of Christian doctrine. Thus Bishop Butler remarks: “As it is owned the whole scheme
of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before
the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions, it
must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the continuance and
progress of learning and liberty; and by particular persons attending to, comparing,
and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded
by the generality of the world.” Analogy, Part II. ch. 3. W. A.
Butler, Letters on the Development of Christian Doctrine, pp. 55-58.
It is impossible not to regret deeply the very different language,
on this point, of a writer in many respects worthy of better things; but who, while
retaining the essential doctrines of Christianity, has, it is to be feared, done
much to unsettle the authority on which they rest. “If the destined course of the
world,” says Dr. Williams, “be really one of providential progress, if there has
been such a thing as a childhood of humanity, and if God has been educating either
a nation or a Church to understand their duty to Himself and to mankind; it must
follow, that when the fulness of light is come, there will be childish things to
put away. . . . Hence, if the religious records represent faithfully
the inner life of each generation, whether a people or a priesthood, they will be,
in St. Paul’s phrase, divinely animated, or with a divine life running through
them; and every writing, divinely animated, will be useful; yet they may,
or rather,
Rational Godliness, pp. 291, 292. A similar
view is maintained by Mr Morell, Philosophy of Religion, p. 183, and is criticised
by Professor Lee, Inspiration of Holy Scripture, p. 147.
It is the misfortune of this sort of language, that it suggests far more than it directly asserts, and probably more than the author intends to convey. Dr. Williams probably does not mean to imply that we are no more bound by the authority of Scripture in matters of religion than by the primitive practice in sowing and threshing, or that we are as much at liberty to invent new theological doctrines as new implements of husbandry. But if he does not mean this, it is to be regretted that he has not clearly pointed out the respects in which his comparison does not hold good.
Note XIX., p. 222.
Summa, P. I. Qu. II. Art. 2.
Note XX., p. 222.
See Archbishop King’s Discourse on Predestination, edited
by Archbishop Whately, p. 10. A different, and surely a more judicious view, is
taken by a contemporary Prelate of the Irish Church, whose earlier exposition of
the same theory In his Letter in answer to Toland’s Christianity not mysterious. Divine Analogy,
pp 45, 46. King’s Theory is also criticized more directly by the same author in
the Procedure of the Understanding, p. 11. Mr. Davison (Discourses on
Prophecy, p. 513) has noticed the weak points in King’s explanation; but with
too great a leaning to the opposite extreme, which reasons concerning the infinite
as if it were a mere expansion of the finite.
Note XXI., p. 223.
Compare the remarks of Hooker, E. P. I. 3. 2. “Moses, in describing the work of creation, attributeth speech unto God. . . . Was this only the intent of Moses, to signify the infinite greatness of God’s power by the easiness of his accomplishing such effects, without travail, pain, or labor? Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not work as a necessary but a voluntary agent, intending beforehand and decreeing with himself that which did outwardly proceed from him. Secondly, to shew that God did then institute a law natural to be observed by creatures, and therefore according to the manner of laws, the institution thereof is described, as being established by solemn injunction.”
Note XXII., p. 224.
“But they urge, there can be no proportion or similitude between
Finite and Infinite, and consequently there can be no analogy. That there can
Note XXIII., p. 224.
I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing, in the above
words, my belief in the purpose and authority of Holy Scripture; inasmuch as it
enables me to correct a serious misunderstanding into which a distinguished writer
has fallen in a criticism of my supposed views—a criticism to which the celebrity
of the author will probably give a far wider circulation than is ever likely to
fall to the lot of the small pamphlet which called it forth. Mr. Maurice, in the
preface to the second edition of his “Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament,” comments upon the distinction (maintained in the present Lectures and in a small
previous publication), between speculative and regulative truths,
in the following terms. “The notion of a revelation that tells us things which are
not in themselves true, but which it is right for us to believe and to act upon
as if they were true, has, I fear, penetrated very deeply into the heart of our
English schools, and of our English world. It may be traced among persons who are
apparently most unlike each other, who live to oppose and confute each other.
. . . But their differences are not in the least likely to be adjusted
by the discovery of this common ground. How the atmosphere is to be regulated by
the regulative Revelation; at what degree of heat or cold this constitution or that
can endure it; who must fix—since the language of the Revelation is assumed not
to be exact, not to express the very lesson which we are to derive from it—what
it does mean; by what contrivances its phrases are to be adapted to various places
and times: these are questions which must, of course, give rise to infinite disputations;
ever new schools and sects must be called into existence to settle them; there is
scope for permissions, prohibitions, compromises, persecutions, to any extent. The
despair which these must cause will probably
Now I certainly believed, and believe still, that God is infinite, and that no human mode of thought, nor even a Revelation, if it is to be intelligible by the human mind, can represent the infinite, save under finite forms. And it is a legitimate inference from this position, that no human representation, whether derived from without or from within, from Revelation or from natural Religion, can adequately exhibit the absolute nature of God. But I cannot admit, as a further legitimate inference, that therefore “the language of the Revelation does not express the very lesson which we are to derive from it;” that it needs any regulation to adjust it to “this constitution or that;” that it requires “to be adapted to various places and times.” For surely, if all men are subject to the same limitations of thought, the adaptation to their constitutions must be made already, before human interpretation can deal with the Revelation at all. It is not to the peculiarities which distinguish “this” constitution from “that,” that the Revelation has to be adapted by man; but, as it is given by God, it is adapted already to the general conditions which are common to all human constitutions alike, which are equally binding in all places and at all times. I have said nothing of a revelation adapted to one man more than to another; nothing of limitations which any amount of intellect or learning can enable a man to overcome. I have not said that the Bible is the teacher of the peasant rather than of the philosopher; of the Asiatic rather than of the European; of the first century rather than of the nineteenth. I have said only that it is the teacher of man as man; and that this is compatible with the possible existence of a more absolute truth in relation to beings of a higher intelligence. We must at any rate admit that man does not know God as God knows Himself; and hence that he does not know Him in the fulness of His Absolute Nature. But surely this admission is so far from implying that Revelation does not teach the very lesson which we are to derive from it, that it makes that lesson the more universal and the more authoritative. For Revelation is subject to no other limitations than those which encompass all human thought. Man gains nothing by rejecting or perverting its testimony; for the mystery of Revelation is the mystery of Reason also.
I do not wish to extend this controversy further; for I am willing
to believe that, on this question at least, my own opinion is substantially one
with that of my antagonist. At any rate, I approve as little as he does of allegorical,
or metaphysical, or mythical interpretations of Scripture: I believe that he is
generally right in maintaining that “the most literal meaning of Scripture is the
most spiritual meaning.” And if there are
Note XXIV., p. 225.
“There seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs. . . . Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as anything whatever does.”—Butler, Analogy, Part II. ch. 6.
Note XXV., p. 226.
Plato, Rep. VI. p. 486: “And this also it is necessary to consider, when you would distinguish between a nature which is philosophical, and one which is not.—What then is that?—That it takes no part, even unobserved, in any meanness; for petty littleness is every way most contrary to a soul that is ever stretching forward in desire to the whole and the all, “to divine and to human.”—Cicero, De Off. I. 2: “Nor is philosophy anything else, if you will define it, than the study of wisdom. But wisdom (as defined by ancient philosophers) is the knowledge of things human and divine, and of the causes in which these are contained.”
Note XXVI., p. 226.
Plato, Protag. p. 343: “And these, having met together by agreement, consecrated to Apollo, in his temple at Delphi, as the first fruits of wisdom, those inscriptions which are in everybody’s mouth, Know thyself, and Nothing to excess.”—Compare Jacobi, Werke, IV.; Vorbericht, p. xlii.: “Know thyself is, according to the Delphian god and Socrates, the highest command, and, so soon as it becomes practical, man is made aware of this truth: without the Divine Thou, there is no human I, and without the human I, there is no Divine Thou.”
Note XXVII., p. 226.
Clemens Alex. Pædag. III. 1: “It is, then, as it appears, the greatest of all lessons, to know one’s self; for, if any one knows himself, he will know God.”
Note XXVIII., p. 227.
“It is plain that there is a capacity in the nature of man, which neither riches, nor honors, nor sensual gratifications, nor anything in this world, can perfectly fill up or satisfy: there is a deeper and more essential want, than any of these things can be the supply of. Yet surely there is a possibility of somewhat, which may fill up all our capacities of happiness; somewhat, in which our souls may find rest; somewhat, which may be to us that satisfactory good we are inquiring after. But it cannot be anything which is valuable only as it tends to some further end. . . . As our understanding can contemplate itself, and our affections be exercised upon themselves by reflection, so may each be employed in the same manner upon any other mind. And since the Supreme Mind, the Author and Cause of all things, is the highest possible object to himself, he may be an adequate supply to all the faculties of our souls; a subject to our understanding, and an object to our affections.”—Butler, Sermon XIV.
Note XXIX., p. 227.
“Christianity is not a religion for the religious, but a religion for man. I do not accept it because my temperament so disposes me, and because it meets my individual mood of mind, or my tastes. I accept it as it is suited to that moral condition in respect of which there is no difference of importance between me and the man I may next encounter on my path.” The Restoration of Belief, p. 325.
Note XXX., p. 227.
“The Scripture-arguments are arguments of inducement, addressed
to the whole nature of man—not merely to intellectual man, but to thinking and
feeling man, living among his fellow men;—and to be apprehended therefore in their
effect on our whole nature.”— Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p.
92.—”There are persons who complain of the Word, because it is not addressed to
some one department of the human soul, on which they set a high value. The systematic
divine wonders that it is not a
Only those Authors are here given from whom passages are quotedd.
ANGELUS SILESIUS (Johann Scheffler), 246, 283.
ANSELM, 235, 236, 286, 320.
APULEIUS, 302.
AQUINAS, 76, 100, 282, 286, 321.
ARISTOTLE, 257, 273, 301, 609, 333, 339.
ATHANASIUS, 276, 300, 312.
ATKINSON, 290.
AUGUSTINE, 259, 261, 281, 283, 285, 302, 311, 312, 333.
BABBAGE, 394.
BACON, 62, 128.
BARTHOLMESS, 263, 287, 288, 289, 321.
BAUER, BRUNO, 246.
BAUR, 313.
BOETHIUS, 100, 282.
BOLINGBROKE, 251.
BRAMHALL, 273, 274.
BROWNE (Bishop), 250, 275, 279, 310, 338, 356, 358.
BUTLER, 64, 136, 332, 338, 354, 360, 361.
BUTLER (W. A.), 355.
CALDERWOOD, 252, 278.
CANZ, 232.
CHEMNITZ, 236.
CICERO, 301. 360.
CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS, 248, 258, 270, 302, 361.
COLERIDGE. 264
COMTE, 247, 290, 350.
COPLESTON, 335.
COUSIN, 317.
CUDWORTH, 278, 335.
CYRIL, 301.
DAMASCENUS, 276.
DESCARTES, 272, 288.
DE STAEL, 289.
DONALDSON, 348.
DROBISCH, 303, 339.
ECKART, 283.
EDWARDS, 251.
EMERSON (R. W ), 247.
EMPIRICUS (SEXTUS), 231, 277, 309.
EULER, 327.
EWERBECK, 271.
FERRIER, 308.
FEUERBACH, 87, 247.
FICHTE, 62, 96, 239, 240, 243. 245, 250, 257, 265, 272, 273, 275, 284, 285, 302, 305, 316, 344.
FRASER. 341.
FROUDE, 237, 331, 332.
GALEN, 231.
GERHARD, 235.
GREG, 236, 331.
GREGORY, of Nissa, 301, 306.
HAMILTON (SIR WILLIAM), 245, 256, 258, 262, 265, 270. 282, 295.
HAMPDEN, 303, 361.
HEGEL, 65, 66, 76, 87, 95, 151, 152, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249, 2.59, 265, 272, 273, 312, 313, 314, 315, 349, 350.
HERDER, 282, 284.
HOBBES, 273, 275.
HOOKER, 261, 330, 357.
HUME, 139, 296, 304, 309.
IRENAEUS, 311.
JACOBI, 262, 275, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 330, 360.
JOWETT, 236, 237, 241, 295, 324, 329, 351.
JUSTIN MARTYR, 276, 300.
KANT, 63, 233, 238, 239, 241, 284, 304.
LAERTIUS, DIOGENES, 309.
LEE, 308.
LEIBNITZ, 250, 254, 291, 308, 310, 336.
LESSING, 302.
MACKAY, 236.
MALEBRANCHE, 305.
MARHEINEKE, 153, 244, 246, 248, 277, 313.
MAURICE, 282, 358.
MCCOSH, 279, 287, 307, 326, 362.
MILLER, 353.
MILTON, 165.
MORELL, 124, 296.
MOZLEY, 340.
MÜLLER (JULIUS), 161, 337.
NEANDER, 257, 291, 344.
NEWMAN (F. W ), 237, 249, 250, 251, 252, 296, 301, 319, 320, 337, 342.
NIEBUHR, 270.
OCCAM, 53, 238.
ORIGEN, 260, 261, 335.
PARKER (THEODORE), 242, 249, 251, 325, 337, 342, 350.
PASCAL, 104, 169, 254, 287, 301, 305, 306, 342.
PAULUS, 87.
PEARSON, 271.
PLATO, 261, 276, 309, 360.
PLOTINUS, 246, 258, 259, 272, 276, 277, 282, 285.
POELITZ, 231.
PORPHYRIUS, 258.
POWELL, 242, 325.
PRIESTLEY, 237, 319.
PROCLUS, 259, 276, 282.
RIGG, 331.
ROGERS, 331.
RÖHN, 87, 267.
ROSE, 231.
ROTHE, 257.
SCHELLING, 245, 249, 257, 276, 282, 283, 312, 321.
SCHLEGEL (F.), 263.
SCHLEIERMACHER, 123, 284, 300.
SOCINUS, 236, 237, 238, 319.
SOUTH, 272.
SPINOZA, 255, 256. 257, 258, 260, 261 272, 282, 285, 316, 322, 323, 348.
STORR, 241, 323.
STRAUSS, 154, 246, 269, 285, 289, 290, 320, 327, 349.
SWEDENBORG, 283.
TERTULLIAN, 108, 293, 312, 357.
THEOPHILUS, of Antioch, 300.
TINDAL, 252.
TRENCH, 343.
TRENDELENBURG, 274, 321.
VATKE, 87, 268.
VAUGHAN, 347.
WARBURTON, 252.
WEGSCHEIDER, 87, 234, 250, 323, 327, 332, 339, 347.
WERENFELS, 253.
WHATELY, 303.
WILBERFORCE, 53. 238.
WILLIAMS (R. ), 345, 355.
WILLM, 244, 291.
WOLF, 231.
XENOPHANES, 58, 243.
YOUNG (JOHN), 345.
Genesis
1:14 1:27 3:5 8:22 28:16 32:28
Exodus
Numbers
Deuteronomy
1 Samuel
1 Kings
Job
11:7 14:5 38:1-41 38:2 38:4 38:8 38:11 38:36 39:1-30 39:14
Psalms
2:17-18 3:13 4:5-31 5:2 14:19 19:1-6 22:1-2 22:9-10 22:19 22:22 34:15 35:7 39:5-6 39:14 42:1-2 43:1-2 45:19 47:19 47:29 48:6 51:17-18 52:1 52:3 65:2 65:2 65:2 74:12 74:17
Proverbs
Ecclesiastes
Isaiah
4:8 4:8 33:22 35:5 44:6 44:17 58:9
Jeremiah
Ezekiel
Joel
Jonah
Nahum
Matthew
7:26 8:8 13:39 14:28 19:8 22:42 25:41
Mark
Luke
John
1:17 3:17 4:20 5:36 6:68 6:68-69 7:46 9:16 13:7 14:8-9
Acts
Romans
1 Corinthians
1:21-24 2:11 3:7 10:13 13:9-10 13:10 13:12 13:12 14:15
2 Corinthians
Galatians
Ephesians
Philippians
Colossians
1 Thessalonians
1 Timothy
Hebrews
1:1 1:1-2 2:17 4:15 4:16 10:1 10:8 10:10
James
1 Peter
1 John
Revelation
Wisdom of Solomon
I II III IV V VI VII VIII 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364