Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1871, by
CHARLES SCRIBNER AND COMPANY,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington
Printed in the United States of America
PART II. | ||
---|---|---|
ANTHROPOLOGY. | ||
CHAPTER I. | ||
ORIGIN OF MAN. | ||
page | ||
§ 1. | Scriptural Doctrine | 3 |
§ 2. | Anti-Scriptural Theories | 4 |
Heathen Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation. — Modern Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation |
5 | |
Theories of Development. — Lamarck. — Vestiges of Creation. — Darwin. — Remarks on the Darwinian Theory. — Atheistic. — Mere Hypothesis |
19 | |
Theories of the Universe. — Darwin. — J. J. Murphy. — Owen. — Common Doctrine. — Admitted Difficulties in the way of the Darwinian Theory. — Sterility of Hybrids. — Geographical Distribution |
29 | |
Pangenesis |
32 | |
§ 3. | Antiquity of Man | 33 |
Lake Dwellings. — Fossil Human Remains.— Human Bones found with those of Extinct Animals. — Flint Instruments. — Races of Men. — Ancient Monuments |
39 | |
CHAPTER II. | ||
NATURE OF MAN. | ||
§ 1. | Scriptural Doctrine | 42 |
Truths assumed in Scriptures. — Relation of the Soul and Body. — Realistic Dualism |
46 | |
§ 2. | Trichotomy | 47 |
Anti-Scriptural. — Doubtful Passages |
48 | |
§ 3. | Realism | 51 |
Its General Character.—Generic Humanity.— Objections to Realism. — From Consciousness. — Contrary to Scriptures. — Inconsistent with Doctrine of the Trinity, and of the Person of Christ |
60 | |
§ 4. | Another Form of the Realistic Theory | 61 |
ORIGIN OF THE SOUL. | ||
§ 1. | Theory of Preëxistence | 65 |
§ 2. | Traducianism | 68 |
§ 3. | Creationism | 70 |
Arguments from the Nature of the Soul | 71 | |
§ 4. | Concluding Remarks | 72 |
CHAPTER IV. | ||
UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE. | ||
§ 1. | Idea of Species | 78 |
General Characteristics. — Definitions |
79 | |
§ 2. | Evidences of the Identity of Species | 82 |
Organic Structure. — Physiology. —Psychology |
85 | |
§ 3. | Application of these Criteria to Man | 86 |
The Evidence Cumulative |
88 | |
§ 4. | Philological and Moral Argument | 88 |
Brotherhood of Man |
90 | |
CHAPTER V. | ||
ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN. | ||
§ 1. | Scriptural Doctrine | 92 |
§ 2. | Man created in the Image of God | 96 |
§ 3. | Original Righteousness | 99 |
§ 4. | Dominion over the Creatures | 102 |
§ 5. | Doctrine of Romanists | 103 |
§ 6. | Pelagian and Rationalistic Doctrine | 106 |
Immanent Dispositions may have Moral Character. — General Judgment of Men on this Point.— Argument from Scripture, and from the Faith of the Church. — The Character of Dispositions depends on their Nature.— Objections considered. — Pelagians teach that Man was created Mortal |
115 | |
CHAPTER VI. | ||
COVENANT OF WORKS. | ||
§ 1. | God made a Covenant with Adam | 117 |
§ 2. | The Promise | 118 |
§ 3. | The Condition | 119 |
§ 4. | The Penalty | 120 |
§ 5. | The Parties | 121 |
§ 6. | The Perpetuity of the Covenant | 122 |
CHAPTER VII. | ||
THE FALL. | ||
§ 1. | Scriptural Account. — The Tree of Life. — The Tree of Knowledge — The Serpent.—The Temptation.— Effects of the First Sin |
123 |
SIN. | ||
§ 1. | Nature of the Question | 130 |
§ 2. | Philosophical Theories | 132 |
Limitation of Being. — Leibnitz’s Theory. — Antagonism. — Schleiermacher’s Theory. — The Sensuous Theory. — Selfishness |
144 | |
Theological Theories. | ||
§ 3. | Doctrine of the Early Church | 150 |
§ 4. | Pelagian Theory | 152 |
Arguments against it | 155 | |
§ 5. | Augustine’s Doctrine | 157 |
Philosophical Element of his Doctrine. — Why he made Sin a Negation. — The Moral Element of his Doctrine |
159 | |
§ 6. | Doctrine of the Church of Rome | 164 |
Diversity of Doctrine in the Latin Church. — Semi-Pelagian. — Anselm. — Abelard. — Thomas Aquinas. — The Scotists |
173 | |
Tridentine Doctrine on Original Sin |
174 | |
The true Doctrine of the Church of Rome |
177 | |
§ 7. | Protestant Doctrine of Sin | 180 |
Sin a specific Evil. — Has relation to Law. — That Law the Law of God. — Extent of the Law’s Demands. — Sin not confined to Acts of the Will. — Consists in want of Conformity to the Law of God. — Includes Guilt and Pollution |
188 | |
§ 8. | Effects of Adam’s Sin on his Posterity | 192 |
§ 9. | Immediate Imputation | 192 |
Statement of the Doctrine. — Ground of the Imputation of Adam’s
Sin. — Adam the Federal Head of his Race. — The Representative Principle in the Scriptures. — This Principle involved in
other Doctrines. — Argument from |
204 | |
§ 10. | Mediate Imputation | 205 |
Origin of the Doctrine in the French Church . — Held by Theologians in other Churches. — Objections. — Theory of Propagation |
214 | |
§ 11. | Preëxistence | 214 |
§ 12 | Realistic Theory | 216 |
President Edwards’ Theory. — Proper Realistic Theory. — Objections |
219 | |
§ 13. | Original Sin | 227 |
Its Nature. — Proof of the Doctrine. — From the Universality of Sin. — From the entire Sinfulness of Man. — From the incorrigible Nature of Sin. — From its early Manifestations. — Evasions of the foregoing Arguments. — Declarations of Scripture. — Argument from the necessity of Redemption. — From the necessity of Regeneration. — From Infant Baptism.— From the Universality of Death. —From the common Consent of Christians |
241 | |
Objections. —Men responsible only for Voluntary Acts. — Inconsistent |
254 | |
§ 14. | Seat of Original Sin | 254 |
The whole Soul its Seat |
255 | |
§ 15. | Inability | 257 |
Doctrine as stated in the Protestant Symbols. — The Nature of the Sinner’s Inability |
260 | |
Inability not mere Disinclination.— Arises from the want of Spiritual Discernment. — Asserted only in reference to “Things of the Spirit.” — In what sense Natural. — In what sense Moral. — Objections to the popular Distinction between Natural and Moral Ability |
265 | |
Proof of the Doctrine |
267 | |
The Negative Argument. — Involved in the Doctrine of Original Sin. — Argument from the Necessity of the Spirit’s Influence.—From Experience. — Objections. —Inconsistent with Moral Obligation. — Destroys the Motives to Exertion. — Encourages Delay |
276 | |
CHAPTER IX. | ||
FREE AGENCY. | ||
§ 1. | Different Theories of the Will | 280 |
Necessity. — Contingency. — Certainty |
284 | |
§ 2. | Definition of Terms | 288 |
Will. — Motive. — Cause. — Liberty. — Liberty and Ability.— Se1fdetermination and Self-determination of the Will |
294 | |
§ 3. | Certainty consistent with Liberty | 295 |
Points of Agreement. — Arguments for the Doctrine of Certainty. — From the Foreknowledge of God. — From Foreordination. — From Providence. — From the Doctrines of Grace. — From Consciousness. — From the Moral Character of Volitions. — From the Rational Nature of Man. — From the Doctrine of Sufficient Cause |
306 | |
PART III. | ||
SOTERIOLOGY. | ||
CHAPTER I. | ||
PLAN OF SALVATION. | ||
§ 1. | God has such a Plan | 313 |
Importance of knowing it. — Means of knowing it |
315 | |
§ 2. | Supralapsarianism | 316 |
§ 3. | Infralapsarianism | 319 |
§ 4. | Hypothetical Redemption | 321 |
Objections to that Scheme |
323 | |
§ 5. | The Lutheran Doctrine as to the Plan of Salvation | 324 |
§ 6. | The Remonstrant Doctrine | 327 |
The Wesleyan Doctrine | 329 | |
§ 8. | The Augustinian Doctrine | 331 |
Preliminary Remarks. — Statement of the Doctrine. — Proof of the Doctrine |
334 | |
Argument from the Facts of Providence. — From the Facts of Scripture |
339 | |
The Relation of God to his Rational Creatures. — Man a Fallen Race. — Work of the Spirit. — Election is to Holiness. — Gratuitous Nature of Salvation. — Paul’s Argument in the Ninth Chapter of Romans. — Argument from Experience |
344 | |
Express Declarations of Scripture. — The Words of Jesus |
346 | |
§ 9. | Objections to the Augustinian Doctrine | 349 |
The Objections shown to bear against the Providence of God. — Founded on our Ignorance. — Same Objections urged against the Teachings of the Apostles |
352 | |
CHAPTER II. | ||
COVENANT OF GRACE. | ||
§ 1. | The Plan of Salvation is a Covenant | 354 |
§ 2. | Different Views of the Nature of that Covenant | 355 |
Pelagian View. — Remonstrant View. — Wesleyan Arminian View. — Lutheran View. — Augustinian Doctrine |
356 | |
§ 3. | Parties to the Covenant | 357 |
Distinction between the Covenant of Redemption and the Covenant of Grace |
358 | |
§ 4. | Covenant of Redemption | 359 |
§ 5. | Covenant of Grace | 362 |
§ 6. | Identity of the Covenant under all Dispensations | 366 |
Promise of Eternal Life made before the Advent of Christ. — Christ the Redeemer under all Dispensations. — Faith the Condition of Salvation from the Beginning |
371 | |
§ 7. | Different Dispensations | 373 |
From Adam to Abraham. — Abraham to Moses.—Moses to Christ. — The Gospel Dispensation |
378 | |
CHAPTER III. | ||
THE PERSON OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | Preliminary Remarks | 378 |
§ 2. | Scriptural Facts concerning the Person of Christ | 380 |
He is truly Man. — He is truly God. — He is one Person
Proof of the Doctrine. — Proof’ of the several Points separately. —
From the current Representations of Scripture. — From particular Passages of Scripture. — |
384 | |
§ 3. | The Hypostatical Union | 387 |
Two Natures in Christ. — Meaning of the Word Nature. — Two
Natures united but not confounded. — The Attributes of one
|
390 | |
§ 4. | Consequences of the Hypostatical Union | 392 |
Communion of Attributes. — The Acts of Christ. — The Man Christ Jesus the Object of Worship. — Christ can sympathize with his People. — The Incarnate Logos the Source of Life. — The Exaltation of the Human Nature of Christ |
397 | |
§ 5. | Erroneous Doctrines on the Person of Christ. — Ebionites. — Gnostics. — Apollinarian Doctrine. — Nestcrianism. — Eutychianism. — Monothelite Controversy |
404 |
§ 6. | Doctrine of the Reformed Churches | 405 |
§ 7. | Lutheran Doctrine | 407 |
Different Views among the Lutherans. — Remarks on the Lutheran Doctrine |
418 | |
§ 8. | Later Forms of the Doctrine | 418 |
Socinianism. — Swedenborg. — Dr. Isaac Watts. — Objections to Dr. Watts’ Theory |
427 | |
§ 9. | Modern Forms of the Doctrine | 428 |
Pantheistical Christology. — Theistical Christology. — The Doctrine of Kenosis. — Ebrard |
434 | |
Gess |
435 | |
Remarks on the Doctrine of Kenosis |
437 | |
Schleiermacher’s Christology |
441 | |
Objections to Schleiermacher’s Theory. — Founded on Pantheistical Principles. — Involves Rejection of the Doctrine of the Trinity. — False Anthropology. — Perverts the Plan of Salvation |
450 | |
CHAPTER IV. | ||
THE MEDIATORIAL WORK OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | Christ the only Mediator | 455 |
§ 2. | Qualifications for the Work | 456 |
§ 3. | Threefold Office of Christ | 459 |
CHAPTER V. | ||
PROPHETIC OFFICE. | ||
§ 1. | Its Nature | 462 |
§ 2. | How Christ executes the Office of a Prophet | 463 |
CHAPTER VI. | ||
PRIESTLY OFFICE. | ||
§ 1. | Christ is truly a Priest | 464 |
§ 2„ | Christ is our only Priest | 466 |
§ 3. | Definition of Terms | 468 |
Atonement. — Satisfaction. — Penalty. — Vicarious. — Guilt. — Redemption. — Expiation. — Propitiation |
478 | |
SATISFACTION OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | Statement of the Doctrine | 480 |
§ 2. | The Sense in which the Work of Christ was a Satisfaction | 482 |
§ 3. | The Doctrine of the Scotists and Remonstrants | 485 |
§ 4. | Christ’s Satisfaction rendered to Justice | 489 |
§ 5. | Christ’s Work a Satisfaction to Law | 493 |
§ 6. | Proof of the Doctrine as above stated | 495 |
Argument from Christ’s Priestly Office. — From the Sacrificial
Character of His Death. — Proof of the Expiatory Character of the Sacrifices for
Sin. — Argument from the Fifty-third Chapter of Isaiah. — Passages in the New Testament
in which Christ’s Work is set forth as a Sacrifice, |
512 | |
Argument from the Nature of Redemption |
516 | |
Redemption from the Penalty of the Law. — From the Law itself. — From the Power of Sin. — From the Power of Satan. — Final Redemption from all Evil. — Argument from Related Doctrines |
520 | |
Argument from Religious Experience of Believers |
523 | |
§ 7. | Objections | 527 |
Philosophical Objections. — Objections drawn from the Feelings. — Moral Objections. — Objections urged by the Modern German Theologians |
532 | |
Answer to the Theory of these Writers |
535 | |
Popular Objections |
539 | |
CHAPTER VIII. | ||
FOR WHOM DID CHRIST DIE? | ||
§ 1. | State of the Question | 544 |
§ 2. | Proof of the Augustinian Doctrine | 546 |
1. From the Nature of the Covenant of Redemption. — 2. Election. — 3. Express Declaration of the Scriptures. — 4. From the Special Love of God. — 5. From the Believer’s Union with Christ. — 6. From the Intercession of Christ. — 7. Church Doctrine embraces all the Facts of the Case |
553 | |
Objections. — From the Universal Offer of the Gospel. — From certain Passages of Scripture |
558 | |
CHAPTER IX. | ||
THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT. | ||
§ 1. | The Orthodox View | 563 |
§ 2. | Doctrine of some of the Early Fathers | 564 |
§ 3. | Moral Theory | 566 |
Objections to that Theory |
571 | |
§ 4. | Governmental Theory | 573 |
Remonstrant Doctrine |
575 | |
Supernaturalists |
576 | |
Objections to Governmental Theory | 578 | |
§ 5. | Mystical Theory | 581 |
Early Mystics. — Mystics of the Time of the Reformation. — Osiander. — Schwenkfeld. — Oetinger. — The Modern Views |
58S | |
§ 6. | Concluding Remarks | 589 |
CHAPTER X. | ||
INTERCESSION OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | Christ our Intercessor | 592 |
§ 2. | Nature of his Intercession | 593 |
§ 3. | Its Objects | 594 |
§ 4. | The Intercession of Saints | 594 |
CHAPTER XI. | ||
KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | The Church the Kingdom of God | 596 |
§ 2. | Christ truly a King | 597 |
§ 3. | Nature of the Kingdom of Christ | 599 |
His Dominion over the Universe. — His Spiritual Kingdom. — His Visible Kingdom. — Nature of that Kingdom |
604 | |
§ 4. | The Kingdom of Glory | 608 |
CHAPTER XII. | ||
THE HUMILIATION OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | Includes his Incarnation | 610 |
§ 2. | His Being made under the Law | 612 |
§ 3. | His Sufferings and Death | 614 |
§ 4. | His Enduring the Wrath of God | 614 |
§ 5. | His Death and Burial | 615 |
The “Descensus ad Inferos.” — The Lutheran and Modern Doctrines of the Humiliation of Christ |
621 | |
CHAPTER XIII. | ||
THE EXALTATION OF CHRIST. | ||
§ 1. | His Resurrection | 626 |
§ 2. | His Ascension | 630 |
§ 3. | His Session at the Right Hand of God | 635 |
CHAPTER XIV. | ||
VOCATION. | ||
§ 1. | Scriptural Usage of the Word | 639 |
§ 2. | External Call | 641 |
§ 3. | Common Grace | 654 |
Lutheran Doctrine. — Rationalistic Doctrine |
657 | |
Proof of the Inward Call of the Spirit as distinct from the Truth |
660 | |
665 | ||
An Influence of the Spirit Common to all Men. — Effects of Common Grace |
670 | |
§ 4. | Efficacious Grace | 675 |
Why Efficacious. — Not simply ab eventu. — Not from its Congruity |
677 | |
The Augustinian Doctrine |
680 | |
Statement of the Doctrine. — The Main Principle involved |
682 | |
It is the Almighty Power of God. — Hence 1. It is Mysterious and Peculiar. 2. Distinct from Common Grace. 3. Distinct from Moral Suasion. 4. Acts immediately. In what Sense Physical. 5. It is Irresistible. 6. The Soul is Passive in Regeneration. 7. Regeneration Instantaneous. 8. It is an Act of Sovereign Grace |
688 | |
§ 5. | Proof of the Doctrine | 689 |
1. Common Consent. 2. Analogy. 3. |
706 | |
§ 6. | Objections | 709 |
§ 7. | History of the Doctrine of Grace | 710 |
Doctrine of the Early Church. — Pelagian Doctrine. — Semi-Pelagian. — Scholastic Period. — Synergistic Controversy. — Controversies in the Reformed Church. — Hypothetical Universalism. — Supernaturalism and Rationalism |
721 |
Having considered the doctrines which concern the nature of God and his relation to the world, we come now to those which concern man; his origin, nature, primitive state, probation, and apostasy; which last subject includes the question as to the nature of sin; and the effects of Adam’s first sin upon himself and upon his posterity. These subjects constitute the department of Anthropology.
§ 1. Scriptural Doctrine.
The Scriptural account of the origin of man is contained in
Two things are included in this account; first that man’s body was formed by the immediate intervention of God. It did not grow; nor was it produced by any process of development. Secondly, the soul was derived from God. He breathed into man “the breath of life,” that is, that life which constituted him a man, a living creature bearing the image of God.
Many have inferred from this language that the soul is an
emanation from the divine essence; particula spiritus divini in corpore inclusa. This idea was strenuously resisted by the Christian
§ 2. Anti-Scriptural Theories.
Heathen Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation.
The Scriptural doctrine is opposed to the doctrine held by
many of the ancients, that man is a spontaneous production of the earth. Many of
them claimed to be γηγενεῖς, αὐτόχθενες, terrigena. The earth was assumed to be pregnant with the germs of all living
organisms, which were quickened into life under favourable circumstances; or it
was regarded as instinct with a productive life to which is to be referred the origin
of all the plants and animals living on its surface. To this primitive doctrine
of antiquity, modern philosophy and science, in some of their forms, have returned.
Those who deny the existence of a personal God, distinct from the world, must of
course deny the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo and consequently of the
creation of man. The theological view as to the origin of man, says Strauss, “rejects
the standpoint of natural philosophy and of science in general. These do not admit
of the immediate intervention of divine causation. God created man, not as such,
or, ‘quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per elementa nascentis telluris explicatur.’
This is the view which the Greek and Roman philosophers, in a very crude form indeed,
presented, and against which the fathers of the Christian Church earnestly contended,
but which is now the unanimous judgment of natural science as well as of philosophy.”
Modern Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation.
Although Strauss greatly exaggerates when he says that men
of science in our day are unanimous in supporting the doctrine of spontaneous generation,
it is undoubtedly true that a large class of naturalists, especially on the continent
of Europe, are in favour of that doctrine. Professor Huxley, in his discourse on
the “Physical Basis of Life,” lends to it the whole weight of his authority. He
does not indeed expressly teach that dead matter becomes active without being subject
to the influence of previous living matter; but his whole paper is designed to show
that life is the result of the peculiar arrangement of the molecules of matter.
His doctrine is that “the matter of life is composed of ordinary matter, differing
from it only in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated.”
Mr. Mivart, while opposing Mr. Darwin’s theory, not only maintains
that the doctrine of evolution is “far from any necessary opposition to the most
orthodox theology,” but adds that “the same may be said of spontaneous generation.”
But while there is a class of naturalists who maintain the
doctrine of spontaneous generation, the great body even of those who are the most
advanced admit that omne vivum ex vivo, so far as science yet knows, is an
established law of nature. To demonstrate this is the object of Professor Huxley’s
important address just referred to, delivered before the British Association in
September, 1870. Two hundred years ago, he tells us, it was commonly taken for granted
that the insects which made their appearance in decaying animal and vegetable substances
were spontaneously produced. Redi, however, an Italian naturalist, about the middle
of the seventeenth century, proved that if such decaying matter were protected by
a piece of gauze admitting the air but excluding flies, no such insects made their
appearance. “Thus, the hypothesis that living matter always arises by the agency
of preëxisting living matter, took definite shape; and had henceforward a right
to be considered and a claim to be refuted, in each particular case, before the
production of living matter in any other way could be admitted by careful reasoners.”
But admitting that life is always derived from life, the question
still remains, Whether one kind of life may not give rise to life of a different
kind? It was long supposed that parasites derived their life from the plant or animal
in which they live. And what is more to the point, it is a matter of familiar experience
“that mere pressure on the skin will give rise to a corn” which seems to have a
life of its own; and that tumours are often developed in the body which acquire,
as in the ease of cancer, the power of multiplication and reproduction. In the case
of vaccination, also, a minute particle of matter is introduced under the skin.
The result is a vesicle distended with vaccine matter “in quantity a hundred or
a thousand-fold that which was originally inserted.” Whence did it come? Professor
Huxley tells us that it has been proved that “the active element in the vaccine
lymph is non-diffusible, and consists of minute particles not exceeding 1/20000
of an inch in diameter, which are made visible in the lymph by the microscope. Similar
experiments have proved that two of the most destructive of epizootic diseases,
sheep-pox and glanders, are also dependent for their existence and their propagation
upon extremely small living solid particles, to which the title of microzymes
is applied.” The question, he says, arises whether these particles are the result
of Homogenesis, or of Xenogenesis, i.e., Are they produced by preëxisting
living particles of the same kind? or, Are they a modification of the tissues of
the bodies in which they are found? The decision of this question has proved to
be a matter of vast practical importance. Some years since diseases attacked the
grape-vine and the silk-worm in France, which threatened to destroy two of the most
productive branches of industry in that country. The direct loss to France from
the silk-worm disease alone, in the course of seventeen years, is estimated at two
hundred and fifty millions of dollars. It was discovered that these diseases of
the vine and worm, which were both infectious and contagious, were due to living
organisms, by which they were propagated and extended. It
Professor Huxley closes his address by saying that he had
invited his audience to follow him “in an attempt to trace the path which has been
followed by a scientific idea, in its slow progress from the position of a probable
hypothesis to that of an established law of nature.” Biogenesis, then, according
to Huxley, is an established law of nature.
Professor Tyndall deals with this subject in his lecture delivered
in September, 1870, on “The Scientific Uses of the Imagination.” He says that the
question concerning the origin of life is, Whether it is due to a creative flat,
‘Let life be!’ or to a process of evolution. Was it potentially in matter from the
beginning? or, Was it inserted at a later period? However the convictions here or
there may be influenced, he says, “the process must be slow which commends the hypothesis
of natural evolution to the public mind. For what are the core and essence of this
hypothesis? Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not
alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler
forms of the horse and lion, not alone the Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, pp.
363-368. Mr. Wallace thinks that “the highest fact of science, the noblest truth
of philosophy,” may be found expressed in his following words of an American poetess:
—
The way Professor Tyndall puts the matter is this:
We can cite his high authority as to another point. Suppose
we give up everything; admit that there is no real distinction between matter and
mind; that all the phenomena of the universe, vital and mental included, may be
referred to physical causes; that a free or spontaneous act is an absurdity; that
there can be no intervention of a controlling mind or will in the affairs of men,
no personal existence of man after death, — suppose we thus give up our morals
and religion, all that ennobles man and dignifies his existence, what do we gain?
According to Professor Tyndall, nothing.
It is very evident, therefore, that the admission of the primary truths of the reason — truths which, in point of fact, all men do admit — truths which concern even our sense perceptions, and involve the objective existence of the material world, necessitates the admission of mind, of God, of providence, and of immortality. Professor Tyndall being judge, materialism, spontaneous generation, the evolution of life, thought, feeling, and conscience out of matter, are absurdities “too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind, unless matter be spiritualized into mind, — and then everything is God, and God is everything.
Theories of Development.
Lamarck.
Lamarck, a distinguished French naturalist, was the first of modern scientific men who adopted the theory that all vegetables and animals living on the earth, including man, are developed from certain original, simple germs. This doctrine was expounded in his “Zoölogie Philosophique,” published in 1809. Lamarck admitted the existence of God, to whom he referred the existence of the matter of which the universe is composed. But God having created matter with its properties, does nothing more. Life, organisms, and mind are all the product of unintelligent matter and its forces. All living matter is composed of cellular tissue, consisting of the aggregation of minute cells. These cells are not living in themselves, but are quickened into life by some ethereal fluid pervading space, such as heat and electricity. Life, therefore, according to this theory, originates in spontaneous generation.
Life, living cells or tissues, having thus originated, all the diversified forms of the vegetable and animal kingdoms have been produced by the operation of natural causes; the higher, even the highest, being formed from the lowest by a long-continued process of development.
The principles of Lamarck’s theory “are involved in the three following propositions: —
“1. That any considerable and permanent change in the circumstances in which a race of animals is placed, superinduces in them a real change in their wants and requirements.
“2. That this change in their wants necessitates new actions on their part to satisfy those Wants, and that finally new habits are thus engendered.
“3. that these new actions and habits necessitate a greater
and more frequent use of particular organs already existing, which thus become strengthened
and improved; or the development of new organs when new wants require them; or the
neglect of the use of old organs, which may thus gradually decrease and finally
disappear.”
Vestiges of Creation.
Some thirty years since a work appeared anonymously, entitled
“The Vestiges of Creation,” in which the theory of Lamarck in essential features
was reproduced. The writer agreed with his
The author of the “Vestiges of Creation” assumes the truth of the nebular hypothesis, and argues from analogy that as the complicated and ordered systems of the heavenly bodies are the result of physical laws acting on the original matter pervading space, it is reasonable to infer that the different orders of plants and animals have arisen in the same way. He refers to the gradation observed in the vegetable and animal kingdoms; the simpler everywhere preceding the more complex, and the unity of plan being preserved throughout. He lays great stress also on the fœtal development of the higher orders of animals. The human fœtus, for example, assuming in succession the peculiarities of structure of the reptile, of the fish, of the bird, and of man. This is supposed to prove that man is only a more perfectly developed reptile; and that the orders of animals differ simply as to the stage they occupy in this unfolding series of life. As the same larva of the bee can be developed into a queen, a drone, or a worker, so the same living cell can be developed into a reptile, a fish, a bird, or a man. There are, however, the author admits, interruptions in the scale; species suddenly appearing without due preparation. This he illustrates by a reference to the calculating machine, which for a million of times will produce numbers in regular series, and then for once produce a number of a different order; thus the law of species that like shall beget like may hold good for an indefinite period, and then suddenly a new species be begotten. These theories and their authors have fallen into utter disrepute among scientific men, and have no other than a slight historical interest.
Darwin.
The new theory on this subject proposed by Mr. Charles Darwin,
has, for the time being, a stronger hold on the public mind. He stands in the first
rank of naturalists, and is on all sides respected not only for his knowledge and
his skill in observation and description, but for his frankness and fairness. His
theory, however, is substantially the same with those already mentioned, inasmuch
as he also accounts for the origin of all the varieties of plants and animals by
the gradual operation of natural causes. In his work
The Darwinian theory, therefore, includes the following principles: —
First, that like begets like; or the law of heredity, according to which throughout the vegetable and animal world, the offspring is like the parent.
Second, the law of variation; that is, that while in all that is essential the offspring is like the parent, it always differs more or less from its progenitor. These variations are sometimes deteriorations, sometimes indifferent, sometimes improvements; that is, such as enable the plant or animal more advantageously to exercise its functions.
Third, that as plants and animals increase in a geometrical ratio, they tend to outrun enormously the means of support, and this of necessity gives rise to a continued and universal struggle for life.
Fourth, in this struggle the fittest survive; that is, those individuals which have an accidental variation of structure which renders them superior to their fellows in the struggle for existence, survive, and transmit that peculiarity to their offspring. This is “natural selection;” i.e., nature, without intelligence or purpose, selects the individuals best adapted to continue and to improve the race. It is by the operation of these few principles that in the course of countless ages all the diversified forms of vegetables and animals have been produced.
“It is interesting,” says Darwin, “to contemplate a tangled
bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes,
with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth,
and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each
other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced
by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with
Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from
the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse;
a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence
to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less
improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher
animals, directly follows.”
Remarks on the Darwinian Theory.
First, it shocks the common sense of unsophisticated men to
be told that the whale and the humming-bird, man and the mosquito, are derived from
the same source. Not that the whale was developed out of the humming-bird, or man
out of the mosquito, but that both are derived by a slow process of variations continued
through countless millions of years. Such is the theory with its scientific feathers
plucked off. No wonder that at its first promulgation it was received by the scientific
world, not only with surprise, but also with indignation.
A second remark is that the theory in question cannot be true, because it is founded on the assumption of an impossibility. It assumes that matter does the work of mind. This is an impossibility and an absurdity in the judgment of all men except materialists; and materialists are, ever have been, and ever must be, a mere handful among men, whether educated or uneducated. The doctrine of Darwin is, that a primordial germ, with no inherent intelligence, develops, under purely natural influences, into all the infinite variety of vegetable and animal organisms, with all their complicated relations to each other and to the world around them. He not only asserts that all this is due to natural causes; and, moreover, that the lower impulses of vegetable life pass, by insensible gradations, into the instinct of animals and the higher intelligence of man, but he argues against the intervention of mind anywhere in the process. God, says Lamarck, created matter; God, says Darwin, created the unintelligent living cell; both say that, after that first step, all else follows by natural law, without purpose and without design. No man can believe this, who cannot also believe that all the works of art, literature, and science in the world are the products of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia.
The Atheistic Character of the Theory.
Thirdly, the system is thoroughly atheistic, and therefore cannot possibly stand.
God has revealed his existence and his government of the world so clearly and so
authoritatively, that any philosophical or scientific speculations inconsistent
with those truths are like cobwebs in the track of a tornado. They offer no sensible
resistance. The mere naturalist, the man devoted so exclusively to the
In saying that this system is atheistic, it is not said that
Mr. Darwin is an atheist. He expressly acknowledges the existence of God; and seems
to feel the necessity of his existence to account for the origin of life. Nor is
it meant that every one who adopts the theory does it in an atheistic sense. It
has already been remarked that there is a theistic and an atheistic form of the
nebular hypothesis as to the origin of the universe; so there may be a theistic
interpretation of the Darwinian theory. Men who, as the Duke of Argyle, carry the
reign of law into everything, affirming that even creation is by law, may hold,
as he does, that God uses everywhere and constantly physical laws, to produce not
only the ordinary operations of nature, but to give rise to things specifically
new, and therefore to new species in the vegetable and animal worlds. Such species
would thus be as truly due to the purpose and power of God as though they had been
created by a word. Natural laws are said to be to God what the chisel and the brush
are to the artist. Then God is as much the author of species as tile sculptor or
painter is the author of the product of his skill. This is a theistic doctrine.
That, however, is not Darwin’s doctrine. His theory is that hundreds or thousands
of millions of years ago God called a living germ, or living germs, into existence,
and that since that time God has no more to do with the universe than if He did
not exist. This is atheism to all intents and purposes, because it leaves the soul
as entirely without God, without a Father, Helper, or Ruler, as the doctrine of
Epicurus or of Comte. Darwin, moreover, obliterates all the evidences of the being
of God in the world. He refers to physical causes what all theists believe to be
due to the operations of the Divine mind. There is no more effectual way of getting
rid of a truth than by rejecting the proofs on which it rests. Professor Huxley
says that when he first read Darwin’s book he regarded it as the death-blow of teleology,
i.e., of the doctrine of design and purpose in nature.
Mr. Darwin argues against any divine intervention in the course
of nature, and especially in the production of species. He says that the time is
coming when the doctrine of special creation, that is, the doctrine that God made
the plants and animals each after its kind, will be regarded as “a curious illustration
of the blindness of preconceived opinion. These authors,” he adds, “seem no more
startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary birth. But do they
really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth’s history certain elemental
atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues?” [This is precisely
what Darwin professes to believe happened at the beginning. If it happened once,
it is not absurd that it should happen often.] “Do they believe that at each supposed
act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were all the infinitely numerous
kinds of animals and plants created as eggs or seed, or as full grown? And in the
case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of nourishment from the
mothers womb?”
Mr. Wallace devotes the eighth chapter of his work on “Natural
Selection”
Dr. Gray
The anti-theistic and materialistic, character of this theory
is still further shown by what Mr. Darwin says of our mental powers. “In the distant
future,” he says, “I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology
will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental
power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his
history.”
It is a mere Hypothesis.
A fourth remark on this theory is that it is a mere hypothesis,
from its nature incapable of proof. It may take its place beside the nebular hypothesis
as an ingenious method of explaining many of the phenomena of nature. We see around
us, in the case of domestic animals, numerous varieties produced by the operations
of natural causes. In the vegetable world this diversity is still greater. Mr. Darwin’s
theory would account for all these facts. It accounts, moreover, for the unity of
plan on which all animals of the same class or order are constructed; for the undeveloped
organs and rudimentally in almost all classes of living creatures; for the different
forms through which the embryo passes before it reaches maturity. These and many
other phenomena may be accounted for on the assumption of the derivation of species.
Admitting all this and much more, this does not amount to a proof of the hypothesis.
These facts can be accounted for in other ways; while there are, as Darwin himself
admits, many facts for which his theory will
It is hazarding little to say that such a hypothesis as this cannot be proved. Indeed its advocates do not pretend to give proof. Mr. Wallace, as we have seen, says, “Mr. Darwin’s work has for its main object, to show that all the phenomena of living things, — all their wonderful organs and complicated structures, their infinite variety of form, size, and colour, their intricate and involved relations to each other, — may have been produced by the action of a few general laws of the simplest kind.” May have been. There is no pretence that this account of the origin of species can be demonstrated. All that is claimed is that it is a possible solution. Christians must be very timid to be frightened by a mere “may have been.”
Mr. Huxley says, “After much consideration, and with assuredly
no bias against Mr. Darwin’s views, it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence
stands, it is not absolutely proven that a group of animals, having all the characters
exhibited by species in Nature,
In “Frasers Magazine” for June and July, 1860, are two papers
on the Darwinian theory, written by William Hopkins F. R. S. In the number for July
it is said, “If we allow full weight to all our author’s arguments in his chapter
on hybridism, we only arrive at the conclusion that natural selection may
possibly have produced changes of organization, which may have superinduced
the sterility of species; and that, therefore, the above proposition may,
be true, though not a single positive fact be adduced in proof of it. And it must
be recollected that this is no proposition of secondary importance — a mere turret,
as it were, in our author’s theoretical fabric, — but the chief corner-stone which
supports it. We confess that all the respect which we entertain for the author of
these views, has inspired us with no corresponding feeling towards this may be
philosophy, which is content to substitute the merely possible for the probable,
and which, ignoring the responsibility of any approximation to rigorous demonstration
in the establishment of its own theories, complacently assumes them to be right
till they are rigorously proved to be wrong. When Newton, in former times, put forth
his theory of gravitation he did not call on philosophers to believe it, or else
to show that it was wrong, but felt it incumbent on himself to prove that it was
right.”
Mr. Hopkins’ review was written before Mr. Darwin had fully
expressed his views as to the origin of man. He says, the great difficulty in any
theory of development is “the transition in passing up to man from the animals next
beneath him, not to man considered merely as a physical organism, but to man as
an intellectual and moral being. Lamarck and the author of the ‘Vestiges’ have not
hesitated to expose themselves to a charge of gross materialism in deriving mind
from matter, and in making all its properties and operations depend on our physical
organization. . . . . We believe that man has an immortal soul, and that the beasts
of the field have not. If any one deny this, we can have no common ground of argument
with him. Now we would ask, at what point of his progressive improvement did man
acquire this spiritual part of his being, endowed with the awful attribute of
The point now in hand, however, is that Mr. Darwin’s theory is incapable of proof. From the nature of the case, what concerns the origin of things cannot be known except by a supernatural revelation. All else must be speculation and conjecture. And no man under the guidance of reason will renounce the teachings of a well-authenticated revelation, in obedience to human speculation, however ingenious. The uncertainty attending all philosophical or scientific theories as to the origin of things, is sufficiently apparent from their number and inconsistencies. Science as soon as she gets past the actual and the extant, is in the region of speculation, and is merged into philosophy, and is subject to all its hallucinations.
Theories of the Universe.
Thus we have, —
1. The purely atheistic theory; which assumes that matter has existed forever, and that all the universe contains and reveals is due to material forces.
2. The theory which admits the creation of matter, but denies
any further intervention of God in the world, and refers the origin of life to physical
causes. This was the doctrine of Lamarck, and of the author of the “Vestiges of
Creation,” and is the theory to which Professor Huxley, notwithstanding his denial
of spontaneous generation in the existing state of things, seems strongly inclined
in his address as President of the British Association for the Promotion of Science,
delivered in September, 1870, he said: “Looking back through the prodigious vista
of the past, I find no record of the commencement of life, and therefore I am devoid
of any means of forming a definite conclusion as to the conditions of its appearance.
Belief, in the scientific sense of the word, is a serious matter, and needs strong
foundations. To say, therefore, in the admitted absence of evidence, that I have
any belief as to the mode in which the existing forms of life have originated, would
be using words in a wrong sense. But expectation is permissible, where belief is
not; and if it were given me to look beyond the abyss of genealogically recorded
time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical
and chemical conditions
Darwin.
3. The third speculative view is that of Mr. Darwin and his
associates, who admit not only the creation of matter, but of living matter, in
the form of one or a few primordial germs from which without any purpose or design,
by the slow operation of unintelligent natural causes, and accidental variations,
during untold ages, all the orders, classes, genera, species, and varieties of plants
and animals, from the lowest to the highest, man included, have been formed. Teleology,
and therefore, mind, or God, is expressly banished from the world. In arguing against
the idea of God’s controlling with design the operation of second causes, Mr. Darwin
asks, “Did He ordain that the crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary,
in order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fan-tail breeds? Did
He cause the frame and mental qualities of the dog to vary in order that a breed
might be formed of indomitable ferocity, with jaws fitted to pin down the bull for
man’s brutal sport? But, if we give up the principle in one case, — if we do not
admit that the variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided, in order
that the greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigour, might
be formed
J. J. Murphy.
4. Others again, unable to believe that unintelligent causes
can produce effects indicating foresight and design, insist that there must be intelligence
engaged in the production of such effects, but they place this intelligence in nature
and not in God. This, as remarked above, is a revival of the old idea of a Demiurgus
or Anima mundi. Mr. J. J. Murphy, in his work on “Habit and Intelligence,”
says, I believe “that there is something in organic progress which mere natural
selection among spontaneous variations will not account for. Finally, I believe
this something is that organizing intelligence which guides the action of the inorganic
forces and forms structures which neither natural selection nor any other unintelligent
agency could form.”
Owen.
5. Professor Owen, England’s great naturalist, agrees with
Darwin in two points: first, in the derivation or gradual evolution of species;
and secondly, that this derivation is determined by the operation of natural causes.
“I have been led,” he says, “to recognize species as exemplifying the continuous
operation of natural law, or secondary cause; and that, not only successively, but
progressively; from the first embodiment of the vertebrate idea under its old ichthyic
vestment until it became arrayed in the glorious garb of the human form.”
The Reign of Law Theory.
6. Still another view is that which demands intelligence to
account for the wonders of organic life, and finds that intelligence in God, but
repudiates the idea of the supernatural. That is, it does not admit that God ever
works except through second causes or by the laws of nature. Those who adopt this
view are willing to admit the derivation of species; and to concede that extant
species were formed by the modifications of those which preceded them; but maintain
that they were thus formed according to the purpose, and by the continued agency,
of God; an agency ever operative in guiding the operation of natural laws so that
they accomplish the designs of God. The difference between this and Professor Owen’s
theory is, that he does not seem to admit of this continued
7. Finally, without pretending to exhaust the speculations on this subject, we have what may be called the commonly received and Scriptural doctrine. That doctrine teaches, — (1.) That the universe and all it contains owe their existence to the will and power of God; that matter is not eternal, nor is life self-originating. (2.) God endowed matter with properties or forces, which He upholds, and in accordance with which He works in all the ordinary operations of his providence. That is, He uses them everywhere and constantly, as we use them in our narrow sphere. (3.) That in the beginning He created, or caused to be, every distinct kind of plant and animal: “And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so.” “And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so.” This is the Scriptural account of the origin of species. According to this account each species was specially created, not ex nihilo, nor without the intervention of secondary causes, but nevertheless originally, or not derived, evolved, or developed from preëxisting species. These distinct species, or kinds of plants and animals thus separately originated, are permanent. They never pass from one into the other. It is, however, to be remembered that species are of two kinds, as naturalists distinguish them, namely, natural and artificial. The former are those which have their foundation in nature; which had a distinct origin, and are capable of indefinite propagation. The latter are such distinctions as naturalists have made for their own convenience. Of course, it is not intended that every one of the so-called species of plants and animals is original and permanent, when the only distinction between one species and another may be the accidental shape of a leaf or colour of a feather. It is only of such species as have their foundation in nature that originality and permanence are asserted. Artificial species, as they are called, are simply varieties. Fertility of offspring is the recognized criterion of sameness of species. If what has been just said be granted, then, if at any time since the original creation, new species have appeared on the earth, they owe their existence to the immediate intervention of God.
Here then are at least seven different views as to the origin
of species. How is it possible for science to decide between them?
Admitted Difficulties in the Way of the Darwinian Theory
One of the great excellences of Mr. Darwin is his candor.
He acknowledges that there are grave objections against the doctrine which he endeavours
to establish. He admits that if one species is derived by slow gradations from another,
it would be natural to expect the intermediate steps, or connecting links, to be
everywhere visible. But he acknowledges that such are not to be found, that during
the whole of the historical period, species have remained unchanged. They are now
precisely what they were thousands of years ago. There is not the slightest indication
of any one passing into another; or of a lower advancing towards a higher. This
is admitted. The only answer to the difficulty thus presented is, that the change
of species is so slow a process that no indications can be reasonably expected in
the few thousand years embraced within the limits of history. When it is further
objected that geology presents the same difficulty, that the genera and species
of fossil animals are just as distinct as those now living; that new species appear
at certain epochs entirely different from those which preceded; that the most perfect
specimens of these species often appear at the beginning of a geologic period and
not toward its close; the answer is that the records of geology are too imperfect,
to give us full knowledge on this subject: that innumerable intermediate and transitional
forms may have passed away and left no trace of their existence. All this
amounts to an
With regard to the more serious objection that the theory
assumes that matter does the work of mind, that design is accomplished without any
designer, Mr. Darwin is equally candid. “Nothing at first,” he says, “can appear
more difficult to believe than that the more complex organs and instincts have been
perfected, not by means superior to, though analogous with, human reason, but by
the accumulation of innumerable slight variations, each good for the individual
possessor. Nevertheless, this difficulty, though appearing to our imagination insuperably
great, cannot be considered real, if we admit the following propositions, namely,
that all parts of the organization and instincts offer at least individual differences,
— that there is a struggle for existence leading to the preservation of profitable
deviations of structure or instinct, — and, lastly, that gradatians in the state
of perfection of each organ may have existed, each good of its kind.”
Again, he says, “Although the belief that an organ so perfect
as the eye could have been formed by natural selection, is more than enough to stagger
any one; yet in the case of any organ, if we know of a long series of gradations
in complexity, each good for its possessor; then, under changing conditions of life,
there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of
perfection through natural selection.”
Sterility of Hybrids.
The immutability of species is stamped on the very face of nature What the letters of a book would be if all were thrown in confusion, the genera and species of plants and animals would be, if they were, as Darwin’s theory assumes, in a state of constant variation, and that in every possible direction. All line-marks would be obliterated, and the thoughts of God, as species have been called, would be obliterated from his works. To prevent this confusion of “kind,” it has been established as a law of nature that animals of different “kinds” cannot mingle and produce something different from either parent, to be again mingled and confused with other animals of a still different kind. In other words, it is a law of nature, and therefore a law of God, that hybrids should be sterile. This fact Mr. Darwin does not deny. Neither does he deny the weight of the argument derived from it against his theory. He only, as in the cases already mentioned, endeavours to account for the fact. Connecting links between species are missing; but they may have perished. Hybrids are sterile; but that may be accounted for in some other way without assuming that it was designed to secure the permanence of species. When a great fact in nature is found to secure a most important end in nature, it is fair to infer that it was designed to accomplish that end, and consequently that end is not to be overlooked or denied.
Geographical Distribution.
Mr. Darwin is equally candid in reference to another objection
to his doctrine. “Turning to geographical distribution,” he says,
Ordinary men reject this Darwinian theory with indignation
as well as with decision, not only because it calls upon them to accept the possible
as demonstrably true, but because it ascribes to blind, unintelligent causes the
wonders of purpose and design which the world everywhere exhibits; and because it
effectually banishes God from his works. To such men it is a satisfaction to know
that the theory is rejected on scientific grounds by the great majority of scientific
men. Mr. Darwin himself says, “The several difficulties here discussed, namely —
that, though we find in our geological formations many links between the species
which now exist and which formerly existed, we do not find infinitely numerous tine
transitional forms closely joining them all together; the sudden manner in which
several whole groups of species first appear in our European formations; the almost
entire absence, as at present known, of formations rich in fossils beneath the Cambrian
strata, — are all undoubtedly of the most serious nature. We see this in the fact
that the most eminent palæontologists, namely, Cuvier,
In 1830 there was a prolonged discussion of this subject is
the Académie des Sciences in Paris, Cuvier taking the side of the permanence of
species, and of creation and organization governed by final purpose; while Geoffroy
St. Hilaire took the side of the derivation and mutability of species, and “denied,”
as Professor Owen says, “evidence of design, and protested against the deduction
of a purpose.” The decision was almost unanimously in favour of Cuvier; and from
1830 to 1860 there was scarcely a voice raised in opposition to the doctrine which
Cuvier advocated. This, as Büchner thinks, was the triumph of empiricism, appealing
to facts, over philosophy guided by “Apriorische Speculationen.” Professor Agassiz,
confessedly the first of living naturalists, thus closes his review of Darwin’s
book: “Were the transmutation theory true, the geological record should exhibit
an uninterrupted succession of types blending gradually into one another. The fact
is that throughout all geological times each period is characterized by definite
specific types, belonging to definite genera, and these to definite families, referable
to definite orders, constituting definite classes and definite branches, built upon
definite plans. Until the facts of nature are shown to have been mistaken by those
who have collected them, and that they have a different meaning from that now generally
assigned to them, I shall therefore consider the transmutation theory as a scientific
mistake, untrue in its facts, unscientific in its method, and mischievous in its
tendency.”
Pangenesis.
Mr. Darwin refers, in the “Origin of Species,”
Finally, it may be noticed that Mr. Wallace, although advocating the doctrine of “Natural Selection,” contends that it is not applicable to man; that it will not account for his original or present state; and that it is impossible, on Mr. Darwin’s theory, to account for man’s physical organization, for his mental powers, or for his moral nature. To this subject the tenth chapter of his work is devoted.
§ 3. Antiquity of Man.
“Anthropologists are now,” as we are told, “pretty well agreed
that man is not a recent introduction into the earth. All who have studied the question,
now admit that his antiquity is very great; and that, though we have to some extent
ascertained the minimum of time during which he must have existed, we have made
no approximation towards determining that far greater period during which he
may have, and probably has, existed. We can with tolerable certainty
affirm that man must have inhabited the earth a thousand centuries ago, but
we cannot assert that he positively did not exist, or that there is any good evidence
against his having existed, for a period of ten thousand centuries.”
On this it may be remarked, first, that it is a historical fact that nothing is less reliable than these calculations of time. A volume might be filled with examples of the mistakes of naturalists in this matter. The world has not forgotten the exultation of the enemies of the Bible when the number of successive layers of lava on the sides of Mount Etna was found to be so great as to require, as was said, thousands upon thousands of years for their present condition. All that has passed away. Mr. Lyell calculated that two hundred and twenty thousand years were necessary to account for changes now going on on the coast of Sweden. Later geologists reduce the time to one tenth of that estimate. A piece of pottery was discovered deeply buried under the deposits at the mouth of the Nile. It was confidently asserted that the deposit could not have been made during the historic period, until it was proved that the article in question was of Roman manufacture. Sober men of science, therefore, have no confidence in these calculations requiring thousands of centuries, or even millions of years, for the production of effects subsequent to the great geological epochs.
The second remark in reference to this great antiquity claimed
the human race is that the reasons assigned for it are, in the
Lake Dwellings.
In many of the lakes of Switzerland piles have been discovered
worn down to the surface of the mud, or projecting slightly above it, which once
supported human habitations. These are so numerous as to render it evident that
whole villages were thus sustained over the surface of the water. These villages,
“nearly all of them,” are “of unknown date, but the most ancient of them “certainly
belonged to the age of stone, for hundreds of implements resembling those of the
Danish shell-mounds and peat mosses have been dredged up from the mud into which
the piles were driven.” Numerous bones of no less than fifty-four species of animals
have been dug up from these localities, all of which, with one exception, are still
living in Europe. The remains of several domesticated
There is evidently in all this no proof of great antiquity.
Even as late as during the last century, similar huts, supported on piles, were
to be seen. All the animal remains found are of extant species. There is nothing
to show that these lake dwellings were even as old as the time of the Romans. The
fact relied upon is the absence of metal, and the presence of stone implements.
Hence, it is inferred that these villages belonged to the “Stone Age.” To this succeeded
the “Bronze Age,” and to that the Age of Iron. Sir Charles Lyell informs us that
the Swiss geologists, as represented by M. Monet, assign “to the bronze age a date
of between three thousand and four thousand years, and to the stone period an age
of five thousand to seven thousand.”
It is, however, a mere arbitrary speculation that there ever was a stone age. It is founded on the assumption that the original condition of man was one of barbarism, from which he elevated himself by slow degrees; during the first period of his progress he used only implements of stone; then those of bronze; and then those of iron; and that thousands of years elapsed before the race passed from one of these stages of progress to another. Hence, if remains of men are found anywhere in connection with stone implements, they are referred to the stone age. According to this mode of reasoning, if in an Indian village flint arrow-heads and hatchets should be found, the inference would be that the whole world was in barbarism when those implements were used. Admitting that at the time the lake dwellings were inhabited, the people of Switzerland, and even all the people of Europe, were unacquainted with the use of the metals, that would not prove that civilization was not at its height in Egypt or India. Moreover, the assumption that the original state of man was one of barbarism, is not only contrary to the Bible and to the convictions of the great body of the learned, but, as is believed, to the plainest historical facts.
Fossil Human Remains.
Much more weight in this discussion is attached to the discovery
of human remains in the same localities and under the same circumstances with those
of animals now extinct. From this it is inferred that man must have lived when those
animals still inhabited the earth. These human remains are not found in any of the
ancient fossiliferous rocks. The Scriptural fact that man was the last of
The fact being admitted, the question is, How is it to be
accounted for? This juxtaposition is no certain proof of contemporaneousness. These
caverns, once the resort of wild beasts, became to men places of concealment, of
defence, of worship, or of sepulture, and, therefore, as Sir Charles Lyell himself
admits, “It is not on the evidence of such intermixtures that we ought readily to
admit either the high antiquity of the human race, or the recent date of certain
lost species of quadrupeds.”
In immediate connection with the passage just referred to,
Lyell suggests another method by which the remains of animals belonging to very
different ages of the world might become mixed together. That is, “open fissures”
which “serve as natural pitfalls.” He quotes the following account from Professor
Sedgwick of a chasm of enormous but unknown depth, which “is surrounded by grassy
shelving banks, and many animals, tempted toward its brink, have fallen down and
perished in it. The approach of cattle is now prevented by a strong lofty wall;
but there can be no doubt that, during the last two or three thousand years, great
masses of bony breccia must have accumulated in the lower parts of the great fissure,
which probably descends through the whole thickness of the scar-limestone to the
depth of perhaps five or six hundred feet.” To this Lyell adds, “When any of these
natural pit-falls happen to communicate with lines of subterranean caverns, the
bones, earth, and breccia may sink by their own weight, or be washed into the vaults
below.”
There is a third way in which this intermingling of the bones
of animals of different ages may be accounted for. With regard to the remarkable
caverns in the province of Liege, Sir Charles Lyell says that Dr. Schmerling, the
naturalist, by whom they had been carefully and laboriously examined, did not think
they were “dens of wild beasts, but that their organic and inorganic contents had
been swept into them by streams communicating with the surface of the country. The
bones, he suggested, may often have been rolled in the beds of such streams before
they reached their underground destination.”
Human Bones found deeply buried.
Still less weight is to be attached to the fact that human
bones have been found deeply buried in the earth. Every one knows that great changes
have been made in the earths surface within the historic period. Such changes are
produced sometimes by the slow operation of the causes which have buried the foundations
of such ancient cities as Jerusalem and Rome far beneath the present surface of
the ground. At other times they have been brought about by sudden catastrophes.
It is not surprising that human remains should be found in peat-bogs, if as Sir
Charles Lyell tells us, “All the coins, axes, arms, and other utensils found in
British and French mosses, are Roman; so that a considerable portion of the peat
in European peat-bogs is evidently not more ancient than the age of Julius Cæsar.”
The data by which the rate of deposits is determined are so
uncertain that no dependence can be placed upon them. Sir Charles Lyell says, “the
lowest estimate of the time required” for the formation of the existing delta of
the Mississippi, is more than one hundred thousand years.
Flint Implements.
Quite as much stress has been laid on the discovery of certain
implements made of flint under deposits which, it is contended, are of such age
as prove that man must have existed on the earth for ages before the time assigned
in the Bible for his creation. To this argument the same answer is to be given.
First, that the presence of the works of human art in such deposits is no proof
that men were contemporaneous with such deposits; in view of the upheavals and displacements
which all geologists admit are of frequent occurrence in the history of our globe. And secondly, the facts themselves are disputed, or differently interpreted
by men of science of equal authority. This is especially true of the flint arrows,
beads, and axes found in the valley of the Somme in France.
Argument from the Races of Men and from Ancient Monuments
Another argument is founded on the assumption that the difference between the Caucasian, Mongolian, and negro races, which is known to have been as distinctly marked two or three thousand years before Christ as it is now, must have required countless ages to develop and establish. To this it is obvious to answer, First, that differences equally great have occurred in domestic animals within the historic period. Secondly, that marked varieties are not unfrequently produced suddenly, and, so to speak, accidentally. Thirdly, that these varieties of race are not the effect of the blind operation of physical causes, but by those causes as intelligently guided by God for the accomplishment of some wise purpose. Animals living in the arctic regions are not only clothed in fur for their protection from the cold, but the color of their clothing changes with the season. So God fashions the different races of men in their peculiarities to suit them to the regions which they inhabit. Dr. Livingstone, the great African traveller, informs us that the negro type, as it is popularly conceived of, occurs very rarely in Africa, and only in districts where great heat prevails in connection with great moisture. The tribes in the interior of that continent differ greatly, he says, both in hue and contour.
The idea that it must have taken countless ages for men to rise from the lowest barbarism to the state of civilization indicated by the monuments of Egypt, rests on no better assumption. The earliest state of man instead of being his lowest, was in many respects his highest state. And our own experience as a nation shows that it does not require millenniums for a people to accomplish greater works than Egypt or India can boast. Two hundred years ago this country was a wilderness from the Atlantic to the Pacific. What is it now? According to Bunsen it would require a hundred thousand years to erect all these cities, and to build all these railroads and canals.
It is further urged as a proof of the great antiquity of man that the monuments and monumental records of Egypt prove that a nation existed in the highest state of civilization at the time of, or immediately after, the flood. The chronology of the Bible, it is argued, and the chronology of Egypt are thus shown to be irreconcilable.
In reference to this difficulty it may be remarked, that the
calculations of Egyptologists are just as precarious, and in many stances just as
extravagant as those of geologists. This is proved by their discrepancies. It may
be said, however, that even the most moderate students of Egyptian antiquities assign
a date to the reign of Manes and the building of the pyramids inconsistent with
the chronology of the Bible. To this it may be replied that the chronology of the
Bible is very uncertain. The data are for the most part facts incidentally stated;
that is, not stated for the purposes of chronology. The views most generally adopted
rest mainly on the authority of Archbishop Usher, who adopted the Hebrew text for
his guide, and assumed that in the genealogical tables each name marked one generation.
A large part, however, of Biblical scholars adopt the Septuagint chronology in preference
to the Hebrew; so that instead of four thousand years from the creation to the birth
of Christ, we have nearly six thousand years. Besides it is admitted, that the usual
method of calculation founded on the genealogical tables is very uncertain. The
design of those tables is not to give the regular succession of births in a given
line, but simply to mark the descent. This is just as well done if three, four,
or more generations be omitted, as if the whole list were complete. That this is
the plan on which these genealogical tables are constructed is an admitted fact.
“Thus in
The extreme uncertainty attending all attempts to determine
the chronology of the Bible is sufficiently evinced by the fact that one hundred
and eighty different calculations have been made by Jewish and Christian authors,
of the length of the period between Adam and Christ. The longest of these make it
six thousand nine hundred and eighty-four, and the shortest three thousand four
hundred and eighty-three years. Under these circumstances it is very clear that
the friends of the Bible have no occasion for uneasiness. If the facts of science
or of history should ultimately make it necessary to admit that eight or ten thousand
years have elapsed since the creation of man, there is nothing in the Bible in the
way of such concession. The Scriptures do not teach us how long men nave existed
on the earth. Their tables of genealogy were intended to prove that Christ was the
son of David and of the Seed of Abraham, and not how many years had elapsed between
the creation and the advent.
§ 1. Scripture Doctrine.
The Scriptures teach that God formed the body of man out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life and he became נֶפֶשׁ חַיָה, a living soul. According to this account, man consists of two distinct principles, a body and a soul: the one material, the other immaterial; the one corporeal, the other spiritual. It is involved in this statement, first, that the soul of man is a substance; and, secondly, that it is a substance distinct from the body. So that in the constitution of man two distinct substances are included.
The idea of substance, as has been before remarked, is one of the primary truths
of the reason. It is given in the consciousness of every man, and is therefore a
part of the universal faith of men. We are conscious of our thoughts, feelings,
and volitions. We know that these exercises or phenomena are constantly
changing, but that there is something of which they are the exercises and
.manifestation. That something is the self which remains unchanged, which is the
same identical something, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. The soul is,
therefore, not a mere series of acts; nor is it a form of the life of God, nor
is it a mere unsubstantial force, but a real subsistence. Whatever acts is, and
what is is an entity. A nonentity is nothing, and nothing can neither have power
nor produce effects. The soul of man, therefore, is an essence or entity or
substance, the abiding subject of its varying states and exercises. The second
point just mentioned is no less plain. As we call know nothing of substance but
from its phenomena, and as we are forced by a law of our nature to believe in
the existence of a substance of which the phenomena are the manifestation, so by
an equally stringent necessity we are forced to believe that where the phenomena
are not only different, but incompatible, there the substances are also
different. As, therefore, the phenomena or properties of matter are essentially
different from those of mind, we are forced to conclude that matter and mind are
two distinct substances; that
Truths on this Subject assumed in Scripture.
The Scriptures do not formally teach any system of psychology, but there are
certain truths relating both to our physical and mental constitution, which they
constantly assume. They assume, as we have seen, that the soul is a substance;
that it is a substance distinct from the body; and that there are two, and not
more than two, essential elements in the constitution of man. This is evident,
(1.) From the distinction everywhere made between soul and body. Thus, in the
original account of the creation a clear distinction is made between the body as
formed from the dust of the earth, and the soul or principle of life which was
breathed into It from God. And in
Relation of the Soul and Body.
Man, then, according to the Scriptures, is a created spirit in vital union with
a material organized body. The relation between these two constituents of our
nature is admitted to be mysterious. That is, it is incomprehensible. We do not
know how the body acts on the mind, or how the mind acts on the body. These
Realistic Dualism.
The Scriptural doctrine of the nature of man as a created spirit in vital union with an organized body, consisting, therefore, of two, and only two, distinct elements or substances, matter and mind, is one of great importance. It is intimately connected with some of the most important doctrines of the Bible; with the constitution of the person of Christ, and consequently with the nature of his redeeming work and of his relation to the children of men; with the doctrine of the fall, original sin, and of regeneration; and with the doctrines of a future state and of the resurrection. It is because of this connection, and not because of its interest as a question in psychology, that the true idea of man demands the careful investigation of the theologian.
The doctrine above stated, as the doctrine of the Scriptures and of the Church,
is properly designated as realistic dualism. That is, it asserts the existence
of two distinct res, entities, or substances; the one extended, tangible, and
divisible, the object of the senses; the other unextended and indivisible, the
thinking, feeling, and willing subject in man. This doctrine stands opposed to
materialism and idealism, which although antagonistic systems in other respects,
agree in denying any dualism of substance. The one makes the mind a function of
the body; the other makes the body a form of the mind. But, according to the
Scriptures and all sound philosophy, neither is the body, as Delitzsch
The Scriptural doctrine of man is of course opposed to the old heathen doctrine
which represents him as the firm in which nature, der Naturgeist, the anima
mundi, cones to self-consciousness; and also to the wider pantheist, doctrine
according to which men are the highest manifestations of the one universal
principle of being and life; and to the doctrine which represents man as the
union of the impersonal, universal reason or λόγος, with a living corporeal
organization. According to this last mentioned view, man consists of the body
(σῶμα), soul (ψυχή), and λόγος, or the impersonal
§ 2. Trichotomy.
It is of more consequence to remark that the Scriptural doctrine is opposed to
Trichotomy, or the doctrine that man consists of three distinct substances,
body, soul, and spirit: σῶμα, ψυχή, and
πνεῦμα; corpus, anima, and animus.
This view of the nature of man is of the more importance to the theologian
because it has not only been held to a greater or less extent in the Church, but
also because it has greatly influenced the form in which other doctrines have
been presented; and because it has some semblance of support from the
Scriptures themselves. The doctrine has been held in different forms. The
simplest, the most intelligible, and the one most commonly adopted is, that the
body is the material part of our constitution; the soul, or
ψυχή, is the principle of
animal life; and the mind, or
πνεῦμα, the principle of our rational and
immortal life. When a plant dies its material organization is dissolved and the
principle of vegetable life which it contained disappears. When a brute dies its body returns to dust, and the or principle of animal life by
which it was animated, passes away. When a man dies his body returns to the
earth, his ψυχή ceases to exist, his
πνεῦμα alone remains until reunited with
the body at the resurrection. To the
πνεῦμα, which is peculiar to man, belong
reason, will, and conscience. To the ψυχή which we have in common with the
brutes, belong understanding, feeling, and sensibility, or, the power of
sense-perceptions. To the σῶμα belongs what is purely material.
Trichotomy anti-Scriptural.
In opposition to all the forms of trichotomy, or the doctrine of a threefold
substance in the constitution of man, it may be remarked, (1.) That it is
opposed to the account of the creation of man as given in
Doubtful Passages Explained.
(5.) The passages of Scriptures which are cited as favouring the opposite
doctrine may all be explained in consistency with the cur-rent representations
of Scripture on the subject. When Paul says to the Thessalonians, “I pray God
your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of
our Lord Jesus Christ” (
This doctrine of a threefold constitution of man being adopted by Plato, was
introduced partially into the early Church, but soon came to be regarded as
dangerous, if not heretical. It being held by the Gnostics that the
πνεῦμα in man was a part of the divine
essence, and incapable of sin; and by the Apollinarians that Christ had only a
human σῶμα
and
ψυχή, but not a human
πνεῦμα, the Church rejected the doctrine that the
ψυχή and
πνεῦμα were
distinct substances, since upon it those heresies were founded. In later times
the Semi-Pelagians taught that the soul and body, but not the spirit in man were
the subjects of original sin. All Protestants, Lutheran and Reformed, were,
therefore, the more zealous in maintaining that the soul and spirit,
ψυχή and
πνεῦμα, are one and the same substance and essence. And this, as before
remarked, has been the common doctrine of the Church.
§ 3. Realism.
Its General Character.
There is still another view of the nature of man which, from Its extensive and
long-continued influence, demands consideration. According to this view, man is
defined to be, The manifestation of the general principle of humanity in union
with a given corporeal organization. This view has been held in various forms
which cannot here be severally discussed. It is only the theory in its more
general features, or in the form in which it has been commonly presented. that
our limits permit us to examine. It necessarily
Precisely, as just stated, as magnetism is antecedent to the magnet. The magnet
is only an individual piece of iron in and through which generic magnetism is
manifested. Thus the realist says, “Etsi rationalitas non esset in aliquo, tamen
in natura remaneret.”
Generic Humanity.
What God created, therefore, was not an individual man, but the species homo, or generic humanity, —an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; individual men are the manifestations of this substance numerically and specifically one and the same, in connection with their several corporeal organizations. Their souls are not individual essences, but one common essence revealed and acting in many separate organisms.
This answer to the question proposed above, What is human nature generically
considered, which makes it an essence or substance common to all the individuals
of the race, is the most common and the most intelligible. Scientific men adopt
a somewhat different phraseology. Instead of substances, they speak of forces.
Nature is defined to be the sum of the forces operating in the external world.
Oxygen is a force; magnetism, electricity, etc., are forces. “A species is . . . . based on a specific amount or condition of concentred force, defined in the
act or law of creation.”
The German theologians, particularly those of the school of Schleiermacher, use the terms life, law, and organic law. Human nature is a generic life, i.e., a form of life manifested in a multitude of individuals of the same kind. In the individual it is not distinct or different from what it is in the genus. It is the same organic law. A single oak may produce ten thousand other oaks; but the whore forest is as much an inward organic unity as any single tree.
These may be convenient formulas to prevent the necessity of circumlocutions,
and to express a class of facts; but they do not convey any definite idea
beyond the facts themselves. To say that a whole forest of oaks have the same
generic life, that they are as truly one as any individual tree is one, means
simply that the nature is the same in all, and that all have been derived from a
common source. And to say that mankind are a unit because they have the same
generic life, and are all descended from a common parent, either means nothing
more than that all men are of the same species, i.e., that humanity is
specifically the same in all mat kind or it means all that is intended by those
who teach that
Objections to Realism.
According to the common doctrine, the soul of every man is an individual subsistence, of the same kind but not of the same numerical substance as the souls of his fellow-men, so that men are ὁμοι-, but not ὁμοούσιοι. In support of this view and in opposition to the doctrine that “all men are one man,” or, that human nature is numerically one and the same essence of which individual men are the modes of manifestation, it may be remarked, —
1. That the latter doctrine is a mere philosophical hypothesis. It is a simple
assumption founded on what is possible. It is possible that the doctrine in
question may be true. So in itself it is possible that there should be an anima
mundi, a principle of life immanent in the world, of which all living organisms
are the different manifestations; so that all vegetables, all animals, and man
himself, are but different forms of one and the same numerical living substance,
just as the multitudinous waves of the sea in all their infinite diversity of
size, shape, and hue, are but the heavings of one and the same vast ocean. In
like manner it is possible that all the forms of life should be only the various
manifestations of the life of God. This is not only possible, but it is such a
simple and grand idea that it has fascinated the minds of men in all ages, so
that the prevailing hypothesis of philosophers as to the constitution of the
universe has been. and still is, pantheistic. Nevertheless, pantheism is
demonstrably false, because it contradicts the intuitive convictions of our
moral and religious nature. It is not enough,
2. Such proof the doctrine under consideration does not find in the Bible. It is simply a hypothesis on which certain facts of the Scriptures may be explained. All men are alike; they have the same faculties, the same instincts and passions; and they are all born in sin. These and other similar facts admit of an easy explanation on the assumption that humanity is numerically one and the same substance of which individuals are only so many different manifestations; just as a thousand different magnets reveal the magnetic force which is the same in all, and therefore all magnets are alike. But as the facts referred to may be explained on divers other assumptions, they afford no proof of this particular theory. It is not pretended that the Bible directly teaches the doctrine in question. Nor does it teach anything which necessitates its adoption. On the contrary, it teaches much that is irreconcilable with it.
Not Supported by Consciousness.
3. The hypothesis under consideration derives no support from consciousness. We
are conscious of our own existence. We are (in one sense) conscious of the
existence of other men. But we are not conscious of a community of essence in
ourselves and all other men. So far from this being the common interpretation
which men put on their consciousness, it is diametrically opposed to it. Every
man believes his soul to be a distinct, individual substance, as much as he
believes his body to be distinct and separate from every other human body. Such
is the common judgment of men. And nothing short of the direct assertion of the
Bible, or arguments which amount to demonstration, can rationally be admitted to
invalidate that judgment. It is inconceivable that anything concerning the
constitution of our nature so momentous in its consequences, should be true,
which does not in some way reveal itself in the common consciousness of men.
There is nothing more characteristic of the Scriptures, and there are few things
which more clearly prove its divine origin, than that it takes for granted and
authenticates all the facts of consciousness. It declares us to be what we are
revealed to ourselves as being in the very constitution and present condition of
our nature. It recognizes the soul as rational, free, and responsible. It
assumes that it is distinct from the body. All this we know from consciousness.
But we do not know that the essence or substance of our soul is numerically the
same as the substance of the souls of all men. If
Realism Contrary to the Teachings of Scripture.
4. The Scriptures not only do not teach the doctrine in question, but they also
teach what is inconsistent with it. We have already seen that it is a clearly
revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the Church universal,
that the soul continues to exist after death as a self-conscious, individual
person. This fact is inconsistent with the theory in question. A given plant is
a material organization, animated by the general principle of vegetable life. If
the plant is destroyed the principle of vegetable life no longer exists as to
that plant. It may exist in other plants; but that particular plant ceased to
exist when the material organization was dissolved. Magnetism continues to exist
as a force in nature, but any particular magnet ceases to be when it is melted,
or volatilized. In like manner, if a man is the manifestation of a generic life,
or of humanity as an essence common to all men, then when his body dies the man
ceases to exist. Humanity continues to be, but the individual man no longer
exists. This is a difficulty which some of the advocates of this theory
endeavour to avoid by giving up what is essential to their own doctrine. Its
genuine and consistent advocates admit it in its full force. The anti-Christian
portion of them acknowledge that their doctrine is inconsistent with the
personal immortality of man. The race, they say, is immortal, but individual men
are not. The same conclusion is admitted by those who hold the analogous
pantheistic, or naturalistic doctrines. If a man is only the modus existendi, a
form in which a common substance or life reveals itself, it matters not whether
that substance be humanity, nature, or God, when the form, the material
organism, is destroyed, the man as a man ceases to exist. Those advocates of the
doctrine who cling to Christianity, while they admit the difficulty, endeavour
to get over it in different ways. Schleiermacher admits that all philosophy is
against the doctrine of the personal existence of man in a future state. His
whole system leads to the denial of it. But he says that the Christian must
admit it on the authority of Christ. Olshausen, in his commentary on the New
Testament, says, when explaining
Inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Trinity.
5. This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. It
necessitates the conclusion that the Father, Son, and Spirit are no more one God
than Peter, James, and John are one man. The persons of the Trinity are one God,
because the Godhead is one essence; but if humanity be one essence numerically
the same in all men, then all men are one man in the same sense that the Father,
Son, and Spirit are one God. This is a reductio ad absurdum. It is clearly
taught in Scripture and universally believed in the Church that the persons of
the Trinity are one God in an infinitely higher sense than that in which all
men are one man. The precise difference is, that the essence common to the
persons of the Godhead is numerically the same
Realism Inconsistent with what the Bible teaches of the Person and Work of Christ.
6. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the doctrine in question
with what the Scriptures teach of the person and work of Christ. According to
the Bible, the Son of God became man by taking to himself a true body and a
reasonable soul. According to the realistic doctrine, he did not assume a
reasonable soul, but generic humanity. What is this but the whole of humanity,
of which, according to the advocates of this doctrine, individual men are the
portions. Human nature as a generic life, humanity as a substance, and a whole
substance, was taken into personal union with the Son of God. The Logos became
incarnate in the race. This is certainly not the Scriptural doctrine. The Son of
God became a man; not all men. He assumed an individual rational soul, not the
general principle of humanity. Besides this, it is the doctrine of those who
adopt this theory that humanity sinned and fell in Adam. The rational, moral,
voluntary substance called human nature, is, or at least was, an agent. The sin
of Adam was the sin not of an individual, but of this generic substance, which
by that sin became the subject both of guilt and of depravity. By reason of this
sin of human nature, the theory is, that all individual men, in their successive
generations, in whom this nature is revealed, or in whom, as they express it, it
is individualized, mine into the world in a state of guilt and pollution. We do
not now refer to the numerous and serious difficulties connected with this
theory as a method of accounting for original sin. We speak of it only in its
relation to Christ's person. If human nature, as a generic life, a substance of
which all men partake, became both guilty and polluted by the apostasy; and that
generic humanity, as distinguished from a newly created and holy rational soul,
was assumed by the Son of God, how can we avoid the conclusion that Christ was,
in
7. Other objections to this theory may be more appropriately considered when we come to speak of the several doctrines to which it is applied. It is sufficient in the conclusion of the present discussion to say that what is said to be true of the genus homo, is assumed to be true of all genera and species in the animal and vegetable worlds. The individual in all cases is assumed to be only the manifestation or modus existendi of the generic substance. Thus there is a bovine, an equine, and a feline substance, having an objective existence of which all oxen, all horses, and all animals of the cat-race, are the manifestations. And so of all species, whether of plants or animals. This is almost inconceivable. Compared to this theory, the assumption of a naturgeist, or anima mundi, or of one universal substance, is simplicity itself. That such a theory should be set forth and made the foundation, or rather the controlling principle of all Christian doctrine, is most unreasonable and dangerous. This realistic doctrine, until recently, has been as much exploded as the eternal ideas of Plato or the forms of Aristotle.
§ 4. Another form of the Realistic Theory.
There is, however, another phase of this doctrine, which it is necessary to
mention. The doctrine that genera and species are real substances existing prior
to individuals, and independent of them, is the old, genuine, and most
intelligible form of Realism.
Some scientific men, instead of defining species as a gi cm' of individuals
having certain characteristics in common, say with Professor Dana, that it “corresponds to the specific amount or condition of concentred force, defined in
the act or law of creation;” or with Dr. Morton, that it is “a primordial
organic form;” or with Agassiz, that it is an original immaterial principle
which determines the form or characteristics of the individuals constituting a
distinct group. These are only different modes of accounting for the fact that
all the individuals of a given species have certain characteristics or
fundamental qualities in common. To such statements there is no objection. But
when it is assumed that these original primordial terms, as in the case of
humanity, for example, are by the law of propagation transmitted from generation to generation, so as to constitute all the individuals of the
species
essentially one, that is, one in essence or substance, so that the act of the
first individual of the species (of Adam, for example) being the act of the
substance numerically the same in all the members of that species, is the act of
each individual member, then something essentially new is added to the above
given scientific definition of species, and we return to the original and
genuine form of Realism in its most offensive features. It would be easy to
show, (1st.) that generation or the law of propagation both in plants and in
animals is absolutely inscrutable; as much so as the nature of matter, mind, or
life, in themselves considered. We can no more tell what generation is, than
what matter is, or what mind is. (2d.) That it is therefore unreasonable and
dangerous to make a given theory as to the nature of generation or the law of
propagation the basis for the explanation of Christian doctrines. (3d.) That
whatever may be the secret and inscrutable process of propagation, it does not
involve the transmission of the same numerical essence, so that a progenitor and
his descendants are one and the same substance. This assumption is liable to all
the objections already urged against the original form of the realistic
doctrine. The theory is moreover destitute of all evidence either from
experience or analogy. There is no conceivable sense in which all the oaks now
on the earth are identical as to their substance with the oaks originally
created. And there is no conceivable sense in whirl. we and all mankind are
identically the same substance with Adam. If a thousand candles are successively
lighted from one candle they do not thereby become one candle. There is not a
communication of the substance of the first to the second, and of the second to
the others in their order, so as to make it in any
Besides the origin and the nature of man, there are two other questions, which are more or less involved in what the Scriptures teach concerning mankind, and which demand attention before we turn to the moral and religious condition of the race. The first of these concerns the Origin of the Soul, and the second the Unity of the Race.
§ 1. Theory of Preëxistence.
Three theories have been advanced as to the origin of the soul. First, that of the Preëxistence of the soul; secondly, that of Traduction, or the doctrine that the soul of the child is derived from the soul of the parent; thirdly, that of immediate Creation, or the doctrine that the soul is not derived as the body is, but owes its existence to the creative power of God.
The doctrine of the preëxistence of the soul has been presented in two forms.
Plato held that ideas are eternal in the divine mind; that these ideas are not
mere thoughts, but living entities; that they constitute the essence and life
of all external things; the universe and all it contains are these ideas
realized, clothed in matter, and developed in history. There was thus an ideal,
or intelligible world, anterior to the world as actually existing in time. What
Plato called ideas, Aristotle called forms. He denied that the ideal was
anterior to the actual. Matter is eternal, and all things consist of matter and
form — by form being meant that which gives character, or determines the nature
of individual things. As in other respects, so also in this, the Platonic, or
Aristo-Platonic philosophy, had much influence on Christian Theology. And some
of the fathers and of the schoolmen approached more or less nearly to this
doctrine of the preëxistence, not only of the soul, but of all things in this
ideal world. St. Bernard, in his strenuous opposition to nominalism, adopted the
Platonic doctrine of ideas, which he identified with genera and species. These
ideas, he taught, were eternal, although posterior to God, as an effect is in
the order of nature after its cause. Providence applies the idea to matter,
which becomes animated and takes form, and thus (“du monde intelligible est
sorti le monde sensible”) “ex mundo intelligibili mundus sensibilis perfectus
natus est ex perfecto.”
Origen's Doctrine.
Preëxistence, as taught by Origen, and as adopted here and there by some few
philosophers and theologians, is not the Platonic doctrine of an ideal-world. It
supposes that the souls of men had a separate, conscious, personal existence in
a previous state; that having sinned in that preëxistent state, they are
condemned to be born into this world in a state of sin and in connection with a
material body. This doctrine was connected by Origen with his theory of an
eternal creation. The present state of being is only one epoch in the existence
of the human soul. It has passed through innumerable other epochs and forms of
existence in the past, and is to go through other innumerable such epochs in the
future. He held to a metempsychosis very similar to that taught by Orientals
both ancient and modern. But even without the encumbrance of this idea of the
endless transmutation of the soul, the doctrine itself has never been adopted in
the Church. It
It is a far more important question, whether the soul of each man is immediately
created, or, whether it is generated by the parents. The former is known, in
theology, as “Creationism,” the latter as “Traducianism.” The Greek Church
from the first took ground in favour of creationism as alone consistent with the
true nature of the soul. Tertullian in the Latin Church was almost a
materialist, at least he used the language of materialism, and held that the
soul was as much begotten as the body. Jerome opposed that doctrine. Augustine
was also very adverse to it; but in his controversy with Pelagius on the
propagation of sin, he was tempted to favour the theory of traduction as
affording an easier explanation of the fact that we derive a corrupt nature from
Adam. He never, however, could bring himself fully to adopt it. Creationism
became subsequently the almost universally received doctrine of the Latin, as it
had always been of the Greek, Church. At the time of the Reformation the
Protestants as a body adhered to the same view. Even the Form of Concord, the
authoritative symbol of the Lutheran Church, favours creationism. The body of
the Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century, however, adopted the theory
of traduction. Among the Reformed the reverse was true. Calvin, Beza, Turrettin,
and the great majority of the Reformed theologians were creationists, only here
and there one adopted the ex traduce theory. In modern times discussion on this
point has been renewed. Many of the recent German theologians, and such as are
inclined to realism in any form, have become more or less zealously the
advocates of traducianism. This, however, is far from being the universal
opinion of the Germans. Perhaps the majority of the German philosophers agree
with Günther:
§ 2. Traducianism.
'What is meant by the term traduction is in general sufficiently
clear from the
signification of the word. Traducianists on the one hand deny that the soul is
created; and on the other hand, they affirm that it is produced by the law of
generation, being as truly derived from the parents as the body. The whole man,
soul and body, is begotten. The whole man is derived from the substance of his
progenitors. Some go further than others in their assertions on this subject.
Some affirm that the soul is susceptible of “abscission and division,” so that
a portion of the soul of the parents is communicated to the child. Others shrink
from such expressions, and yet maintain that there is a true derivation of the
one from the other. Both classes, however, insist on the numerical identity of
essence in Adam and all his posterity both as to soul and as to body. The more
enlightened and candid advocates of traducianism admit that the Scriptures are
silent on the subject. Augustine had said the same thing a thousand years ago.
“De re obscurissima disputatur, non adjuvantibus divinarum scripturarum certis
clarisque documentis.” The passages cited in support of the doctrine teach
nothing decisive on the subject. That Adam begat a son in his own likeness, and
after his own image, and called his name Seth, only asserts that Seth was like
his father. It sheds no light on the mysterious process of generation, and does
not teach how the likeness of the child to the parent is secured by physical
causes. When Job asks, “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?” and
when our Lord says, “That which is born of the flesh is flesh,” the fact is
asserted that like begets like; that a corrupt nature is transmitted from
parent to child. But that this can be done only by the transmission of
numerically the same substance is a gratuitous assumption. More stress is laid
on certain facts of Scripture which are assumed to favour this theory. That in
the creation of the woman no mention is made of God's having breathed into her
the breath of life, is said to imply that her soul as well as her body was
derived from Adam. Silence, however, proves nothing. In
§ 3. Creationism.
The common doctrine of the Church, and especially of the Reformed theologians, has ever been that the soul of the child is not generated or derived from the parents, but that it is created by the immediate agency of God. The arguments generally urged in favour of this view are, —
1. That it is more consistent with the prevailing representations of the
Scriptures. In the original account of the creation there is a marked
distinction made between the body and the soul. The one is from the earth, the
other from God. This distinction is kept up throughout the Bible. The body and
soul are not only represented as different substances, but also as having
different origins. The body shall return to dust, says the wise man, and the
spirit to God who gave it. Here the origin of the soul is represented as
different flap and higher than that of the body. The former is from God in a
sense in which the latter is not. In like manner God is said to form “the
spirit of man within him” (
Argument from the Nature of the Soul.
2. The latter doctrine, also, is clearly most consistent with the nature of the
soul. The soul is admitted, among Christians, to be immaterial and spiritual. It
is indivisible. The traducian doctrine denies this universally acknowledged
truth. It asserts that the soul admits of “separation or division of essence.”
3. A third argument in favour of creationism and against traducianism is derived from the Scriptural doctrine as to the person of Christ. He was very man; He had a true human nature; a true body and a rational soul. He was born of a woman. He was, as to his flesh, the son of David. He was descended from the fathers. He was in all points made like as we are, yet without sin. This is admitted on both sides. But, as before remarked in reference to realism, this, on the theory of traducianism, necessitates the conclusion that Christ's human nature was guilty and sinful. We are partakers of Adam's sin both as to guilt and pollution, because the same numerical essence which sinned in him is communicated to us. Sin, it is said, is an accident, and supposes a substance in which it inheres, or to which it pertains. Community in sin supposes, therefore, community of essence. If we were not in Adam as to essence we did not sin in him, and do not derive a corrupt nature from him. But, if we were in him as to essence then his sin was our sin both as to guilt and pollution. This is the argument of traducianists repeated in every form. But they insist that Christ was in Adam as to the substance of his human nature as truly as we were. They say that if his body and soul were not derived from the body and soul of his virgin mother he was no true man, and cannot be the redeemer of men. What is true of other men must, consequently, be true of Him. He must, therefore, be as much involved in the guilt and corruption of the apostasy as other men. It will not do to affirm and deny the same thing. It s a contradiction to say that we are guilty of Adam's sin because we are partakers of his essence, and that Christ is not guilty of his sin nor involved in its pollution, although He is a partaker of his essence. If participation of essence involve community of guilt and depravity in the one case, it must also in the other. As this seems a legitimate conclusion from the traducian doctrine, and as this conclusion is anti-Christian, and false, the doctrine itself cannot be true.
§ 4. Concluding Remarks.
Such are the leading arguments on both sides of this question. In reference to this discussion it may be remarked, —
1. That while it is incumbent on us strenuously to resist any
doctrine which
assumes the divisibility, and consequent materiality, of the human soul, or
which leads to the conclusion that the human
3. It is obviously most unreasonable and presumptuous, as well as dangerous, to make a theory as to the origin of the soul the ground of a doctrine so fundamental to the Christian system as that of original sin. Yet we see theologians, ancient and modern, boldly asserting that if their doctrine of derivation, and the consequent numerical sameness of substance in all men, be not admitted, then original sin is impossible. That is, that nothing can be true, no matter how plainly taught in the word of God, which they cannot explain. This is done even by those who protest against introducing philosophy into theology, utterly unconscious, as it would seem, that they themselves occupy, quoad hoc, the same ground with the rationalists. They will not believe in hereditary depravity unless they can explain the mode of its transmission. There can be no such thing, they say, as hereditary depravity unless the soul of the child is the same numerical substance as the soul of the parent. That is, the plain assertions of the Scriptures cannot be true unless the most obscure, unintelligible, and self-contradictory, and the least generally received philosophical theory as to the constitution of man and the propagation of the race be adopted. No man has a right to hang the millstone of his philosophy around the neck of the truth of God.
3. There is a third cautionary remark which must not be omitted.
The whole theory of traducianism is founded on the assumption that God, since the original
creation, operates only through means. Since the “sixth day the Creator has,
in this world, exerted no
4. Finally this doctrine of traducianism is held by those who contend for the old realistic doctrine that humanity is a generic substance or life. The two theories, however, do not seem to harmonize, and their combination produces great confusion and obscurity. According to the one theory the soul of the child is derived from the soul of its parents; according to the other theory there is no derivation. One magnet is not, or need not be derived from another; one Leyden jar is not derived from another; nor one galvanic battery from another. There is no derivation in the case. The general forces of magnetism, electricity and galvanism, are manifested in connection with given material combinations. And if a man be the manifestation of the general principle of humanity in connection with a given human body, his human nature is not derived from his immediate progenitors.
The object of this discussion is not to arrive at certainty as to what is not
clearly revealed in Scripture, nor to explain what is, on all sides, admitted to
be inscrutable, but to guard against the adoption of principles which are in
opposition to plain and important doctrines of the word of God. If traducianism
teaches that the soul admits of abscission or division; or that the human race
are constituted of numerically the same substance; or that the Son of God
assumed into personal union with himself the same numerical substance which
sinned and fell in Adam; then it is to be rejected as both false and
dangerous. But if, without pretending to explain everything, it simply asserts
that the human race is propagated in accordance with the general law which secures that like
begets like;
that the child derives its nature from its parents through the operation of
physical laws, attended and controlled by the agency of God, whether directive
or creative, as in all other
There is still another question which science has forced on theology, in relation to man, which cannot be overlooked. Have all mankind had a common origin? and have they a common nature? Are they all descended from one pair, and do they constitute one species? These questions are answered affirmatively in the Bible and by the Church universal. They are answered in the negative by a large and increasing class of scientific men. As the unity of the race is not only asserted in the Scriptures but also assumed in all they teach concerning the apostasy and redemption of man, it is a point about which the mind of the theologian should be intelligently convinced. As a mere theologian he may be authorized to rest satisfied with the declarations of the Bible; but as a defender of the faith he should be able to give an answer to those who oppose themselves.
There are two points involved in this question: community of origin, and unity of species All plants and animals derived by propagation from the same original stock are of the same species but those of the same species need not be derived from a common stock. If God saw fit at the beginning, or at any time since, to create plants or animals of the same kind in large numbers and in different parts of the earth, they would be of the same species (or kind) though not of the same origin. The oaks of America and those of Europe are identical in species, even although not derived from one and the same parent oak. It may be admitted that the great majority of plants and animals were originally produced not singly or in pairs, but in groups, the earth bringing forth a multitude of individuals of the same kind. It is therefore in itself possible that all men may be of the same species, although not all descended from Adam. And such is the opinion of some distinguished naturalists. The Scriptural doctrine, however, concerning man is, that the race is not only the same in kind but the same in origin. They are all the children of a common parent, and have a common nature.
§ 1. Meaning of the Word, or the Idea of Species.
It is obviously essential to any intelligent answer to the question whether all the varieties of. men are of one species, that we should be able to tell what a species is. This is a point of very great difficulty. Naturalists not only differ in their definitions of the term, but they differ greatly in classification. Some assume a spot on the wing of a butterfly, or a slight diversity of plumage in a bird, as proof of difference of species. Some therefore divide into six or eight species what others comprehend in one. Nothing there-fore can be done until men come to a common understanding on this subject, and the true idea of species be determined and authenticated.
General Characteristics of Species.
Before considering the various definitions of the term, it is proper to remark
that there are certain characteristics of species which at least, until of late,
have been generally recognized and admitted. (1.) Originality, i.e., they owe
their existence and character to immediate creation. They are not produced by
physical causes, nor are they ever derived from other genera or species. They
are original forms. This is admitted by naturalists of all classes. Such is the
doctrine of Cuvier, Agassiz, Dr. Morton, and of those who hold that the
varieties of the human race are so many distinct species. They mean by this that
they had different origins, and are not all derived from a common stock. Every
species therefore, by general consent, has had a single origin. (2.)
Universality, i.e., all the individuals and varieties belonging to the same
species have all its essential characteristics. Wherever you find the teeth of a
carnivorous animal, you find a stomach able to digest animal food, and claws
adapted to seize and hold prey. Wherever you find fins to effect motion in
water, you find a breathing apparatus suited to the same element. The species is
transmitted whole and entire. It is the same in all individuals belonging to
it, and in that sense universal. (3.) Immutability, or permanence. By this is
meant first, that one species is never lost or merged in another; and secondly,
that two or more species never combine so as to produce a third. The rose cannot
be merged into the tulip; nor can the rose and tulip be made to produce a new
species, which is neither the one nor the other. The only permanent
transmissible forms of organic life, are such as constitute distinct species. Immutability, therefore, or the
Definitions of Species.
No group of animals therefore can be regarded as a distinct species which has
not existed as distinct from the beginning, and which is not immutable in its
essential characteristics, and which is not
§ 2. Evidence of Identity of Species.
Such being the case, the only question is, how can we deter-mine whether the immaterial principle which constitutes and deter-mines the species, be the same or different. Aside from divine revelation, this can be ascertained: (1.) Partly from the organic structure. (2.) Partly from the φύσις, or physical nature. (3.) Partly from the ψυχή, or psychological nature. (4.) Partly from permanence and capability of indefinite propagation.
Organic Structure.
The first evidence of the identity of species is to be sought in the σῶμα,
or the organic structure. The evidence of design is impressed won all the
organized bodies in the universe, and especially upon the bodies of all animals.
Those intended to live on the dry ground, those intended to live in water, and those
intended to fly in the air, have their animal frame adapted to these severe,
modes or conditions of existence. There is also clear evidence of
Physiological Argument.
The second method of determining the identity of the immaterial principle in
which the idea of species resides, is the examination of its φύσις, or its
physiology. To this department belongs all that relates to enervation or the
distribution of the nerve power; to the circulation of the blood; to
respiration; to calorification or production of animal heat; to the
distribution of the muscles voluntary and involuntary; to the processes of
digestion, assimilation, propagation, etc., etc. As to this point it is to be
observed, (1.) That the φύσις, or animal nature, is always in accordance with
Psychological Argument.
The third criterion of the identity of species is to be sought in the ψυχή, or the psychological nature of the animal. The ψυχή is the immaterial principle which belongs to all animals, and is the same in kind in every distinct species. It is that in which the life resides; which is the seat of the instincts, and of that measure of intelligence, be it greater or less, which belongs to the animal. The ψυχή is the same in all the individuals of the same species, and it is permanent. The instincts and habits of the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the beaver; of the lion, tiger, wolf, fox, horse, dog, and ox; and of all the endless diversities of beasts, birds, fishes, and insects, are the same in all ages and in all parts of the world. This immaterial principle is of a higher order in some cases than in others, and admits of greater or less degrees of culture, as seen in the trained elephant or well-disciplined pointer. But the main thing is that each species has its own ψυχή, and that this is a higher element and more decisive evidence of identity than the corporeal structure or even the φύσις, or animal nature. Where these three criteria concur, where the corporeal organization, in everything indicative of design, is the same; where the φύσις and the ψυχή, the physical and psychological natures, are the same, there, beyond all reasonable doubt, the species is the same.
The fourth criterion of species is found not only in its permanence but in the
capacity of procreation and indefinite propagation which belongs to all the
individuals and varieties which it includes. Animals of the same species can
propagate their kind. Animals of different species cannot combine and perpetuate
a new or mongrel
§ 3. Application of these Criteria to Man.
When we come to apply these several criteria to the human race, it is found beyond dispute that they all concur in proving that the whole human family are of one and the same species. In the first place the corporeal frame or external structure is the same in all the varieties of the race. There is the same number of bones in the skeleton; their arrangement and disposition are the same. There is the same distribution of the blood-vessels. The brain, the spinal marrow, and the nervous system are the same in all. They all have the same muscles amounting to many thousand in number. The organs for breathing, respiration, digestion, secretion, and assimilation, are the same in all. There are indeed indefinite diversities in size, complexion, and character, and colour of the hair, within the same variety of the race, and between the varieties themselves. Some of these diversities are variable, and some are fixed. The Caucasian, the Mongolian, the African, have each their peculiarities by which the one is easily distinguished from the other, and which descend from generation to generation without alteration. With regard to these peculiarities, however, it is to be remarked, first, that they are less important and less conspicuous than those which distinguish the different varieties of domestic animals all belonging to the same species. No two men, or no men of different races, differ from each other so much as the little Italian greyhound and the powerful mastiff or bull-dog. And secondly, none of these peculiarities are indicative of difference of design, or plan, and therefore they are not indicative of difference in the immaterial principle, which according to the naturalists of the highest class, determines the identity of species and secures its permanence. And thirdly, these peculiarities are all referrible to the differences of climate, diet, and mode of life, and to the effect of propagation in case of acquired peculiarities. The truth of this last statement as to the influence of these several causes in modifying and perpetuating varieties in the same species, is abundantly illustrated and confirmed in the case of all the lower animals. Such is the sameness of all the varieties of mankind as to their corporeal structure, that a system of anatomy written in Europe and founded on the examination of the bodies of Europeans exclusively, would be as applicable in Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, as in Europe itself.
The second criterion of sameness of species is to be sought in the φύσις, or physical nature. In this respect also all mankind are found to agree, so that the physiology of the Caucasian, Mongolian, and African is precisely the same. The laws which regulate the vital processes are the same in all; respiration, digestion, secretion, and propagation, are all conducted in the same way in every variety of the species.
The third criterion is found in the ψυχή or psychological nature. This, as we have seen, is the highest test, for the ψυχή or immaterial principle is the most important element in the constitution of every living creature. Where that is the same, the species is the same. There can be no reasonable doubt that the souls of all men are essentially the same. They not only have in common all the appetites, instincts, and passions, which belong to the souls of the lower animals, but they all share in those higher attributes which belong exclusively to man. They all are endowed with reason, conscience, and free agency. They all have the same constitutional principles and affections. They all stand in the same relation to God as spirits possessing a moral and religious nature.
The fourth criterion is permanence, and the ability of indefinite propagation.
We have seen that it is a law of nature, recognized by all naturalists (with a
few recent exceptions), that animals of different species do not cohabit, and
cannot propagate. Where the species are nearly allied, as the horse and the ass,
they may produce offspring combining the peculiarities of both parents. But
there the process stops. Mules cannot continue the mongrel race. It is however
an admitted fact that men of every race, Caucasian, Mongolian, and African, can
thus cohabit, and their offspring can be indefinitely propagated and combined. “Were these units [species],” says
Professor Dana,
The Evidence of Identity of Race Cumulative.
It is to be observed that the strength of this argument for the unity of the human race does not depend upon any one of the above mentioned particulars separately. It is rather in their combination that the power of the argument lies. It is not simply because the corporeal structure is essentially the same in all men; nor simply because they have all the same physical, or the same psychological nature; or that they are capable of producing permanently prolific offspring; but because all these particulars are true in respect to the whole human family wherever found and through the whole course of its history. It becomes a mere matter of logomachy to dispute whether men are of the same species, if they have the same material organism, the same φύσις and the same ψυχή. Whether of the same species or not, if these things be admitted which cannot be rationally denied, they are of the same nature, they are beings of the same kind. Naturalists may give what meaning they please to the word species. This cannot alter the facts of the case. All men are of the same blood, of the same race, of the same order of creation.
“That the races of men,” says Delitzsch, “are not species of one genus, but
varieties of one species, is confirmed by the agreement in the psychological and
pathological phenomena in them all, by similarity in the anatomical structure,
in the fundamental powers and traits of the mind, in the limits to the duration
of life, in the normal temperature of the body and the average rate of
pulsation, in the duration of pregnancy, and in the unrestricted fruitfulness of
marriages between the various races.”
§ 4. Philological and Moral Evidence.
Besides the arguments above mentioned, which are all of a zoölogical character,
there are others, not less conclusive, of a different kind. It is one of the
infelicities which has attended this controversy, that it has been left too much
in the hands of naturalists, of men trained to the consideration almost
exclusively
The science of comparative philology, is founded on laws which are as certain
ant, as authoritative as the laws of nature. Language is not a fortuitous
production. It is essentially different from instinctive cries, or inarticulate
sounds. It is a production of the mind, exceedingly complex and subtle. It is
impossible that races, entirely distinct, should have the same language. It is
absolutely certain from the character of the French, Spanish, and Italian
languages, that those nations are, in large measure, the common descendants of
the Latin race. When therefore it can be shown that the languages of different
races or varieties of men are radically the same, or derived from a common
stock, it is impossible rationally to doubt their descent from a common
ancestry. Unity of language, therefore, proves unity of species because it
proves unity of origin. Diversity of language, however, does not prove diversity
either of species or of origin; because that diversity may be otherwise
accounted for; as by the confusion of tongues at Babel, or by the early and
long-continued separation of different tribes. The point, however, now to be
urged, is this. Such naturalists as Agassiz, on merely zoölogical principles,
have decided that it is more probable (not that it is necessary or certain, but
simply that it is more probable), that the different varieties of men, even down
to different nations, have had different origins, and as Agassiz in his later
writings maintains, are of different species; when, in many cases at least, it
is absolutely certain, from the character of the languages which they speak,
that they must have been derived from a common stock. Agassiz and others
represent the Asiatic and European races as distinct in origin and species. But
Alexander von Humboldt says, “The comparative study of languages shows us that
races now separated by vast tracts of land, are allied together, and have
migrated from one common primitive seat. . . . The largest field for such
investigations into the ancient condition of language, and consequently into the
period when the whole family of mankind was, in the strict sense of the word, to
be regarded as one living whole, presents itself to the long chain of
The Spiritual Relationship of Men.
Besides the arguments already mentioned in favour of the unity of mankind, next
to the direct assertion of the Bible, that which after all has the greatest
force is the one derived from the present condition of our moral and spiritual
nature. Wherever we meet a man, no matter of what name or nation, we not only
find that he has the same nature with ourselves; that he has the same organs,
the same senses, the same instincts, the same feelings, the same faculties, the
same understanding, will, and conscience, and the same capacity for religious
culture, but that he has the same guilty and polluted nature, and needs the same
redemption.
Our attention has thus far been directed specially to the unity of mankind in species. Little need he said in conclusion as to their unity of origin. (1.) Because in the opinion of the most distinguished naturalists, unity of species is itself decisive proof of the unity of origin. (2.) Because even if this he denied, it is nevertheless universally admitted that when the species is the same the origin may he the same. If mankind differ as to species they cannot be descended from a common parent, but if identical in species there is no difficulty in admitting their common descent. It is indeed principally for the sake of disproving the Scriptural statement that all men are the children of Adam, and to break up the common brotherhood of man, that diversity of species is insisted upon. If therefore the latter be admitted, the former may he easily conceded. (3.) The common origin of the languages of the vast majority of men, proves, as we have seen, their community of origin, and as an inference their unity as to species. And as this community of origin is proved as to races which the mere zoölogist is disposed with the greatest confidence to represent as distinct, the insufficiency of the grounds of their classification is thereby demonstrated. (4.) It is, however, the direct testimony of the Scriptures on this subject, with which all known facts are consistent; and the common apostasy of the race, and their common need of redemption, which render it certain to all who believe the Bible or the testimony of their own consciousness as to the universal sinfulness of humanity, that all man are the descendants of one fallen progenitor.
§ 1. The Scriptural Doctrine.
The Scriptural doctrine on this subject includes the following particulars.
First, That man was originally created in a state of maturity and perfection. By
this, however, is not meant that humanity in Adam before the fall, existed in
the highest state of excellence of which it is susceptible. It is altogether
probable that our nature, in virtue of its union with the divine nature in the
person of Christ, and in virtue of the union of the redeemed with their exalted
Redeemer, shall hereafter be elevated to a dignity and glory far greater than
that in which Adam was created or to which he ever could have attained. By the
maturity of man as at first created is meant that he was not created in a state
of infancy. It is a favourite assumption of sceptics that man at first both as
to soul and body, was imbecile and unfurnished; slowly forming for himself an
articulate language, and having his moral powers gradually awakened. This,
however, is inconsistent not only with the Scriptural account of his creation,
but also with the part he was designed to act, and in fact did act. By the
perfection of his original state is meant, that he was perfectly adapted to the
and for which the was made and to the sphere in which he was designed to move.
This perfection as to his body consisted not only in the integrity and due
proportion of all its parts, but also in its perfect adaptation to the nature of
the soul with which it was united. It is commonly said by theologians that the
body way created immortal and impassible. With regard to its immortality it is
certain that if man had not sinned he would not have died. But whether the
immortality which would then have been they destiny of the body, would have been
the result of its original organization, or whether after its period of probation
it would have undergone a change to adapt it to its everlasting condition, is a
matter to be subsequently considered. By impassibility is not necessarily meant
entire freedom from susceptibility to pain, for
That the primitive state of our race was not one of barbarism from which men have raised themselves by a slow process of improvement, we know, First, from the authority of Scripture, which represents, as we have seen, the first man as created in the full perfection of his nature. This fact for all Christians is decisive. Secondly, the traditions of all nations treat of a golden age from which men have fallen. These wide-spread traditions cannot rationally be accounted for, except on the assumption that the Scriptural account of the primitive state of man is correct. Thirdly, the evidence of history is all on the side of the doctrine of the Bible on this subject. Egypt derived its civilization from the East; Greece from Phœnicia and Egypt; Italy from Phœnicia and Greece; the rest of Europe from Italy. Europe is now rapidly extending her civilizing influence over New Zealand, Australia, and the Islands of the Pacific Oceans. The affinity of languages proves that the early civilization of Mexico and South America had its source in Eastern Asia. On the other hand, there is no authentic account of a nation of savages rising by their own efforts from a state of barbarism to a civilized condition. The fact that Sir John Lubbock, and other advocates of the opposite doctrine, are obliged to refer to such obscure and really insignificant facts, as the superior culture of the modern Indians on this continent, is a proof of the dearth of historical evidence in support of the theory of primitive barbarism. Fourthly, the oldest records, written and monumental, give evidence of the existence of nations in a high state of civilization, in the earliest periods of human history. This fact is easily accounted for on the assumption of the truth of the Scriptural doctrine of the primitive state of man, but is unaccountable on the opposite hypothesis. It necessitates the gratuitous assumption of the existence of men for untold ages prior to these earliest historical periods. Fifthly, comparative philology has established the fact of the intimate relation of all of the great divisions of the human race. It has further proved that they all had their origin from a common centre, and that that centre was the seat of the earliest civilization.
The theory that the race of man has passed through a stone, a bronze, and an iron age, stages of progress from barbarism to civilization, is, as before remarked, destitute of scientific foundation. It cannot be proved that the stone age prevailed contemporaneously in all parts of the earth. And unless this is proved it avails nothing to show that there was a period at which the inhabitants of Europe were destitute of a knowledge of the metals. The same may be proved of the Patagonians and of some African tribes of the present day.
It has, therefore, been almost the universal belief that the original state of man was as the Bible teaches, his highest state, from which the nations of the earth have more or less deteriorated. This primitive state, however, was distinguished by the intellectual, moral, and religious superiority of men rather than by superiority in the arts or natural sciences. The Scriptural doctrine, therefore, is consistent with the admitted fact that separate nations, and the human race as a whole, have made great advances in all branches of knowledge and in all the arts of life. Nor is it inconsistent with the belief that the world under the influence of Christianity is constantly improving, and will ultimately attain, under the reign of Christ, millennial perfection and glory. All that is denied is, that men were originally savages in the lowest state of barbarism, from which they have gradually emerged.
The late Archbishop Whately, in his work on “Political Economy,” avowed his
belief of the common doctrine on the primitive state of man. He says, “We have
no reason to believe that any community ever did, or ever can emerge, unassisted
by external helps, from a state of barbarism unto anything that can be called
civilization.” In opposition to this doctrine, Sir John Lubbock tries to show “That there are indications of progress even among savages,” and, “That among
the most civilized nations there are traces of original barbarism.”
To prove that savages may by their own exertions become civilized he refers to such facts as the following: The Australians had formerly bark-canoes, which they have abandoned for others, hollowed out of the trunk of a tree, “which they buy from the Malays.” The Peruvians had domesticated the llama; the Polynesians made bark-cloth. “Another very strong case,” he says, “is the boomerang of the Australians. This weapon is known to no other race of men,” and therefore, he argues, cannot be a relic of a higher state of civilization. He lays great stress on the case of the Cherokees who have become agriculturists, having ploughs, horses, black-cattle, etc., ignoring the fact that they were surrounded by civilized Americans and had enjoyed for years the faithful teaching of Christian missionaries who instructed them in all the useful arts.
He finds indications of the original barbarism of the race in the fact that
flint implements are found not only in Europe, but also in Asia, the cradle of
mankind; and in the gradual improvement of the relation between the sexes.
§ 2. Man Created in the Image of God.
Secondly. Other animals, however, besides man, were created in maturity and
perfection, each according to its kind. It was the distinguishing characteristic
of man, that he was created in the image and likeness of God. Many of the early
writers assumed that the word “image” had reference to the body, which they
thought by its beauty, intelligence of aspect, and erect stature, was an
adumbration of God, and that the word “likeness “referred to the intellectual
and moral nature of man. According to Augustine, image relates to the cognitio
veritatis, and likeness to the amor virtutis; the former to the intellectual,
and the latter to the moral faculties. This was the foundation of the scholastic
doctrine that the image of God includes the natural attributes of the soul; and
the likeness our moral conformity to the divine Being. This distinction was
introduced into the Romish theology. Bellarmin
His intellectual and moral nature. God is a Spirit, the human
The Lutheran theologians were, in general, inclined to go to the apposite
extreme. The image of God, according to them, was that
The Reformed theologians take the middle ground between the extremes of making
the image of God to consist exclusively in man's rational nature, or
exclusively in his moral conformity to his Maker. They distinctly include both.
Calvin
§ 3. Original Righteousness.
In the moral image of God, or original righteousness, are included, —
1. The perfect harmony and due subordination of all that constituted man. His reason was subject to God; his will was subject to his reason; his affections and appetites to his will; the body was the obedient organ of the soul. There was neither rebellion of the sensuous part of his nature against the rational, nor was there any disproportion between them needing to be controlled or balanced by ab extra gifts or influence.
2. But besides this equilibrium and harmony in the original constitution of man,
his moral perfection in which he resembled God, included knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness. The two passages of the New Testament in which
these elements of the divine image in which man was created, are distinctly
mentioned, are
The other passage above referred to is
It is plain from these passages that knowledge, righteousness, and holiness are
elements of the image of God in which man was originally created. By knowledge
is not meant merely the faculty of cognition, the ability to acquire knowledge,
but the contents of that faculty. As knowledge may be innate, so it may be
concreated. Adam, as soon as he began to be had self-knowledge; he was
conscious of his own being, faculties, and states. He had also the knowledge of
what was out of himself, or he had what the modern philosophy calls
world-consciousness. He not only perceived the various material objects by which
he was surrounded, but he apprehended aright their nature. How far this
knowledge extended we are unable to determine. Some have supposed that our first
parent had a more thorough knowledge of the external world, of its laws, and of
the nature of its various productions, than human science has ever since
attained. It is certain that he was able to give appropriate names to all
classes of animals which passed in review before him, which supposes a due
apprehension of their distinctive characteristics. On this point we know
nothing beyond what the Bible teaches us. It is more important to remark that
Adam knew God; whom to know is life eternal. Knowledge, of course, differs as to
its objects. The cognition of mere speculative truths, as those of science and
history, is a mere act of the understanding; the cognition of the beautiful
involves the exercise of our æsthetic nature; of moral truths the exercise of
our moral nature; and the knowledge of God the exercise of our spiritual and
religious nature, The natural man, says the Apostle, receives
All that has been said with regard to the original state of man is involved in the account of the creation, which declares that he was made like God; and that he was pronounced to be good, good exceedingly. What the goodness is which belongs to man as a rational, immortal, and religious being, and which is necessary to fit him for the sphere in which he was to move, and the destiny for. which he was created, we learn partly from the express declarations of the Scriptures, partly from the nature of the case, and partly from what is involved in humanity as restored by Christ. From all these sources it is plain that the Protestant doctrine concerning the image of God and the original righteousness in which and with which Adam was created includes not only his rational nature, but also knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.
§ 4. Dominion over the Creatures.
The third particular which enters into the dignity of man's original state, and
into the image of God with which he was invested, was his dominion over the
creatures. This arose from the powers with which he was invested, and from the
express appointment of God. God constituted him ruler over the earth. He placed,
as the Psalmist said, all things under his feet. In
§ 5. The Doctrine of the Romish Church.
The doctrine of Romanists as to the original state of man agrees with that of
Protestants, except in one important particular. They hold that man before the
fall, was in a state of relative perfection; that is, not only free from any
defect or infirmity of body, but endowed with all the attributes of a spirit,
and imbued with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and invested with
dominion over the creatures. Protestants include all this under the image of
God; the Romanists understand by the image of God only the rational, and
especially the voluntary nature of man, or the freedom of the will. They
distinguish, therefore, between the image of God and original righteousness. The
latter they say is lost, the former retained. Protestants, on the other hand,
hold that it is the divine image in its most important constituents, that man
forfeited by his apostasy. This, however, may be considered only a difference as
to words. The important point of difference is, that the Protestants hold that
original righteousness, so far as it consisted in the moral excellence of Adam,
was natural, while the Romanists maintain that it was supernatural. According to
their theory, God created man soul and body. These two constituents of his
nature are naturally in conflict. To preserve the harmony between them, and the
due subjection of the flesh to the spirit, God gave man the supernatural gift
of original righteousness. It was this gift that man lost by his fall; so that
since the apostasy he is in the state in which Adam was before he was invested
with this supernatural endowment. In opposition to this doctrine, Protestants
maintain that original righteousness was concreated and natural. Original
righteousness, says Luther,
The question whether original righteousness was natural or supernatural cannot
be answered until the meaning of the words be determined. The word natural is
often used to designate that which constitutes nature. Reason is in such a sense
natural to man that without it he ceases to be a man. Sometimes it designates
what of necessity flows from the constitution of nature; as when we say it is
natural for man to desire his own happiness; sometimes it designates what is concreated or innate as opposed to what is adventitious, accessory, or acquired; in this use of the word the sense of justice, pity, and the social affections,
are natural to men. Original righteousness is asserted by Protestants to be
natural, first, with the view of denying that human nature as at first
constituted involved the conflicting principles of flesh and spirit as
represented by Bellarmin, and that the pura naturalia, or simple principles of
nature as they existed in Adam, were without moral character; and. secondly, to
assert that the nature of man as created was good, that
Objections to the Romish Doctrine.
The obvious objections to the Romish doctrine that original righteousness was a
supernatural gift, are, (1.) That it supposes a degrading view of the original
constitution of our nature. According to this doctrine the seeds of evil were
implanted in the nature of man as it came from the hands of God. It was
disordered or diseased, there was about it what Bellarmin calls a morbus or
languor, which needed a remedy. But this is derogatory to the justice and
goodness of God, and to the express declarations of Scripture, that man,
humanity, human nature, was good. (2.) This doctrine is evidently founded on the
Manichean principle of the inherent evil of matter. It is because man has a
material body, that this conflict between the flesh and spirit, between good and
evil, is said to be unavoidable. But this is opposed to the word of God and the
faith of the Church. Matter is not evil. And there is no necessary tendency to
evil from the union of the soul and body which requires to be supernaturally
corrected. (3.) This doctrine as to original righteousness arose out of the
Semi-Pelagianism of the Church of Rome, and was designed to sustain it. The two
doctrines are so related that they stand or fall together. According to the
theory in question, original sin is the simple loss of original righteousness.
Humanity since the fall is precisely what it was before the fall, and before the
addition of the supernatural gift of righteousness. Bellarmin
§ 6. Pelagian and Rationalistic Doctrine.
According to Pelagians and Rationalists man was created a rational free agent,
but without moral character. He was neither righteous nor unrighteous, holy nor
unholy. He had simply the capacity of becoming either. Being endowed with reason
and free will, his character depended upon the use which he made of those
endowments. If he acted right, he became righteous; if he acted wrong, he
became unrighteous. There can be, according to their system, no such thing as
concreated moral character, and therefore they reject the doctrine of original
righteousness as irrational. This view of man's original state is the necessary
consequence of the assumption that moral character can be predicated only of
acts of the will or of the subjective consequences of such acts. This principle
which precludes the possibility of original righteousness in Adam, precludes
also the possibility of innate, hereditary depravity, commonly called original
sin; and also the possibility of indwelling sin, and of habits of grace. It is
a principle
Consciousness proves that Dispositions as distinguished from Acts may have Moral Character.
By the mere moral philosopher, and by theologians whose theology is a philosophy, it is assumed as an axiom, or intuitive truth, that a man is responsible only for what he has full power to do or to avoid. Plausible as this principle is, it is, —
1. Opposed to the testimony of consciousness. It is a fact of consciousness that
we do attribute moral character to principles which precede all voluntary action
and which are entirely independent of the power of the will. And it is a fact
capable of the clearest demonstration that such is not only the dictate of our
own individual consciousness, but also the conviction of all men. If we examine
our own consciousness as to the judgment which we pass upon ourselves, we shall
find that we hold ourselves responsible not only for the deliberate acts of the
will, that is, for acts of deliberate self-determination, which suppose both
knowledge and volition, but also for emotional, impulsive acts, which precede
all deliberation; and not only for such impulsive acts, but also for the
principles, dispositions, or immanent states of the mind, by which its acts
whether impulsive or deliberate, are determined. When a man is convinced of sin,
it is not so much for specific acts of transgression that his conscience
condemns him, as for the permanent states of his mind; his selfishness,
worldliness, and maliciousness; his ingratitude, unbelief, and hardness of
heart; his want of right affections, of love to God, of zeal for the Redeemer,
and of benevolence towards men. These are not acts. They are not states of mind
under the control of the will; and yet in the judgment of conscience, which we
cannot silence or pervert, they constitute our character and are just ground of
condemnation. In like manner whatever If right dispositions or principles we
discover within ourselves, whatever there is of love to God, to Christ, or to
his people; whatever
Argument from the General Judgment of Men.
2. It may, however, be said that our consciousness or moral judgments are
influenced by our Christian education. It is there-fore important to observe, in
the second place, that this judgment of our individual consciousness is
confirmed by the universal judgment of our fellow-men. This is plain from the
fact that in all known languages there are words to distinguish between
dispositions, principles, or habits, as permanent states of the mind, and
voluntary acts. And these dispositions are universally recognized as being
either good or bad. Language is the product of the common consciousness of men.
There could not be such terms as benevolence, justice, integrity, and fidelity,
expressing principles
The Moral Character of Acts determined by the Principles whence they flow.
3. So far from its being true that in the judgment of men the voluntary act alone constitutes character, the very opposite is true. The character of the act is decided by the nature of the principle by which it is determined. If a man gives alms, or worships God from a selfish principle, under the control of a disposition to secure the applause of men, those acts instead of being good are instinctively recognized as evil. Indeed, if this Pelagian or Rationalistic principle were true, there could be no such thing as character; not only because individual acts have no moral quality except such as is derived from the principle whence they flow, but also because character necessarily supposes something permanent and controlling. A man without character is a man without principles; i.e., in whom there is nothing which gives security as to what his acts will be.
Argument from Scripture.
4. The Scriptures in this, as in all cases, recognize the validity of the
intuitive and universal judgments of the mind. They everywhere distinguish
between principles and acts, and everywhere attribute moral character to the
former, and to acts only sc far as they proceed from principles. This is the
doctrine of our Lord when he says, “Either make the tree good, and his fruit
good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for a tree is
known by his fruit.” (
The Faith of the Church on this Subject.
5. It is fair on this subject to appeal to the universal faith of the Church. Even the Greek Church, which has the lowest form of doctrine of any of the great historical Christian communities, teaches that men need regeneration as soon as they are born, and that by regeneration a change of nature is effected, or a new principle of life is infused into the soul. So also the Latin Church, however inconsistently, recognizes the truth of the doctrine in question in all her teachings. All who die unbaptized, according to Romanists, perish; and by baptism not Only the guilt, but also the pollution of sin is removed, and new habits of grace are infused into the soul. It is needless to remark that the Lutheran and Reformed churches agree in holding this important doctrine, that moral character does not belong exclusively to voluntary acts, but extends to dispositions, principles, or habits of the mind. This is involved in all their authoritative decisions concerning original righteousness, original sin, regeneration, and sanctification.
The Moral Character of Dispositions depends on their Nature and not on their Origin.
The second great principle involved in the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that the moral character of dispositions or habits depends on their nature and not on their origin. There are some who endeavour to take a middle ground between the rationalistic and the evangelical doctrines. They admit that moral character may be predicated of dispositions as distinguished from voluntary acts, but they insist that this can only be done when such dispositions have been self-acquired. They acknowledge that the frequent repetition of certain acts has a tendency to produce an abiding disposition to perform them. This is acknowledged to be true not only in regard to the indulgence of sensual appetites, but also in regard to purely mental acts. Not only does the frequent use of intoxicating liquors produce an inordinate craving for them, but the frequent exercise of pride or indulgence of vanity, confirms and strengthens a proud and vainglorious spirit, or state of mind; which state of mind, when thus produced, it is admitted, goes to determine or constitute the man's moral character. But they deny that a man can be responsible for any disposition, or state of mind, which is not the result of his own voluntary agency. In opposition to this doctrine, and in favour of the position that the moral character of dispositions, or principles, does not depend upon their origin, that whether concreated, innate, infused, or self-acquired they are good or bad according to their nature, the arguments are the same in kind as those presented under the preceding head.
1. The first is derived from our consciousness. In our judgments of ourselves
the question is what we are, and not how we became what we know ourselves to be.
If conscious that we do not love God as we ought; that we are worldly, selfish,
proud, or suspicious, it is no relief to the consciousness, that such has been
our character from the beginning. We may know that we were born with these evil
dispositions, but they are not on that account less evil in the sight of
conscience. We groan under the burden of hereditary, or of indwelling sin, as
deeply and as intelligently as under the pressure of our self-acquired evil
dispositions. So also in our instinctive judgments of other men. if a man be
addicted to frivolous pursuits, we pronounce him a frivolous man, without
sopping to inquire whether his disposition be innate, derived by inheritance
from his ancestors, or whether it was acquired. On the contrary, if he manifests
from his youth a disposition for the
This the Common Rule of Judgment.
2. As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man. What we find
revealed in our own consciousness we find manifested as the consciousness of our
fellow men. It is the Instinctive or intuitive judgment of all men that moral
dispositions derive their character from their nature, and not from their
origin. In the ordinary language of men, to say that a man is naturally proud or
malicious is not an extenuation, but an aggravation. The more deeply these evil
principles are seated in his nature, and the less they depend upon circumstances
or voluntary action, the more profound is our abhorrence and the more severe is
our condemnation.
The Testimony of Scripture.
3. This also is the plain doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures teach that God made man upright; that the angels were created holy, for the unholy angels are those which kept not their first estate; that since the fall men are born in sin; that by the power of God, and not by the power of the will, the heart is changed, and new dispositions are implanted in our nature; and yet the Bible always speaks of the sinful as sinful and worthy of condemnation, whether, as in the case of Adam, that sinfulness was self-acquired, or, as in the case of his posterity, it is a hereditary evil. It always speaks of the holy as holy, whether so created as were the angels, or made so by the supernatural power of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification. And in so doing the Bible, as we have seen, does not contradict the intuitive judgment of the human mind, but sanctions and confirms that judgment.
The Faith of the Church.
4. It need hardly be added that such also is the faith of the Church universal.
All Christian churches receive the doctrines of original in and regeneration in
a form which involves not only the principle that dispositions, as distinguished
from acts, may have a moral character, but also that such character belongs to
them whether they be innate, acquired, or infused. It is, therefore, most
unreasonable to assume the ground that a man can be responsible only for his
voluntary acts, or for their subjective effects, when our own consciousness, the
universal judgment of men, the word of God, and the Church universal, so
distinctly assert the contrary. It is a matter of surprise how
subtle is the poison of the principle which has now been considered. It is not
only the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, but it is often asserted by
orthodox theologians who do not carry it out to its legitimate results, but who,
nevertheless, allow it injuriously to modify their views of some of the most
important doctrines of the Bible. On the assumption that no man can be
Objections Considered.
The difficulty on this subject arises in great measure from con-founding two distinct things. It is one thing that a creature should be treated according to his character; and quite another thing to account for his having that character. If a creature is holy he will be regarded and treated as holy. If he is sinful, he will be regarded and treated as sinful. If God created Adam holy He could not treat him as unholy. If He created Satan sinful, He would regard him as sinful; and if men are born in sin they cannot be regarded as free from sin. The difficulty is not in God's treating his creatures according to their true character, but in reconciling with his holiness and justice that a sinful character should be acquired without the creature's personal agency. If God had created Satan sinful he would be sinful, but we should not know how to reconcile it with the character of God that he should be so created. And if men are born in sin the difficulty is not in their being regarded and treated as sinful, but in their being thus born. The Bible teaches us the solution of this difficulty. It reveals to us the principle of representation, on the ground of which the penalty of Adam's sin has come upon his posterity as the reward of Christ's righteousness comes upon his people. In the one case the penalty brings subjective sinfulness, and in the other the reward brings subjective holiness.
It is a common objection to the doctrine that holiness can be concreated and
sinfulness hereditary, that it makes sin and holiness substances. There is
nothing in the soul, it is said, but its substance and its acts. If sin or
holiness be predicated of anything but the acts of the soul it must be
predicated of its substance; and thus we have the doctrine of physical holiness
and physical depravity. The assumption on which this objection rests is not only
an arbitrary one, but it is obviously erroneous. There are in the soul, (1.) Its
substance. (2.) Its essential properties or attributes, as reason, sensibility,
and will, without which it ceases to be a human soul. (3.) Its constitutional
dispositions, or natural tendencies to exercise
Pelagians teach that Man was created Mortal.
The second distinguishing feature of the Pelagian or Rationalistic doctrine as
to man's original state, is that man was created mortal. By this it is meant to
deny that death is the consequence or penalty of transgression; and to affirm
that Adam was liable to death, and certainly would have died in virtue of the
original constitution of his nature. The arguments urged in support of this
doctrine are, (1.) That the corporeal organization of Adam was not adapted to last forever.
It was in its very nature perishable. It required to be constantly refreshed by
sleep and renewed by food, and would by a natural and inevitable process have
grown old and decayed. (2.) That all other animals living on the earth evince in their constitution and
structure that they were not intended by their Creator to live on indefinitely.
They were created male and female, designed to propagate their race. This proves
that a succession of individuals, and not the continued existence of the same
individuals, was
Answer to the Pelagian Arguments.
With regard to this subject it is to be remarked that there are two distinct points to be considered. First, whether Adam would have died had he not sinned; and second, whether his body as originally formed was adapted to an immortal state of existence. As to the former there can be no doubt. It is expressly asserted in Scripture that death is the wages of sin. In the threatening, “In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die,” it is plainly implied that if he did not eat he should not die. It is clear therefore from the Scriptures that death is the penal consequence of sin and would not have been inflicted, had not our first parents transgressed. The second point is much less clear, and less important. According to one view adopted by many of the fathers, Adam was to pass his probation in the earthly paradise, and if obedient, was to be translated to the heavenly paradise, of which the earthly was the type. According to Luther, the effect of the fruit of the tree of life of which our first parents would have been permitted to eat had they not sinned, would have been to preserve their bodies in perpetual youth. According to others, the body of Adam and the bodies of his posterity, had he maintained his integrity, would have undergone a change analogous to that which, the Apostle teaches us, awaits those who shall be alive at the second coming of Christ. They shall not die, but they all shall be changed; the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal shall put on immortality. Two things are certain, first, that if Adam had not sinned he would not have died; and secondly, that if the Apostle, when he says we have borne the image of the earthly, means that our present bodies are like the body of Adam as originally constituted, then his body no less than ours, required to be changed to fit it for immortality.
God having created man after his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, entered into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of perfect obedience, forbidding him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil upon the pain of death.
According to this statement, (1.) God entered into a covenant with Adam. (2.) The promise annexed to that covenant was life. (3.) The condition was perfect obedience. (4.) Its penalty was death.
§ 1. God entered into Covenant with Adam.
This statement does not rest upon any express declaration of
the Scriptures. It is, however, a concise and correct mode of asserting a plain
Scriptural fact, namely, that God made to Adam a promise suspended upon a condition, and
attached to disobedience a certain penalty. This is what in Scriptural language
is meant by a covenant, and this is all that is meant by the term as here used.
Although the word covenant is not used in Genesis, and does not elsewhere, in
any clear passage, occur in reference to the transaction there recorded, yet
inasmuch as the plan of salvation is constantly represented as a New Covenant,
new, not merely in antithesis to that made at Sinai, but new in reference to all
legal covenants whatever, it is plain that the Bible does represent the
arrangement made with Adam as a truly federal transaction. The Scriptures know
nothing of any other than two methods of attaining eternal life: the one that
which demands perfect obedience, and the other that which demands faith. If the
latter is called a covenant, the former is declared to be of the same nature. It
is of great importance that the Scriptural form of presenting truth should be
retained. Rationalism was introduced into the Church under the guise of a
philosophical statement of the truths of the Bible free from the mere outward
form in which the sacred writers, trained in Judaism, had presented them. On
this ground the federal system, as it was called, was discarded. On the same
God then did enter into a covenant with Adam. That covenant is sometimes called a covenant of life, because life was promised as the reward of obedience. Sometimes it is called the covenant of works, because works were the condition on which that promise was suspended, and because it is thus distinguished from the new covenant which promises life on condition of faith.
§ 2. The Promise.
The reward promised to Adam on condition of his obedience, was life. (1.) This is involved in the threatening: “In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” It is plain that this involved the assurance that he should not die, if he did not eat. (2.) This is confirmed by innumerable passages and by the general drift of Scripture, in which it is so plainly and so variously taught, that life was, by the ordinance of God, connected with obedience. “This do and thou shalt live.” “The man that doeth them shall live by them.” This is the uniform mode in which the Bible speaks of that law or covenant under which man by the constitution of his nature and by the ordinance of God, was placed. (3.) As the Scriptures everywhere present God as a judge or moral ruler, it follows of necessity from that representation, that his rational creatures will be dealt with according to the principles of justice. If there be no transgression there will be no punishment. And those who continue holy thereby continue in the favour and fellowship of him whose favour is life, and whose loving kindness is better than life. (4.) And finally, holiness, or as the Apostle expresses it, to be spiritually minded, is life. There can therefore be no doubt, that had Adam continued in holiness, he would have enjoyed that life which flows from the favour of God.
The life thus promised included the happy, holy, and immortal existence of the
soul and body. This is plain. (1.) Because time life promised was that suited to
the being to whom the promise was made. But the life suited to man as a moral
and intelligent being,
§ 3. Condition of the Covenant.
The condition of the covenant made with Adam is said in this symbols of our church to be perfect obedience. That that statement is correct may be inferred (1.) From the nature of the case and from the general principles clearly revealed in the word of God. Such is the nature of God, and such the relation which He sustains to his moral creatures, that sin, the transgression of the divine law, must involve the destruction of the fellowship between man and his Creator, and the manifestation of the divine displeasure. The Apostle therefore says, that he who offends in one point, who breaks one precept of the law of God, is guilty of the whole. (2.) It is everywhere assumed in the Bible, that the condition of acceptance under the law is perfect obedience. “Cursed is every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them.” This is not a peculiarity of the Mosaic economy, but a declaration of a principle which applies to all divine laws. (3.) The whole argument of the Apostle in his epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians, is founded on the assumption that the law demands perfect obedience. If that be not granted, his whole argument falls to the ground.
The specific command to Adam not to eat of a certain tree, was therefore not the only command he was required to obey. It was given simply to be the outward and visible test to determine whether he was willing to obey God in all things. Created holy, with all his affections pure, there was the more reason that the test of his obedience should be an outward and positive command; something wrong simply because it was forbidden, and not evil in its own nature. It would thus be seen that Adam obeyed for the sake of obeying. His obedience was more directly to God, and not to his own reason.
The question whether perpetual, as well as perfect obedience was the condition
of the covenant made with Adam, is probably to
§ 4. The Penalty.
The penalty attached to the covenant is expressed by the comprehensive term death. “In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” That this does not refer to the mere dissolution of the body, is plain. (1.) Because the word death, as used in Scripture in reference to the consequences of transgression, includes all penal evil. The wages of sin is death. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. Any and every form of evil, therefore, which is inflicted as the punishment of sin, is comprehended under the word death (2.) The death threatened was the opposite of the life promised But the life promised, as we have seen, includes all that is involved in the happy, holy, and immortal existence of the soul and body; and therefore death must include not only all the miseries of this life and the dissolution of the body, but also all that is meant by spiritual and eternal death. (3.) God is the life of the soul. His favour and fellowship with him, are essential to its holiness and happiness. If his favour be forfeited, the inevitable consequences are the death of the soul, i.e., its loss of spiritual life, and unending sinfulness and misery. (4.) The nature of the penalty threatened is .earned from its infliction. The consequences of Adam's sin were the loss of the image and favour of God and all the evils which flowed from that loss. (5.) Finally, the death which was incurred by the sin of our first parents, is that from which we are redeemed by Christ. Christ, however, does not merely deliver the body from the grave, he saves the soul from spiritual and eternal death; and therefore spiritual and eternal death, together with the dissolution of the body and all the miseries of this life, were included in the penalty originally attached to the covenant of works. In the day in which Adam ate the forbidden fruit he did die. The penalty threatened was not a momentary infliction but permanent subjection to all the evils which flow from the righteous displeasure of God.
§ 5. The Parties to the Covenant of Works.
It lies in the nature of a covenant that there must be two of more parties. A
covenant is not of one. The parties to the original covenant were God and Adam.
Adam, however, acted not in his individual capacity but as the head and
representative of his whole race. This is plain. (1.) Because everything said to
him had as much reference to his posterity as to Adam himself. Everything
granted to him was granted to them. Everything promised to him was promised to
them. And everything threatened against him, in case of transgression, was
threatened against them. God did not give the earth to Adam for him alone, but
as the heritage of his race. The dominion over the lower animals with which he
was invested belonged equally to his descendants. The promise of life embraced
them as well as him; and the threatening of death concerned them as well as
him. (2.) In the second place, it is an outstanding undeniable fact, that the
penalty which Adam incurred has fallen upon his whole race. The earth is cursed
to them as it was to him. They must earn their bread by the sweat of their
brows. The pains of childbirth are the common heritage of all the daughters of
Eve. All men are subject to disease and death. All are born in sin, destitute of
the moral image of God. There is not an evil consequent on the sin of Adam which
does not affect his race as much as it affected him. (3.) Not only did the
ancient Jews infer the representative character of Adam from the record given in
Genesis, but the inspired writers of the New Testament give this doctrine the
sanction of divine authority. In Adam, says the Apostle, all died. The sentence
of condemnation, he teaches us, passed on all men for one offence. By the
offence of one all were made sinners. (4.) This great fact is made the ground on
which the whole plan of redemption is founded. As we full in Adam, we are saved
in Christ. To deny the principle in the one case, is to deny it in the other;
for the two are inseparably united in the representations of Scripture. (5.) The
principle involved in the headship of Adam underlies all the religious
institutions ever ordained by God for men; all his providential dealings with
our race; and even the distributions of the saving influences of his Spirit. It
is therefore one of the fundamental principles both of natural and of revealed
religion. (6.) What is thus clearly revealed in the word and providence of God,
finds a response in the very constitution of our nature. All men are led as it
were instinctively to recognize the validity of this principle of representation.
§ 6. Perpetuity of the Covenant of Works.
If Adam acted not only for himself but also for his posterity, that fact determines the question, Whether the covenant of works be still in force. In the obvious sense of the terms, to say that men are still under that covenant, is to say that they are still on probation; that the race did not fall when Adam fell. But if Adam acted as the head of the whole race, then all men stood their probation in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. The Scriptures, therefore, teach that we come into the world under condemnation. We are by nature, i.e., as we were born, the children of wrath. This fact is assumed in all the provisions of the gospel and in all the institutions of our religion. Children are required to be baptized for the remission of sin. But while the Pelagian doctrine is to be rejected, which teaches that each man comes into the world free from sin and free from condemnation, and stands his probation in his own person, it is nevertheless true that where there is no sin there is no condemnation. Hence our Lord said to the young man, “This do and thou shalt live.” And hence the Apostle in the second chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, says that God will reward every man according to his works. To those who are good, He will give eternal life; to those who are evil, indignation and wrath. This is only saying that the eternal principles of justice are still in force. If any man can present himself before the bar of God and prove that he is free from sin, either imputed or personal, either original or actual, he will not be condemned. But the fact is that the whole world lies in wickedness. Man is an apostate race. Men are all involved in the penal and natural consequences of Adam's transgression. They stood their probation in him, and do not stand each man for himself.
The Scriptural Account.
The Scriptural account of the Fall, as given in the look of Genesis, is, That God placed Adam in “the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die Now the serpent was more subtile than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die. For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods (as God), knowing good and evil. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make wise; she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.”
The consequences of this act of disobedience were, (1.) An immediate sense of guilt and shame. (2.) The desire and effort to hide themselves from the face of God. (3.) The denunciation and immediate execution of the righteous judgment of God upon the serpent, upon the man, and upon the woman. (4.) Expulsion from the garden of Eden and prohibition of access to the Tree of Life.
That this account of the probation and fall of man is neither an allegory nor a
myth, but a true history, is evident, (1.) From internal evidence. When
contrasted with the mythological accounts of the creation and origin of man as
found in the records of early heathen nations, whether Oriental, Grecian, or
Etruscan, the difference
There are many who, while admitting the historical character of this account, still regard it as in a great measure figurative. They understand it as a statement not so much of external events as of an internal process of thought; explaining how it was that Eve came to eat of the forbidden tree and to induce Adam to join in her transgression. They do not admit that a serpent was the tempter, or that he spoke to Eve, but assume that she was attracted by the beauty of the forbidden object, and began to question in her own mind either the fact or the justice of the prohibition. But there is not only no valid reason for departing from the literal interpretation of the passage, but that interpretation is supported by the authority of time writers of the New Testament. They recognize the serpent as present, and as the agent in the temptation and fall of our first parents.
The Tree of Life.
According to the sacred narrative, there were two trees standing side by side in
the garden of Eden which had a peculiar symbolical
The Tree of Knowledge.
The nature and significancy of the tree of knowledge of good and evil are not so
clear. By the tree of knowledge, indeed, it is altogether probable, we are to
understand a tree the fruit of which would impart knowledge. This may be
inferred, (1.) From analogy As the tree of life sustained or imparted life, so
the tree of knowledge was appointed to communicate knowledge. (2.) From the suggestion of the tempter, who assured the woman that eating of the fruit of
that tree would open her eyes. (3.) She so understood the designation, for she
regarded the tree as desirable to render wise. ( 4.) The effect of eating of the
forbidden fruit was that the eyes
The words “good and evil” in this connection admit of three interpretations.
In the first place, in Scripture, the ignorance of infancy is sometimes
expressed by saying that a child cannot tell its right hand from its left;
sometimes by saying, that he cannot discern between the evil and the good. Thus
in
The Serpent.
It may be inferred from the narrative, that Adam was present with Eve during the
temptation. In
As to the serpent's speaking there is no more difficulty than in the utterance of articulate words from Sinai, or the sounding of a voice from heaven at the baptism of our Lord, or in the speaking of Balaam's ass. The words uttered were produced by the power of Satan, and of such effects produced by angelic beings good and evil there are numerous instances in the Bible.
The Nature of the Temptation.
The first address of the tempter to Eve was designed to awaken distrust in the goodness of God, and doubt as to the truth of the prohibition. “Hath God indeed said, ye shall net eat of every tree of the garden?” or, rather, as the words probably mean, “Has God said, ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?” The next address was a direct assault upon her faith. “Ye shall not surely die;” but on the contrary, become as God himself in knowledge. To this temptation she yielded, and Adam joined in the transgression. From this account it appears that doubt, unbelief, and pride were the principles which led to this fatal act of disobedience. Eve doubted God's goodness; she disbelieved his threatening; she aspired after forbidden knowledge.
The Effects of the First Sin.
The effects of sin upon our first parents themselves, were, (1.) Shame, a sense of degradation and pollution. (2.) Dread of the displeasure of God; or, a sense of guilt, and the consequent desire to hide from his presence. These effects were unavoidable. They prove the loss not only of innocence but of original righteousness, and with it of the favour and fellowship of God. The state therefore to which Adam was reduced by his disobedience, so far as his subjective condition is concerned, was analogous to that of the fallen angels. He was entirely and absolutely ruined. It is said that no man becomes thoroughly depraved by one transgression. In one sense this is true. But one transgression by incurring the wrath and curse of God and the loss of fellowship with Him, as effectually involves spiritual death, as one perforation of the heart causes the death of the body; or one puncture of the eyes involves us in perpetual darkness. The other forms of evil consequent on Adam's disobedience were merely subordinate. They were but the expressions of the divine displeasure and the consequences of that spiritual death in which the threatened penalty essentially consisted.
§ 1. The Nature of the Question to be Considered.
Our first parents, we are told, fell from the estate wherein they were created
by sinning against God. This presents the question, which is one of the most
difficult and comprehensive whether in morals or in theology, What is sin? The
existence of sin is an undeniable fact. No man can examine his own nature, or
observe the conduct of his fellow men, without having the conviction forced upon
him that there is such an evil as sin. This is not a purely moral or theological
question. It falls also within the province of philosophy, which assumes to
explain all the phenomena of human nature as well as of the external world.
Philosophers, therefore, of every age and of every school, have been compelled
to discuss this subject. The philosophical theories, as to the nature of sin,
are as numerous as the different schools of philosophy. This great question
comes under the consideration of the Christian theologian with certain
limitations. He assumes the existence of a personal God of infinite perfection,
and he assumes the responsibility of man. No theory of the nature or origin of
sin which conflicts with either of these fundamental principles, can for him be
true. Before entering upon the statement of any of the theories which have been
more or less extensively adopted, it is important to ascertain the data on which
the answer to the question, What is sin? is to be determined; or the premises
from which that answer is to be deduced. These are simply the declarations of
the word of God and the facts of our own moral nature. Ignoring either wholly or
in part these two sources of knowledge, many philosophers and even theologians,
have recourse to the reason, or rather to the speculative understanding, for the
decision of the question. This method, however, is unreasonable, and is sure to
lead to false conclusions. In determining the nature of sensation we cannot
adopt the à priori method, and argue from the nature of a thing how it
ought to
affect our organs of sense. We must assume the facts of sense consciousness as
the phenomena to be explained. We cannot
With regard to the nature of sin, it is to be remarked that there are two
aspects in which the subject may be viewed. The first concerns its metaphysical,
and the second, its moral nature. What is that which we call sin? Is it a
substance, a principle, or an act? Is it privation, negation, or defect? Is it
antagonism between mind and matter, between soul and body? Is it selfishness as
a feeling, or as a purpose? All these are questions which concern the
metaphysical nature of sin, what it is as a res in natura. Whereas such
questions as the following concern rather its moral nature, namely, What gives
sin its character as moral evil? How does it stand related to law? What law is
it to which sin is related? What is its relation to the justice of God? What
is its relation to his holiness? What has, or can have the relation of sin to
law; is it acts of deliberation only, or also impulsive acts and affections,
emotions and principles, or dispositions?
§ 2. Philosophical Theories of the Nature of Sin.
The first theory in the order of time, apart from the primitive doctrine of the
Bible, as to the origin and nature of sin, is the dualistic, or that which
assumes the existence of an eternal principle of evil. This doctrine was widely
disseminated throughout the East, and in different forms was partially
introduced into the Christian church. According to the doctrine of the Parsis
this original principle was a personal being; according to the Gnostics,
Marcionites, and Manicheans, it was a substance, an eternal ὕλη or matter.
Augustine says, “Iste [Manes] duo principia inter se diversa atque adversa,
eademque æterna et coæterna, hoc est semper fuisse, composuit: duasque
naturas atque substantias, boni scilicet et mali, sequens alios antiquos
hæreticos, opinatus est.”
This theory obviously is: (1.) Inconsistent with Theism, in making something
out of God eternal and independent of his will. He ceases to be an infinite
Being and an absolute sovereign. He is everywhere limited by a coeternal power
which He cannot control. (2.) It destroys the nature of sin as a moral evil, in
making it a substance, and in representing it as inseparable from the nature of
man as a creature composed of matter and spirit. (3.) It destroys, of course,
human responsibility, not only by making moral evil necessary from the very
constitution of man, and by referring its origin to a source, eternal and
necessarily operative; but by
Sin regarded as a mere Limitation of Being.
The second anti-Christian theory of the nature of sin is that which makes it a
mere negation, or limitation of being. Being, substance, is good. “Omne quod
est, in quantum aliqua substantia est, et bonum [est],”
This theory, it is clear, (1.) ignores the difference between the malum
metaphysicum and the malum morale, between the physical and the moral between a
stunted tree and a wicked man. Instead of explaining sin, it denies its
existence. It is therefore in conflict with the clearest of intuitive truths and
the strongest of our instinctive convictions. There is nothing of which we are
more sure, not even our own existence, than we are of the difference between sin
and limitation of being, between what is morally wrong and what is a mere
negation of power. (2.) This theory assumes the truth of the pantheistic system
of the universe, and therefore is at variance with our religious nature, which
demands and assumes the existence of a personal God. (3.) In destroying the idea
of sin, it destroys all sense of moral obligation, and gives unrestrained
liberty to all evil passions. It not only teaches that all that is, is right;
that everything that exists or happens has a right to be, but that the only
standard of virtue is power. The strongest is the best. As Cousin says, the
victor is always right; the victim is always wrong. The conqueror is always
more moral than the vanquished. Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice, he
says, are in necessary harmony. Feebleness is a vice (i.e., sin), and therefore
is always punished and beaten.
Leibnitz's Theory of Privation.
Nearly allied in terms, but very different in spirit and purpose from this
doctrine of Spinoza and his successors, is the theory of Leibnitz, who also
resolves sin into privation, and refers it to the necessary limitation of being.
Leibnitz, however, was a theist, and his object in his “Théodicée” was to
vindicate God by proving that
The objections to this theory which makes sin mere privation,
Sin necessary Antagonism.
Still another theory obviously inconsistent with the facts of consciousness and the teachings of the Bible, is that which accounts for sin on the law of necessary opposition, or antagonism. All life, it is said, implies action and reaction. Even in the material universe the same law prevails. The heavenly bodies are kept in their orbits by the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces There is polarity in light, and in magnetism and electricity. All chemical changes are produced by attraction and repulsion. Thus in the animal world there is no strength without obstacles to be overcome; no rest without fatigue; no life without death. So also the mind is developed by continual struggles, by constant conflict with what is within and without. The same law, it is urged, must prevail in the moral world. There can be no good without evil. Good is the resistance or the overcoming of evil. What the material universe would be, had matter but one property; if everything were oxygen or everything carbon; what life would be without action and reaction; what the mind would he without the struggle with error and search after truth; such, it is said, the moral world would be without sin; a stagnant, lifeless pool. So far as creatures are concerned, it is maintained, that it is a law of their constitution, that they should be developed by antagonism, by the action of contrary forces, or opposing principles; so that a moral world without sin is an impossibility. Sin is the necessary condition of the existence of virtue.
This general theory is of early origin and wide dissemination In its latest
form, as presented by Blasche and Rosenkranz, the universe
Schleiermacher's Theory of Sin.
Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin is so related to his whole philosophical and theological system that one cannot be understood without some knowledge of the other. His philosophy is pantheistic. His theology is simply the interpretation of human consciousness in accordance with the fundamental principles of his philosophy. It is called Christian theology because it is the interpretation of the religious consciousness of Christians; i.e., of those who know and believe the facts recorded concerning Christ. The leading principles of his system are the following:
1. God is the absolute Infinity (die einfache and absolute Unendlichkeit), not a person, but simple being with the single attribute of omnipotence. Other attributes which we ascribe to the Infinite Being express not what is in Him (or rather in It), but the effects produced in us. Wisdom, goodness, holiness in God, mean simply the causality in Him which produces those attributes in us.
Absolute power means all power. God, or the absolutely powerful being, is the only cause. Everything that is and everything that occurs are due to his efficiency.
3. This infinite power produces the world. Whatever the relation between the two, whether it is the substance of which the world is the phenomenon, or whether the world is the substance of which God is the life, the world in some sense is. There is a finite as well as an infinite.
4. Man, as an integral part of the world, consists of two elements, or stands related both to the finite and infinite, God and nature. There is in man self-consciousness, or a consciousness which is affected by the world. He is in the world and of the world, and is acted upon by the world. On the other hand, he has what Schleiermacher calls Gottesbewusstseyn, or God-consciousness. This is not merely a consciousness of God, but is God in us in the form of consciousness.
5. The normal, or ideal, state of man consists in the absolute and uninterrupted control of the God-consciousness, or of God in us. These two principles he sometimes distinguishes as flesh and spirit. But by flesh he does not mean the body; nor what St. Paul commonly means by it, our corrupt fallen nature; but our whole nature so far as it stands related to the world. It is tantamount, in the terminology of Schleiermacher, to self-consciousness. And by spirit he does not mean the reason, nor what the Bible means by the spirit in man, i.e., the Holy Ghost, but the (Gottesbewusstseyn) God-consciousness, or God in us.
6. Religion consists in the feeling of absolute dependence. That is, in the recognition of the fact that God, or the absolute Being, is the only cause, and that we are merely the form in which his causality is revealed or exercised.
7. The original state of man was not a normal or ideal state. That is, the God-consciousness or divine principle was not strong enough absolutely to control the self-consciousness. That was a state to be reached by progress or development.
8. The feeling which arises from the want of this absolute control of the higher principle is the sense of sin; and the conviction that the higher principle ought to rule is the sense of guilt. With this feeling of sin and guilt arises the sense of the need of redemption.
9. This redemption consists in giving to the God-consciousness complete control; and is effected through Christ, who is the normal or ideal man. That is, He is the man in whom the God-consciousness, the divine nature, God (these, in this system, are interchangeable terms), was from the beginning completely dominant. We become like Him, i.e., are redeemed, partly by the recognition of his true character as sinless, and partly by communion with Him through his Church.
It is plain that this system precludes the possibility of sin in the true Scriptural sense of the term, —
1. Because it precludes the idea of a personal God. If sin be
want of conformity to law, there must be a lawgiver, one who
2. Because the system denies all efficiency, and of course all liberty to the creature. If the Infinite Being is the only agent, then all that is, is due to his direct efficiency; and sin, therefore, is either his work or it is a mere negation.
3. Because what, according to this theory, is called sin is absolutely universal and absolutely necessary. It is the unavoidable consequence or condition of the existence of such a being as man. That is, of a being with a self-consciousness and a God-consciousness, in such proportions and relation that the dominance of the latter can be attained only gradually.
4. Because what are called sin and guilt are only such in our consciousness, or
in our subjective apprehension of them. Certain things produce in us the sense
of pain, others the feeling of pleasure; some the feeling of approbation,
others of disapprobation; and that by the ordinance, so to speak, of God. But
pain and pleasure, right and wrong, are merely subjective states. They have no
objective reality. We are sinful and guilty only in our own feelings, not in the
sight or judgment of God.
The Sensuous Theory.
A sixth theory places the source and seat of sin in the sensuous nature of man.
We are composed of body and spirit. Whatever may be the relation of the two,
they cannot fail to be recognized as in some sense distinct elements of our
nature. All attempts to identify them not only lead to the contradiction of
self-evident truths, but to the degradation of the spiritual. If the mind be the
product of the body, or the highest function of matter, or if the body be the
product of the mind, or the external form in which mind exists, in either way
the mind is materialized. “It is,” says Müller,
It is obvious, however, that this theory in any of its forms fails to bring out the real nature of sin, or satisfactorily to account for its origin.
1. Sin is not essentially the state or act of a sensuous nature. The creatures presented in Scripture as the most sinful are the fallen spirits, who have no bodies and no sensual appetites.
2. In the second place, the sins which are the most offensive in man, and which most degrade him, and most burden his conscience, have nothing to do with the body. Pride, malice, envy, ambition, and, above all, unbelief and enmity to God, are spiritual sins. They may not only exist in beings who have no material organization, but in the soul when separated from the body, and when its sensuous nature is extinct.
3. This theory tends to lower our sense of sin and guilt. All moral evil becomes mere weakness, the yielding of the feebler powers of the spirit to the stronger forces of the flesh. If sin invariably, and by a law which controls men in their present state of existence, arises from the very constitution of their nature as sentient beings, then the responsibility for sin must be greatly lessened, if not entirely destroyed.
4. If the body be the seat and source of sin, then whatever tends to weaken the
body or to reduce the force of its desires must render men more pure and
virtuous. If this be so then monkery and asceticism have a foundation in truth.
They are wisely adapted to the elevation of the soul above the influence of the
flesh and of the world, and of all forms of evil. All experience, however,
proves the reverse. Even when those who thus seclude themselves from the world,
and macerate the body, are sincere, and faithfully
5. On the assumption involved in this theory, the old should be good. In them the lusts of the flesh become extinct. They lose the power to enjoy what pleases the eyes or pampers the tastes of the young. The world to them has lost its attractions. The body becomes a burden. It is in the state to which the youthful ascetic endeavours to reduce his corporeal frame by abstinence and austerity; and yet the older the man, unless renewed by the grace of God, the worse the sinner. The soul is more dead, more insensible to all that is elevating and spiritual, and more completely alienated from God; less grateful for his mercies, less afraid of his wrath, and less affected by all the manifestations of his glory and love. It is not the body, therefore, that is the cause of sin.
6. This theory is opposed to the doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures do indeed
refer a large class of sins to the sensual nature of man; and they represent
the flesh (or σάρξ) as the seat of sin and the source of all its manifestations
in our present state. They moreover, use the word σαρκικός, carnal, as
synonymous with corrupt or sinful. All this, however, does not prove that they
teach that man's animal or sensuous nature is the seat and source of his
sinfulness. All depends on the sense in which the sacred writers use the words
σάρξ and σαρκικός as antithetical to
πνεῦμα and πνευματικός. According to
one interpretation, σάρξ means the body with its animal life, its instincts and
appetites. Or as Bretschneider defines it:
The Theory that all Sin consists in Selfishness.
There is another doctrine of the nature of sin which belongs to the
philosophical, rather than to the theological theories on the subject. It makes
all sin to consist in selfishness. Selfishness is not to be confounded with
self-love. The latter is a natural and original principle of our nature and of
the nature of all sentient creatures, whether rational or irrational. Belonging
to their original constitution, and necessary to their preservation and
well-being, it cannot be sinful. It is simply the desire of happiness which is
inseparable from the nature of a sentient being. Selfishness, therefore, is net
mere self-love, but the undue preference of our own happiness to the happiness
or welfare of other. According to
This theory is founded on the following principles, or is an essential element in the following system of doctrine: (1.) Happiness is the greatest good. Whatever tends to promote the greatest amount of happiness is for that reason good, and whatever has the opposite tendency is evil. (2.) As happiness is the only and ultimate good, benevolence, or the disposition or purpose to promote happiness, must be the essence and sum of virtue. (3.) As God is infinite, He must be infinitely benevolent, and therefore it must be his desire and purpose to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness. (4.) The universe being the work of God must be designed and adapted to secure that end, and is therefore the best possible world or system of things. (5.) As sin exists in the actual world, it must be the necessary means of the greatest good, and therefore it is consistent, as some say, with the holiness of God to permit and ordain its existence; or, as others say, to create it. (6.) There is no more sin in the world than is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the universe.
The first and most obvious objection to this whole theory has
already been presented, namely, that it destroys the very idea of moral good. It
confounds the right with the expedient. It thus contradicts the consciousness
and intuitive judgments of the mind. It is intuitively true that the right is
right in its own nature, independently of its tendency to promote happiness. To
make holiness only a means to an end; to exalt enjoyment above moral excellence,
is not only a perversion and a degradation of the higher to the lower, but it is
the utter destruction of the principle. This is a matter which, properly
speaking, does not admit of proof. Axioms cannot be proved. They can only be
affirmed. Should a man deny that sweet and bitter differ, it would be impossible
to prove that there is a difference between them. We can only appeal to our own
consciousness and affirm that we perceive the difference. And we can appeal to
the testimony of all other men, who also affirm the same thing. But after all
this is only an assertion of a fact first by the individual, and then by the
mass of mankind. In like manner if any man says that there is no difference
between the good and the expedient, that a thing is good simply because it is
The doctrine which makes all sin to consist in selfishness, as it has been
generally held, especially in this country, considers selfishness as the
opposite of benevolence agreeably to the theory which has just been considered.
There are others, however, that mean by it the opposite to the love of God. As
God is the proper centre of the soul and the sum of all perfection, apostasy
from Him is the essence of sin; apostasy from God involves, it is said, a
falling back into ourselves, and making self the centre of our being. Thus
Müller,
§ 3. The Doctrine of the Early Church.
The theories already considered are called philosophical, either because they
concern the metaphysical nature of sin, or because
§ 4. Pelagian Theory.
In the early part of the fifth century, Pelagius, Cœlestius, and Julian,
introduced a new theory as to the nature of sin and the state of man since the
fall, and of our relation to Adam. That their doctrine was an innovation is
proved by the fact that it was universally rejected and condemned as soon as it
was fully understood. They were all men of culture, ability, and exemplary
character. Pelagius was a Briton, whether a native of Brittany or of what is now
called Great Britain, is a matter of doubt. He was by profession a monk,
although a layman. Cœlestius was a teacher and jurist; Julian an Italian
bishop. The radical principle of the Pelagian theory is, that ability limits
obligation. “If I ought, I can,” is the aphorism on which the whole system
rests. Augustine's celebrated prayer, “Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis,” was
pronounced by Pelagius an absurdity, because it assumed that God can demand more
than man render, and what man must receive as a gift. In opposition to this
assumption he laid down the principle that man must have plenary ability to do
and to be whatever can be righteously required of him. “Iterum quærendum est,
peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est? Si necessitatis est, peccatum non est;
si voluntatis, vitari potest. Iterum quærendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine
peccato esse? Procul dubio debet. Si debet potest; si non potest, ergo non
debet. Et si non debet homo esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum peccato esse, et
jam peccatum non erit, si illud deberi constiterit.”
The intimate conviction that men can be responsible for nothing which is not
in their power, led, in the first place, to the Pelagian doctrine of the freedom
of the will. It was not enough to constitute free agency that the agent should
be self-determined, or that all his volitions should be determined by his own
inward states. It was required that he should have power over those states.
Liberty of the will, according to the Pelagians, is plenary power, at all times
and at every moment, of choosing between good and evil, and of being either holy
or unholy. Whatever does not thus fall within the imperative power of the will
can have no moral character. “Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel
vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim
utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio
procreamur: atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod
Deus condidit.”
2. Sin, therefore, consists only in the deliberate choice of evil. It presupposes knowledge of what is evil, as well as the full power of choosing or rejecting it. Of course it follows, —
3. That there can be no such thing as original sin, or inherent hereditary
corruption. Men are born, as stated in the foregoing quotation, ut sine virtute,
ita sine vitio. In other words men are born into the world since the fall in the
same state in which Adam was created. Julian says:
4. Consequently Adam's sin injured only himself. This was one of the formal
charges presented against the Pelagians in the Synod of Diospolis. Pelagius
endeavored to answer it, by saying that the sin of Adam exerted the influence
of a bad example, and in that
5. As men come into the world without the contamination of original sin, and as they have plenary power to do all that God requires, they may, and in many cases do, live without sin; or if at any time they transgress, they may turn unto God and perfectly obey all his commandments. Hence Pelagius taught that some men had no need for themselves to repeat the petition in the Lord's prayer, “Forgive us our trespasses.” Before the Synod of Carthage one of the grounds on which he was charged with heresy was, that he taught, “et ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines impeccabiles, id est, sine peccato.”
6. Another consequence of his principles which Pelagius unavoidably drew was that men could be saved without the gospel. As free will in the sense of plenary ability, belongs essentially to man as much as reason, men whether Heathen, Jews, or Christians, may fully obey the law of God and attain eternal life. The only difference is that under the light of the Gospel, this perfect obedience is rendered more easy. One of his doctrines, therefore, was that “lex sic mittit ad regnum cœlorum, quomodo et evangelium.”
7. The Pelagian system denies the necessity of grace in the sense of the
supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. As the Scriptures, however, speak so
fully and constantly of the grace of God as manifested and exercised in the
salvation of men, Pelagius could not avoid acknowledging that fact. By grace,
however, he understood everything which we derive from the goodness of God. Our
natural faculties of reason and free will, the revelation of the truth whether
in his works or his word, all the providential blessings and advantages which
men enjoy, fall under the Pelagian idea of grace. Augustine says, Pelagius
represented grace to be the natural endowments of men, which inasmuch as they
are the gift of God are grace. “Ille (Pelagius) Dei gratiam non appellat nisi
naturam, qua libero arbitrio conditi sumus.”
8. As infants are destitute of moral character, baptism in their case cannot
either symbolize or effect the remission of sin. It is, according to Pelagius,
only a sign of their consecration to God. He believed that none but the baptized
were at death admitted into the kingdom of heaven, in the Christian sense of
that term, but held that unbaptized infants were nevertheless partakers of
eternal life. By that term was meant what was afterwards called by the
schoolmen, limbos infantum. This was described as that
μέσος τόπος κολάσεως καὶ παραδείσου,
εἰς ὃν καὶ τὰ ἀβάπτιστα βρέφη μετατ
θέμενα ζῇν μακαρίως.
Arguments against the Pelagian Doctrine.
The objections to the Pelagian views of the nature of sin will of necessity come under consideration, when the Scriptural and Protestant doctrine comes to be presented. It is sufficient for the present to state, —
1. That the fundamental principle on which the whole system is founded
contradicts the common consciousness of men. It is not true, as our own
conscience teaches us, that our obligation is limited by our ability. Every man
knows that he is bound to be better than he is, and better than he can make
himself by any exertion of his We are bound to love God perfectly, but we know
that such perfect love is beyond our power. We recognize the obligation to be
free from all sin, and absolutely conformed to the
2. It is no less revolting to the moral nature of man to assert, as Pelagianism teaches, that nothing is sinful but the deliberate transgression of known law; that there is no moral character in feelings and emotions; that love and hatred, malice and benevolence, considered as affections of the mind, are alike indifferent; that the command to love God is an absurdity, because love is not under the control of the will. All our moral judgments must be perverted before we can assent to a system involving such consequences.
3. In the third place, the Pelagian doctrine, which confounds freedom with ability, or which makes the liberty of a free agent to consist in the power to determine his character by a volition, is contrary to every man's consciousness. We feel, and cannot but acknowledge, that we are free when we are self determined; while at the same time we are conscious that the controlling states of the mind are not under the power of the will, or, in other words, are not under our own power. A theory which is founded on identifying things which are essentially different, as liberty and ability, must be false.
4. The Pelagian system leaves the universal sinfulness of men, a fact which cannot be denied, altogether unaccounted for. To refer it to the mere free agency of man is to say that a thing always is simply because it may be.
5. This system fails to satisfy the deepest and most universal necessities of our
nature. In making man independent of God by
6. It makes redemption (in the sense of a deliverance from sin) unnecessary or impossible. It is unnecessary that there should be a redeemer for a race which has not fallen, and which has full ability to avoid all sin or to recover itself from its power. And it is impossible, if free agents are independent of the control of God.
7. It need hardly be said that a system which asserts, that Adam's sin injured only himself; that men are born into the world in the state in which Adam was created; that men may, and often do, live without sin; that we have no need of divine assistance in order to be holy; and that Christianity has no essential superiority over heathenism or natural religion, is altogether at variance with the word of God. The opposition indeed between Pelagianism and the gospel is so open and so radical that the former has never been regarded as a form of Christianity at all. It has, in other words, never been the faith of any organized Christian church. It is little more than a form of Rationalism.
§ 5. Augustinian Doctrine.
The Philosophical Element of Augustine's Doctrine.
There are two elements in Augustine's doctrine of sin: the one metaphysical or
philosophical, the other moral or religious. The one a speculation of the
understanding, the other derived from his religious experience and the teaching
of the Holy Spirit. The one has passed away, leaving little more trace on the
history of doctrine than other speculations, whether Aristotelian or Platonic.
The other remains, and has given form to Christian doctrine from that day to
this. This is not to be wondered at. Nothing is more uncertain and
unsatisfactory than the speculations of the understanding or philosophical
theories. Whereas nothing is more certain and universal than the moral
consciousness of men and the truths which it reveals. And as the Scriptures,
being the work of God, do and must conform their teachings to what God teaches
in the constitution of our nature, doctrines founded on the twofold teaching of
the Spirit, in his word and in the hearts of his people, remain unchanged from
generation to generation, while the speculations of philosophy or of
philosophical theologians pass away as the leaves
The metaphysical element in Augustine's doctrine of sin arose from his
controversy with the Manicheans. Manes taught that in was a substance. This
Augustine denied. With him it was a maxim that “Omne esse bonum est.” But if
esse (being) is good, and if evil is the opposite of good, then evil must be the
opposite of being, or nothing, i.e., the negation or privation of being. Thus
he was led to adopt the language of the new Platonists and of Origen, who, by a
different process, were brought to define evil as the negation of being, as
Plotinus calls it, στέρησις τοῦ ὄντος;
and Origen says, πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν,
and evil itself he says is ἐστερῆσθαι τοῦ ὄντος. In thus making being
good and the negation of being evil, Augustine seems to have made the same
mistake which other philosophers have so often made, — of confounding physical
and moral good. When God at the beginning declared all things, material and
immaterial, which He had made, to be very good, He simply declared them to be
suited to the ends for which they were severally made. He did not intend to
teach us that moral goodness could be predicated of matter or of an irrational
animal. In other cases the word good means agreeable, or adapted to give
pleasure. In others again, it means morally right. To infer from time fact that
everything which God made is good, or that every esse is bonum, that therefore
moral evil being the negation of good must be the negation of being, is as
illogical as to argue that because honey is good (in the sense of being
agreeable to the taste) therefore worm-wood is bad, in the sense of being
sinful. Although Augustine held the language of those philosophers who, both
before and since, destroy the very nature of sin in making it mere limitation of
being, yet he was very far from holding the same system. (1.) They made sin
necessary, as arising from the very nature of a creature. He made it voluntary.
(2.) They made it purely physical. He made it moral. With him it includes
pollution and guilt. With them it included neither. (3.) With Augustine this
negation was not merely passive, it was not the simple want of being, it was
such privation as tended to destruction. (4.) Evil with Augustine, therefore, as
was more fully and clearly taught by his followers, was not mere privation, nor
simply defect. That a stone cannot see, involves the negation of the power of
vision. But it is not
Augustine's Reasons for making Sin a Negation.
In thus making sin negation, Augustine had principally two ends in view. (1.) To
show that sin is not necessary. If it were something existing of itself, or
something created by the power of God, it was beyond the power of man. He was
its victim, not its author. (2.) He desired to show that it was not due to the
divine efficiency. According to his theory of God's relation to the world, not
only all that is, every substance, is created and upheld by l rod, but all
activity or power, all energy by which positive effects are produced, is the
energy of God. If sin, therefore, was anything in itself, anything more than a
defect, or a want of conformity to a rule, God must be its author. He,
therefore, took such a view of the psychological nature of sin, that it did not
require an efficient, but as he often said only a deficient cause. If a man, to
use the old Augustinian illustration, strike the cords of an untuned harp, he is
the cause of the sound but not of the discord. So God is the cause of the
sinner's activity but not of the discordance between his acts and the laws of
eternal truth and right.
The Moral Element of His Doctrine.
The true Augustinian doctrine of sin was that which the illustrious father drew
from his own religious experience, as guided and determined by the Spirit of
God. He was, (1.) Conscious of sin. He recognized himself as guilty and
polluted, as amenable to the justice of God and offensive to his holiness. (2.)
He felt himself to be thus guilty and polluted not only because of deliberate
acts of transgression, but also for his affections, feelings, and emotions. This
sense of sin attached not only to these positive and consciously active states
of mind, but also to the mere absence of right affections, to hardness of heart,
to the want of love, humility, faith, and other Christian virtues, or to their
feebleness and inconstancy. (3.) He
Taught by his own experience that he was from his birth guilty and polluted, and
that he had no power to change his own nature, and seeing that all men are
involved in the same sinfulness and helplessness, he accepted the Scriptural
solution of these facts of consciousness and observation, and therefore held,
(1.) That God created man originally in his own image and likeness in knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness, immortal, and invested with dominion over the
creatures. He held also that Adam was endowed with perfect liberty of the will,
not only with spontaneity and the power of self-determination, but with the
power of choosing good or evil, and thus of determining his own character. (2.)
That being left to the freedom of his own will, Adam, under the temptation of
the Devil, voluntarily sinned against God, and thus fell from the estate in
which he was created. (3.) That the consequences of this sin upon Adam were the
loss of the divine image, and the corruption of his whole nature, so that he
became spiritually dead, and thus indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all
spiritual good. Besides this spiritual death, he became mortal, liable to all
the miseries of this life, and to eternal death. (4.) Such was the union between
Adam and his descendants, that the same consequences of his transgression came
on them that fell upon him. They are born the children of wrath, i.e., in a
state of condemnation, destitute of the image of God, and morally depraved. (5.)
This inherent, hereditary depravity is truly and properly of the nature of sin,
involving both guilt and corruption. In its formal nature it consists in the
privation of original righteousness and (concupiscence) inordinatio naturæ,
disorder of the whole nature. It is of the nature of a habitus as distinguished
from an act, activity or agency. It is voluntary, in the sense mentioned above,
especially in that it did not arise from necessity of nature, or from the
efficiency of God, but from the free agency of Adam. (6.) That the loss of
original righteousness and the corruption of nature consequent on the fall of
Adam are penal inflictions, being the punishment of his first sin. (7.) That
regeneration, or effectual calling,
This is the Augustinian system in all that is essential. It is this which has
remained, and been the abiding form of doctrine among the great body of
evangelical Christians from that day to this. It is of course admitted that
Augustine held much connected with the several points above mentioned, which was
peculiar to the man or to the age in which he lived, but which does not belong
to Augustinianism as a system of doctrine. As Lutheranism does not include all
the individual opinions of Luther, and as Calvinism does not include all the
personal views of Calvin, so there is much taught by Augustine which does not
belong to Augustinianism. He taught that all sin is the negation of being; that
liberty is ability, so that in denying to fallen man ability to change his own
heart, he denies to him freedom of the will; that concupiscence (in the lower
sense of the word), as an instinctive feeling, is sinful; that a sinful nature
is propagated by the very law of generation; that baptism removes the guilt of
original sin; and that all unbaptized infants (as Romanists still teach and
almost all Protestants deny) are lost. These, and other similar points are not
integral parts of his system, and did not receive the sanction of the Church
when it pronounced in favour of his doctrine as opposed to that of the
Pelagians. In like manner it is a matter of minor importance how he understood
the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity; whether he held the
representative, or the realistic theory; or whether he ultimately sided for
Traducianism as against Creationism, or for the latter as against the former. On
these points his language is confused and undecided. It is enough that he held
that such was the union between Adam and his race, that the whole human family
stood their probation in him and fell with him in his first transgression, so
that all the evils which are the consequences of that transgression, including
physical and spiritual death, are the punishment of that sin. On this point he
is perfectly explicit. When it was objected by Julian that sin cannot be the
punishment of sin, he replied that we must distinguish three things, that we
must know, “aliud esse peccatum, aliud pœnam, peccati, aliud utrumque, id est,
ita peccatum, ut ipsum sit etiam pœna peccati, . . . . pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum
est, ut ipsum sit et pœna peccati.”
§ 6. Doctrine of the Church of Rome.
This is a point very difficult to decide. Romanists themselves are as much at variance as to what their Church teaches concerning original sin as those who do not belong to their communion. The sources of this difficulty are, (1.) First, the great diversity of opinions on this subject prevailing in the Latin Church before the authoritative decisions of the Council of Trent and of the Romish Catechism. (2.) The ambiguity and want of precision or fulness in the decisions of that council. (3.) The different interpretations given by prominent theologians of the true meaning of the Tridentine canons.
Diversity of Sentiment in the Latin Church.
As to the first of these points it may be remarked that there were mainly three
conflicting elements in the Latin Church before the Reformation, in relation to
the whole subject of sin. (1.) The doctrine of Augustine. (2.) That of the
Semi-Pelagians, and (3.) That of those of the schoolmen who endeavoured to find
a middle ground between the other two systems. The doctrine of Augustine, as
exhibited above, was sanctioned by the Latin Church, and pronounced to be the
true orthodox faith. But even during the lifetime of Augustine, and to a greater
extent in the following century, serious departures from his system began to
prevail. These departures related to all the intimately connected doctrines of
sin, grace, and predestination. Pelagianism was universally disclaimed and
condemned. It was
The Semi-Pelagians.
The principal leaders of this party were John Cassianus, an Eastern monk and
disciple of Chrysostom; Vincentius Lerinensis, and Faustus of Rhegium. The most
important work of Cassian was entitled “Collationes Patrum,” which is a
collection of dialogues on various subjects. He was a devout rather than a
speculative writer, relying on the authority of Scripture for the
The ablest and most influential of the leaders of the Semi-Pelagian party was
Faustus of Rhegium, who secured the condemnation of Lucidus, an extreme advocate
of the Augustinian doctrine, in the Synod of Arles, 475, A.D.; and who was
called upon by the council to write the work “De gratia Dei et humanæ mentis
libero arbitrio,” which attained great celebrity and authority. The
Semi-Pelagians, however, were far from agreeing among themselves either as to
sin or as to grace. Cassian taught that the effects of Adam's sin on his
posterity were, (1.) That they became mortal, and subject to the physical
infirmities of this life. (2.) That the knowledge of nature and of the divine
law which Adam originally possessed, was in a great measure preserved until the
sons of Seth intermarried with the daughters of Cain, when the race became
greatly deteriorated. (3.) That the moral effects of the fall were to weaken the
soul in all its power for good, so that men constantly need the assistance of
divine grace. (4.) What that grace was, whether the supernatural influence of
the Spirit, the providential efficiency of God, or his various gifts of
faculties and of knowledge, he nowhere distinctly
The decisions of the councils of Orange and Valence in favour of Augustinianism, did not arrest the controversy. The Semi-Pelagian party still continued numerous and active, and so far gained the ascendency, that in the ninth century Gottschalk was condemned for teaching the doctrine of predestination in the sense of Augustine. From this period to the time of the Reformation and the decisions of the Council of Trent, great diversity of opinion prevailed in the Latin Church on all the questions relating to sin, grace, and predestination. It having come to be generally admitted that original righteousness was a supernatural gift, it was also generally held that the effect of Adam's sin upon himself and upon his posterity was the loss of that righteousness. This was its only subjective effect. The soul, therefore, is left in the state in which it was originally created, and in which it existed, some said a longer, others a shorter, period, or no perceptible period at all, before the receipt of the supernatural endowment. It is in this state that met are born into the world since the apostasy of Adam.
The Doctrine of Anselm.
This loss of original righteousness was universally regarded as a penal evil. It was the punishment of the first sin of Adam which came equally upon him and upon all his descendants. The question now is, What is the moral state of a soul destitute of original righteousness considered as a supernatural gift? It was the different views taken as to the answer to that question, which gave rise to the conflicting views of the nature and consequences of original sin.
1. Some said that this negative state was itself sinful. Admitting that original
sin is simply the loss of original righteousness, it was nevertheless truly and
properly sin. This was the ground taken by Anselm, the father of the scholastic
philosophy and theology. In his work, “De Conceptu Virginali et Originali
Peccato,” he says of children,
Doctrine of Abelard.
2. The ground taken by others of the schoolmen was that the loss of original
righteousness left Adam precisely in the state in which he was created, and
therefore in puris naturalibus (i.e., in the simple essential attributes of his
nature). And as his descendants share his fate, they are born in the same
state. There is no inherent hereditary corruption, no moral character either
goon or bad. The want of a supernatural gift not belonging to the nature of man,
and which must be bestowed as a favour, cannot be accounted
Doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.
3. The third form of doctrine which prevailed during this period
was that
proposed by Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1224-74) a Dominican monk, the Doctor Angelicus of the schoolmen, and by far the most influential theologian in the
Latin Church since the days of Augustine. His “Summa Theologiæ” was long
regarded as a standard work among Romanists, and is still referred to as an
authority both by Romanists and Protestants. Thomas approached much nearer to
Augustine than the other theologians of his age. He taught (1.) That original
righteousness was to Adam a supernatural gift. (2.) That by his transgression
he forfeited that gift for himself and his posterity. (3.) That original
righteousness consisted essentially in the fixed bias of the will towards God,
or the subjection of the will to God. (4.) That the inevitable consequence or
adjunct of the loss of this original righteousness, this conversion of the will
towards God, is the aversion of the will from God. (5.) That original sin,
therefore, consists in two things, first, the loss of original righteousness and
second, the disorder of the whole nature. The one he called the formale the
other the materiale of original sin. To use his own illustration, a knife is
Doctrine of the Scotists.
4. Duns Scotus, a Franciscan, Professor of Theology at Oxford, Paris, and
Cologne, where he died A.D. 1308, was the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas. So
far as the subject of original sin is concerned, he sided with the
Semi-Pelagians. He made original sin to consist solely in the loss of original
righteousness, and as this was purely a. supernatural gift, not pertaining to
the nature of man, its loss left Adam and his posterity after him, precisely in
tile state in which man was originally created. Whatever of disorder is
consequent on this loss of righteousness is not of the nature of sin. “Peccatum
originale,” he says, “non potest esse aliud quam ista privatio [justitiæ originalis]. Non enim est concupiscentia: tum quia
illa est naturalis, tum quia
ipsa est in parte sensitiva, ubi non est peccatum.”
The Dominicans and Franciscans became, and long continued the two most powerful orders of monks in the Roman Church. As they were antagonistic on so many other points, they were also opposed in doctrine. The Dominicans, as the disciples of Thomas Aquinas, were called Thomists, and the Franciscans, as followers of Duns Scotus, were called Scotists. The opposition between these parties, among other doctrinal points, embraced as we have seen, that of original sin. The Thomists were inclined to moderate Augustinianism, the Scotists to Semi-Pelagianism. All the theories however above mentioned, variously modified, had their zealous advocates in the Latin Church, when the Council of Trent was assembled to determine authoritatively the true doctrine and to erect a barrier to the increasing power of the Reformation.
Tridentine Doctrine on Original Sin.
The Council of Trent had a very difficult task to perform. In the first place,
it was necessary to condemn the doctrines of the Reformers. But the
Protestants, as well Lutheran as Reformed, had proclaimed their adherence to the
Augustinian system in its purity and fulness; and that system had received the
sanction of councils and popes and could not be directly impugned. This
difficulty was surmounted by grossly misrepresenting the Protestant doctrine,
and making it appear inconsistent with the doctrine of Augustine. This method
has been persevered in to the present day. Moehler in his “Symbolik”
represents the doctrine of the Protestants, and especially that of Luther, on
original sin, as a form of Manicheism. The other, and more serious difficulty,
was the great diversity of opinion existing in the Church and in the Council it
self. Some were Augustinians; some held that original sin consisted
1. The Synod pronounces an anathema on those who do not confess that Adam, when he transgressed in paradise the commandment of God, did immediately lose the holiness and righteousness in which he had been constituted (constitutus fuerat, or positus erat); and that by that offence he incurred the wrath and indignation of God, and thus also death and subjection to him who has the power of death, that is, the devil; and that the whole Adam by the offence of his transgression was as to the body and the soul. changed for the worst.
The effects of Adam's first sin upon himself therefore was: (1.) The loss of original righteousness. (2.) Death and captivity to Satan. (3.) The deterioration of his whole nature both soul and body.
2. The Synod also anathematizes those who say that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not his posterity; or that he lost the holiness and righteousness which he received from God, for himself only and not also for us, or that he transmitted to the whole human race only death and corporeal pains (pœnas corporis), and not sin, which is the death of the soul.
It is here taught that the effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity are: (1.) The loss of original righteousness. (2.) Death and the miseries of this life; and (3.) Sin, or spiritual death (peccatum, quod est mors animæ). This is a distinct condemnation of Pelagianism, and the clear assertion of original sin, as something transmitted to all men. The nature of that however, is not further stated than that it is the death of the soul, which may be differently explained.
3. Those also are condemned who say that this sin of Adam, which is conveyed to
all (omnibus transfusum), and inheres in
It is here asserted: (1.) That original sin is conveyed by propagation and not, as the Pelagians say, by imitation. (2.) That it belongs to every man and inheres in him. (3.) That it cannot be removed by any other means than the blood of Christ.
4. The Synod condemns all who teach that new-born children should not be baptized; or, that although baptized for the remission of sins, they derive nothing of original sin from Adam, which needs to be expiated in the laver of regeneration in order to attain eternal life, so that baptism, in their case, would not be true but false. Children, therefore, who cannot have committed sin, in their own persons, are truly baptized for the remission of sins, that what they had contracted in generation, may be purged away in regeneration.
From this it appears that according to the Council of Trent there is sin in new-born infants which needs to be remitted and washed away by regeneration.
5. The fifth canon asserts that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, and everything is removed which has the true and proper nature of sin. It is admitted that concupiscence (vel fomes) remains in the baptized, against which believers are to contend, but it is declared that this concupiscence, although sometimes (as is admitted) called sin by the Apostle, is not truly and properly sin in the regenerated.
This is all that the Council teaches under the caption of original sin, except to say that they do not intend their decisions to apply to the Virgin Mary. Whether she was the subject of original sin, as the Dominicans, after Thomas Aquinas, maintained, or whether she was immaculately conceived, as zealously asserted by the Franciscans after Duns Scotus, the Synod leaves undecided.
In the sixth session when treating of justification (i.e., regeneration and
sanctification), the Council decides several points, which go to determine the
view its members took of the nature of original sin. In the canons adopted in
that session, it is among other things, declared: (1.) That men cannot without
divine grace through Jesus Christ, by their own works, i.e., works performed in
their own strength, be justified before God. (2.) That grace
From all this it appears that while the Council of Trent rejected the Pelagian doctrine of man's plenary ability since the fall, and the Semi-Pelagian doctrine that men can begin the work of reformation and conversion; it no less clearly condemns the Augustinian doctrine of the entire inability of man to do anything spiritually good, whereby he may prepare or dispose himself for conversion, or merit the regenerating grace of God.
The True Doctrine of the Church of Rome.
What was the true doctrine of the Church of Rome as to original sin, remained as much in doubt after the decisions of this Council as it had been before. Each party interpreted its canons according to their own views. The Synod declares that all men are born infected with original sin; but whether that sin consisted simply in the guilt of Adam's first sin; or in the want of original righteousness; or in concupiscence, is left undecided. And therefore all these views continued to be maintained by the theologians of the Romish Church. The older Protestants generally regarded the canons of the Council of Trent as designed to obscure the subject, and held that the real Doctrine of the Church involved the denial of any original sin in the sense of sin, subjective or inherent. In this view, many, if not the majority of modern theologians concur. Winer (in his “Comparative Darstellung,”) Guericke (in his “Symbolik”), Koellner (in his “Symbolik”), Baur (in his “Answer to Moehler”), and Dr. Shedd, in his “History of Christian Doctrine,” all represent the Church of Rome as teaching that original sin is merely negative, the want of original righteousness, and is denying that there is anything subjective in the state of human nature as men are born into the world, which has the proper nature of sin. The reasons which favour this view of the subject, are, —
1. The prevailing doctrine of the schoolmen and of the Romish
theologians as to the nature of sin. According to Protestants, “Quidquid a norma justitiæ in Deo dissidet,
et cum ea pugnat,
On the other hand, however, it may be urged, (1.) That the Council of Trent
expressly declares against the Pelagian doctrine, that Adam's sin injured only
himself, and asserts that our whole nature, soul, and body, was thereby changed
for the worse. (2.) They assert that we derived from Adam not merely a mortal
nature, but sin which is the death of the soul. (3.) That new-born infants need
baptism for the remission of sin, and that what is removed in the baptism of
infants, veram et propriam peccati rationem habet. (4.) The Roman Catechism
teaches
From all this it appears that although the doctrine of the Roman Church is neither logical nor self-consistent, it is nevertheless true that that Church does teach the doctrine of original sin, in the sense of a sinful corruption of nature, or of innate, hereditary sinfulness. It is also to be observed that all parties in the Roman Church, before and after the Council of Trent, however much they differed in other points, united in teaching the imputation of Adam’s sin; i.e., that for that sin the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men.
§ 7. Protestant Doctrine of Sin.
The Protestant Churches at the time of the Reformation did
not attempt to determine the nature of sin philosophically. They regarded it neither
as a necessary limitation; not as a negation of being; nor as the indispensable
condition of virtue; nor as having its seat in man’s sensuous nature; nor as consisting
in selfishness alone; nor as being, like pain, a mere state of consciousness, and
not an evil in the sight of God. Founding their doctrine on their moral and religious
consciousness and upon the Word of God, they declared sin to be the transgression
of, or want of conformity to the divine law. In this definition all classes of theologians,
Lutheran and Reformed, agree. According to Melancthon, “Peccatum recte definitur
ἀνομία, seu discrepantia a lege Dei, h. e., defectus
naturæ et actionum pugnans cum lege Dei, easdemque ex ordine justitiæ divinæ
ad pœnam obligans.” Gerhard says:
It is included in these definitions, (1.) That sin is a specific
evil, differing from all other forms of evil. (2.) That sin stands
Sin is a Specific Evil.
Sin is a specific evil. This we know from our own consciousness. None but a sentient being can know what feeling is. We can neither determine à priori what the nature of a sensation is, nor can we convey the idea to any one destitute of the organs of sense. Unless we had felt pain or pleasure, we should not be able to understand what those words mean. If born blind, we cannot know light. If born deaf, we can have no idea of what hearing is. None but a rational creature can know what is meant by folly. Only creatures with an æsthetic nature can have the perception of beauty or of deformity. In like manner only moral beings can know what sin or holiness is. Knowledge in all these cases is given immediately in the consciousness. It would be in vain to attempt to determine à priori, what pain, pleasure, sight, and hearing are; much less to prove that there are no such sensations; or that they do not differ from each other and from every other form of our experience. Every man in virtue of his being a moral creature, and because he is a sinner, has therefore in his own consciousness the knowledge of sin, he knows that when he is not what he ought to be, when he does what he ought not to do, or omits what he ought to do, he is chargeable with sin. He knows that sin is not simply limitation of his nature; not merely a subjective state of his own mind, having no character in the sight of God; that it is not only something which is unwise, or derogatory to his own dignity; or simply inexpedient because hurtful to his own interests, or injurious to the welfare of others. He knows that it has a specific character of its own, and that it includes both guilt and pollution.
Sin has Relation to Law.
A second truth included in our consciousness of sin is, that
it has relation to law. As moral and rational beings we are of necessity subject
to the law of right. This is included in the consciousness of obligation. The word
ought would otherwise have no meaning.
Sin is Related to the Law of God.
The great question is, What is that law which prescribes to
man what he ought to be and to do? (1.) Some say it is our own reason, or the higher
powers of the soul. Those powers have the prerogative to rule. Man is autonomic.
He is responsible to himself. He is bound to subject his life, and especially his
lower powers, to his reason and conscience. Regard to his own dignity is the comprehensive
obligation under which he lies, and he fulfills all his duties when he lives worthily
of himself. To this theory it is obvious to object, (a.) That law is something outside
of ourselves and over us; entirely independent of our will or reason. We can neither
make nor alter it. If our reason and conscience are perverted, and determine that
to be right which is in its nature wrong, it does not alter the case. The law remains
unchanged in its demands and in its authority. (b.) On this theory there could be
no sense of guilt. When a man acts against the dictates of his reason, or in a manner
derogatory to the dignity of his nature, he may feel ashamed, or degraded, but not
guilty. There can be no conviction that he is amenable to justice, nor any of that
fearful looking for of judgment, which the Apostle says is inseparable from the
commission of sin. (2.) Others say the law is to be found in the moral order of
the universe, or in the eternal fitness of things. These however are mere abstractions.
They can impose no obligation, and inflict no penalty on transgression. This theory
again leaves out of view, and entirely unaccounted for, some of the plainest facts
of the universal consciousness of men. (3.) Others
The Extent of the Law’s Demands.
The next question is, What does this law demand? This is the
point on which there has been most diversity of opinion, and systems of theology
as well as of morals are founded on the different answers which it has received.
The answer given by the unsophisticated and enlightened conscience of men, and by
the word of God, is that the law demands complete perfection, or the entire conformity
of the moral nature and conduct of a rational creature with the nature and will
of God. We are commanded to love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with
all the strength, and with all the mind, and our neighbour as ourselves. This implies
entire congeniality with God; the unreserved consecration of all our powers to his
service, and absolute submission to his will. Nothing more than this can be required
of any creature. No angel or glorified saint can be or do more than this, and this
is what the law demands of every rational creature, at all times, and in every state
of his being. In one sense this obligation is limited by the capacity (not the ability,
in the modern theological sense of that term) of the creature. The capacity of a
child is less than that of an adult Christian or of an angel. He can know less.
He can contain less. He is on a lower stage of being. But it is the absolute moral
perfection of the child, of the adult, or of the angel that the law demands. And
this perfection includes the entire absence of all sin, and the entire conformity
of nature to the image and will of God. As this is the doctrine of the Bible. so
also it is the teaching of conscience. Every man, at least every Christian, feels
that he sins or is sinful whenever and howsoever he comes short of full conformity
to the image of God. He feels that languor, coldness of affection, defect of zeal,
and the want of due humility, gratitude, meekness, forbearance, and benevolence
are in him of the nature of sin. The old maxim, omne minus bonum
1. That there can be no perfection in this life. Every form of perfectionism which has ever prevailed in the Church is founded either on the assumption that the law does not demand entire freedom from moral evil, or upon the denial that anything is of the nature of sin, but acts of the will. But if the law is so extensive in its demands as to pronounce all defect in any duty, all coming short in the purity, ardour, or constancy of holy affections, sinful, then there is an end to the presumption that any mere maim since the fall has ever attained perfection.
2. It follows also from this principle that there can never be any merit of good works attributable to men in this world. By merit, according to the Scriptural sense of that word, is meant the claim upon reward as a matter of justice, founded on the complete satisfaction of the demands of the law. But if those demands never have been perfectly fulfilled by any fallen man, no such man can either be justified for his works, or have, as the Apostle expresses it, any καύχημα, any claim founded on merit in the sight of God. He must always depend on mercy and expect eternal life as a free gift of God.
3. Still more obviously does it follow from the principle
in question that there can be no such thing as works of supererogation. If no man
in this life can perfectly keep the commandments of God, it is very plain that no
man can do more than the law demands. The Romanists regard the law as a series of
specific enactments. Besides these commands which bind all men there are certain
things which they call precepts, which are not thus universally binding, such as
celibacy, poverty, and monastic obedience, and the like. These go beyond the law.
By adding to the fulfilment of the commands of God, the observance of these precepts,
a man may do more than required of him, and thus acquire an amount of merit greater
than he needs for himself, and which in virtue of the communion
Sin not Confined to Acts of the Will.
4. Another conclusion drawn from the Scriptural doctrine as
to the extent of the divine law, as held by all Augustinians, is that sin is not
confined to acts of the will. There are three senses in which the word voluntary
is used in connection with this subject. The first and strictest sense makes nothing
an act of the will but an act of deliberate self-determination, something that is
performed, sciente et volente. Secondly, all spontaneous, impulsive exercises
of the feelings and affections are in a sense voluntary. And, thirdly, whatever
inheres in the will as a habit or disposition, is called voluntary as belonging
to the will. The doctrine of the Romish Church on these points, as shown in the
preceding section, is a matter of dispute among Romanists themselves. The majority
of the schoolmen and of the Roman theologians deny that anything is of the nature
of sin, but voluntary acts in the first sense of the word voluntary above mentioned.
How they endeavour to reconcile the doctrine of hereditary, inherent corruption,
or original sin, with that principle has already been stated. Holding that principle,
however, they strenuously deny that mere impulses, the motus primo primi,
as they are called, of evil dispositions are of the nature of sin. To this doctrine
they are forced by their view of baptism. In that ordinance, according to their
theory, everything of the nature of sin is removed. But concupiscence with its motions
remains. These, however, if not deliberately assented to and indulged, are not sinful.
Whether they are or not, of course depends on the extent of the law. Nothing is
sinful but what is contrary to the divine law. If that law demands perfect conformity
to the image of God, then these impulses of evil are clearly sinful. But if the
law takes cognizance only of deliberate acts they are not. The Protestant doctrine
which pronounces these impulsive acts to be of the nature of sin is confirmed by
the consciousness of the believer. He recognizes as evil in their own nature the
first risings of malice, envy, pride, or cupidity. He knows that they spring from
an evil or imperfectly sanctified nature They constitute part
5. It follows from the principle that the law condemns all want of conformity to the nature of God, that it condemns evil dispositions or habits, as well as all voluntary sins, whether deliberate or impulsive. According to the Bible and the dictates of conscience there is a sinfulness as well as sins; there is such a thing as character as distinguished from transient acts by which it is revealed; that is, a sinful state, abiding, inherent, immanent forms of evil, which are truly and properly of the nature of sin. All sin, therefore, is not an agency, activity, or act; it may be and is also a condition or state of the mind. This distinction between habitual and actual sin has been recognized and admitted in the Church from the beginning. Our Lord teaches us this distinction when He speaks of an evil heart as distinguished from evil exercises, which are as distinct as a tree and its fruits. The Apostle speaks of sin as a law, or controlling principle regulating or determining his acts even in despite of his better nature. He says sin dwells in him. He complains of it as a burden too heavy to be borne, from which he groans to be delivered. And his experience in this matter is the experience (we do not say the theory) of all the people of God. They know there is more in them of the nature of sin than mere acts and exercises; that their heart is not right in the sight of God; that the fountain from which the waters flow is itself bitter; that the tree is known by its fruits.
Sin is Want of Conformity to the Law of God.
Protestants teach not only that sin is a specific evil, that
it has relation to law, that that law is the nature and will of God, and that it
takes cognizance of and condemns all forms and degrees of moral evil or want of
moral excellence, but also that the formal nature of sin is the want of conformity
to the divine law or standard of excellence. This want of conformity is not a mere
negation, such as may be predicated of a stone or of a brute, of whom it may be
said they are not conformed to the image of God. The want of conformity to the divine
law which constitutes sin is the want of congeniality of one moral nature with another;
of the dependent and created nature with the infinitely holy nature, which of necessity
is not only the sum but the standard of all excellence. Herein is sin that we are
not like God. As the opposite of reason is
Sin includes Guilt and Pollution.
Sin includes guilt and pollution; the one expresses its relation
to the justice, the other to the holiness of God. These two elements of sin are
revealed in the conscience of every sinner. He knows himself to be amenable to the
justice of God and offensive in his holy eyes. He is to himself even, hateful and
degraded and self-condemned. There are, however, two things included in guilt.
This is admitted, and cannot be denied. The only question is, What is necessary in order to the sense of guilt as it exists in the conscience? Or, What is required to constitute anything a just ground of punishment in the sight of God? Is it sufficient that the thing itself should be sinful? Or, Is it necessary that it should be due to our own voluntary act? This latter ground is taken not only by Pelagians, and by all who define sin to be the voluntary transgression of known law, but also by many who hold to habitual, as distinguished from actual sin, and who even acknowledge that men are born in sin. They still insist that even evil innate, inherent sin, must be referrible to our own voluntary agency, or it cannot be guilt in us. But this is, —
1. Contrary to our own consciousness. The existence of sin
in the heart, the presence of evil dispositions, without regard to their
2. The principle in question is no less opposed to the common judgments of men. All men instinctively judge a man for what he is. If he is good they so regard him. If he is bad, they pronounce him to be bad. This judgment is just as inevitable or necessary as that he is tall or short, learned or unlearned. The question as to the origin of the man’s character does not enter into the grounds of this judgment. If born good, if he made himself good, or if he received his goodness as a gift from God, does not materially affect the case. He is good, and must be so regarded and treated. In like manner all that is necessary in order to justify and necessitate the judgment that a man is bad is that he should be so. This is the principle on which we judge ourselves, and on which men universally judge each other. The principle, therefore, must be sound.
3. The doctrine that sin in order to include guilt must be referrible to our own voluntary action, is contrary to analogy. It is not so with holiness. Adam was created holy. His holiness as truly constituted his character as though it had been self-acquired, and had it been retained, it would have continued to be, and so long as it was retained it was an object of complacency and the ground of reward in the sight of God. Habitual grace, as it is called, or the new principle of spiritual life, imparted to the soul in regeneration, is not self-produced. It is due to the supernatural power of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it constitutes the believer’s character. The only reason why it is not meritorious, is that it is so imperfect, and because it cannot cancel the debt we already owe to the justice of God. The soul, however, if perfectly sanctified by the Holy Ghost is just as pure, just as much an object of approbation and delight in the sight of God as an unfallen angel.
4. The doctrine in question contradicts the faith of the Church Universal. A distinction must be made between the faith of the Church and the speculations (or even the doctrines) of theologians. These are often divergent. The former is determined by the Scriptures and the inward teachings of the Spirit; the latter are greatly modified by the current philosophy of the age in which those theologians lived, and by the idiosyncrasies of their own minds. During the Middle Ages, for example, the speculations of the schoolmen and the faith of the Church, had very little in common. The faith of the Church is to be found in its creeds, prayers, and forms of devotion generally. In all these, through every age, the Church has shown that she regards all men as burdened with original sin, as belonging to a polluted and guilty race, polluted and guilty from the first moment of existence. It cannot be said that the Church believed original sin to be due to the agency of each individual man, or to the act of generic humanity. These are thoughts foreign to the minds of common believers. The conviction therefore must have existed in the Church always and everywhere that guilt may be present which does not attach to the voluntary agency of the guilty. Infants have always been baptized for the remission of sin, and men have ever been regarded by the Church as born in sin.
5. The explanation given of the undeniable fact of innate pollution and guilt, by those who admit the fact, and yet maintain that this original sin is referrible to our own agency, is altogether unsatisfactory. That explanation is that we acted thousands of years before we existed, that is, that the substance which constitutes our individual souls, committed, in the person of Adam, the sin of disobeying God in paradise. This explanation of course presupposes the fact to be explained. The fact remains whatever becomes of the explanation. Men are born in a state of guilt and pollution All that follows from the rejection of the explanation is, that sin may exist, which is not referrible to the voluntary agency of those in whom it inheres. This consequence is far easier of admission, in the judgment of the vast majority of men, than the doctrine that we are personally chargeable with eating the forbidden fruit as our own act.
6. The Bible in everywhere teaching that men are born in sin,
that they come into the world the children of wrath, does thereby teach that there
can be, and that there is sin (pollution and guilt) which is inherited and derived,
which is inherent and innate, and therefore not referrible to our own agency. As
the Scriptures nowhere
§ 8. The Effects of Adam’s Sin upon his Posterity.
That the sin of Adam injured not himself only but also all descending from him by ordinary generation, is part of the faith of the whole Christian world. The nature and extent of the evil thus entailed upon his race, and the ground or reason of the descendants of Adam being involved in the evil consequences of his transgression, have ever been matter of diversity and discussion. As to both of these points the common Augustinian doctrine is briefly stated in the Symbols of our Church. According to our standards, “the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam’s first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together within all actual transgressions which proceed from it.” This corruption of nature is in the Confession of Faith declared to be “both in itself and in all motions thereof, truly and properly sin.” And in virtue of this original corruption men are “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.” As to the ground of these evils, we are taught that “the covenant being made with Adam not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression.” Or, as it is expressed in the Confession, “Our first parents, being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature were conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.”
In this view of the relation of mankind to Adam, and of the consequences of his apostasy, the three leading subjects included, are the imputation of Adam’s first sin; the corruption of nature derived from him; and the inability of fallen man to any spiritual good.
§ 9. Immediate Imputation.
It being admitted that the race of man participates in the evil consequences of the fall of our first parent, that fact is accounted for on different theories.
1. That which is adopted by Protestants generally, as well
Lutherans as Reformed, and also by the great body of the Latin Church is, that in
virtue of the union, federal and natural, between
2. Others, while they admit that a corrupt nature is derived from Adam by all his ordinary posterity, yet deny, first, that this corruption or spiritual death is a penal infliction for his sin; and second, that there is any imputation to Adam’s descendants of the guilt of his first sin. All that is really imputed to them is their own inherent, hereditary depravity. This is the doctrine of mediate imputation.
3. Others discard entirely the idea of imputation, so far as Adam’s sin is concerned, and refer the hereditary corruption of men to the general law of propagation. Throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms, like begets like. Man is not an exception to that law. Adam having lost his original righteousness and corrupted his nature by his apostasy, transmits that despoiled and deteriorated nature to all his descendants. To what extent man’s nature is injured by the fall, is left undetermined by this theory. According to some it is so deteriorated as to be in the true Scriptural sense of the term, spiritually dead, while according to others, the injury is little if anything more than a physical infirmity, an impaired constitution which the first parent has transmitted to his children.
4. Others again adopt the realistic theory, and teach that as generic humanity existed whole and entire in the persons of Adam and Eve, their sin was the sin of the entire race. The same numerical rational and voluntary substance which acted in our first parents, having been communicated to us, their act was as truly and properly our act, being the act of our reason and will, as it was their act. It is imputed to us therefore not as his, but as our own. We literally sinned in Adam, and consequently the guilt of that sin is our personal guilt and the consequent corruption of nature is the effect of our own voluntary act.
5. Others, finally, deny any causal relation, whether logical or natural, whether judicial or physical, between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of his race. Some who take this ground say that it was a divine constitution, that, if Adam sinned, all men should sin. The one event was connected with the other only in the divine purpose. Others say that there is no necessity to account for the fact that all men are sinners, further than by referring no their liberty of will. Adam sinned, and other men sin. That is all. The one fact us as easily accounted for as the other.
Statement of the Doctrine of Immediate Imputation.
The first of the above mentioned doctrines is that presented
in the Symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and by the great body of the
theologians of those great historical branches of the Protestant community.
1. To impute is to reckon to, or to lay to one’s account. So far as the meaning of the word is concerned, it makes no difference whether the thing imputed be sin or righteousness; whether it is our own personally, or the sin or righteousness of another.
2. To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice. Hence the evil consequent on the imputation is not an arbitrary infliction; not merely a misfortune or calamity; not a chastisement in the proper sense of that word, but a punishment, i.e., an evil inflicted in execution of the penalty of law and for the satisfaction of justice.
3. A third remark in elucidation of what is meant by the imputation
of Adam’s sin is, that by all theologians, Reformed and Lutheran, it is admitted,
that in the imputation of Adam’s sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ’s
righteousness to believers, the nature of imputation is the same, so that the one
case illustrates the others. When it is said that our sins were imputed to Christ,
or that He bore our sins, it is not meant that he actually committed our sins, or
that He was morally criminal on account of them, or that the demerit of them rested
upon Him. All that is meant is
It is no less a doctrine of Scripture than a fact of experience
that mankind are a fallen race. Men universally, under all the circumstances of
their being in this world, are sinful, and exposed to innumerable evils. Many of
these, and that in many instances
The Ground of the Imputation of Adam’s Sin.
The ground of the imputation of Adam’s sin, or the reason
why the penalty of his sin has come upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine
above stated, is the union between us and Adam. There could of course be no propriety
in imputing the sin of one man to another unless there were some connection between
them to explain and justify such imputation. The Scriptures never speak of the imputation
of the sins of angels either to men or to Christ, or of his righteousness to them;
because there is no such relation between men and angels, or between angels and
Christ, as to involve the one in the judicial consequences of the sin or righteousness
of the other. The union between Adam and his posterity which is the ground of the
imputation of his sin to them, is both natural and federal. He was their natural
head. Such is the relation between parent and child, not only in the case of
Adam the Federal Head of his Race.
1. The first argument, therefore, in favour of the doctrine
of imputation is that the Scriptures present Adam as not only the natural, but also
the federal head of his posterity. This is plain, as already remarked, from the
narrative given in Genesis. Everything there said to Adam was said to him in his
representative capacity. The promise of life was for him and for his seed after
him. The dominion within which he was invested, belonged to his posterity as well
as to himself. All the evils threatened against him in case of transgression, included
them, and have in fact come upon them. They are mortal; they have to earn their
bread by the sweat of their brows; they are subject to all the inconveniences and
sufferings arising from the banishment of our first parents from paradise and from
the curse pronounced for man’s sake upon the earth. They no less obviously are born
into the world destitute of original righteousness and subject to spiritual death.
The full penalty, therefore, threatened against Adam, has been inflicted upon them.
It was death with the promise of redemption. Now that these evils are penal in our
case as well as in his, is plain, because punishment is suffering inflicted in execution
of a threatening, and for the satisfaction of justice. It matters not what that
suffering may be. Its character as penalty depends not on its nature, but upon the
design of its infliction. One man, as before remarked, may be shut up in a prison
to protect him from popular violence; another, in execution of a legal sentence.
In one case the imprisonment is a favour, in the other, it is a punishment. As therefore,
the evils which men suffer on account of the sin of Adam, are inflicted in execution
of the penalty threatened against him, they are as truly penal in our case as they
were in his; and he was consequently treated as the federal head and representative
of his race. Besides the plain assumption of the truth of this
The Representative Principle in the Scriptures.
2. This representative principle pervades the whole Scriptures.
The imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity is not an isolated fact. It is only
an illustration of a general principle which characterizes the dispensations of
God from the beginning of the world. God declared himself to Moses to be, “The Lord,
the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and
truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity amid transgression, and
sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children, and upon the children’s children unto the third and to the fourth
generation.” (
If the fact be admitted that we bear the consequences of Adam’s sin, and that children suffer for the iniquities of their fathers, it may be said that this is not to be referred to the justice of God, but to the undesigned working of a general law, which in despite of incidental evil, is on the whole beneficent. The difficulty on that assumption instead of being lessened, is only increased. On either theory the nature and the degree of suffering are the same. The innocence of the sufferers is the same. The only difference relates to the question, Why they suffer for offences of which they are not personally guilty? The Bible says these sufferings are judicial; they are inflicted as punishment for the support of law. Others say, they are merely natural consequences, or arbitrary inflictions of a sovereign. If a king should put the children of a rebel to death, would it relieve his conduct from reproach to say that it was an act of arbitrary sovereignty? If the prevention of crime be one important end of punishment (although not its primary end), would it not be a relief to say, that the death of the children was designed to prevent other parents from rebelling? That the execution of the children of a criminal by a human sovereign would be a cruel and unjust punishment, may be admitted, while it is, and must be denied, that it is unjust in God that he should visit the iniquities of the fathers upon their children. In the first place no human sovereign has the right over his subjects which belongs to God over his creatures as their Creator. And in the second place, no human sovereign has the power and wisdom to secure the highest good from the penalties which he attaches to the violations of law. We cannot infer that because a course of action would be wrong in man, therefore it must be unjust in God. No man could rightfully send pestilence or famine through a land, but God does send such visitations not only righteously, but to the manifestation of his own glory and to the good of his creatures.
The same Principle involved in other Doctrines.
That the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity is proved
not only (1.) From the fact that he was their natural head and representative; and
(2.) From the fact that this principle of representation pervades the Scriptures;
and (3.) From the fact that it is the ground on which the providence of God is administered.
(4.) From the fact that evils consequent on the apostasy of Adam are expressly declared
in Scripture to be penal inflictions
Argument from
The Apostle in
Whatever may be thought of the details of this exposition,
there can hardly he a doubt that it expresses the main idea of the passage. Few
can doubt, and few ever have doubted, that the Apostle does here clearly teach that
the sin of Adam is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race. With this
agrees not only, as we have already seen, the Scriptural account of the fall, but
also what the Apostle teaches in
Argument from General Consent.
The imputation of Adam’s sin has been the doctrine of the Church universal in all ages. It was the doctrine of the Jews, derived from the plain teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures. It was and is the doctrine of the Greek, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. Its denial is a novelty. It is only since the rise of Arminianism that any considerable body of Christians have ventured to set themselves in opposition to a doctrine so clearly taught in the Bible, and sustained by so many facts of history and experience. The points of diversity in reference to this subject do not relate to the fact that Adam’s sin is imputed to his posterity, but either to the grounds of that imputation or to its consequences. In the Greek Church the lowest views prevalent among Christians were adopted. The theologians of that church generally held that natural death, and a deterioration of our nature, and a change for the worse in the whole state of the world, were the only penal evils which the race of mankind suffer on account of Adam’s sin. In the Latin Church during the Middle Ages, as we have already seen, great diversity of opinion obtained as to the nature and extent of the evils brought upon the world by the apostasy of our first parent. The Council of Trent declared those evils to be death, the loss of original righteousness, and sin which is pronounced to be the death of the soul. The Lutherans and Reformed held the same doctrine with more consistency and earnestness. But in all this diversity it was universally admitted, first, that certain evils are inflicted upon all mankind on account of Adam’s sin; and, secondly, that those evils are penal. Men were universally, so far as the Church was concerned, held to bear in a greater or less degree the punishment of the sin of their first parent.
Objections to the Doctrine.
The great objection to this doctrine, that it is manifestly
unjust that one man should be punished for the sin of another, has already been
incidentally referred to. What is punishment? It is evil on suffering inflicted
in support of law. Wherein is the injustice that one man should, on the ground of
the union between them, be punished for the sin of another? If there be injustice
in the case it must be in the infliction of suffering anterior to or irrespective
of personal ill desert. It does not consist in the motive of the infliction. The
infliction of suffering to gratify malice or revenge is of course a crime. To inflict
it in mere caprice is no less obviously
§ 10. Mediate Imputation.
About the middle of the seventeenth century Amyraut, Cappel,
and La Place (or Placæus), three distinguished professors in the French theological
school at Saumur, introduced several modifications of the Augustinian or Reformed
doctrine on the decrees, election, the atonement, and the imputation of Adam’s sin.
La Place taught that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, and that that corrupt
nature, and not Adam’s sin, is the ground of the condemnation which has come upon
all mankind. When it was objected to this statement of the case that it left out
of view the guilt of Adam’s first sin, he answered that he did not deny the imputation
of that sin, but simply made it dependent on our participation of his corrupted
nature. We are inherently depraved, and therefore we are involved in the guilt of
Adam’s sin. There is no direct or immediate imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity,
but only an indirect or mediate imputation of it, founded on the fact that we share
his moral character. These views were first presented by La Place in a disputation,
“De statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam,” published in the “Theses Salmurienses,” and
afterwards more elaborately in a treatise, “De imputatione primi peccati Adami.”
This doctrine was formally condemned by the National Synod of France in 1644-45;
It was to evade the force of this decision that Placæus proposed
the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation. He said he did not deny
the imputation of Adam’s sin, but only that it preceded the view of hereditary corruption.
But this is the very thing which the Synod asserted. Hereditary corruption, or spiritual
death is the penalty, or, as expressed by the Lutheran confessions, by Calvin, and
by the Protestants generally, it was an evil inflicted by “the just judgment of
God, on account of Adam’s sin (propter peccatum Adami).” The Formula Consensus Ecclesiarum
Helveticarum was set forth 1675, in opposition to the doctrine of Amyraut on universal
grace, to the doctrine of Placæus on mediate imputation, and to that of others
concerning the active obedience of Christ.
Rivet, one of the professors of the University of Leyden,
published a treatise in support of the decision of the French Synod, entitled “Decretum
Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatarum Galliæ initio anni 1645, de Imputatione
primi Peccati omnibus Adami posteris,
Mediate Imputation outside of the French Church.
Although the doctrine of mediate imputation was thus generally
condemned both by the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, it found some distinguished
advocates beyond the pale of the French Church. The younger Vitringa, Venema, and
Stapfer, in his “Polemical Theology,” gave it their sanction. From the last named
author it was adopted by President Edwards, in one chapter of his work on “Original
Sin.” It appears there, however, merely as an excrescence. It was not adopted into
his system so as to qualify his theological views on other doctrines. Although President
Edwards does clearly commit himself to the doctrine of Placæus, as he says,
Objections to the Doctrine of Mediate Imputation.
The leading objections against the doctrine of mediate imputation are, —
1. That it denies what the Scriptures assert. The Scriptures assert that the sentence of condemnation has passed upon all men for the sin of one man. This the doctrine of mediate imputation denies, and affirms that the ground of that condemnation is inherent depravity. We are accounted partakers of Adam’s sin only because we derive a corrupt nature from him. According to the Scriptures, however, the reason why we are depraved is, that we are regarded as partakers of his sin, or because the guilt of that sin is imputed to us. The guilt in the order of nature and fact precedes the spiritual death which is its penal consequent.
2. This doctrine denies the penal character of the hereditary
corruption in which all men are born. According to the Scriptures and to the faith
of the church universal, mortality, the loss of original righteousness, and hereditary
corruption are inflicted upon mankind in execution of the threatening made against
Adam, and are included in the comprehensive word, death, by which the threatened
penalty was expressed. This is as emphatically taught by President Edwards as by
any other of the Reformed theologians. He devotes a section of his work to prove
that the death mentioned in Genesis, and of which the Apostle speaks in
Mediate Imputation increases the Difficulties to be accounted for.
3. It is a further objection to the doctrine of mediate imputation that it increases instead of relieving the difficulty of the case. It denies that a covenant was made with Adam. It denies that mankind ever had a probation. It assumes that in virtue of a natural law of propagation when Adam lost the image of God and became sinful, his children inherit his character, and on the ground of that character are subject to the wrath and curse of God. All the evils therefore which the Scriptural and Church doctrine represent as coming upon the posterity of Adam as the judicial punishment of his first sin, the doctrine of mediate imputation represents as sovereign inflictions, or mere natural consequences. What the Scriptures declare to be a righteous judgment, Placæus makes to be an arbitrary dispensation.
Inconsistent with the Apostle’s Argument in
4. It is a still more serious objection that this doctrine
destroys the parallel between Adam and Christ on which the Apostle lays so much
stress in his Epistle to the Romans. The great point which he there labours to teach
and to illustrate, and which he represents as a cardinal element of the method of
salvation, is that men are justified for a righteousness which is not personally
their own. To illustrate and confirm this great fundamental doctrine, he refers
to the fact that men have been condemned for a sin which is not personally their
own. He over and over insists that it was for the sin of Adam, and not for our own
sin or sinfulness, that the sentence of death (the forfeiture of the divine favour)
passed upon all men. It is on this ground he urges men the more confidently to rely
upon the promise of justification on the ground a righteousness which is not inherently
ours. This parallel destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the Apostle are overturned,
if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any
The Doctrine founded on a False Principle.
5. Perhaps, however, the most serious objection against the
doctrine of mediate imputation is drawn from the principle on which it rests, and
the arguments of its advocates in its support. The great principle insisted upon
in support of this doctrine is that one man cannot justly be punished for the sin
of another. If this be so then it is unjust in God to visit the iniquities of the
fathers upon their children. Then it was unjust in Christ to declare that the blood
of the prophets slain from the beginning should come upon the men of his generation.
Then it is unjust that the Jews of the present day, and ever since the crucifixion
of our Lord, should be scattered and peeled, according to the predictions of the
prophets, for the rejection of the Messiah. Then, also, were the deluge sent in
wrath upon the world, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the extermination
of the Canaanites, in which thousands of children perished innocent of the offences
for which those judgments were inflicted, all acts of stupendous injustice. If this
principle be sound, then the administration of the divine government over the world,
God’s dealings with nations and with the Church, admit of no defence. He has from
the beginning and through all time held children responsible for the conduct of
parents, included them without their consent in the covenants made with their fathers,
and visited upon them the consequences
The Theory of Propagation.
The theory of those who deny all imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, whether mediate or immediate, and who account for the corruption of the race consequent on his apostasy, on the general law of propagation, that like begets like, differs only in terms from the doctrine of La Place. All he meant by mediate imputation was that the descendants of Adam, derived from him a corrupt nature, have the same moral character, and therefore are adjudged worthy of the same condemnation. This the advocates of the theory just mentioned are willing to admit. Their doctrine therefore is liable to all the objections which bear against the doctrine of mediate imputation, and therefore does not call forth a separate consideration.
§ 11. Preëxistence.
The principle that a man can be justly held responsible or
regarded as guilty only for his own voluntary acts and for then subjective consequences,
is so plausible that to many minds it has the authority of an intuitive truth. It
is, however, so clearly the
1. That it does not pretend to be taught in the Scriptures, and therefore cannot be an article of faith. Protestants unite in teaching that “The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, and man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or the traditions of men.” As the doctrine of the preexistence of souls is neither expressly set down in the Bible, nor deducible from it, as is admitted, it cannot be received as one of the formative principles of Christian doctrine. All that its Christian advocates claim is that it is not contradicted in Scripture, and therefore that they are free to hold it.
2. But even this cannot be conceded. It is expressly contrary to the plain teachings of the Word of God. According to the history of the creation, man was formed in the image of God. His body was fashioned out of the dust of the earth, and his soul was derived immediately from God, and was pronounced by him “very good.” This is utterly inconsistent with the idea that Adam was a fallen spirit. The Bible also teaches that Adam was created in the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and fell from that state here in this life, and not in a previous and higher state of being. The Scriptures also, as we have seen, say that it was by one man that sin entered into the world, and death by sin, because all sinned in that one man. There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity. This contradicts the theory which refers the present sinfulness of men, not to the act of Adam, but to the voluntary act of each individual man, in a previous state of existence.
3. This doctrine is as destitute of all support from the testimony of consciousness as from the authority of Scripture. No man has any reminiscences of a previous existence. There is nothing in his present state which connects him with a former state of being. It is a simple, pure assumption, without the slightest evidence from any known facts.
4. The theory, if true, affords no relief. Sins of which we know nothing; which were committed by us before we were born; which cannot be brought home to the conscience as our own sins, can never be the righteous grounds of punishment, any more than the acts of an idiot. It is unnecessary however to pursue this subject further, as the objections against the realistic theory, in most instances, bear with equal force against the theory of preexistence.
§ 12. Realistic Theory.
Those who reject the untenable doctrine of preexistence and
yet hold to the principle that guilt can attach only to what is due to our agency,
are driven to assume that Adam and his race are in such a sense one, that his act
of disobedience was literally the act of all mankind. And consequently that they
are as truly personally guilty on account of it, as Adam himself was; and that the
inherent corruption flowing from that act, belongs to us in the same sense and in
the same way, that it belonged to him. His sin, it is therefore said, “Is ours not
because it is imputed to us; but it is imputed to us, because it is truly and properly
our own.” We have constantly to contend with the ambiguity of terms. There is a
sense in which the above proposition is perfectly true, and there is a sense in
which it is not true. It is true that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to
us because it is ours according to the terms of the covenant of grace; because it
was wrought out for us by our great head and representative, who obeyed and suffered
in our stead. But it is not true that it is ours in the sense that we were the agents
by whom that righteousness was effected, or the persons in whom it inheres. In like
manner, Adam’s sin may be said to be imputed to us because it is ours, inasmuch
as it is the sin of the divinely constituted head and representative of our race.
But it is not ours in the same sense in which it was his. It was not our act, i.e., an act in which our reason, will, and conscience were exercised. There is a
sense in which the act of an agent is the act of the principal. It binds him in
law, as effectually as he could bind himself. But he is not, on that account, the
efficient agent of the act. The sense in which many assert
President Edwards’ Theory of Identity.
The assumption which President Edwards undertakes to controvert,
is, “That Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents.”
Objections to the Edwardian Theory.
The fatal consequences of this view of the nature of preservation were presented under the head of Providence. All that need be here remarked, is, —
1. That it proceeds upon the assumption that we can understand the relation of the efficiency of God to the effects produced in time. Because every new effect which we produce is due to a new exercise of our efficiency, it is assumed that such must be the case with God. He, however, inhabits eternity. With him there is no distinction between the past and future. All things are equally present to Him. As we exist in time and space, all our modes of thinking are conditioned by these circumstances of our being. But as God is not subject to the limitations of time or space, we have no right to transfer these limitations to Him. This only proves that we cannot understand how God produces successive effects. We do not know that it is by successive acts, and therefore it is most unreasonable and presumptuous to make that assumption the ground of explaining great Scriptural doctrines. It is surely just as conceivable or intelligible that God should will the continuous existence of the things which He creates, as that He should create them anew at every successive moment.
2. This doctrine of a continued creation destroys the Scriptural and common sense distinction between creation and preservation. The two are constantly presented as different, and they are regarded as different by the common judgment of mankind. By creation, God calls things into existence, and by preservation He upholds them in being. The two ideas are essentially distinct. Any theory, therefore, which confounds them must be fallacious. God wills that the things which He has created shall continue to be; and to deny that He can cause continuous existence is to deny his omnipotence.
3. This doctrine denies the existence of substance. The idea of substance is a primitive idea. It is given in the constitution of our nature. It is an intuitive truth, as is proved by its universality and necessity. One of the essential elements of that idea is uninterrupted continuity of being. Substance is that which stands; which remains unchanged under all the phenomenal mutations to which it is subjected. According to the theory of continued creation there is and can be no created substance. God is the only substance in the universe. Everything out of God is a series of new effects; there is nothing which has continuous existence, and therefore there is no substance.
4. It necessarily follows that if God is the only substance He is the only agent in the universe. All things out of God being every moment called into being out of nothing, are resolved into modes of God’s efficiency. If He creates the soul every successive instant, He creates all its states. thoughts, feelings, and volitions. The soul is only a series of divine acts. And therefore there can be no free agency, no sin, no responsibility, no individual existence. The universe is only the self-manifestation of God. This doctrine, therefore, in its consequences, is essentially pantheistic.
5. In resolving all identity into an “arbitrary constitution of God,” it denies that there is any real identity in any created things. Edwards expressly says, They are not numerically the same. They cannot be the same with an absolute identity. They are one only because God so regards them, and because they are alike, so that we look upon them as the same. This being the case, there seems to be no foundation even for guilt and pollution in the individual soul as flowing from its own acts, because there is nothing but an apparent, not a real connection between the present and the past in the life of the soul. It is not the same soul that is guilty today of the sin committed yesterday. Much less can such an arbitrary or assumed and merely apparent identity between Adam and his race be a just ground of their bearing the guilt of his first sin. In short, this doctrine subverts all our ideas. It assumes that things which, as the human soul, are really one, are not one in the sense of numerical sameness; and that things which are not identical, as Adam and his posterity, are one in the same sense that the soul of a man is one, or that identity can be predicated of any creature. This doctrine, therefore, which would account for the guilt and native depravity of men on the assumption of an arbitrary divine constitution of God, by which beings which are really distinct subsistences are declared to be one, is not only contrary to the Scriptures and to the intuitive convictions of men, but it affords no satisfactory solution of the facts which it is intended to explain. It does not bring home to any human conscience that the sin of Adam was his sin in the sense in which our sins of yesterday are our guilt of today.
The Proper Realistic Theory.
The strange doctrine of Edwards, above stated, agrees with
the realistic theory so far as that he and the realists unite in saying that Adam
and his race are one in the same sense in which a tree is one during its whole progress
from the germ to maturity, or in which the human soul is one during all the different
periods of its
Recapitulation of the Objections to the Realistic Theory.
The objections to the realistic doctrine were presented when
the nature of man was under consideration. It was then stated, (1.) That realism
is a mere hypothesis; one out of many possible assumptions. Possibility is all
that can be claimed for it. It cannot be said to be probable, much less certain;
and therefore cannot legitimately be made the basis of other doctrines. (2.) That
it has no support from the Scriptures. The Bible indeed does say that Adam and his
race are one; but it also says that Christ and his people are one; that all the
multitudes of believers of all ages and in heaven and earth are one. So in common
life we speak of every organized community as one. The visible Church is one. Every
separate state or kingdom is one. Everything depends on the nature of this oneness.
And that is to be determined by the nature of the thing spoken of, and the usus
loquendi of the Bible and of ordinary life. As no man infers from the fact that
the Scriptures declare Christ and his people to be one, that they are numerically
the same substance; or from the unity predicated of believers as distinguished from
the rest of mankind, that they are one substance and the rest of men of a different
substance; so we have no right to infer from the fact that the Bible says that
Realism no Solution of the Problem of Original Sin.
The objections which bear against this theory as a solution
of the problems of original sin are no less decisive. There are two things which
realism proposes to explain. First, the fact that we are punished for the sin of
Adam; and, secondly, that hereditary depravity is in us truly and properly sin,
involving guilt as well as pollution. The former is accounted for on the ground
that Adam’s sin was our own act; and the latter on the ground that native depravity
is the consequence of our own voluntary action. As a man is responsible for his
character or permanent state of mind
1. That admitting realism to be true; admitting that humanity is numerically one and the same substance, of which individual men are the modes of manifestation; and admitting that this generic humanity sinned in Adam, this affords no satisfactory solution of either of the facts above stated. Two things are necessary in order to vindicate the infliction of punishment for actual sin on the ground of personal responsibility. First, that the sin be an act of conscious self-determination. Otherwise it cannot be brought home upon the conscience so as to produce the sense of criminality. And suffering without the sense of criminality or blameworthiness, so far as the sufferer is concerned, is not punishment, but wanton cruelty. And, secondly, to vindicate punishment in the eye of justice, in the case supposed, there must be personal criminality manifest to all intelligent beings cognizant of the case. If a man should commit an offence in a state of somnambulism or of insanity, when he did not know what he did, and all recognition of which on his restoration to a normal condition is impossible, it is plain that such an offence could not justly be the ground of punishment. Suffering inflicted on such ground would not be punishment in the view of the sufferer, or righteous in the view of others. It is no less plain that if a man should commit a crime in a sound state of mind, and afterwards become insane, he could not justly be punished so long as he continued insane. The execution of a maniac or idiot for any offence committed prior to the insanity or idiocy would be an outrage. If these principles are correct then it is plain that, even admitting all that realists claim, it affords no relief. It gives no satisfactory solution either of our being punished for Adam’s sin or for the guilt which attaches to our inherent hereditary depravity. A sin of which it is impossible that we should be conscious as our voluntary act, can no more be the ground of punishment as our act, than the sin of an idiot, of a madman, or of a corpse. When the body of Cromwell was exhumed and gibbeted, Cromwell was not punished; and the act was, in the sight of all mankind, merely a manifestation of impotent revenge.
2. But the realistic theory cannot be admitted. The assumption
that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible
for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is, as Baur says, an unthinkable proposition;
that is, one to which
3. It is a further objection to this theory that it assigns
no reason why we are responsible for Adam’s first sin and not for his subsequent
transgressions. If his sin is ours because the whole of humanity, as a generic nature,
acted in him, this reason applies as well to all his other sins as to his first
act of disobedience, at least prior to the birth of his children. The genus was
no more individualized and concentrated in Adam when he was in the garden, than
after he was expelled from it. Besides, why is it the sin of Adam rather than, or
more than the sin of Eve for which we are responsible? That mankind do bear a relation
to the sin of Adam
4. The objection urged against the doctrine of mediate imputation,
that it is inconsistent with the Apostle’s doctrine of justification, and incompatible
with his argument in
5. Finally, the solution presented by Realists to explain
our relation to Adam and to solve the problems of original sin, ought to be rejected,
because Realism is a purely philosophical theory. It is indeed often said that the
doctrine of our covenant relation to Adam, and of the immediate imputation of his
sin to his posterity, is a theory. But this is not correct. It is not a theory,
but the simple statement of a plain Scriptural fact. The Bible says, that Adam’s
sin was the cause of the condemnation of his race. It tells us that it is not the
mere occasional cause, but the judicial ground of that condemnation; that it was
for, or on account of, his sin, that the sentence of condemnation was pronounced
upon all men. This is the whole doctrine of immediate imputation. It is all that
that doctrine includes. Nothing is added to the simple Scriptural statement. Realism,
however, is a philosophical theory outside of the Scriptures, intended to account
for the fact that Adam’s sin is the ground of the condemnation of our race. It introduces
a doctrine of universals, of the relation of individuals to genera and species,
concerning which the Scriptures teach nothing, and it makes that philosophical theory
an integral part of Scripture doctrine. This is adding to the word of God. It is
making the truth of Scriptural doctrines to depend on the correctness of philosophical
speculations. It is important to bear in mind the relation which philosophy properly
sustains to theology. (1.) The relation is intimate and necessary. The two sciences
embrace nearly the same spheres and are conversant with the same subjects. (2.)
There is a philosophy which underlies all Scriptural doctrines; or which the Scriptures
assume in all their teachings. (3.) As the doctrines of the Bible are from God,
and therefore infallible and absolutely true, no philosophical principle can be
admitted as sound, which does not accord within those doctrines. (4.) Therefore
the true office and sphere of Christian philosophy, or of philosophy in the hands
of a Christian, is to ascertain and teach those facts and principles concerning
God, man, and nature, which are in accordance with the divine word. A Christian
cannot assume a certain theory of human freedom and by that theory determine what
the Bible teaches of foreordination and providence; but on the contrary, he should
allow the teachings of the Bible to determine his theory of liberty. And so of all
other doctrines; and this may be done in full assurance that the philosophy which
we are thus led to adopt, will be found to authenticate
§ 13. Original Sin.
The effects of Adam’s sin upon his posterity are declared in our standards to be, (1.) The guilt of his first sin. (2.) The loss of original righteousness. (3.) The corruption of our whole nature, which (i.e., which corruption), is commonly called original sin. Commonly, but not always. Not unfrequently by original sin is meant all the subjective evil consequences of the apostasy of our first parent, and it therefore includes all three of the particulars just mentioned. The National Synod of France, therefore, condemned the doctrine of Placæus, because he made original sin to consist of inherent, hereditary depravity, to the exclusion of the guilt of Adam’s first sin.
This inherent corruption in which all men since the fall are born, is properly called original sin, (1.) Because it is truly of the nature of sin. (2.) Because it flows from our first parents as the origin of our race. (3.) Because it is the origin of all other sins; and (4.) Because it is in its nature distinguished from actual sins.
The Nature of Original Sin.
As to the nature of this hereditary corruption, although the
faith of the Church Catholic, at least of the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches,
has been, in all that is essential, uniform, yet diversity of opinion has prevailed
among theologians. (1.) According to many of the Greek fathers, and in later times,
of the extreme Remonstrants or Arminians, it is a physical, rather than a moral
evil. Adam’s physical condition was deteriorated by his apostasy, and that deteriorated
natural constitution has descended to his posterity. (2.) According to others, concupiscence,
or native corruption, is such an ascendency of man’s sensuous, or animal nature
over his higher attributes of reason and conscience, as involves a great proneness
to sin, but is not itself sinful. Some of the Romish theologians distinctly avow
this doctrine, and some Protestants, as we have seen, maintain that this is the
symbolical doctrine of the Roman Church itself. The same view has been advocated
by some divines of our own age and country. (3.) Others hold a doctrine nearly allied
to that just mentioned. They
The “Augsburg Confession.”
“Articuli Smalcaldici.”
“Formula Corcordiæ.”
“Constat Christianos non tantum actualia delicta . . . peccata
esse agnoscere et definire debere, sed etiam . . . hæreditarium morbum . . . imprimis
pro horribili peccato, et quidem pro principio et capite omnium peccatorum (e
quo reliquæ transgressiones, tanquam e radice nascantur . . .) omnino habendum esse.”
“Confessio Helvetica II.”
“Confessio Gallicana.”
“Articuli XXXIX.”
“Confessio Belgica.”
“Catechesis Heidelbergensis.” (Pravitas humanæ naturæ existit)
“ex lapsu et inobedientia primorum parentum Adami et Evæ. Hinc natura nostra ita
est depravata, ut omnes in peccatis concipiamur et nascamur.”
By nature in these Confessions it is expressly taught, we
are not to understand essence or substance (as was held by Matthias Flacius, and
by him only at the time of the Reformation). On this point the Form of Concord says:
That although original sin corrupts our whole nature, yet the essence or substance
of the soul is one thing, and original sin is another. “Discrimen igitur retinendum
est inter naturam nostram, qualis a Deo creata est, hodieque conservatur, in qua
peccatum originale habitat, et inter ipsum peccatum originis, quod in natura habitat.
Hæc enim duo secundum sacræ Scripturæ regulam distincte considerari, doceri et
credi debent et possunt.”
“The Westminster Confession.”
Statement of the Protestant Doctrine.
From the above statements it appears that, according to the doctrine of the Protestant churches, original sin, or corruption of nature derived front Adam, is not, (1.) A corruption of the substance or essence of the soul. (2.) Neither is it an essential element infused into the soul as poison is mixed with wine. The Forum of Concord, for example, denies that the evil dispositions of our fallen nature are “conditiones, seu concreatæ essentiales naturæ proprietates.” Original sin is declared to be an “accidens, i.e., quod non per se subsistit, sed in aliqua substantia est, et ab ea discerni potest.” The affirmative statements on this subject are (1.) That this corruption of nature affects the whole soul. (2.) That it consists in the loss or absence of original righteousness, and consequent entire moral depravity of our nature, including or manifesting itself in an aversion from all spiritual good, or from God, and an inclination to all evil. (3.) That it is truly and properly of the nature of sin, involving both guilt and pollution. (4.) That it retains its character as sin even in the regenerated. (5.) That it renders the soul spiritually dead, so that the natural, or unrenewed man, is entirely unable of himself to do anything good in the sight of God.
This doctrine therefore stands opposed, —
1. To that which teaches that the race of man is uninjured by the fall of Adam.
2. To that which teaches that the evils consequent on the fall are merely physical.
3. To the doctrine which makes original sin entirely negative, consisting in the want of original righteousness.
4. To the doctrine which admits a hereditary depravity of
nature, and makes it consist in an inclination to sin, but denies that it is itself
sinful. Some of the orthodox theologians made a distinction between vitium
and peccatum. The latter term they wished to confine to actual sin, while
the former was used to designate indwelling and hereditary sinfulness. There are
serious objections to this distinction: first, that vitium, as thus understood,
is really sin; it includes both guilt and pollution, and is so defined by Vitringa
and others who make the distinction. Secondly, it is opposed to established theological
usage. Depravity, or inherent hereditary corruption, has always been designated peccatum, and therefore to say that it is not
peccatum, but merely
vitium, produces confusion and leads to error. Thirdly, it is contrary to
Scripture
5. The fifth form of doctrine to which the Protestant faith stands opposed, is that which admits a moral deterioration of our nature, which deserves the displeasure of God, and which is therefore truly sin, and yet denies that the evil is so great as to amount to spiritual death, and to involve the entire inability of the natural man to what is spiritually good.
6. And the doctrine of the Protestant churches is opposed to the teachings of those who deny that original sin affects the whole man, and assert that it has its seat exclusively in the affections or the heart, while the understanding and reason are uninjured or uninfluenced.
In order to sustain the Augustinian (or Protestant) doctrine of original sin, therefore, three points are to be established: I. That all mankind descending from Adam by ordinary generation are born destitute of original righteousness, and the subjects of a corruption of nature which is truly and properly sin. II. That this original corruption affects the whole man; not the body only to the exclusion of the soul; not the lower faculties of the soul to the exclusion of the higher; and not the heart to the exclusion of the intellectual powers. III. That it is of such a nature as that before regeneration fallen men are “utterly indisposed, disabled, and opposed to all good.”
Proof of the Doctrine of Original Sin.
First Argument from the Universality of Sin.
The first argument in proof of this doctrine is drawn from
the universal sinfulness of men. All men are sinners. This is undeniably the doctrine
of the Scriptures. It is asserted, assumed, and proved. The assertions of this fact
are too numerous to be quoted. In
But in the second place, this melancholy fact is constantly assumed in the Word of God. The Bible everywhere addresses men as sinners. The religion which it reveals is a religion for sinners. All the institutions of the Old Testament, and all the doctrines of the New, take it for granted that men universally are under the power and condemnation of sin. “The world,” as used in Scripture, designates the mass of mankind, as distinguished from the church, or the regenerated people of God, and always involves in its application the idea of sin. The world hateth you. I am not of the world. I have chosen you out of the world. All the exhortations of the Scriptures addressed to men indiscriminately, calling them to repentance, of necessity assume the universality of sin. The same is true of the general threatenings and promises of the Word of God. In short, if all men are not sinners, the Bible is not adapted to their real character and state.
But the Scriptures not only directly assert and everywhere
assume the universality of sin among men, but this is a point which perhaps more
than any other is made the subject of a formal and protracted argument. The Apostle,
especially in his Epistle to the Romans, begins with a regular process of proof,
that all, whether Jews or Gentiles, are under sin. Until this fact is admitted and
acknowledged, there is no place for and no need of the Gospel, which is God’s method
of saving sinners. Paul therefore begins by asserting God’s purpose to punish all
sin. He then shows that the Gentiles are universally chargeable with the sin of
impiety; that although knowing God, they neither worship him as God, nor are thankful.
The natural, judicial, and therefore the unavoidable consequence of impiety, according
to the Apostle’s doctrine, is immorality. Those who abandon Him, God gives up to
the unrestrained dominion of evil. The whole Gentile world
What the Scriptures so clearly teach is taught no less clearly by experience and history. Every man knows that he himself is a sinner. He knows that every human being whom he ever saw, is in the same state of apostasy from God. History contains the record of no sinless man, save the Man Christ Jesus, who, by being sinless, is distinguished from all other men. We have no account of any family, tribe, or nation free from the contamination of sin. The universality of sin among men is therefore one of the most undeniable doctrines of Scripture, and one of the most certain facts of experience.
Second Argument from the Entire Sinfulness of Men.
This universal depravity of men is no slight evil. The whole
human race, by their apostasy from God, are totally depraved. By total depravity,
is not meant that all men are equally wicked; nor that any man is as thoroughly
corrupt as it is possible for a man to be; nor that men are destitute of all moral
virtues. The Scriptures recognize the fact, which experience abundantly confirms,
that men, to a greater or less degree, are honest in dealings, kind in their feelings,
and beneficent in their conduct. Even the heathen, the Apostle teaches us, do by
nature the things of the law. They are more or less under the dominion of conscience,
which approves or disapproves their moral conduct. All this is perfectly consistent
with the Scriptural doctrine of total depravity, which includes the entire absence
of holiness; the want of due apprehensions of the divine perfections, and of our
relation to God
1. By its fruits; by the fearful prevalence of the sins of the flesh, of sins of violence, of the sins of the heart, as pride, envy, and malice; of the sins of the tongue, as slander and deceit; of the sins of irreligion, of ingratitude, profanity, and blasphemy; which have marked the whole history of our race, and which still distinguish the state of the whole world.
2. By the consideration that the claims of God on our supreme reverence, love, and obedience, which are habitually and universally disregarded by unrenewed men, are infinitely great. That is, they are so great that they cannot be imagined to be greater. These claims are not only ignored in times of excitement and passion, but habitually and constantly. Men live without God. They are, says the Apostle, Atheists. This alienation from God is so great and so universal, that the Scriptures say that men are the enemies of God; that the carnal mind, i.e., that state of mind which belongs to all men in their natural state, is enmity against God. This is proved not only by neglect and disobedience, but also by direct rebellion against his authority, when in his providence he takes away our idols; or when his law, with its inexorable demands and its fearful penalty, is sent home upon the conscience, and God is seen to be a consuming fire.
3. A third proof of the dreadful evil of this hereditary corruption
is seen in the universal rejection of Christ by those whom He came to save. He is
in himself the chief among ten thousand, and altogether lovely; uniting in his own
person all the perfections of the Godhead, and all the excellences of humanity.
His mission was one of love, of a love utterly incomprehensible, unmerited, immutable,
and infinite. Through love He not only humbled himself to be born of a woman, and
to be made under the law, but to live a life of poverty, sorrow, and persecution;
to endure inconceivably great sufferings for our sakes, and finally to bear our
sins in his own body on the tree. He has
The Sinfulness of Men Incorrigible.
4. Another proof of the point under consideration is found
in the incorrigible nature of original sin. It is, so far as we are concerned, an
incurable malady. Men are not so besotted even by the fall as to lose their moral
nature. They know that sin is an evil, and that it exposes them to the righteous
judgment of God. From the beginning of the world, therefore, they have tried not
only to expiate, but also to destroy it. They have resorted to all means possible
to them for this purpose. They have tried the resources of philosophy and of moral
culture. They have withdrawn from the contaminating society of their fellow-men.
They have summoned all the energies of their nature, and all the powers of their
will. They have subjected themselves to the most painful acts of self-denial, to
ascetic observances in all their forms. The only result of these efforts has been
that these anchorites have become like whitened sepulchres, which appear outwardly
beautiful, while within they are filled with dead men’s bones and all uncleanness.
Men have been slow to learn what our Lord teaches, that
Argument from the Experience of God’s People.
5. We may appeal on this subject to the experience of God’s
people in every age and in every part of the world. In no one respect has that experience
been more uniform, than in the conviction of their depravity in the sight of an
infinitely Holy God. The patriarch Job, represented as the best man of his generation,
placed his hand upon his mouth, and his mouth in the dust before God, and declared
that he abhorred himself, and repented in dust and ashes. David’s Penitential Psalms
are filled not only with the confessions of sin, but also with the avowals of his
deep depravity in the sight of God. Isaiah cried out, Woe is me! I am a man of unclean
lips, and I dwell among a people of unclean lips. The ancient prophets, even when
sanctified from the womb, pronounced their own righteousnesses as filthy rags. What
is said of the body politic is everywhere represented as true of the individual
man. The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot,
even unto the head, there is no soundness in it; but wounds, and bruises, and putrefying
sores. In the New Testament the sacred writers evince the same deep sense of their
own sinfulness, and strong conviction of the sinfulness of the race to which they
belong. Paul speaks of himself as the chief of sinners. He complains that he was
carnal, sold under sin. He groans under the burden of an evil nature, saying, O,
wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? From the
days of the Apostles to the present time, there has been no diversity as to this
point in the experience of Christians. There is no disposition ever evinced by them
to palliate or excuse their sinfulness before God. They uniformly and everywhere,
and just in proportion to their holiness, humble themselves under a sense of their
guilt and pollution, and abhor themselves repenting in dust and ashes. This is not
an irrational, nor is it an exaggerated experience. It is the natural effect of
the apprehension of the truth; of even a partial discernment of the holiness of
God, of the spirituality of the law, and of the want of conformity to that divine
standard. There is always connected with this experience of sin, the conviction
that our sense of its evil and its power over us, and consequently of our guilt
and pollution, is altogether inadequate. It is always a part of the believer’s burden,
that he feels less than his reason and conscience enlightened by the
6. It need scarcely be added, that what the Scriptures so
manifestly teach indirectly of the depth of the corruption of our fallen nature,
they teach also by direct assertion. The human heart is pronounced deceitful above
all things, and desperately wicked. Even in the beginning (
Third Argument from the early Manifestation of Sin.
A third great fact of Scripture and experience on this subject
is the early manifestation of sin. As soon as a child is capable of moral action,
it gives evidence of a perverted moral character. We not only see the manifestations
of anger, malice, selfishness, envy, pride, and other evil dispositions, but the
whole development of the soul is toward the world. The soul of a child turns by
an inward law from God to the creature, from the things that are unseen and eternal
to the things that are seen and temporal. It is in its earliest manifestations,
worldly, of the earth, earthy. As this is the testimony of universal experience,
so also it is the doctrine of the Bible.
These three undeniable facts, the universality of sin among
men, its controlling power, and its early manifestation, are clear proof of the
corruption of our common nature. It is a principle of judgment universally recognized
and acted upon, that a course of action in any creature, rational or irrational,
which is universal and controlling, and which is adopted uniformly from the beginning
of its
Evasions of the Foregoing Arguments.
The methods adopted by those who deny the doctrine of original sin, to account for the universality of sin, are in the highest degree unsatisfactory.
1. It is not necessary here to refer to the theories which get over this great difficulty either by denying the existence of sin, or by extenuating its evil nature, so that the difficulty ceases to exist. If there be really no such evil as sin, there is no sin to account for. But the fact of the existence of sin, of its universality and of its power, is too palpable and too much a matter of consciousness to admit of being denied or ignored.
2. Others contend that we have in the free agency of man a sufficient solution of the universality of sin. Men can sin; they choose to sin, and no further reason for the fact need be demanded. If Adam sinned without an antecedent corrupt nature, why, it is asked, must corruption of nature be assumed to account for the fact that other men sin? A uniform effect, however, demands a uniform cause. That a man can walk is no adequate reason why he always walks in one direction. A man may exercise his faculties to attain one object or another; the fact that he does devote them through a long life to the acquisition of wealth is not accounted for by saying that he is a free agent. The question is, Why his free agency is always exercised in one particular direction. The fact, therefore, that men are free agents is no solution for the universal sinfulness and total apostasy of our race from God.
3. Others seek in the order of development of the constituent
elements of our nature, an explanation of the fact in question. We are so constituted
that the sensuous faculties are called into exercise before the higher powers of
reason and conscience. The former therefore attain an undue ascendency, and lead
the child and the man to obey the lower instincts of his nature, when he should
be guided by his higher faculties. But, in the first place, this is altogether an
inadequate conception of our hereditary depravity. It does not consist exclusively
or principally in the ascendency of the flesh (in the limited sense of that word)
over the Spirit. It is a far deeper and more radical evil. It is spiritual death,
according to the express declarations of the Scriptures. And, in the second place,
it cannot be the normal condition of man that his natural faculties should develop
in such order as inevitably and universally to lead to his moral degradation and
ruin. And, in the third place, this theory relieves no difficulties while it accounts
for no facts. It is as hard to reconcile with the justice and goodness of God that
men should be born with a nature so constituted as certainly to lead them to sin,
as that they should be born in a state of sin. It denies any fair probation to the
race. According to the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, mankind had not
only a fair but a
The Scriptures expressly Teach the Doctrine.
The Scriptures not only indirectly teach the doctrine of original
sin, or of the hereditary, sinful corruption of our nature as derived from Adam,
by teaching, as we have seen, the universal and total depravity of our race, but
they directly assert the doctrine. They not only teach expressly that men sin universally
and from the first dawn of their being, but they also assert that the heart of man
is evil. It is declared to be “Deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked:
Who can know it?” (
The Psalmist also directly asserts this doctrine when he says
(
Another passage equally decisive is
The Bible Represents Men as Spiritually Dead.
Another way in which the Scriptures clearly teach the doctrine
of original sin is to be found in the passages in which they describe the natural
state of man since the fall. Men, all men, men of every nation, of every age, and
of every condition, are represented as spiritually dead. The natural man, man as
he is by nature, is destitute of the life of God, i.e., of spiritual life. His
understanding is darkness, so that he does not know or receive the things of God.
He is not susceptible of impression from the realities of the spiritual world. He
is as insensible to them as a dead man to the things of this world. He is alienated
from God, and utterly unable to deliver himself from this state of corruption and
misery. Those, and those only, are represented as delivered from this state in which
men are born, who are renewed by the Holy Ghost; who are quickened, or made alive
by the power of God, and who are therefore called spiritual as governed and actuated
by a higher principle than any which belongs to our fallen nature. “The natural
man,” says the Apostle (that is, man as he is by nature), “receiveth not the things
of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them;
because they are spiritually discerned.” (
Argument from the Necessity of Redemption.
Another argument in support of the doctrine of original sin
is that the Bible everywhere teaches that all men need redemption through the blood
of Christ. The Scriptures know nothing of the salvation of any of the human family
otherwise than through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. This is so plainly
the doctrine of the Bible that it never has been questioned in the Christian Church.
Infants need redemption as well as adults, for they also are included in the covenant
of grace. But redemption, in the Christian sense of the term, is deliverance through
the blood of Christ, from the power and consequences of sin. Christ came to save
sinners. He saves none but sinners. If He saves infants, infants must be in a state
of sin. There is no possibility of avoiding this conclusion, except by denying one
or the other of the premises from which it is drawn. We must either deny that infants
are saved through Christ, which is such a thoroughly anti-Christian sentiment, that
it has scarcely ever been avowed within the pale of the Church; or we must deny
that redemption, in the Christian sense of the term, includes deliverance from sin.
This is the ground taken by those who deny the doctrine of original sin, and yet
admit that infants are saved through Christ. They hold that in their case redemption
is merely preservation from sin. For Christ’s sake, or through his intervention,
they are transferred to a state of being in which their nature develops in holiness.
In answer to this evasion it is enough to remark, (1.) That it is contrary to the
plain and universally received doctrine of the Bible as to the nature of the work
of Christ. (2.) That this view supersedes the necessity of redemption at all. The
Bible, however, clearly teaches that the death of Christ is absolutely necessary;
that if there had been any other way in which men could be saved Christ is dead
in vain. (
Argument from the Necessity of Regeneration.
This is still further plain from what the Scriptures teach
concerning the necessity of regeneration. By regeneration is meant both in Scripture
and in the language of the Church, the renewing of the Holy Ghost; the change of
heart or of nature effected by the power of the Spirit, by which the soul passes
from a state of spiritual death into a state of spiritual life. It is that change
from sin to holiness, which our Lord pronounces absolutely essential to salvation.
Sinners only need regeneration. Infants need regeneration. Therefore infants are
in a state of sin. The only point in this argument which requires to be proved,
is that infants need regeneration in the sense above explained. This, however, hardly
admits of doubt. (1.) It is proved by the language of the Scriptures which assert
that all men must be born of the Spirit, in order to enter the Kingdom of God. The
expression used, is absolutely universal. It means every human being descended from
Adam by ordinary generation. No exception of class, tribe, character, or age is
made; and we are not authorized to make any such exception. But besides, as remarked
above, the reason assigned for this necessity of the new birth, applies to infants
as well as to adults. All who are born of the flesh, and because they are thus born,
our Lord says, must be born again (2.) Infants always have been included with their
parents in every revelation or enactment of the covenant of grace. The promise to
our first parents of a Redeemer, concerned their children as well as themselves.
The covenant with Abraham was not only with him, but also with his posterity, infant
and adult. The covenant at Mount Sinai, which as Paul teaches, included the covenant
of grace, was solemnly ratified with the people and with their “little ones.” The
Scriptures, therefore, always contemplate children from their birth as needing to
be saved, and as interested in the plan of salvation which it is the great design
of the Bible to reveal. (3.) This is still further evident from the fact that the
sign and seal of the covenant of grace, circumcision under the Old dispensation,
and baptism under the New, was applied to new-born infants. Circumcision was indeed
a sign and seal of the national covenant between God and the Hebrews as a nation.
That is, it was a seal of those promises made to Abraham, and afterwards through
Moses, which related to the external theocracy or Commonwealth of Israel. But nevertheless,
The same argument obviously applies to infant baptism. Baptism
is an ordinance instituted by Christ, to signify and seal the purification of the
soul, by the sprinkling of his blood, and its regeneration by the Holy Ghost. It
can therefore be properly administered only to those who are in a state of guilt
and pollution. It is, however, administered to infants, and therefore infants are
assumed to need pardon and sanctification. This is the argument which Pelagius and
his followers, more than all others, found it most difficult to answer. They could
not deny the import of the rite. They could not deny that it was properly administered
to infants, and yet they refused to admit the unavoidable conclusion, that infants
are born in sin. They were therefore driven to the unnatural evasion, that baptism
was administered to infants, not on the ground of their present state, but on the
assumption of their probable future condition. They were not sinners, but would
probably become such, and thus need the benefits of which baptism is the sign and
pledge. Even the Council of Trent found it necessary
Argument from the Universality of Death.
Another decisive argument on this subject, is drawn from the
universality of death. Death, according to the Scriptures, is a penal evil. It presupposes
sin. No rational moral creature is subject to death except on account of sin. Infants
die, therefore infants are the subjects of sin. The only way to evade this argument
is to deny that death is a penal evil. This is the ground taken by those who reject
the doctrine of original sin. They assert that it is a natural evil, flowing from
the original constitution of our nature, and that it is therefore no more a proof
that all men are sinners, than the death of brutes is a proof that they are sinners.
In answer to this objection, it is obvious to remark that men are not brutes. That
irrational animals, incapable of sin, are subject to death, is therefore no evidence
that moral creatures may be justly subject to the same evil, although free from
sin. But, in the second place, what is of far more weight, the objection is in direct
opposition to the declarations of the Word of God. According to the Bible, death
in the case of man is a punishment. It was threatened against Adam as the penalty
of transgression. If he had not sinned, neither had he died. The Apostle expressly
declares that death is the wages (or punishment) of sin; and death is on account
of sin. (
Although the Apostle’s argument as above stated is a direct
proof of original sin (or inherent, hereditary corruption), it is no less a proof,
as urged on another occasion, of the imputation of Adam’s sin. Paul does argue,
in
Argument from the Common Consent of Christians.
Finally, it is fair, on this subject, to appeal to the faith
of the Church universal. Protestants, in rejecting the doctrine of tradition, and
in asserting that the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and
New Testaments is the only infallible rule of faith and practice, do not reject
the authority of the Church as a teacher. They do not isolate themselves from the
great company
Objections.
The objections to this doctrine, it must be admitted, are many and serious. But this is true of all the great doctrines of religion, whether natural or revealed. Nor are such difficulties confined to the sphere of religion. Our knowledge in every department is limited, and in a great measure confined to isolated facts. We know that a stone falls to the ground, that a seed germinates and produces a plant after its own kind; but it is absolutely impossible for us to understand how these familiar effects are accomplished. We know that God is, and that He governs all his creatures, but we do not know how his effectual controlling agency is consistent with the free agency of rational beings. We know that sin and misery exist in the world, and we know that God is infinite in power, holiness, and benevolence. How to reconcile the prevalence of sin with the character of God we know not. These are familiar and universally admitted facts as well in philosophy as in religion. A thing may be, and often certainly is true, against which objections may be urged which no man is able to answer. There are two important practical principles which follow from the facts just mentioned. First, that it is not a sufficient or a rational ground for rejecting any well authenticated truth that we are not able to free it from objections or difficulties. And, secondly, any objection against a religious doctrine is to be regarded as sufficiently answered if it can be shown to bear with equal force against an undeniable fact. If the objection is not a rational reason for denying the fact it is not a rational reason for rejecting the doctrine. This is the method which the sacred writers adopt in vindicating truth.
It will be seen that almost all the objections against the doctrine of original sin are in conflict with one or the other of the principles just mentioned. Either they are addressed not to the evidences of the truth of the doctrine whether derived from Scripture or from experience, but to the difficulty of reconciling it with other truths; or these objections are insisted upon as fatal to the doctrine when they obviously are as valid against the facts of providence as they are against the teachings of Scripture.
The Objection that Men are Responsible only for their Voluntary Acts.
1. The most obvious objection to the doctrine of original
sin is rounded on the assumption that nothing can have moral character except voluntary
acts and the states of mind resulting from or produced
Objection Founded on the Justice of God.
2. It is objected that it is inconsistent with the justice
of God that men should come into the world in a state of sin. In answer to this
objection it may be remarked, (1.) That whatever God does must be right. If He permits
men to be born in sin, that fact must be consistent with his divine perfection.
(2.) It is a fact of experience no less than a doctrine of Scripture that men are
either, as the Church teaches, born in a state of sin and condemnation, or, as all
men must admit, in a state which inevitably leads to their becoming sinful and miserable.
The objection, therefore, bears against a providential fact as much as against a
Scriptural doctrine. We must either deny God or admit that the existence and universality
The Doctrine represents God as the Author of Sin.
3. A third objection often and confidently urged is, that
the Church doctrine on this subject makes God the author of sin. God is the author
of our nature, If our nature be sinful, God must be the author of sin. The obvious
fallacy of this syllogism is, that the word nature is used in one sense in the major
proposition, and in a different sense in the minor. In the one it means substance
or essence; in the other, natural disposition. It is true that God is the author
of our essence. But our essence is not sinful. God is indeed our Creator. He made
us, and not we ourselves. We are the work of his hands. He is the Father of the
spirits of all men. But He is not the author of the evil dispositions with which
that nature is infected at birth. The doctrine of original sin attributes no efficiency
to God in the production of evil. It simply supposes that He judicially abandons
our apostate race, and withholds from the descendants of Adam the manifestations
of his favour and love, which are the life of the soul. That the inevitable consequence
of this judicial abandonment is spiritual death, no more makes God the author of
sin, than the immorality and desperate and unchanging wickedness of the reprobate,
from whom God withholds his Spirit, are to be referred to the infinitely Holy One
as their author. It is moreover a historical fact universally admitted, that character,
within certain limits, is transmissible from parents to children. Every nation,
separate tribe, and even every extended family of men, has its physical, mental,
social, and moral peculiarities which are propagated from generation to generation.
No process of discipline or culture can transmute a Tartar into an Englishman, or
an Irishman into a Frenchman. The Bourbons, the Hapsburgs, and other historical
families, have retained and transmitted their peculiarities for ages. We may be
unable to explain thus, but we cannot deny it. No one is born an absolute man, with
nothing but generic humanity belonging to him. Everyone is born a man in a definite
state, with all those characteristics physical,
It is said to destroy the Free Agency of Men.
4. It is further objected to this doctrine that it destroys the free agency of man. If we are born with a corrupt nature by which we are inevitably determined to sinful acts, we cease to be free in performing those acts, and consequently are not responsible for them. This objection is founded on a particular theory of liberty, and must stand or fall with it. The same objection is urged against the doctrines of decrees, of efficacious grace, of the perseverance of the saints, and all other doctrines which assume that a free act can be absolutely certain as to its occurrence. It is enough here to remark that the doctrine of original sin supposes men to have the same kind and degree of liberty in sinning under the influence of a corrupt nature, that saints and angels have in acting rightly under the influence of a holy nature. To act according to its nature is the only liberty which belongs to any created being.
§ 14. The Seat of Original Sin.
Having considered the nature of original sin, the next question concerns its
seat. According to one theory it is in the body. The only evil effect of Adam’s
sin upon his posterity, which some theologians admit, is the disorder of his physical
nature, whereby undue influence is secured to bodily appetites and passions. Scarcely
distinguishable from this theory is the doctrine that the sensuous nature of man,
as distinguished from the reason and conscience, is alone affected by our hereditary
depravity. A third doctrine is, that the heart, considered as the seat of the affections
as distinguished from the understanding, is the seat of natural depravity. This
doctrine is connected with the idea that all sin and holiness are forms of feeling
or states of the affections. And it is made the ground on which the nature of regeneration
and conversion, the relation between repentance and faith, and other points of practical
theology are explained. Everything is made to depend on the inclinations or state
of the feelings. Instead of the affections following the understanding, the understanding
it is said, follows the affections. A man understands and receives the truth only
when he loves it. Regeneration is simply a change in time state of the affections,
and the only inability under which sinners labour as to the things of God, is disinclination.
In opposition to all these doctrines
As the Scriptures speak of the body being sanctified in two senses, first, as being consecrated to the service of God; and secondly, as being in a normal condition in all its relations to our spiritual nature, so as to be a fit instrument unto righteousness; and also as a partaker of the benefits of redemption; so also they represent the body as affected by the apostasy of our race. It is not only employed in the service of sin or as an instrument to unrighteousness; but it is in every respect deteriorated. It is inordinate in its cravings, rebellious, and hard to restrain. It is as the Apostle says, the opposite of the glorious, spiritual body with which the believer is hereafter to be invested.
The Whole Soul the Seat of Original Sin.
The theory that the affections (or, the heart in the limited sense of that word), to the exclusion of the rational faculties, are alone affected by original sin, is unscriptural, and the opposite doctrine which makes the whole soul the subject of inherent corruption, is the doctrine of the Bible, as appears, —
1. Because the Scriptures do not make the broad distinction between the understanding and the heart, which is commonly made in our philosophy. They speak of “the thoughts of the heart,” of “the intents of the heart,” and of “the eyes of the heart,” as well as of its emotions and affections. The whole immaterial principle is in the Bible designated as the soul, the spirit, the mind, the heart. And therefore when it speaks of the heart, it means the man, the self, that in which personal individuality resides. If the heart be corrupt the whole soul in all its powers is corrupt.
2. The opposite doctrine assumes that there is nothing moral
in our cognitions or judgments; that all knowledge is purely speculative. Whereas,
according to the Scripture the chief sins of men consist in their wrong judgments,
in thinking and believing evil to be good, and good to be evil. This in its highest
form, as our Lord teaches us, is the unpardonable sin, or blasphemy against the
Holy Ghost. It was because the Pharisees thought that Christ was evil, that his
works were the works of Satan, that He declared that they could never be forgiven.
It was because Paul could see no beauty in Christ that he should desire Him, and
because he verily thought
3. A third argument on this subject is drawn from the fact that the Bible represents the natural or unrenewed man as blind or ignorant as to the things of the Spirit. It declares that he cannot know them. And the fallen condition of human nature is represented as consisting primarily in this mental blindness. Men are corrupt, says the Apostle, through the ignorance that is in them.
4. Conversion is said to consist in a translation from darkness to light. God is said to open the eyes. The eyes of the understanding (or heart) are said to be enlightened. All believers are declared to be the subjects of a spiritual illumination. Paul describes his own conversion by saying that, “God revealed his Son in him.” He opened his eyes to enable him to see that Jesus was the Son of God, or God manifest in the flesh. He thereby became a new creature, and his whole life was thenceforth devoted to the service of Him, whom before he hated and persecuted.
5. Knowledge is said to be the effect of regeneration. Men are renewed so as to know. They are brought to the knowledge of the truth; and they are sanctified by the truth. From all these considerations it is evident that the whole man is the subject of original sin; that our cognitive, as well as our emotional nature is involved in the depravity consequent on our apostasy from God that in knowing as well as in loving or in willing, we are under the influence and dominion of sin.
§ 15. Inability.
The third great point included in the Scriptural doctrine of original sin, is the inability of fallen man in his natural state, of himself to do anything spiritually good. This is necessarily included in the idea of spiritual death. On this subject it is proposed: (1.) To state the doctrine as presented in the symbols of the Protestant churches. (2.) To explain the nature of the inability under which the sinner is said to labour. (3.) To exhibit the Scriptural proofs of the doctrine; and (4.) To answer the objections usually urged against it.
The Doctrine as stated in Protestant Symbols.
There have been three general views as to the ability of fallen man, which have prevailed in the Church. The first, the Pelagian doctrine, which asserts the plenary ability of sinners to do all that God requires of them. The second is the Semi-Pelagian doctrine (taking the word Semi-Pelagian in its wide and popular sense), which admits the powers of man to have been weakened by the fall of the race, but denies that he lost all ability to perform what is spiritually good. And thirdly, the Augustinian or Protestant doctrine which teaches that such is the nature of inherent, hereditary depravity that men since the fall are utterly unable to turn themselves unto God, or to do anything truly good in his sight. With these three views of the ability of fallen men are connected corresponding views of grace, or the influence and operations of the Holy Spirit in man’s regeneration and conversion. Pelagians deny the necessity of any supernatural influence of the Spirit in the regeneration and sanctification of men. Semi-Pelagians admit the necessity of such divine influence to assist the enfeebled powers of man in the work of turning unto God, but claim that the sinner coöperates in that work and that upon his voluntary coöperation the issue depends. Augustinians and Protestants ascribe the whole work of regeneration to the Spirit of God, the soul being passive therein, the subject, and not the agent of the change; although active and coöperating in all the exercises of the divine life of which it has been made the recipient.
The doctrine of the sinner’s inability is thus stated in the
symbols of the Lutheran Church. The “Augsburg Confession”
“Formula Concordiæ:”
“Sacræ literæ hominis non renati cor duro lapidi, qui ad
tactum non cedat, sed resistat, idem rudi trunco, interdum etiam feræ in domitæ
comparant, non quod homo post lapsum non amplius sit rationalis creatura, aut quod
absque auditu et meditatione verbi divini ad Deum convertatur, aut quod in rebus
externis et civilibus nihil boni aut mali intelligere possit, aut libere aliquid
agere vel omittere queat.”
“Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese, et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus
spiritualibus, et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam nihil inchoare, operari,
aut coöperari potest, nec plus, quam lapis, truncus, aut limus.”
The doctrine of the Reformed churches is to the same effect.
“Quantum vero ad bonum et ad virtutes, intellectus hominis,
non recte judicat de divinis ex semetipso. . . . Constat vero mentem vel intellectum
ducem esse voluntatis, cum autem cœcus sit dux, claret quousque et voluntas pertingat.
Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum, nondum renato; vires nullæ
ad perficiendum bonum. . . . .
“Confessio Gallicana:” “Etsi enim nonnullam habet boni et
mali discretionem: affirmamus tamen quicquid habet lucis mox fieri tenebras, cum
de quærendo Deo agitur, adeo ut sua intelligentia et ratione nullo modo possit
ad eum accedere: item quamvis voluntate sit præditus, qua ad hoc vel illud movetur,
tamen quum ea sit penitus sub peccato captiva, nullam prorsus habet ad bonum appetendum
libertatem, nisi quam ex gratia et Dei dono acceperit.”
“Articuli XXXIX:” “Ea est hominis post lapsum Adæ conditio,
ut sese naturalibus suis viribus et bonis operibus ad fidem et invocationem Dei
convertere ac præparare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei quæ per Christum est nos præveniente, ut velimus et cooperante dum volumus, ad pietatis opera facienda,
quæ Deo grata sunt ac accepta, nihil valemus.”
“Opera quæ fiunt ante gratiam Christi, et Spiritus ejus afflatum,
cum ex fide Christi non prodeant minime Deo grata sunt. . . . . Immo, cum non sint
facta ut Deus illa fieri voluit et præcepit, peccati rationem habere non dubitamus.”
“Canones Dordrechtanæ,”
“Residuum quidem est post lapsum in homine lumen aliquod naturæ,
cujus beneficio ille notitias quasdam de Deo, de rebus naturalibus,
“Westminster Confession.”
“Their (believers’) ability to do good works is not at all
of themselves, but wholly from the Spirit of Christ.”
Effectual calling “is of God’s free and special grace alone,
not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until,
being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer
this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.”
The Nature of the Sinner’s Inability.
It appears from the authoritative statements of this doctrine, as given in the standards of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, that the inability under which man, since the fall, is said to labour, does not arise: —
Inability does not arise from the Loss of any Faculty of the Soul.
1. From the loss of any faculty of his mind or of any original, essential attribute of his nature. He retains his reason, will, and conscience. He has the intellectual power of cognition, the power of self-determination, and the faculty of discerning between moral good and evil. His conscience, as the Apostle says, approves or disapproves of his moral acts.
Nor from the Loss of Free-agency.
2 The doctrine of man’s inability, therefore, does not assume
that man has ceased to be a free moral agent. He is free because he determines his
own acts. Every volition is an act of free self-determination. He is a moral agent
because he has the consciousness of moral obligation, and whenever he sins he acts
freely
Inability not mere Disinclination.
3. The inability of sinners, according to the above statement of the doctrine, is not mere disinclination or aversion to what is good. This disinclination exists, but it is not the ultimate fact. There must be some cause or reason for it. As God and Christ are infinitely lovely, the fact that sinners do not love them is not accounted for by saying that they are not inclined to delight in infinite excellence. That is only stating the same thing in different words. If a man does not perceive the beauty of a work of art, or of a literary production, it is no solution of the fact to say that he has no inclination for such forms of beauty. Why is it that what is beautiful in itself, and in the judgment of all competent judges, is without form or comeliness in his eyes? Why is it that the supreme excellence of God, and all that makes Christ the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely in the sight of saints and angels, awaken no corresponding feelings in the unrenewed heart? The inability of the sinner, therefore, neither consists in his disinclination to good nor does it arise exclusively from that source.
It Arises from the Want of Spiritual Discernment.
4. According to the Scriptures and to the standards of doctrine
above quoted, it consists in the want of power rightly to discern spiritual things,
and the consequent want of all right affections toward them. And this want of power
of spiritual discernment arises from the corruption of our whole nature, by which
the reason or understanding is blinded, and the taste and feelings are perverted.
And as this state of mind is innate, as it is a state or condition of our nature,
it lies below the will, and is beyond its power, controlling both our affections
and our volitions. It is indeed a familiar fact of experience that a man’s judgments
as to what is true or false, right or wrong, are in many cases determined by his
interests or feelings. Some have, in their philosophy, generalized this fact into
a law, and teach that as to all æsthetic and moral subjects the judgments and apprehensions
of the understanding are determined by the state of the feelings. In applying this
law to the matters
Inability Asserted only in Reference to the “Things of the Spirit.”
5. This inability is asserted only in reference to “the things
of the Spirit.” It is admitted in all the Confessions above quoted that man since
the fall has not only the liberty of choice of self-determination, but also is able
to perform moral acts, good as well as evil. He can be kind and just, and fulfil
his social duties in a mariner to secure the approbation of his fellow-men. It is
not meant that the state of mind in which these acts are performed, or the motives
by which they are determined, are such as to meet the approbation of an infinitely
holy God; but simply that these acts, as to the matter of them, are prescribed by
the moral law. Theologians, as we have seen, designate the class of acts as to which
fallen man retains his ability as “justitia civilis,” or “things external.”
And the class as to which his inability is asserted is designated as “the things
of God,” “the things of the Spirit,” “things connected with salvation.” The difference
between these two classes of acts, although it may not be easy to state it in words,
as universally recognized. There is an obvious difference between morality and religion;
and between those religious affections of reverence and gratitude which all men
more or less experience, and true piety. The difference lies in the state of mind,
the
In one Sense this Inability is Natural.
6. This inability is natural in one familiar and important sense of the word. It is not natural in the same sense that reason, will, and conscience are natural. These constitute our nature, and without them or any one of them, we should cease to be men. In the second place, it is not natural as arising from the necessary limitations of our nature and belonging to our original and normal condition. It arises out of the nature of man as a creature that he cannot create, and cannot produce any effect out of himself by a mere volition. Adam in the state of perfection could not will a stone to move, or a plant to grow. It is obvious that an inability arising from either of the sources above mentioned, i.e., from the want of any of the essential faculties of our nature, or from the original and normal limitations of our being, involves freedom from obligation. In this sense nothing is more true than that ability limits obligation. No creature can justly be required to do what surpasses his powers as a creature.
On the other hand, although the inability of sinners is not natural in either of the senses above stated, it is natural in the sense that it arises out of the present state of his nature. It is natural in the same sense as selfishness, pride, and worldly mindedness are natural. It is not acquired, or super-induced by any ab extra influence, but flows from the condition in which human nature exists since the fall of Adam.
In another Sense it is Moral.
7. This inability, although natural in the sense just stated, is nevertheless moral, inasmuch as it arises out of the moral state of the soul, as it relates to moral action, and as it is removed by a moral change, that is, by regeneration.
Objections to the Popular Distinction between Natural and Moral Ability.
In this country much stress has been laid upon the distinction between moral and natural ability. It has been regarded as one of the great American improvements in theology, and as marking an important advance in the science. It is asserted that man since the fall has natural ability to do all that is required of him, and on this ground his responsibility is made to rest; but it is admitted that he is morally unable to turn unto God, or perfectly keep his commandments. By this distinction, it is thought, we may save the great principle that ability limits obligation, that a man cannot be bound to do what he cannot do, and at the same time hold fast the Scriptural doctrine which teaches that the sinner cannot of himself repent or change his own heart. With regard to this distinction as it is commonly and popularly presented, it may be remarked: —
1. That the terms natural and moral are not antithetical. A thing may be at once natural and moral. The inability of the sinner, as above remarked, although moral, is in a most important sense natural. And, therefore, it is erroneous to say, that it is simply moral and not natural.
2. The terms are objectionable not only because they lack precision, but also because they are ambiguous. One man means by natural ability nothing more than the possession of the attributes of reason, will, and conscience. Another means plenary power, all that is requisite to produce a given effect. And this is the proper meaning of the words. Ability is the power to do. If a man has the natural ability to love God, he has full power to love Him. And if He has the power to love Him, he has all that is requisite to call that love into exercise. As this is the proper meaning of the terms, it is the meaning commonly attached to them. Those who insist on the natural ability of the sinner, generally assert that he has full power, without divine assistance, to do all that is required of him: to love God with all his soul and mind and strength, and his neighbour as himself. All that stands in the way of his thus doing is not an inability, but simply disinclination, or the want of will. An ability which is not adequate to the end contemplated, is no ability. It is therefore a serious objection to the use of this distinction, as commonly made, that it involves a great error. It asserts that the sinner is able to do what in fact he cannot do.
3. It is a further objection to this mode of stating the doctrine that it tends to embarrass or to deceive. It must embarrass the people to be told that they can and cannot repent and believe. One or the other of the two propositions, in the ordinary and proper sense of the terms, must be false. And and esoteric or metaphysical sense in which the theologian may attempt to reconcile them, the people will neither appreciate nor respect. It is a much more serious objection that it tends to deceive men to tell them that they can change their own hearts, can repent, and can believe. This is not true, and every man’s consciousness tells him that it is untrue. It is of no avail for the preacher to say that all he means by ability is that men have all the faculties of rational beings, and that those are the only faculties to be exercised in turning to God or in doing his will. We might as reasonably tell an uneducated man that he can understand and appreciate the Iliad, because he has all the faculties which the scholar possesses. Still less does it avail to say that the only difficulty is in the will. And therefore when we say that men can love God, we mean that they can love Him if they will. If the word will, be here taken in its ordinary sense for the power of self-determination, the proposition that a man can love God if he will, is not true; for it is notorious that the affections are not under the power of the will. If the word be taken in a wide sense as including the affections, the proposition is a truism. It amounts to saying, that we can love God if we do love Him.
4. The distinction between natural and moral ability, as commonly made, is unscriptural. It has already been admitted that there is an obvious and very important distinction between an inability arising out of the limitations of our being as creatures, and an inability arising out of the apostate state of our nature since the Fall of Adam. But this is not what is commonly meant by those who assert the natural ability of men to do all that God requires of them. They mean and expressly assert that man, as his nature now is, is perfectly able to change his own heart, to repent and lead a holy life; that the only difficulty in the way of his so doing is the want of inclination, controllable by his own power. It is this representation which is unscriptural. The Scriptures never thus address fallen men and assure them of their ability to deliver themselves from the power of sin.
5. The whole tendency and effect of this mode of statement
are injurious and dangerous. If a sinner must be convinced of his guilt before he
can trust in the righteousness of Christ for his justification,
In opposition therefore to the Pelagian doctrine of the sinner’s plenary ability, to the Semi-Pelagian or Arminian doctrine of what is called “a gracious ability,” that is, an ability granted to all who hear the gospel by the common and sufficient grace of the Holy Spirit, and to the doctrine that the only inability of the sinner is his disinclination to good, Augustinians have ever taught that this inability is absolute and entire. It is natural as well as moral. It is as complete, although different in kind, as the inability of the blind to see, of the deaf to hear, or of the dead to restore themselves to life.
Proof of the Doctrine.
1. The first and most obvious argument in support of the Augustinian or Orthodox argument on this subject is the negative one. That is, the fact that the Scriptures nowhere attribute to fallen men ability to change their own hearts or to turn themselves unto God. As their salvation depends on their regeneration, if that work was within the compass of their own powers, it is incredible that the Bible should never rest the obligation of effecting it upon the sinner’s ability. If he had the power to regenerate himself, we should expect to find the Scriptures affirming his possession of this ability, and calling upon him to exercise it. It may indeed be said that the very command to repent and believe implies the possession of everything that is requisite to obedience to the command. It does imply that those to whom it is addressed are rational creatures, capable of moral obligation, and that they are free moral agents. It implies nothing more. The command is nothing more than the authoritative declaration of what is obligatory upon those to whom it is addressed. We are required to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. The obligation is imperative and constant. Yet no sane man can assert his own ability to make himself thus perfect. Notwithstanding therefore the repeated commands given in the Bible to sinners to love God with all the heart, to repent and believe the gospel, and live without sin, it remains true that the Scriptures nowhere assert or recognize the ability of fallen man to fulfil these requisitions of duty.
Express Declarations of the Scriptures.
2. Besides this negative testimony of the Scriptures, we have
the repeated and explicit declarations of the Word of God on this subject. Our Lord
compares the relation between himself and his people to that which exists between
the vine and its branches. The point of analogy is the absolute dependence common
to both relations. “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in
the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me Without me ye can do nothing.” (
Involved in the Doctrine of Original Sin.
3. The doctrine of the sinner’s inability is involved in the
Scriptural doctrine of original sin. By the apostasy of man from God he not only
lost the divine image and favour, but sunk into a state of spiritual death. The
Bible and reason alike teach that God is the life of the soul; his favour, and communion
with Hun, are essential not only to happiness but also to holiness. Those who are
under his wrath and curse and are banished from his presence, are in outer darkness.
They have no true knowledge, no desire after fellowship with a Being who to them
is a consuming fire. To the Apostle it appears as the greatest absurdity and impossibility
that a soul out of favour with God should be holy. This is the fundamental idea
of his doctrine of sanctification. Those who are under the law are under the curse,
and those who are under the curse are absolutely ruined. It is essential, therefore,
to holiness that we should be delivered from the law and restored to the favour
of God before any exercise of love or any act of true obedience can he performed
or experienced on our part. We are free from sin only because we are not under the
law, put under grace. The whole of the sixth and seventh chapters of the Epistle
to the Romans is devoted to the development of this principle. To the Apostle the
doctrine that the sinner has ability of himself to return
The Necessity of the Spirit’s influence.
4. The next argument on this subject is derived from what
the Scriptures teach of the necessity and nature of the Spirit’s influence in regeneration
and sanctification. If any man will take a Greek Concordance of the New Testament,
and see how often the words Πνεῦμα and
Τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον are used by the sacred writers,
he will learn how prominent a part the Holy Spirit takes in saving men, and how
hopeless is the case of those who are left to themselves. What the Scriptures clearly
teach as to this point is, (1.) That the Holy Spirit is the source of spiritual
life and all its exercises; that without his supernatural influence we can no more
perform holy acts than a dead branch, or a branch separated from the vine can produce
fruit. (2.) That in the first instance (that is, in regeneration) the soul is the
subject and not the agent of the change produced. The Spirit gives life, and then
excites and guides all
The Argument from Experience.
5. This is a practical question. What a man is able to do
is best determined not by à priori reasoning, or by logical deductions from
the nature of his faculties, but by putting his ability to the test. The thing to
be done is to turn from sin to holiness; to love God perfectly and our neighbour
as ourselves; to perform every duty without defect or omission, and keep ourselves
from all sin of thought, word, or deed, of heart or life. Can any man do this? Does
any man need argument to convince him that he cannot do it? He knows two things
as clearly and as surely as he knows his own existence: first, that he is bound
to be morally perfect, to keep all God’s commands, to have all right feelings in
constant exercise as the occasion calls for them, and to avoid all sin in feeling
as well as in act; and, secondly, that he can no more do this than he can raise
the dead. The metaphysician may endeavour to prove to the people that there is no
external world, that matter is thought; and the metaphysician may believe it, but
the people, whose faith is determined by the instincts and divinely constituted
laws of their nature, will retain their own intuitive convictions. In like manner
the metaphysical theologian may tell sinners that they can regenerate themselves,
can repent and believe, and love God perfectly,
It is universally admitted, because a universal fact of consciousness, that the feelings and affections are not under the control of the will. No man can love what is hateful to him, or hate what he delights in, by any exercise of his self-determining power. Hence the philosophers, with Kant, pronounce the command to love, an absurdity, as sceptics declare the command to believe, absurd. But the foolishness of men is the wisdom of God. It is right that we should be required to love God and believe his Word, whether the exercise of love and faith be under the control of our will or not. The only way by which this argument from the common consciousness of men can be evaded, is by denying that feeling has any moral character; or by assuming that the demands of the law are accommodated to the ability of the agent. If he cannot love holiness, he is not bound to love it. If he cannot believe all the gospel, he is required to believe only what he can believe, what he can see to be true in the light of his own reason. Both these assumptions, however, are contrary to the intuitive convictions of all men, and to the express declarations of the Word of God. All men know that moral character attaches to feelings as well as to purposes or volitions; that benevolence as a feeling is right and malice as a feeling is wrong. They know with equal certainty that the demands of right are immutable, that the law of God cannot lower itself to the measure of the power of fallen creatures. It demands of them nothing that exceeds the limitations of their nature as creatures; but it does require the full and constant, and therefore perfect, exercise of those powers in the service of God and in accordance with his will. And this is precisely what every fallen rational human being is fully persuaded he cannot do. The conviction of inability, therefore, is as universal and as indestructible as the belief of existence, and all the sophisms of metaphysical theologians are as impotent as the subtleties of the idealist or pantheist. Any man or set of men, any system of philosophy or of theology which attempts to stem the great stream of human consciousness is certain to be swept down into the abyss of oblivion or destruction.
Conviction of Sin.
There is another aspect of this argument which deserves to be considered. What is conviction of sin? What are the experiences of those whom the Spirit of God brings under that conviction? The answer to these questions may be drawn from the Bible, as for example time seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, from the records of the inward life of the people of God in all ages, and from every believer’s own religious experience. From all these sources it may be proved that every soul truly convinced of sin is brought to feel and acknowledge, (1.) That he is guilty in the sight of God, and justly exposed to the sentence of his violated law. (2.) That he is utterly polluted and defiled by sin; that his thoughts, feelings, and acts are not what conscience or the divine law can approve; and that it is not separate, transient acts only by which he is thus polluted, but also that his heart is not right, that sin exists in him as a power or a law working in him all manner of evil. And, (3.) That he can make no atonement for his guilt, and that he cannot free himself from the power of sin; so that he is forced to cry out, O wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death! This sense of utter helplessness, of absolute inability, is as much and as universally an element of genuine conviction as a sense of guilt or the consciousness of defilement. It is a great mercy that the theology of the heart is often better than the theology of the head.
6. The testimony of every man’s consciousness is confirmed
by the common consciousness of the Church and by the whole history of our race.
Appeal may be made with all confidence to the prayers, hymns, and other devotional
writings of the people of God for proof that no conviction is more deeply impressed
on the hearts of all true Christians than that of their utter helplessness and entire
dependence upon the grace of God. They deplore their inability to love their Redeemer,
to keep themselves from sin, to live a holy life in any degree adequate to their
own convictions of their obligations. Under this inability they humble themselves,
they never plead it as an excuse or palliation; they recognize it as the fruit and
evidence of the corruption of their nature derived as a sad inheritance from their
first parents. They refer with one voice, whatever there is of good in them, not
to their own ability, but to the Holy Spirit. Everyone adopts as expressing the
inmost conviction of his heart, the language of the Apostle, “Not I, but the grace
of God which was with me.” As this is the testimony
Objections.
1. The most obvious and plausible objection to this doctrine
is the old one so often considered already, namely, that it is inconsistent with
moral obligation. A man, it is said, cannot be justly required to do any thing for
which he has not the requisite ability. The fallacy of this objection lies in the
application of this principle. It is self-evidently true in one sphere, but utterly
untrue in another. It is true that the blind cannot justly be required to see, or
the deaf to hear. A child cannot be required to understand the calculus, or an uneducated
man to read the classics. These things belong to the sphere of nature. The inability
which thus limits obligation arises out of the limitations which God has imposed
on our nature. The principle in question does not apply in the sphere cf morals
and religion, when the inability arises not out of the limitation, but out of the
moral corruption of our nature. Even in the sphere of religion there is a bound
set to obligation by the capacity of the agent. An infant cannot be expected or
required to have the measure of holy affections which fills the souls of the just
made perfect. It is only when inability arises from sin and is removed by the removal
of sin, that it is consistent with continued obligation. And as it has been shown
from Scripture that the inability of the sinner to repent and believe, to love God
and to lead a holy life, does not arise from the limitation of his nature as a creature
(as is the case with idiots or brutes); nor from the want of the requisite faculties
or capacity, but simply from the corruption of our nature, it follows that it does
not exonerate him from the obligation to be and to do all that God requires. This,
as shown above,
We are responsible for external acts, because they depend on our volitions. We are responsible for our volitions because they depend on our principles and feelings; and we are responsible for our feelings and for those states of mind which constitute character, because (within the sphere of morals and religion) they are right or wrong in their own nature. The fact that the affections and permanent and even immanent states of the mind are beyond the power of the will does not (as has been repeatedly shown in these pages), remove them out of the sphere of moral obligation. As this is attested by Scripture and by the general judgment of men, the assumed axiom that ability limits obligation in the sphere of morals cannot be admitted.
Moral obligation being founded upon the possession of the attributes of a moral agent, reason, conscience, and will, it remains unimpaired so long as these attributes remain. If reason be lost all responsibility for character or conduct ceases. If the consciousness of the difference between right and wrong, the capacity to perceive moral distinctions does not exist in a creature or does not belong to its nature, that creature is not the subject of moral obligation, and in like manner if he is not an agent, is not invested with the faculty of spontaneous activity as a personal being, he ceases, so far as his conscious states are concerned, to be responsible for what he is or does. Since the Scriptural and Augustinian doctrine admits that man since the fall retains his reason, conscience, and will, it leaves the grounds of responsibility for character and conduct unimpaired.
It does not weaken the Motives to Exertion.
2. Another popular objection to the Scriptural doctrine on
this subject is, that it destroys all rational grounds on which rests the use of
the means of grace. If we cannot accomplish a given end, why should we use the means
for its accomplishment? So the farmer might say, If I cannot secure a harvest, why
should I cultivate my fields? In every department of human activity the result depends
on the coöperation of causes over which man has no control. He is expected to use
the means adapted to the desired end and trust for the coöperation of other agencies
without which his
The Doctrine does not encourage Delay.
3. Still another objection is everywhere urged against this
doctrine. It is said that it encourages delay. If a man believes that he cannot
change his heart, cannot repent and believe the gospel, he will say, “I must wait
God’s time. As He gives men a new heart, as faith and repentance are his gifts I
must wait until He is pleased
§ 3. Certainty Consistent with Liberty.
In all discussions concerning sin and grace, the question concerning the nature and necessary conditions of free agency is of necessity involved. This is one of the points in which theology and psychology come into immediate contact. There is a theory of free agency with which the doctrines of original sin and of efficacious grace are utterly irreconcilable, and there is another theory with which those doctrines are perfectly consistent. In all ages of the Church, therefore, those who have adopted the former of these theories, reject those doctrines; and, on the other hand, those who are constrained to believe those doctrines, are no less constrained to adopt the other and congenial theory of free agency. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Remonstrants are not more notoriously at variance with Augustinians, Lutherans, and Calvinists, on the doctrines of sin and grace, than they are on the metaphysical and moral question of human liberty. In every system of theology, therefore, there is a chapter De libero arbitrio. This is a question which every theologian finds in his path, and which he must dispose of; and on the manner in which it is determined depends his theology, and of course his religion, so far as his theology is to him a truth and reality.
It may seem preposterous to attempt, in the compass of a few pages, the discussion of a question on which so many volumes have been written. There is, however, this important difference between all subjects which relate to the soul, or the world within, and those which relate to the external world: with regard to the former, all the materials of knowledge being facts of consciousness, are already in our possession; whereas, in regard to the latter, the facts have first to be collected. In questions, therefore, which relate to the mind, a mere statement of the case is often all that is required, and all that can be given. If that statement be correct, the facts of consciousness spontaneously arrange themselves in order around it; if it be incorrect, they obstinately refuse to be thus marshalled. If this be so, why is it that men differ so much about these questions? To this it may be answered, —
1. That they do not differ so much as they appear to. When
2. On no subject is the ambiguity of language a more serious impediment, in the way of conscious agreement, than in reference to this whole department, and especially in regard to the question of free agency. The same statement often appears true to one mind and false to another, because it is understood differently. This ambiguity arises partly from the inherent imperfection of human language. Words have, and must have more than one use; and although we may define our terms, and state in which its several senses we use a given word, yet the exigencies of language, or inattention, almost unavoidably lead to its being employed in some other of its legitimate meanings. Besides, the states of mind which these terms are employed to designate, are themselves so complex that no words can accurately represent them. We have terms to express the operations of the intellect, others to designate the feelings, and others again for acts of the will; but thousands of our acts include the exercise of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will, and it is absolutely impossible to find words for all these complex and varying states of mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that men should misunderstand each other, fail in their most strenuous efforts to express what they mean so that others shall attach precisely the same sense to the words which they use.
3. There is another reason for the diversity of opinion which
has ever prevailed on all subjects connected with free agency. Although the facts
which should determine the questions discussed are facts of consciousness common
to all men, yet they are so numerous and of such different kinds, that it is hard
to allow each its place and importance. From habit, or mental training, or from
the moral state of mind, some men allow too much weight to one class of these facts,
and too little to another. Some are governed
§ 1. Different Theories of the Will.
All the different theories of the will may be included under the three classes of Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty.
Necessity.
To the first of these classes belong: —
1. The doctrine of Fatalism, which teaches that all events
are determined by a blind necessity. This necessity does not arise from the will
of an intelligent Being governing all his creatures and all their acts according
to their nature, and for purposes of wisdom and goodness; but from a law of sequence
to which God (or rather the gods) as well as men is subject. It precludes the idea
of foresight or plan, or of the voluntary selection of an end, and the adoption
of means for its accomplishment. Things are as they are, and must be as they are,
and are to be, without any rational cause. This theory ignores any distinction between
physical laws and free agency. The acts of men and the operations of nature are
determined by a necessity of the same kind. Events are like a mighty stream borne
onward by a resistless force, — a force outside of themselves, which cannot be controlled
or modified. All we have to do is to acquiesce in being thus carried on. Whether
we acquiesce or not makes no difference. A man falling from a precipice cannot by
an act of will counteract the force of gravity; neither can he in any way control
or modify the action of fate. His outward circumstances and inward acts are all
equally determined by an inexorable law or influence residing out of himself. This
at least is one form of fatalism. This view of the doctrine of necessity may rest
on the assumption that the universe has the ground of its existence in itself, and
is governed in all its operations by fixed laws, which determine the sequence of
all events in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdom, by a like necessity.
2. A second form of the doctrine of necessity, is the mechanical theory. This denies that man is the efficient cause of his own acts. It represents him as passive, or as endued with no higher form of activity than spontaneity. It avowedly precludes the idea of responsibility. It assumes that the inward state of man, and consequently his acts, are determined by his outward circumstances. This doctrine as connected with the materialism of Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, and especially as fully developed by the French Encyclopædists, supposes that from the constitution of our nature, some things give us pain, others pleasure: some excite desire, and others aversion; and that this susceptibility of being acted upon is all the activity which belongs to man, who is as purely a piece of living mechanism as the irrational animals. A certain external object produces a corresponding impression on the nerves, that is transmitted to the brain, and an answering impulse is sent back to the muscles; or the effect is spent on the brain itself in the form of thought or feeling thereby excited or evolved. The general features of this theory are the same so far as its advocates ignore any distinction between physical and moral necessity, and reject the doctrine of free agency and responsibility, however much they may differ on other points.
3. A third form of necessity includes all those theories which supersede the efficiency of second causes, by referring all events to the immediate agency of the first cause. This of course is done by Pantheism in all its forms, whether it merely makes God the soul of the world, and refers all the operations of nature and all the actions of men to his immediate agency; or whether it regards the world itself as God; or whether it makes God the only substance of which nature and mind are the phenomena. According to all these views, God is the only agent; all activity is but different modes in which the activity of God manifests itself.
The theory of occasional causes leads to the same result. According to this doctrine, all efficiency is in God. Second causes are only the occasions on which that efficiency is exerted. Although this system allows a real existence to matter and mind, and admits that they are endowed with certain qualities and attributes, yet these are nothing more than susceptibilities, or receptivities for the manifestation of the divine efficiency. They furnish the occasions for the exercise of the all-pervading power of God. Matter and mind are alike passive: all the changes in the one, and all the appearance of activity in the other, are due to God’s immediate operation.
Under the same head belongs the doctrine that the agency of God in the preservation of the world is a continuous creation. This mode of representation is indeed often adopted as a figure of speech by orthodox theologians; but if taken literally it implies the absolute inefficiency of all second causes. If God creates the outward world at every successive moment, He must be the immediate author of all its changes. There is no connection between what precedes and what follows, between antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, but succession in time; and when applied to the inward world, or the soul, the same consequence of necessity follows. The soul, at any given moment, exists only in a certain state; if in that state it is created, then the creative energy is the immediate cause of all its feelings, cognitions, and acts. The soul is not an agent; it is only something which God creates in a given form. All continuity of being, all identity, and all efficiency are lost; and the universe of matter and mind becomes nothing more than the continued pulsation of the life of God.
Nearly allied with the doctrine of a continued creation is the “exercise scheme.” According to this theory the soul is a series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as the soul, no self, but only certain perceptions which succeed each other with amazing rapidity. Hume denies any real cause. All we know is that these perceptions exist, and exist in succession. Emmons says, God creates them. It is of course in vain to speak of the liberty of man in producing the creative acts of God. If He creates our volitions in view of motives, they are his acts and not ours. The difference between this system and Pantheism is little more than nominal.
Contingency.
Directly opposed to all these schemes of necessity, is the
doctrine of contingency, which has been held under different names and
Although the advocates of the liberty of contingency generally
direct their arguments against the doctrine of necessity, yet it is apparent that
they regard certainty no less than necessity to be inconsistent with liberty. This
is plain, (1.) From the designations which they give their theory, as liberty of
indifference, self-determining power of the will, power to the contrary. (2.) From
their formal definition of liberty, as the power to decide for or against, or without
motives; or it is power of “willing what we will.” “If,” says Reid, “in every voluntary
action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something
involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in the external circumstances
of the agent, he is not free.”
Certainty.
The third general theory on this subject is separated by an
equal distance from the doctrine of necessity on the one hand, and
This theory is often called the theory of moral or philosophical,
as distinguished from physical, necessity. This is a most unfortunate and unsuitable
designation. (1.) Because liberty and necessity are directly opposed. It is a contradiction
to say that an act is free and yet necessary; that man is a free agent, and yet
that all his acts are determined by a law of necessity. As all the advocates of
the theory in question profess to believe in the freedom of the human will, or that
man is a free agent, it is certainly to be regretted that they should use language
which in its ordinary and proper sense teaches directly the reverse. (2.) Certainty
and necessity are not the same, and therefore they should not be expressed by the
same word. The necessity with which a stone falls to the ground, and the certainty
with which a perfectly holy being confirmed in a state of grace will act holily,
are as different as day and night. Applying the same term to express things essentially
distinct tends to confound the things themselves. A man may be forced to do a thing
against his will, but to say he can be forced to will against his will is a contradiction.
A necessary volition is no volition, anymore than white is black. Because in popular
language we often speak of a thing as necessary when it is absolutely certain, and
although the Scriptures, written in the language of ordinary life, often do the
same thing, is no reason why in philosophical discussions the word should be so
used as unavoidably to mislead. (3.) Using the word necessity to express the idea
of certainty brings the truth into reproach. It clothes it in the garb of error.
It makes Edwards use the language of Hobbes. It puts Luther into the category with
Spinoza; all Augustinians into the same class with the French materialists. They
all use the same language, though their meaning is as diverse as possible. They
all say that the acts of men are necessary. When they come to explain themselves,
the one class says they are truly and properly necessary in such a sense that they
are not free, and that they preclude the possibility of moral character or responsibility.
The other class say that they are necessary, but in such a sense as to be nevertheless
free and perfectly consistent with the moral responsibility of the agent. It is
certainly a great evil that theories diametrically opposed to each
By the old Latin writers the theory of moral certainty is
commonly designated Lubentia Rationalis, or Rational Spontaneity. This is
a much more appropriate designation. It implies that in every volition there are
the elements of rationality and spontaneous action. In brutes there is a spontaneity
but no reason, and therefore they are not free agents in such a sense as to be the
objects ot approbation or disapprobation. In maniacs also there is self-determination,
but it is irrational, and therefore not free. But wherever reason and the power
of self-determination or spontaneity are combined in an agent, he is free and responsible
for his outward acts and for his volitions. This representation would satisfy Reid,
who says, “We see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing,
so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined
make moral liberty.”
The old writers, in developing their doctrine of rational
spontaneity were accustomed to say, the will is determined by the last judgment
of the understanding. This is true or false as the language is interpreted. If by
the last judgment of the understanding be meant the intellectual apprehension and
conviction of the reasonableness and excellence of the object of choice, then none
but the perfectly reasonable and good are always thus determined. Men in a multitude
of cases choose that which their understanding condemns as wicked, trifling, or
destructive. Or if the meaning be that every free act is the result of conscious
deliberation, and consequent decision of the mind as to the desirableness of a given
act, then again it cannot be said that the will follows the last dictate of the
understanding. It is in reference probably to one or both of these interpretations
of the language in question that Leibnitz says: “Non semper sequimur judicium ultimum
intellectus practici, dum ad volendum nos determinamus; at ubi volumus, semper sequimur
collectionem omnium inclinationum, tam a parte rationum, tam passionum, profectarum;
id quod sæpenumero sine expresso intellectus judicio contingit.”
Another form under which this doctrine is often expressed is, that the will is as the greatest apparent good. This is a very common mode of stating the doctrine, derived from Leibnitz, the father of optimism, whose whole “Theodicée” is founded on the assumption that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. By “good,” writers of this class generally mean “adapted to produce happiness,” which is regarded as the summum bonum. Their doctrine is that the will always decides in favour of what promises the greatest happiness. It is not the greatest real, but the greatest apparent good which is said to determine the volition. A single draught from the bowl may appear to the drunkard, in the intensity of his craving, a greater good, i.e., as better suited to relieve and satisfy him, than the welfare of himself or family for life. This whole theory is founded on the assumption that happiness is the highest end, and that the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring of all voluntary action. As both of these principles are abhorrent to the great mass of cultivated, and especially of Christian minds; as men act from other and higher motives than a desire to promote their own happiness, there are few who, in our day, will adopt the doctrine that the will is as the greatest apparent good, as thus expounded. If, however, the word good be taken in a more comprehensive sense, including everything that is desirable, whether as right, becoming, or useful, as well as suited to give happiness, then the doctrine is no doubt true. The will in point of fact always is determined in favour of that which under some aspect, or for some reason, is regarded as good. Otherwise men might choose evil as evil, which would violate a fundamental law of all rational and sensuous natures.
It is still more common, at least in this country, to say
that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. To this mode
It is better to abide by the general statement. The will is not determined by any law of necessity; it is not independent, indifferent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the preceding state of mind; so that a man is free so long as his volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind; or so long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason and feelings.
§ 2. Definition of Terms.
Before proceeding to give an outline of the usual arguments in support of this doctrine, it is important to state the meaning of the words employed. No one in the least conversant with discussions of this nature can have failed to remark how much difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the terms employed, and how often men appear to differ in doctrine, when in fact they only differ in language.
The Will.
First, the word will itself is one of those ambiguous
terms. Ii is sometimes used in a wide sense, so as to include all the desires, affections,
and even emotions. It has this comprehensive sense when all the faculties of the
soul are said to be included under the two categories of understanding and will.
Everything, therefore, pertaining to the soul, that does not belong to the former,
is said to belong to the latter. All liking and disliking, all preferring, all inclination
and disinclination, are in this sense acts of the will. At other times, the word
is used for the power of self-determination, or for that faculty by which we decide
on our acts. In this sense only purposes and imperative volitions are acts of the
will. It is obvious that if a writer affirms the liberty of the will in the latter
sense, and his reader takes the word in the former, the one can never understand
the other. Or if the same writer sometimes uses the word in its wide and sometimes
in its narrow sense, he will inevitably mislead himself and others. To say that
we have power over our volitions, and to say that we have power over our desires
Motive.
Secondly, The word motive is often taken in different senses. It is defined to be anything which has a tendency to move the mind. Any object adapted to awaken desire or affection; any truth or conception which is suited to influence a rational and sensitive being to a decision, is said to be a motive. This is what is called the objective sense of the word. In this sense it is very far from being true that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. The most important truths, the most weighty considerations, the most alluring objects, are often powerless, so far as the internal state of the mind is concerned. The word, however, is often used in a subjective sense, for those inward convictions, feelings, inclinations, and principles which are in the mind itself, and which impel or influence the man to decide one way rather than another. It is only in this sense of the term that the will is determined by the strongest motive. But even then it must be admitted, as before remarked, that we have no criterion or standard by which to determine the relative strength of motives, other than their actual effect. So that to say that the will is determined by the strongest motive, only means that it is not self-determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one way rather than another, by something within him, so that the volition is a revelation of what he himself is.
Cause.
Thirdly, The word cause is no less ambiguous. It sometimes
means the mere occasion; sometimes the instrument by which something is accomplished;
sometimes the efficiency to which the effect is due; sometimes the end for which
a thing is done, as when we speak of final causes; sometimes the ground or reason
why the effect or action of the efficient cause is so rather than otherwise. To
say that motives are the occasional causes of volition, is consistent
Liberty.
Fourthly, No little ambiguity arises from confounding liberty
of the will with liberty of the agent. These forms of expression are often used
as equivalent. The same thing is perhaps commonly intended by saying, “The will
is free,” and “The agent is free.” It is admitted that the same thought may be properly
expressed by these phrases. As we speak of freedom of conscience, when we mean to
say that the man is free as to his conscience; so we may speak of freedom of the
will, when all we mean is, that the man is free in willing. The usage, however,
which makes these expressions synonymous is liable to the following objections:
(1.) Predicating liberty of the will is apt to lead to our conceiving of the will
as separated from the agent; as a distinct self-acting power in the soul. Or, if
this extreme be avoided, which is not always the case, the will is regarded as too
much detached from the other faculties of the soul, and as out of sympathy with
it in its varying stales. The will is only the soul willing. The soul is of course
a unit. A
Liberty and Ability.
Fifthly, Another fruitful source of confusion on this subject,
is confounding liberty with ability. The usage which attaches the same meaning to
these terms is very ancient. Augustine denied free will to man since the fall. Pelagius
affirmed freedom of will to be essential to our nature. The former intended simply
to deny to fallen man the power to turn himself unto God. The latter defined liberty
to be the ability at any moment to determine himself either for good or evil. The
controversy between Luther and Erasmus was really about ability, nominally it was
about free-will. Luther’s book is entitled “De Servo Arbitrio,” that of Erasmus,
“De Libero Arbitrio.” This usage pervades all the symbols of the Reformation, and
was followed by the theologians of the sixteenth century. They all ascribe free
agency to man in the true sense of the words, but deny to him freedom of will. To
a great extent this confusion is still kept up. Many of the prevalent definitions
of liberty are definitions of liberty are definitions of ability; and much that
is commonly
Other writers who do not ignore the distinction between liberty
and ability, yet distinguish them only as different forms of liberty. This is the
case with many of the German authors. As for example with Müller, who distinguishes
the Formale Freiheit, or ability, from the Reale Freiheit, or liberty
as it actually exists. The former is only necessary as the condition of the latter.
That is, he admits, that if a man’s acts are certainly determined by his character,
he is really free. But in order to render him justly responsible for his character,
it must be self-acquired.
Confusion of thought and language, however, is not the principal
evil which arises from making liberty and ability identical. It necessarily brings
us into conflict with the truth, and with the moral judgments of men. There are
three truths of which every man is convinced from the very constitution of his nature.
(1.) That he is a free agent. (2.) That none but free agents can be accountable
for their character or conduct. (3.) That he does not possess ability to change
his moral state by an act of the will. Now, if in order to express the fact of his
inability, we say, that he is not a free agent, we contradict his consciousness;
or, if he believe what we say, we destroy his sense of responsibility. Or it we
tell him that because he is a free agent, he has power to change his heart at will,
we again bring ourselves into conflict with his convictions. He knows he is a free
agent, and yet he knows that he has not the power to make himself holy. Free agency
is the power to decide according to our character; ability is the power to change
our character by a volition. The former, the Bible and consciousness affirm belongs
to man in every condition of his being
Self-determination and Self-determination of the Will.
Sixthly, Another source of confusion is not discriminating
between self-determination and self-determination of the will. Those who use the
latter expression, say they intend to deny that the will is determined by the antecedent
state of the mind, and to affirm that it has a self-determining power, independent
of anything preexisting or coëxisting. They say that those who teach that when the
state of the mind is the same, the volition will inevitably be the same, teach necessity
and fatalism, and reduce the will to a machine. “I know,” says Reid, “nothing more
that can be desired to establish fatalism throughout the universe. When it is proved
that, through all nature, the same consequences invariably result from the same
circumstances, the doctrine of liberty must be given up.”
§ 3. Certainty Consistent with Liberty.
Although the doctrine of necessity subverts the foundation
of all morality and religion, our present concern is with the doctrine of contingency.
We wish simply to state the case as between certainty and uncertainty. The doctrine
of necessity, in the proper sense of the word, is antichristian; but the Christian
world is, and ever has been divided between the advocates and opponents of the
Points of Agreement.
It may be well before proceeding further, to state the points as to which the parties to this controversy are agreed.
1. They are agreed that man is a free agent, in such a sense as to be responsible for his character and acts. The dispute is not about the fact, but the nature of free agency. If any one denied that men are responsible moral agents, then he belongs to the school of necessity, and is not a party to the discussion now under consideration.
2. It is agreed as to the nature of free agency that it supposes
both reason and active power. Mere spontaneity does not constitute
3. It is admitted, on both sides, that in all important cases, men act under the influence of motives. Reid, indeed, endeavours to show that in many cases the will decides without any motive. When there is no ground of preference, he says this must be the case; as when a man decides which of fifty shillings he shall give away. He admits, however, that these arbitrary decisions relate only to trifles. Others of the same school acknowledge that no rational volition is ever arrived at except under the influence of motives.
4. It is further agreed that the will is not determined with certainty by external motives. All Augustinians deny that the internal state of the mind which determines the will, is itself necessarily or certainly determined by anything external to the mind itself.
5. It may be assumed, also, that the parties are agreed that the word will is to be taken in its proper, restricted sense. The question is not, whether men have power over their affections, their likes and dislikes. No one carries the power of the will so far as to maintain that we can, by a volition, change our feelings. The question concerns our volitions alone. It is the ground or reason of acts of self-determination that is in dispute. And, therefore, it is the will considered as the faculty of self-determination, and not as the seat of the affections, that comes into view. The question, why one man is led to love God, or Christ, or his fellow men, or truth and goodness; and another to love the world, or sin, is very different from the question, what determines him to do this or that particular act. The will is that faculty by which we determine to do something which we conceive to be in our power. The question, whether a man has power to change his own character at any moment, to give himself, in the language of Scripture, a new heart, concerns the extent of his power. That is, it is a question concerning the ability or inability of the sinner; and it is a most important question: but it should not be confounded with the question of free agency, which is the one now under consideration.
The whole question therefore is, whether, when a man decides
to do a certain thing, his will is determined by the previous state of his mind.
Or, whether, with precisely the same views and feelings,
Argument that Certainty suits all Free Agents.
It is certainly a strong argument in favour of that view of
free agency, which makes it consistent with certainty, or which supposes that an
agent may be determined with inevitable certainty as to his acts, and yet those
acts remain free, that it suits all classes or conditions of free agents. To deny
free agency to God, would be to deny Him personality, and to reduce Him to a mere
power or principle. And yet, in all the universe, is there anything so certain as
that God will do right? But if it be said that the conditions of existence in an
infinite being are so different from what they are in creatures, that it is not
fair to argue from the one to the other, we may refer to the case of our blessed
Lord. He had a true body and a reasonable soul. He had a human will; a mind regulated
by the same laws as those which determine the intellectual and voluntary acts of
ordinary men. In his case, however, although there may have been the metaphysical
possibility of evil (though even that is a painful hypothesis), still it was more
certain that He would be without sin than that the sun or moon should endure. No
conceivable physical law could be more certain in the production of its effects
than his will in always deciding for the right. But if it be objected even to this
case, that the union of the divine and human natures in the person of our Lord places
Him in a different category from ourselves, and renders it unfair to assume that
what was true in his case must be true in ours; without admitting the force of the
objection, we may refer to the condition of the saints in heaven. They, beyond doubt,
continue to be free agents; and yet their acts are, and to everlasting will be,
determined with absolute and inevitable certainty to good. Certainty, therefore,
must be consistent with free agency. What can any Christian say to this? Does he
deny that the saints in glory are free, or does he deny the absolute certainty of
their perseverance in holiness? Would his conception of the blessedness of heaven
be thereby exalted? Or would it raise his ideas of the dignity of the redeemed to
believe it to be uncertain whether they will be sinful or holy? We may, however,
come down to our present state of existence. Without assuming anything as to the
corruption of our nature, or taking for granted anything which Pelagius would deny,
it is a certain fact that all men sin. There has never existed a mere man on the
face
Arguments from Scripture.
A second argument on this subject is derived from those doctrines of Scripture which necessarily suppose that free acts may be certain as to their occurrence.
1. The first and most obvious of these doctrines is the foreknowledge
of God. Whatever metaphysical explanation may be given of this divine attribute;
however we may ignore the distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge, or however
we may contend that because God inhabits eternity, and is in no wise subject to
the limitations of time, and that to Him nothing is successive, still the fact remains
that we exist in time, and that to us there is a future as well as a present. It
remains, therefore, a fact that human acts are known before they occur in time,
and consequently are foreknown. But if foreknown as future, they must be certain;
not because foreknowledge renders their occurrence certain, but because it supposes
it to be so. It is a contradiction in terms to say that an uncertain event can be
foreknown as certain. To deny foreknowledge to God, to say that free acts, because
necessarily uncertain as to their occurrence, are not the objects of foreknowledge
any more than sounds are the objects of sight, or mathematical truths of the affections,
is to destroy the very idea of God. The future must be as dark to Him as to us;
and He must every moment be receiving vast accessions of knowledge. He cannot be
an eternal being, pervading all duration with a simultaneous existence, much less
an omniscient Being, to whom there is nothing new. It is impossible, therefore,
to believe in God as He is revealed in the Bible, unless we believe that all things
are known unto Him from the beginning. But if all things are known, all things,
whether fortuitous or free, are certain; consequently certainty must be consistent
with freedom. We are not more assured of our existence than we are of our free agency.
To say that this is a delusion is to deny the veracity of consciousness, which of
necessity not only involves a denial of the veracity of God, but also subverts the
foundation of all knowledge, and plunges us into absolute scepticism. We may just
as well say that our existence
2. Another doctrine held by a large part of the Christian world in all ages which of necessity precludes the doctrine of contingency, is that of the foreordination of future events. Those who believe that God foreordains whatever comes to pass must believe that the occurrence of all events is determined with unalterable certainty. It is not our object to prove any of these doctrines, but simply to argue from them as true. It may, however, be remarked that there is no difficulty attending the doctrine of foreordination which does not attach to that of foreknowledge. The latter supposes the certainty of free acts, and the former secures their certainty. If their being certain be consistent with liberty, their being rendered certain cannot be incompatible with it. All that foreordination does is to render it certain that free acts shall occur. The whole difficulty is in their being certain, and that must be admitted by every consistent theist. The point now in hand is, that those who believe that the Bible teaches the doctrine of foreordination are shut up to the conclusion that an event may be free and yet certain, and therefore that the theory of contingency which supposes that an act to be free must be uncertain, is unscriptural and false.
3. The doctrine of divine providence involves the same conclusion.
That doctrine teaches that God governs all his creatures and all their actions.
That is, that He so conducts the administration of his government as to accomplish
all his purposes. Here again the difficulty is the same, and is no greater than
before. Foreknowledge supposes certainty; foreordination determines it; and providence
effects it. The last does no more than the first of necessity presupposes. If certainty
be compatible with freedom, providence which only secures certainty cannot be inconsistent
with it. Who for any metaphysical difficulty — who, because he is not able to comprehend
how God can effectually govern free agents without destroying their nature, would
give up the doctrine of providence? Who would wish to see the reins of universal
empire fall from the hands of infinite wisdom and love, to be seized by chance or
fate? Who would not rather be governed by a Father than by a tornado? If God cannot
effectually control the acts of free agents there can be no prophecy, no prayer,
no thanksgiving, no promises, no security of salvation, no certainty whether in
the end God or Satan is to be triumphant, whether heaven or hell is to be the consummation.
Give us certainty — the secure conviction that a sparrow cannot fall, or a sinner
move a finger, but as God permits and
4. The whole Christian world believes that God can convert men. They believe that He can effectually lead them to repentance and faith; and that He can secure them in heaven from ever falling into sin. That is, they believe that He can render their free acts absolutely certain. When we say that this is the faith of the whole Christian world we do not mean that no individual Christian or Christian theologian has ever denied this doctrine of grace; but we do mean that the doctrine, to the extent above stated, is included in the Confessions of all the great historical churches of Christendom in all ages. It is just as much a part of the established faith of Christians as the divinity of our Redeemer. This being the fact, the doctrine that contingency is necessary to liberty cannot be reconciled with Christian doctrine. It has, indeed, been extensively held by Christians; but our object is to show that it is in conflict within doctrines which they themselves as Christians must admit. If God can fulfil his promise to give men a new heart; if He can translate them from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of his dear Son; if He can give them repentance unto life; if there be no impropriety in praying that He would preserve them from falling, and give them the secure possession of eternal life, then He can control their free acts. He can, by his grace, without violating their freedom, make it absolutely certain that they will repent and believe, and persevere in holiness. If these things are so, then it is evident that any theory which makes contingency or uncertainty essential to liberty must be irreconcilable with some of the plainest and most precious doctrines of the Scriptures.
The Argument from Consciousness.
A third argument on this subject is derived from consciousness.
It is conceded that every man is conscious of liberty in his voluntary acts. It
is conceded further that this consciousness proves the fact of free agency. The
validity of this argument urged by the advocates of contingency against the doctrine
of necessity in any such form as involves a denial of this fact of consciousness,
we fully admit. The doctrine opposed by Reid and Stewart, as well as by many continental
writers, was really a doctrine which denied both the liberty and responsibility
of man. This is not the Augustinian or Edwardean doctrine, although unhappily both
are expressed by the same terms. The one is the doctrine of physical or mechanical
necessity; the other that of certainty. As between the advocates of the latter theory
and the defenders of contingency, it is agreed that man is a free agent; it is further
agreed that it is included in the consciousness of free agency, that we are efficient
and responsible authors of our own acts, that we had the power to perform or not
to perform any voluntary act of which we were the authors. But we maintain that
we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not
to perform an act, is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might
have been otherwise had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been
allowed their due weight. No man is conscious of a power to will against his will;
that is, the will, in the narrow sense of the word, cannot be against the will in
the wide sense of the term. This is only saying, that a man cannot prefer against
his preference or choose against his choice. A volition is a preference resulting
in a decision. A man may have one preference at one time and another at another.
He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time;
but he cannot have coëxisting opposite preferences. What consciousness teaches on
this subject seems to be simply this: that in every voluntary act we had some reason
for acting as we did; that in the absence of that reason, or in the presence of
others, which others we may feel ought to have been present, we should or could
have acted differently. Under the reasons for an act are included all that
is meant by the word motives, in the subjective sense of the term; i.e.,
principles, inclinations, feelings, etc. We cannot conceive that a man can be conscious
that, with his principles, feelings, and inclinations being one way, his will may
be another way. A man filled with the fear of God, or with the love of Christ, cannot
will
Argument from the Moral Character of Volition.
This suggests a fourth argument on this subject. Unless the will be determined by the previous state of the mind, in opposition to being self-determined, there can be no morality in our acts. A man is responsible for his external acts, because they are decided by his will; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his principles and feelings; he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own, and constitute his character. If you detach the outward act from the will it ceases to have any moral character. If I kill a man, unless the act was intentional, i.e., the result of a volition to kill or injure, there is no morality in the act. If I willed to kill, then the character of the act depends on the motives which determined the volition. If those motives were a regard to the authority of God, or of the demands of justice legally expressed, the volition was right. If the motive was malice or cupidity, the volition and consequent act were wrong. It is obvious that if the will be self-determined, independent of the previous state of the mind, it has no more character than the outward act detached from the volition, — it does not reveal or express anything in the mind. If a man when filled with pious feeling can will the most impious acts; or, when filled with enmity to God, have the volitions of a saint, then his volitions and acts have nothing to do with the man himself. They do not express his character and he cannot be responsible for them.
Argument from the Rational Nature of Man.
The doctrine that the will is determined and not self-determined,
is moreover involved in the rational character of our acts. A rational act is not
merely an act performed by a rational being, but one performed for a reason, whether
good or bad. An act performed without a reason, without intention or object, for
which no reason be assigned beyond the mere power of acting, is as irrational as
the actions of a brute or of an idiot. If the will therefore ever acts independently
of the understanding and of the feelings, its volitions are not the acts of a rational
being any further than they would be if reason were entirely dethroned. The only
true idea of liberty is that of a being acting in accordance with the laws of
The doctrine that the will acts independently of the previous
state of the mind supposes that our volitions are isolated atoms, springing up from
the abyss of the capricious self-determination of the will, from a source beyond
the control or ken of reason. They are purely casual, arbitrary, or capricious.
They have no connection with the past, and give no promise of the future. On this
hypothesis there can be no such thing as character. It is, however, a fact of experience
universally admitted, that there are such things as principles or dispositions which
control the will. We feel assured that an honest man will act honestly, and that
a benevolent man will act benevolently. We are moreover assured that these principles
may be so strong and fixed as to render the volitions absolutely certain. “Rational
beings,” says Reid, “in proportion as they are wise and good, will act according
to the best motives; and every rational being who does otherwise, abuses his liberty.
The most perfect being, in everything where there is a right and a wrong, a better
and a worse, always infallibly acts according to the best motives. This, indeed,
is little else than an identical proposition; for it is a contradiction to say,
that a perfect being does what is wrong or unreasonable. But to say that he does
not act freely, because he always does what is best, is to say, that the proper
use of liberty destroys liberty, and that liberty consists only in its abuse.”
Argument from the Doctrine of a Sufficient Cause.
The axiom that every effect must have a cause, or the doctrine
of a sufficient reason, applies to the internal as well as to the external world.
It governs the whole sphere of our experience, inward and outward. Every volition
is an effect, and therefore must have a cause. There must have been some sufficient
reason why it was so, rather than otherwise. That reason was not the mere power
of the agent to act; for that only accounts for his acting, not for his acting one
way rather than another. The force of gravity accounts for a stone falling to the
earth, but not for its falling here instead of there. The power to walk accounts
for a man’s walking, but not for his walking east rather than west. Yet we are told
even by the most distinguished writers, that the efficiency of the agent is all
that is required to satisfy the instinctive demand which we make for a sufficient
reason, in the case of our volitions. Reid, as quoted above, asks, “Was there a
cause of the action? Undoubtedly there was. Of every event there must be a cause
that had power sufficient to produce it, and that exerted that power for the purpose.
In the present case, either the man was the cause of the action, and then it was
a free action, and is justly imputed to him; or it must have had another cause,
and cannot justly be imputed to the man. In this sense, therefore, it is granted
that there was a sufficient reason for the action; but the question about liberty,
is not in the least affected by this concession.”
Another common method of answering this argument is to assume
that because the advocates of certainty say that the will is determined by motives,
and therefore, that the motives are the cause why the volition is as it is, they
mean that the efficiency to which the volition is due is in the motives, and not
in the agent. Thus Stewart says, “The question is not concerning the influence of
motives, but concerning the nature of that influence. The advocates for necessity
[certainty] represent it as the influence of a cause in producing its effect. The
advocates for liberty acknowledge that the motive is the occasion for acting, or
the reason for acting, but contend that it is so far from being the efficient cause
of it, that it supposes the efficiency to reside elsewhere, namely, in the mind
of the agent.”
The doctrine of free agency, therefore, which underlies the
Bible, which is involved in the consciousness of every rational being, and which
is assumed and acted on by all men, is at an equal remove, on the one hand, from
the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity, which precludes the possibility
of liberty and responsibility; and, on the other, from the doctrine of contingency,
which assumes that an act in order to be free must be uncertain; or that the will
is self determined, acting independently of the reason, conscience, inclinations
and feelings. It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he
is author of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of
himself, but by his own views, convictions inclinations, feelings, and dispositions,
so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really represent or reveal
what he is. The profoundest of modern authors admit that this is the true theory
of liberty; but some
A second remark on the principle above stated, is, that it
is not only opposed to the common judgment of men, but that it is also contrary
to the faith of the whole Christian Church. We trust that this language will not
be attributed to a self-confident or dogmatic spirit. We recognize no higher standard
of truth apart from the infallible word of God, than the teachings of the Holy Spirit
as revealed in the faith of the people of God. It is beyond dispute the doctrine
of the Church universal, that Adam was created holy; that his moral character was
not self-acquired. It is no less the doctrine of the universal Church, that men,
since the fall, are born unholy; and it is also included in the faith of all Christian
Churches. that in regeneration men are made holy, not by their own act, but by the
act of God. In other words, the doctrines of original righteousness, of original
sin, and of regeneration by the Spirit of God, are, and ever have been the avowed
doctrines of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant Churches: and if these doctrines are,
as these Churches all believe, contained in the word of God, then it cannot
Under this head are included God s purpose and plan in relation to the salvation of men; the person and work of the Redeemer; and the application of that work by the Holy Spirit to the actual salvation of the people of God.
§ 1. God has such a Plan.
The Scriptures speak of an Economy of Redemption; the plan
or purpose of God in relation to the salvation of men. They call it in reference
to its full revelation at the time of the advent, the οἰκονομία τοῦ
πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν, “The economy of the fulness of times.” It
is declared to be the plan of God in relation to his gathering into one harmonious
body, all the objects of redemption, whether in heaven or earth, in Christ.
A plan supposes: (1.) The selection of some definite end or object to be accomplished. (2.) The choice of appropriate means. (3.) At least in the case of God, the effectual application and control of those means to the accomplishment of the contemplated end.
As God works on a definite plan in the external world, it
is fair to infer that the same is true in reference to the moral and spiritual world.
To the eye of an uneducated man the heavens are a chaos of stars. The astronomer
sees order and system in this confusion; all those bright and distant luminaries
have their appointed places and fixed orbits; all are so arranged that no one interferes
with any other, but each is directed according to one comprehensive and magnificent
conception. The innumerable forms of vegetable
The Importance of a Knowledge of this Plan.
If there be such a plan concerning the redemption of man,
it is obviously of the greatest importance that it should be known and correctly
apprehended. If in looking at a complicated machine we are ignorant of the object
it is designed to accomplish, or of the relation of its several parts, we must be
unable to understand or usefully to apply it. In like manner if we are ignorant
of the great end aimed at in the scheme of redemption, or of the relation of the
several parts of that scheme; or if we misconceive that end and that relation, all
our views must be confused or erroneous. We shall be unable either to exhibit it
to others or to apply it to ourselves. If the end of redemption as well as of creation
and of providence, is the production of the greatest amount of happiness, then Christianity
is one thing; if the end be the glory of God, then Christianity is another thing.
The whole character of our theology and religion depends on the answer to that question.
In like manner, if the special and proximate design of redemption is to render certain
the salvation of the people of God, then the whole Augustinian system follows by
a logical necessity; if its design is simply to render the salvation of all men
possible, the opposite system must be received as true. The order of the divine
decrees, or in other words, the relation in which the several parts of the divine
How the Plan of God can be known.
If there be such a preconceived divine scheme relating to
the salvation of men; and if the proper comprehension of that scheme be thus important,
the next question is, How can it be ascertained? The first answer to this question
is that in every system of facts which are really related to each other, the relation
is revealed in the nature of the facts. The astronomer, the geologist, and the zoologist
very soon discover that the facts of their several sciences stand in a certain relation
to each other, and admit of no other. If the relation be not admitted the facts
themselves must be denied or distorted. The only source of mistake is either an
incomplete induction of the facts, or failing to allow them their due relative importance.
One system of astronomy has given place to another, only because the earlier astronomers
were not acquainted with facts which their successors discovered. The science has
at last attained a state which commands the assent of all competent minds, and which
cannot be hereafter seriously modified. The same, to a greater or less extent, is
true in all departments of natural science. It must be no less true in theology.
What the facts of nature are to the naturalist, the facts of the Bible and of our
moral and religious consciousness, are to the theologian. If, for example, the Bible
and experience teach the fact of the entire inability of fallen men to anything
spiritually good, that fact stubbornly refuses to harmonize with any system which
denies efficacious grace or sovereign election. It of itself determines the relation
in which the eternal purpose of God stands to the salvation of the individual sinner.
So of all other great Scriptural facts. They arrange themselves in a certain order
by an inward law, just as certainly and as clearly as the particles of matter in
the process of crystallization, or in the organic unity of the body of an animal.
It is true here as in natural science, that it is only by an imperfect induction
of facts, or by denying or perverting them, that their relative position in the
scheme of salvation can be a matter of doubt or of diversity of opinion. But secondly,
we have in theology a guide which the man of science does not possess. We have in
the Scriptures not only the revelation of the grand design of God in all his works
of creation, providence, and redemption, which is declared to be his own glory,
but we have, in many cases, the relation which one
As men differ in their understanding of the facts of Scripture, and as some are more careful than others to gather all the facts which are to be considered, or more faithful in submitting to their authority, so they differ in their views of the plan which God has devised for the salvation of men. The more important of the views which have been adopted on this subject are, —
§ 2. Supralapsarianism.
First, the supralapsarian scheme. According to this view, God in order to manifest his grace and justice selected from creatable men (i.e., from men to be created) a certain number to be vessels of mercy, and certain others to be vessels of wrath. In the order of thought, election and reprobation precede the purpose to create and to permit the fall. Creation is in order to redemption. God creates some to be saved, and others to be lost.
This scheme is called supralapsarian because it supposes that
men as unfallen, or before the fall, are the objects of election to eternal life,
and foreordination to eternal death. This view was introduced among a certain class
of Augustinians even before the Reformation, but has not been generally received.
Augustine himself, and after him the great body of those who adopt his system of
doctrine, were, and are, infralapsarians. That is, they hold that it is from the
mass of fallen men that some were elected to eternal life, and some for the just
punishment of their sins, foreordained to eternal death. The position of Calvin
himself as to this point has been disputed. As it was not in his day a special matter
of discussion, certain passages may be quoted from his writings which favour the
supralapsarian and other passages which favour the infralapsarian view. In the “Consensus
Genevensis,” written by him, there is an explicit assertion of the infralapsarian
doctrine After saying that there was little benefit in speculating on the foreordination
of the fall of man, he adds, “Quod ex damnata Adæ sobole Deus quos visum est eligit,
quos vult reprobat, sicuti ad fidem exercendam longe aptior est, ita majore fructu
tractatur.”
In the “Formula Consensus Helvetica,” drawn up as the testimony
of the Swiss churches in 1675, whose principal authors were Heidegger and Turrettin,
there is a formal repudiation of the supralapsarian view. In the Synod of Dort,
which embraced delegates from all the Reformed churches on the Continent and in
Great Britain, a large majority of the members were infralapsarians, Gomarus and
Voetius being the prominent advocates of the opposite view. The canons of that synod,
while avoiding any extreme statements, were so framed as to give a symbolical authority
to the infralapsarian doctrine. They say:
Objections to Supralapsarianism.
The most obvious objections to the supralapsarian theory are,
(1.) That it seems to involve a contradiction. Of a Non Ens, as Turrettin
says, nothing can be determined. The purpose to save or condemn, of necessity must,
in the order of thought, follow the purpose to create. The latter is presupposed
in the former, (2.) It is a clearly revealed Scriptural principle that where there
is no sin there is no condemnation. Therefore there can be no foreordination to
death which does not contemplate its objects as already sinful. (3.) It seems plain
from the whole argument of the Apostle in
§ 3. Infralapsarianism.
According to the infralapsarian doctrine, God, with the design
to reveal his own glory, that is, the perfections of his own nature, determined
to create the world, secondly, to permit the fall of
The arguments in favour of this view of the divine plan have already been presented in the form of objections to the supralapsarian theory. It may, however, be further remarked, —
1. That this view is self-consistent and harmonious. As all
the decrees of God are one comprehensive purpose, no view of the relation of the
details embraced in that purpose which does not admit of their being reduced to
unity can be admitted. In every great mechanism, whatever the number or complexity
of its parts, there must be unity of design. Every part bears a given relation to
every other part, and the perception of that relation is necessary to a proper understanding
of the whole. Again, as the decrees of God are eternal and immutable, no view of
his plan of operation which supposes Him to purpose first one thing and then another
can ho consistent with their nature. And as God is absolutely sovereign and independent,
all his purposes must be determined from within or according to the counsel of his
own will. They cannot be sup.. posed to he contingent or suspended on the action
of his creatures, or upon anything out of Himself. The infralapsarian scheme, as
held by most Augustinians, fulfils all these conditions. All the particulars form
one comprehensive whole. All follow in an order which supposes no change of purpose;
and all depend on the infinitely wise, holy, and righteous will of God. The final
end is the glory of God. For that end He creates the world, allows the fall; from
among fallen men He elects some to everlasting life, and leaves the rest to the
just recompense of their sins. Whom He elects He calls, justifies, and glorifies.
This is the golden chain the links of which cannot be separated or transposed. This
is the form in which the scheme of redemption lay in the Apostle’s mind as he teaches
us in
Different Meanings assigned the Word Predestination.
2. There is an ambiguity in the word predestination. It may
be used, first, in the general sense of foreordination. In this sense it has equal
reference to all events; for God foreordains whatever comes to pass. Secondly, it
may refer to the general purpose of redemption without reference to particular individuals.
God predetermined to reveal his attributes in redeeming sinners, as He
§ 4. Hypothetical Redemption.
According to the common doctrine of Augustinians, as expressed
an the Westminster Catechism, “God, having . . . . elected some to everlasting life,
did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and
misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer.” In opposition
to this view some of the Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century introduced
the scheme which is known in the history of theology as the doctrine
This scheme is sometimes designated as “universalismus hypotheticus.” It was designed to take a middle ground between Augustinianism and Arminianism. It is liable to the objections which press on both systems. It does not remove the peculiar difficulties of Augustinianism, as it asserts the sovereignty of God in election. Besides, it leaves the case of the heathen out of view. They, having no knowledge of Christ, could not avail themselves of this decretum hypotheticum, and therefore must be considered as passed over by a decretum absolutum. It was against this doctrine of Amyraut and other departures from the standards of the Reformed Church that, in 1675, the “Formula Consensus Helvetica” was adopted by the churches of Switzerland. This theory of the French theologians soon passed away as far as the Reformed churches in Europe were concerned. Its advocates either returned to the old doctrine, or passed on to the more advanced system of the Arminians. In this country it has been revived and extensively adopted.
At first view it might seem a small matter whether we say that election precedes redemption or that redemption precedes election. In fact, however, it is a question of great importance. The relation of the truths of the Bible is determined by their nature. If you change their relation you must change their nature. If you regard the sun as a planet instead of as the centre of our system you must believe it to be something very different in its constitution from what it actually is. So in a scheme of thought, if you make the final cause a means, or a means the final cause, nothing but confusion can be the result. As the relation of election to redemption depends on the nature of redemption the full consideration of this question must be reserved until the work of Christ has been considered. For the present it is sufficient to say that the scheme proposed by the French theologians is liable to the following objections.
Arguments against this Scheme.
1. It supposes mutability in the divine purposes; or that the purpose of God may fail of accomplishment. According to this scheme, God, out of benevolence or philanthropy, purposed the salvation of all men, and sent his Son for their redemption. But seeing that such purpose could not be carried out, He determined by his efficacious grace to secure the salvation of a certain portion of the human race. This difficulty the scheme involves, however it may be stated. It cannot however be supposed that God intends what is never accomplished; that He purposes what He does not intend to effect; that He adopts means for an end which is never to be attained. This cannot be affirmed of any rational being who has the wisdom and power to secure the execution of his purposes. Much less can it be said of Him whose power and wisdom are infinite. If all men are not saved, God never purposed their salvation, and never devised and put into operation means designed to accomplish that end. We must assume that the result is the interpretation of the purposes of God. If He foreordains whatsoever comes to pass, then events correspond to his purposes; and it is against reason and Scripture to suppose that there is any contradiction or want of correspondence between what He intended and what actually occurs. The theory, therefore, which assumes that God purposed the salvation of all men, and sent his Son to die as a means to accomplish that end, and then seeing, or foreseeing that such end could not or would not be attained, elected a part of the race to be the subjects of efficacious grace, cannot be admitted as Scriptural.
2. The Bible clearly teaches that the work of Christ is certainly efficacious. It renders certain the attainment of the end it was designed to accomplish. It was intended to save his people, and not merely to make the salvation of all men possible. It was a real satisfaction to justice, and therefore necessarily frees from condemnation. It was a ransom paid and accepted, and therefore certainly redeems. If, therefore, equally designed for all men, it must secure the salvation of all. If designed specially for the elect, it renders their salvation certain, and therefore election precedes redemption. God, as the Westminster Catechism teaches, having elected some to eternal life, sent his Son to redeem them.
3. The Scriptures further teach that the gift of Christ secures
the gift of all other saving blessings. “He that spared not his own Son, but delivered
him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?” (
4. The Bible in numerous passages directly asserts that Christ came to redeem his people; to save them from their sins; and to bring them to God. He gave Himself for his Church; He laid down his life for his sheep. As the end precedes the means, if God sent his Son to save his people, if Christ gave Himself for his Church, then his people were selected and present to the divine mind, in the order of thought, prior to the gift of Christ.
5. If, as Paul teaches (
6. The motive (so to speak) of God in sending his Son is not, as this theory assumes, general benevolence or that love of which all men are equally the objects, but that peculiar, mysterious, infinite love in which God, in giving his Son, gives Himself and all conceivable and possible good. All these points, however, as before remarked, ask for further consideration when we come to treat of the nature and design of Christ’s work.
§ 5. The Lutheran Doctrine as to the Plan of Salvation.
It is not easy to give the Lutheran doctrine on this subject,
because it is stated in one way in the early symbolical books of that Church, and
in a somewhat different way in the “Form of Concord,” and in the writings of the
standard Lutheran theologians. Luther himself taught the strict Augustinian doctrine,
as did also Melancthon in the first edition of his “Loci Communes.” In the later
editions of that work Melancthon taught that men coöperate with the grace of God
in conversion, and that the reason why one man is regenerated and another not is
to be found in that coöperation. This gave rise to the protracted and vehement synergistic
controversy, which for a long time seriously disturbed the peace of
According to this scheme, God, (1.) From general benevolence
or love to the fallen race of man, wills their salvation by a sincere purpose and
intention. “Benevolentia Dei universalis,” says Hollaz, “non est inane votum, non
sterilis velleitas, non otiosa complacentia, qua quis rem, quæ sibi placet, et
quam in se amat, non cupit efficere aut consequi adeoque mediis ad hunc finem ducentibus
non vult uti; sed est voluntas efficax, qua Deus salutem hominum, ardentissime amatam,
etiam efficere atque per media sufficientia et efficacia consequi serio intendit.”
The Lutheran doctrine, therefore, answers the question, Why
one man is saved and another not? by saying, Because the one believes and the other
does not. The question, Why God elects some and not others, and predestinates them
to eternal life? is answered by saying, Because He foresees that some will believe
unto the end, and others will not. If asked, Why one believes and another not? the
answer is, Not that one coöperates with the grace of God and the other does not;
but that some resist and reject the grace offered to all, and others do not. The
difficulty arising from the Lutheran doctrine of the entire corruption of our fallen
nature, and the entire inability of the sinner to do anything spiritually good,
is met by saying, that the sinner has power to use the means of grace, he can hear
the word and receive the sacraments, and as these means of grace are imbued with
a divine supernatural power1 they produce a saving effect upon all who do not voluntarily
and persistently resist their influence. Baptism, in the case of infants, is attended
by the regeneration of the soul; and therefore all who are baptized in infancy have
a principle of grace implanted in them, which, if cherished, or, if not voluntarily
quenched, secures their salvation. Predestination in the Lutheran system is confined
to the elect. God predestinates those who He foresees will
§ 6. The Remonstrant Doctrine.
In the early part of the seventeenth century Arminius introduced a new system of doctrine in the Reformed churches of Holland, which was formally condemned by the Synod of Dort which sat from November 1618 to May 1619. Against the decisions of that Synod the advocates of the new doctrine presented a Remonstrance, and hence they were at first called Remonstrants, but in after years their more common designation has been Arminians. Arminianism is a much lower form of doctrine than Lutheranism. In all the points included under Anthropology and Soteriology it is a much more serious departure from the system of Augustinianism which in all ages has been the life of the church. The Arminians taught, —
1. That all men derive from Adam a corrupt nature by which
they are inclined to sin. But they deny that this corruption is of the nature of
sin. Men are responsible only for their own voluntary acts and the consequences
of such acts. “Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie
dicto . . . . nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dictæ pœnæ ab Adamo in posteros
dimanet, sed pro malo infirmitate.”
2. They deny that man by his fall has lost his ability to
good. Such ability, or liberty as they call it, is essential to our nature, and
cannot be lost without the loss of humanity. “Innatam arbitrii humani libertatem
(i.e., ability) olim semel in creatione datam, nunquam . . . . tollit (Deus).”
3. This ability, however, is not of itself sufficient to secure
the return of the soul to God. Men need the preventing, exciting, and assisting
grace of God in order to their conversion and holy living. “Gratiam Dei statuimus
esse principium, progressum et complementum omnis boni: adeo ut ne ipse quidem regenitus
absque præcedente ista, sive præveniente, excitante, prosequente et coöperante
gratia, bonum ullum salutare cogitare, velle, aut peragere possit.”
4. This divine grace is afforded to all men in sufficient
measure to enable them to repent, believe, and keep all the commandments of God.
“Gratia efficax vocatur ex eventu. Ut statuatur gratia habere ex se sufficientem
vim, ad producendum consensum in voluntate, sed quia vis illa partialis est, non
posse exire in actum sive effectum sortiri sine coöperatione liberæ voluntatis
humanæ, ac proinde ut effectum habeat, . . . . pendere a libera voluntate.”
5. Those who of their own free will, and in the exercise of
that ability which belongs to them since the fall, coöperate with this divine grace,
are converted and saved. “Etsi vero maxima est gratiæ disparitas, pro liberrima
scilicet voluntatis divinæ dispensatione tamen Spiritus Sanctus omnibus et singulis,
quibus verbum fidei ordinarie prædicatur, tantum gratiæ confert, aut saltem conferre
paratus est, quantum ad fidem ingenerandum, et ad promovendum suis gradibus salutarem
ipsorum conversionem sufficit.”
6. Those who thus believe are predestinated to eternal life,
not however as individuals, but as a class. The decree of election does not concern
persons, it is simply the purpose of God to save believers. “Decretum vocant Remonstrantes
decretum prædestinationis ad salutem, quia eo decernitur, qua ratione et conditione
Deus peccatores saluti destinet. Enunciatur autem hoc decretum Dei hac formula:
Deus decrevit salvare credentes, non quasi credentes quidam re ipsa jam sint, qui
objiciantur Deo salvare volenti, sive prædestinanti; nihil minus; sed, ut quid
in iis, circa quos Deus prædestinans versatur, requiratur, ista enunciatione
clare significetur. Tantundem enim valet atqui si diceres, Deus decrevit homines salvare
sub conditione fidei. . . . . Etiamsi hujusmodi prædestinatio non sit prædestinatio
certarum personarum, est tamen omnium hominum prædestinatio, si modo credant et
in virtute prædestinatio certarum personarum, quæ et quando credunt.”
§ 7. Wesleyan Arminianism.
The Arminian system received such modifications in the hands of Wesley and his associates and followers, that they give it the designation of Evangelical Arminianism, and claim for it originality and completeness. It differs from the system of the Remonstrants, —
1. In admitting that man since the fall is in a state of absolute or entire pollution and depravity. Original sin is not a mere physical deterioration of our nature, but entire moral depravity.
2. In denying that men in this state of nature have any power
to coöperate with the grace of God. The advocates of this system regard this doctrine
of natural ability, or the ability of the natural man to coöperate with the grace
of God as Semi-pelagian, and the doctrine that men have the power by nature perfectly
to keep the commandments of God, as pure Pelagianism.
3. In asserting that the guilt brought upon all men by the sin of Adam is removed by the justification which has come upon all men by the righteousness of Christ.
4. That the ability of man even to coöperate with the Spirit
of God, is due not to anything belonging to his natural state as fallen, but to
the universal influence of the redemption of Christ. Every infant, therefore, comes
into the world free from condemnation on the ground of the righteousness of Christ
and with a seed of divine grace, or a principle of a new life implanted in his heart.
“That by the offence of one,” says Wesley,
According to this view of the plan of God, he decreed or purposed, (1.) To permit the fall of man. (2.) To send his Son to make a full satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. (3.) On the ground of that satisfaction to remit the guilt of Adam’s first transgression and of original sin, and to impart such a measure of grace and light to all and every man as to enable all to attain eternal life. (4.) Those who duly improve that grace, and persevere to the end, are ordained to be saved; God purposes from eternity, to save those who He foresees will thus persevere in faith and holy living.
It is plain that the main point of difference between the
later Lutheran, the Arminian, and the Wesleyan schemes, and that of Augustinians
is, that according to the latter, God, and according to the former, man, determines
who are to be saved. Augustine taught that out of the fallen family of men, all
of whom might have been justly left to perish in their apostasy, God, out of his
mere good mercy, elected some to everlasting life, sent his Son for their redemption,
and gives to them the Holy Spirit to secure their repentance, faith, and holy living
unto the end. “Cur autem non omnibus detur [donum fidei], fidelem movere non debet,
qui credit ex uno omnes isse in condemnationem, sine dubio justissimam: ita ut nulla
Dei esset justa reprehensio, etiamsi nullus inde liberaretur. Unde constat, magnam
esse gratiam, quod plurimi liberantur.”
§ 8. The Augustinian Scheme.
Preliminary Remarks.
It is to be remembered that the question is not which view of the plan of God is the freest from difficulties, the most agreeable to our natural feelings, and therefore the most plausible to the human mind. It may be admitted that it would appear to us more consistent with the character of God that provision should be made for the salvation of all men, and that sufficient knowledge and grace should be granted to every human being to secure his salvation. So it would be more consistent with the natural understanding and feelings, if like provision had been made for the fallen angels; or if God had prevented the entrance of sin and misery into the universe; or if, when they had entered, He had provided for their ultimate elimination from the system, so that all rational creatures should be perfectly holy and happy for eternity. There would be no end to such plans if each one were at liberty to construct a scheme of divine operation according to his own views of what would be wisest and best. We are shut up to facts: the facts of providence, of the Bible, and of religious experience. These facts must determine our theory. We cannot say that the goodness of God forbids the permission of sin and misery, if sin and misery actually exist. We cannot say that justice requires that all rational creatures should be treated alike, have the same advantages, and the same opportunity to secure knowledge, holiness, and happiness, if, under the government of a God of infinite justice, the greatest disparity actually exists. Among all Christians certain principles are admitted, according to which the facts of history and of the Scriptures must be interpreted.
1. It is admitted that God reigns; that his providence extends
to all events great and small, so that nothing does or can occur contrary to his
will, or which He does not either effect by his own power, or permit to be done
by other agents. This is a truth of natural religion as well as of revelation. It
is (practically) universally recognized. The prayers and thanksgivings which men
by a law of their nature address to God, assume that He controls all events. War,
pestilence and famine, are deprecated as manifestations of his displeasure. To Him
all men turn for deliverance
2. No less clear and universally admitted is the principle that God can control the free acts of rational creatures without destroying either their liberty or their responsibility. Men universally pray for deliverance from the wrath of their enemies, that their enmity may be turned aside, or that the state of their minds may be changed. All Christians pray that God would change the hearts of men, give them repentance and faith, and so control their acts that his glory and the good of others may be promoted. This again is one of those simple, profound, and far-reaching truths, which men take for granted, and on which they act and cannot avoid acting, whatever may be the doubts of philosophers, or the speculative difficulties with which such truths are attended.
3. All Christians admit that God has a plan or purpose in the government of the world. There is an end to be accomplished. It is inconceivable that an infinitely wise Being should create, sustain, and control the universe, without contemplating any end to be attained by this wonderful manifestation of his power and resources. The Bible, therefore, teaches us that God works all things after the counsel of his own will. And this truth is incorporated in all the systems of faith adopted among Christians, and is assumed in all religious worship and experience.
4. It is a necessary corollary from the foregoing principles that the facts of history are the interpretation of the eternal purposes of God. Whatever actually occurs entered into his purpose. We can, therefore, learn the design or intention of God from the evolution or development of his plan in the history of the world, and of every individual man. Whatever occurs, He for wise reasons permits to occur. He can prevent whatever He sees fit to prevent. If, therefore, sin occurs, it was God’s design that it should occur. If misery follows in the train of sin, such was God’s purpose. If some men only are saved, while others perish, such must have entered into the all comprehending purpose of God. It is not possible for any finite mind to comprehend the designs of God, or to see the reasons of his dispensations. But we cannot, on that account, deny that He governs all things, or that He rules according to the counsel of his own will.
The Augustinian system of doctrine is nothing more than the application of these general and almost universally recognized principles to the special case of the salvation of man.
Statement of the Doctrine.
The Augustinian scheme includes the following points: (1.) That the glory of God, or the manifestation of his perfections, is the highest and ultimate end of all things. (2.) For that end God purposed the creation of the universe, and the whole plan of providence and redemption. (3.) That He placed man in a state of probation, making Adam, their first parent, their head and representative. (4.) That the fall of Adam brought all his posterity into a state of condemnation, sin, and misery, from which they are utterly unable to deliver themselves. (5.) From the mass of fallen men God elected a number innumerable to eternal life, and left the rest of mankind to the just recompense of their sins. (6.) That the ground of this election is not the foresight of anything in the one class to distinguish them favourably from the members of the other class, but the good pleasure of God. (7.) That for the salvation of those thus chosen to eternal life, God gave his own Son, to become man, and to obey and suffer for his people, thus making a full satisfaction for sin and bringing in everlasting righteousness, rendering the ultimate salvation of the elect absolutely certain. (8.) That while the Holy Spirit, in his common operations, is present with every man, so long as he lives, restraining evil and exciting good, his certainly efficacious and saving power is exercised only in behalf of the elect. (9.) That all those whom God has thus chosen to life, and for whom Christ specially save Himself in the covenant of redemption, shall certainly (unless they die in infancy), be brought to the knowledge of the truth, to the exercise of faith, and to perseverance in holy living unto the end.
Such is the great scheme of doctrine known in history as the Pauline, Augustinian, or Calvinistic, taught, as we believe, in the Scriptures, developed by Augustine, formally sanctioned by the Latin Church, adhered to by the witnesses of the truth during the Middle Ages, repudiated by the Church of Rome in the Council of Trent, revived in that Church by the Jansenists, adopted by all the Reformers, incorporated in the creeds of the Protestant Churches of Switzerland, of the Palatinate, of France, Holland, England, and Scotland, and unfolded in the Standards framed by the Westminster Assembly, the common representative of Presbyterians in Europe and America.
It is a historical fact that this scheme of doctrine has been
the moving power in the Church; that largely to it are to be referred
Proof of the Doctrine.
In the first place, it is a simple, harmonious, self-consistent
scheme. It supposes no conflicting purposes in the divine mind; no willing first
one thing, and then another; no purposing ends which are never accomplished; and
no assertion of principles in conflict with others which cannot be denied. All the
parts of this vast plan admit of being reduced to one comprehensive purpose as it
was hid for ages in the divine mind. The purpose to create, to permit the fall,
to elect some to everlasting life, while others are left, to send his Son to redeem
his people, and to give the Spirit to apply that redemption, are purposes which
harmonize one with all the others, and form one consistent plan. The parts of this
scheme are not only harmonious, but they are also connected in such a way that the
one involves the others, so that if one be proved it involves the truth of all the
rest. If Christ was given for the redemption of his people, then their redemption
is rendered certain, and then the operations of the Spirit must, in their case,
be certainly efficacious; and if such be the design of the work of Christ, and the
nature of the Spirit’s influence, then those who are the objects of the one, and
the subjects of the other, must persevere in holiness unto the end. Or if we begin
with any other of the principles aforesaid, the same result follows. If it be proved
or conceded that the fall brought mankind into an estate of helpless sin and misery,
then it follows that salvation must be of grace; that it is of God and not of us,
that we are in Christ; that vocation is effectual; that election is of the good
pleasure of God; that the sacrifice of Christ renders certain the salvation of his
people; and that they cannot fatally fall away from God. So of all the rest. Admit
that the death of Christ renders certain the salvation of his people, and all the
rest follows. Admit that election is not of works, and the whole plan must be admitted
as true. Admit that nothing happens contrary to God’s purposes, then again the whole
Augustinian scheme must be admitted. There can scarcely be a clearer proof that
we understand a complicated machine than that we can put together its several parts,
so that each exactly fits its place; no one admitting of
Argument from the Facts of Providence.
In the second place, this scheme alone is consistent with the facts of God’s providence. Obvious as the truth is, it needs to be constantly repeated, that it is useless to contend against facts. If a thing is, it is vain to ignore it, or to deny its significance. We must conform our theories to facts, and not make the facts conform to our theories. That view of divine truth, therefore, is correct which accords with the facts of God’s providence; and that view of doctrine must be false which conflicts with those facts. Another principle no less plain, and no less apt to be forgotten, is the one assumed above as admitted by all Christians, namely, that God has a plan and that the events of his providence correspond with that plan. In other words, that whatever happens, God intended should happen; that to Him nothing can be unexpected, and nothing contrary to his purposes. If this be so, then we can learn with certainty what God’s plan is, what He intended to do or to permit, from what actually comes to pass. If one portion of the inhabitants of a given country die in infancy, and another portion live to mature age; such was, for wise reasons, the purpose of God. If some are prosperous, and others miserable, such also is in accordance with his holy will. If one season is abundant, another the reverse, it is so in virtue of his appointment. This is a dictate even of natural religion. As much as this even the heathen believe.
It can hardly be doubted that if these simple principles be
granted, the truth of the Augustinian scheme must be admitted. It is a fact that
God created man; it is a fact that the fall of Adam involved our whole race in sin
and misery; it is a fact that of this fallen family, some are saved and others perish;
it is a fact that the salvation of those who actually attain eternal life, is secured
by the mediation of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit. These are providential
facts admitted by all Christians. All that Augustinianism teaches is, that these
facts were not unexpected
Sovereignty of God in the Dispensations of his Providence.
There is, however, another view which must be taken of this
subject. Augustinianism is founded on the assumption of the sovereignty of God.
It supposes that it belongs to Him, in virtue of his own perfection, in virtue of
his relation to the universe as its creator and preserver, and of his relation to
the world of sinners as their ruler and judge, to deal with them according to his
own good pleasure; that He can rightfully pardon some and condemn others; can rightfully
give his saving grace to one and not to another; and, therefore, that it is of Him,
and not of man, that one and not another is made a partaker of eternal life. On
the other hand, all anti-Augustinian systems assume that God is bound to provide
salvation for all; to give sufficient grace to all; and to leave the question of
salvation and perdition to be determined by each man for himself. We are not condemned
criminals of whom the sovereign may rightfully pardon some and not others; but rational
creatures, having all an equal and valid claim on our Maker to receive all that
is necessary for our salvation. The question is not which of these theories is the
more agreeable, but which is true. And to decide that question one method is to
ascertain which accords best with providential facts. Does God in his providential
dealings with men act on the principles of sovereignty, distributing his favours
according to the good pleasure of his will; or on the principle of impartial justice,
dealing with all men alike? This question admits of but one answer. We may make
as little as we please of mere external circumstances, and magnify as much as we
can the compensations of providence which tend to equalize the condition of men.
We may press to the extreme the principle that much shall be required of those who
receive much, and less of those who receive less. Notwithstanding these qualifications
and limitations, the fact is patent that the greatest inequalities do exist among
men; that God deals far more favourably with some than with others; that He distributes
his providential blessings, which include not only temporal
This sovereignty of God in the dispensation of his providence is evinced in his dealings both with nations and with individuals. It cannot be believed that the lot of the Laplanders is as favourable as that of the inhabitants of the temperate zone; that the Hottentots are in as desirable a position as Europeans; that the people of Tartary are as well off as those of the United States. The inequality is too glaring to be denied; nor can it be doubted that the rule which God adopts in determining the lot of nations is his own good pleasure, and not the relative claims of the people affected by his providence. The same fact is no less obvious as concerns individuals. Some are happy, others are miserable. Some have uninterrupted health; others are the victims of disease and suffering. Some have all their faculties, others are born blind or deaf. Some are rich, others sunk in the misery and degradation of abject poverty. Some are born in the midst of civilized society and in the bosom of virtuous families, others are from the beginning of their being surrounded by vice and wretchedness. These are facts which cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that the lot of each individual is determined by the sovereign pleasure of God.
The same principle is carried out with regard to the communication of religious knowledge and advantages. God chose the Jews from among all time families of the earth to be the recipients of his oracles and of the divinely instituted ordinances of religion. The rest of the world was left for centuries in utter darkness. We may say that it will be more tolerable in the judgment for the heathen than for the unfaithful Jews; and that God did not leave even the Gentiles without a witness. All this may be admitted, and yet what the Apostle says stands true: The advantages of the Jews were great every way. It would be infatuation and ingratitude for the inhabitants of Christendom not to recognize their position as unspeakably more desirable than that of Pagans. No American Christian can persuade himself that it would have been as well had he been born in Africa; nor can he give any answer to the question, Why was I born here and not there? other than, “Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.”
It is therefore vain to adopt a theory which does not accord
with these facts. It is vain for us to deny that God is a sovereign in the distribution
of his favours if in his providence it is undeniable that He acts as a sovereign.
Augustinianism accords with these
Argument from the Facts of Scripture.
The third source of proof on this subject is found in the facts of the Bible, or in the truths therein plainly revealed. Augustinianism is the only system consistent with those facts or truths.
1. This appears first from the clear revelation which the Scriptures make of God as infinitely exalted above all his creatures, and as the final end as well as the source of all things. It is because He is infinitely great and good that his glory is the end of all things; and his good pleasure the highest reason for whatever comes to pass. What is man that he should contend with God; or presume that his interests rather than God’s glory should be made the final end? The Scriptures not only assert the absolute sovereignty of God, but they teach that it is founded, first, on his infinite superiority to all creatures; secondly, upon his relation to the world and all it contains, as creator and preserver, and therefore absolute proprietor; and, thirdly, so far as we men are concerned, upon our entire forfeiture of all claim on his mercy by our apostasy. The argument is that Augustinianism is the only system which accords with the character of God and with his relation to his creatures as revealed in the Bible.
2. It is a fact that men are a fallen race; that by their
alienation from God they are involved in a state of guilt and pollution, from which
they cannot deliver themselves. They have by their guilt forfeited all claim on
God’s justice; they might in justice be left to perish; and by their depravity they
have rendered themselves unable to turn unto God, or to do anything spiritually
good. These are facts already proved. The sense of guilt is universal and indestructible.
All sinners know the righteous judgment of God, that they are worthy of death. The
inability of sinners is not only clearly and repeatedly asserted in the Scriptures,
but is proved by all experience, by the common consciousness of men, and, of course,
by the consciousness of every individual man, and especially of every man who has
ever been or who is truly convinced of sin. But if men are thus unable to change
their own hearts, to prepare
From the Work of the Spirit.
3. This is confirmed by another obvious fact or truth of Scripture.
The regeneration of the human heart; the conversion of a sinner to God is the work,
not of the subject of that change, but of the Spirit of God. This is plain, first,
because the Bible always attributes it to the Holy Ghost. We are said to be born,
not of the will of man, but of God; to be born of the Spirit; to be the subjects
of the renewing of the Holy Ghost; to be quickened, or raised from the dead by the
Spirit of the Lord; the dry bones live only when the Spirit blows upon them. Such
is the representation which pervades the Scriptures from beginning to end. Secondly,
the Church, therefore, in her collective capacity, and every living member of that
Church recognizes this truth in their prayers for the renewing power of the Holy
Ghost. In the most ancient and universally recognized creeds of the Church the Spirit
is designated as τὸ ζωοποιόν, the life-giving;
the author of all spiritual life. The sovereignty involved in this regenerating
influence of the Holy Spirit is necessarily implied in the nature of the power exerted.
It is declared to be the mighty power of God; the exceeding greatness of his power;
the power which wrought in Christ when it raised Him from the dead. It is represented
as analogous to the power by which the blind were made to see, the deaf to hear,
and lepers were cleansed. It is very true the Spirit illuminates, teaches, convinces,
persuades, and, in a word, governs the soul according to its nature as a rational
creature But all this relates to what is
Election is to Holiness.
4. Another plainly revealed fact is, that we are chosen to
holiness; that we are created unto good works; in other words, that all good in
us is the fruit, and, therefore, cannot by possibility be the ground of election.
In
From the Gratuitous Nature of Salvation.
5. Another decisive fact is that salvation is of grace. The
two ideas of grace and works; of gift and debt; of undeserved favour and what is
merited; of what is to be referred to the good pleasure of the giver, and what to
the character or state of the receiver, are antithetical. The one excludes the other.
“If by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But
if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work.”
The Apostle’s Argument in
This also is the purpose of the Apostle in the whole of the
ninth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. He had asserted agreeably to the predictions
of time ancient prophets, that the Jews as a nation were to be cast off, and the
blessings of the true religion were to be extended to the Gentiles. To establish
this point, he first shows that God was not bound by his promise to Abraham to save
all the natural descendants of that patriarch. On the contrary, that it was a prerogative
which God, as sovereign, claimed and exercised
Argument from Experience.
The whole history of the Church, and the daily observation
of Christians, prove the sovereignty of God in the dispensation of saving blessings,
for which Augustinians contend. It is true, indeed, first, that God is a covenant
keeping God, and that his promise is to his people and to their seed after them
to the third and fourth generations. It is, therefore, true that his grace is dispensed,
although not exclusively, yet conspicuously, in the line of their descendants. Secondly,
it is also true that God has promised his blessing to attend faithful instruction.
He commands parents to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of
Express Declarations of Scripture.
6. The Scriptures clearly assert that God has mercy on whom
He will have mercy, and compassion on him on whom He will have compassion. They
teach negatively, that election to salvation is not of works; that it does not depend
on the character or efforts of its objects; and affirmatively, that it does depend
on
The Words of Jesus.
Of all the teachers sent by God to reveal his will, no one
more frequently asserts the divine sovereignty than our blessed Lord himself. He
speaks of those whom the Father had “given Him.” (
If the office of the theologian, as is so generally admitted, be to take the facts of Scripture as the man of science does those of nature, and found upon them his doctrines, instead of deducing his doctrines from the principles or primary truths of his philosophy, it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the doctrine of Augustine is the doctrine of the Bible. According to that doctrine God is an absolute sovereign. He does what seems good in his sight. He sends the truth to one nation and not to another. He gives that truth saving power in one mind and not in another. It is of him, and not of us, that any man is in Christ Jesus, and is an heir of eternal life.
This, as has been shown, is asserted in express terms, with
great frequency and clearness in the Scriptures. It is sustained by all the facts
of providence and of revelation. It attributes to God
§ 9. Objections to the Augustinian Scheme.
That there are formidable objections to the Augustinian doctrine
of divine sovereignty cannot be denied. They address themselves even more powerfully
to the feelings and to the imagination than they do to the understanding. They are
therefore often arrayed in such distorted and exaggerated forms as to produce the
strongest revulsion and abhorrence. This, however, is due partly to the distortion
of the truth and partly to the opposition of our imperfectly or utterly unsanctified
nature, to the things of the Spirit, of which the Apostle speaks in
Of these objections, however, it may be remarked in general, in the first place, that they do not bear exclusively on this doctrine. It is one of the unfair devices of controversy to represent difficulties which press with equal force against some admitted doctrine as valid only against the doctrine which the objector rejects. Thus the objections against Augustinianism, on which special reliance is placed, bear with their full force against the decrees of God in general; or if these be denied, against the divine foreknowledge; against the permission of sin and misery, and especially against the doctrine of the unending sinfulness and misery of many of God’s intelligent creatures. These are doctrines which all Christians admit, and which are arrayed by infidels and atheists in colours as shocking to the imagination and feelings as any which Anti-Augustinians have employed in depicting the sovereignty of God. It is just as difficult to reconcile to our natural ideas of God that He, with absolute control over all creatures, should allow so many of them to perish eternally as that He should save some and not others. The difficulty is in both cases the same. God does not prevent the perdition of those whom, beyond doubt, He has power to save. If those who admit God’s providence say that He has wise reasons for permitting so many of our race to perish, the advocates of his sovereignty say that He has adequate reasons for saving some and not others. It is unreasonable and unjust, therefore, to press difficulties which bear against admitted truths as fatal to doctrines which are matters of controversy. When an objection is shown to prove too much it is rationally refuted.
The same objections bear against the Providence of God.
A second general remark respecting these objections is, that
they hear against the providence of God. This has already been shown. It is useless
and irrational to argue against facts. It can avail
Founded on our Ignorance.
A third obvious remark is that these objections are subjective; i.e., they derive all their force from the limitation of our powers and from the narrowness of our views. They assume that we are competent to sit in judgment on God’s government of the universe; that we can ascertain the end which He has in view, and estimate aright the wisdom and justice of the means adopted for its accomplishment. This is clearly a preposterous assumption, not only because of our utter incapacity to comprehend the ways of God, but also because we must of necessity judge before the consummation of his plan, and must also judge from appearances. It is but right in judging of the plans even of a fellow mortal, that we should wait until they are fully developed, and also right that we should not judge without being certain that we can see his real intentions, and the connection between his means and end.
Besides all this, it is to be observed that these difficulties
arise from our contemplating, so to speak, only one aspect of the case. We look
only on the sovereignty of God and the absolute nature of his control over his creatures.
We leave out of view, or are incapable of understanding the perfect consistency
of that sovereignty and control, with the free agency and responsibility of his
rational creatures. It is perfectly true, in one aspect, that God determines according
to his own good pleasure the destiny of every human being; and it is equally true,
in another aspect, that every man determines his own destiny. These truths can both
be established on the firmest grounds. Their consistency, therefore, must be admitted
as a fact, even though we may not be able to discover it. Of the multitudes who
start in the pursuit of fame, wealth, or power, some succeed while others fail.
Success and failure, in every case, are determined by the Lord. This is distinctly
asserted in the Bible. “God,” saith the Psalmist, “putteth down one and setteth
up another.” (
These Objections were urged against the Teachings of the Apostle.
Another remark respecting these objections should not be overlooked. They were urged by the Jews against the doctrine of the Apostle. This at least proves that his doctrine is our doctrine. Had he not taught what all Augustinians hold to be true, there would have been no room for such objections. Had he denied that God dispenses salvation according to his own good pleasure, having mercy on whom He will have mercy, why should the Jews urge that God was unjust and that the responsibility of man was destroyed? What appearance of injustice could there have been had Paul taught that God elects those whom He foresees will repent and believe, and because of that foresight? It is only because he clearly asserts the sovereignty of God that the objections have any place. The answers which Paul gives to these difficulties should satisfy us for two reasons; first, because they are the answers dictated by the Spirit of God; and secondly, because they are in themselves satisfactory to every rightly constituted mind.
The first of these objections is that it is inconsistent with the justice of God to save one and not another, according to his own good pleasure. To this Paul answers, (1.) That God claims this prerogative. (2.) That He actually exercises it. It is useless to deny facts, or to say that what God really does is inconsistent with his nature. (3.) That it is a rightful prerogative, founded not only on the infinite superiority of God and in his proprietorship in all his creatures; but also in his relation as moral governor to the race of sinful men. If even a human sovereign is entitled to exercise his discretion in pardoning one criminal and not another, surely this prerogative cannot reasonably be denied to God. There can be no injustice in allowing the sentence of a just law to be executed upon an offender. And this is all that God does in regard to sinners.
The further difficulty connected with this subject arising from the foreordination of sin, belongs to the subject of decrees, and has already been considered. The same remark applies to the objection that the doctrine in question destroys all motive to exertion and to the use of means of grace; and reduces the doctrine of the Scriptures to a purely fatalistic system.
The practical tendency of any doctrine is to be decided from
its nature, and from its effects. The natural effect of the conviction that we have
forfeited all claims on God’s justice, that we are at his mercy, and that He may
rightfully leave us to perish in our sins,
§ 1. The Plan of Salvation is a Covenant.
The plan of salvation is presented under the form of a covenant. This is evident, —
First, from the constant use of the words בְּרִית
and διαθήκη in reference to it. With regard to the former of these words, although
it is sometimes used for a law, disposition, or arrangement in general, where the
elements of a covenant strictly speaking are absent, yet there can be no doubt that
according to its prevailing usage in the Old Testament, it means a mutual contract
between two or more parties. It is very often used of compacts between individuals,
and especially between kings and rulers. Abraham and Abimelech made a covenant.
(
The meaning of the word διαθήκη
in the Greek Scriptures is just as certain and uniform. It is derived from the verb
διατίθημι, to arrange, and, therefore, in ordinary
Greek is used for any arrangement, or disposition. In the Scriptures it is almost
uniformly used in the sense of a covenant. In the Septuagint it is the translation
of בְּרִית in all the cases above
referred to. It is the term always used in the New Testament to designate the covenant
with Abraham, with the Israelites, and with believers. The old covenant and the new
are presented in contrast. Both were covenants. If
Secondly, that the plan of salvation is presented in the Bible under the form of a covenant is proved not only from the signification and usage of the words above mentioned, but also and more decisively from the fact that the elements of a covenant are included in this plan. There are parties, mutual promises or stipulations, and conditions. So that it is in fact a covenant, whatever it may be called. As this is the Scriptural mode of representation, it is of great importance that it should be retained in theology. Our only security for retaining the truths of the Bible, is to adhere to the Scriptures as closely as possible in our mode of presenting the doctrines therein revealed.
§ 2. Different Views of the Nature of this Covenant.
It is assumed by many that the parties to the covenant of grace are God and fallen man. Man by his apostasy having forfeited the favour of God, lost the divine image, and involved himself in sin and misery, must have perished in this state, had not God provided a plan of salvation. Moved by compassion for his fallen creatures, God determined to send his Son into the world, to assume their nature, and to do and suffer whatever was requisite for their salvation. On the ground of this redeeming work of Christ, God promises salvation to all who will comply with the terms on which it is offered. This general statement embraces forms of opinion which differ very much one from the others.
1. It includes even the Pelagian view of the plan of salvation, which assumes that there is no difference between the covenant of works under which Adam was placed, and the covenant of grace, under which men are now, except as to the extent of the obedience required. God promised life to Adam on the condition of perfect obedience, because he was in a condition to render such obedience. He promises salvation to men now on the condition of ouch obedience as they are able to render, whether Jews, Pagans, or Christians. According to this view the parties to the covenant are God and man; the promise is life; the condition is obedience, such as man in the use of his natural powers is able to render.
2. The Remonstrant system does not differ essentially from
the Pelagian, so far as the parties, the promise and the condition of the covenant
are concerned. The Remonstrants also make God and man the parties, life the promise,
and obedience the condition.
3. Wesleyan Arminianism greatly exalts the work of Christ, the importance of the Spirit’s influence, and the grace of the gospel above the standard adopted by the Remonstrants. The two systems, however, are essentially the same. The work of Christ has equal reference to all men. It secures for all the promise of salvation on the condition of evangelical obedience; and it obtains for all, Jews and Gentiles, enough measures of divine grace to render such obedience practicable. The salvation of each individual man depends on the use which he makes of this sufficient grace.
4. The Lutherans also hold that God had the serious purpose to save all men; that Christ died equally for all; that salvation is offered to all who hear the gospel, on the condition, not of works or of evangelical obedience, but of faith alone; faith, however, is the gift of God; men have not the power to believe, but they have the power of effectual resistance; and those, and those only, under the gospel, who wilfully resist, perish, and for that reason. According to all these views, which were more fully stated in the receding chapter, the covenant of grace is a compact between God and fallen man, in which God promises salvation on condition of a compliance with the demands of the gospel. What those demands are, as we have seen, is differently explained.
The essential distinctions between the above-mentioned views of the plan of salvation, or covenant of grace, and the Augustinian system, are, (1.) That, according to the former, its provisions have equal reference to all mankind, whereas according to the latter they have special reference to that portion of our race who are actually saved; and (2.) That Augustinianism says that it is God and not man who determines who are to be saved. As has been already frequently remarked, the question which of these systems is true is not to be decided by ascertaining which is the more agreeable to our feelings or the more plausible to our understanding, but which is consistent with the doctrines of the Bible and the facts of experience. This point has already been discussed. Our present object is simply to state what Angustinians mean by the covenant of grace.
The word grace is used in Scripture and in ordinary religious writings in three senses. (1.) For unmerited love; i.e., love exercised towards the undeserving. (2.) For any unmerited favour, especially for spiritual blessings. Hence, all the fruits of the Spirit in believers are called graces, or unmerited gifts of God. (3.) The word grace often means the supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost. This is preëminently grace, being the great gift secured by the work of Christ, and without which his redemption would not avail to our salvation. In all these senses of the word the plan of salvation is properly called a covenant of grace. It is of grace because it originated in the mysterious love of God for sinners who deserved only his wrath and curse. Secondly, because it promises salvation, not on the condition of works or anything meritorious on our part, but as an unmerited gift. And, thirdly, because its benefits are secured and applied not in the course of nature, or in the exercise of the natural powers of the sinner, but by the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit, granted to him as an unmerited gift.
§ 3. Parties to the Covenant.
At first view there appears to be some confusion in the statements of the Scriptures as to the parties to this covenant. Sometimes Christ is presented as one of the parties; at others He is represented not as a party, but as the mediator and surety of the covenant; while the parties are represented to be God and his people. As the old covenant was made between God and the Hebrews, and Moses acted as mediator, so the new covenant is commonly represented in the Bible as formed between God and his people, Christ acting as mediator. He is, therefore, called the mediator of a better covenant founded on better promises.
Some theologians propose to reconcile these modes of representation
by saying that as the covenant of works was formed with Adam as the representative
of his race, and therefore in him with all mankind descending from him by ordinary
generation; so the covenant of grace was formed with Christ as the head and representative
of his people, and in Him with all those given to Him by the Father. This simplifies
the matter, and agrees with the parallel which the Apostle traces between Adam and
Christ in
This is a matter which concerns only perspicuity of statement.
There is no doctrinal difference between those who prefer the one statement and
those who prefer the other; between those who comprise all the facts of Scripture
relating to the subject under one covenant between God and Christ as the representative
of his people, and those who distribute them under two. The Westminster standards
seem to adopt sometimes the one and sometimes the other mode of representation.
In the Confession of Faith
Two Covenants to be Distinguished.
This confusion is avoided by distinguishing between the covenant
of redemption between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of grace between
God and his people. The latter supposes the
The same view is taken by Witsius:
§ 4. Covenant of Redemption.
By this is meant the covenant between the Father and the Son
in reference to the salvation of man. This is a subject which, from its nature,
is entirely beyond our comprehension. We must receive the teachings of the Scriptures
in relation to it without presuming to penetrate the mystery which naturally belongs
to it. There is only one God, one divine Being, to whom all the attributes of divinity
belong. But in the Godhead there are three persons, the same in substance, and equal
in power and glory. It lies in the nature of personality, that one person is objective
to another. If
In order to prove that there is a covenant between the Father
and the Son, formed in eternity, and revealed in time, it is not necessary that
we should adduce passages of the Scriptures in which this truth is expressly asserted.
There are indeed passages which are equivalent to such direct assertions. This is
implied in the frequently recurring statements of the Scripture that the plan of
God respecting the salvation of men was of the nature of a covenant, and was formed
in eternity. Paul says that it was hidden for ages in the divine mind; that it was
before the foundation of the world. Christ speaks of promises made to Him before
his advent; and that He came into the world in execution of a commission which
He had received from the Father. The parallel so distinctly drawn between Adam and
Christ is also a proof of the point in question. As Adam was the head and representative
of his posterity, so Christ is the head and representative of his people. And as
God entered into covenant with Adam so He entered into covenant with Christ. This,
in
The proof of the doctrine has, however, a much wider foundation.
When one person assigns a stipulated work to another person with the promise of
a reward upon the condition of the performance of that work, there is a covenant.
Nothing can be plainer than that all this is true in relation to the Father and
the Son. The Father gave the Son a work to do; He sent Him into the world to perform
it, and promised Him a great reward when the work was accomplished. Such is the
constant representation of the Scriptures. We have, therefore, the contracting parties,
the promise, and the condition. These are the essential elements of a covenant.
Such being the representation of Scripture, such must be the truth to which we are
bound to adhere. It is not a mere figure, but a real transaction, and should be
regarded and treated as such if we would understand aright the plan of salvation.
In the fortieth Psalm. expounded by the Apostle as referring to the Messiah, it
is said, “Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to
do thy will.” i.e. to execute thy purpose, to carry on
It is plain, therefore, that Christ came to execute a work, that He was sent of the Father to fulfil a plan, or preconceived design. It is no less plain that special promises were made by the Father to the Son, suspended upon the accomplishment of the work assigned Him. This may appear as an anthropological mode of representing a transaction between the persons of the adorable Trinity. But it must be received as substantial truth. The Father did give the Son a work to do, and He did promise to him a reward upon its accomplishment. The transaction was, therefore, of the nature of a covenant. An obligation was assumed by the Son to accomplish the work assigned Him; and an obligation was assumed by the Father to grant Him the stipulated reward. The infinitude of God does not prevent these things being possible.
As the exhibition of the work of Christ in the redemption of man constitutes a large part of the task of the theologian, all that is proper in this place is a simple reference to the Scriptural statements on the subject.
The Work assigned to the Redeemer.
(1) He was to assume our nature, humbling Himself to be born
of a woman, and to be found in fashion as a man. This was to be a real incarnation,
not a mere theophany such as occurred repeatedly under the old dispensation. He
was to become flesh: to take part of flesh and body; to be bone of our bone and
flesh of our flesh, made in all things like unto his brethren, yet without sin,
that He might be touched with a sense of our infirmities, and able to sympathize
with those who are tempted, being Himself also
The Promises made to the Redeemer.
Such, in general terms, was the work which the Son of God undertook to perform. The promises of the Father to the Son conditioned on the accomplishment of that work, were, (1.) That He would prepare Him a body, fit up a tabernacle for Him, formed as was the body of Adam by the immediate agency of God, uncontaminated and without spot or blemish. (2.) That He would give the Spirit to Him without measure, that his whole human nature should be replenished with grace and strength, and so adorned with the beauty of holiness that He should be altogether lovely. (3.) That He would be ever at his right hand to support and comfort Him in the darkest hours of his conflict with the powers of darkness, and that He would ultimately bruise Satan under his feet. (4.) That He would deliver Him from the power of death, and exalt Him to his own right hand in heaven; and that all power in heaven and earth should be committed to Him. (5.) That He, as the Theanthropos and head of the Church, should have the Holy Spirit to send to whom He willed, to renew their hearts, to satisfy and comfort them, and to qualify them for his service and kingdom. (6.) That all given to Him by the Father should come to Him, and be kept by Him, so that none of them should be lost. (7.) That a multitude whom no man can number should thus be made partakers of his redemption, and that ultimately the kingdom of the Messiah should embrace all the nations of the earth. (8.) That through Christ, in Him, and in his ransomed Church, there should be made the highest manifestation of the divine perfections to all orders of holy intelligences throughout eternity. The Son of God was thus to see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.
§ 5. The Covenant of Grace.
In virtue of what the Son of God covenanted to perform, and
what in the fulness of time He actually accomplished, agreeably to
Christ as Mediator of the Covenant.
As Christ is a party to the covenant of redemption, so He
is constantly represented as the mediator of the covenant of grace; not only in
the sense of an internuncius, as Moses was a mediator between God and the
people of Israel, but in the sense, (1.) That it was through his intervention, and
solely on the ground of what He had done, or promised to do, that God entered into
this new covenant with fallen men. And, (2.) in the sense of a surety. He guarantees
the fulfilment of all the promises and conditions of the covenant. His blood was
the blood of the covenant. That is, his death had all the effects of a federal sacrifice,
it not only bound the parties to the contract, but it also secured the fulfilment
of all its provisions. Hence He is called not only Μεσίτης,
but also Ἔγγυος (
The Condition of the Covenant.
The condition of the covenant of grace, so far as adults are
concerned, is faith in Christ. That is, in order to partake of the benefits of this
covenant we must receive the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God in whom and for
whose sake its blessings are vouchsafed to the children of men. Until we thus believe
we are aliens and strangers from the covenant of promise, without God and without
Christ. We must acquiesce in this covenant, renouncing all other methods of salvation,
and consenting to be saved on the terms which it proposes, before we are made partakers
of its benefits. The word “condition,” however, is used in two senses. Sometimes
it means the meritorious consideration on the ground of which certain benefits are
bestowed. In this sense perfect obedience was the condition of the covenant originally
made with Adam. Had he retained his integrity he would have merited the promised
blessing. For to him that worketh the reward is not of grace but of debt. In the
same sense the work of Christ is the
The Promises of the Covenant.
The promises of this covenant are all included in the comprehensive formula, so often occurring in the Scriptures, “I will be your God, and ye shall be my people.” This involves the complete restoration of our normal relation to God. All ground of alienation, every bar to fellowship is removed. He communicates Himself in his fulness to his people; and they become his by entire conformity to his will and devotion to his service, and are the special objects of his favour.
God is said to be our God, not only because He is the God whom we acknowledge and profess to worship and obey, as He was the God of the Hebrews in distinction from the Gentiles who did not acknowledge his existence or profess to be his worshippers, but He is our God, — our infinite portion; the source to us of all that God is to those who are the objects of his love. His perfections are revealed to us as the highest knowledge; they are all pledged for our protection, blessedness, and glory. His being our God implies also that He assures us of his love, and admits us to communion with Himself. As his favour is life, and his loving kindness better than life; as the vision of God, the enjoyment of his love and fellowship with Him secure the highest possible exaltation and beatification of his creatures, it is plain that the promise to be our God, in the Scriptural sense of the term, includes all conceivable and all possible good.
When it is said that we are to be his people it means, (1.)
That we are his peculiar possession. His delights are with the children
§ 6. The Identity of the Covenant of Grace under all Dispensations.
By this is meant that the plan of salvation has, under all
dispensations, the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian, been the same. On
this subject much diversity of opinion, and still more of mode of statement has
prevailed. Socinians say that under the old economy, there was no promise of eternal
life; and that the condition of salvation was not faith in Christ. The Remonstrants
admitted that the patriarchs were saved, and that they were saved through Christ,
i.e., in virtue of the work which the Redeemer was to accomplish; but they also
questioned whether any direct promise of eternal life was given in the Old Testament,
or whether faith in the Redeemer was the condition of acceptance with God. On this
subject the “Apology for the Confession of the Remonstrants” says
The Baptists, especially those of the time of the Reformation, do not hold the common doctrine on this subject. The Anabaptists not only spoke in very disparaging terms of the old economy and of the state of the Jews under that dispensation, but it was necessary to their peculiar system, that they should deny that the covenant made with Abraham included the covenant of grace. Baptists hold that infants cannot be church members, and that the sign of such membership cannot properly be administered to any who have not knowledge and faith. But it cannot be denied that infants were included in the covenant made with Abraham, and that they received circumcision, its appointed seal and sign. It is therefore essential to their theory that the Abrahamic covenant should be regarded as a merely national covenant entirely distinct from the covenant of grace.
The Romanists assuming that saving grace is communicated through the sacraments, and seeing that the mass of the ancient Israelites, on many occasions at least, were rejected of God, notwithstanding their participation of the sacraments then ordained, were driven to assume a radical difference between the sacraments of the Old Testament and those of the New. The former only signified grace, the latter actually conveyed it. From this it follows that those living before the institution of the Christian sacraments were not actually saved. Their sins were not remitted, but pretermitted, passed over. At death they were not admitted into heaven, but passed into a place and state called the limbus patrum, where they remained in a negative condition until the coming of Christ, who after his death descended to hell, sheol, for their deliverance.
In opposition to these different views the common doctrine of the Church has ever been, that the plan of salvation has been the same from the beginning. There is the same promise of deliverance from the evils of the apostasy, the same Redeemer, the same condition required for participation. in the blessings of redemption, and the same complete salvation for all who embrace the offers of divine mercy.
In determining the degree of knowledge possessed by the ancient
people of God, we are not to be governed by our own capacity of discovering from
the Old Testament Scriptures the doctrines of grace. What amount of supplementary
instruction the people received from the prophets, or what degree of divine illumination
was granted to them we cannot tell. It is, however, clear from the writings of the
New Testament, that the knowledge of the
From the Scriptures, therefore, as a whole, from the New Testament, and from the Old as interpreted by infallible authority in the New, we learn that the plan of salvation has always been one and the same; having the same promise, the same Saviour, the same condition, and the same salvation.
The Promise of Eternal Life made before the Advent.
That the promise was the same to those who lived before the
advent that it is to us, is plain. Immediately after the fall God gave to Adam the
promise of redemption. That promise was contained in the prediction that the seed
of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head. In this passage it is clear that
the serpent is Satan. He was the tempter, and on him the curse pronounced was designed
to fall. Bruising his head implies fatal injury or overthrow. The prince of darkness
who had triumphed over our first parents, was to be cast down, and despoiled of
his victory. This overthrow was to be accomplished by the seed of the woman. This
phrase might mean the posterity of the woman, and in this sense would convey an
important truth; man was to triumph over Satan. But it evidently had a more specific
reference. It refers to one individual, who in a sense peculiar to himself, was
to be the seed of the woman. This is clear from the analogy of prophecy. When it
was promised to Abraham that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be
blessed; it would be very natural to understand by seed his posterity, the Hebrew
people. But we know certainly, from the direct assertion of the Apostle (
The Apostle in
Christ, the Redeemer, under both Dispensations.
This is a very imperfect exhibition of the evidence which
the Scriptures afford that the promise of redemption, and of all that redemption
includes, pardon, sanctification, the favour of God, and eternal life, was made
to the people of God from the beginning. It is no less clear that the Redeemer is
the same under all dispensations. He who was predicted as the seed of the woman,
as the seed of Abraham, the Son of David, the Branch, the Servant of the Lord, the
Prince of Peace, is our Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, God manifest in the
flesh. He, therefore, from the beginning has been held up as the hope of the world,
the Salvator hominum. He was set forth in all his offices, as Prophet, Priest, and
King. His work was described as a sacrifice, as well as a redemption. All this is
so obvious, and so generally admitted, as to render the citation of proof texts
unnecessary. It is enough to refer to the general declarations of the New Testament
on this subject. Our Lord commanded the Jews to search their Scriptures, because
they testified of Him. He said that Moses and the prophets wrote of Him. Beginning
at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded to the disciples in all the Scriptures
the things concerning Himself. The Apostles when they began to preach the gospel,
not only everywhere proved from the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ, but they
referred to them continually in support of everything which they taught concerning
his person and his work. It is from the Old Testament they prove his divinity; his
incarnation; the sacrificial nature of his death; that He was truly a Priest to
make reconciliation for the people, as well as a Prophet and a King; and that He
was to die, to rise again on the third day, to ascend into heaven, and to be invested
with absolute authority over all the earth, and aver all orders of created beings.
There is not a doctrine concerning Christ, taught in the New Testament, which the
Apostles do not affirm to have been revealed under former dispensations. They therefore
distinctly assert that it was through Him and the efficacy
Such a revelation of the Messiah was undoubtedly made in the
Old Testament as to turn the eyes of the whole Jewish nation in hope and faith.
What the two disciples on the way to Emmaus said, “We trusted it had been He who
should have redeemed Israel,” reveals what was the general expectation and desire
of the people. Paul repeatedly speaks of the Messiah as the hope of Israel. The
promise of redemption through Christ, he declared to be the great object of the
people’s hope. When arraigned before the tribunals of the Jews, and before Agrippa,
he uniformly declared that in preaching Christ and the resurrection, he had not
departed from the religion of the fathers, but adhered to it, while his enemies
had deserted it. “Now I stand, and am judged,” he says, “for the hope of the promise
made of God unto our fathers.” (
Faith the Condition of Salvation from the Beginning.
As the same promise was made to those who lived before the
advent which is now made to us in the gospel, as the same Redeemer
This is plain not only from the considerations just mentioned,
but also further, (1.) From the fact that the Apostle teaches that faith, not works,
was before as well as after Christ the condition of salvation. This, in his Epistle
to the Romans, he not only asserts, but proves. He argues that from the nature of
the case the justification of sinners by works is a contradiction. If sinners, they
are under condemnation for their works, and therefore cannot be justified by them.
Moreover he proves that the Old Testament everywhere speaks of gratuitous forgiveness
and acceptance of men with God; but if gratuitous, it cannot be meritorious. He
further argues from the case of Abraham, who, according to the express declaration
of the Scriptures, was justified by faith; and he quotes from the old prophets the
great principle, true then as now, that the “just shall live by faith.” (2.) In
the second place, he proves that the faith intended was faith in a promise and not
merely general piety or confidence toward God. Abraham, he says, “staggered not
at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to
God; and being fully persuaded that what He had promised He was able also to perform.”
(
Not only, therefore, from these explicit declarations that
faith in the promised Redeemer was required from the beginning, but from the admitted
fact that the Old Testament is full of the doctrine of redemption by the Messiah,
it follows that those who received the religion of the Old Testament received that
doctrine, and exercised faith in the promise of God concerning his Son. The Epistle
to the Hebrews is designed in great part to show that the whole of the Old
Paul, in
The covenant of grace, or plan of salvation, being the same in all its elements from the beginning, it follows, first, in opposition to the Anabaptists, that the people of God before Christ constituted a Church, and that the Church has been one and the same under all dispensations. It has always had the same promise, the same Redeemer, and the same condition of membership, namely, faith in the Son of God as the Saviour of the world.
It follows from the same premises, in opposition to the Romanists, that the salvation of the people of God who died before the coming of Christ, was complete. They were truly pardoned, sanctified, and, at death, admitted to that state into which those dying in the Christian faith are now received. This is confirmed by what our Lord and the Apostles teach. The salvation promised us is that on which the Old Testament saints have already entered. The Gentile believers are to sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The bosom of Abraham was the place of rest for all the faithful. All that Paul claims for believers under the gospel is, that they are the sons of Abraham, and partakers of his inheritance. If this is so, then the whole ritual theory which assumes that grace and salvation are communicated only through Christian sacraments must be false.
§ 7. Different Dispensations.
First, from Adam to Abraham.
Although the covenant of grace has always been the same, the
dispensations of that covenant have changed. The first dispensation extended from
Adam to Abraham. Of this period we have so few
The Second Dispensation.
The second dispensation extended from Abraham to Moses. This was distinguished from the former, (1.) By the selection of the descendants of Abraham to be the peculiar people of God. They were chosen in order to preserve the knowledge of the true religion in the midst of the general apostasy of mankind. To this end special revelations were made to them, and God entered into a covenant with them, promising that He would be their God, and that they should be his people. (2.) Besides thus gathering his Church out of the world, and making its members a peculiar people, distinguished by circumcision from the Gentiles around them, the promise of redemption was made more definite. The Redeemer was to be of the seed of Abraham. He was to be one person. The salvation He was to effect should pertain to all nations. (3.) Subsequently it was made known that the Deliverer was to be of the tribe of Judah.
The Third Dispensation.
The third dispensation of this covenant was from Moses to
Christ. All that belonged to the previous periods was taken up and included in this.
A multitude of new ordinances of polity, worship, and
Besides this evangelical character which unquestionably belongs
to the Mosaic covenant, it is presented in two other aspects in the Word of God.
First, it was a national covenant with the Hebrew people. In this view the parties
were God and the people of Israel; the promise was national security and prosperity;
the condition was the obedience of the people as a nation to the Mosaic law; and
the mediator was Moses. In this aspect it was a legal covenant. It said. “Do this
and live.” Secondly, it contained, as does also the New Testament, a renewed proclamation
of the original covenant of works. It is as true now as in the days of Adam, it
always has been and always must be true, that rational creatures who perfectly obey
the law of God are blessed in the enjoyment of his favour; and that those who sin
are subject to his wrath and curse. Our Lord assured the young man who came to Him
for instruction that if he kept the commandments he should live. And Paul says (
These different aspects under which the Mosaic economy is
presented account for the apparently inconsistent way in which it in spoken of in
the New Testament. (1.) When viewed in relation to the people of God before the
advent, it is represented as divine
The Gospel Dispensation.
The gospel dispensation is called new in reference to the Mosaic economy, which was old, and about to vanish away. It is distinguished from the old economy, —
1. In being catholic, confined to no one people, but designed and adapted to all nations and to all classes of men.
2. It is more spiritual, not only in that the types and ceremonies
of the Old Testament are done away, but also in that the revelation itself is more
inward and spiritual. What was then made known objectively, is now, to a greater
extent, written on the heart. (
4. It is more purely evangelical. Even the New Testament, as we have seen, contains a legal element, it reveals the law still as a covenant of works binding on those who reject the gospel; but in the New Testament the gospel greatly predominates over the law. Whereas, under the Old Testament, the law predominated over the gospel.
5. The Christian economy is specially the dispensation of
the Spirit. The great blessing promised of old, as consequent on the coming of Christ,
was the effusion of the Spirit on all flesh, i.e., on all nations and on all classes
of men. This was so distinguishing a characteristic of the Messianic period that
the evangelist says, “The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not
yet glorified.” (
6. The old dispensation was temporary and preparatory; the new is permanent and final. In sending forth his disciples to preach the gospel, and in promising them the gift of the Spirit, He assured them that He would be with them in that work unto the end of the world. This dispensation is, therefore, the last before the restoration of all things; the last, that is, designed for the conversion of men and the ingathering of the elect. Afterwards comes the end; the resurrection and the final judgment. In the Old Testament there are frequent intimations of another and a better economy, to which the Mosaic institutions were merely preparatory. But we have no intimation in Scripture that the dispensation of the Spirit is to give way for a new and better dispensation for the conversion of the nations. When the gospel is fully preached, then comes the end.
§ 1. Preliminary Remarks.
1. The most mysterious and the most familiar fact of consciousness and experience is the union of soul and body in the constitution of our nature. According to the common faith of mankind and of the Church, man consists of two distinct substances, soul and body. By substance is meant that which is. It is the entity in which properties, attributes, and qualities inhere, and of which they are the manifestations. It is therefore something more than mere force. It is something more than a collective name for a certain number of properties which appear in combination. It is that which continues, and remains unchanged under all the varying phenomena of which it may be the subject. The substance which we designate the soul, is immaterial, that is, it has none of the properties of matter. It is spiritual, i.e., it has all the properties of a spirit. It is a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent. The substance which we call the body, on the other hand, is material. That is, it has all the properties of matter and none of the properties of mind or spirit. This is the first fact universally admitted concerning the constitution of our nature.
2. The second fact concerns the nature of the union between
the soul and body. It is, (a.) A personal union. Soul and body constitute one individual
man, or human person. There is but one consciousness. It is the man or person who
is conscious of sensations and of thoughts, of affections of the body and of the
acts of the mind. (b.) It is a union without mixture or confusion. The soul remains
spirit, and the body remains matter. Copper and zinc combined form brass. The constituent
elements lose their distinctive characteristics, and produce a third substance.
There is no such mixture in the union of the soul and body. The two remain distinct.
Neither is there a transfer of any of the properties of the one to the other. No
property of the mind is transferred to the body; and no property of the body is
transferred to the mind. (c.) Nevertheless the union is not a mere inhabitation,
3. Thirdly, the consequences of this union of the soul and
body are, (a.) A κοινωνία ἰδιωμάτων, or communion
of attributes. That is, the person is the possessor of all the attributes both of
the soul and of the body. We may predicate of the man whatever may be predicated
of his body; and we may predicate of him whatever may be predicated of his soul.
We say of the man that he is tall or short; that he is sick or well; that he is
handsome or deformed. In like manner, we may say that he is judicious, wise, good,
benevolent, or learned. Whatever is true of either element of his constitution is
true of the man. What is true of the one, however, is not true of the other. When
the body is wounded or burnt it is not the soul that is the subject of these accidents;
and when the soul is penitent or believing, or enlightened and informed, the body
is not the subject spoken of. Each has its properties and changes, but the person
or man is the subject of them all. (b.) Hence, inconsistent, or apparently contradictory
affirmations may be made of the same person. We may say that he is weak and that
he is strong; that he is mortal and immortal; that he is a spirit, and that he is
dust and ashes. (c.) We may designate the man from one element of his nature when
what we predicate of him is true only of the other element. We may call him a spirit
and yet say that he hungers and thirsts. We may call him a worm of the dust when
we speak of him as the subject of regeneration. That is, the person may be designated
from either nature when the predicate belongs to the other. (d.) As in virtue of
the personal union of the soul and body all the properties of either are properties
of the man, so all the acts of either are the acts of the man. Some of our acts
are purely mental, as thinking, repenting, and believing; some are purely bodily,
as the processes of digestion, assimilation, and the circulation of the blood; some
are mixed, as all voluntary acts, as walking, speaking, and writing. In these there
is a direct concurrence or cooperation of the mind and body. These several classes
of acts are acts of the man. It is the man who thinks; it is the man who speaks
and writes; and the man who digests and assimilates his food. (e.) A fifth consequence
of this hypostatic union is the exaltation of the body. The reason why the body
of a man and its life are so immeasurably exalted above those of a brute
The union of soul and body in the constitution of man is the analogue of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ. No analogy is expected to answer in all points. There is in this case enough of resemblance to sustain faith and rebuke unbelief. There is nothing in the one more mysterious or inscrutable than in the other. And as the difficulties to the understanding in the union of two distinct substances, matter and mind, in the person of man have induced many to deny the plainest facts of consciousness, so the difficulties of the same kind attending the doctrine of the union of two natures, the one human and the other divine in the person of Christ, have led many to reject the plainest facts of Scripture.
§ 2. The Scriptural Facts concerning the Person of Christ.
The facts which the Bible teaches concerning the person of Christ are, first, that He was truly man, i.e., He had a perfect or complete human nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of man (that is, of man as man, and not of man as fallen) can be predicated of Christ. Secondly, He was truly God, or had a perfect divine nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of God can be predicated of Christ. Thirdly, He was one person. The same person, self, or Ego, who said, “I thirst,” said, “Before Abraham was, I am.” This is the whole doctrine of the incarnation as it lies in the Scriptures and in the faith of the Church.
Proof of the Doctrine.
The proof of this doctrine includes three distinct classes
of passages of Scripture, or may be presented in three different forms. First, the
proof of the several elements of the doctrine separately. Secondly, the current
language of the Scriptures which speak of Christ, from beginning to end, sometimes
as man and sometimes as God; and combine the two modes of statement, or pass from
First Argument, all the Elements of the Doctrine separately taught.
First, the Scriptures teach that Christ was truly man, or had a complete human nature. That is, He had a true body and a rational soul.
Christ had a True Body.
By a true body is meant a material body, composed of flesh
and blood, in everything essential like the bodies of ordinary men. It was not a
phantasm, or mere semblance of a body. Nor was it fashioned out of any heavenly
or ethereal substance. This is plain because He was born of a woman. He was conceived
in the womb of the Virgin Mary, nourished of her substance so as to be consubstantial
with her. His body increased in stature, passing through the ordinary process of
development from infancy to manhood. It was subject to all the affections of a human
body. It was subject to pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, fatigue, suffering, and
death. It could be seen, felt, and handled. The Scriptures declare it to have been
flesh and blood. “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood,
he also himself likewise took part of the same.” (
Christ had a Rational Soul.
It is no less plain that He had a rational soul. He thought, reasoned, and felt; was joyful and sorrowful; He increased in wisdom; He was ignorant of the time when the day of judgment should come. He must, therefore, have had a finite human intelligence. These two elements, a true body and a rational soul, constitute a perfect or complete human nature, which is thus proved to have entered into the composition of Christ’s person.
Christ is truly God.
Secondly, the Scriptures, with equal clearness, declare that Christ was truly God. This has been already proved at length. All divine names and titles are applied to Him. He is called God, the mighty God, the great God, God over all; Jehovah; Lord; the Lord of lords and the King of kings. All divine attributes are ascribed to Him. He is declared to be omnipresent, omniscient, almighty, and immutable, the same yesterday, today, and forever. He is set forth as the creator and upholder and ruler of the universe. All things were created by Him and for Him; and by Him all things consist. He is the object of worship to all intelligent creatures, even the highest; all the angels (i.e., all creatures between man and God) are commanded to prostrate themselves before Him. He is the object of all the religious sentiments; of reverence, love, faith, and devotion. To Him men and angels are responsible for their character and conduct. He required that men should honour Him as they honoured the Father; that they should exercise the same faith in Him that they do in God. He declares that He and the Father are one; that those who had seen Him had seen the Father also. He calls all men unto him; promises to forgive their sins; to send them the Holy Spirit; to give them rest and peace; to raise them up at the last day; and to give them eternal life. God is not more, and cannot promise more, or do more than Christ is said to be, to promise, and to do. He has, therefore, been the Christian’s God from the beginning, in all ages and in all places.
Christ One Person.
Thirdly, He was, nevertheless, although perfect man and perfect
God, but one person. There is, in the first place, the absence of all evidence of
a twofold personality in Christ. The Scriptures reveal the Father, Son, and Spirit
as distinct persons in the Godhead, because they use the personal pronouns in reference
to each other. The Father says Thou to the Son, and the Son says Thou to the Father.
The Father says to the Son, “I will give thee; and the Son says, “Lo, I come to
do thy will.” Moreover the one is objective to the other. The Father loves and sends
the Son; the Son loves and obeys the Father. The same is true of the Spirit. There
is nothing analogous to this in the case of Christ. The one nature is never distinguished
from the other as a distinct person. The Son of God never addresses the Son of Man
as a different person from Himself. The Scriptures reveal but one
Second Argument, from the Current Representations of Scripture.
The current language of Scripture concerning Christ proves that He was at once divine and human. In the Old Testament, He is set forth as the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah anti the family of David; as to be born of a virgin in the town of Bethlehem; as a man of sorrows; as meek and lowly; as bearing the chastisement of our sins, and pouring out his soul unto death. He is everywhere represented as a man. At the same time He is everywhere represented as God; He is called the Son of God, Immanuel, the Mighty God, Jehovah our righteousness; and He is spoken of as from everlasting; as enthroned in heaven and receiving the adoration of angels.
In the New Testament, the same mode of representation is continued.
Our Lord, in speaking of Himself, and the Apostles when speaking of Him, uniformly
speak of Him as a man. The New Testament gives his genealogy to prove that He was
of the house and lineage of David. It records his birth, life, and death. It calls
Him the Son of Man, the man Christ Jesus. But with like uniformity our Lord assumes,
and the Apostles attribute to Him a divine nature. He declares Himself to be the
Son of God, existing from eternity, having all power in heaven and in earth, entitled
to all the reverence, love, and obedience due to God. The Apostles worship Him;
they call Him the great God and Saviour; they acknowledge their dependence upon
Him and responsibility to Him; and they look to Him for pardon, sanctification,
and eternal life. These conflicting representations, this constant setting forth
the same person as man and also as God, admits of no solution but in
Third Argument, from Particular Passages of Scriptures.
Although, as appears from what has already been said, the doctrine of the incarnation does not rest on isolated proof-texts, but upon the broad basis of the whole revelation of God concerning the person and work of his Son, yet there are some passages in which this doctrine is so clearly stated in all its elements, that they cannot be properly overlooked in treating of this subject.
To this class of passages belongs, —
1. The first chapter of John,
2. A second passage to the same effect is found in
3. In
4. In
5. No passage, however, is more full and explicit on this
subject than
6. In
Nothing can be plainer than that the Scriptures do teach that Christ is truly God, that He is truly man, and that He is one person. They assert of Him whatever may be said of God, and everything that can be said of a sinless man. They enter into no explanations. They assume it as a certain fact that Christ is God and man in one person, just as they assume that a man is a soul and body in one person.
Here the subject might be left. All the ends of the spiritual
life of the believer, are answered by this simple statement of the doctrine concerning
Christ’s person as it is presented in the Scriptures. False explanations, however,
create the necessity for a correct one. Errorists in all ages have so explained
the facts recorded concerning Christ, as either to deny the truth concerning his
divine nature, or the integrity of his human nature, or the unity of his
§ 3. The Hypostatical Union.
Two Natures in Christ.
There is a union. The elements united are the divine and human nature. By nature, in this connection is meant substance. In Greek the corresponding words are φοσις and οὐσία; in Latin, natura and substantia. The idea of substance is a necessary one. We are constrained to believe that where we see the manifestation of force, there is something, an objective entity which acts, and of which such force is the manifestation. It is self-evident that a non-ens cannot act. It may be well here to call to mind a few admitted principles which have already been repeatedly adverted to. (1.) It is intuitively certain that attributes, properties, and power or force, necessarily imply a substance of which they are manifestations. Of nothing, nothing can be predicated. That of which we can predicate the attributes either of matter or mind, must of necessity be a reality. (2.) It is no less certain that where the attributes are incompatible, the substances must be different and distinct. That which is extended cannot be unextended. That which is divisible cannot be indivisible. That which is incapable of thought cannot think. That which is finite cannot be infinite. (3.) Equally certain is it that attributes cannot exist distinct and separate from substance. There cannot be accidentia sine subjecto; otherwise there might be extension without anything extended, and thought without anything that thinks. (4.) Again, it is intuitively certain that the attributes of one substance cannot be transferred to another. Matter cannot be endowed with the attributes of mind; for then it would cease to be matter. Mind cannot be invested with the properties of matter, for then it would cease to be mind, neither can humanity be possessed of the attributes of divinity, for then it would cease to be humanity. This is only saying that the finite cannot be infinite. Speaking in general terms, in the whole history of human thought, these principles have been recognized as axiomatic; and their denial puts an end to discussion.
If the above mentioned principles be admitted, then it follows
that in setting forth his Son as clothed in all the attributes of humanity, with
a body that was born of a woman, which increased an stature, which was seen, felt,
and handled; and with a soul that
Thomas Aquinas says,
The Two Natures are united but not mingled or confounded.
We have seen that the first important point concerning the person of Christ is, that the elements united or combined in his person are two distinct substances, humanity and divinity; that He has in his constitution the same essence or substance which constitutes us men, and the same substance which makes God infinite, eternal, and immutable in all his perfections. The second point is, that this union is not by mixture so that a new, third substance is produced, which is neither humanity nor divinity but possessing the properties of both. This is an impossibility, because the properties in question are incompatible. We cannot mingle mind and matter so as to make a substance which is neither mind nor matter, but spiritual matter, for that would be a contradiction. It would amount to unextended extension, tangible intangibility, or visible invisibility. Neither is it possible that the divine and human natures should be so mingled as to result in a third, which is neither purely human nor purely divine, but theanthropic. Christ’s person is theanthropic, but not his nature; for that would make the finite infinite, and the infinite finite. Christ would be neither God nor man; but the Scriptures constantly declare Him to be both God and man. In all Christian creeds therefore, it is declared that the two natures in Christ retain each its own properties and attributes. They all teach that the natures are not confounded, “Sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus in una persona unitæ vel conjunctæ.”
As therefore the human body retains all its properties as
matter, and the soul all its attributes as spirit in their union in our persons;
so humanity and divinity retain each its peculiar properties in their union in the
person of Christ. And as intelligence, sensibility, and will are the properties
of the human soul, without which it ceases to be a soul, it follows that the human
soul of Christ retained its intelligence, sensibility, and will. But intelligence
and will are no less the essential properties of the divine nature, and therefore
were
There is no Transfer of the Attributes of one Nature to the Other.
The third point in relation to the person of Christ, is that no attribute of the one nature is transferred to the other, This is virtually included in what has already been said. There are those, however, who admit that the two natures in Christ are not mixed or confounded, who yet maintain that the attributes of the one are transferred to the other. But the properties or attributes of a substance constitute its essence, so that if they be removed or if others of a different nature be added to them, the substance itself is changed. If you take rationality from mind it ceases to be mind. If you add rationality to matter it ceases to be matter. If you make that extended which in itself is incapable of extension the identity of the thing is lost. If therefore infinity be conferred in the finite, it ceases to be finite. If divine attributes be conferred on man, he ceases to be man; and if human attributes be transferred to God, he ceases to be God. The Scriptures teach that the human nature of Christ remained in its integrity after the incarnation; and that the divine nature remained divine. The Bible never requires us to receive as true anything which the constitution of our nature given to us by God himself, forces us to believe to be false or impossible.
The Union is a Personal Union.
Thc union of the two natures in Christ is a personal or hypostatic
union. By this is meant, in the first place, that it is not a mere indwelling of
the divine nature analogous to the indwelling of the Spirit of God in his people.
Much less is it a mere moral or sympathetic union; or a temporary and mutable relation
between the two. In the second place, it is intended to affirm that the union is
such that Christ is but one person. As the union of the soul and body constitutes
a man one person, so the union of the
The facts, therefore, revealed in Scripture concerning Christ
constrain us to believe, (1.) That in his person two natures, the divine and the
human, are inseparably united; and the word nature in this connection means substance.
(2.) That these two natures or substances are not mixed or confounded so as to form
a third, which is neither the one nor the other. Each nature retains all its own
properties unchanged; so that in Christ there is a finite intelligence and infinite
intelligence, a finite will or energy, and an infinite will. (3.) That no property
of the divine nature is transferred to the human, and much less is any property
of the human transferred to the divine. Humanity in Christ is not deified, nor is
the divinity reduced to the limitations of humanity. (4.) The union of the natures
is not mere contact or occupancy of the same portion of space. It is not an indwelling,
or a simple control of
§ 4. Consequences of the Hypostatical Union.
Communion of Attributes.
The first and most obvious of these consequences is, the κοινωνία ἰδιωμάτων, or communion of attributes. By this is not meant that the one nature participates in the attributes of the other, but simply that the person is the κοινωνός, or partaker of the attributes of both natures; so that whatever may be affirmed of either nature may be affirmed of the person. As of a man can be affirmed whatever is true of his body and whatever is true of his soul, so of Christ may be affirmed whatever is true of his human nature and whatever is true of his divinity; as we can say of a man that he is mortal and immortal; that he is a creature of the dust and the child of God: so we may say of Christ that He is finite and infinite; that He is ignorant and omniscient; that He is less than God and equal with God; that He existed from eternity and that He was born in time; that He created all things and that He was a man of sorrows. It is on this principle, that what is true of either nature is true of the person, that a multitude of passages of Scripture are to be explained. These passages are of different kinds.
1. Those in which the predicate belongs to the whole person. This is the most numerous class. Thus when Christ is called our Redeemer, our Lord, our King, Prophet, or Priest, our Shepherd, etc., all these things are true of Him not as the Logos, or Son, nor as the man Christ Jesus, but as the Θεάνθρωπος, the God-man. And in like manner, when He is said to have been humbled, to have given Himself for us, to be the head of the Church, to be our life, and to be our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, this is true of Christ as a person. The same may be said with regard to those passages in which He is said to be exalted above all principalities and powers; to sit at the right hand of God; and to come to judge the world.
2. There are many passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate is true only of the divine nature, or of the Logos. As when our Lord said, “Before Abraham was I am;” “The glory which I had with thee before the foundation of the world; or when it is said, “Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the world, and the heavens are the work of thine hands.”
3. Passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate
is true only of the human nature. As when Christ said, “I thirst;” “My soul is sorrowful
even unto death.” And when we read that “Jesus wept.” So all those passages which
speak of our Lord as walking, eating, and sleeping; and as being seen, touched,
and handled. There are two classes of passages under this general head which are
of special interest. First, those in which the person is designated from the divine
nature when the predicate is true only of the human nature. “The Church of God which
He purchased with his blood.” “The Lord of glory was crucified.” The Son knows not
the time when the final judgment is to come. (
4. There is a fourth class of passages which come under the
first general head mentioned above, but have the peculiarity that the denomination
is derived from the divine nature, when the predicate is not true of the divine
nature itself, but only of the
Θεάνθρωπος. Thus it is
said, “The Son also himself shall be subject to him who put all things under him.”
Here the designation Son is from the
It is instructive to notice here how easily and naturally the sacred writers predicate of our Lord the attributes of humanity and those of divinity, however his person may be denominated. They call Him Lord, or Son, and attribute to Him, often in the same sentence, what is true of Him only as God, what is true only of his humanity, and what is true of Him only as the God-man. Thus in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said, God hath spoken unto us by his Son. Here Son means the incarnate Logos. In the next clause, “By whom he made the world,” what is said is true only of the eternal Son. So also what immediately follows, Who is “the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, and upholding all things (the universe) by the word of his power.” But in the next clause, “When he had by himself (i.e., by his sacrificial death) purged away our sins,” the reference is to his human nature, as the body only died. And then it is added, He “sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high,” which is true of the God-man.
The Acts of Christ.
The second consequence of the hypostatical union relates to
the acts of Christ. As a man is one person, and because he is one person all his
acts are the acts of that person, so all the acts of Christ are the acts of his
whole person. But, as was before remarked, the acts of a man are of three classes:
such as are purely mental, as thought; such as belong exclusively to the body, as
Here also, as in the case of the attributes of Christ, his person may be denominated from one nature when the act ascribed to Him belongs to the other nature. He is called God, the Son of God, the Lord of glory, when his delivering Himself unto death is spoken of. And He is called man, or the Son of man, when the acts ascribed to Him involve the exercise of divine power or authority. It is the Son of man who forgives sins; who is Lord of the Sabbath; who raises the dead; and who is to send forth his angels to gather his elect.
Such being the Scriptural doctrine concerning the person of Christ, it follows that although the divine nature is immutable and impassible, and therefore neither the obedience nor the suffering of Christ was the obedience or suffering of the divine nature, yet they were none the less the obedience and suffering of a divine person. The soul of man cannot be wounded or burnt, but when the body is injured it is the man who suffers. In like manner the obedience of Christ was the righteousness of God, and the blood of Christ was the blood of God. It is to this fact that the infinite merit and efficiency of his work are due. This is distinctly asserted in the Scriptures. It is impossible, says the Apostle, that the blood of bulls and of goats could take away sin. It was because Christ was possessed of an eternal Spirit that He by the one offering of Himself hath perfected forever them who are sanctified. This is the main idea insisted upon in the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is the reason given why the sacrifice of Christ need never be repeated, and why it is infinitely more efficacious than those of the old dispensation. This truth has been graven on the hearts of believers in all ages. Every such believer says from his heart, “Jesus, my God, thy blood alone has power sufficient to atone.”
The Man Christ Jesus the object of Worship.
Another obvious inference from this doctrine is that the man Christ Jesus is the object of religious worship. To worship, in the religious sense of the word, is to ascribe divine perfections to its object. The possession of those perfections, is, therefore, the only proper ground for such worship. The humanity of Christ, consequently, is not the ground of worship, but it enters into the constitution of that person who, being God over all and blessed forever, is the object of adoration to saints and angels. We accordingly find that it was He whom they saw, felt, and handled, that the Apostles worshipped as their Lord and God; whom they loved supremely, and to whom they consecrated themselves as a living sacrifice.
Christ can sympathize with his People.
A third inference which the Apostles drew from this doctrine is. that Christ is a merciful and faithful high-priest. He is just the Saviour we need. God as God, the eternal Logos, could neither be nor do what our necessities demand. Much less could any mere man, however wise, holy, or benevolent, meet the wants of our souls. It is only a Saviour who is both God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever, who is all we need and all we can desire. As God He is ever present, almighty and infinite in all his resources to save and bless; and as man, or being also a man, He can be touched with a sense of our infirmities, was tempted as we are, was subject to the law which we violated, and endured the penalty which we had incurred. In Him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead, in a bodily form, in fashion as a man, so as to be accessible to us, and so that from his fulness we can all partake. We are therefore complete in Him, wanting nothing.
The Incarnate Logos the Source of Life.
The Scriptures teach that the Logos is everlasting life, having
life in Himself, and the source of life, physical, intellectual, and spiritual.
They further teach that his incarnation was the necessary condition of the communication
of spiritual life to the children of men. He, therefore, is the only Saviour, the
only source of life to us. We become partakers of this life, by union with Him.
This union is partly federal established in the councils of eternity partly vital
by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and partly voluntary and conscious by faith.
It is to those who believe, to those who receive Him as God manifest in the flesh,
that He becomes
The Exaltation of the Human Nature of Christ.
Another consequence of the hypostatical union is the exaltation of the humanity of Christ. As the human body in virtue of its vital union with an immortal soul, is immeasurably exalted above any mere material organization in the universe (so far as known or revealed), so the humanity of Christ in virtue of its union with his divine nature is immeasurably exalted in dignity and worth, and even power over all intelligent creatures. The human body, however, is not now, and will not be, even when made like to Christ’s glorious body, so exalted as to cease to be material. In like manner the humanity of Christ is not so exalted by its union with his divine nature as to cease to be human. This would break the bond of sympathy between Him and us. It has been the pious fault of some Christians that they merge his humanity in his Godhead. This is as real, if not so fatal an error, as merging his Godhead in his humanity. We must hold fast to both. “The Man Christ Jesus,” and “The God over all blessed forever,” is the one undivided inseparable object of the adoration, love, and confidence of the people of God; who can each say, —
§ 5. Erroneous and Heretical Doctrines on the Person of Christ.
Plainly as all the truths above mentioned concerning the person
of Christ, seem now to us to be revealed in the Holy Scriptures, it was not until
after the conflict of six centuries that they came to be fully stated so as to secure
the general assent of the Church. We must indeed always bear in mind the difference
between the speculations of theologians and the faith of the great body of the people
if God. It is a false assumption that the doctrines taught by the ecclesiastical
writers of a particular age, constituted the faith of believers of that age. The
doctrines of theologians are largely determined by their antecedents and by the
current philosophy of the day in which they live. This is unavoidable. The faith
of the
The Ebionites.
The errors which disturbed the peace of the early Church on
this, as on other subjects, arose either from Judaism or from heathen philosophy.
The Jews who professed themselves Christians, were not able, in many instances,
as we learn from the New Testament itself, to emancipate themselves from their former
opinions and prejudices. They had by the misinterpretation of their Scriptures been
led to expect a Messiah who was to be the head of their nation as David and Solomon
had been. They, therefore, as a body, rejected Christ, who came as a man of sorrows,
not having anywhere to lay his head. And of those who were constrained by his doctrines
and miracles to acknowledge Him as the promised Messiah, many believed Him to be
a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary, distinguished from other men only by his
holiness and his extraordinary endowments. This was the case with the sect known
as Ebionites. Why so called is a matter of doubt. Although as a body, and characteristically,
they entertained this low, humanitarian view of the person of Christ, yet it appears
from the fragmentary records of the ancient writers, that they differed much
Another class of nominal Jewish Christians is known as Nazarenes. They differed but little from the Jewish Ebionites. Both insisted on the continued obligation of the Mosaic law, and both regarded Christ as a mere man. But the Nazarenes acknowledged his miraculous conception, and thus elevated Him above all other men, and regarded Him as the Son of God in a peculiar sense. The acknowledgment of the divinity of Christ, and the ability and willingness to unite in worship of which He was the object, was from the beginning the one indispensable condition of Christian fellowship. These Jewish sects, therefore, who denied his divinity, existed outside of the Church, and were not recognized as Christians.
The Gnostics.
As the Ebionites denied the divinity, so the Gnostics in different
ways denied his humanity. They were led to this denial by their views of the origin
of evil. God is the source only of good. As evil exists it must have its origin
not only outside of Him, but independently of Him. He is, however, the source of
all spiritual existences. By emanation from his substance spiritual beings are produced;
from them other emanations proceed, and from those still others in ever increasing
deterioration according to their distance from the primal fountain. Evil arises from
matter. The world was created, not by God, but by an inferior spirit, the Demiourgos,
whom some sects of the Gnostics regarded as the God of the Jews. Man consists of
a spirit derived from God combined with a material body and an animal soul. By this
union of the spiritual with the material, the spirit is defiled and enslaved. Its
redemption consists in its emancipation from the body, so as to enable it to reenter
the sphere of pure spirits, or to be lost in God. To effect this redemption, Christ,
one of the highest emanations from God (or Æons), came into the world. It was necessary
that He should appear “in fashion as a man,” but it was impossible He should become
a man, without subjecting Himself to the pollution and bondage from which He came
to deliver men. To meet this difficulty various theories were adopted. Some held
that Christ
The Apollinarian Doctrine.
As the Gnostic doctrine which denied entirely the human nature
of Christ was rejected, the next attempt was directed against the integrity of that
nature. Many of the early fathers, especially of the Alexandrian school, had presented
views of this element of Christ’s person, which removed Him more or less from the
class of ordinary men. They nevertheless maintained that He was truly a man. The
Apollinarians, so called from Apollinaris, a distinguished bishop of Laodicea, adopting
the Platonic distinction between the σῶμα, ψυχή, and
πνεῦμα, as three distinct subjects or principles in
the constitution of man, admitted that Christ had a true body (σῶμα)
and animal soul (ψυχή), but not a rational spirit, or
mind (πνεῦμα or νοῦς). In
Him the eternal Son, or Logos, supplied the place of the human intelligence. The
Apollinarians were led to the adoption of this theory partly from the difficulty
of conceiving how two complete natures can be united in one life and consciousness.
If
Nestorianism.
The integrity of the two natures in Christ having been thus
asserted and declared to be the faith of the Church, the next question which arose
concerned the relations of the two natures, the one to the other, in the one person
of Christ. Nestorianism is the designation adopted in church history, for the doctrine
which either affirms, or implies a twofold personality in our Lord. The divine Logos
was represented as dwelling in the man Christ Jesus, so that the union between the
two natures was somewhat analogous to the indwelling of the Spirit. The true divinity
of Christ was thus endangered. He was distinguished from other men in whom God dwelt,
only by the plenitude of the divine presence, and the absolute control of the divine
over the human. This was not the avowed or real doctrine of Nestorius, but it was
the doctrine charged upon him, and was the conclusion to which his principles were
supposed to lead. Nestorius was a man of great excellence and eminence; first a
presbyter in Antioch, and afterwards Patriarch of Constantinople. The controversy
on this subject arose from his defending one of his presbyters who denied that the
Virgin Mary could properly be called the Mother of God. As
Eutychianism.
As Nestorius so divided the two natures in Christ as almost
to necessitate the assumption of two persons, his opponents were led to the opposite
extreme. Instead of two, they insisted that there was but one nature in Christ.
Cyril himself had taught what clearly implied this idea. According to Cyril there
is but one nature in Christ because by the incarnation, or hypostatical union the
human was changed into the divine.
The condemnation of Eutyches at Constantinople greatly incensed
Dioscurus, bishop of Alexandria, and his associates. Through his influence a general
synod was convened at Ephesus in 449 A.D., from which the opposers of Eutyches
were forcibly excluded, and his doctrine of one nature in Christ formally sanctioned.
The Council proceeded to excommunicate those who taught a contrary doctrine, and
Eutyches was restored to office. The doctrines of the Council (known in history
as “the robber council”) were sanctioned by the emperor Theodosius. But as he died
in the following year, his successor being hostile to Dioscurus,
With this council the conflict on this doctrine so far ceased that there has since been no further modification of the Church doctrine. The decision against Nestorius, in which the unity of Christ’s person was asserted; that against Eutyches, affirming the distinction of natures; and that against the Monothelites, declaring that the possession of a human nature involves of necessity the possession of a human will, have been received as the true faith by the Church universal, the Greek, Latin, and Protestant.
During the Middle Ages, although the person of Christ was the subject of diverse speculations on the part of individual writers, there was no open or organized opposition to the decisions of the above named councils.
§ 6. Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.
At the time of the Reformation the Reformed adhered strictly
to the doctrine of the early Church. This is apparent from the different Confessions
adopted by the several Reformed bodies, especially from the Second Helvetic Confession,
which, as will be seen, reviews and rejects all the ancient heresies on this subjects
and repeats and adopts the language of the ancient creeds. In this Confession it
is said:
It thus appears that the Reformed distinctly rejected all
the errors concerning the person of Christ, condemned in the early Church; the Arian,
the Ebionitic, the Gnostic, the Apollinarian, the Nestorian, the Eutychian, and
the Monothelite, as well as the peculiar Lutheran doctrine introduced at the time
of the Reformation. The Reformed taught what the first six general councils taught,
and what the Church universal received, — neither more nor less. With this agrees
the beautifully clear and precise statement of the Westminster Confession: “The
Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one
substance, and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take
upon Him man’s nature, and all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof,
yet without sin: being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the
Virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures,
the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without
conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet
one Christ, the only mediator between God and man.”
§ 7. Lutheran Doctrine.
The Lutherans in their symbols adopt all the doctrinal decisions
of the early Church respecting the person of Christ. They therefore hold, (1.) That
Christ is very God and very man. (2.) That He has two distinct natures, a human
and divine; that as to the latter He is consubstantial with the Father, and as to
the former He is consubstantial with men. (3.) That He is one person. There is one
Christ and not two. (4.) That the two natures are intimately united, but without
confusion or change. Each nature retains its own peculiar properties. Nevertheless
they hold that the attributes of the one nature were communicated to the other.
They admit a “communio idiomatum” in the sense that whatever is true of either nature
is true of the person. But beyond this they insist upon a “communicatio naturarum.”
And by nature, in this connection, they mean essence. In their symbols and writings
the formula “natura, seu substantia, seu essentia” is of frequent occurrence. The
divine essence is communicated to the human. The one interpenetrates the other.
They “are mixed” (commiscentur). They do not become one essence, but remain
two; yet where the one is the other is; what the one does the ether does. The human
is as truly divine as the eternal essence
The above statement is believed to be a correct exhibition of the doctrine of the Lutheran Church as presented in the eighth chapter of the “Form of Concord.” There is, however, no little difficulty in determining what the Lutheran doctrine really is. The Christology of Luther, although very clear and pronounced on certain points, was indefinite and doubtful in others. His successors differed seriously among themselves. It was one of the principal objects of the “Form of Concord” to settle the matters in dispute. This was done by compromise. Both parties made concessions, and yet both insisted upon the assertion of their peculiar views in one part or other of that document. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile some portions of the “Form of Concord” with others. It did not in fact put an end to the divisions which it was designed to heal.
Different Views among the Lutherans.
The principal points of difference among the Lutheran divines concerning the person of Christ were the following: The nature and effects of the union of natures in Christ; the ground of that union; and the time of its occurrence. The Reformed Church in adhering to the doctrine as it had been settled in the Council of Chalcedon, maintained that there is such an essential difference between the divine and human natures that the one could not become the other, and that the one was not capable of receiving the attributes of the other. If God became the subject of the limitations of humanity He would cease to be God; and if man received the attributes of God he would cease to be man. This was regarded as a self-evident truth. The “communion of attributes” which the Reformed, in accordance with the common faith of the Church, admitted, concerned only the person and not the natures of Christ. Christ possessed all the attributes of humanity and of divinity, but the two natures remained distinct; just as a man is the subject of all that can be predicated of his body and of his soul, although the attributes of the one are not predicable of the other. The Lutherans maintained that, according to this view, the two natures were as separate as duo asseres agglutinatos. This they pronounced to be no real incarnation. The Reformed acknowledged that Jesus Christ the son of the Virgin Mary is a divine person, but denied that his human nature was divine. The Lutherans maintained that man became God, and that the human did become divine. Otherwise, Christ as clothed in our nature, could not be an object of divine worship. As though we could not reverence a man unless we believed that the attributes of his mind were transferred to his body.
Although the Lutheran theologians agree as to the fact that
the man Christ Jesus became God, they differ as to the mode in which this was accomplished.
Their language as to the fact is as strong as it can be made. Thus Brentius, the
friend of Luther and the Reformer of Würtemberg, in his work “De Personali Unione,”
says, If the Logos “did not intend to remain either personally or with his nature
outside of Christ, but purposed to become man, He must needs exalt the humanity
into his own majesty. Therein, in fact, consists the incarnation, that the man Christ
not merely never existed or worked without the Logos, but also that the Logos never
existed or worked without the man, whom He had assumed; and is this was only possible
though the elevation of the humanity to
No less diversity appears in the answer to the question, What
is meant by the communication of natures? Sometimes it is said to be a communication
of the essence of God to the human nature of Christ; sometimes a communication of
divine attributes; and sometimes it is said to mean nothing more than that the human
is made the organ of the divine.
The favorite illustration of this union of two natures was
derived from heated iron. In that case (according to the theory of heat then in
vogue) two substances are united. The one interpenetrates the other. The iron receives
the attributes of the caloric. It glows and burns. Where the iron is, there the
caloric is. Yet the one is not changed into the other. The iron remains iron, and
the heat remains heat. This is very ingenious; but, as is often the case, the analogy
fails in the very point to be illustrated. The fact to be explained is how man becomes
God and God man; how the human becomes divine, and the finite becomes infinite.
In the illustration the heat does not become iron nor the iron heat. The only relation
between the two is juxtaposition in space. But
A second and minor point of difference was that some referred the communion of the attributes of the two natures to the hypostatical union, while others held that that union was the result of the communication of the divine nature to the human.
The main difficulty, however, and the principal source of
diversity related to the time and manner of the union of the two natures. We have
already seen that one party held that this union took place at the moment of the
“miraculous conception.” The conception was the ascension. As the union of the divine
with the human nature rendered the human divine, it became instanter omnipresent,
almighty, and infinitely exalted. The effect of the incarnation was that the
λόγος no longer existed extra carnem, neither
was the caro extra λόγον. Whatever the one is
the other is; whatever the one knows the other knows; whatever the one does the
other does; and whatever majesty, glory, or blessedness the one has the other also
has. “So certainly as the act of incarnation communicates the divine essence to
humanity, even so certainly must this actual omnipresence, and not merely its potence,
which does not exist, be communicated to the flesh of Christ.”
To avoid these fatal consequences of their theory, the Lutherans
were driven to different and conflicting subtle explanations. According to some
there was no actual communication of the divine essence and attributes to the human
nature until after his resurrection. The Logos was in Him only potentially. There
was on the part of the divine nature a retractio, or
ἡσυχάζειν, or quiescence, so that it was as though it were not there. According
to others, there was a voluntary κρύψις or veiling of
itself or of its divine glory on the part of the humanity of Christ. According to
others, this humiliation was rather the act of the Godman, who only occasionally
revealed the fact that the human nature was divine. No explanation could meet the
difficulties of the case, because they are inseparable from the assumption that
the human nature of Christ was replete with divine attributes from the moment of
its miraculous conception. It is a contradiction to say that the same individual
mind was omniscient and yet was ignorant and increased in knowledge; that the same
rational soul was supremely happy and exceeding sorrowful, at the same time; that
the same body was potentially alive and yet actually dead. From the nature of the
case there can be no difference between the κτῆσις and
χρῆσις of such divine attributes as omniscience and
omnipresence. It would require a volume to give the details of the controversies
between the different schools of the Lutheran divines on these and kindred points.
This general outline is all that can here be expected. These details may be found at length in the larger work of
Dorner on the Person of Christ, already frequently referred to, and in the work
entitled Christi Person und Werk, Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik
vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus Von G. Thomasius D. und ord. Professor
der Theologie an der Universität Erlangen. In two volumes, 1853, and 1857. See also The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, as represented in the
Augsburg Confession, and in the History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Norton Professor of Theology in the Evangelical
Lutheran Theological Seminary, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy
in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott &
Remarks on the Lutheran Doctrine.
1. The first remark which suggests itself on this Lutheran
doctrine is its contrast with the simplicity of the gospel. The New Testament predicates
of our Lord Jesus Christ all that can be predicated of a sinless man, and all that
can be predicated of a divine person. It is only stating this fact in another form
to say that the Bible teaches that the eternal Son of God became man taking to Himself
a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was,
2. A second objection is that the character of the explanation was determined by the peculiar views of Luther as to the Lord’s Supper. He believed that the body and blood of Christ are really and locally present in the Eucharist. And when asked, How can the body of Christ which is in heaven be in many different places at the same time? He answered that the body of Christ is everywhere. And when asked, How can that be? His only answer was, That in virtue of the incarnation the attributes of the divine nature were communicated to the human, so that wherever the Logos is there the soul and body of Christ must be.
There are two things specially prominent in Luther as a theologian.
The one is his entire subjection to the authority of Scripture, as he understood
it. He seemed, moreover, never to doubt the correctness of his interpretations,
nor was he willing to tolerate doubt in others. As to matters not clearly determined
in the Bible, according to his view, he was exceedingly tolerant and liberal. But
with regard to points which he believed to be taught in the Word of God, he allowed
neither hesitation nor dissent. The other marked trait in his character was his
power of faith. He could believe not only what was repugnant to his feelings, but
what was directly opposed to his system, and even what was in its own nature impossible.
His cardinal doctrine was “justification by faith alone,” as he translated
Lutherans, indeed, deny that their doctrine concerning the
person of Christ is thus subordinate to their views of the Lord’s Supper. Even Dorner,
in one place, seems to take the same ground. Elsewhere, however, he fully admits
the fact. Thus when speaking of Luther, he says that he “did not develop his deep
and full Christological intuitions in a connected doctrinal form. His controversy
with the Swiss, on the contrary, had led him, as we have shown, to the adoption
of single divergent principles, which aided in reducing Christology to the rank
of a follower in the train of another doctrine, instead of conceding to it an independent
life and sphere of its own.”
3. It is to be objected to the Lutheran doctrine, not only
that it undertakes to explain what is an inscrutable mystery, and that the explanation
derives its character from Luther’s views of the Eucharist, but also that the explanation
itself is utterly unsatisfactory. In the first place, it is one sided. It insists
on a communication of natures and a communion of attributes. Lutherans maintain
that God became man as truly, and in the same sense that man became God. Yet they
deny that the divine nature received anything from the human, or that God was in
any way subject to the limitations of humanity. Nevertheless, such limitation appears
to be involved in the Lutheran doctrine of Christ’s humiliation. The idea is that
after the incarnation the Logos is not extra carnem, that all his activity
is with and through the activity of his humanity; and yet it is affirmed that the
humanity did not exercise, while on earth, except occasionally, its divine perfections.
This seems of necessity to involve the admission that the Logos did not exercise
those perfections during the period of the humiliation.
In the second place, the doctrine in question is destitute of any Scriptural support. Almost all the arguments derived from the Scriptures, urged by Lutherans, are founded on passages in which the person of Christ is denominated from his human nature when divine attributes or prerogatives are ascribed to Him; whence it is inferred that those attributes and prerogatives belong to his humanity. Thus because it is said, “The Son of Man is in heaven,” it is inferred that the human nature, i.e., the soul and body of Christ, were in heaven while He was on earth. But they do not carry out the principle, and argue that because Christ is denominated from his divine nature when the limitations of humanity are ascribed to Him, that therefore his divine nature is limited. But if his being called God when He is said to have purchased the Church with his blood, does not prove that the divine nature suffered death, neither does his being called the Son of Man when He is said to be in heaven, prove the ubiquity of his humanity. Still less force is due to the argument from passages in which the Theanthropos is the subject to which divine perfections and prerogatives are ascribed. That our Lord said, “All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth,” no more proves that his human nature is almighty, than his saying, “Before Abraham was I am,” proves that his humanity is eternal. If saying that man is a rational creature does not imply that his body thinks, saying that Jesus Christ is God, does not imply that his human nature is divine. If the personal union between the soul and body in man, does not imply that the attributes of the soul are communicated to the body, then the personal union of the two natures in Christ does not imply that the divine attributes are communicated to his humanity.
In the third place, the Lutheran doctrine destroys the integrity of the human nature of Christ. A body which fills immensity is not a human body. A soul which is omniscient, omnipresent, and almighty, is not a human soul. The Christ of the Bible and of the human heart is lost if this doctrine be true.
In the fourth place, the Lutheran doctrine is contrary to
the
Finally, it is a fatal objection to the doctrine under consideration
that it involves the physical impossibility that attributes are separable from the
substances of which they are the manifestation. This is the same kind of impossibility
as action without something acting; or, motion without something moving. It is an
objection urged by Lutherans as well as others against the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation
that it supposes the accidents, or attributes of the bread and wine in the Eucharist,
to continue when their substance no longer exists. In like manner, according to
the Lutheran doctrine, the attributes of the divine nature or essence are transferred
to another essence. If there be no such transfer or communication, then the human
nature of Christ is no more omniscient or almighty, than the worker of a miracle
is omnipotent. If the divine nature only exercises its omnipotence in connection
with the activity of the humanity, then the humanity is the mere organ or instrument
of the divine nature. This idea, however, the Lutherans repudiate. They admit that
for God to exercise his power, when Peter said the lame man, “Rise up and walk,”
was something entirely different from rendering Peter omnipotent. Besides, omnipresence
and omniscience are not attributes of which a creature can be made the organ. Knowledge
is something subjective. If a mind knows everything, then that mind, and not another
in connection with it, is omniscient, If Christ’s body is everywhere present, then
it is the substance of that body, and not the essence of God that is omnipresent.
The Lutheran doctrine is, however, The Form of Concord, chap. viii. sections 6 and 7,
Epitome; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 606, says “Credimus, docemus
et confitemur, divinam et humanam naturas non in unam substantiam commixtas, nec
unam in alteram mutatam esse, sed utramque naturam retinere suas proprietates essentiales,
ut quæ alterius naturæ proprietates fiere nequeant. “Proprietates divinæ naturæ sunt: esse omnipotentem, æternam,
infinitam, et secundum naturæ naturalisque suæ essentiæ proprietatem, per se,
ubique presentem esse, omnis novices, etc. Hæc omnia neque sunt neque unquam fiunt
humanæ naturæ proprietates.”
It seems a plain contradiction in terms, to say that the human becomes divine, that the finite becomes infinite; and no less a contradiction to say that the humanity of Christ has infinite attributes and yet itself is not infinite.
The Lutheran doctrine of the Person of Christ has never been disconnected from the Lutheran doctrine of he Lord’s Supper. Both are peculiar to that Church and form no part of Catholic Christianity.
§ 8. Later Forms of the Doctrine.
During the period between the Reformation and the present time, the doctrine concerning the Person of Christ was constantly under discussion. The views advanced however were, for the most part, referrible to the one or other of the forms of the doctrine already considered. The only theories calling for special notice are Socinianism and that of the Preëxistent Humanity of Christ.
Socinianism.
Socinus was an Italian, born of a noble family at Siena, in 1539. The earlier part of his life was not devoted to learning. Being a favourite of the Grand Duke, he passed twelve years at his court, and then removed to Basel that he might prosecute his theological studies, in which he had become deeply interested. After a few years he removed to Poland and settled at Cracow. There and in its vicinity he passed the greater part of his active life. He died in 1604.
The early Socinians erected a college at Racovia, in Lesser Poland, which attained so high a reputation that it attracted students from among Protestants and Romanists. It was however suppressed by the government in 1658, and the followers of Socinus, after having suffered a protracted persecution, were expelled from the kingdom.
Socinus and his followers admitted the divine authority of
the Scriptures. The sacred writers, they said, wrote, divino Spiritu impulsi
eoque dictante. They admitted that the Bible contained doctrines above, but
not contrary to reason. Of this contrariety reason was to judge. On this ground
they rejected many doctrines held by the Church universal, especially the doctrines
of the Trinity and of the Atonement. Socinus said that as there is but one divine
essence there can be but one divine person. He denied that there is any such thing
as natural religion or natural theology. Supernatural revelation he regarded as
the only source of our knowledge of God and of divine things. The only religion
was the Christian, which he defined to be “Via divinitus proposita et patefacta
perveniendi ad immortalitatem, seu æternam vitam.”
All men having sinned they became subject to the penalty of eternal death, which Socinus understood to be annihilation. To deliver men from this penalty God sent Christ into the world, and it is only through Him that immortality can be secured. Concerning Christ, he taught that He was in Himself and by nature a mere man, having had no existence prior to his being born of the Virgin Mary. He was, however, distinguished from all other men, —
1. By his miraculous conception.
2. Although peccable and liable to be tempted, He was entirely free from sin.
3. He received a special baptism of the Holy Ghost, that is, of the divine efficiency.
4. Some time before entering upon his public ministry He was
taken up into heaven that He might see God and be instructed immediately by Him.
There are two passages which speak of Christ’s having been in heaven (
5. The great distinction of Christ is that since his resurrection
and ascension all power in heaven and in earth has been committed to Him. He is
exalted above all creatures, and constituted God’s viceroy over the whole universe.
The question is asked, “Quid tamen istud ejus divinum imperium nominatim complectitur?”
To which the answer is, “Propter id quod jam dictum est, nempe quod hoc potestatem
complectitur plenissimam et absolutissimam in verum Dei populum, hinc necessario
sequitur, eodem divino imperio contineri potestatem et dominationem in omnes angelos
et spiritus tam malos, quam bonos.”
6. On account of this exaltation and authority Christ is properly
called God, and is to be worshipped. Socinus would recognize no man as a Christian
who was not a worshipper of Christ. The answer to Question 246 in the Racovian Catechism,
declares those “qui Christum non invocant nec adorandum censent,” to be no Christians,
because in fact they have no Christ.
7. Socinus acknowledges that men owe their salvation to Christ. He saves them not only in his character of prophet by teaching them the truth; not only in his character of priest by interceding for them; but especially in virtue of his kingly office. He exercises the divine and absolute power and authority granted to Him for their protection and assistance. He operates not only over them and for them, but also within them, so that it is through Him that immortality or eternal life is secured.
From all this it appears that Socinus and his early followers
held
Preëxistence of Christ’s Humanity.
Swedenborg.
This theory has been held in different forms. The doctrine of Swedenborg is so mystical that it is very difficult to be clearly understood, and it has been modified in a greater or less degree by his recognized disciples. Swedenborg was the son of a Swedish bishop. He was born in January, 1688, and died in March, 1772. He enjoyed every advantage of early education. He manifested extraordinary precocity, and made such attainments in every branch of learning as to gain the highest rank among the literati of that day. He wrote numerous works in all the departments of science before he turned his attention to matters of religion. Believing that the existing Church in all its forms had failed to arrive at the true sense of Scripture, he regarded himself as called by God, in an extraordinary or miraculous manner, to reveal the hidden meaning of the Word of God and found a new Church.
1. Concerning God, he taught that He was not only essence but form, and that that form was human. He called God “the eternal God-man.” There are two kinds of bodies, material and spiritual. Every man, besides his external material body has another which is internal and spiritual. The latter has all the organs of the former, so that it can see, hear, and feel. At death the outer body is laid aside, and the soul thereafter acts through the ethereal or spiritual vestment. This is the only resurrection which Swedenborg admitted. There is no rising again of the bodies laid in the grave. As however the spiritual corresponds to the material, those who know each other in this world will enjoy mutual recognition in the world to come. This feature of his anthropology is connected with his doctrine concerning God. For as the soul from its nature forms for itself a body for action ad extra, so the essence of God forms for itself a spiritual body for external manifestation.
As there is but one divine essence, Swedenborg maintained
that there can be but one divine person. The Church doctrine of the Trinity he regarded
as Tritheistic. He admitted a Trinity of
2. Concerning man, Swedenborg taught that he was created in the image of God, and was a creature of a very exalted nature. The Scriptural account of the fall he understood allegorically of the apostasy of the Church. Men, however, he admits, are sinful, and are even born with a bias to evil, but they have not lost their ability to do good. They consequently need redemption. They are susceptible of being delivered from evil not only because they retain their moral liberty, but also because in virtue of the inward spiritual body they are capable of intercourse with spiritual beings. As man by means of his material body is conversant with the world of sense, so in virtue of his spiritual body he is capable of intercourse with the inhabitants of the spiritual world. Swedenborg reports many instances in which he conversed with God and angels, good and bad. By angels, however, he meant men who had departed this life. He did not admit the existence of any created intelligence other than man.
3. Christ he held to be Jehovah, the only living and true
God, the creator, preserver, and ruler of the world. As this divine person was God
and man from eternity, his incarnation, or manifestation in the flesh, consisted
in his assuming a material body with its psychical life in the womb of the Virgin
Mary. This was the body which grew, suffered, and died. In the case of ordinary
men the material body is left forever in the grave, but in the case of Christ the
outward body was gradually refined and glorified until it was lost in that which
is spiritual and eternal. This idea of a twofold body in Christ is not by any means
peculiar to Swedenborg. Barclay, the representative theologian of the Quakers, says:
“As there was the outward visible body and temple of Jesus Christ, which took its
origin from the Virgin Mary: there is also the spiritual body of Christ, by and
through which He that was the Word in the beginning with God, and was and is God,
did reveal Himself to the sons of men in all ages, and whereby men in all ages come
to be made partakers of eternal life, and to have communion and fellowship with
God and Christ.”
4. Christ’s redemptive work does not consist in his bearing
our sins upon the tree, or in making satisfaction to the justice of God for our
offences. All idea of such satisfaction Swedenborg rejects. The work of salvation
is entirely subjective. Justification is pardon granted on repentance. The people
of God are made inwardly righteous, and being thus holy are admitted to the presence
of God and holy spirits in heaven. His peculiar views of the state of the departed,
or of Heaven and Hell, do not call for consideration in this place.
Isaac Watts.
No one familiar with Dr. Watts’ “Psalms and Hymns,” can doubt
his being a devout worshipper of our Lord Jesus Christ, or call in question his
belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet on account of his peculiar views on the
person of Christ, there is a vague impression that he had in some way departed from
the faith of the Church. It is, indeed, often said that he was Arian. In his works,
His peculiar views on the person of Christ are brought out
in three discourses on “The Glory of Christ as God-man,”
In the second, he treats of the “extensive powers of the human
nature of Christ in its present glorified state.” In a previous essay he took the
position that the “human soul of Christ is the first, the greatest, the wisest,
the holiest, and the best of all created spirits.”
The third discourse is devoted to proving the preëxistence
of the human soul of Christ. He argues from the fact that there are many expressions
in the Bible, which seem to imply that He had a dependent nature before He came
into this world. He is called the angel or messenger of God, and is represented
as sent to execute his will. He urges also the fact that He is said to be the image
of God. But the divine essence or nature cannot be the image of itself. That term
can only apply to a created nature united to the divine, so that the “complex person”
thus constituted, should reveal what God is. An argument is also drawn from all
those passages in which Christ is said to have humbled Himself, to have become poor,
to have made Himself of no reputation. All this cannot, he says, be properly understood
of the divine nature, but is perfectly intelligible and full of meaning if referred
to the human soul of our Lord. It was an act of unspeakable condescension for the
highest intelligent creature to “empty Himself” and become as ignorant and feeble
as an infant, and to submit not only to grow in wisdom, but to subject Himself to
the infirmities and sufferings of our mortal state. If asked how so exalted an intellect
can be reduced to the condition or state of an infant, he answers, that something
analogous to this not unfrequently occurs, even in human experience. Men of mature
age and of extensive learning have lost all their knowledge, and have been reduced
to the necessity of learning it all over again, though in some cases it has returned
suddenly. It was the same nature that emptied itself that was afterwards filled
with glory as a recompense. Another argument for the preëxistence of the soul of
Christ, he says, may be drawn from the fact that his incarnation “‘is always expressed
in some corporeal language,
Again,
He also argues from what the Bible teaches of the Sonship
of Christ. “When He is called a Son, a begotten Son, this seems to imply derivation
and dependency; and perhaps the Sonship of Christ, and his being the only begotten
of the Father, may be better explained by attributing it to his human soul, existing
by some peculiar and immediate manner of creation, formation, or derivation from
the Father, before other creatures were formed; especially if we include in the
same idea of Sonship his union to the divine nature, and if we add also his exaltation
to the office of the Messiah, as King and Lord of all.”
Dr. Watts explains clearly what he means by the preëxistence
of the humanity of Christ, when he says:
The above is very far from being a full exposition of the considerations urged by Dr. Watts in support of his theory. It is simply a selection of the more plausible of his arguments presented in order that his doctrine may be properly understood.
It appears that he believed in the eternal Godhead of the Logos as the second person of the Trinity; and that God, before any other creatures were called into existence, created a human soul in personal union with the Logos of such exalted powers as to render him the greatest of all created spirits; that the incarnation consisted in this complex person assuming a material human body with its animal life; that the humiliation of Christ consisted in his human soul thus exalted in its own nature, emptying itself of its knowledge, power, and glory, and submitting not only to the gradual development of his humanity, but also to all that made our Lord while here on earth a man of sorrows. His exaltation consisted in the enlargement of the powers of his soul during his state of humiliation, and in his resurrection and ascension to the right hand of God.
Objections.
The more obvious objections to this theory are, —
1. That it is contrary to the common faith of the Church, and, therefore, to the obvious sense of Scripture. The Bible in teaching that the Son of God became man, thereby teaches that He assumed a true body and a rational soul. For neither a soul without a body, nor a body without a soul, is a man in the Scriptural sense of the term. It was the Logos which became man; and not a God-man that assumed a material body.
2. The passages of Scripture cited in its support are interpreted, for the most part, in violation of the recognized principle that whatever is true of either nature in Christ, may be predicated of his person. As Christ could say, “I thirst,” without implying that his divine nature was subject to the wants of a material body; so He could say, “All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth,” without teaching that such power vests in his humanity.
3. The doctrine that Christ’s human soul was the first and
most exalted of created spirits, raises Him beyond the reach of human sympathies.
He is, as man, farther from us than the angel Gabriel. We need, and the Bible reveals
to us a, so to speak, more circumscribed Saviour, one who, although true God, is
nevertheless
§ 9. Modern Forms of the Doctrine.
Dorner, in the first edition of his work on the “Person of
Christ,” says that the Lutheran theology carried the attempt to preserve the unity
of Christ’s person, on the Church assumption that He possessed two distinct natures,
to the utmost extreme. If that attempt be a failure, nothing more remains. He holds
it to be a failure not only because it involves the impossible assumption of a transfer
of attributes without a change of substance, but also because it is one-sided. It
refuses to admit of the communication of human attributes to the divine nature,
whilst it insists on the transfer of divine perfections to the human nature. And
moreover, he urges, that admitting all the Lutheran theory claims, the union of
the two natures remains just as unreal as it is on the Church doctrine. Any distinction
of natures, in the ordinary sense of the words, must, he says, be given up. It is
on this assumption that the modern views of the person of Christ are founded. These
views may be divided into two classes, the Pantheistical and the Theistical. These
two classes, however, have a good deal in common. Both are founded on the principle
of the oneness of God and man. This is admitted on all sides. “The characteristic
feature of all recent Christologies,” says Dorner, “is the endeavour to point out
the essential unity of the divine and human.”
Pantheistical Christology.
As Christian theology purports to be an exhibition of the theology of the Bible, every theory which involves the denial of a personal God, properly lies beyond its sphere. In modern systems, however, there is such a blending of pantheistic principles with theistic doctrines, that the two cannot be kept entirely separate. Pantheistical and theistical theologians, of the modern school, unite in asserting “the oneness of God and man.” They understand that doctrine, however, in different senses. With the former it is understood to mean identity, so that man is only the highest existence-form of God; with the others, it often means nothing more than that “natura humana capax est naturæ divinæ.” The human is capable of receiving the attributes of the divine. Man may become God.
It follows, in the first place, from the doctrine, that God
is the only real Being of which the world is the ever changing phenomenon, that
“die Menschwerdung Gottes ist eine Menschwerdung von Ewigkeit.” The incarnation
of God is from eternity. And, in the second place, that this process is continuous,
complete in no one instance, but only in the whole. Every man is a form of the life
of God, but the infinite is never fully realized or revealed in any one manifestation.
Some of these philosophers were willing to
Theistical Christology.
We have the authority of Dorner for saying that the modern speculations on Christology are founded on the two principles that there is but one nature in Christ, and that human nature is capax naturæ divinæ, is capable of being made divine. To this must be added a third, although Dorner himself does not hold it, that the divine is capable of becoming human.
The advocates of these principles agree, First, in admitting
that there was a true growth of the man Christ Jesus. When an infant He was as feeble,
as ignorant, and as unconscious of moral character as other infants. When a child
He had no more intellectual or physical strength than other children. There is,
however, a difference in their mode of statement as to what Christ was during the
maturity of his earthly life. According to some, He had no superhuman knowledge
or power. All He knew was communicated to Him, some say by the Father, others say
by the Logos. The miracles which He wrought were not by his own power, but
Secondly, they agree that the development of the humanity of our Lord was without sin. He was from the beginning holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. Nevertheless He had to contend with all the infirmities of our nature, and to resist all the temptations arising from the flesh, the world, and the devil, with which his people have to contend. He was liable to sin. As He was subject to hunger, thirst, weariness, and pain, as He had feelings capable of being wounded by ingratitude and insult, He was liable to the impatience and resentment which suffering or injury is adapted to produce. As He was susceptible of pleasure from the love and admiration of others, He was exposed to the temptation of seeking the honour which comes from men. In all things, however, He was without sin.
Thirdly, they agree that it was only gradually that Christ came to the knowledge that He was a divine person, and into the possession and use of divine attributes. Communications of knowledge and power were made to Him from time to time from on high, so that both the knowledge of what He was and the consciousness of the possession of divine perfections came to Him by degrees. Christ’s exaltation, therefore, began and was carried on while He was here on earth, but it was not until his resurrection and ascension that He became truly and forever divine.
Fourthly, since his ascension and session at the right hand
of God, He is still a man, and only a man. Nevertheless He is an infinite man. A
man with all the characteristics of a human soul possessed of all the perfections
of the Godhead. Since his ascension, as Gess expresses it, a man has been taken
into the adorable Trinity. “As the glorified Son remains man, a man is thus received
into the trinitarian life of the Deity from and by the glorification of the Son.”
The result of the incarnation, therefore, is that God becomes
man in such a sense that the Son of God has no life or activity, no knowledge, presence,
or power outside of or apart from his humanity. In Christ there is but one life,
one activity, one consciousness. Every act of the incarnate Logos is a human act,
and every experience of the humanity of Christ, all his sorrows, infirmities, and
pains, were the experience of the Logos. “The absolute life, which is the being
of God, exists in the narrow limits of an earthly-human life; absolute holiness
and truth, the essential attributes of God, develop themselves in the form of human
thinking and willing; absolute love has assumed a human form, it lives as human
feeling, as human sensibility in the heart of this man; absolute freedom has the
form of human self-determination. The Son of God has not reserved for Himself a
special existence form (ein besonderes Fürsichseyn), a special consciousness, a
special sphere or power of action; He does not exist anywhere outside of the flesh
(nec Verbum
As to the manner in which this complete identification of
the human and divine in the person of Christ is effected, there are, as above intimated,
two opinions. According to Dorner there is a human soul to begin with, to which
the Eternal Logos, without subjecting Himself to any change, from time to time communicates
his divinity, as the human becomes more and more capable of receiving the perfections
of God, until at last it becomes completely divine. With this Dorner connected a
philosophical theory concerning the relation of Christ to the universe, and especially
to the whole spiritual world.
The other view of the subject is, that the Eternal Logos,
by a process of self-limitation, divested Himself of all his divine attributes.
He ceased to be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. He
On this point Thomasius says, First, that if the Eternal Son,
after the assumption of humanity, retained his divine perfections and prerogatives,
He did not become man, nor did He unite Himself with humanity. He hovered over it;
and included it as a larger circle does a smaller. But there was no real contact
or communication. Secondly, if at the moment of the incarnation the divine nature
in the fulness of its being and perfection was communicated to the humanity, then
Christ could not have had a human existence. The historical life is gone; and all
bond of relationship and sympathy with us is destroyed. Thirdly, the only way in
which the great end in view could be answered was that God Himself by a process
of depotentiation, or self-limitation, should become man; that He should take upon
Himself a form of existence subject to the limitations of time and space, and pass
through the ordinary and regular process of human development, and take part in
all the sinless experiences of a human life and death.
Ebrard.
Ebrard puts the doctrine in a somewhat different form. He molds that the Logos reduced Himself to the dimensions of a man; but at the same time retained and exercised his divine perfections as the second person of the Trinity. In answer to the question, How human and divine attributes can be united in the same person, he says the solution of the difficulty is to be found in the original constitution and destiny of humanity. Man was designed for this supreme dominion, perfect holiness, and boundless knowledge. “The glorification of God as Son in time is identical with the acme of the normal development of man.” It is held by many, not by all of the advocates of this theory, that the incarnation would have taken place had men never sinned. It entered into the divine purpose in reference to man that he should thus attain oneness with Himself.
As to the still more difficult question, How can the Son as
the second person of the Trinity retain his divine perfections (as Ebrard holds
that He does), and yet, as revealed on earth, lay them aside? “The one is world-ruling
and omniscient, and the other is not,” he says we must understand the problem. It
is not that two natures become one nature. “Two natures as two things (Stücken)
are out of the question.” The Logos is not one nature, and the incarnate Son of
God, Jesus, another; but the incarnate Son possesses the properties of both natures.
The question only is, How can the incarnate Logos, since He has not the one nature,
the divine, in the form of God (in der Ewigkeitsform), be one with the world-governing
Logos who is in the form of God? This question, which is equivalent to asking, How
the same individual mind can be finite and infinite at the same time, he answers
by saying, first, that the continuity of existence does not depend upon continuity
of consciousness. A man in a swoon or in a state of magnetic sleep, is the same
person, although his consciousness be suspended or abnormal. That is true, but the
question is, How the same mind can be conscious and unconscious at the same time,
How th same individual Logos can be a feeble infant and at the same time the intelligently
active world-governing God. Secondly, he admits that the above answer does not fully
meet the case, and therefore adds that the whole difficulty disappears when we remember
(dass die Ewigkeit nicht eine der Zeit parallellaufende Linie ist), that Eternity
and Time are not parallel lines. But, thirdly, seeing that this is not enough,
he says that the Eternal Logos overlooks his human form of existence with one glance
(mit einem Schlage), whereas the incarnate Logos does not, but with true human consciousness,
looks forward and backward. All this avails nothing. The contradiction remains.
The theory assumes that the same individual mind can be conscious and unconscious,
finite and infinite, ignorant and omniscient, at the same time.
Gess.
Gess admits the contradiction involved in the doctrine as
presented by Ebrard, and therefore adopts the common form of the theory. He holds
that the Eternal Son at the incarnation laid aside the Godhead and became a man.
The substance of the Logos remained; but that substance was in the form of an infant,
and had nothing beyond an infant’s knowledge or power. In the
Remarks.
1. The first remark to be made on this theory in all its forms
is that it is a departure from the faith of the Church. This objection turns up
first on every occasion, because that is its proper place. If the Bible be the only
infallible rule of faith and practice; and if the Bible be a plain book, and if
the Spirit guides the people of God (not the external church, or body of mere professing
Christians) into the knowledge of the truth, then the presumption is invincible
that what all true Christians believe to be the sense of Scripture is its sense.
The whole Christian world has believed, and still does believe, that Christ was
a true man; that He had a real body and a human soul. The Council of Chalcedon in
formulating this article of the common faith, declared that Christ was, and is,
God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever; that according to the
one nature He is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) within
us, and according to the other He is consubstantial with the Father. There is no
dispute as to the sense in which the Council used the word nature, because
it has an established meaning in theology, and because it is explained by the use
of the Latin word consubstantial, and the Greek word ὁμοούσιος.
Nor is it questioned that the decisions of that Council have been accepted by the
whole Church. This doctrine of two natures in Christ the new theory rejects. This,
as we have seen, Dorner expressly asserts. We have seen, also, that Ebrard says,
that the idea of two natures in the sense of two substances (Stücke, concrete existences)
is out of the question. The Logos did not assume human nature, but human attributes;
He appeared in the fashion of a man. Gess, in his luminous book, teaches over and
over, that it was the substance
This is not Apollinarianism; for Apollinaris taught that the Logos supplied the place of a rational soul in the person of Christ. He did not become such a soul, but, retaining in actu as well as in potentia, the fulness of the divine perfections, took its place. Nor is it exactly Eutychianism. For Eutyches said that there were two natures before the union, and only one after it. The two were so united as to become one. This the theory before us denies, and affirms that from the beginning the Logos was the sole rational element in the constitution of the person of our Lord. It agrees, however, with both these ancient and Church-rejected errors in their essential principles. It agrees with the Apollinarians in saying that the Logos was the rational element in Christ; and it agrees with the Eutychians in saying that Christ had but one nature.
The doctrine is in still more obvious contradiction to the
decisions of the Council of Constantinople on the Monothelite controversy. That
Council decided that as there were two natures in Christ, there were of necessity
two wills. The new theory in asserting the oneness of Christ’s nature, denies that
He had two wills. The acts, emotions, and sufferings of his earthly life, were the
acts, emotions, and sufferings of the Logos. So far as Christian interest in the
doctrine is concerned, it was to get at this conclusion the theory was adopted if
not devised. It was to explain how that more than human value belongs to the sufferings
of Christ, and more than human efficacy to his life, that so many Christian men
were led to embrace the new doctrine. The Church doctrine. however, does not consider
either the sufferings or the life of Christ as those of a mere man. He was a divine
person, God manifest in the flesh; and his sufferings and life were those of that
person.
2. The arguments from Scripture in support of the theory are for the most part founded on the neglect of the principle so often referred to, that anything can be predicated of the person of Christ that can be predicated either of his human or of his divine nature. That the one person is said to be born and to suffer and die, no more proves that the Logos as such was born and suffered and died, than saying of a man that he is sick or wounded proves that his soul is diseased or injured. The same remark, of course, applies to the exaltation and dominion of the risen Redeemer. It is the one person who is the object of the worship of all created intelligences, and to whom their obedience is due; but this does not prove that Christ’s human nature is possessed of divine attributes. Indeed, according to the modern doctrine of Kenosis, He has no human nature, as already proved.
3. The theory in question is inconsistent with the clear doctrine both of revealed and natural religion concerning the nature of God. He is a Spirit infinite, eternal, and immutable. Any theory, therefore, which assumes that God lays aside his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, and becomes as feeble, ignorant, and circumscribed as an infant, contradicts the first principle of all religion, and, if it be pardonable to say so, shocks the common sense of men.
4. Instead of removing any difficulties attending the doctrine
of the incarnation, it greatly increases them. According to Dorner’s view we are
called upon to believe that a human soul receives gradually increasing measures
of the divine fulness, until at last it becomes infinite. This is equivalent to
saying that it ceases to exist. It is only on the assumption that Dorner, when he
says that the essential nature of God is love, and that the communication of the
Godhead is the communication of the fulness of the divine love, means that God is
purely ethical, an attribute, but not a substance, that we can attach any definite
meaning to his doctrine. According to Ebrard we are required to believe that the
one divine and infinite substance of the Logos was finite and infinite; conscious
and unconscious; omnipresent, and confined within narrow limits in space; and that
it was active in the exercise of omnipotence, and as feeble as an infant at one
and the same time. According to the more common view of the subject, we are called
upon to believe
5. This doctrine destroys the humanity of Christ. He is not and never was a man. He never had a human soul or a human heart. It was the substance of the Logos invested with a human body that was born of the Virgin, and not a human soul. A being without a human soul is not a man. The Saviour which this theory offers us is the Infinite God with a spiritual body. In thus exalting the humanity of Christ to infinitude it is dissipated and lost.
Schleiermacher.
The prevalent Christology among a numerous and distinguished
class of modern theologians, though not professedly pantheistic, is nevertheless
founded on the assumption of the essential oneness of God and man. This class includes
the school of Schleiermacher in all its modifications not only in Germany, but also
in England and America. Schleiermacher is regarded as the most interesting as well
as the most influential theologian of modern times. He was not and could not be
self-consistent, as he attempted the reconciliation of contradictory doctrines.
There are three things in his antecedents and circumstances necessary to be considered,
in order to any just appreciation of the man or of his system. First, he passed
the early part of his life among the Moravians, and imbibed something of their spirit,
and especially of their reverence for Christ, who to the Moravians is almost the
exclusive object of worship. This reverence for Christ, Schleiermacher retained
all his life. In one of the discourses pronounced on the occasion of his death,
it was said, “He gave up everything that he might save Christ.” His philosophy,
his historical criticism, everything, he was willing to make bend to the great aim
of preserving to himself that cherished object of reverence and love.
Schleiermacher’s Christology.
He assumed, (1.) That religion in general, and Christianity
in particular, was not a doctrine or system of doctrine; not a cultus, or
a discipline; but a life, an inward spiritual power or force. (2.) That the true
Christian is conscious of being the recipient of this new life. (3.) That he knows
that it did not originate in himself, nor in the Church to which he belongs, because
humanity neither in the individual nor in any of its organizations is capable of
producing what is specifically new and higher and better than itself. (4.) This
necessitates the assumption of a source, or author of this life, outside of the
race of ordinary men or of humanity in its regular development. (5.) Hence he assumed
the actual historical existence of a new, sinless, and absolutely perfect man by
a new creative act. (6.) That man was Christ, from whom every Christian is conscious
that he derives the new life of which he is the subject. (7.) Christ is the Urbild,
or Ideal Man, in whom the idea of humanity is fully realized. (8.) He is nevertheless
divine, or God in fashion as a man, because man is the modus existendi of
God on the earth. In ordinary men, even in Adam, God, so to speak, was and is imperfectly
developed. The God-consciousness, or God within, is overborne by our world-consciousness,
or our consciousness as determined by things seen and
Objections to this Theory.
This is a meagre outline of Schleiermacher’s Christology. His doctrine concerning Christ is so implicated with his peculiar views on anthropology, on theology, and on the relation of God to the world, that it can neither be fully presented nor properly appreciated except as an integral part of his whole system.
Gladly as Schleiermacher’s theory was embraced as a refuge
by those who had been constrained to give up Christianity as a doctrine, and great
as have been its popularity and influence, it was assailed from very different quarters
and judged from many different standpoints. Here it can only be viewed from the
position of Christian theology. It should be remembered that as the idealist does
not feel and act according to his theory, so the inward life of a theologian may
not be determined by his speculative doctrines. This does not render error less
objectionable or less dangerous. It
1. The first objection to Schleiermacher’s theory is that it is not and does not pretend to be Biblical. It is not founded upon the objective teachings of the Word of God. It assumes, indeed, that the religious experience of the Apostles and early Christians was substantially the same, and therefore involved the same truths, as the experience of Christians of the present day. Schleiermacher even admits that their experience was so pure and distinctly marked as to have the authority of a standard by which other believers are to judge of their own. But he denies that the interpretation which they gave of their experience has normal authority for us, that is, he says that we are not bound to believe what the Apostles believed. His appeals to the Scriptures in support of his peculiar doctrines are extremely rare, and merely incidental. He professes to build up a system independent of the Bible, founded on what Christians now find in the contents of their own consciousness.
2. The system is not what it purports to be. Schleiermacher
professed to discard speculation from the province of religion. He undertook to
construct a theory of Christianity with which philosophy should have nothing to
do, and therefore one against which it could have no right to object. In point of
fact his system is a matter of speculation from beginning to end. It could never
have existed except as the product of a mind imbued with the principles of German
philosophy. It has no coherence, no force, and indeed no meaning, unless you take
for granted the correctness of his views of the nature of God, of the nature of
man, and of the relation of God to the world. This objection was urged against his
system by all parties in Germany. The supernaturalists, who believed in the Bible,
charged him with substituting the conclusions of his own philosophy for the dictates
of Christian consciousness. And the philosophers said he was true neither to his
philosophy nor to his religion. He changed from one ground to the other just as
it suited his purpose. On this subject Strauss
Founded on Pantheistic Principles.
3. A third objection is that the system is essentially pantheistic.
This is, indeed, an ambiguous term. It is here used, however, in its ordinary and
proper sense. It is not meant that Schleiermacher held that the universe is God,
or God the universe, but that he denied any proper dualism between God and the world,
and between God and man. He held such views of God as were inconsistent with Theism
in the true and accepted meaning of the word. That is, he did not admit the existence
of a personal, extramundane God. This is a charge brought against his system from
the beginning, even by avowed pantheists themselves. They say that while denying
the existence of a personal God he nevertheless teaches doctrines inconsistent with
that denial, i.e., with what they regard as the true view of the relation of the
infinite to the finite. Theists brought the same objection. Dr. Braniss
Involves the Rejection of the Doctrine of the Trinity.
4. Schleiermacher’s system ignores the doctrine of the Trinity. With him God in the world, is the Father; God in Christ, the Son; God in the Church, the Spirit. All personal preëxistence of Christ is thus necessarily excluded. The Scriptures and the Church teach that the eternal Son of God, who was with the Father from eternity; who made the worlds; who could say, “Before Abraham was I am,” became man, being born of a woman, yet without sin. This Schleiermacher denies. There was no Son of God, before the birth of Christ in Bethlehem. Then only, Christ began to be as a distinct person; He had no preëxistence beyond that which is common to all men.
5. This system makes Christ a mere man. He is constantly
represented as the Ideal man, Urbild, a perfect man. In Him the idea of humanity
is said to be fully realized. His life is said to be one; and that one a true human
life. There was in Him but one nature, and that nature human. Now it matters little
that with these representations Christ is said to be divine, and his life a divine
life; for this is said on the ground that the divine is human, and the human divine.
God and man are one. The difference between
Schleiermacher’s Anthropology.
6. As the system under consideration is unscriptural in what
it teaches concerning the nature of God, and the person of Christ, it is no less
contrary to the Scriptures in what it teaches concerning man. Indeed, the theology
and anthropology of the system are so related that they cannot be separately held.
According to the Bible and the common faith both of the Church and of the world,
man is a being created by the word of God’s power, consisting of a material body
and an immaterial soul. There are, therefore, in the constitution of his person,
two distinct subjects or substances, each with its own properties; so that although
intimately united in the present state of being, the soul is capable of conscious
existence and activity, out of the body, or separated from it. The soul of man is
therefore a distinct individual subsistence, and not the form, or modus existendi
of a general life. According to Schleiermacher, “Man as such, or in himself, is
the knowing (das Erkennen) of the earth in its eternal substance (Seyn) and in its
ever changing development. Or the Spirit (der Geist, God) in the way or form in
which it comes to self-consciousness in our earth.” Der Mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in Seinem ewigen Seyn und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der
Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet.
The theory is that there is an infinite, absolute, and universal
something, spirit, life, life-power, substance, God, Urwesen, or whatever it may
be called, which develops itself by an inward force, in all the forms of actual
existence. Of these forms man is the highest. This development is by a necessary
process, as much so as the growth of a plant or of an animal. The stem of the tree,
its branches, foliage, and fruit, are not formed by sudden, creative acts, accomplishing
the effect, by way of miracle. All is regular, a law-work, an uninterrupted force
acting according to its internal nature. So in the self-evolution of the spirit,
or principle of life, there is no room for special intervention, or creative acts.
All goes on in the way of history, and by regular organic development. Here there
is a fault in Schleiermacher’s doctrine. He admitted a creative, supernatural act
at the creation. And as the quantum of life, or spirit, communicated to man at first
was insufficient to carry on his development to perfection, i.e., until it realized,
or actualized all that is in that life of which he is the manifestation (i.e.,
in God), there was a necessity for a new creative act, by which in the person of
Christ, a perfect man was produced. From Him, and after Him, the process goes on
naturally, by regular development.
There is another mode of representation current with the disciples
of Schleiermacher, especially in this country. its advocates speak of humanity as
a generic life. They define man to be the manifestation of this generic life in
connection with a special corporeal organization, by which it is individualized
and becomes personal. It was this generic humanity which sinned in Adam, and thenceforth
was corrupt in all the individual men in whom it was manifested. It was this generic
humanity that Christ assumed into personal union with his divinity, not as two distinct
substances, but so united as to become one generic human life. This purified humanity
now develops itself, by an inward force in the Church, just as from Adam generic
humanity was developed in his posterity. All this, however, differs only in words
from Schleiermacher’s simpler and more philosophic statement. For it is still assumed
as the fundamental idea of the gospel, that God and man are one. This generic humanity
is only a form of the life of God. And as to its sinning in Adam, and being thenceforth
corrupt, sin and corruption are only imperfect development. God, the universal life
principle, as Dr. Nevin calls it, so variously manifested in the different existences
in this world, is imperfectly or insufficiently manifested in man generally, but
perfectly in Christ, and through Hun ultimately in like perfection in his people.
Christ, therefore, according to Dorner, is a universal person. He comprises in Himself
the whole of humanity. All that is separately revealed in others is summed up in
Him. In this system “Der Mittelpunkt,” says Schwarz, “christlicher Wahrheit, der
christologische Kern der ganzen Dogmatik ist die Göschel-Dorner’sche monströse Vorstellung
von der Allpersönlichkeit Christi, die ihm als dem Urmenschen zukommt. Es
ist ‘die Zusammenfassung des ganzen gegliederten
The design of the preceding paragraphs is simply to show the unscriptural character of Schleiermacher’s Christology in all its modifications, because it is founded on a view of the nature of man entirely at variance with the Word of God. It assumes the oneness of God and man. It takes for granted that fully developed humanity is divine; that Christ in being the ideal, or perfect man, is God.
Schleiermacher’s Theory perverts the Plan of Salvation.
7. It need hardly be remarked that the plan of salvation according
to Schleiermacher’s doctrine is entirely different from that revealed in the Bible
and cherished by the Church in all ages. It is, in Germany at least, regarded as
a rejection of the Church system, and as a substitute for it, and only in some of
its forms as a reconciliation of the two, as to what is deemed absolutely essential.
The system in all its forms rejects the doctrines of atonement or satisfaction to
the justice of God; of regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Spirit; of justification
as a judicial or forensic act; of faith in Christ, as a trusting to what He has
done for us, as distinguished from what He does in us; in short, of all the great
distinctive doctrines not merely of the Reformation but of the Catholic faith. By
many of the followers of Schleiermacher these doctrines are rejected in so many
words; by others the terms are more or
This Vermittelungstheologie (the mediating-theology),
as it is called in Germany, is confessedly an attempt to combine the conclusions
of modern speculation with Christian doctrine, or rather with Christianity. It is
an attempt to mix incongruous elements which refuse to enter into combination. The
modern speculative philosophy in all its forms insists on the denial of all real
dualism; God and the world are correlata, the one supposes the other; without
the world there is no God; creation is the self-evolution or self-manifestation
of God: and is therefore necessary and eternal. God can no more be without the world,
than mind without thought. The preservation, progress, and consummation of the world
is by a necessary process of development, as in all the forms of life. There is
no possibility of special intervention, on the part of God. Miracles whether spiritual
or physical are an absurdity and an impossibility.
Schwarz, himself a great admirer, although not a disciple of Schleiermacher, characterizes this “mediating theology” as an utter failure. It is neither one thing nor the other. It is neither true to its speculative principles, nor true to Christianity. It virtually rejects the Church system, yet endeavours to save Christianity by adopting at least its phraseology. Schwarz says it is a system of “phrases;” which endeavours to heal the wounds of orthodoxy by words which seem to mean much, but which may be made to mean much or little as the reader pleases. It speaks constantly of Christianity as a life, as the life of God, as developing itself organically and naturally, not by supernatural assistance, but by an inward life-power, as in other cases of organic development. It assumes to rise to the conception of the whole world as an organism, in which God is one of the factors; the world and God differing not in substance or life, but simply in functions. It concedes to “speculation” that the fundamental truth of philosophy and of Christianity is the oneness of God and man. Man is God living in a certain form, or state of development. While “the mediating theology” concedes all this, it nevertheless admits of a miraculous or supernatural beginning of the world and of the person of Christ, and thus gives up its whole philosophical system. At least the members of one wing of Schleiermacher’s school are thus inconsistent; those of the other are more true to their principles.
As Christian theology is simply the exhibition and illustration
of the facts and truths of the Bible in their due relations and proportions, it
has nothing to do with these speculations. The “mediating theology” does not pretend
to be founded on the Bible. It does not, at least in Germany, profess allegiance
to the Church doctrine. It avowedly gives up Christianity as a doctrine to save
it as a life. It is founded on “speculation” and not upon authority, whether of
the Scriptures or of the Church. It affords therefore no other and no firmer foundation
for our faith and hope, than any other philosophical system; and that, as all history
proves, is a foundation of quick-sand, shifting and sinking from month to month
and even from day to day. Schleiermacher has been dead little more than thirty years,
and already there are eight or ten different classes of his general disciples who
differ from each other almost as much as from the doctrines of the Reformation.
Twesten and Ullmann, Liebner and Thomasius, Lange and Alexander,
The simple, sublime, and saving Christology of the Bible and of the Church universal is: “That the eternal Son of God became man by taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul and so was and continues to be God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever.”
§ 1. Christ the only Mediator.
According to the Scriptures the incarnation of the eternal
Son of God was not a necessary event arising out of the nature of God. It was not
the culminating point in the development of humanity. It was an act of voluntary
humiliation. God gave his Son for the redemption of man. He came into the world
to save his people from their sins; to seek and save those who are lost. He took
part in flesh and blood in order, by death, to destroy him who had the power of
death, that is the devil, and to deliver those who through fear of death (i.e.,
through apprehension of the wrath of God), were all their lifetime subject to bondage.
He died the just for the unjust that He might bring us near to God. Such is the
constant representation of the Scriptures. The doctrine of the modern speculative
theology, that the incarnation would have occurred though man had not sinned, is,
therefore, contrary to the plainest teachings of the Bible. Assuming, however, that
fallen men were to be redeemed, then the incarnation was a necessity. There was
no other way by which that end could be accomplished. This is clearly taught in
the Scriptures. The name of Christ is the only name whereby men can be saved. If
righteousness could have been attained in any other way, Christ, says the Apostle,
is dead in vain. (
As the design of the incarnation of the Son of God was to
reconcile us unto God, and as reconciliation of parties at variance is a work of
mediation, Christ is called our mediator. As reconciliation is sometimes effected
by mere intercession, or negotiation, the person who thus effectually intercedes
may be called a mediator. But where reconciliation involves the necessity of satisfaction
for sin as committed against God, then he only is a mediator who makes an atonement
for sin. As this was done, and could be done by Christ alone, it follows that He
only is the mediator between God
The Romish Church regards priests, and saints, and angels, and especially the Virgin Mary, as mediators, not only in the sense of intercessors, but as peace-makers without whose intervention reconciliation with God cannot be attained. This arises from two erroneous principles involved in the theology of the Church of Rome. The first concerns the office of the priesthood. Romanists teach that the benefits of redemption can be obtained only thrpugh the intervention of the priests. Those benefits flow through the sacraments. The sacraments to be available must be administered by men canonically ordained. The priests offer sacrifices and grant absolution. They are as truly mediators, although in a subordinate station, as Christ himself. No man can come to God except through them. And this is the main idea in mediation in the Scriptural sense of the word.
The other principle is involved in the doctrine of merit as held by Romanists. According to them, good works done after regeneration have real merit in the sight of God. It is possible for the people of God not only to acquire a degree of merit sufficient for their own salvation, but more than suffices for themselves. This, on the principle of the communion of saints, may be made available for others. The saints, therefore, are appealed to, to plead their own merits before the throne of God as the ground of the pardon or deliverance of those for whom they intercede. This according to the Scriptures is the peculiar work of Christ as our mediator; assigning it to the saints, therefore, constitutes them mediators. As the Christian minister is not a priest, and as no man has any merit in the sight of God, much less a superabundance thereof, the whole foundation of this Romish doctrine is done away. Christ is our only mediator, not merely because the Scriptures so teach, but also because He only can and does accomplish what is necessary for our reconciliation to God; and He only has the personal qualifications for the work.
§ 2. Qualifications for the Work.
What those qualifications are the Scriptures clearly teach.
1. He must be a man. The Apostle assigns as the reason why
Christ assumed our nature and not the nature of angels, that He came to redeem us.
(
2. The Mediator between God and man must be sinless. Under
the law the victim offered on the altar must be without blemish. Christ, who was
to offer Himself unto God as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, must be Himself
free from sin. The High Priest, therefore, who becomes us, He whom our necessities
demand, must be holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. (
3. It was no less necessary that our Mediator should be a divine person. The blood of no mere creature could take away sin. It was only because our Lord was possessed of an eternal Spirit that the one offering of Himself has forever perfected them that believe. None but a divine person could destroy the power of Satan and deliver those who were led captive by him at his will. None but He who had life in Himself could be the source of life, spiritual and eternal, to his people. None but an almighty person could control all events to the final consummation of the plan of redemption, and could raise the dead; and infinite wisdom and knowledge are requisite in Him who is to be judge of all men, and the head over all to his Church. None but one in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead could be the object as well as the source of the religious life of all the redeemed.
These qualifications for the office of mediator between God and man are all declared in the Scriptures to be essential; they are met in Christ; and they all were demanded by the nature of the work which He came to perform.
As it was necessary that Christ should be both God and man in two distinct natures and one person, in order to effect our redemption, it follows that his mediatorial work, which includes all He did and is still doing for the salvation of men, is the work not of his human to the exclusion of his divine nature, nor of the latter to the exclusion of the former. It is the work of the Θεάνθρωπος, of the God-man. Of the acts of Christ, as already remarked, some are purely divine, as creation, preservation, etc.; others purely human, i.e., those which the ordinary powers of man are not only adequate to accomplish, but in which only human faculties were exercised; and, thirdly, those which are mixed, which belong to the whole person. As speaking in man is a joint exercise of the mind and of the body, so the mediatorial work in Christ is the joint work of his divinity and humanity. Each nature acts agreeably to its own laws. When a man speaks, the mind and body concur in the production of the effect, each according to its nature. So when our Lord spake, the wisdom, truth, and authority with which He spake were due to his divinity; the human form of the thoughts and their articulation were what they were in virtue of the functions of his human nature. So with all his redemptive acts. As the mind of man concurs in the endurance of the sufferings of the body according to the nature of mind, so the divinity of Christ concurred with the sufferings of his human nature according to the nature of the divinity.
On this subject the schoolmen made the following distinctions:
“(1.) Est ὁ ἐνεργῶν, Agens seu Principium
quod agit, quod est suppositum seu persona Christi. (2.)
Τὸ ἐνεργητικὸν seu Principium formale quo agit;
illud per quod agens, seu persona Christi operatur, duæ scilicet naturæ, quarum
unaquæque citra ullum confusionem operatur. (3.) Ἐνέργεια
seu operatio quæ pendet a principio quo, et naturam sui principii refert,
ut sit divina, si principium quo sit divina natura, humana vero, si sit humanitas.
(4.) Ενέργημα, seu ἀποτέλεσμα,
quod pendet a principio quod, estque opus externum quod mediationem vocamus. . . . .
Ita unum est agens principale, nim. persona Christi, et unum
ἀποτέλεσμα seu opus mediatorium; sed operatur per duas
naturas, ut duo principia, unde fluunt duæ ἐνεργείαι
seu operationes ad unum illud opus concurrentes.”
All Christ’s acts and sufferings in the execution of his mediatorial work were, therefore, the acts and sufferings of a divine person. It was the Lord of glory who was crucified; it was the Son of God who poured out his soul unto death. That this is the doctrine of the Scriptures is plain, (1.) Because they attribute the efficacy and power of his acts, the truth and wisdom of his words, and the value of his sufferings to the fact that they were the acts, words, and sufferings of God manifested in the flesh. They are predicated of one and the same person who from the beginning was with God and was God, who created all things and for whom all things were made and by whom all things consist. (2.) If the mediatorial work of Christ belongs to his human nature exclusively, or, in other words, if He is our mediator only as man, then we have only a human Saviour, and all the glory, power, and sufficiency of the Gospel are departed. (3.) From the nature of the work. The redemption of fallen men is a work for which only a divine person is competent. The prophetic office of Christ supposes that He possessed “all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;” his sacerdotal office required the dignity of the Son of God to render his work available; and none but a divine person could exercise the dominion with which Christ as mediator is intrusted. Only the Eternal Son could deliver us from the bondage of Satan, and from the death of sin, or raise the dead, or give eternal life, or conquer all his and our enemies. We need a Saviour who was not only holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners, but who also “is higher than the heavens.”
§ 3. The Threefold Office of Christ.
It has long been customary with theologians to exhibit the
mediatorial work of Christ under the heads of his prophetic, sacerdotal, and kingly
offices. To this division and classification it has been objected by some that these
offices are not distinct, as it was the duty of the priests as well as of the prophets
to teach; by others, that time sacerdotal office of Christ was identical with the
prophetic, that his redemption was effected by teaching. This method, however, has
not only the sanction of established usage and obvious convenience, but it is of
substantive importance, and has a firm Scriptural basis. (1.) In the Old Testament
the several offices were distinct. The prophet, as such, was not a priest; and the
King was neither priest nor prophet. Two of these offices were at times united in
the same person under the theocracy, as Moses was both priest and prophet, and David
prophet and king. Nevertheless the offices were distinct. (2.) The Messiah, during
the
Under the old economy the functions of these several offices
were not only confided to different persons, no one under the theocracy being at
once prophet, priest, and king; but when two of these offices were united in one
person they were still separate. The same man might sometimes act as prophet and
sometimes as priest or king; but in Christ these offices were more intimately united.
He instructed while acting as a priest, and his dominion extending over the soul
gave freedom from blindness and error as well as from the power of sin and the dominion
of the devil. The gospel is his sceptre. He rules the world by truth and love. “Tria
ista officia,” says Turrettin, “ita in Christo conjunguntur, ut non solum eorum
operationes distinctas exerat, sed eadem actio a tribus simul prodeat, quod rei
admirabilitatem non parum auget. Sic Crux Christi, quæ est Altare sacerdotis, in
quo se in victimam Deo obtulit, est etiam schola prophetæ, in qua nos docet mysterium
salutis, unde Evangelium vocatur verbum crucis, et Trophæum regis, in qua scil.
triumphavit de principatibus et potestatibus.
§ 1. Nature of the Prophetic Office.
According to Scriptural usage a prophet is one who speaks
for another. In
When, therefore, the Messiah was predicted as a prophet it
was predicted that He should be the great organ of God in communicating his mind
and will to men. And when our Lord appeared on earth it was to speak the words of
God. “The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me.” (
§ 2. How Christ executes the Office of a Prophet.
In the execution of his prophetic office, Christ is revealed to us, (1.) As the eternal Word, the Λόγος, the manifested and manifesting Jehovah. He is the source of all knowledge to the intelligent universe, and especially to the children of men. He was, and is, the light of the world. He is the truth. In Him dwell all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; and from Him radiates all the light that men receive or attain. (2.) This, although independent of his official work as prophet in the economy of redemption, is its necessary foundation. Had He not in Himself the plenitude of divine wisdom He could not be the source of knowledge, and especially of that knowledge which is eternal life to all his people. Under the old dispensation, or before his advent in the flesh, He made known God and his purposes and will, not only by personal manifestations of Himself to the patriarchs and prophets, but also by his Spirit, in revealing the trukh and will of God, in inspiring those appointed to record these revelations, and in illuminating the minds of his people, and thus bringing them to the saving knowledge of the truth. (3.) While on earth He continued the exercise of his prophetic office by his personal instructions, in his discourses, parables, and expositions of the law and of the prophets; and in all that He taught concerning his own person and work, and concerning the progress and consummation of his kingdom. (4.) Since his ascension He performs the same office not only in the fuller revelation of the gospel made to the Apostles and in their inspiration as infallible teachers, but also in the institution of the ministry and constantly calling men to that office, and by the influences of the Holy Ghost, who coöperates with the truth in every human heart, and renders it effectual to the sanctification and salvation of his own people. Thus from the beginning, both in his state of humiliation and of exaltation, both before and after his advent in the flesh, does Christ execute the office of a prophet in revealing to us by his Word and Spirit the will of God for our salvation.
§ 1. Christ is truly, not figuratively, a Priest.
The meaning of the word priest and the nature of the office are to be determined, first, by general usage and consent; secondly, by the express declarations of the Scriptures; and, thirdly, by the nature of the functions peculiar to the office. From these sources it can be shown that a priest is, (1.) A man duly appointed to act for other men in things pertaining to God. The idea which lies at the foundation of the office is, that men, being sinners, have not liberty of access to God. Therefore, one, either having that right in himself, or to whom it is conceded, must be appointed to draw near to God in their behalf. A priest, consequently, from the nature of his office, is a mediator. (2.) A priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins. His function is to reconcile men to God; to make expiation for their sins; and to present their persons, acknowledgments, and offerings to God. (3.) He makes intercession for the people. Not merely as one man may pray for another, but as urging the efficacy of his sacrifice and the authority of his office, as grounds on which his prayers should be answered.
Much depends upon the correctness of this definition. It would amount to little to admit Christ to be a priest, if by that term we mean merely a minister of religion, or even one by whose intervention divine blessings are secured and conveyed. But if by a priest be meant all that is included in the above statement, then the relation in which Christ stands to us, our duties to Him, his relation to God, and the nature of his work, are all thereby determined.
That the above definition is correct, and that Christ is a priest in the true sense of the term, is evident,
1. From the general usage of the word and the nature of the
office among all nations and in all ages of the world. Men have everywhere and at
all times been conscious of sin. In that consciousness are included a sense of guilt
(or of just exposure to the displeasure of God), of pollution, and of consequent
unworthiness to approach God Their consciences, or the laws of their moral
2. The sense in which Christ is a priest must be determined by the use of the word and by the nature of the office under the old dispensation. In the Old Testament a priest was a man selected from the people, appointed to act as their mediator, drawing nigh to God in their behalf, whose business it was to offer expiatory sacrifices, and to make intercession for offenders. The people were not allowed to draw near to God. The High Priest alone could enter within the veil; and he only with blood which he offered for himself and for the sins of the people. All this was both symbolical and typical. What the Aaronic priests were symbolically, Christ was really. What they in their office and services typified was fulfilled in Him. They were the shadow, He the substance. They taught how sin was to be taken away, He actually removed it. It would be to set the Scriptures at naught, or to adopt principles of interpretation which would invalidate all their teaching, to deny that Christ is a priest in the Old Testament sense of the term.
3. We have in the New Testament an authoritative definition
of the word, and an exhibition of the nature of the office. In
4. Christ is not only called a priest in Hebrews, but the
Apostle throughout that Epistle proves, (a.) That He had all the qualifications
for the office. (b.) That He was appointed by God. (c.) That He was a priest of
a higher order than Aaron. (d.) That his priesthood superseded all others. (e.)
That He performed all the functions of the office, — mediation, sacrifice, and
intercession.
5. The effects or benefits secured by the work of Christ are those which flow from the exercise of the priestly office in our behalf . Those benefits are, (a.) Expiation of our guilt; (b.) The propitiation of God; and (c.) Our consequent reconciliation with Him, whence flow all the subjective blessings of spiritual and eternal life. These are benefits which are not secured by teaching, by moral influence, by example, or by any inward change wrought in us. Christ, therefore, is truly a priest in the full Scriptural sense of the term.
§ 2. Christ our only Priest.
This follows from the nature and design of the office. (1.) No man, save the Lord Jesus Christ, has liberty of access unto God. All other men, being sinners, need some one to approach God on their behalf. (2.) No other sacrifice than his could take away sin. (3.) It is only through Him that God is propitious to sinful men; and (4.) It is only through Him that the benefits which flow from the favour of God are conveyed to his people.
The priests of the Old Testament were, as before remarked, only symbols and types of the true priesthood of Christ. Their sacrifices could not purify the conscience from the sense of sin. They availed only to the purifying of the flesh. They secured reconciliation with God only so far as they were regarded as representing the real sacrifice of Christ as the object of faith and ground of confidence. Hence, as the Apostle teaches, they were offered continually, because, being ineffectual in themselves, the people needed to be constantly reminded of their guilt and of their need of the more effectual sacrifice predicted in their Scriptures.
If the Old Testament priests were not really priests, except
typically, much less are ministers of the gospel. When among Protestants any class
of ministers are called priests, the word is the substitute for presbyter, for which
it is constantly interchanged. It stands for πρεσβύτερος
and not for ἱερεύς. (It is defined, Greek,
πρεσβύτερος, elder; Latin, presbyter; Spanish,
presbitero; French, prêtre; Anglo Saxon, preost; Dutch and German, priester; Danish,
præst.) Among Romanists it is not so. With them the minister is really a priest.
(1.) Because he mediates between God and the people. (2.) Because he assumes to
offer propitiatory sacrifices. (3.) Because in absolution he effectually and authoritatively
intercedes, rendering the sacrifice for sin effectual in its
1. That the word priest, ἱερεύς, is never once applied to them in the New Testament. Every appropriate title of honour is lavished upon them. They are called the bishops of souls, pastors, teach. ers, rulers, governors, the servants or ministers of God; stewards of the divine mysteries; watchmen, heralds, but never priests. As the sacred writers were Jews, to whom nothing was more familiar than the word priest, whose ministers of religion were constantly so denominated, the fact that they never once use the word, or any of its cognates, in reference to the ministers of the gospel, whether apostles, presbyters, or evangelists, is little less than miraculous. It is one of those cases in which the silence of Scripture speaks volumes.
2. No priestly function is ever attributed to Christian ministers. They do not mediate between God and man. They are never said to offer sacrifices for sins; and they have no power as intercessors which does not belong to every believer.
3. All believers are priests in the only sense in which men are priests under the gospel. That is, all have liberty of access to God through Christ. He has made all his people kings and priests into God.
4. This Romish doctrine is derogatory to the honour of Christ. He came to be the mediator between God and man; to make satisfaction for our sins, to secure for us pardon and reconciliation with God. To suppose that we still need the priestly intervention of men, is to assume that his work is a failure.
5. The sacred writers expressly teach what this doctrine denies. They teach that men have everywhere free access to Christ, and through Him unto God; that faith in Him secures an interest in all the benefits of his redemption, and that, therefore, a thief on the cross, a prisoner in a dungeon, a solitary believer in his own chamber is near to God, and secure of his acceptance, provided he calls on the name of the Lord. To deny this, to teach the necessity of the intervention or ministration of men, to secure for us the salvation of our souls, is to contradict the plainest teachings of the Word of God.
6. This doctrine contradicts the intimate convictions of the people of God in all ages. They know that they have through Christ, and by the Spirit free access unto God. They are thus taught by the Holy Ghost. They avail themselves of this liberty in spite of all men can do. They know that the doctrine which subjects them to the priesthood as the only authorized dispensers of grace and salvation, is not of God; and that it brings the souls of men into the most slavish bondage.
7. All the principles on which the doctrine of the priesthood of the Christian clergy rests are false. It is false that the ministry are a distinct class from the people, distinguished from them by supernatural gifts, conveyed by the sacrament of orders. It is false that the bread and wine are transmuted into the body and blood of Christ. It is false that the Eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice applied for the remission of sins and spiritual benefits, according to the intention of the officiating priest. Christ, therefore, as He is the only mediator between God and man, is the only and all-sufficient High Priest of our profession.
§ 3. Definition of Terms.
Christ, it is said, executeth the office of a priest, in his once offering up of Himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and reconcile us to God, and in making continual intercession for us. Expiation, propitiation, reconciliation, and intercession are the several aspects under which the work of Christ as a priest, is presented in the Word of God.
Before attempting to state what the Scriptures teach in reference to these points, it will be well to define the terms which are of constant occurrence in theological discussions of this subject.
The Word Atonement.
The word atonement is often used, especially in this country,
to designate the priestly work of Christ. This word does not occur in the English
version of the New Testament except in
1. Its ambiguity. To atone is properly to be, or cause to be, at one. It is so
used in common language as well as in theology. In this sense to atone is to reconcile;
and atonement is reconciliation. It, therefore, expresses the effect, and not the
nature of Christ s work. But it is also, in the second place, used to express that
by which the reconciliation is effected. It then means satisfaction, or compensation.
It answers in our version to the Hebrew word כִּפֵּר; which in relation to the offence or guilt,
means to expiate. Thus in
2. Another objection to its general use is that it is not sufficiently comprehensive. As commonly used it includes only the sacrificial work of Christ, and not his vicarious obedience to the divine law. The atonement of Christ is said to consist of his sufferings and death. But his saving work includes far more than his expiatory sufferings.
3. A third objection is that this use of the word atonement
is a departure from the established usage of the Churches of the
Satisfaction.
The word satisfaction is the one which for ages has been generally
used to designate the special work of Christ in the salvation of men. With the Latin
theologians the word is “satisfactio,” with the German writers, “Genugthun,”
its exact etymological equivalent, “the doing enough.” By the satisfaction of Christ
is meant all He has done to satisfy the demands of the law and justice of God, in
the place and in behalf of sinners. This word has the advantage of being precise,
comprehensive, and generally accepted, and should therefore be adhered to. There
are, however, two kinds of satisfaction, which as they differ essentially in their
nature and effects, should not be confounded. The one is pecuniary or commercial;
the other penal or forensic. When a debtor pays the demand of his creditor in full,
he satisfies his claims, and is entirely free from any further demands. In this
case the thing paid is the precise sum due, neither more nor less. It is a simple
matter of commutative justice; a quid pro quo; so much for so much. There
can be no condescension, mercy, or grace on the part of a creditor receiving the
payment of a debt. It matters not to him by whom the debt is paid, whether by the
debtor himself, or by someone in his stead; because the claim of the creditor is
simply upon the amount due and not upon the person of the debtor. In the case of
crimes the matter is different. The demand is then upon the offender. He himself
is amenable to justice. Substitution in human courts is out of the question. The
essential point in matters of crime, is not the nature of the penalty, but who shall
suffer. The soul that sins, it shall die. And the penalty need not be, and very
rarely is, of the nature of the injury inflicted. All that is required is that it
should be a just equivalent. For an assault, it may be a fine; for theft, imprisonment;
for treason, banishment, or death. In case a substitute is provided to bear the
penalty in the place of the criminal, it would be to the offender a matter of pure
grace, enhanced in proportion to the dignity of the substitute, and the greatness
of the evil from which the criminal is delivered. Another important difference between
pecuniary and penal satisfaction, is that the one ipso facto liberates. The
moment the debt is paid the debtor is free, and that completely. No delay can be
admitted, and no conditions can be attached to his deliverance. But in the case
of a criminal, as he has no claim to have
As the satisfaction of Christ was not pecuniary, but penal or forensic; a satisfaction for sinners, and not for those who owed a certain amount of money, it follows, —
1. That it does not consist in an exact quid pro quo, so much for so much. This, as just remarked, is not the case even among men. The penalty for theft is not the restitution of the thing stolen, or its exact pecuniary value. It is generally something of an entirely different nature. It may be stripes or imprisonment. The punishment for an assault is not the infliction of the same degree of injury on the person of the offender. So of slander, breach of trust, treason, and all other criminal offences. The punishment, for the offence is something different from the evil which the offender himself inflicted. All that justice demands in penal satisfaction is that it should be a real satisfaction, and not merely something graciously accepted as such. It must bear an adequate proportion to the crime committed. It may be different in kind, but it must have inherent value. To fine a man a few pence for wanton homicide would be a mockery; but death or imprisonment for life would be a real satisfaction to justice. All, therefore, that the Church teaches when it says that Christ satisfied divine justice for the sins of men, is that what He did and suffered was a real adequate compensation for the penalty remitted and the benefits conferred. His sufferings and death were adequate to accomplish all the ends designed by the punishment of the sins of men. He satisfied justice. He rendered it consistent with the justice of God that the sinner should be justified. But He did not suffer either in kind or degree what sinners would have suffered. In value, his sufferings infinitely transcended theirs. The death of an eminently good man would outweigh the annihilation of a universe of insects. So the humiliation, sufferings, and death of the eternal Son of God immeasurably transcended in worth and power the penalty which a world of sinners would have endured.
2. The satisfaction of Christ was a matter of grace. The Father
was not bound to provide a substitute for fallen men, nor was the Son bound to assume
that office. It was an act of pure grace that
3. Nevertheless, it is a matter of justice that the blessings which Christ intended to secure for his people should be actually bestowed upon them. This follows, for two reasons: first, they were promised to Him as the reward of his obedience and sufferings. God covenanted with Christ that if He fulfilled the conditions imposed, if He made satisfaction for the sins of his people, they should be saved. It follows, secondly, from the nature of a satisfaction. If the claims of justice are satisfied they cannot be again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfaction rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both cases the persons for whom the satisfaction is made are certainly freed. Their exemption or deliverance is in both cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice. This is what the Scriptures teach when they say that Christ gave Himself for a ransom. When a ransom is paid and accepted, the deliverance of the captive is a matter of justice. It does not, however, thereby cease to be to the captives a matter of grace. They owe a debt of gratitude to him who paid the ransom, and that debt is the greater when the ransom is the life of their deliverer. So in the case of the satisfaction of Christ. Justice demands the salvation of his people. That is his reward. It is He who has acquired this claim on the. justice of God; his people have no such claim except through Him. Besides, it is of the nature of a satisfaction that it answers all the ends of punishment. What reason can there be for the infliction of the penalty for which satisfaction has been rendered?
4. The satisfaction of Christ being a matter of covenant between
the Father and the Son, the distribution of its benefits is determined by the terms
of that covenant. It does not ipso facto liberate. The people of God are
not justified from eternity. They do not come into the world in a justified state
They remain (if adults) in a state of condemnation until they believe. And even
the benefits of redemption are granted gradually. The believer receives more and
more of them in this life, but the full plenitude of blessings
Penalty.
The words penal and penalty are frequently misunderstood.
By the penalty of a law is often understood a specific kind or degree of suffering.
The penalty of the divine law is said to be eternal death. Therefore if Christ suffered
the penalty of the law He must have suffered death eternal; or, as others say, He
must have endured the same kind of sufferings as those who are cast off from God
and die eternally are called upon to suffer. This difficulty is sometimes met by
the older theologians by saying, with Burman,
Another answer equally common is that Christ suffered what
the law denounced on sinners, so far as the essence of the penalty is concerned,
but not as to its accidents. These accidents greatly modify all punishments. To
a man of culture and refinement, who has near relations of the same class, imprisonment
for crime is an unspeakably more severe infliction than it is to a hardened and
degraded offender. The essence of the penalty of the divine law is the manifestation
of God’s displeasure, the withdrawal of the divine favour. This Christ suffered
in our stead. He bore the wrath of God. In the case of sinful creatures, this induces
final and hopeless perdition, because they have no life in themselves. In the case
of Christ, it was a transient hiding of his Father’s face. With sinners, thus being
cast off from God is necessarily attended
A third and more satisfactory answer to the objection in question is that the words penal and penalty do not designate any particular kind or degree of suffering, but any kind or any degree which is judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice. The word death, as used in Scripture to designate the wages or reward of sin, includes all kinds and degrees of suffering inflicted as its punishment. By the words penal and penalty, therefore, we express nothing concerning the nature of the sufferings endured, but only the design of their infliction. Suffering without any reference to the reason of its occurrence is calamity; if inflicted for the benefit of the sufferer, it is chastisement; if for the satisfaction of justice, it is punishment. The very same kind and amount of suffering may in one case be a calamity; in another a chastisement; in another a punishment. If a man is killed by accident, it is a calamity. If he is put to death on account of crime and in execution of a judicial sentence, it is punishment. A man may be imprisoned to protect him from unjust violence. His incarceration is then an act of kindness. But if he be imprisoned in execution of a judicial sentence, then it is punishment. In both cases the evil suffered may be precisely the same. Luther was imprisoned for years to save him from the fury of the Pope. When, therefore, we say that Christ’s sufferings were penal, or that He suffered the penalty of the law, we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of the pains which He endured. We only say, on the one hand, that his sufferings were neither mere calamities, nor chastisements designed for his own benefit, nor merely dogmatic, or symbolical, or exemplary, or the necessary attendants of the conflict between good and evil; and, on the other hand, we affirm that they were designed for the satisfaction of justice. He died in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly.
It is not to be inferred from this, however, that either the
kind
Vicarious.
By vicarious suffering or punishment is not meant merely sufferings
endured for the benefit of others. The sufferings of martyrs, patriots, and philanthropists,
although endured for the good of the Church, the country, or of mankind, are not
vicarious. That word, according to its signification and usage, includes the idea
of substitution. Vicarious suffering is suffering endured by one person in the stead
of another, i.e., in his place. It necessarily supposes the exemption of the party
in whose place the suffering is endured. A vicar is a substitute, one who takes
the place of another, and acts in his stead. In this sense, the Pope assumes to
be the vicar of Christ on earth. He claims and assumes to exercise Christ’s prerogatives.
What a substitute does for the person whose place he fills, is vicarious, and absolves
that person from the necessity of doing or suffering the same thing.
Guilt.
The word guilt, as has been repeatedly remarked, expresses
the relation which sin bears to justice, or, as the older theologians said, to the
penalty of the law. This relation, however, is twofold. First, that which is expressed
by the words criminality and ill-desert, or demerit. This is inseparable from sin.
It can belong to no one who is not personally a sinner, and it permanently attaches
to all who have sinned. It is not removed by justification, much less by pardon.
It cannot be transferred from one person to the other. But secondly, guilt means
the obligation to satisfy justice. This may be removed by the satisfaction of justice
personally or vicariously. It may be transferred from one person to another, or
assumed by one person for another. When a man steals or commits any other offence
to which a specific penalty is attached by the law of the land, if he submit to
the penalty, his guilt in this latter sense is removed. It is not only proper that
he should remain without further molestation by the state for that offence, but
justice demands his exemption from any further punishment. It is in this sense
that it is said that the guilt of Adam’s sin is imputed to us; that Christ assumed
the guilt of our sins; and that his blood cleanses from guilt. This is very different
from demerit or personal ill-desert. The ordinary theological sense of the word
guilt is well expressed by the German word Schuld, which means the responsibility
for some wrong, or injury, or loss; or, the obligation to make satisfaction. It,
therefore, includes the meaning of our words guilt and debt. “Ich bin nicht schuldig,”
means I am not answerable. I am not bound to make satisfaction. “Des
Redemption.
Redemption sometimes means simple deliverance; but properly, and always in its application to the work of Christ, it means deliverance by purchase. This is plain because it is a deliverance not by authority, or power, or teaching, or moral influence, but by blood, by the payment of a ransom. This is the etymological signification of the word ἀπολύτρωσις, which is from λύτρον, a ransom and that from λύω, to purchase, e.g., the freedom of a slave or captive.
Expiation and Propitiation.
Expiation and propitiation are correlative terms. The sinner,
or his guilt is expiated; God, or justice, is propitiated. Guilt must, from the
nature of God, be visited with punishment, which is the expression of God’s disapprobation
of sin. Guilt is expiated, in the Scriptural representation, covered, by satisfaction,
i.e., by vicarious punishment. God is thereby rendered propitious, i.e., it is
now consistent with his nature to pardon and bless the sinner. Propitious and loving
are not convertible terms. God is love. He loved us while sinners, and before satisfaction
was rendered. Satisfaction or expiation does not awaken love in the divine mind.
It only renders it consistent with his justice that God should exercise his love
towards transgressors of his law. This is expressed by the Greek verb
ἱλάσκομαι, propitium facio. “To reconcile oneself
to any one by expiation.”
§ 1. Statement of the Doctrine.
The Symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches agree entire1y
in their statement of this doctrine. In the “Augsburg Confession”
The Reformed Confessions are of like import. The Second Helvetic
Confession
In the “Formula Consensus Helvetica”
The “Westminster Confession”
This, however, is not a doctrine peculiar to the Lutheran
and Reformed churches; it is part of the faith of the Church universal. The Council
of Trent says,
§ 2. The Intrinsic Worth of Christ’s Satisfaction.
The first point is that Christ’s work was of the nature of
a satisfaction, because it met and answered all the demands of God’s law and justice
against the sinner. The law no longer condemns the sinner who believes in Christ.
Those, however, whom the infinitely holy and strict law of God does not condemn
are entitled to the divine fellowship and favour. To them there can be no condemnation.
The work of Christ was not, therefore, a mere substitute for the execution of the
law, which God in his sovereign mercy saw fit to accept in lieu of what the sinner
was bound to render. It had an inherent worth which rendered it a perfect satisfaction,
so that justice has no further demands. It is here as in the case of state criminals.
If such an offender suffers the penalty which the law prescribes as the punishment
of his offence he is no longer liable to condemnation. No further punishment can
justly be demanded for that offence. This is what is called the perfection of Christ’s
satisfaction. It perfectly, from its own intrinsic worth, satisfies the demands
of justice. This is the point meant
This perfection of the satisfaction of Christ, as already
remarked, is not due to his having suffered either in kind or in degree what the
sinner would have been required to endure; but principally to the infinite dignity
of his person. He was not a mere man, but God and man in one person. His obedience
and sufferings were therefore the obedience and sufferings of a divine person. This
does not imply, as the Patripassians in the ancient Church assumed, and as some
writers in modem times assume, that the divine nature itself suffered. This idea
is repudiated alike by the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. In the “Second
Helvetic Confession”
It follows from the perfection of Christ’s satisfaction that it supersedes and renders impossible all other satisfactions for sin. The sufferings which justified believers are called upon to endure are not punishments, because not designed for the satisfaction of justice. They are chastisements intended for the benefit of the sufferer, the edification of the Church, and the glory of God. In this view all Protestant churches concur.
Romish Doctrine of Satisfaction.
Romanists, while on the one hand they exalt to the utmost
the intrinsic value of Christ’s satisfaction, yet on the other hand they restrict
its application. At one time, it was the prevalent doctrine in the Latin Church
that the work of Christ availed only for the pardon of sins committed before baptism.
With regard to post-baptismal sins, it was held either that they were unpardonable,
or that atonement must be made for them by the sinner himself. This idea that the
satisfaction of Christ avails only to the forgiveness of sins committed before conversion
has been adopted by many Rationalists, as for example by Bretschneider.
The Romish doctrine of satisfactions arose out of a perversion
of
§ 3. Doctrine of the Scotists and Remonstrants.
While Protestants and the Church generally have held the doctrine
that the satisfaction of Christ, because of the dignity of his person and the nature
and degree of his sufferings was and is infinitely meritorious, absolutely perfect
from its intrinsic worth, and completely efficacious in its application to all the
sins of the believer, the Scotists in the Middle Ages, and after them Grotius and
the Remonstrants, denied that the work of Christ had inherent
It is obvious that the objections presented in the above extracts arise from confounding pecuniary with judicial or legal satisfaction. There is an analogy between them, and, therefore, on the ground of that analogy it is right to say that Christ assumed and paid our debts. The analogy consists, first, in the effect produced, namely, the certain deliverance of those for whom the satisfaction is made; secondly, that a real equivalent is paid; and, thirdly, that in both cases justice requires that the liberation of the obligee should take place. But, as we have already seen, the two kinds of satisfaction differ, first, in that in penal satisfaction the demand is not for any specific degree or kind of suffering; secondly, that while the value of pecuniary satisfaction is independent entirely of the person by whom the payment is made, in the other case everything depends on the dignity of him by whom the satisfaction is rendered; and, thirdly, that the benefits of a penal satisfaction are conferred according to the terms or conditions of the covenant in pursuance of which it is offered and accepted.
The principle that a thing avails for whatever God chooses to take it, which is the foundation of the doctrine that Christ’s work was not a satisfaction in virtue of its intrinsic worth but only by the gracious acceptance of God, cannot be true. For, —
1. It amounts to saying that there is no truth in anything. God may (if such language may be pardoned) take anything for anything; a whole for a part, or a part for the whole; truth for error, or error for truth; right for wrong, or wrong for right; the blood of a goat for the blood of the Eternal Son of God. This is impossible. The nature of God is immutable, — immutable reason, truth, and goodness; and his nature determines his will and his judgments. Therefore it is impossible that He should take that to be satisfaction which is not really such.
2. The principle in question involves the denial of the necessity of the work of Christ. It is inconceivable that God should send his only begotten Son into the world to suffer and die if the same end could have been accomplished in any other way. If every man could atone for his own sins, or one man for the sins of the whole world, then Christ is dead in vain.
3. If this doctrine be true then it is not true that it is
impossible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins. If every
creatum oblatum tantum valet, pro quanto Deus acceptat,
4. The Scriptures teach the necessity of the death of Christ,
not only by implication, but also by direct assertion. In
5. What the Scriptures teach of the justice of God leads to
the same conclusion. Justice is a form of moral excellence. It belongs to the nature
of God. It demands the punishment of sin. If sin be pardoned it can be pardoned
in consistency with the divine justice only on the ground of a forensic penal satisfaction.
Therefore the Apostle says (
6. The Scriptures, in representing the gift of Christ as the highest conceivable exhibition of the divine love, do thereby teach, first, that the end to be accomplished was worthy of the sacrifice; and, secondly, that the sacrifice was necessary to the attainment of the end. If the end could have been otherwise attained there would have been no exhibition of love in the gift of Christ for its accomplishment.
7. All that the Bible teaches of the truth of God; of the immutability of the law; of the necessity of faith; of the uselessness and worthlessness of all other sacrifices for sin; and of the impossibility of salvation except through the work of the incarnate Son of God, precludes the idea that his satisfaction was not necessary to our salvation, or that any other means could have accomplished the object. And if thus absolutely necessary, it must be that nothing else has worth enough to satisfy the demands of God’s law. It is the language and spirit of the whole Bible, and of every believing heart in relation to Christ that his “blood alone has power sufficient to atone.”
§ 4. Satisfaction rendered to Justice.
The second point involved in the Scriptural doctrine concerning
he satisfaction of Christ is, that it was a satisfaction to the justice of God.
This is asserted in all the Confessions above cited. And by justice is not meant
simply general rectitude or rightness of character and action; nor simply rectoral
justice, which consists in a due regard to the rights and interests of subjects
in relation to rulers; much less does it mean commutative justice or honesty. It
is admitted that the Hebrew word צַדִּיק, the Greek
δίκαιος, the Latin justus, the English just or
righteous, and their cognates, are used in all these senses both in Scripture and
in ordinary life. But they are also used to express the idea of distributive or
retributive justice; that form of moral excellence which demands the righteous distribution
of rewards and punishments which renders it certain, under the government of God,
that obedience will be rewarded and sin punished. This is also properly called,
especially in its relation to sin, vindicatory justice, because it vindicates and
maintains the right. Vindicatory and vindictive, in the ordinary sense of this latter
term, are not synonymous. It is a common mistake or misrepresentation to confound
these two words, and to represent those who ascribe to God the attribute of vindicatory
justice as regarding Him as a vindictive being, thirsting for revenge. There is
as much difference between the words and the ideas they express as there is between
a righteous judge and a malicious murderer. The question then is, Does the attribute
of vindicatory justice belong to God? Does his infinite moral excellence require
that sin should be punished on account of its own inherent demerit, irrespective
of the good effects which may flow from such punishment? Or is justice what Leibnitz
defines it to be, “Benevolence guided by wisdom.” It is admitted that the work of
Christ was in some
1. We ascribe intelligence, knowledge, power, holiness, goodness, and truth to God, (a.) Because these are perfections which belong to our own nature, and must of necessity belong to Him in whose image we were created. (b.) Because these attributes are all manifested in his works. (c.) Because they are all revealed in his Word. On the same grounds we ascribe to God justice; that. is, the moral excellence which determines Him to punish sin and reward righteousness. The argument in this case is not only of the same kind, but of the same cogency. We are just as conscious of a sense of justice as we are of intelligence or of power. This consciousness belongs to man as man, to all men in all ages and under all circumstances. It must, therefore, belong to the original constitution of their nature. Consequently it is as certain that God is just, in the ordinary sense of that word, as that He is intelligent or holy.
2. The Spirit of God in convincing a man of sin convinces him of guilt as well as of pollution. That is, He convinces him of his desert of punishment. But a sense of a desert of punishment is a conviction that we ought to be punished; and this is of necessity attended with the persuasion that, under the righteous government of God, the punishment of sin is inevitable and necessary. They who sin, the Apostle says, know the righteous judgment of God, that they are worthy of death.
3. The justice of God is revealed in his works, (a.) In the
constitution
4. The Scriptures so constantly and so variously teach that
God is just, that it is impossible to present adequately their testimony on the
subject. (a.) We have the direct assertions of Scripture. Almost the first words
which God spoke to Adam were, “In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely
die.” The angels who sinned are reserved in chains unto the judgment of the great
lay. Death is declared to be the wages, i.e., the proper recompense of sin, which
justice demands that it should receive. God is declared to be a consuming fire.
Men can no more secure themselves from the punishment of their sins, by their own
devices, than they can save themselves from a raging conflagration by a covering
of chaff. The penalty of the law is as much a revelation of the nature of God as
its precept is. As He cannot, consistently with his perfections, exonerate men from
the obligation of obedience, so He cannot allow them to sin with impunity. It is,
therefore, declared that He will reward every man according to his works. (b.) All
the divinely ordained institutions of religion, whether Patriarchal, Mosaic, or
Christian, were founded on the assumption of the justice of God, and were designed
to impress that great truth in the minds of men. They take for granted that men
are sinners; and that, being sinners, they need expiation for their guilt as well
as moral purification, in order to salvation. Sacrifices, therefore, were instituted
from the beginning to teach the necessity of expiation and to serve as prophetic
types of the only effectual expiation which, in the fulness of time, was to be offered
for the sins of men.
§ 5. The Work of Christ Satisfies the Demands of the Law.
A third point involved in the Church doctrine on the work of Christ, is that it is a satisfaction to the divine law. This indeed may seem to be included under the foregoing head. If a satisfaction to justice, it must be a satisfaction to law. But in the ordinary use of the terms, the word law is more comprehensive than justice. To satisfy justice is to satisfy the demand which justice makes for the punishment of sin. But the law demands far more than the punishment of sin, and therefore satisfaction to the law includes more than the satisfaction of vindicatory justice. In its relation to the law of God the Scriptural doctrine concerning the work of Christ includes the following points: —
1. The law of God is immutable. It can neither be abrogated nor dispensed with. This is true both as respects its precepts and penalty. Such is the nature of God as holy, that He cannot cease to require his rational creatures to be holy. It can never cease to be obligatory on them to love and obey God. And such is the nature of God as just, that He cannot cease to condemn sin, and therefore all those who are guilty of sin.
2. Our relation to the law is two-fold, federal and moral. It is of the nature of a covenant prescribing the conditions of life. It says, “Ye shall keep my statutes and my judgments; which if a man do, he shall live in them.” And, “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.”
3. From this federal relation to the law we are, under the gospel, delivered. We are no longer bound to be free from all sin, and to render perfect obedience to the law, as the condition of salvation. If this were not the case, no flesh living could be saved. We are not under law but under grace.
4. This deliverance from the law is not effected by its abrogation, or by lowering its demands, but by the work of Christ. He was made under the law that He might redeem those who were under the law.
5. The work of Christ was therefore of the nature of a satisfaction to the demands of the law. By his obedience and sufferings, by his whole righteousness, active and passive, He, as our representative and substitute, did and endured all that the law demands.
6. Those, who by faith receive this righteousness, and trust upon it for justification, are saved; and receive the renewing of their whole nature into the image of God. Those who refuse to submit to this righteousness of God, and go about to establish their own righteousness, are left under the demands of the law; they are required to be free from all sin, or having sinned, to bear the penalty.
Proof of the Immutability of the Law.
The principles above stated are not arbitrarily assumed; they are not deductions from any à priori maxims or axioms; they are not the constituent elements of a humanly constructed theory; they are not even the mere obiter dicta of inspired men; they are the principles which the sacred writers not only announce as true, but on which they argue, and which they employ in the construction of that system of doctrine which they present as the object of faith and ground of hope to fallen men. The only legitimate way therefore of combating these principles, is to prove, not that they fail to satisfy the reason, the feelings, or the imagination, or that they are incumbered with this or that difficulty; but that they are not Scriptural. If the sacred writers do announce and embrace them, then they are true, or we have no solid ground on which to rest our hopes for eternity.
The Scriptural character of these principles being the only
question of real importance, appeal must be made at once to the Word of God. Throughout
the Scriptures, the immutability of the divine law; the necessity of its demands
being satisfied; the impossibility of sinners making that satisfaction for themselves;
the possibility of its being rendered by substitution; and that a wonderfully constituted
person, could and would, and in fact has, accomplished this work in our behalf,
are the great constituent principles of the religion of the Bible. As the revelation
contained in the Scriptures has been made in a progressive form, we find all these
principles culminating in their full development in the later writings of the New
Testament. In St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans, for example, the following positions
are assumed and established (1.) The law must be fulfilled. (2.) It demands perfect
obedience; and, in case of transgression, the penalty of death. (3.) No fallen man
can fulfil those conditions, or satisfy the demands of the
§ 6. Proof of the Doctrine.
The Scriptural evidence in support of this great doctrine, as far as it can well be presented within reasonable limits, has already, in great measure, been exhibited, in the statement and vindication of the several elements which it includes.
It has been shown, (1.) That the work of Christ for our salvation,
was a real satisfaction of infinite inherent dignity and worth. (2.) That it was
a satisfaction not to commutative justice (as paying a sum of money would be), nor
to the rectoral justice or benevolence of God, but to his distributive and vindicatory
justice which renders necessary the punishment of sin; and (3.) That it was a satisfaction
to the law of God, meeting its demands of a perfect righteousness for the justification
of sinners. If these points be admitted, the Church doctrine concerning the satisfaction,
or
Christ saves us as our Priest.
Christ is said to save men as a priest. It is not by the mere exercise of power, nor by instruction and mental illumination; nor by any objective, persuasive, moral influence; nor by any subjective operation, whether natural or supernatural, whether intelligible or mystical, but by acting for them the part of a representative, substitute, propitiator, and intercessor. It was in the Old Testament foretold that the Messiah was to be both priest and king, that he was to be a priest after the order of Melchisedec. In the New Testament, and especially in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is devoted almost exclusively to the exhibition of the priestly character and work of Christ, it is taught, —
1. That a priest is a substitute or representative, appointed to do for sinners what they could not do for themselves. Their guilt and pollution forbid their access to God. Someone, therefore, must be authorized to appear before God in their behalf, and effect reconciliation of God to sinners.
2. That this reconciliation can only be effected by means of an expiation for sin. The guilt of sin can be removed in no other way. Without the shedding of blood, there is no remission. A priest, therefore, is one appointed for men (i.e., to act in their behalf), to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sin.
3. That this expiation was effected by the substitution of
a victim in the place of the sinner, to die in his stead, i.e., in Scriptural language,
“to bear his sins.” “Guilt,” says Ebrard, in a passage already quoted, “can be removed
only by being actually punished, i.e. expiated. Either the sinner himself must
bear the punishment, or a substitute must be found, which can assume the guilt,
bear the penalty, and give the freedom from guilt or righteousness thus secured,
to the offender.”
4. Such being the nature of the priesthood and the way in
which a priest saves those for whom he acts, the Apostle shows, first, with regard
to the priests under the old economy, that such was the method, ordained by God,
by which the remission of ceremonial sins and restoration to the privileges of the
theocracy, were to be
5. The Aaronic priesthood and sacrifices were, therefore, temporary, being the mere types and shadows of the true priest and the real sacrifice, promised from the beginning.
6. Christ, the Eternal Son of God, assumed our nature in order that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. That is, to make expiation for sin. The word used is ἱλάσκομαι, propitium reddere; which in the Septuagint, is the substitute for כִּפֵּר (to cover guilt), to hide sin from the sight of God. In the New Testament, as in the Septuagint, ἱλάσκομαι is the special term for sacerdotal expiation, and is not to be confounded with ἀποκαταλλάττεσθαι, to reconcile. The latter is the effect of the former; reconciliation is secured by expiation.
7. Christ is proved, especially in
8. The sacrifice which this great high priest offered in our behalf, was not the blood of irrational animals, but his own most precious blood.
9. This one sacrifice has perfected forever (τετελείωκεν,
made a perfect expiation for) them that are sanctified. (
10. This sacrifice has superseded all others. No other is needed; and no other is possible.
11. Those who reject this method of salvation certainly perish.
To them there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins. (
It can hardly be questioned that this is a correct, although
feeble statement of the leading ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews. With this agree
all other representations of the Scriptures both in the Old Testament and in the
New, and therefore if we adhere to the doctrine of the Bible we must believe that
Christ saves us, not by
Christ saves us as a Sacrifice.
Intimately connected with the argument from the priestly office
of Christ, and inseparable from it, is that which is derived from those numerous
passages in which He is set forth as a sacrifice for sin. Much as the nature of
the Old Testament sacrifices has of late years. been discussed, and numerous as
are the theories which have been advanced upon this subject, there are some points
with regard to which all who profess faith in the Scriptures, are agreed. In the
first place, it is agreed that Christ was in some sense a sacrifice for the sins
of men; secondly, that the sense in which He was a sacrifice is the same as that
in which the sin offerings of the Old Testament were sacrifices; and, thirdly, that
the true Scriptural idea of sacrifices for sin is a historical question and not
a matter of speculation. According to Michaelis, they were mere fines;
Proof of the Common Doctrine concerning Sacrifices for Sin.
That this is the true doctrine concerning sacrifices for sin may be argued, —
1. From the general sentiment of the ancient world. These
offerings arose from a sense of guilt and apprehension of the wrath of God. Under
the pressure of the sense of sin, and when the displeasure of God was experienced
or apprehended, men everywhere resorted to every means in their power to make expiation
for their offences, and to propitiate the favour of God. Of these means the most
natural, as it appears from its being universally adopted, was the offering of propitiatory
sacrifices. The more numerous and costly these offerings the greater hope was cherished
of their efficacy. Men did not spare even the fruit of their bodies for the sin
of their
2. The second argument is that it is beyond doubt that the
Hebrews, to whom the Mosaic institutions were given, understood their sacrifices
for sin to be expiatory offerings and not mere forms of worship or expressions of
their devotion of themselves to God; or as simply didactic, designed to make a moral
impression on the offender and on the spectators. They were explained as expiations,
in which the victim bore the guilt of the sinner, and died in his stead and for
his deliverance. That such was the doctrine of the Hebrews is proved by such authors
as Outram, in his work “De Sacrificiis;” by Schoettgen, “Horæ Hebrææ et Talmudicæ;”
Eisenmenger, “Endecktes Judenthum,” and other writers on the subject. Outram quotes
from the Jewish authorities forms of confession connected with the imposition of
hands on the victim. One is to the following effect:
3. It is no less certain that the whole Christian world has
ever regarded the sacrifices for sin to be expiatory, designed to teach the necessity
of expiation and to foreshadow the method by which it was to be accomplished. Such,
as has been shown, is the faith of the Latin, of the Lutheran, and of the Reformed
churches, all the great historical bodies which make up the sum of professing
4. But these arguments from general conviction and assent, although perfectly valid in such cases as the present, are not those on which the faith of Christians rests. They find the doctrine of expiatory sacrifices clearly taught in Scripture; they see that the sin offerings under the Old Testament were expiations.
The Old Testament Sacrifices Expiatory.
This is plain from the clear meaning of the language used
in reference to them. They are called sin offerings; trespass offerings, i.e.,
offerings made by sinners on account of sin. They are said to bear the sins of the
offender; to make expiation for sin, i.e., to cover it from the sight of God’s
justice; they are declared to be intended to secure forgiveness, not through repentance
or reformation, these are presupposed before the offering is brought, but by shedding
of blood, by giving soul for soul, life for life. The reason assigned in
The argument, therefore, is that the Scriptures expressly
declare that these sacrifices were made for the expiation of sin. This idea is expressed
by the word כִּפֵּר, to cover,
to hide from view, to blot out, to expiate. Hence the substantive
כֹּפֶר means that which delivers
from punishment or evi. It is the common word for an atonement, but it also is used
for a ransom, because it is rendered to secure deliverance. Thus the half shekel
required to be paid by every male Israelite as a ransom for his soul was called
a כֹּפֶר
(in Greek, λύτρον, or λύτρα).
See
The ceremonies attending the offering of sacrifices for sin
show that they were understood to be expiatory. (1) The victims were selected
from the class of clean animals appropriated for the support of the life of man.
They were to be free from all blemish. This physical perfection was typical of the
freedom from all sin of Him who was to be the substitute for sinners. (2.) The offender
was required himself to bring the victim to the altar. The service involved an acknowledgment
on the part of the offerer of his just exposure to punishment for his sin. (3.)
The hands of the offender were to be laid on the head of the victim, to express
the ideas of substitution and of transfer of guilt. The sin of the offerer was laid
upon the head of the victim. (4.) The blood of the victim, slain by the priest,
was received by him as the minister of God, sprinkled on the altar, or, on the great
day of atonement, carried into the Most Holy place where the symbol of God’s presence
was, and sprinkled on the top of the ark of the covenant; showing that the service
terminated on God; that it was designed to appease his wrath (according to Scriptural
phraseology), to satisfy his justice, and to open the way for the free forgiveness
of sin. The significance
The imposition of the hands of the offender upon the head
of the victim was essential to this service. The general import of the imposition
of hands was that of communication. Hence this ceremony was practiced on various
occasions: (1.) In appointing to office, to signify the transfer of authority. (2.)
In imparting any spiritual gift or blessing. (3.) In substituting one for another,
and transferring the responsibility of one to another. This was the import of the
imposition of hands upon the head of the victim. It was substituted in the place
of the offerer, and the guilt of the one was symbolically transferred from the one
to the other. Hence the victim was said to bear the sins of the people; their sins
were said to be laid upon it. In the solemn services of the great day of atonement,
the import of this rite is rendered especially clear It was commanded that two goats
should be selected, one for a sin-offering and the other for a scape-goat. The two
constituted one sacrifice, as it was impossible that one could signify all that
was intended to be taught. Of the scape-goat it is said, “Aaron shall lay both his
hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of
the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting
them upon the head of the goat, . . . . and the goat shall bear upon him all their
iniquities unto a land not inhabited.” This renders it plain that the design of
the imposition of hands was to signify the transfer of the guilt of the offender
to the victim. The nature of these offerings is still further evident from the fact
that the victim was said “to bear the sin” of the offender. For example, in
The passages in which Christ is represented as a sacrifice
for sin, are too numerous to be here specially considered. The New Testament, and
particularly the Epistle to the Hebrews, as before remarked, declares and teaches,
that the priesthood of the old economy was a type of the priesthood of Christ; that
the sacrifices of that dispensation were types of his sacrifice; that as the blood
of bulls and of goats purified the flesh, so the blood of Christ cleanses the soul
from guilt; and that as they were expiations effected by vicarious punishment, in
their sphere, so was the sacrifice of
The
It is not however only in the typical services of the old
economy that this great doctrine was set forth in the Hebrew Scriptures. In the
Passages of the Hew Testament in which the Work of Christ is set forth as Sacrifice.
In
In
What Paul teaches so abundantly of the sacrificial death of
Christ is taught by the Apostle John (
The above are only a part of the passages in which our blessed
Lord is, in the New Testament, set forth as a sin offering, in the Scriptural sense
of that term. What is thus taught is taught by other forms of expression which imply
the expiatory character of his death, or his priestly function of making satisfaction
for sin. Thus in
Nearly the same language is used by the Apostle Peter (
Another form of expression used by the sacred writers clearly
teaches the expiatory character of Christ’s work. Under the old economy, the great
function of the high priest was to make expiation for sin, and thereby restore the
people to the favour of God, and secure for them the blessings of the covenant under
which they lived. All this was typical of Christ and of his work. He came to save
his people from their sins, to restore them to the favour of God, and to secure
for them the enjoyment of the blessings of the new and better covenant of which
He is the mediator. He, therefore, assumed our nature in order that He might die,
and by death effect our reconciliation with God. For as He did not undertake the
redemption of angels, but the redemption of man, it was the nature of man that He
assumed. He was made in all things like unto his brethren, that He might be a merciful
and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God,
εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι τάς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ, to make expiation for the sins
of the people. The word
ἱλάσκομαι (or
ἐξιλάσκομαι) is the technical word in Hellenistic Greek
to express the idea of expiation. In common Greek, the word means propitium reddere,
and in the passive form it is used in this sense in the Septuagint as in
Still another form in which the doctrine of expiation is taught
is found in those passages which refer our reconciliation to God to the death of
Christ. The Greek word used to express this idea in
1. Because the means by which the reconciliation is effected is “the death of his Son.” The design of sacrificial death is expiation. It would be to do violence to all Scriptural usage to make the proximate design and effect of a sacrifice the removal of the sinner’s enmity to God.
2. “Being reconciled by the death of his Son,” in
3. Those reconciled are declared to be ἐχθροί, in the passive sense of the word, “those who are the objects of God’s just displeasure.” They are guilty. Justice demands their punishment. The death of Christ, as satisfying justice, reconciles God to us; effects peace, so that we can be received into favour.
4. What is here taught is explained by all those passages
which teach the method by which the reconciliation of God and man is effected, namely,
by the expiation of sin. Meyer, on this passage, says, “κατηλλάγημεν
and καταλλαγέντες must of necessity be understood passively:
ausgesöhnt mit Gott, atoned for in the sight of God, so that he no longer
is hostile to us; he has said aside his anger, and we are made partakers of his
grace and favour.” The same doctrine is taught in
It is clearly, therefore, the doctrine of the New Testament, that Jesus Christ our Lord saves his people by acting for them the part of a priest. For this office He had all the requisite qualifications; He was thereto duly appointed, and He performed all its functions. He was an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of men. He is not only repeatedly declared to be a sin offering in the Old Testament sense of that term; but He is said to have borne our sins; to have made expiation for the sins of the people; and to have reconciled us, who were the just objects of the divine wrath, to God by his death, by his cross, by the sacrifice of Himself. These representations are so frequent; they are so formally stated, so illustrated, and so applied, as to render them characteristic. They constitute the essential element of the Scriptural doctrine concerning the method of salvation.
Christ our Redeemer.
There is a third class of passages equally numerous and equally important. Christ is not only set forth as a Priest and as a sacrifice, but also as a Redeemer, and his work as a Redemption. Redemption is deliverance from evil by the payment of a ransom. This idea is expressed by the words ἀπολύτρωσις, from λύτρον, and the verbs λυτρός, ἀγοράζω (to purchase), and ἐξαγοράζω (to buy from, or deliver out of the possession or power of any one by purchase). The price or ransom paid for our redemption is always said to be Christ himself, his blood, his death. As the evils consequent on our apostasy from God are manifold, Christ’s work as a Redeemer is presented in manifold relations in the word of God.
Redemption from the Penalty of the Law.
1. The first and most obvious consequence of sin, is subjection
to the penalty of the law. The wages of sin is death. Every sin of necessity subjects
the sinner to the wrath and curse of God. The first step, therefore, in the salvation
of sinners, is their redemption from that curse. Until this is done they are of
necessity separated from God. But alienation from Him of necessity involves both
misery and subjection to the power of sin. So long as men are under the curse, they
are cut off from the only source of holiness and life. Such is the doctrine taught
throughout the Bible, and elaborately in Romans,
Redemption from the Law.
2. Nearly allied to this mode of representation are those
passages in which Christ is said to have delivered us from the law. Redemption from
bondage to the law includes not only deliverance from its penalty, but also from
the obligation to satisfy its demands. This is the fundamental idea of Paul’s doctrine
of justification. The law demands, and from the nature of God, must demand perfect
obedience. It says, Do this and live; and, “Cursed is every one that continueth
not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.” No man since
the fall is able to fulfil these demands, yet He must fulfil them or perish. The
only possible method, according to the Scriptures, by which men can be saved, is
that they should be delivered from this obligation of perfect obedience. This, the
Apostle teaches, has been effected by Christ. He was “made under the law to redeem
them that were under the law.” (
Redemption from the Power of Sin.
3. As deliverance from the curse of the law secures restoration
to the favour of God, and as the love of God is the life of the soul, and restores
us to his image, therefore in redeeming us from the curse of the law, Christ redeems
us also from the power of sin. “Whosoever committeth sin,” saith our Lord, “is the
servant (the slave) of sin.” This is a bondage from which no man can deliver himself.
To effect this deliverance was the great object of the mission of Christ. He gave
Himself that He might purify unto Himself a peculiar people zealous of good works.
He died, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us unto God. He loved the
Church and gave Himself for it, that He might present it unto Himself a glorious
Church, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing. This deliverance from sin is
a true redemption. A deliverance effected by a ransom, or satisfaction to justice,
was the necessary condition of restoration to the favour of God; and restoration
to his favour was the necessary condition of holiness. Therefore, it is said,
Redemption from the Power of Satan.
4. The Scriptures teach that Christ redeems us from the power
of Satan. Satan is said to be the prince and god of this world.
Final Redemption from all Evil.
5. Christ redeems us not only from the curse of the law, from
the law itself as a covenant of works, from the power of sin, and from the dominion
of Satan, but also from all evil. This evil is the consequence of the curse of the
law, and being redeemed from that we are delivered from all evil. Hence the word
redemption is often used for the sum of all the benefits of Christ’s work, or for
the consummation of the great scheme of salvation. Thus our Lord says,
It is therefore the plain doctrine of Scripture that, as before said, Christ saves us neither by the mere exercise of power, nor by his doctrine, nor by his example, nor by the moral influence which He exerted, nor by any subjective influence on his people, whether natural or mystical, but as a satisfaction to divine justice, as an expiation for sin and as a ransom from the curse and authority of the law, thus reconciling us to God, by making it consistent with his perfections to exercise mercy toward sinners, and then renewing them after his own image, and finally exalting them to all the dignity, excellence, and blessedness of the sons of God.
Argument from Related Doctrines.
All the doctrines of grace are intimately connected. They stand in such relation to each other, that one of necessity supposes the truth of the others. The common Church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, therefore, is not an isolated doctrine. It is assumed in all that the Scriptures teach of the relation between Christ and his people; of the condition on which our interest in his redemption is suspended; and of the nature of the benefits of that redemption.
1. No doctrine of the Bible, relating to the plan of salvation,
is more plainly taught or more wide reaching than that which concerns the union
between Christ and his people. That union in one aspect, was from eternity, we were
in Him before the
2. In like manner these same truths are implied in what sinners
are required to do in order to become the subjects of the redemption of Christ.
It is not enough that we should receive his doctrines; or endeavour to regulate
our lives by his moral precepts; or that we confide in his protection, or submit
to his control as one into whose hands all power in heaven and earth has been committed.
3. If we turn to the Scriptural account of the benefits which we receive from Christ, we find that this view of the nature of his work, is therein necessarily implied. We are justified through Him. He is our righteousness. We are made the righteousness of God in Him. But justification is not a subjective work. It is not sanctification. It is not a change wrought in us either naturally or supernaturally. It is not the mere executive act of a sovereign, suspending the action of the law, or granting pardon to the guilty. It is the opposite of condemnation. It is a declaration that the claims of justice are satisfied. This is the uniform meaning of the Hebrew and Greek words employed in Scripture, and of the corresponding words in all other languages, as far as those languages are cultivated to express what passes in the consciousness of men. But if God, in justifying sinners, declares that with regard to them the claims of justice are satisfied, it confessedly is not on the ground that the sinner himself has made that satisfaction, but that Christ has made it in his behalf.
The doctrine of sanctification also, as presented in the Scriptures,
is founded on the substitution of Christ. Sanctification is not a work of nature,
but a work of grace. It is a transformation of character effected not by moral influences,
but supernaturally by the Holy Spirit; although on that account only the more rationally.
The first step in the process is deliverance from the curse of the law by the body,
or death of Christ. Then God being reconciled, He admits us into fellowship with
Himself. But as the sinner is only imperfectly sanctified, he is still in his state
and acts far from being in himself an object of the divine complacency. It is only
as united to Christ and represented by Him, that he enjoys the continuance
Argument from the Religious Experience of Believers.
By the religious experience of Christians is meant those states
and acts of the mind produced by “the things of the Spirit,” or by the truths of
God’s Word as revealed and applied by the Holy Ghost. We are clearly taught in Scripture
that the truth is not only objectively presented in the Word, but that it is the
gracious office of the Spirit, as a teacher and guide, to lead the people of God
properly to understand the truths thus outwardly revealed, and to cause them to
produce their proper effect on the reason, the feelings, the conscience, and the
life. What the Holy Spirit thus leads the people of God to believe must be true.
No man however is authorized to appeal to his own inward experience as a test of
truth for others. His experience may be, and in most cases is, determined more or
less by his peculiar training, his own modes of thinking, and diverse other modifying
influences. But this does not destroy the value of religious experience as a guide
to the knowledge of the truth. It has an authority second only to that of the Word
of God. One great source of error in theology has always been the neglect of this
inward guide. Men have formed their opinions, or framed their doctrines on philosophical
principles, or moral axioms, and thus have been led to adopt conclusions which contradict
the inward teachings of the Spirit, and even their own religious consciousness.
The only question is, How can we distinguish the human from the divine? How can
we determine what in our experience is due to the teaching of the Spirit, and what
to other influences? The answer to these questions is, (1.) That what is conformed
to the infallible standard in the Scriptures, is genuine, and what is not thus conformed
is spurious. The Bible contains not only the truths themselves, but a record of
the effects produced on the mind when they are applied by the Holy Spirit. (2.)
Another
It is certainly an unanswerable argument in favour of the
divinity of Christ, for example, as a doctrine of the Bible, that all true Christians
look up to Christ as God; that they render Him the adoration, the love, the confidence,
the submission, and the devotion which are due to God alone, and which the apprehension
of divine perfection only can produce. It is certainly a proof that the Scriptures
teach that man is a fallen being, that he is guilty and defiled by sin, that he
is utterly unable to free himself from the burden and power of sin, that he is dependent
on the grace of God and the power of the Spirit, if these truths are inwrought into
the experience of all true believers. In like manner, if all Christians trust in
Christ for their salvation; if they look to Him as their substitute, obeying and
suffering in their stead, bearing their sins, sustaining the curse of the law in
their place; if they regard Him as the expiatory sacrifice to take away their guilt
and satisfy the justice of God in their behalf; if they thank and bless Him for
having given Himself as a ransom for their redemption from the penalty and obligation
of the law as prescribing the condition of salvation, and from the dominion of Satan,
from the power of sin and from all its evil consequences; then, beyond doubt, these
are the truths of God, revealed by the Spirit in the word, and taught by the Spirit
to all who submit to his guidance. That such is the experience of true believers
in relation to the work of Christ, is plain, (1.) Because this is the form and manner
in which holy men of old whose experience is recorded in the Scriptures, expressed
their relation to Christ and their obligations to Him. He was to them an expiatory
sacrifice; a ransom; an ἱλασμός or propitiation.
“Jesus, my God, Thy blood alone hath power sufficient to atone.”
“To the dear fountain of Thy blood, incarnate God, I fly”
“My soul looks back to see the burdens Thou didst bear, When hanging on the cursed tree, and hopes her sins were there.”
Does any Christian object to such hymns? Do they not express his inmost religious convictions? If they do not agree with the speculations of his understanding, do they not express the feelings of his heart and the necessities of his fallen nature? The speculations of the understanding are what man teaches; the truths which call forth these feelings of the heart are what the Holy Ghost teaches.
This argument may be presented in another light. It may be
shown that no other theory of the work of Christ does correspond with the inward
experience of God’s people. The theory that the work of Christ was didactic; that
it was exemplary; that its proximate design was to produce a subjective change in
the sinner or a moral impression on the minds of all intelligent creatures; these
and other theories, contrary to the common Church doctrine, fail especially in two
points. First, they do not account for the intimate
Throughout the New Testament, Christ is represented not only as the object of worship and of supreme love and devotion, but also as being to his people the immediate and constant source of life and of all good. Not Christ as God, but Christ as our Saviour. He is the head, we are his members. He is the vine, we are the branches. It is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us. He is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. His blood cleanses us from all sins. He redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. He is our great High Priest who ever lives to make intercession for us. It would be easy to show from the records of the religious life of the Church that believers have ever regarded Christ in the light in which He is here presented. The argument is that these representations are not consistent with any moral or governmental theory of the atonement.
There are two hymns which, perhaps, beyond all others, are dear to the hearts of all Christians who speak the English language. The one written by Charles Wesley, an Arminian; the other by Toplady, a Calvinist. It is hard to see what meaning can be attached to these hymns by those who hold that Christ died simply to teach us something, or to make a moral impression on us or others. How can they say, —
Why should they fly to Him if He be only a teacher or moral reformer? What do they mean when they say, —
“Hide me, O my Saviour hide”?
Hide from what? Not from the vindicatory justice of God, for they admit no such attribute.
“Other refuge have I none;”
refuge from what?
“All my trust on Thee is laid.”
For what do we trust Him? According to their theory He is not the ground of our confidence. It is not for his righteousness, but For our own that we are to be accepted by God. It would seem that those only who hold the common Church doctrine can say, —
“Thou, O Christ, art all I need.”
All I need as a creature, as a sinner, as guilty, as polluted, as miserable and helpless; all I need for time or for eternity. So of Toplady’s precious hymn, —
“Rock of ages, cleft for me;”
for me personally and individually; as Paul said he lived “by faith of the Son of God who loved me, and gave himself for me.”
How can such language be used by those who deny the necessity of expiation; who hold that guilt need not be washed away, that all that is necessary is that we should be made morally good? No one can say, —
who does not believe that Christ “bore our sins in his own body on the tree.”
It is a historical fact that where false theories of the atonement prevail, Christ and his work are put in the background. We hear from the pulpits much about God as a moral governor; much about the law and obligation, and of the duty of submission; but little about Christ, of the duty of fleeing to Him, of receiving Him, of trusting in Him, of renouncing our own righteousness that we may put on the righteousness of God; and little of our union with Him, of his living in us, and of our duty to live by faith in Him Thus new theories introduce a new religion.
§ 7. Objections.
The only legitimate method of controverting a doctrine which
purports to be founded on the Scriptures is the exegetical. If its advocates undertake
to show that it is taught in the Bible, its opponents are bound to prove that the
Bible, understood agreeably to the recognized laws of interpretation, does not teach
it. This method, comparatively speaking, is little relied upon, or resorted to by
the adversaries of the Church doctrine concerning the satisfaction of Christ. Their
main reliance is on objections of two classes: the one drawn from speculative or
philosophical principles; the other from the sentiments or feelings. It is not uncommon
for modern writers, especially among the German theologians, to begin the discussion
of this subject by a review of the Scriptural statements in relation to it. This
is often eminently satisfactory. It is
Others, and perhaps the majority of the most popular of this class of theologians, go further than this. They are willing that criticism and forced interpretations should make what havoc they please with the Bible. Any and every book may be rejected from the canon. Any and every doctrine may be interpreted out of the sacred pages; still the only Christianity they value is safe. Christianity is independent of any form of doctrine. It is a life, an inward, organic power, which remodels the soul; which life is Christianity, because it is assumed to have its origin in Christ.
Others again act on the principles of that form of rationalism
which has received the name of Dogmatism. The doctrines and facts of the Bible are
allowed to stand as true. They are allowed to be the proper modes of statement for
popular instruction and impression. But it is assumed to be the office of the theologian
to discover, present, and bring into harmony with his system, the philosophical
truths which underlie these doctrinal statements of the Bible. And these philosophical
truths are assumed to be the substance of the Scriptural doctrines, of which the
doctrines themselves are the unessential and mutable forms. Thus the doctrine of
the Trinity is admitted. The form in which it is presented in the Bible is regarded
as its popular form, which it may be useful to retain for the people. But the real
and important truth which it involves is, that original, unintelligent, unconscious
Being (the Father) comes to conscious existence in the world (the Son), by an eternal
process, and returns by an unceasing flow into the infinite (the Spirit). It is
also admitted that God became flesh, but it was, as some say, in the whole race
of man; mankind are the manifestation of God in the flesh; or, as others say, the
Church is his body, that is, the form in which the incarnation is realized. Christ
is acknowledged to be our saviour from sin, but it is by a purely subjective process.
He introduces a new life power into humanity, which enters into conflict with the
evil of our nature, and after a painful struggle overcomes it. This is called the
application of philosophy to the explanation of Scriptural doctrines. It is patent,
however, that this is not explanation, but substitution. It is the substitution
of the human for the divine; of the thoughts of men, which are mere vapour, for
the thoughts of God, which are eternal verities. It is giving a stone for bread,
and a scorpion for an egg. It is, indeed, a very convenient method of getting rid
of the teachings of the Bible, while professing to admit its authority. It is important,
however, to notice the concession involved in these modes of proceeding. It is acknowledged
that the Church doctrine
Moral Objections.
Another class of objections to the Scriptural doctrine of satisfaction, which may be called philosophical, although not of the speculative kind, are those which are founded on certain assumed moral axioms. It is said to be self-evident that the innocent cannot be guilty; and if not guilty he cannot be punished, for punishment is the judicial infliction of evil on account of guilt. As the Church doctrine, while maintaining the perfect sinlessness of Christ, teaches that He bore the guilt of sin, and therefore was regarded and treated as a sinner, that doctrine assumes both an impossibility and an act of injustice. It assumes that God regards things as they are not. He regards the innocent as guilty. This is an impossibility. And if possible for Him to treat the innocent as guilty, it would be an act of gross injustice. On this class of objections it may be remarked, —
1. That they avail nothing against the plain declaration of the Scriptures. If the Bible teaches that the innocent may bear the guilt of the actual transgressor; that He may endure the penalty incurred in his place, then it is in vain to say that this cannot be done.
2. If it be said that these moral objections render it necessary to explain these representations of Scripture as figurative, or as anthropomorphic modes of expression, as when God is said to have eyes, to stand, or to walk, then the reply is that these representations are so didactic, are so repeated; and are so inwrought into the whole system of Scriptural doctrine, that they leave us no alternative but to receive them as the truths of God, or to reject tie Bible as his word.
3. Rejecting the Bible does not help the matter. We cannot
reject the facts of providence. Where is the propriety of saying that the innocent
cannot justly suffer for the guilty, when we see that they actually do thus suffer
continually, and everywhere since the world began? There is no moral principle asserted
in tie Bible, which is not carried out in providence. God says He will visit the
iniquities of the fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation
of those that hate Him. And so He does,
4. Men constantly deceive themselves by postulating as moral axioms what are nothing more than the forms in which their feelings or peculiar opinions find expression. To one man it is an axiom that a holy God cannot permit sin, or a benevolent God allow his creatures to be miserable; and he, therefore, infers either that there is no God, or that He cannot control the acts of free agents. To another it is self-evidently true that a free act cannot be certain, and therefore that there can be no foreordination, or foreknowledge, or prediction of the occurrence of such acts. To another, it is self-evident that a merciful God cannot permit any portion of his rational creatures to remain forever under the dominion of sin and suffering. There would be no end of controversy, and no security for any truth whatever, if the strong personal convictions of individual minds be allowed to determine what is, or what is not true, what the Bible may, and what it may not, be allowed to teach. It must be admitted, however, that there are moral intuitions, founded on the constitution of our nature, and constituting a primary revelation of the nature of God, which no external revelation can possibly contradict. The authority of these intuitive truths is assumed or fully recognized in the Bible itself. They have, however, their criteria. They cannot be enlarged or diminished. No man can add to, or detract from, their number. Those criteria are, (1.) They are all recognized in the Scriptures themselves. (2.) They are universally admitted as true by all rational minds. (3.) They cannot be denied. No effort of the will, and no sophistry of the understanding can destroy their authority over the reason and conscience.
5. It is very evident that the principle that “the innocent
cannot justly be punished for the guilty,” cannot stand the application of the above-mentioned
criteria. So far from being recognized in the Bible, it is contrary to its plainest
declarations and facts. So far from being universally received among men as true,
it has never been received at all as part of the common faith of mankind. The
To the head of objections founded on assumed moral axioms
belong those urged by a large class of modern, and especially of German theologians.
These theologians have their peculiar views of the nature of God, of his relation
to the world, and of anthropology in all its branches, which underlie and determine
all their theological doctrines. It is denied that Schleiermacher founded a school;
but it is certain that he introduced a method of theologizing, and advocated principles,
which have determined the character of the theology of a large class of men, not
only in Germany, but also in England and America: Twesten, Nitsch, Lücke, Olshausen,
Ullmann, Lange, Liebner, and even Ebrard in Germany and Morell and Maurice in England,
belong to this class of writers. In this country what is known as the “Mercersburg
Theology” is the product of the same principles. Everything which distinguishes
that theology from the theology of the Reformed Church, comes from the introduction
of these new German speculative principles.
1. That it is a mere speculative, or philosophical, anthropological theory. It has no more authority than the thousands of speculations which the teeming mind of man has produced. Schleiermacher says that man is the form in which the universal spirit comes to consciousness and individuality on this earth. These writers say that man is the form in which generic humanity is individualized. Every philosophy has its own anthropology. It is evidently most unreasonable and presumptuous to found the explanation of a great Scriptural doctrine, which the people are bound to understand and receive, and on which they are required to rest their hope of salvation, upon a theory as to the nature of man, which has no divine authority, and which not one man in a thousand, perhaps not one in hundreds of thousands, believes or ever has believed. The self-confidence and self-exaltation which such a course implies, can hardly be the fruit of the Holy Spirit.
2. The theory itself is unintelligible. The phrases “universal man,” and “the whole of humanity,” as here used, have no meaning. To say that “humanity itself was nailed to the cross,” conveys no rational idea. By a universal man might be meant a universal genius, or a man who represents all mankind as Adam did. But this is expressly repudiated. By “a universal man,” as distinguished from an individual man, is intended a man who includes the whole of humanity in himself. Though this might be said of Adam when he stood absolutely alone, before the creation of Eve, yet it cannot be said of any one of a multitude of men. A universal man would be a man who included in himself all human persons; an idea as monstrous as the modern doctrine of “the all-personality of God.”
In the language of the Church, to assume a nature is to assume
a substance with its essential attributes and properties. Through all ages in the
Church the words φύσις, οἰσία, substantia,
and natura, have, in relation to this subject, been used interchangeably.
When it is said that the Logos assumed our nature, it is meant that He took into
personal union with Himself a substance or essence having the same essential properties
which constitute us men. But He did not assume the whole of that substance or essence.
He assumed the whole of humanity in the sense of assuming all the attributes of
humanity. He took upon Him all that was necessary to constitute
3. There is a moral or ethical impossibility, as well as a metaphysical
one, involved in this theory. The doctrine is, that in assuming human nature Christ
assumed the guilt attaching to the sins humanity had committed. He became responsible
for those sins; and was bound to bear the penalty they had incurred. Nevertheless
human nature as it existed in his person was guiltless and absolutely pure. This,
to our apprehensions, is an impossibility. Guilt and sin can be predicated only
of a person. This if not a self-evident, is, at least, a universally admitted truth.
Only a person is a rational agent. It is only to persons that responsibility, guilt,
or moral character can attach. Human nature apart from human persons cannot act,
and therefore cannot contract guilt, or be responsible. Christ assumed a rational
soul which had never existed as a person, and could not be responsible on the ground
of its nature for the sins of other men. Unless guilt and sin be essential attributes
or properties of human nature, Christ did not assume guilt by assuming that nature.
If guilt and sin cannot be predicated of Christ’s person, they cannot by possibility
be predicated of his human nature. The whole theory, therefore, which denies that
Christ as a divine person clothed in a nature like our own, assumed the guilt of
our sins by imputation of what did not belong to Him, and sustained the penalty
which we had incurred, and makes that denial on the ground that the innocent cannot
bear the sins of the guilty; that God could not regard Him as sin, unless He was
in
When it is said that we derive a sinful nature from Adam, and that guilt as well as pollution attaches to the nature of fallen men, the doctrine is, that we, and all who derive that nature from Adam, are personally sinful and guilty. We are born, as the Apostle says, the children of wrath. It is not an impersonal nature which is guilty, for this would be a contradiction, but persons whose immanent, subjective state is opposed to the character and law of God. All this, however, is denied concerning Christ. These theologians admit that, as a person, He was without sin. But if without sin, He was without guilt. It was according to the Scriptures by the imputation to Him of sins not his own, that He bore our guilt, or assumed the responsibility of satisfying justice on our account. It is only by admitting that by being born of a woman, or becoming flesh, Christ placed Himself in the category of sinful men, and became personally a sinner, and guilty in the sight of God, as all other men are, that it can be maintained that the assumption of our nature in itself involved the assumption of guilt, or that He thereby became responsible for all the sins which men possessing that nature had committed.
4. It is another fatal objection to this scheme that it subverts
the whole gospel plan of salvation. Instead of directing the soul to Christ, to
his righteousness, and to his intercession; that is, to what is objective and out
of itself, as the ground of its hope toward God, it turns the attention of the sinner
in upon himself. The only righteousness he has on which to trust is within. He has
a new nature, and because of that nature is and deserves to be, reconciled unto
God and entitled to eternal life. It places Christ just as far from us as Adam is.
As Adam is the source of a nature for which we are condemned, so Christ is the source
of a nature for which we are justified and saved. The system, therefore, calls upon
us to exchange a hope founded upon what Christ is and has done in our behalf, a
hope which rests upon an infinitely meritorious righteousness out of ourselves,
for a hope founded on the glimmer of divine life which we find within ourselves.
We may call this new nature by what high-sounding names we please. We may call it
theanthropic, divine-human, or divine, it makes no difference. Whatever it is called,
it is something so weak and so imperfect that it cannot satisfy ourselves, much
less the infinitely holy and just God. To call on men to trust for their acceptance
before God on the ground of what they are made by this inward
No one can read the theological works of the speculative school, without being satisfied that their design is not to set forth what the Scriptures teach. To this little or no attention is paid. Their object is to give a scientific interpretation of certain facts of Scripture (such as sin and redemption), in accordance with the principles of the current philosophy. These writers are as much out of the reach, and out of contact with the sympathies and religious life of the people, as men in a balloon are out of relation to those they leave behind. To the aeronauts indeed those on the earth appear very diminutive and grovelling; but they are none the less in their proper sphere and upon solid ground. All that the excursionists can hope for is a safe return to terra firma. And that is seldom accomplished without risk or loss.
Popular Objections.
The more popular objections to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction have already been considered in the progress of the discussion. A certain amount of repetition may be pardoned for the sake of a brief and distinct statement of the several points. These objections were all urged by Socinus and his associates at the time of the Reformation. They are principally the following: —
There is no Vindicatory Justice in God.
1. There is no such attribute in God as vindicatory justice,
and therefore there can be no satisfaction to justice required or rendered. This
would be a fatal objection if the assumption which it involves were correct. But
if it is intuitively true, that sin ought to be punished, then it is no less true
that God will, and from the constitution of his nature must do, what ought to be
done. All men, in despite of the sophistry of the understanding, and in despite
of their moral degradation, know that it is the righteous judgment of God, that
those who sin are worthy of death. They, therefore,
There can be no Antagonism in God.
2. To the same effect it is objected that there can be no
antagonism in God. There cannot be one impulse to punish and another impulse not
to punish . All God’s acts or manifestations of Himself toward his creatures, must
be referred to one principle, and that principle is love. And, therefore, his plan
of saving sinners can only be regarded as an exhibition of love, not of justice
in any form. All that He can, as a God of love, require, is the return of his creatures
to Himself, which is a return to holiness and happiness. It is true God is love.
But it is no less true that love in God is not a weakness, impelling Him to do what
ought not to be done. If sin ought to be punished, as conscience and the word of
God declare, then there is nothing in God which impels Him to leave it unpunished.
His whole nature is indeed harmonious, but it has the harmony of moral excellence,
leading with absolute certainty to the judge of all the earth doing right; punishing
or pardoning, just as moral excellence demands. The love of God has not prevented
the final perdition of apostate angels; and it could not require the restoration
of fallen men without an adequate atonement. The infinite, discriminating love of
God to our race, is manifested in his giving his own Son to bear our sins and to
redeem us from the curse of the law by sustaining the penalty in his own person.
“Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to
be the propitiation (ἱλασμός, propitiatio,
expiatio. No man can get the saving import out of that word) for our sins.”
(
The Transfer of Guilt or Righteousness Impossible.
3. It is objected that the transfer of guilt and righteousness
involved in the Church doctrine of satisfaction is impossible. The transfer of guilt
or righteousness, as states of consciousness or forms of moral character, is indeed
impossible. But the transfer of guilt as responsibility to justice, and of righteousness
as that which satisfies justice, is no more impossible than that one man should
pay the debt of another. All that the Bible teaches on this subject is that Christ
paid as a substitute, our debt to the justice
Expiation a Heathenish Idea.
4. The idea of expiation, the innocent suffering for the guilty and God being thereby propitiated, is declared to be heathenish and revolting. No man has the right to make his taste or feelings the test of truth. That a doctrine is disagreeable, is no sufficient evidence of its untruth. There are a great many terribly unpleasant truths, to which we sinners have to submit. Besides, the idea of expiation is not revolting to the vast majority of minds, as is proved by its being incorporated in all religions of men, whether pagan, Jewish, or Christian. So far from being revolting, it is cherished and delighted in as the only hope of the guilty. So far from the innocent suffering for the guilty being a revolting spectacle, it is one of the sublimest exhibitions of self-sacrificing love. All heaven stands uncovered before the cross on which the Son of God, holy and harmless, bore the sins of men. And God forbid that redeemed sinners should regard the cross as an offence. God is not won to love by the death of his Son, but that death renders it consistent with moral excellence that his infinite love for sinful men should have unrestricted sway.
Satisfaction to Justice unnecessary.
5. It is objected that the doctrine of satisfaction to justice by means of vicarious punishment is unnecessary. All that is needed for the restoration of harmony in the universe can be effected by the power of love. The two great ends to be accomplished are a clue impression on rational minds of the evil of sin, and the reformation of sinners. Both these objects, it is contended, are secured without expiation or any penal suffering. According to some, the work of Christ operates æsthetically to accomplish the ends desired; according to others, it operates morally through the exhibition of love or by example, or by the confirmation of truth; and according to others, the operation is supernatural or mystical. But in any case his work was no satisfaction to justice or expiation for sin. It is enough to say in answer to all this, —
1. That such is not the doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures
teach that something more was necessary for the salvation of men than moral influences
and impressions, or the revelation and confirmation
2. These schemes are not only unscriptural, but they are inoperative They do not meet the necessities of the case, as those necessities reveal themselves in the consciousness of men. They make no provision for the removal of guilt. But the sense of guilt is universal and ineradicable. It is not irrational. It is not founded on ignorance or misconception of our relation to God. The more the soul is enlightened, the more deep and painful is its sense of guilt. There are some philosophers who would persuade us that there is no such thing as sin; that the sense of moral pollution of which men complain, and under which the holiest men groan as under a body of death, is all a delusion, a state of mind produced by erroneous views of God and of his relation to his creatures. There are others, theologians as well as philosophers, who while admitting the reality of moral evil, and recognizing the validity of the testimony of consciousness as to our moral pollution, endeavour to persuade us that there is no such thing as guilt. Responsibility to justice, the desert of punishment, the moral necessity for the punishment of sin, they deny. The one class is just as obviously wrong as the other. Consciousness testifies just as clearly and just as universally to the guilt, as to the pollution. It craves as importunately deliverance from the one as from the other. A plan of salvation, therefore, which makes no provision for the removal of guilt, or satisfaction of justice, which admits no such thing as the vicarious punishment of sin, is as little suited to our necessities as though it made no provision for the reformation and sanctification of men.
3. A third remark on these humanly devised schemes of redemption
is, that while they leave out the essential idea of expiation, or satisfaction to
justice by vicarious punishment, without which salvation is impossible, and reconciliation
with a just God inconceivable they contain no element of influence or power which
does not belong in a higher degree to the Scriptural and Church doctrine. Whatever
“If a man,” says Delitzsch, “keeps in view our desert of punishment,
and allows the three saving doctrines of Scripture to stand in their integrity,
namely, (1.) That God made Him who knew no sin to be sin for us, i.e., imputed
our sins to Him. (2.) That Christ, although free from guilt, laden with our guilt,
was made a curse for us, i.e., suffered the wrath of God due to us; or, as the
Scripture also says, that God executed on his Son judgment against sin, He having
taken upon Him flesh and blood and offered Himself as a sacrifice for us for the
expiation of sin. (3.) That in like manner his righteousness is imputed to believers,
so that we may stand before God, as He had submitted to the imputation of our sins
in order to their expiation; if these premises remain unobliterated, then it is
as clear as the sun that Christ suffered and died as our substitute, in order that
we need not suffer what we deserved, and in order that we instead of dying should
be partakers of the life secured by his vicarious death.”
§ 1. State of the Question.
This is a question between Augustinians and Anti- Augustinians. The former believing that God from all eternity having elected some to everlasting life, had a special reference to their salvation in the mission and work of his Son. The latter, denying that there has been any such election of a part of the human family to salvation, maintain that the mission and work of Christ had an equal reference to all mankind.
The question, therefore, does not, in the first place, concern the nature of Christ’s work. It is true, if it be denied that his work was a satisfaction for sin, and affirmed that it was merely didactic; that his life, sufferings, and death were designed to reveal and confirm truth; then it would follow of course that it had no reference to one class of men more than to another, or to men more than to angels. Truth is designed for the illumination of all the minds to which it is presented. But admitting the work of Christ to have been a true satisfaction for sin, its design may still be an open question. Accordingly, Lutherans and Reformed, although they agree entirely as to the nature of the atonement, differ as to its design. The former maintain that it had an equal reference to all mankind, the latter that it had special reference to the elect.
In the second place, the question does not concern the value
of Christ’s satisfaction. That Augustinians admit to be infinite. Its value depends
on the dignity of the sacrifice; and as no limit car be placed to the dignity of
the Eternal Son of God who offered Him self for our sins, so no limit can be assigned
to the meritorious value of his work. It is a gross misrepresentation of the Augustinian
doctrine to say that it teaches that Christ suffered so much for so many; that He
would have suffered more had more been included in the purpose of salvation. This
is not the doctrine of any Church on earth, and never has been. What was sufficient
for one was sufficient for all. Nothing less than the light and heat of the sun
is sufficient for any one plant or animal. But what is absolutely
In the third place, the question does not concern the suitableness of the atonement. What was suitable for one was suitable for all. The righteousness of Christ, the merit of his obedience and death, is needed for justification by each individual of our race, and therefore is needed by all. It is no more appropriate to one man than to another. Christ fulfilled the conditions of the covenant under which all men were placed. He rendered the obedience required of all, and suffered the penalty which all had incurred; and therefore his work is equally suited to all.
In the fourth place, the question does not concern the actual application of the redemption purchased by Christ. The parties to this controversy are agreed that some only, and not all of mankind are to be actually saved.
The whole question, therefore, concerns simply the purpose
of God in the mission of his Son. What was the design of Christ’s coming into the
world, and doing and suffering all He actually did and suffered? Was it merely to
make the salvation of all men possible; to remove the obstacles which stood in the
way of the offer of pardon and acceptance to sinners? or, Was it specially to render
certain the salvation of his own people, i.e., of those given to Him by the Father?
The latter question is affirmed by Augustinians, and denied by their opponents.
It is obvious that if there be no election of some to everlasting life, the atonement
can have no special reference to the elect. It must have equal reference to all
mankind. But it does not follow from the assertion of its having a special reference
to the elect that it had no reference to the non-elect. Augustinians readily admit
that the death of Christ had a relation to man, to the whole human family, which
it had not to the fallen angels. It is the ground on which salvation is offered
to every creature under heaven who hears the gospel; but it gives no authority for
a like offer to apostate angels. It moreover secures to the whole race at large,
and to all classes of men, innumerable blessings, both providential and religious.
It was, of course, designed to produce these effects; and, therefore, He died to
secure them. In view of the effects which the death of Christ produces in the relation
of all mankind to God, it has in all ages been customary
§ 2. Proof of the Augustinian Doctrine.
That these questions must be answered in the affirmative, is evident, —
1. From the nature of the covenant of redemption. It is admitted
that there was a covenant between the Father and the Son in relation to the salvation
of men. It is admitted that Christ came into the world in execution of that covenant.
The nature of the covenant, therefore, determines the object of his death. According
to one view, man having by his fall lost the ability of fulfilling the conditions
of the covenant of life, God, for Christ’s sake, enters into a new covenant, offering
men salvation upon other and easier terms; namely, as some say, faith and repentance,
and others evangelical obedience. If such be the nature of the plan of salvation,
then it is obvious that the work of Christ has equal reference to all mankind. According
to another view, the work of Christ was designed to secure the pardon of original
sin and the gift of the Holy Spirit for all men, Jews or Gentiles, and those are
saved who duly improve the grace they severally receive. The former is the doctrine
of the ancient Semi-Pelagians and modern Remonstrants; the latter of the Wesleyan
Arminians. The Lutherans hold that God sent his Son to make a full and real legal
satisfaction for the sins of all mankind; and that on the ground of this perfect
satisfaction the offer of salvation is made to all who hear the gospel; that grace
is given (in the word and sacraments) which, if unresisted, is sufficient to secure
their salvation. The French theologians at Saumur, in the 17th century, taught also
that Christ came into the world to do whatever was necessary for the salvation of
men. But God, foreseeing that, if left to themselves, men would universally reject
the offers of mercy, elected some to be the subjects of his saving grace by which
they are brought to faith and repentance According to this view of the plan of salvation,
election is subordinate to redemption. God first redeems all and then
Argument from the Doctrine of Election.
2. This follows also almost necessarily from the doctrine
of election. Indeed it never was denied that Christ died specially for the elect
until the doctrine of election itself was rejected. Augustine,
Express Declarations of Scripture.
3. We accordingly find numerous passages in which the design
of Christ’s death is declared to be, to save his people from their sins. He did
not come merely to render their salvation possible but actually to deliver them
from the curse of the law, and from the power of sin. This is included in all the
Scriptural representations of the nature and design of his work. No man pays a ransom
without the certainty of the deliverance of those for whom it is paid. It is not
a ransom unless it actually redeems. And an offering is no sacrifice unless it actually
expiates and propitiates.
There are also very numerous passages in which it is expressly
declared that Christ gave Himself for his Church (
Argument from the Special Love of God.
4. By the love of God is sometimes meant his goodness, of
which all sensitive creatures are the objects and of whose benefits they are the
recipients. Sometimes it means his special regard for the children of men, not only
as rational creatures, but also as the offspring of Him who is the Father of the
spirits of all men. Sometimes it means that peculiar, mysterious, sovereign, immeasurable
love which passes knowledge, of which his own people, the Church of the first-born
whose names are written in heaven, are the objects. Of this love it is taught, (1.)
That it is infinitely great. (2.) That it is discriminating, fixed on some and not
upon others
Argument from the Believer’s Union with Christ.
5. Another argument is derived from the nature of the union
between Christ and his people. The Bible teaches, (1.) That a certain portion of
the human race were given to Christ. (2.) That they were given to Him before the
foundation of the world. (3.) That all thus given to Him will certainly come to
Him and be saved. (4.) That this union, so far as it was from eternity, is not a
union of nature, nor by faith, nor by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It was
a federal union. (5.) That Christ, therefore, was a federal head and representative.
As such He came into the world, and all He did and suffered was as a representative,
as a substitute, one acting in the place and for the benefit of others. But He was
the representative of those given to Him, i.e., of those who were in Him. For it
was this gift and the union consequent upon it, that gave Him his representative
character, or constituted Him a federal head. He was therefore the federal head,
not of the human race, but of those given to Him by the Father. And, therefore,
his work, so far as its main design is concerned, was for them alone. Whatever reference
it had to others was subordinate and incidental. All this is illustrated and proved
by the Apostle in
6. There is another argument on this subject generally presented,
which ought not to be overlooked. The unity of the priestly office rendered the
functions of the priesthood inseparable. The high-priest interceded for all those
for whom he offered sacrifice. The one service did not extend beyond the other.
He bore upon his breast the names of the twelve tribes. He represented them in drawing
near to God. He offered sacrifices for their sins on the great day of atonement,
and for them he interceded, and for no others. The sacrifice and the intercession
went together. What was true of the Aaronic priests, is true of Christ. The former,
we are told, were the types of the latter. Christ’s functions as priest are in like
manner united. He intercedes for all for whom He offered Himself as a sacrifice.
He himself, however, says expressly, “I pray not for the world, but for them which
thou hast given me.” (
The Church Doctrine embraces all the Facts of the Case.
7. The final test of any theory is its agreeing or disagreeing with the facts to be explained. The difficulty with all the Anti-Augustinian views as to the design of Christ’s death, is that while they are consistent with more or less of the Scriptural facts connected with the subject, they are utterly irreconcilable with others not less clearly revealed and equally important. They are consistent, for example, with the fact that the work of Christ lays the foundation for the offer of the gospel to all men, with the fact that men are justly condemned for the rejection of that offer; and with the fact that the Scriptures frequently assert that the work of Christ had reference to all men. All these facts can be accounted for on the assumption, that the great design of Christ’s death was to make the salvation of all men possible, and that it had equal reference to every member of our race. But there are other facts which this theory leaves out of view, and with which it cannot be reconciled. On the other hand it is claimed that the Augustinian doctrine recognizes all the Scriptural assertions connected with the subject, and reconciles them all. If this be so, it must be the doctrine of the Bible. The facts which are clearly revealed concerning the death or work of Christ are, —
(1.) That God from eternity gave a people to his Son.
(2.) That the peculiar and infinite love of God to his people is declared to be the motive for the gift of his Son; and their salvation the design of his mission.
(3.) That it was as their representative, head, and substitution, He came into the world, assumed our nature, fulfilled all righteousness, and bore the curse of the law.
(4.) That the salvation of all given to Him by the Father, is thus rendered absolutely certain.
That the Augustinian scheme agrees with these great Scriptural facts, is readily admitted, but it is denied that it accounts for the fact that on the ground of the work of Christ, salvation may be offered to every human being; and that all who hear and reject the gospel, are justly condemned for their unbelief. That these are Scriptural facts cannot be denied, and if the Augustinian doctrine does not provide for them, it must be false or defective. There are different grounds on which it is assumed that the Augustinian doctrine does not provide for the universal offer of the gospel. One is, the false assumption that Augustinians teach that the satisfaction of Christ was in all respects analogous to the payment of a debt, a satisfaction to commutative or commercial justice. Hence it is inferred that Christ suffered so much for so many; He paid so much for one soul, and so much for another, and of course He would have been called upon to pay more if more were to have been saved. If this be so, then it is clear that the work of Christ can justify the offer of salvation to those only whose debts He has actually cancelled. To this view of the case it may be remarked, —
1. That this doctrine was never held by any historical church and the ascription of it to Augustinians can only be accounted for on the ground of ignorance.
2. It involves the greatest confusion of ideas. It confounds
the obligations which arise among men as owners of property, with the obligations
of rational creatures to an infinitely holy God. A debtor is one owner, and a creditor
is another. Commutative justice requires that they should settle their mutual claims
equitably. But God is not one owner and the sinner another. They do not stand in
relation to each other as two proprietors. The obligation which binds a debtor to
pay a creditor, and the principle which impels a just God to punish sin, are entirely
distinct. God is the absolute owner of all things. We own nothing. We cannot sustain
to him, in this respect, the relation of a debtor to his creditor. The objection
in question, therefore, is founded on an entire mistake or misrepresentation of
the attribute of justice, to which, according to Augustinians, the satisfaction
of Christ is rendered. Because the sin of Adam was the ground of the condemnation
of his race, does
3. As this objection is directed against a theory which no Church has ever adopted, and as it attributes to God a form of justice which cannot possibly belong to Him, so it is contrary to those Scriptural representations on which the Augustinian doctrine is founded. The Scriptures teach that Christ saves us as a priest, by offering Himself as a sacrifice for our sins. But a sacrifice was not a payment of a debt, the payment of so much for so much. A single victim was sometimes a sacrifice for one individual; sometimes for the whole people. On the great day of atonement the scape-goat bore the sins of the people, whether they were more or less numerous. It had no reference at all to the number of persons for whom atonement was to be made. So Christ bore the sins of his people; whether they were to be a few hundreds, or countless millions, or the whole human family, makes no difference as to the nature of his work, or as to the value of his satisfaction. What was absolutely necessary for one, was abundantly sufficient for all.
The objection, however, is at times presented in a somewhat
different form. Admitting the satisfaction of Christ to be in itself of infinite
value, how can it avail for the non-elect if it was not designed for them? It does
not avail for the fallen angels, because it was not intended for them; how then
can it avail for the non-elect, if not designed for them? How can a ransom, whatever
its intrinsic value, benefit those for whom it was not paid? In this form the objection
is far more specious. It is, however, fallacious. It overlooks the peculiar nature
of the case. It ignores the fact that all mankind were placed under the same constitution
or covenant. What was demanded for the salvation of one was demanded for the salvation
of all. Every man is required to satisfy the demands of the law. No man is required
to do either more or less. If those demands are satisfied by a representative or
substitute, his work is equally available for all. The secret purpose of God in
providing such a substitute for man, has nothing to do with the nature of his work,
or with its appropriateness. The righteousness of Christ being of infinite value
or merit, and being in its nature precisely what all men need, may be offered to
all men. It is thus offered to the elect and to the non-elect; and it is offered
to both classes conditionally. That condition is a cordial acceptance of it as the
only ground of justification. If any of the elect (being adults)
If the Atonement be limited in Design, it must be restricted in the Offer.
There is still another ground on which it is urged that Augustinians
cannot consistently preach the gospel to every creature. Augustinians teach, it
is urged, that the work of Christ is a satisfaction to divine justice. From this
it follows that justice cannot condemn those for whose sins it has been satisfied.
It cannot demand that satisfaction twice, first from the substitute and then from
the sinner himself. This would be manifestly unjust, far worse than demanding no
punishment at all. From this it is inferred that the satisfaction or righteousness
of Christ, if the ground on which a sinner may be forgiven, is the ground on which
he must be forgiven. It is not the ground on which he may be forgiven, unless it
is the ground on which he must be forgiven. If the atonement be limited in design
it must be limited in its nature, and if limited in its nature it must be limited
in its offer. This objection again arises from confounding a pecuniary and a judicial
satisfaction between which Augustinians are so careful to discriminate. This distinction
has already been presented on a previous page (470). There is no grace in accepting
a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates.
The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition.
Nothing of this is true in the case of judicial satisfaction. If a substitute be
provided and accepted it is a matter of grace. His satisfaction does not ipso
facto liberate. It may accrue to the benefit of those for whom it is made at
once or at a remote period; completely or gradually; on conditions or unconditionally;
or it may never benefit them at all unless the condition on which its application
is suspended be performed. These facts are universally admitted by those who hold
that the work of Christ was a true and perfect satisfaction to divine justice. The
application of its benefits is determined by the covenant between the Father and
the Son. Those for whom it was specially rendered are not justified from eternity;
they are not born in a justified state; they are by nature, or birth, the children
of wrath even as others. To be the children of wrath is to be justly exposed to
divine wrath. They remain in this state of exposure until they believe, and should
they die (unless in infancy) before they believe they would inevitably
Certain Passages of Scripture considered.
Admitting, however, that the Augustinian doctrine that Christ
died specially for his own people does account for the general offer of the gospel,
how is it to be reconciled with those passages which. in one form or another, teach
that He died for all men? In answer to this question, it may be remarked in the
first place that Augustinians do not deny that Christ died for all men. What they
deny is that he died equally, and with the same design, for all men. He died for
all, that He might arrest the immediate execution of the penalty of the law upon
the whole of our apostate race; that He might secure for men the innumerable blessings
attending their state on earth, which, in one important sense, is a state of probation;
and that He might lay the foundation for the offer of pardon and reconciliation
with God, on condition of faith and repentance. These are the universally admitted
consequences of his satisfaction, and therefore they all come within its design.
By this dispensation it is rendered manifest to every intelligent mind in heaven
and upon earth, and to the finally impenitent themselves, that the perdition of
those that perish is their own fault. They will not come to Christ that they may
have life. They refuse to have Him to reign over them. He calls but they will not
answer. He says, “Him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out.” Every human
being who does come is saved. This is what is meant when it is said, or implied
in Scripture, that Christ gave Himself
But, in the second place, it is to be remarked that general terms are often used indefinitely and not comprehensively. They mean all kinds, or classes, and not all and every individual. When Christ said, “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me,” He meant men of all ages, classes, and conditions, and not every individual man. When God predicted that upon the advent of the Messiah He would pour out his Spirit upon all flesh, all that was foretold was a general effusion of the Holy Ghost. And when it is said that all men shall see (experience) the salvation of God, it does not mean that all men individually, but that a vast multitude of all classes shall be saved. The same remark applies to the use of the term world. It means men, mankind, as a race or order of beings. No one hesitates to call the Lord Jesus the “Salvator hominum.” He is so hailed and so worshipped wherever his name is known. But no one means by this that He actually saves all mankind. What is meant is that He is our Saviour, the Saviour of men, not of angels, not of Jews exclusively, nor yet of the Gentiles only, not of the rich, or of the poor alone, not of the righteous only, but also of publicans and sinners. He is the Saviour of all men who come unto Him. Thus when He is called the Lamb of God that bears the sin of the world, all that is meant is that He bears the sins of men; He came as a sin-offering bearing not his own, but the sins of others.
In the third place, these general terms are always to be understood
in reference to the things spoken of in the context. When all things, the universe,
is said to be put in subjection to Christ it is, of course, to be understood of
the created universe. In
There is another class of passages with which it is said that
the Augustinian doctrine cannot be reconciled; such, namely, as speak of those perishing
for whom Christ died. In reference to these passages it may be remarked, first,
that there is a sense, as before stated, in which Christ did die for all men. His
death had the effect of justifying the offer of salvation to every man; and of course
was designed to have that effect. He therefore died sufficiently
As God in the course of nature and in the dispensation of his providence, moves on in undisturbed majesty, little concerned at the apparent complication or even inconsistency of one effect or one dispensation with another; so the Spirit of God in the Bible unfolds the purposes, truths, and dealings of God, just as they are, assured that even finite minds will ultimately be able to see the consistency of all his revelations. The doctrines of foreordination, sovereignty, and effectual providential control, go hand in hand with those of the liberty and responsibility of rational creatures. Those of freedom from the law, of salvation by faith without works, and of the absolute necessity of holy living stand side by side. On the same page we find the assurance of God’s love to sinners, and declarations that He would that all men should come unto Him and live, with explicit assertions that He has determined to leave multitudes to perish in their sins. In like manner, the express declarations that it was the incomprehensible and peculiar love of God for his own people, which induced Him to send his Son for their redemption; that Christ came into the world for that specific object; that He died for his sheep; that He gave Himself for his Church; and that the salvation of all for whom He thus offered Himself is rendered certain by the gift of the Spirit to bring them to faith and repentance, are intermingled with declarations of good-will to all mankind, with offers of salvation to every one who will believe in the Son of God, and denunciations of wrath against those who reject these overtures of mercy. All we have to do is not to ignore or deny either of these modes of representation, but to open our minds wide enough to receive them both, and reconcile them as best we can. Both are true, in all the cases above referred to, whether we can see their consistency or not.
In the review of this subject, it is plain that the doctrine
that Christ died equally for all men with the purpose of rendering the salvation
of all possible, has no advantage over the doctrine that He died specially for his
own people, and with the purpose of rendering their salvation certain. It presents
no higher view of
The history of this doctrine is commonly divided into three per nods, the Patristic; the Scholastic; and the time of the Reformation and from that event to the present day. The method which the writers on this subject have usually adopted, is to pass in review in chronological order the distinguished theologians living during these several periods, and present a general outline of the teaching of each.
The two great objects to be accomplished by the work of Christ are, the removal of the curse under which mankind laboured on account of sin; and their restoration to the image and fellowship of God. Both these are essential to salvation. We have guilt to be removed, and souls dead in sin to be quickened with a new principle of divine life. Both these objects are provided for in the doctrine of redemption as presented in the Scriptures and held in the Church. In the opposing theories devised by theologians, either one of these objects is ignored or one is unduly subordinated to the other. It was characteristic of the early Greek church to exalt the latter, while the Latin made the former the more prominent. In reviewing the history of the doctrine it will be found that there are five general theories which comprise all the numerous forms in which it has been held.
§ 1. The Orthodox View.
The first is that which has been for ages regarded as the
orthodox doctrine; in its essential features common to the Latin, Lutheran, and
Reformed churches. This is the doctrine which the writer has endeavoured to exhibit
and vindicate in the preceding pages. According to this doctrine the work of Christ
is a real satisfaction, of infinite inherent merit, to the vindicatory justice of
God; so that He saves his people by doing for them, and in their stead, what they
were unable to do for themselves, satisfying the demands of the law in their behalf,
and bearing its penalty in their stead; whereby they are reconciled to God, receive
the Holy
This doctrine provides for both the great objects above mentioned. It shows how the curse of the law is removed by Christ’s being made a curse for us; and how in virtue of this reconciliation with God we become, through the Spirit, partakers of the life of Christ. He is made unto us not only righteousness, but sanctification. We are cleansed by his blood from guilt, and renewed by his Spirit after the image of God. Having died in Him, we live in Him. Participation of his death secures participation of his life.
§ 2. Doctrine of some of the Fathers.
The second theory is that which prevailed extensively among
the fathers. It was intended only as a solution of the question how Christ delivers
us from the power of Satan. It contemplated neither the removal of guilt nor the
restoration of divine life; but simply our deliverance from the power of Satan.
It was founded on those passages of Scriptures which represent man since the fall
as in bondage to the prince of darkness. The object of redemption was to deliver
mankind from this bondage. This could only be done by in some way overcoming Satan
and destroying his right or power to hold men as his slaves. This Christ has effected,
and thus becomes the Redeemer of men. This general theory is presented in three
different forms. The first appeals to the old principle of the rights of war, according
to which the conquered became the slaves of the conqueror. Satan conquered Adam,
and thus became the rightful owner of him and his posterity. Hence he is called
the god and prince of this world. To deliver men from this dreaded bondage, Christ
offered Himself as a ransom to Satan. Satan accepted the offer, and renounced his
right to retain mankind as his slaves. Christ, however, broke the bonds of Satan,
whose power was founded upon the sinfulness of his subjects. Christ being divine,
and without sin, could not be held subject to his power. In answer to the question,
How Satan could accept Christ as the ransom for men, if he knew Him to be a divine
person? it was said that he did not know Him to be divine, because his divinity
was veiled by his humanity. And then in answer to the question, How he could accept
of Him as a ransom, if he regarded Him as merely a man? it is said that he saw that
Christ was unspeakably superior to other men, and perhaps one of the higher order
of angels, whom he might hope securely to retain. The second form of this theory
does not regard Christ as a ransom
The third form of the theory is, that as the right and power
of Satan over man is founded on sin, he exceeded his authority when he brought about
the death of Christ, who was free from all sin; and thus justly forfeited his authority
over men altogether. This general theory that Christ’s great work, as a Redeemer,
was to deliver man from bondage to Satan, and that the ransom was paid to Him and
not to God; or that the difficulty in the way of our salvation was the right which
Satan had acquired to us as slaves, which right Christ in some way cancelled, was
very prevalent for a long time in the Church. It is found in Irenæus, Origen, Theodoret,
Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Augustine, Jerome, Hilary, Leo the Great, and others.
1. That man by sin became subject to the penalty of the divine law.
2. That Satan has the office of inflicting that penalty in so far as he is allowed to torment and degrade the children of men.
3. That Christ by his death having satisfied the penalty of
the law, of course has delivered us from the power of Satan. See especially
§ 3. The Moral Theory.
A third general theory concerning the work of Christ is that
which rejects all idea of expiation, or of the satisfaction of justice by vicarious
punishment, and attributes all the efficacy of his work to the moral effect produced
on the hearts of men by his
Some of the advocates of this view of the work of Christ do
indeed speak freely of the justice of God. They recognize Him as a just Being who
everywhere and always punishes sin. But this is done only by the operation of eternal
laws. Holiness, from its nature, produces happiness; and that is its reward. Sin,
from its nature, produces misery; and that is its punishment. Remove the sin and
you remove the punishment. The case is analogous to health and disease. If a man
is well, he is physically happy; if diseased, he is in a state of suffering. The
only way possible to remove the suffering is to remove the disease; and further
than this nothing can be required. This is the view presented by John Young, D.
D.
Coleridge, in his “Aids to Reflection,” presents the same view. In a note at the end of that work he gives the following illustration of the subject. A widow has a prodigal son, who deserts her and leaves her desolate. That son has a friend who takes his place and performs all filial duties to the unhappy mother. The prodigal, won by the exhibition of goodness on the part of his friend, returns to his home penitent and reformed. How unreasonable and revolting, says Coleridge, would it be to say that the friend had made expiation or rendered a satisfaction to justice for the sins of the prodigal.
This moral view of the atonement, as it is called, has been
presented in different forms. In the first form the work of Christ in the salvation
of men is confined to his office of teacher. He introduced a new and higher form
of religion, by which men were redeemed from the darkness and degradation of heathenism.
This was so great a good, and so patent to the eyes of those who themselves were
converts from heathenism, and who were surrounded by its evils, that it is not wonderful
that some of the fathers exalted
A second form of this theory, while it retains the idea that the real benefit conferred by Christ was his doctrine, yet ascribes his title of Saviour principally to his death. As the Scriptures so constantly assert that we are saved by the blood, the cross, the sufferings of Christ, this feature of the Scriptural teaching cannot be overlooked. It is therefore said that He saves us, not as a sacrifice, but as a martyr. He died for us. By his death his doctrines were sealed with blood. Not only, therefore, as attesting his own sincerity, but as giving assurance of the truths which He taught, especially the truths concerning a future life, the love of God, and his willingness to forgive sin, and as confirming to us the truth of those doctrines He is entitled to be regarded as the Saviour of men.
Thirdly, others again regard the power of Christ in saving men from sin, as not due to his teaching, or to his sealing his doctrines with his blood, but to the manifestation which He made of self-sacrificing love. This exerts a greater power over the hearts of men than all else besides. If the wicked cannot be reclaimed by love, which manifests itself not only in words of gentleness, by acts of kindness, and by expressions of sympathy, but also by entire self-sacrifice, by the renunciation of all good, and by voluntary submission to all evil, their case must be hopeless. As such love as that of Christ was never before exhibited to men; as no such instance of self-sacrifice had ever before occurred, or can ever occur again, He is the Saviour by way of eminence. Other men, who through love submit to self-denial for the good of men, are within their sphere and in their measure, saviours too; the work of salvation by the exhibition of self-sacrificing love, is going on around us continually, and from eternity to eternity, so long as evil exists, in the presence of beings imbued with love. Still Christ in his work occupies a place peculiar and preeminent, and therefore we are Christians; we recognize Christ as the greatest of Saviours.
Such is the view elaborately presented by Dr. Bushnell in
the work just referred to. Toward the end of his book, however, he virtually takes
it all back, and lays down his weapons, conquered
Objections to this Theory.
The obvious objections to this moral view of the atonement in all its forms, are, —
1. That while it retains some elements of the truth, in that it recognizes the restoration of man to holiness and God, as the great end of the work of Christ, and regards his work as involving the greatest possible or conceivable manifestation of divine love, which manifestation is the most powerful of all natural influences to operate on the hearts of men; yet it leaves out entirely what is essential to the Scriptural doctrine of atonement. The Bible exhibits Christ as a priest, as offering Himself a sacrifice for the expiation of our sins, as bearing our sins in his own body on the tree, as having been made a curse for us, and as giving Himself is a ransom for our redemption. The Scriptures teach that this expiation of guilt is absolutely necessary before the souls of the guilty can be made the subjects of renewing and sanctifying grace. Before this expiation they are spiritually dead under the penalty of the law, which is death in all its forms. And therefore while thus under the curse, all the moral influences in the world would be as useless as noonday light to give sight to the blind, or sanitary measures to raise the dead. In rejecting, therefore, the doctrine of expiation, or satisfaction to justice, this theory rejects the very essence of the Scriptural doctrine of atonement.
2. This theory does not meet the necessities of our condition. We are sinners; we are guilty as well as polluted. The consciousness of our responsibility to justice, and of the necessity of satisfying its demands, is as undeniable and as indestructible as our consciousness of pollution. Expiation for the one is as much a necessity as sanctification for the other. No form of religion, therefore, which excludes the idea of expiation, or which fails to provide for the removal of guilt in a way which satisfies the reason and conscience, can be suited to our necessities. No such religion has ever prevailed among men, or can by possibility give peace to a burdened conscience. It is because the Lord Jesus Christ is revealed as a propitiation for our sins, as bearing in our stead the penalty which we had incurred, that his blood cleanses us from all sin, and gives that peace which passes all understanding.
The idea that there is no forgiveness with God; that by inexorable
law He deals with his creatures according to their subjective state and character,
and that therefore the only salvation necessary or possible is sanctification, is
appalling. No man is in such an
3. All the arguments presented on the preceding pages, in
favour of the doctrine of expiation, are of course arguments against a theory which
rejects that doctrine. Besides, this theory evidently changes the whole plan of
salvation. It alters all our relations to Christ, as our head and representative,
and the ground of our acceptance with God; and consequently it changes the nature
of religion. Christianity is one thing if Christ is a sacrifice for sin; and altogether
a different thing if He is only a moral reformer, an example, a teacher, or even
a martyr. We need a divine Saviour if He is to bear our iniquities, and to make
satisfaction for the sins of the world; but a human saviour is all that is needed
if the moral theory of the atonement is to be adopted. Gieseler says, what every
Christian knows must be true without being told, that
§ 4. The Governmental Theory.
This theory was introduced into the Church by Grotius, in the seventeenth century. He wrote in opposition to the Socinians, and therefore his book is entitled: “Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi.” It is in point of learning and ability all that could be expected from one of the greatest men of his generation. The design with which the book was written, and the universally received formulas of expression at that time prevailing, to the use of which Grotius adheres, give his work an aspect of orthodoxy. He speaks of satisfaction to justice, of propitiation, of the penal character of our Lord’s sufferings, of his death as a vicarious sacrifice, and of his bearing the guilt of our sins. In short, so far as the use of terms is concerned, there is hardly any departure from the doctrine of the Reformed Church, of which he was then a member. Different principles, however, underlaid his whole theory, and, therefore, a different sense was to be attached to the terms he used. There was, after all, no real satisfaction of justice, no real substitution, and no real enduring of the penalty of the law. His Socinian opponents, when they came to answer his book, said that he had given up all the main principles in dispute. Grotius was a jurist as well as a theologian, and looked at the whole subject from a juridical standpoint. The main elements of his theory are, —
1. That in the forgiveness of sin God is to be regarded neither
as an offended party, nor as a creditor, nor as a master, but as a moral governor.
A creditor can remit the debt due to him at pleasure; a master may punish or not
punish as he sees fit; but a ruler must act, not according to his feelings or caprice,
but with a view to the best interests of those under his authority. Grotius says
that the overlooking the distinctions above indicated is the fundamental error of
the Socinians.
2. The end of punishment is the prevention of crime, or the
preservation of order and the promotion of the best interests of the community.
“Justitiæ rectoris pars est servare leges etiam positivas et a se latas, quod verum
esse tam in universitate libera quam in rege summo probant jurisconsulti: cui illud
est consequens, ut rectori relaxare legem non liceat, nisi causa aliqua accedat,
si non necessaria, certe sufficiens: quæ itidem recepta est a jurisconsultis sententia.
Ratio utriusque est, quod actus ferendi aut relaxandi legem non sit actus absoluti
dominii, sed actus imperii, qui tendere debeat ad boni ordinis conversationem.”
3. As a good governor cannot allow sin to be committed with immunity, God cannot pardon the sins of men without some adequate exhibition of his displeasure, and of his determination to punish it. This was the design of the sufferings and death of Christ. God punished sin in Him as an example. This example was the more impressive on account of the dignity of Christ’s person, and therefore in view of his death, God can consistently with the best interests of his government remit the penalty of the law in the case of penitent believers.
4. Punishment, Grotius defined as suffering inflicted on account of sin. It need not be imposed on account of the personal demerit of the sufferer; nor with the design of satisfying justice, in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. It was enough that it should be on account of sin. As the sufferings of Christ were caused by our sins, insomuch as they were designed to render their remission consistent with the interest of God’s moral government, they fall within this comprehensive definition of the word punishment. Grotius, therefore, could say that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, as his sufferings were an example of what sin deserved.
5. The essence of the atonement, therefore, according to Grotius
Remonstrants.
The Synod of Dort met two years after the publication of the
work in which this theory was propounded. Grotius joined those who remonstrated
against the decisions of that Synod, and who on that account were called Remonstrants.
The Remonstrant theologians, however, did not as a class adhere to Grotius’s peculiar
doctrine. They did not regard the work of Christ as a governmental transaction,
but adhered to the Scriptural mode of representation. They spoke of his death as
a sacrifice and ransom. They rejected indeed the Church doctrine. They denied that
what Christ did was a satisfaction of justice; that He bore the penalty of the law;
that He acted as our substitute, fulfilling in our place all the demands of the
law. As these ideas have no part, according to their view, in the doctrine of sacrifices
for sin, so they have no place in the true doctrine concerning the work of Christ.
Under the Old Testament a sacrifice was not an equivalent for the penalty incurred;
it was not a satisfaction to justice; the victim did not do what the offerer ought
to have done. It was simply a
The Supernaturalists.
Although the Remonstrants as a body did not accept of the
governmental theory as proposed by Grotius, his main idea was frequently reproduced
by subsequent writers. This was done especially by the Supernaturalists in Germany
in their endeavour to save something from the destructive principles of the Rationalists.
They conceded that the work of Christ was not strictly a satisfaction to justice.
They taught that it was necessary as an example and a symbol.
C. Ch. Flatt endeavoured to find “a middle way between the
course of those who introduced into the Scriptures their own philosophical opinions,
or the philosophy of the age in which they lived, and the strict grammatical, historical
interpretation of those who insisted on taking the words of Scripture either in
their etymological sense, or in that sense in which it can he historically proved
that at least a part of the contemporaries of the sacred writers understood them,
or which stupid Rabbinical literalists attached to certain phrases without regard
to the fact how often the meaning of words, without a change of form, through higher
culture and refinement of moral feeling, is spiritualized and ennobled.”
Storr, in all his works, and especially in his “Commentary
on the Epistle to the Hebrews,” and his dissertation on the design of Christ’s death,
makes the Scriptures his authoritative guide, and therefore approaches much nearer
to the Church doctrine than perhaps any German theologian of his generation. He
assumes that Christ as man was bound to render the same obedience to the divine
law as is due from all other men. But in virtue of the union of his human with the
divine nature He as man was entitled
American Theologians.
The governmental theory of the atonement seems to have had an entirely independent origin in this country. It was the necessary consequence of the principle that all virtue consists in benevolence. If that principle be correct, all the moral attributes of God are modifications of benevolence. There is no such perfection in God as justice other than the purpose and disposition to promote happiness. The death of Christ, therefore, could have no other design than to render the forgiveness of sin consistent with the best interests of the moral government of God. This theory was elaborated by the younger President Edwards, presented in full in Dr. Beman’s work on the Atonement, and adopted by that numerous and highly influential class of American theologians who embraced the principle on which the theory, as held in this country, is founded. In the work of Dr. E. A. Park, of Andover, on the Atonement, there is a collection of discourses from the pens of the most distinguished teachers of this doctrine. In the introduction to that volume Professor Park gives an interesting history of the development of this view of the atonement as held in this country.
Objections to the Theory.
1. The first and most obvious objection to this theory is
that it is founded on an erroneous idea of the nature of punishment. It assumes
that the special design of punishment is the good of society. If the best interests
of a community, either human or divine, a commonwealth of men or the moral government
of God, can be secured without the punishment of crime, then no such punishment
ought to be inflicted. But suffering inflicted for the good of others is not punishment
any more than suffering inflicted for the good of the sufferer. The amputation of
a crushed limb is not of the nature
No evil is of the nature of punishment unless it be inflicted in satisfaction of justice and in execution of the penalty of law. A writer in the “British Quarterly Review” for October, 1866, says: “There is a story of an English judge who once said to a criminal, ‘You are transported not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen.’” The reviewer then adds, “No principle more false in itself or more ruinous to public morality was ever announced from the English bench. The whole moral effect of punishment lies in its being just. The man who suffers for the benefit of others is a martyr and not a convict.” It is on this false principle that the whole governmental theory of the atonement is founded. It admits of no ground of punishment but the benefit of others. And if that benefit can be otherwise secured all necessity for punishment ceases, and all objection to the dispensing of pardon is removed. If the fundamental principle of a theory be false, the theory itself must be unsound.
2. The theory contradicts the intuitive moral judgments of
men. The testimony of every man’s conscience in view of his own sins is that he
deserves to be punished, not for the good of others, but for his own demerit. If
not guilty he cannot justly be punished; and if guilty he cannot justly be pardoned
without satisfaction to justice. As this is the testimony of conscience with regard
to our own sins, it is the testimony of the consciousness of all men with regard
to the sins of others. When a great crime is committed, the instinctive judgment
of men is that the perpetrators ought to be punished. No analysis of human consciousness
can resolve this sentiment of justice into a conviction of the understanding that
the interests of society demand the punishment of crime. That indeed is true. It
is one of the incidental benefits, but not the special design or end of punishment.
Indeed, the whole moral effect of punishment depends upon the assumption that it
is inflicted on the ground of ill desert, and not for the public good. If the latter
object be made prominent, punishment loses its nature and of course its appropriate
moral effect. A theory which ignores these intuitive
3. All the arguments heretofore urged in proof that the justice of God cannot be resolved into benevolence are valid arguments against the governmental theory of the atonement. The doctrine that happiness is the highest good, and that all virtue consists in the desire and purpose to promote the greatest possible amount of happiness, is almost discarded from the schools, and should be discarded from theology where it has wrought so much evil. It is so inconsistent with our moral nature, to assert that there is no difference between right and wrong except that between the expedient and the inexpedient, that the doctrine could never have been adopted except as a means of solving difficulties for the understanding, at the expense of the conscience. This point has been already considered when treating of the attributes of God and of the design of creation; and therefore it need not be further discussed in this place.
4. A fourth argument against the governmental theory is that it is unscriptural. The Bible constantly represents Christ as a priest, as a sacrifice, as a propitiation, as an expiation, as the substitute and representative of sinners; as assuming their place and sustaining the curse or penalty of the law in their stead. All these representations are either ignored or explained away by the advocates of this theory. Governments, civil commonwealths, from which the principles and illustrations of this theory are derived, know nothing of priests, sacrifices, and vicarious punishments. And, therefore, these ideas do not enter, and cannot be admitted into the governmental theory. But these ideas are the vital elements of the Scriptural doctrine of the atonement; so that if we renounce them we renounce the doctrine itself, or at least seriously impair its integrity and power. Whole volumes on the atonement have been written in which the words priest, sacrifice, and propitiation hardly occur.
5. This theory, as well as the moral view of the atonement
is false, because defective. As it is true that the work of Christ is designed and
adapted to exert the most powerful moral influence on sinners to induce them to
return to God, so it is true that
§ 5. The Mystical Theory.
The fifth theory on this subject is the mystical. This agrees with the moral view (under which it might be included), in that it represents the design of Christ’s work to be the production of a subjective effect in the sinner. It produces a change in him. It overcomes the evil of his nature and restores him to a state of holiness. The two systems differ, however, as to the means by which this inward change is accomplished. According to the one it is by moral power operating according to the laws of mind by the exhibition of truth and the exercise of moral influence. According to the other it is by the mysterious union of God and man, of the divine with the human nature, i.e., of divinity with humanity, brought about by the incarnation.
This general idea is presented in various forms. Sometimes
the writers quoted in favour of this mystical view teach nothing more ihan what
has ever been held in the Church, and what is clearly caught in the Scriptures..
It is true that there is a moral and spiritual union between God and man effected
by the incarnation of the Son of God and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. He and
his people are one. Our Lord prays to the Father,
Among the Platonizing fathers, however, the mystical operation
of the incarnation was connected with their doctrine of the Logos. What the real
doctrine of the fathers and of Philo their predecessor and master in his matter
concerning the Logos was, has ever been a matter of dispute among the learned. It
is not at all even yet a settled matter whether Philo regarded the Logos as a person
In the hands of the Platonizing fathers this doctrine was
only modified. Some of them, as Origen, held that the Logos was a person eternally
begotten of the Father; according to Clemens Alexandrinus, He was, as the Logos
ἐνδιάθετος, eternally in God as his wisdom, and therefore
impersonal; but as the Logos προφορικός, or united to
the world as its formative principle, He became a person. In applying these philosophical
speculations to the explanation of the doctrine concerning the person and work of
Christ, there is no little diversity among these writers, so far as the details
are concerned. In substance they agree. The eternal Logos or Son, became truly a
man, and as such gave Himself as a sacrifice and ransom for the redemption of men.
He also by his incarnation secures our recovery from the power of sin and restoration
to the image and fellowship of God. How this latter object is accomplished is the
mystical part of the theory. The Logos is the eternal Son of God; but He is also
the interior life and substance of the world. Rational creatures included in the
world, are endowed
In the beginning of the ninth century John Scotus Erigena anticipated most of the results of the highest modern speculation. Schelling and Hegel had him for a predecessor and guide. With him “Creator et creatura unum est. Deus est omnia, et omnia Deus.” The creation is necessary and eternal; the incarnation is necessary and eternal; and redemption is necessary and eternal. All is process. An eternal unfolding of the infinite in the finite, and return of the finite into the infinite. Erigena, from his place in history and his relation to the Church, was forced to clothe his philosophy as much as possible with the drapery of Christianity this secured for him an influence which continued long after his death over later speculative theologians.
During the Middle Ages there was a succession of advocates
of the mystical theory. Some of them following Erigena adopted a system essentially
pantheistic; others were theistic. The one class strove to reduce Christianity into
a system of philosophy. They adopted the principle of Erigena, “Conficitur inde,
veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque, veram religionem esse veram
philosophiam.” The two sources of knowledge are recta ratio and vera auctoritas.
Both are divine as coming from God. Reason however, as first, is the higher, and
nothing is to
Mystical Theory at the Time of the Reformation.
At the time of the Reformation the same mode of apprehending
and presenting Christianity was adopted. While the Reformers held to the great objective
truths of the Bible, to a historical Christ, to the reality and necessity of his
obedience and satisfaction as something done for us and in our place, i.e., to
an objective redemption and justification, a class of writers soon appeared who
insisted on what they called the Christ within us, and merged the objective work
of Christ into a subjective operation in the souls of his people; or at least subordinated
the former entirely to the latter. A work, entitled “Die Deutsche Theologie” (German
Theology), was published during the lifetime of Luther, which contained a great
amount of important truth, and to which the illustrious reformer acknowledged himself
greatly indebted. In that book, however, the mystical element was carried to a dangerous
extreme. While the historical facts respecting Christ and his redeeming work were
allowed to remain, little stress was laid upon them. The real value of the blessings
received from Christ, was the change effected in the soul itself; and that change
was not referred to the work of the Holy Spirit, so much as to the union of the
divine nature with our nature, in virtue of the incarnation. The book teaches that
if it were possible for a man to be as pure
Osiander.
Osiander and Schwenkfeld, two contemporaries of Luther, were
both advocates, although in different forms, of the same theory. Men are saved by
the substantial union of the divine nature with the nature of man. According to
Osiander justification is not by the imputation, but by the infusion of righteousness.
And the righteousness infused is not the righteousness of Christ wrought out here
on earth. What Christ did centuries ago cannot make us righteous. What we receive
is his divine nature. This is the specific doctrine for which Osiander was denounced
in the Form of Concord. Man, according to him, was originally created not after
the image of God as such, nor of the Son as such, but of the Son as He was to become
man. Manhood was eternally included in the idea and nature of the Son of God. His
incarnation was, therefore, due to his nature, and not to the accident of man’s
sinning. The idea of the incarnation is eternal, and in reference to it the whole
universe was created and all things consist. Christ’s human nature is only the vehicle
for conveying to us his divine nature. In the vine, he says, there are two natures,
the one is the nature of the wood, which it retains, even if it should be withered
up; the other is “plane occulta, fructifera et vinifera natura.” And as the clusters
of grapes could not have the vinous nature, unless they were wood of the wood of
the vine; so neither can we partake of the divine nature of Christ, unless we, by
faith and baptism, are so incorporated with Him, as to be flesh of his flesh and
bone of his bone. But the human nature of Christ, without the divine (si sine Deo
esset), would be of no avail.
Schwenkfeld.
While Osiander makes the divine nature of Christ as communicated
to us our righteousness and life, and regards his humanity as only the means of
communication, Schwenkfeld exalts the human into the divine, and regards this divine
human nature as the source of life to us. He agreed with Osiander in making justification
subjective, by the infusion of righteousness; and also in teaching that
Schwenkfeld’s followers were numerous enough to form a distinct sect, which continues to this day. Some religionists, both in Germany and in this country, are still called by his name. All the writers on the history of doctrine give the authorities for the statements concerning the doctrines of Osiander and Schwenkfeld derived from sources not generally accessible in this country.
Oetinger.
The prominent representative of the mystical theory during
the eighteenth century, was Friedrich Christopher Oetinger, a distinguished theologian
of South Germany. He was born in 1702, and died in 1782. He enjoyed every advantage
of culture
The Modern Views.
In the present period of the Church’s history, this mystical
theory of the person and work of Christ is probably more prevalent than ever before.
The whole school of German speculative theologians, with their followers in England
and America, are on this ground. Of these theologians there are, as remarked above,
two classes, the pantheistic and the theistic. According to the former, the nature
of man at first was an imperfect manifestation of the absolute Being, and in the
development of the race this manifestation is rendered complete; but complete only
as an eternal progress. According to the other, man has an existence and personality,
in one sense, outside of God. Nevertheless God and man are substantially the same.
This identity or sameness is shown perfectly in Christ, and through Him, is realized
more and more perfectly in the Church as some teach, or, as others say, in the
whole race.
§ 6. Concluding Remarks.
In reviewing these several theories concerning the method of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, it is important to remark, —
1. That it is not to be inferred because certain writers are
quoted as setting forth one particular theory, that they recognized the truth of
no other view of the work of Christ. This remark is especially applicable to the
patristic period. While some of the fathers speak at times of Christ’s saving the
world as a teacher, and others of them say that He gave himself as a ransom to Satan,
and others again that He brings men back to the image of God, this does not prove
that they ignored the fact that he was a sin offering, making expiation for the
guilt of the world. It is characteristic of the early period of the Church, before
special doctrines had become matters of controversy, that the people and the theologians
retain the common language and representations of the Bible; while the latter, especially,
dwell sometimes disproportionately on one mode of Scriptural representation, and
sometimes disproportionately on another. The fathers constantly speak of Christ
as a priest, as a sacrifice, and as a ransom. They ascribe our salvation to his
blood and to his cross. The ideas of expiation and propitiation
2. The second remark which the preceding survey suggests is,
that the theories antagonistic to the common Church doctrine are purely philosophical.
Origen assumed that in man there are the three constituent principles: body, soul,
and spirit; and that in analogy therewith, there are three senses of Scripture,
the historical, the moral, and the spiritual. The first is the plain meaning of
the words which suggests itself to any ordinary, intelligent reader; the second
is the allegorical application of the historical sense for moral instruction. For
example, what Moses commands about not muzzling an ox which treads out the corn,
may be understood as teaching the general principle that labour should be rewarded,
and, therefore, may be applied as it is by the Apostle, to enforce the duty of supporting
ministers of the Gospel. The third or spiritual sense, is the general philosophical
truth, which is assumed to underlie the doctrines of the Scriptures; of which truths
the Scriptural doctrines are only the temporary forms. Thus Origen made the Bible
teach Platonism. The object of most of the early apologists, was to show that Christianity
had a philosophy as well as heathenism; and that the philosophy of the former is
identical with the philosophy of the latter so far as that of the latter can prove
itself to be true. The trouble was, and always has been, that whatever philosophy
was assumed to be true, the doctrines of Scripture were made to conform to it or
were sublimated into it. The historical and moral senses of Scripture constitute
the object of faith; the spiritual sense is the object of gnosis or knowledge. The
former is very well in its place and for the people; but the latter is something
of a higher order to which only the philosophically cultivated can attain. That
the mystical theory of the person and work of Christ, especially, is the product
of philosophical speculation is obvious — (1.) From the express avowals of its most
distinguished advocates. (2.) From the nature of the theory itself, which reveals
itself as a philosophy, i.e., as a speculative doctrine concerning the nature of
being, the nature of God, the nature of man, and of the relation of God to the world,
etc. (3.) From the fact that it has changed with the varying systems of philosophy.
So long as Platonism was in vogue, the spiritual sense of Scripture was assumed
to be Platonism; that system discarded, the schoolmen adopted the philosophy of
Aristotle, and then the Bible taught the doctrines of
After all, apart from the Bible, the best antidote to all
these false theories of the person and work of Christ, is such a book as Doctor
Schaff’s “Christ in Song.”
§ 1. Christ our Intercessor.
Under the old dispensation the High Priest, after having offered sacrifices for sin in the outer court, was directed, on the day of atonement, to take the blood of the victims and a censer with burning incense, and to enter within the veil, and there present the blood before God, sprinkling it upon the mercy seat. In like manner, as we are taught by the Apostle, Christ, having offered Himself on the cross as a sacrifice for our sins, has passed through the heavens, there to appear before God in our behalf. He is, therefore, said to be the minister of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched and not man. His priestly office is now exercised in heaven, where he ever lives to intercede for us.
This work of Christ is expressed in Scripture, —
1. By saying that He appears before God for us.
2. His intercession is expressed by saying that He draws near
to God on our behalf. The word used is ἐντυγχάνειν, to meet with, to talk with. To meet, or approach one
for
(ὑπέρ)
another, is to intercede in his behalf. (
3. Christ is called our Paraclete, παράκλητος.
This word is translated advocate in
§ 2. Its Nature.
As to the nature of Christ’s intercession, little can be said. There is error in pressing the representations of Scripture too far; and there is error in explaining them away. This latter error is chargeable on many of the later theologians, who teach that the Scriptures intend, by the intercession of Christ, nothing more than his continued intervention or agency in the salvation of his people. Many of the Lutheran theologians, on the other extreme, err in insisting that this intercession of our Lord in our behalf in heaven is vocalis, verbalis, et oralis. Sounds and words suppose an atmosphere and a body, which is flesh and blood, which Paul says cannot inherit the kingdom of God. The Reformed theologians abstain from these extremes, and consider it enough to say that the intercession of Christ includes — (1.) His appearing before God in our behalf, as the sacrifice for our sins, as our High Priest, on the ground of whose work we receive the remission of our sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and all needed good. (2.) Defence against the sentence of the law and the charges of Satan, who is the great accuser. (3.) His offering Himself as our surety, not only that the demands of justice shall be shown to be satisfied, but that his people shall be obedient and faithful. (4.) The oblation of the persons of the redeemed, sanctifying their prayers, and all their services, rendering them acceptable to God, through the savour of his own merits.
§ 3. Its Objects.
As to the objects of Christ’s intercession, the Lutherans
make a distinction between his intercession as general and special. He intercedes
generally for all men, and specially for the elect. The former is assumed on the
authority of
§ 4. Intercession of Saints.
There is but one Mediator between God and man, and but one
High Priest through whom we draw near to God. And as intercession is a priestly
function, it follows that Christ is our only intercessor. But as there is a sense
in which all believers are kings and priests unto God, which is consistent with
Christ’s being our only king and priest; so there is a sense in which one believer
may intercede for another, which is not inconsistent with Christ’s being our only
intercessor. By intercession in the case of believers is only meant that one child
of God may pray for another or for all men. To intercede is in this sense merely
to pray for. But in the case of Christ it expresses an official act, which none
who does not fill his office can perform. As under the old economy one Israelite
could pray for his brethren, but only the High Priest could enter within the veil
and officially interpose in behalf of the people; so now, although we may pray,
one for another, Christ only can appear as a priest before God in our behalf and
plead his
Protestants object to the intercession of saints as taught and practised in the Church of Rome.
1. Because it supposes a class of beings who do not exist; that is, of canonized departed spirits. It is only those who, with the angels, have been officially declared by the Church, on account of their merits, to be now in heaven, who are regarded as intercessors. This, however, is an unauthorized assumption on the part of the Church. It has no prerogative to enable it thus to decide, and to enroll whom it will among glorified spirits. Often those thus dignified have been real enemies of God, and persecutors of his people.
2. It leads to practical idolatry. Idolatry is the ascription of divine attributes to a creature. In the popular mind the saints, and especially the Virgin Mary, are regarded as omnipresent; able at all times and in all places, to hear the prayers addressed to them, and to relieve the wants of their worshippers.
3. It is derogatory to Christ. As He is the only and sufficient mediator between God and man, and as He is ever willing to hear and answer the prayers of his people, it supposes some deficiency in Him, if we need other mediators to approach God in our behalf.
4. It moreover is contrary to Scripture, inasmuch as the saints are assumed to prevail with God on account of their personal merits. Such merit no human being has before God. No man has any merit to plead for his own salvation, much less for the salvation of others.
5. The practice is superstitious and degrading. Superstition is belief without evidence. The practice of the invocation of saints is founded on a belief which has no support from Scripture. It is calling upon imaginary helpers. It degrades men by turning them from the Creator to the creature, by leading them to put their trust in an arm of flesh, instead of in the power of Christ. It, therefore, turns away the hearts and confidence of the people from Him to those who can neither hear nor save.
§ 1. The Church God’s Kingdom.
God as the creator and preserver of the universe, and as infinite in his being and perfections, is, in virtue of his nature, the absolute sovereign of all his creatures. This sovereignty He exercises over the material world by his wisdom and power, and over rational beings as a moral ruler. From this rightful authority of God, our race revolted, and thereby became a part of the kingdom of darkness of which Satan is the head. To this kingdom the mass of mankind has ever since belonged. But God, in his. grace and mercy, determined to deliver men from the. consequences of their apostasy. He not only announced the coming of a Redeemer who should destroy the power of Satan, but He at once inaugurated an antagonistic kingdom? consisting of men chosen out of the world, and through the renewing of the Holy Ghost restored to their allegiance. Until the time of Abraham this kingdom does not appear to have had any visible organization apart from the families of the people of God. Every pious household was a church of which the parent was the priest.
To prevent the universal spread of idolatry, to preserve the knowledge of the truth, to gather in his elect, and to prepare the way for the coming of the promised Redeemer, God entered into covenant with the father of the faithful and with his descendants through Isaac, constituting them his visible kingdom, and making them the depositaries and guardians of his supernatural revelations. In this covenant He promised eternal life upon condition of faith in Him that was to come.
When Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt, they were made a theocracy so constituted in its officers, in its institutions, and in its services, as not only to preserve alive the knowledge of God’s purpose and plan of salvation, but also to set forth the character, offices, and work of the promised seed of Abraham in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.
The kingdom of God, therefore, as consisting of those who acknowledge, worship, love, and obey Jehovah as the only living and true God, has existed in our world ever since the fall of Adam. It has ever been the light and life of the world. It is the salt by which it is preserved. It is the leaven by which it is ultimately to be pervaded. To gather his people into this kingdom, and to carry it on to its consummation, is the end of all God’s dispensations, and the purpose for which his eternal Son assumed our nature. He was born to be a king. To this end He lived and died and rose again, that He might be Lord of all those given to Him by the Father.
§ 2. Christ is truly a King.
Although the kingdom of God had existed from the beginning, yet as everything therewith connected before the Advent was merely preparatory, the Scriptures constantly speak of the Messiah as a king who was to set up a kingdom into which in the end all other kingdoms were to be merged. The most familiar designation applied to Him in the Scriptures is Lord. But Lord means proprietor and ruler; and when used of God or Christ, it means absolute proprietor and sovereign ruler. Apart from Christ’s right in us and sovereignty over us as God, He as the God-man is our Lord. We belong to Him by the purchase of his blood, and God has set Him as King on his holy hill of Zion.
In the Book of Genesis the Messiah is set forth as the Shiloh
to whom is to be the gathering of the people. In reference to Him it was said in
In the New Testament Christ is set forth as a king, in harmony
with the predictions which foretold his advent. The Angel Gabriel, in announcing
to the Virgin Mary the approaching birth of the Messiah said, “Thou shalt conceive
in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great,
and shall be called the Son of the Highest: and the Lord God shall give unto him
the throne of his father David: And he shall reign over the house of Jacob forever;
and of his kingdom there shall be no end.” (
Nothing, therefore, is more certain, according to the Scriptures,
than that Christ is a king; and consequently, if we would retain
§ 3. Nature of Christ’s Kingdom.
Although the kingdom of God on earth was set up immediately after the fall, yet as the Messiah was to come to make all things new, and to take into his hands as the Theanthropos the administration of this kingdom, the Old Testament predicted, and the New Testament announces, the establishment of a new kingdom as consequent on his advent.
The word βασιλεία is used in Scripture in three senses. (1.) For royal authority or dominion; such dominion as it is the prerogative of a king to exercise. (2.) For those who are subject to that authority. Among men any community, or commonwealth, or territory subject to a king, constitutes his kingdom. And in the New Testament, those who acknowledge Christ as their king constitute his kingdom. (3.) The word is used metonymically for the effects of the exercise of royal authority. It is to be understood in the first of these senses in all those cases in which a kingdom or dominion is said to be given to Christ; or when we pray, Thy kingdom come, or when it is said, Of his kingdom there is no end. It is used in the second sense when men are said to enter into the kingdom of Christ, or to be cast out of it, or when the character of those is described who are to constitute that kingdom. And it is used in the third sense when men are said to inherit, to see (or enjoy), to seek, and to value more than hid treasure, the kingdom of God. Hence also the kingdom of God is said to consist in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. Such are the effects of the reign of Christ.
This kingdom is called the kingdom of Christ, or of the Son of God, because administered by Him. The royal authority is vested in Him. It is called the kingdom of God, because Christ is God, and because it is the kingdom which God was to establish on earth in distinction from the kingdoms of men. It is called the kingdom of heaven, because its king dwells in heaven, because it is spiritual and heavenly, and because it is to be consummated in heaven, Various as are the applications and uses of these designations in the New Testament, they are included under the general idea of the Messianic kingdom; that kingdom which the Messiah came into the world to establish. That kingdom, however, is presented in different aspects, or, in other words, Christ exercises his royal authority, so to speak, in different spheres.
Christ’s Dominion over the Universe.
Christ has what theologians are accustomed to call his kingdom
of power. As Theanthropos and as Mediator, all power in heaven and upon earth has
been committed to his hands. (
This universal authority is exercised in a providential control,
and for the benefit of his Church. He employs the angels as ministering spirits,
to minister to the heirs of salvation. He controls and restrains the principalities,
powers, world-rulers, and spirits of wickedness. (
Christ’s Spiritual Kingdom.
But besides this kingdom of power, Christ has a kingdom of grace. This also is exhibited under two aspects. It includes the relation in which He stands to his true people individually and collectively (the invisible Church); and the relation He sustains to the visible Church, or the body of his professing people.
He is the king of every believing soul. He translates it from the kingdom of darkness. He brings it into subjection to Himself. He rules in and reigns over it. Every believer recognizes Christ as his absolute Sovereign; Lord of his inward, as well as of his outward, life. He yields to Him the entire subjection of the reason, of the conscience, and of the heart. He makes Him the object of reverence, love, and obedience. In Him he trusts for protection from all enemies, seen and unseen. On Him he relies for help in every emergency, and for final triumph. On Him the loyalty of the believer terminates. To acquit himself as a good soldier of Jesus Christ, to spend and be spent in his service and in the promotion of his kingdom, becomes the governing purpose of his life.
The terms of admission into this spiritual kingdom are faith
and repentance (
On the other hand, we are taught that no external profession
secures admission into this kingdom. “Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord,
shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.” (
The laws of this kingdom require first and above all, faith
in Jesus Christ; the sincere belief that He is the Son of God and the Saviour of
the world, and cordial submission to Him and trust in Him as our prophet, priest,
and king. With this faith is united supreme love. “He that loveth father or mother
more than me, is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than
me, ir not worthy of me. . . . . He that findeth his life, shall lose it, and he that
loseth his life for my sake shall find it.” (
The laws of the kingdom moreover require not only these duties to Christ, but that his people should be holy in heart and life. They must be poor in spirit; meek; merciful; peace-makers; long-suffering; ready to forgive; disinterested, not seeking their own; bearing all things; believing all things; and hoping all things. They are forbidden to be avaricious, or covetous, or proud, or worldly minded. In one word, they are required to be like Christ, in disposition, character, and conduct.
The special law of Christ’s kingdom is that its members should
love one another, not only with the love of complacency and delight, but with brotherly
love. A love which leads to the recognition of all Christians as brethren, belonging
to the same family, entitled to the same privileges and blessings; and which prompts
to and secures ministering to their necessities, so that there be no lack. This
law is laid down at length by the Apostle in
This kingdom of Christ over all his people is exercised not only by his power in their protection and direction, but especially by his Word and Spirit, through which and by whom He reigns in and rules over them.
This kingdom of Christ is everlasting. That is, the relation which believers sustain to Christ on earth they will sustain to Him forever.
Christ’s Visible Kingdom.
As religion is essentially spiritual, an inward state, the kingdom of Christ as consisting of the truly regenerated, is not a visible body, except so far as goodness renders itself visible by its outward manifestations. Nevertheless as Christ has enjoined upon his people duties which render it necessary that they should organize themselves in an external society, it follows that there is and must be a visible kingdom of Christ in the world. Christians are required to associate for public worship, for the admission and exclusion of members, for the administration of the sacraments, for the maintenance and propagation of the truth. They therefore form themselves into churches, and collectively constitute the visible kingdom of Christ on earth, consisting of all who profess the true religion, together with their children.
Nature of this Kingdom.
First, it is spiritual. That is, it is not of this world.
It is not analogous to the other kingdoms which existed, or do still exist among
men. It has a different origin and a different end. Human kingdoms are organized
among men, under the providential government of God, for the promotion of the temporal
well-being of society. The kingdom of Christ was organized immediately by God, for
the promotion of religious objects. It is spiritual, or not of this world, moreover,
because it has no power over the lives, liberty, or property of its members; and
because all secular matters lie beyond its jurisdiction. Its prerogative is simply
to declare the truth of God as revealed in his Word and to require that the truth
should be professed and obeyed by all under its jurisdiction. It can decide no question
of politics or science which is not decided in the Bible. The kingdom of Christ,
under the present dispensation, therefore, is not
Secondly, this kingdom of Christ is catholic or universal. It embraces all who profess the true religion. It is confined to no one organization; but includes them all; because all are under the authority of Christ and subject to the laws which He has laid down in his Word. As all Christians are included in the kingdom of Christ, it is the duty of all to recognize each other as belonging to one great commonwealth, and as subjects of the same sovereign.
Thirdly, this form of Christ’s kingdom is temporary. It is to be merged into a higher form when He shall come the second time without sin unto salvation. As an external organization it is designed to answer certain ends, and will cease when those ends are accomplished.
Fourthly, the kingdom of Christ is not a democracy, nor an aristocracy, but truly a kingdom of which Christ is absolute sovereign. This involves the denial, —
1. That the State has any authority to make laws to determine the faith, to regulate the worship, or to administer the discipline of the Church. It can neither appoint nor depose its officers.
2. It denies that any civil officer as such, or in virtue of his office, has any authority in the kingdom of Christ; much less can any such officer be the head of the Church.
3. It denies that Church power vests ultimately in the people, or in the clergy. All their power is purely ministerial. It is derived from Christ, and is exercised by others in his name, and according to the rules laid down in his Word. How far the Church has discretionary power in matters of detail is a disputed point. By some all such discretion is denied. They maintain that everything concerning the organization, officers, and modes of action of the Church is as minutely laid down in the New Testament as the curtains, tassels, and implements of the tabernacle are detailed in the Old Testament. Others hold that while certain principles on this subject are laid down in Scripture, considerable latitude is allowed as to the means and manner in which the Church may carry them out in the exercise of her functions. This latter view has always been practically adopted. Even the Apostolical Churches were not all organized precisely in the same way. The presence of an Apostle, or of a man clothed with apostolical authority, as in the case of James in Jerusalem, necessarily gave to a Church a form which other churches where no Apostle permanently resided could not have. Some had deaconesses, others had not. So all churches in every age and wherever they have existed, have felt at liberty to modify their organization and modes of action so as to suit them to their peculiar circumstances. All such modifications are matters of indifference. They cannot be made to bind the conscience, nor can they be rendered conditions of Christian or ecclesiastical fellowship.
As Christ is the only head of the Church it follows that its
allegiance is to Him, and that whenever those out of the Church undertake to regulate
its affairs or to curtail its liberties, its members are bound to obey Him rather
than men. They are bound by all legitimate means to resist such usurpations, and
to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free. They are under
equal obligation to resist all undue assumption of authority by those within the
Church, whether it be by the brotherhood or by individual officers, or by Church
councils or courts. The allegiance of the people terminates on Christ. They are
bound to obey others only so far as obedience to them is obedience to Him. In the
early ages some endeavoured to impose on Christians the yoke of the Jewish law.
This of course they were bound to resist. In the following centuries, and by degrees,
the intolerable rituals, ceremonies, fasts, festivals, and priestly, prelatical,
and papal assumptions, which oppress so large a part of the Christian world, have
been imposed upon the people in derogation to the authority
As Christ is the head of his earthly kingdom, so is He its only lawgiver. He prescribes, —
1. The terms of admission into his kingdom. These cannot be
rightfully altered by any human authority. Men can neither add to them, nor detract
from them. The rule which He has laid down on this subject is, that what He requires
as a condition for admission into his kingdom in heaven, is to be required as a
condition of admission to his kingdom on earth. Nothing more and nothing less is
to be demanded. We are to receive all those whom Christ receives. No degree of knowledge,
no confession, beyond that which is necessary to salvation, can be demanded as a
condition of our recognizing any one as a Christian brother and treating him as
such. Philip baptized the Eunuch on the confession “I believe that Jesus Christ
is the Son of God.” (
2. A second law of this visible kingdom of our Lord is that
heretics and those guilty of scandalous offences should be excommunicated. “A man
that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition reject.” (
3. Christ has ordained that the power of exercising discipline and the other prerogatives of the Church should be in the hands of officers, having certain gifts and qualifications and duly appointed.
4. That the right to judge of the qualifications of such officers
5. That such officers are not lords over God’s heritage, but servants. Their authority is restricted to prescribed limits, and the people have a right to a substantive part in the government of the Church through their representatives.
6. Every member of Christ’s kingdom is bound to obey his brethren in the Lord. This obligation does not rest on consent or mutual covenant, but on the fact that they are brethren, the temples and organs of the Holy Spirit. It is, therefore, not limited to those brethren with whom the individual chooses to associate himself. It hence follows that in the normal condition of Christ’s kingdom, each part would be subject to the whole, and the whole would be one body in the Lord.
The development of these several points belongs to the department of Ecclesiology.
§ 4. The Kingdom of Glory.
The Scriptures teach that when Christ shall come again, He will gather his people into the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world. Concerning that kingdom it is taught, —
1. That it shall consist only of the redeemed. None but the
regenerate or converted can enter that kingdom. The tares are to be separated from
the wheat. The evil, we are told (
2. Those counted worthy of that kingdom shall not only be elevated to the perfection of their nature, but shall also be exalted to great dignity, power, and glory. They shall be kings and priests unto God. They are to sit on thrones. They are to judge angels. They are to reign with Christ, sharing his dominion and glory.
3. This kingdom is to be everlasting.
4. The bodies of the saints, now natural, must be rendered
spiritual. This mortal must put on immortality, and this corruptible must put on
incorruption; for “flesh and blood (the body as now organized) cannot inherit the
kingdom of God.” (
5. The seat of this kingdom is not clearly revealed. Some suppose that it is to be on this earth regenerated and fitted for this new order of things. Others understand the Scriptures to teach that heaven as indicating an entirely different locality, is to be the final home of the redeemed.
6. Diversity of opinion exists as to the time when this kingdom shall be inaugurated. Chiliasts have commonly held that Christ is to come a thousand years (or a protracted period) before the general resurrection and final judgment, and reign visibly on earth, and that this is the kingdom to which the prophecies and promises of Scripture especially refer. This doctrine of necessity greatly modifies the view taken of the nature of this kingdom. It must be an earthly kingdom, as distinguished from that which is spiritual and heavenly. It must be a kingdom which flesh and blood can inherit. The common doctrine of the Church on the subject is that the general resurrection, the final judgment, the end of the world, and the inauguration of Christ’s kingdom of glory are synchronous events.
These are topics which belong to the head of Eschatology.
§ 1. Includes his Incarnation.
The Apostle tells us that Christ humbled Himself. In answer to the question, Wherein his humiliation consisted? our standards wisely content themselves with the simple statements of the Scriptures: “Christ’s humiliation consisted in his being born and that in a low condition, made under the law, undergoing the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, and the cursed death of the cross; in being buried, and continuing under the power of death for a time.”
On all these points the schoolmen and modern philosophical theologians have indulged in unprofitable speculations. All that is known, or can be known respecting them is the facts themselves.
The person of whom all the particulars above enumerated are
predicated, is the Eternal Son of God. It was He who was born, who suffered, and
who died. It was a person equal with God, who, the Apostle says, in
In opposition to the early heretics, some of whom said that
The incarnation of the Son of God, his stooping to take into personal and perpetual union with Himself a nature infinitely lower than his own, was an act of unspeakable condescension, and therefore is properly included in the particulars in which He humbled Himself. It is so represented in the Scriptures, and that it is such is involved in the very nature of the act, on any other hypothesis than that which assumes the equality of God and man; or that man is a modus existendi of the Deity, and that the highest.
The Lutheran theologians exclude the incarnation as an element
of Christ’s humiliation, on the ground that his humiliation was confined to his
earthly existence, whereas his union with our nature continues in heaven. This,
however, is contrary to Scripture, because the Apostle says that He made himself
of no reputation in becoming man. (
There are some forms of the modern speculations on this subject
which effectually preclude our regarding the incarnation as an act of humiliation.
It is assumed, as stated on a previous page, that this union of the divine and human
is the culminating point in the regular development of humanity. Its relation to
the sinfulness of man and the redemption of the race is merely incidental. It would
have been reached had sin never entered into the world. It is obvious that this
is a mere philosophical theory, entirely outside of the Scriptures, and can legitimately
have no influence on Christian doctrine. The Bible everywhere teaches that God sent
his Son into the world to save sinners; that He was born of a
Christ was born in a Low Condition.
Not only the assumption of human nature, out also all the circumstances by which it was attended enter into the Scriptural view of the humiliation of our Lord. Had He when He came into the world so manifested his glory, and so exercised his power, as to have coerced all nations to acknowledge Him as their Lord and God, and all kings to bow at his feet and bring Him their tributes, enthroning Him as the rightful and absolute sovereign of the whole earth, it had still been an act of unspeakable condescension for God to become man. But to be a servant; to be born in a stable and cradled in a manger; to be so poor as not to have a place where to lay his head; to appear without form or comeliness, so as to be despised and rejected of men, makes the condescension of our Lord to pass all comprehension. There is, indeed, a wonderfu1 sublimity in this. It shows the utter worthlessness of earthly pomp and splendour in the sight of God. The manifestation of God in the form of a servant, has far more power not only over the imagination but also over the heart, than his appearing in the form of an earthly king clothed in purple and crowned with gold. We bow at the feet of the poor despised Galilean with profounder reverence and love than we could experience had He appeared as Solomon in all his glory.
§ 2. He was made under the Law.
The humiliation of Christ included also his being made under
the law. The law to which Christ subjected Himself was, (1.) The law given to Adam
as a covenant of works; that is, as prescribing perfect obedience as the condition
of life. (2.) The Mosaic law which bound the chosen people. (3.) The moral law as
a rule of duty. Christ was subject to the law in all these aspects, in that He assumed
the obligation to fulfil all righteousness, i.e., to do everything which the law
in all its forms demanded. This subjection to the law was voluntary and vicarious.
It was voluntary, not only as his incarnation was a voluntary act, and therefore
all its consequences were assumed of his own free will; but also because even after
He assumed our nature He was free
§ 3. His Sufferings and Death.
The sufferings of Christ, and especially his ignominious death on the cross, are an important element in his humiliation. These sufferings continued from the beginning to the end of his earthly life. They arose partly from the natural infirmities and sensibilities of the nature which He assumed, partly from the condition of poverty in which He lived, partly from constant contact with sinners, which was a continued grief to his holy soul and caused Him to exclaim, “How long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you;” partly from the insults, neglects, and opposition to which He was subjected; partly from the cruel buffetings and scorning to which He submitted, and especially from the agonies of the crucifixion, the most painful as well as the most ignominious mode of inflicting the penalty of death; partly from the anguish caused by the foresight of the dreadful doom that awaited the whole Jewish nation; and especially no doubt from the mysterious sorrow arising from the load of his people’s sins and the hiding of his Father’s face, which forced from his brow the sweat of blood in the garden, and from his lips the cry of anguish which He uttered on the cross. These are wonders not only of love, but of self-abnegation and of humiliation, which angels endeavour to comprehend, but which no human mind can understand or estimate. There was never sorrow like unto his sorrow.
§ 4. He endured the Wrath of God.
Our standards specify “the wrath of God,” as a distinct particular
of the burden of sorrow which Christ, for our sakes, humbled Himself to bear. The
word wrath is the familiar Scriptural term to express any manifestation of the displeasure
of God against sin. Christ, although in Himself perfectly holy, bore our sins. He
was “made sin” (
§ 5. His Death and Burial.
Christ humbled Himself even unto death, and continued under
the power of death for a time. The reality of Christ’s death has never been disputed
among Christians. Some modern rationalists, unwilling to admit a miraculous resurrection,
endeavoured to show that death was not in his case actually consummated, but that
He was deposited in an unconscious state in the tomb. In answer to the arguments
of rationalists, certain Christian writers have taken the trouble to demonstrate,
from the facts stated in the account of the crucifixion, that it was not a swoon,
but actual death which occurred. We are raised above such question by believing
the inspiration of the New Testament. In the apostolic writings the
Under the clause, “He continued under the power of death for a time,” is intended to be expressed all that is meant by ancient creeds which asserted “He descended into hell.” Such at least is the view presented in our standards in accordance with the teachings of the majority of the Reformed theologians.
That the sufferings of Christ ceased the moment He expired
on the cross, is plain from
In the larger Westminster Catechism,
1. From the original and proper meaning of the Greek word
ᾅδης, and the corresponding English word hell.
Both mean the unseen world. The one signifies what is unseen, the other what is
covered and thus hidden from view. Both are used as the rendering
2. This view is confirmed by the fact that these words were not in the creed originally. They were introduced in the fourth century, and then not as a separate or distinct article, but as merely explanatory. “He was dead and buried,” i.e., he descended into hell. That the two clauses were at first considered equivalent is obvious, because some copies of the creed had the one form, some the other, and some both, though all were intended to say the same thing.
3. The passages of Scripture which are adduced to prove that
Christ descended into hell in a sense peculiar to Himself, do not teach that doctrine.
In
A second passage relied upon in this matter is
Much less can
Much the most difficult and important passage bearing on this
question is
1. When Christ is the subject the antithesis between
σάρξ and
πνεῦμα is not necessarily
that between the body and soul. It may be between the human and the divine nature.
So in
2 The word ζωοποιέω never means to continue in life, but always to impart life. Therefore to render ζωοποιηθείς, being preserved alive, is contrary to the proper meaning of the word. It is more over opposed to the antithesis between that word and θανατωθείς, as the one expresses the idea of the infliction of death, the other expresses that of vivifying. ‘He was put to death as to his humanity, or as a man; but was quickened by the Spirit, or divine nature, energy or power that resided in his person.’ He had power to lay down his life, and He had power to take it again.
3. The difference between the force of the two datives is
justified and determined by the meaning of the participles with which
σαρκί and πνεύματι are connected.
‘He was put to death as to the
4. Another objection to the interpretation above mentioned
is, that it makes the passage teach a doctrine contrary to the analogy of faith.
Whenever Christ is spoken of as preaching, in all cases in which the verb
κηρύσσειν is used, it refers to making proclamation
of the gospel. If, therefore, this passage teaches that Christ, after his death
and before his resurrection, preached to spirits in prison, it teaches that He preached
the gospel to them. But according to the faith of the whole Church, Latin, Lutheran,
and Reformed, the offer of salvation through the gospel is confined to the present
life. It is certainly a strong objection to an interpretation of any one passage
that it makes it teach a doctrine nowhere else taught in the Word of God, and which
is contrary to the teachings of that Word, as understood by the universal Church.
For such reasons as these the authors of our standards have discarded the doctrine
of a descensus ad inferos in any other sense than a departure into the invisible
state. The meaning of the whole passage as given by Beza is in accordance with the
doctrine of the Reformed Church. “Christus, inquit [apostolus], quem dixi virtute
vivificatum, jam olim in diebus Noe, quum appararetur arca, profectus sive adveniens,
e cœlo videlicet, ne nunc primum putemus illum ecclesiæ curam et administrationem
suscepisse adveniens, inquam, non corpore (quod nondum assumpserat), sed ea ipsa
virtute, per quam postea resurrexit, prædicavit spiritibus illis, qui nunc
in carcere meritas dant pœnas, utpote qui recta monenti Noe . . . . parere olim recusarint.”
The majority of modern interpreters adopt the old interpretation.
Bretschneider
The Romish Doctrine of the “Descensus ad Inferos.”
The Romanists teach that the department of Hades to which
Christ descended, was not the abode of evil spirits, but that in which dwelt the
souls of believers who died before the advent of the Redeemer, and that the object
of his descent was neither to preach the gospel, nor to despoil Satan, but to deliver
the pious dead from the intermediate state in which they then were (called the
Limbus patrum), and to introduce them into heaven. These were the captives
which, according to
The Views of Lutherans and of Modern Theologians on the Humiliation of Christ.
As the Lutherans at the time of the Reformation departed from
the faith of the Church on the person of Christ, they were led into certain peculiarities
of doctrine on other related subjects. Insisting,
In the seventeenth century there was an earnest and protracted
dispute among the Lutherans as to the question, whether the humiliation of Christ
was a mere κρύψις (or concealing) of the divine majesty
of his human nature; or whether it was an actual κένωσις,
an emptying himself for the time being of the divine attributes which belonged to
his humanity in virtue of the hypostatical union. According to the former view,
Christ, as man, was from the moment of his conception, everywhere present, omnipotent,
and omniscient, and actually in his human nature governed the universe. The only
difference, therefore, between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation,
concerns the mode in which this universal dominion was exercised. While on earth
it was in a way not to be apparent and recognized; whereas after his ascension,
it was open and avowed. According to the opposite view both these points were denied.
That is, while it was admitted that the human nature was entitled to these divine
attributes and prerogatives, from the moment of its conception, nevertheless it
is said that they were not claimed or exercised while He was on earth; and therefore
during his humiliation although there was a κτῆσις or
possession of the attributes, yet there was not the χρῆσις
of them, and consequently during that period He was not as man omnipresent, omniscient,
and everywhere dominant. The exaltation, therefore, was not a mere change in the
mode of exercising his divine prerogatives, but an entering on their use as well
as on their manifestation. The theologians of Tubingen maintained the former view,
those of Giessen the latter. The question having been referred to the Saxon theologians
they decided substantially in favour of the latter doctrine, and this was the view
generally adopted by the Lutheran divines. The precise point of dispute between
the parties was “An homo Christus in Deum assumtus in statu exinanitionis tanquam
rex præsens cuncta licet latenter gubernarit?” This the one party affirmed and
the other denied. The one made omnipresence and dominion the necessary consequence
of the hypostatical
According to the Lutheran system, therefore, the subject of
the humiliation was the human nature of Christ, and consisted essentially in the
voluntary abstaining from the exercise and manifestation of the divine attributes
with which it was imbued and interpenetrated. According to the Reformed doctrine
it was He who was equal with God who emptied Himself in assuming the fashion of
a man, and this divine person thus clothed in our nature humbled Himself to be obedient
even unto death. It is therefore of the eternal Son of whom all that is taught of
the humiliation of Christ is to be predicated. This is clearly the doctrine of the
Apostle in
The modern theologians, of whom Ebrard is a representative,
in discarding the Church doctrine of two natures (in the sense of substances) in
Christ, and in making the incarnation consist in a voluntary self-limitation, are
necessarily led into a theory as to the humiliation of Christ at variance with both
the Lutheran and Reformed views on that subject. According to this modern doctrine
the Eternal Son of God did not assume a human nature, in the Church sense of those
words, but He became a man. His infinite intellect was reduced to the limits of
the intellect of human intelligence, to be gradually developed as in the case of
other men. His omnipotence was reduced to the limits of human power. His omnipresence
was exchanged for limitation to a definite portion of space. He did not, however,
as stated above, when treating of the doctrine of Christ’s person, cease to be God.
According to this theory the incarnation resulted, as Ebrard says,
According to our standards the exaltation of Christ includes, (1.) His resurrection. (2.) His ascension. (3.) His sitting at the right hand of God. (4.) His coming to judge the world at the last day.
§ 1. Resurrection of Christ.
The resurrection of Christ is not only asserted in the Scriptures,
but it is also declared to be the fundamental truth of the gospel. “If Christ be
not risen,” says the Apostle, “then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also
vain” (
(1.) It was predicted in the Old Testament. (2.) It was foretold
by Christ Himself. (3.) It was a fact admitting of easy verification. (4.) Abundant,
suitable, and frequently repeated evidence was afforded of its actual occurrence.
(5.) The witnesses to the fact that Christ was seen alive after his death upon the
cross, were numerous, competent, and on every account worthy of confidence. (6.)
Their sincerity of conviction was proved by the sacrifices, even that of life, which
their testimony entailed upon hem. (7.) Their testimony was confirmed by God bearing
witness together with them (συνεπιμαρτωροῦντος
τοῦ θεοῦ,
The importance of Christ's resurrection arises, —
1. From the circumstance that all his claims, and the success of his work, rest on the fact that He rose again from the dead. If He rose, the gospel is true. If He did not rise, it is false. If He rose, He is the Son of God, equal with the Father, God manifest in the flesh; the Salvator Hominum; the Messiah predicted by the prophets; the prophet, priest, and king of his people; his sacrifice has been accepted as a satisfaction to divine justice, and his blood as a ransom for many.
2. On his resurrection depended the mission of the Spirit, without which Christ’s work had been in vain.
3. As Christ died as the head and representative of his people, his resurrection secures and illustrates theirs. As He lives, they shall live also. If He remained under the power of death, there is no source of spiritual life to men; for He is the vine, we are the branches; if the vine be dead the branches must be dead also.
4. If Christ did not rise, the whole scheme of redemption is a failure, and all the predictions and anticipations of its glorious results for time and for eternity, for men and for angels of every rank and order, are proved to be chimeras. “But now is Christ risen from the dead and become the first-fruits of them that slept.” Therefore the Bible is true from Genesis to Revelation. The kingdom of darkness has been overthrown. Satan has fallen like lightning from heaven; and the triumph of truth over error, of good over evil, of happiness over misery, is forever secured.
Nature of Christ’s Resurrection Body.
1. The identity of the body in which Christ rose with that
which expired upon the cross, was proved by indubitable evidence. It retained even
the print of the nails which had pierced his hands and his feet. Nevertheless it
was changed. To what extent, however, is not clearly made known. The facts recorded
in the sacred history bearing on the nature of the Lord’s body during the period
between his resurrection and ascension are, (a.) That it was not at first clearly
recognized as the same. Mary Magdalene mistook Him for the gardener. (
2. Such was the state of our Lord’s body during the forty
days subsequent to his resurrection. It then passed into its glorified state. What
that state is we know only so far as may be learned from what the Apostle teaches
from the nature of the bodies with which believers are to be invested after the
resurrection. Those bodies, we are told, are to be like Christ’s “glorious body.”
(
The risen body of Christ, therefore, as it now exists in heaven, although retaining its identity with his body while here on earth, is glorious, incorruptible, immortal, and spiritual. It still occupies a definite portion of space, and retains all the essential properties of a body.
The efficient Agent in the Resurrection of Christ.
In numerous passages of Scripture the resurrection of our
Lord is referred to God as God or to the Father. The same person who in the second
Psalm says, “Thou art my Son,” is addressed in the sixteenth Psalm by that Son,
“Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to
see corruption.” In
§ 2. Ascension of Christ.
The next step in the exaltation of Christ was his ascension
to heaven. In
In opposition to this Scriptural and generally accepted view
of the ascension of Christ, as a transfer from one place to another, from the earth,
as one sphere of the universe, to heaven, another, and equally definite locality,
the Lutherans made it a mere change of state, of which change the human nature of
Christ was the subject. Prior to his resurrection, the human nature of our Lord,
although really possessed of the attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence,
voluntarily forbore the exercise and manifestation of these divine perfections.
His ascension was his entering on their full enjoyment and exercise. He passed from
the condition of an ordinary man to being as a man (as to his soul and body) everywhere
present, and everywhere the supreme ruler. The heaven He entered is immensity. Thus
the “Form of Concord”
The modern theory which makes the incarnation of the Son of
God to consist in his laying aside “the existence-form” or God, and, by a process
of self-limitation assuming that of a man, of necessity modifies the view taken
of his exaltation and ascension. That ascension is admitted to be a transfer from
one portion of space to another, from earth to heaven. It is also admitted that
our Lord now as a man occupies a definite portion of space. He is as to his human
nature in one place and not everywhere. But his present existence-form is still
human and only human. On this point Ebrard says, That the only begotten Son of God
became a human soul, and formed itself a body in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and
was born of her as a man. In the human nature thus assumed there were two elements.
The one including all the essentials of humanity without which man is no longer
man. The other includes only what is accidental and variable; as for example, weakness,
subjection to death, and other evils consequent on sin. All these on his ascension
he laid aside, and now dwells in heaven as a glorified man (verklärter Mensch).
He has laid aside forever the existence-form of God, and assumed that of man in
perpetuity, in which form by his Spirit He governs the Church and the world. Locally,
therefore, He is absent from the world, but He is dynamically present to all his
people in his present human existence-form. On this last mentioned point he quotes
with approbation the language of Polanus:
According to the teaching of Scripture the ascension of Christ was necessary, —
1. In the first place He came from heaven. Heaven was his home. It was the appropriate sphere of his existence. His presence makes heaven, and therefore until this earth is purified from all evil, and has undergone its great process of regeneration, so as to become a new heavens and a new earth, this world is not suited for the Redeemer’s abode in his state of exaltation.
2. It was necessary that as our High Priest He should, after
offering Himself as a sacrifice, pass through the heavens, to appear before God
in our behalf. An essential part, and that a permanent one, of his priestly office
was to be exercised in heaven. He there makes constant intercession for his people.
As He died for our sins, He rose for our justification. All this was typified under
the old dispensation. The victim was slain without in the court of the temple; the
high priest bore the blood with much incense within the veil and sprinkled it on
the Mercy Seat. What the high priest did in the earthly temple, it was necessary
for the High
3. It was expedient, our Lord said, that He should go away;
“for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I
will send him unto you.” (
4. Again our Lord told his sorrowing disciples, “I go to prepare
a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and
receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also.” (
§ 3. Sitting at the Right Hand of God.
This is the next step in the exaltation of our Lord. He rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God; that is, was associated with Him in glory and dominion. The subject of this exaltation was the Theanthropos, not the Logos specially or distinctively; not the human nature exclusively; but the theanthropic person. When a man is exalted it is not the soul in distinction from the body; nor the body in distinction from the soul, but the whole person.
The ground of Christ’s exaltation is twofold: the possession
of divine attributes by which He was entitled to divine honour and was qualified
to exercise absolute and universal dominion; and secondly, his mediatorial work.
Both these are united in
This universal dominion is exercised by the Theanthropos.
It is vain for us to speculate on the relation of the divine and human natures in
the acts of this supreme ruler. We cannot understand the relation between the soul
and the body in the voluntary exercises in which both are agents, as when we write
or speak. We
In this exaltation of Christ to supreme dominion was fulfilled
the prediction of the Psalmist, as the organ of the Holy Ghost, that all things,
the whole universe, according to the interpretation of the Apostle as given in
This absolute dominion has been committed to Christ as mediator.
He who is over all is the head of the Church; it is for the Church, for the consummation
of the work of redemption that as the God-man He has been thus exalted over all
created beings. (
§ 4. Christ’s coming to judge the World.
This is the last step in his exaltation. He who was arraigned as a criminal at the bar of Pilate; who was unrighteously condemned, and who amid cruel mockings, was crucified with malefactors, is to come again with power and great glory; before Him are to be gathered all nations and all the generations of men, to receive from his lips their final sentence. He will then be exalted before all intelligences, as visibly their sovereign judge.
What the Scriptures teach on this subject is, (1.) That Christ is to come again. (2.) That this coming is to be personal, visible, and glorious. (3.) That the object of his second advent is to judge the world. (4.) That the persons to be judged are the quick and the dead, i.e., those then alive and those who died before his appearing. (5.) That the rule of judgment will be the law of God, either as written on the heart or as revealed in his Word. Those having the written revelation will be judged by it; those who have had no such external revelation, will be judged according to the light they have actually enjoyed. (6.) That the ground of judgment will be the deeds done in the body. (7.) That the sentence to be pronounced will be final, fixing the destiny of those concerned for eternity.
This whole subject belongs to the department of Eschatology, to which its more detailed consideration must be deferred. It is introduced here simply as connected with the exaltation of Christ, of which it is to be the culminating point.
§ 1. Scriptural Usage of the Word.
The Scriptures clearly teach that the several persons of the adorable Trinity sustain an economical relation to the work of man’s redemption. To the Father is referred the plan itself, the selection of its objects, and the mission of the Son to carry the gracious purpose into effect. To the Son, the accomplishment of all that is requisite to render the salvation of sinful men consistent with the perfections and law of God, and to secure the final redemption of those given to Him by the Father. The special work of the Spirit is the application of the redemption purchased by Christ. Such is the condition of men since the fall, that if left to themselves they would continue in their rebellion and refuse the offers of reconciliation with God. Christ then had died in vain. To secure the accomplishment of the promise that He should “see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied,” the Holy Spirit so operates on the chosen people of God, that they are brought to repentance and faith, and thus made heirs of eternal life, through Jesus Christ their Lord.
This work of the Spirit is in the Scriptures called Vocation. It is one of the many excellences of the Reformed Theology that it retains, as far as possible, Scriptural terms for Scriptural doctrines. It is proper that this should be done. Words and thoughts are so intimately related that to change the former, is to modify, more or less seriously, the latter. And as the words of Scripture are the words of the Spirit, it is becoming and important that they should be retained.
The act of the Spirit by which men are brought into saving
union with Christ, is expressed by the word κλῆσις,
vocation. As in
Those who are the subjects of this saving influence of the
Spirit, are designated “the called.”
Such then is the established usage of Scripture. It is by
a divine call, that sinners are made partakers of the benefits of redemption. And
the influence of the Spirit by which they are translated from the kingdom of darkness
into the kingdom of God’s dear Son, is a vocation, or effectual calling. The ground
of this usage is to be found in the Scriptural idea of God and of his relation to
the world. He speaks and it is done. He said, Let there be light, and light was.
He calls the things that are not, and they
§ 2. The External Call.
The Scriptures, however, distinguish between this effectual
call and the external call addressed in the Word of God to all to whom that word
is made known. In this sense “many are called but few are chosen.” God said by his
prophet (
This external call includes, (1.) A declaration of the plan
of salvation. (2.) The promise of God to save all who accede to the terms of that
plan. (3.) Command, exhortation, and invitation to all to accept of the offered
mercy. (4.) An exhibition of the reasons which should constrain men to repent and
believe, and thus
This call is universal in the sense that it is addressed to all men indiscriminately to whom the gospel is sent. It is confined to no age, nation, or class of men. It is made to the Jew and Gentile, to Barbarians and Scythians, bond and free; to the learned and to the ignorant; to the righteous and to the wicked; to the elect and to the non-elect. This follows from its nature. Being a proclamation of the terms on which God is willing to save sinners, and an exhibition of the duty of fallen men in relation to that plan, it of necessity binds all those who are in the condition which the plan contemplates. It is in this respect analogous to the moral aw. That law is a revelation of the duties binding all men in virtue of their relation to God as their Creator and moral Governor. It promises the divine favour to the obedient, and threatens wrath to the disobedient. It therefore of necessity applies to all who sustain the relation of rational and moral creatures to God. So also the gospel being a revelation of the relation of fallen men to God as reconciling the world unto Himself, comes to all belonging to the class of fallen men.
The Scriptures, therefore, in the most explicit terms teach
that the external call of the gospel is addressed to all men. The command of Christ
to his Church was to preach the gospel to every creature. Not to irrational creatures,
and not to fallen angels these two classes are excluded by the nature and design
of the gospel. Further than this there is no limitation, so far as the present state
of existence is concerned. We are commanded to make the
It is not Inconsistent with the Doctrine of Predestination.
This general call of the gospel is not inconsistent with the
doctrine of predestination. For predestination concerns only the purpose of God
to render effectual in particular cases, a call addressed to all. A general amnesty
on certain conditions may be offered by a sovereign to rebellious subjects, although
he knows that through pride or malice many will refuse to accept it; and even although,
for wise reasons, he should determine not to constrain their assent, supposing that
such influence over their minds were within his power. It is evident from the nature
of the call that it has nothing to do with the secret purpose of God to grant
It is Consistent with the Sincerity of God.
It is further said to be inconsistent with the sincerity of
God, to offer salvation to those whom He has predetermined to leave to the just
recompense of their sins. It is enough to say in answer to this objection, so strenuously
urged by Lutherans and Arminians, that it bears with equal force against the doctrine
of God’s foreknowledge, which they admit to be an essential attribute of his nature.
How can He offer salvation to those whom He foreknows will despise and reject it;
and when He also knows that their guilt and condemnation will thereby be greatly
aggravated. There is no real difficulty in either case except what is purely subjective.
It is in us, in our limited and partial apprehensions; and in our inability to comprehend
the ways of God, which are past finding out. We cannot understand how God governs
the world and accomplishes his infinitely wise designs. We must be satisfied with
facts. Whatever actually is, it must be right for God to permit to be. And it is
no less evident that whatever He permits to be, it must be right for Him to intend
to permit. And this is all that the Augustinian scheme, in obedience to the Word
of God, is constrained to assert. It is enough that the offer of salvation through
Jesus Christ, is to be made to every creature; that whosoever accepts that offer
shall be saved; and that for the salvation of all, abundant provision has been made.
What God’s purposes may be in instituting and promulgating this scheme of mercy,
has nothing to do with our duty as ministers in making the proclamation,
The Lutheran Doctrine.
The Lutherans from their anxiety to get rid of the sovereignty
of God in the dispensation of his grace, are led to hold that the gospel offer is
universal, not only in the sense above stated, in that the command is given to the
Church, to make it known to all men, but that it has in some way been actually communicated
to all. They admit the difficulty of reconciling this assumption with the present
state of the world. They attempt to meet this difficulty by saying, that at three
different epochs the knowledge of the plan of salvation was actually known to all
men. First, when the promise of redemption through the seed of the woman, was made
to our first parents. Secondly, in the days of Noah; and thirdly, during the age
of the Apostles, by whom, it is assumed, the gospel was carried to the ends of the
world, even to the inhabitants of this western continent. That this knowledge has
since been lost, is to be referred not to the purpose of God, but to the wilful
ingratitude and wickedness of the ancestors of the present inhabitants of the heathen
world. They refer also to the fact that the Church is as a city set upon a hill;
that it does more or less attract the attention of the whole earth. All men have
heard of Christians and of Christianity; and it is their own fault if they do not
seek further knowledge on the subject. It is very plain, however, that these considerations
do not touch the difficulty. The heathen are without Christ and without God in the
world. This is Paul’s account of their condition. It is in vain, therefore, for
us to attempt to show that they have the knowledge which the Apostle asserts they
do not possess, and which, as all history shows, does not exist among them. The
Lutheran divines feel the unsatisfactory nature of their own solution of this great
problem. Gerhard, after referring to all possible sources of divine knowledge accessible
to the heathen, says,
The Call to Salvation is only through the Gospel.
The call in question is made only through the Word of God, as heard or read. That is, the revelation of the plan of salvation is not made by the works or by the providence of God; nor by the moral constitution of our nature, nor by the intuitions or deductions of reason; nor by direct revelation to all men everywhere and at all times; but only in the written Word of God. It is not denied that God may, and in past ages certainly did, convey this saving knowledge by direct revelation without the intervention of any external means of instruction. Such was the fact in the case of the Apostle Paul. And such cases, for all we know, may even now occur. But these are miracles. This is not the ordinary method. For such supernatural revelations of truth after its being made known in the Scriptures and committed to the Church with the command to teach all nations, we have no promise in the Scriptures and no evidence from experience.
It has ever been, and still is, the doctrine of the Church universal in almost all its parts, that it is only in and through the Scriptures that the knowledge necessary to salvation is revealed to men. The Rationalists, as did the Pelagians, hold that what they call “the light of nature,” reveals enough of divine truth to secure the return of the soul to God, if it be properly improved. And many Arminians, as well as Mystics, hold that the supernatural teaching of the Spirit is granted in sufficient measure to every man to secure his salvation, if he yields himself up to its guidance. It would be very agreeable to our natural feelings to believe this, as it would be to believe that all men will be saved. But such is not the doctrine of the Bible; and it requires but little humility to believe that God is better as well as wiser than man; that his ways are higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts; and that whatever He ordains is best.
That the Scriptures do teach that saving knowledge is contained only in the Bible, and consequently that those ignorant of its contents, are ignorant of the way of salvation, is plain, —
1. Because the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament,
constantly represent the heathen as in a state of fatal ignorance.
2. This doctrine follows also from the nature of the gospel. It claims to be the only method of salvation. It takes for granted that men are in a state of sin and condemnation, from which they are unable to deliver themselves. It teaches that for the salvation of men the Eternal Son of God assumed our nature, obeyed and suffered in our stead, and having died for our sins, rose again for our justification; that, so far as adults are concerned, the intelligent and voluntary acceptance of Christ as our God and Saviour is the one indispensable condition of salvation; that there is no other name under heaven whereby men can be saved. It provides, therefore, for a Church and a Ministry whose great duty it is to make known to men this great salvation. All this takes for granted that without this knowledge, men must perish in their sins.
3. This is further evident from the nature of the message which the ministers of the gospel are commissioned to deliver. They are commanded to go into all the world, and say to every creature, “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt he saved.” “He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.” Where is the propriety of such a message if men can be saved without the knowledge of Christ, and consequently without faith in Him.
4. This necessity of a knowledge of the gospel is expressly
asserted in the Scriptures. Our Lord not only declares that no man can come unto
the Father, but by Him; that no man knoweth
This is indeed an awful doctrine. But are not the words of
our Lord also awful, “Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction,
and many there be which go in thereat; because strait is the gate, and narrow is
the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it”? (
Why is the Gospel addressed to all Men?
As all men are not saved, the question arises, Why should the call he addressed to all? or, What is the design of God in making the call of the gospel universal and indiscriminate? The answer to this question will be determined by the views taken of other related points of Christian doctrine. If we adopt the Pelagian hypothesis that God limits Himself by the creation of free agents. that such agents must from their nature be exempt from absolute control; then the relation to God in this matter is analogous to that of one finite spirit to another. He can instruct, argue, and endeavour to persuade. More than this free agency does not admit. Men as rational, voluntary beings, must be left to determine for themselves, whether they will return to God in the way of his appointment, or continue in their rebellion. The call of the gospel to them is intended to bring them to repentance. This is an end which God sincerely desires to accomplish, and which He does all He can to effect. He cannot do more than the preaching of the gospel accomplishes, without doing violence to the freedom of voluntary agents.
The Lutherans admit total depravity, and the entire inability
of men since the fall to do anything spiritually good; but they hold that the Word
of God has an inherent, supernatural, and divine power, which would infallibly secure
the spiritual resurrection of the spiritually dead, were it not wilfully neglected,
or wickedly resisted. The call of the gospel is, therefore, addressed to all men
with the same intention on the part of God. He not only desires, as an event in
itself well pleasing in his sight, that all may repent and believe, but that is
the end which He purposes to accomplish. Its accomplishment is hindered, in all
cases of failure, by the voluntary resistance of men. While, therefore, they attribute
the conversion of men to the efficacious grace of God, and not to the coöperation
or will of the subjects of that grace, they deny that grace is “irresistible.” The
fact that one man is converted under the call of the gospel and not another, that
one accepts and another rejects the offered mercy, is not to be referred to anything
in the purpose of God, or to the nature of the influence of which the hearers of
the gospel are the subjects, but solely to the fact that one does, and the other
does not resist that influence. The Lutheran doctrine is thus clearly stated by
Quenstedt: “Vocatio
The objections to this view are obvious.
1. It proceeds on the assumption that events in time do not correspond to the purpose of God. This is not only inconsistent with the divine perfection, but contrary to the express declarations of Scripture, which teaches that God works all things according to the counsel of his own will. He foreordains whatever comes to pass.
2. It supposes either that God has no purpose as to the futurition of events, or that his “serious intentions” may fill of being accomplished. This is obviously incompatible with the nature of an infinite Being.
3. It not only assumes that the purpose of God may fail, but also that it may be effectually resisted; that events may occur which it is his purpose or intention should not occur. How then can it be said that God governs the world; or, that He does his pleasure in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth?
4. It assumes without proof, and contrary to Scripture and experience, that the Word of God as read or spoken by men, has an inherent, supernatural, life-giving power, adequate to raise the spiritually dead. Whereas the Scriptures constantly teach that the efficacy of the truth is due to the attending influence of the Holy Spirit, ab extra incidens; that the Word is effectual only when attended by this demonstration of the Spirit, and that without it, it is foolishness to the Greek and an offence to the Jew; that Paul may plant, and Apollos water, but that God only can give the increase.
5. It assumes that the only power which God exercises in the conversion of sinners is that inherent in the Word, whereas the Scriptures abound with prayers for the gift of the Spirit to attend the Word and render it effectual; and such prayers are constantly offered, and ever have been offered, by the people of God. They would, however, be not only unnecessary but improper, if God had revealed his purpose not to grant any such influence, but to leave men to the unattended power of the Word itself. Any doctrine contrary to what the Bible prescribes as a duty, and what all Christians do by the instinct of their renewed nature, must be false.
6. This doctrine, moreover, takes for granted that the ultimate
reason why some hearers of the gospel believe and others do not, is to be found
in themselves; that the one class is better, more impressible, or less obstinate
than the other. The Scriptures, however, refer this fact to the sovereignty of God.
Our Lord says, “I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast
hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.”
(
7. The doctrine in question has no support from Scripture.
The passages constantly referred to in its favour are,
8. Finally, the Lutheran doctrine relieves no difficulty. The Reformed doctrine assumes that some men perish for their sins; and that those who are thus left to perish are passed by not because they are worse than others, but in the sovereignty of God. The Lutheran doctrine concedes both those facts. Some men do perish; and they perish, at least in the case of the heathen, without having the means of salvation offered to them. There is the same exercise of sovereignty in the one case as in the other. The Lutheran must stand with his hand upon his mouth, side by side with the Reformed, and join him in saying, “Even so Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight.”
The simple representation of Scripture on this subject, confirmed by the facts of consciousness and experience is, that all men are sinners; they are all guilty before God; they have all forfeited every claim upon his justice. His relation to them is that of a father to his disobedient children; or, of a sovereign to wickedly rebellious subjects. It is not necessary that all should receive the punishment which they have justly incurred. In the sight of an infinitely good and merciful God, it is necessary that some of the rebellious race of man should suffer the penalty of the law which all have broken. It is God’s prerogative to determine who shall be vessels of mercy, and who shall be left to the just recompense of their sins. Such are the declarations of Scripture; and such are the facts of the case. We can alter neither. Our blessedness is to trust in the Lord, and to rejoice that the destiny of his creatures is not in their own hands, nor in the hands either of fate or of chance; but in those of Him who is infinite in wisdom, love and power.
But if the Lutheran doctrine that the call of the gospel is
universal,
1. The most obvious answer to that question is found in the nature of the call itself. The call of the gospel is simply the command of God to men to repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, with the promise that those who believe shall be saved. It is the revelation of a duty binding upon all men. There is as much reason that men should be commanded to believe in Christ, as that they should be commanded to love God. The one duty is as universally obligatory as the other. The command to believe no more implies the intention on the part of God to give faith, than the command to love implies the intention to give love. And as the latter command does not assume that men have of themselves power to love God perfectly, so neither does the command to believe assume the power of exercising saving faith, which the Scriptures declare to be the gift of God.
2. The general call of the gospel is the means ordained by God to gather in his chosen people. They are mingled with other men, unknown except by God. The duty obligatory on all is made known to all; a privilege suited to all is offered indiscriminately. That some only are made willing to perform the duty, or to accept the privilege, in no way conflicts with the propriety of the universal proclamation.
3. This general call of the gospel with the promise that whoever
believes shall be saved, serves to show the unreasonable wickedness and perverseness
of those who deliberately reject it. The justice of their condemnation is thus rendered
the more obvious to themselves and to all other rational creatures. “This is the
condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than
light, because their deeds were evil. He that believeth not is condemned already,
because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.” (
§ 3. Common Grace.
The word χάρις, הֶמֶד,
means a favourable disposition, or kind feeling; and especially love as exercised
towards the inferior, dependent, or unworthy. This is represented as the crowning
attribute of the divine nature. Its manifestation is declared to be the grand end
of the whole scheme of redemption. The Apostle teaches that predestination, election,
and salvation are all intended for the praise of the glory of the grace of God which
He exercises towards us in Christ Jesus. (
This is an influence of the Holy Spirit distinct from, and
accessary to the influence of the truth. There is a natural relation between truth,
whether speculative, æsthetic, moral, or religious, and the mind of man. All such
truth tends to produce an effect suited to its nature, unless counteracted by inadequate
apprehension or by the inward state of those to whom it is presented. This is of
course true of the Word of God. It is replete with truths of the highest order;
the most elevated; the most important; the most pertinent to the nature and necessities
of man; and the best adapted to convince the reason, to control the conscience,
to affect the heart, and to govern the life. Opposed to this doctrine of the supernatural
influence of the Spirit of God on the minds of men, additional to the moral influence
of the truth, is the deistical theory of God’s relation to the world. That theory
assumes that having created all things, and endowed his creatures of every order,
material and immaterial, rational and irrational, with the properties and attributes
suited to their nature and destiny, he leaves the world to the control of these
subordinate or second causes, and never intervenes with the exercise of his immediate
agency. This same view is by many Rationalists, Pelagians, and Remonstrants, transferred
to the sphere of the moral and religious relations of man. God having made man a
rational and moral being and endowed him with free agency; and having revealed in
his works and in his Word the truth concerning Himself and the relation of man to
the great Creator, leaves man to himself. There is no influence on the part of God
exerted on the minds of men, apart from that which is due to the truth which He
has revealed. Those numerous passages of Scripture which attribute the conversion
and sanctification of men to the Spirit of God, the advocates of this theory explain
by saying: That as the Spirit is the author of the truth, He may be said to be the
author of the effects which the truth produces; but they deny any intervention or
agency of the Spirit additional to the truth objectively present to the mind. On
this point Limborch
Lutheran Doctrine on Common Grace.
A second view on this subject is that of the Lutherans already
referred to. They also deny any influence of the Spirit accessary to the power inherent
in the Word. But they are very far from adopting the deistical or rationalistic
hypothesis. They fully admit the supernatural power of Christianity and all its
ordinances. They hold that the Word “habet vim aut potentiam activam supernaturalem
ac vere divinam ad producendos supernaturales effectus, scilicet, mentes hominum
convertendas, regenerandas et renovendas.”
Rationalistic View.
A third doctrine which is opposed to the Scriptural teaching
on this subject, is that which makes no distinction between the influence of the
Spirit and the providential efficiency of God. Thus Wegscheider
It depends of course on the view taken of God’s relation to the world, what is the degree or kind of influence to be ascribed to Him in promoting the reformation or sanctification of men. According to the mechanical theory, adopted by Deists, Rationalists, or (as they are often called in distinction from Supernaturalists) Naturalists, there is no exercise of the power of God on the minds of men. As He leaves the external world to the control of the laws of nature, so He leaves the world of mind to the control of its own laws. But as almost all systems of philosophy assume a more intimate relation between the Creator and his creatures than this theory acknowledges, it follows that confounding the providential agency of God over his creatures with the influence of the Holy Spirit, admits of the ascription to Him of an agency more or less direct in the regeneration and sanctification of men.
According to the common doctrine of Theism second causes have
a real efficiency, but they are upheld and guided in their operation by the omnipresent
and universally active efficiency of God; so that the effects produced are properly
referred to God. He sends rain upon the earth; He causes the grass to grow; He fashions
the eye and forms the ear; and He feeds the young ravens when they cry. All the
operations of nature in the external world, which evince design, are due not to
the working of blind physical laws, but to those laws as constantly guided by the
mind and will of God. In like manner He is said to control the laws of mind: to
sustain and direct the operation of moral causes. His relation to the world of mind
is, in this point, analogous to his relation
Many philosophical systems, however, ignore all second causes. They assume that effects are due to the immediate agency of God. This is the doctrine not only of Pantheists, but also of many Christian philosophers. This idea is involved in the theory of occasional causes, and in the doctrine so popular at one time among theologians that preservation is a continual creation. If God creates the universe ex nihilo every successive moment, as even President Edwards strenuously asserts, then all effects and changes are the product of his omnipotence, and the efficiency or agency of second causes is of necessity excluded. According to this doctrine there can be no distinction between the operations of nature and those of grace. The same thing is obviously true in reference to the theory of Dr. Emmons and the high Hopkinsians. Dr. Emmons teaches that God creates all the volitions of men, good or bad. The soul itself is but a series of exercises. First in chronological order comes a series of sinful volitions; then, in some cases, not in all, this is followed by a series of holy volitions. God is equally the author of the one and of the other. This is true of all mental exercises. No creature can originate action. God is the only real agent in the universe. According to this doctrine all operations of the Spirit are merged in this universal providential efficiency of God; and all distinction between nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural is obliterated.
In opposition, therefore, first, to the proper naturalistic theory, which excludes God entirely from his works, and denies to Him any controlling influence either over material or mental operations and effects; secondly, in opposition to the doctrines which identify the operations or influence of the Spirit with the power of the truth; and thirdly, in opposition to the theory which ignores the influence between the providential efficiency of God and the operations of the Holy Spirit; the Scriptures teach that the influence of the Spirit is distinct from the mere power, whether natural or supernatural, of the truth itself; and that it is no less to be distinguished from the providential efficiency (or potentia ordinata) of God which coöperates with all second causes.
There is an influence of the Spirit distinct from the Truth.
As to the first of these points, namely, that there is an influence of the Spirit on the minds distinct from and accessary to the power of the truth, which attends the truth sometimes with more, and sometimes with less power, according to God’s good pleasure, the proof from Scripture is plain and abundant.
1. The Bible makes a broad distinction between the mere hearers
of the Word, and those inwardly taught by God. When our Lord says (
2. The reason is given why the truth in itself is inoperative
and why the inward teaching of the Spirit is absolutely necessary. That reason is
found in the natural state of man since the fall, He is spiritually dead. He is
deaf and blind. He does not receive the things of the Spirit, neither can he know
them, because they are spiritually discerned. It is therefore those only who are
spiritual, i.e., in whom the Spirit dwells, and whose discernment, feelings and
whole life are determined by the Spirit, who receive the truths which are freely
given unto all who hear the gospel. This is the doctrine of the Apostle as delivered
in
3. The Scriptures therefore teach that there is an influence
of the Spirit required to prepare the minds of men for the reception of the truth.
The truth is compared to light, which is absolutely
4. Accordingly the great promise of the Scriptures especially
in reference to the Messianic period was the effusion of the Holy Spirit. “Afterward,”
said the prophet Joel, “I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh” (
After the resurrection of our Lord He directed his disciples
to remain at Jerusalem until they were imbued with power from on high. That is,
until they had received the gift of the Holy Spirit. It was on the day of Pentecost
that the Spirit descended upon the disciples, as the Apostle said, in fulfilment
of the predictions of the Old Testament prophets. The effect of his influence was
not only a general illumination of the minds of the Apostles, and the communication
of miraculous gifts, but the conversion of five thousand persons to the faith at
once. It is impossible to deny that these effects were due to the power of the Spirit
as something distinct from, and accessary to, the mere power of the truth. This
is the explanation of the events of the day of Pentecost given by the Apostle Peter,
in
When our Lord says (
5. Another clear proof that the Spirit exercises upon the
minds of men an influence distinguishable from the influence of the truth either
in the Lutheran or Remonstrant view, is that those who have the knowledge of the
Word as read or heard, are directed to pray for the gift of the Spirit to render
that Word effectual. Of such prayers we have many examples in the Sacred Scriptures.
David, in
6. The Scriptures therefore always recognize the Holy Spirit
as the immediate author of regeneration, of repentance, of faith, and of all holy
exercises. He dwells in believers, controlling their inward and outward life. He
enlightens, leads, sanctifies, strengthens, and comforts. All these effects are
attributed to his agency. He bestows his gifts on every one severally as he will.
(
7. This truth, that the Spirit does attend the Word and ordinances
of God by a power not inherent in the Word and sacraments themselves, but granted
in larger or less measures, as God sees fit, is inwrought into the faith of the
whole Christian Church. All the Liturgies of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant churches
are
The Influence of the Spirit may be without the Word.
There is another unscriptural view of this subject which must at least be noticed, although its full consideration belongs to another department. Many admit that there is a supernatural power of the Spirit attending the Word and sacraments, but they hold that the Spirit is confined to these channels of communication; that He works in them and by them but never without them. On this subject Romanists hold that Christ gave the Holy Spirit to the Apostles. They transmitted the gift to their successors the bishops. Bishops in the laying on of hands in ordination communicate the grace of orders to the priests. In virtue of this grace the priests have supernatural power to render the sacraments the channels of grace to those who submit to their ministrations. Those, therefore, who are in the Romish Church, and those only, are, through the sacraments, made partakers of the Holy Spirit. All others, whether adults or infants, perish because they are not partakers of those ordinances through which alone the saving influences of the Spirit are communicated. This also is the doctrine held by those called Anglicans in the Church of England.
The Lutheran Church rejected with great earnestness the doctrine
of Apostolic Succession, the Grace of Orders, and the Priesthood of the Christian
Ministry as held by the Church of Rome. Lutherans, however, taught not only that
there is “a mystical union” between the Spirit and the Word, as we have already
seen, so that all saving effects are produced by the power inherent in the Word
itself, and that the Spirit does not operate on the hearts of men without the Word,
but also that there is an objective supernatural power in the sacraments themselves,
so that they
The Reformed, while they teach that, so far as adults are concerned, the knowledge of the Gospel is necessary to salvation, yet hold that the operations of the Holy Spirit are confined neither to the Word nor to the sacraments. He works when and where He sees fit, as in the times of the Old Testament and during the Apostolic age his extraordinary gifts were not conveyed through the medium of the truth, so neither now are the gifts for ecclesiastical office, nor is the regeneration of infants, effected by any such instrumentality. The saving efficacy of the Word and sacraments where they take effect, is not due to “any virtue in them; . . . . but only” to “the blessing of Christ, and the working of his Spirit in them that by faith receive them.”
The Work of the Spirit is distinct from Providential Efficiency.
As grace, or the influence of the Holy Spirit, is not inherent
in the Word or sacraments, so neither is it to be confounded with the providential
efficiency of God. The Scriptures clearly teach, (1.) That God is everywhere present
in the world, upholding all the creatures in being and activity. (2.) That He constantly
coöperates with second causes in the production of their effects. He fashioned our
bodies. He gives to every seed its own body. (3.) Besides this ordered efficiency
(potentia ordinata), which works uniformly according to fixed laws, He, as
a free, personal, extramundane Being, controls the operations of these fixed laws,
or the efficiency of second causes, so as to determine their action according to
his own will. He causes it to rain at one time and not at another. He sends fruitful
seasons, or He causes drought. “Elias . . . . prayed earnestly that it might not rain;
and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he
prayed again, and the heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit.”
(
As distinct from this providential control which extends over
all creatures, the Scriptures tell of the sphere of the Spirit’s operations.
1. The revelation of truth. Nothing is plainer than that the great doctrines of the Bible were made known not in the way of the orderly development of the race, or of a growth in human knowledge, but by a supernatural intervention of God by the Spirit.
2. The inspiration of the sacred writers, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.
3. The various gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, bestowed
on men to qualify them for the special service of God. Some of these gifts were
extraordinary or miraculous, as in the case of the Apostles and others; others were
ordinary, i.e., such as do not transcend the limits of human power. To this class
belong the skill of artisans, the courage and strength of heroes, the wisdom of
statesmen, the ability to rule, etc. Thus it was said of Bezaleel, “I have filled
him with the Spirit of God, in wisdom and in understanding and in knowledge and
in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning works, to work in gold, and in silver,
and in brass.” (
4. To the Spirit are also referred conviction of sin, righteousness, and judgment; the resistance and rebuke of evil in the heart; strivings and warnings; illumination of the conscience; conviction of the truth; powerful restraints; and temporary faith founded on moral convictions; as well as regeneration, sanctification, consolation, strength, perseverance in holiness, and final glorification both of the soul and of the body.
All these effects which the Bible clearly and constantly refers to the Holy Spirit, Rationalism refers to second causes and to the attending providential efficiency of God. It admits of revelation, but only of such as is made in the works of God and in the constitution of our nature, apprehended by the mind in its normal exercises. All truth is discovered by the intuitive or discursive operations of reason. Inspiration is only the subjective state due to the influence of these truths on the mind. Miracles are discarded, or referred to some higher law. Or if admitted, they are allowed to stand by themselves, and all other subsequent intervention of God in controlling the minds of men is reduced to the regular process of human development and progress. The Bible and the Church universal recognize a broad distinction between the work of the Spirit and the operation of second causes as energized and controlled by the general efficiency of God. It is to one and the same divine agent that all the influences which control the conduct, form the character, and renew and sanctity the children of men, are to be referred; that by his energy revealed the truth to the prophets and apostles, rendered them infallible as teachers, and confirmed their divine missions by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles. The former class no more belong to the category of nature or natural operations, than the latter. God as an extramundane Spirit, a personal agent, has access to all other spirits. He can and He does act upon them as one spirit acts upon another, and also as only an Almighty Spirit can act; that is, producing effects which God alone can accomplish.
The Bible therefore teaches that the Holy Spirit as the Spirit
of truth, of holiness, and of life in all its forms, is present with every human
mind, enforcing truth, restraining from evil, exciting to good, and imparting wisdom
or strength, when, where, and in what measure seemeth to Him good. In this sphere
also He divides “to every man severally as He will.” (
The Influences of the Spirit granted to all Man.
That there is a divine influence of the Spirit granted to all men, is plain both from Scripture and from experience.
1. Even in
2. The martyr Stephen (
3. That the Spirit does exercise this general influence, common
to all men, is further plain from what the Scriptures teach of the reprobate. There
are men from whom God withdraws the restraints of his Spirit; whom for their sins,
He gives up to themselves and to the power of evil. This is represented as a fearful
doom. It fell, as the Apostle teaches, upon the heathen world for
4. The Bible therefore speaks of men as partakers of the Spirit
who are not regenerated, and who finally come short of eternal life. It not only
speaks of men repenting, of their believing for a time, and of their receiving the
Word with joy, but still further. of their being enlightened, of their tasting of
the heavenly gift, and of their being made partakers of the Holy Ghost. (
Argument from Experience.
What is thus taught in Scripture is confirmed by the experience
of every man, and of the Church in the whole course of its history. God leaves no
man without a witness. No one can recall the time when he was not led to serious
thoughts, to anxious inquiries, to desires and efforts, which he could not rationally
refer to the operation of natural causes. These effects are not due to the mere
moral influence of the truth, or to the influence of other men over our minds, or
to the operation of the circumstances in which we may be placed. There is something
in the nature of these experiences, and of the way in which they come and go, which
proves that they are due to the operation of the Spirit of God. As the voice of
conscience has in it an authority which it does not derive from ourselves, so these
experiences have in them a character which reveals the source whence they come.
They are the effects of that still small voice, which sounds in every human ear,
saying, This is the way; walk ye in it. This is much more obvious at one time than
at others. There are seasons in every man’s life, when he is almost overwhelmed
with the power of these convictions. He may endeavour to suppress them by an effort
of the will, by arguments to prove them to be unreasonable, and by diverting his
mind by business or amusement, without
During the apostolic period the Spirit, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel, was poured out on all classes of men. The effects of his influence were, (1) The various spiritual gifts, whether miraculous or ordinary, then so abundantly enjoyed. (2.) The regeneration, holiness, zeal, and devotion of the multitudes added to the Church. And (3.) The moral conviction of the truth, the excitement of all the natural affections, temporary faith, repentance, and reformation. The latter class of effects was just as conspicuous and as undeniable as either of the others. And such has been the experience of the Church in all ages. Whenever and wherever the Spirit has been manifested to a degree in any measure analogous to the revelation of his presence and power on the day of Pentecost, while many have been truly born of God, more have usually been the subjects of influences which did not issue in genuine conversion.
The evidence therefore from Scripture, and from experience, is clear that the Holy Spirit is present with every human mind, and enforces, with more or less power, whatever of moral or religious truth the mind may have before it.
The Effects of common Grace.
The effects produced by common grace, or this influence of
the Spirit common to all men, are most important to the individual and to the world.
What the external world would be if left to the blind operation of physical causes,
without the restraining and guiding influence of God’s providential efficiency,
that would the world of mind be, in all its moral and religious manifestations,
without the restraints and guidance of the Holy Spirit. There are two ways in which
we may learn what the effect would be of the withholding the Spirit from the minds
of men. The first is, the consideration of the effects of reprobation, as taught
in Scripture and by experience, in the case of individual men. Such men have a seared
conscience. They are reckless and indifferent, and entirely under the control of
the evil passions of their nature. This state is consistent with external decorum
and polish. Men may be as whitened sepulchres. But this is a restraint which the
1. All the decorum, order, refinement, and virtue existing among men. Mere fear of future punishment, the natural sense of right, and the restraints of human laws, would prove feeble barriers to evil, were it not for the repressing power of the Spirit, which, like the pressure of the atmosphere, is universal and powerful, although unfelt.
2. To the same divine agent is due specially that general fear of God, and that religious feeling which prevail among men, and which secure for the rites and services of religion in all its forms, the decorous or more serious attention which they receive.
3. The Scriptures refer to this general influence of the Spirit
those religious experiences, varied in character and degree, which so often occur
where genuine conversion, or regeneration does not attend or follow. To this reference
has already been made in a general way as a proof of the doctrine of common grace.
The great diversity of these religious experiences is due no doubt partly to the
different degrees of religious knowledge which men possess; partly to their diversity
of culture and character; and partly to the measure of divine influence of which
they are the subjects. In all cases, however, there is in the first place a conviction
of the truth. All the great doctrines of religion have a self-evidencing light;
an evidence of their truth to which nothing but the blindness and hardness of heart
produced by sin, can render the mind insensible. Men may argue themselves into a
theoretical disbelief of the being of God, of the obligation of the moral law, and
of a future state of retribution. But as these truths address themselves to our
moral constitution, which we cannot
In the second place, with this conviction of the truths of
religion is connected an experience of their power. They produce to a greater or
less degree an effect upon the feelings appropriate to their nature; a conviction
of sin, the clear perception that what the Bible and the conscience teach of our
guilt and pollution, produces self-condemnation, remorse, and self-abhorrence. These
are natural, as distinguished from gracious affections. They are experienced often
by the unrenewed and the wicked. A sense of God’s justice necessarily produces a
fearful looking for of judgment. Those who sin, the Apostle says, know the righteous
judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death. (
It is also natural and according to experience, that the promise
of the Gospel, and the exhibition of the plan of salvation, contained in the Scriptures,
which commend themselves to the enlightened
In the third place, the state of mind induced by these common operations of the Spirit, often leads to reformation, and to an externally religious life. The sense of the truth and importance of the doctrines of the Bible constrains men often to great strictness of conduct and to assiduous attention to religious duties.
The experiences detailed above are included in the “law work” of which the older theologians were accustomed to speak as generally preceding regeneration and the exercise of saving faith in Christ. They often occur before genuine conversion, and perhaps more frequently attend it; but nevertheless they are in many cases neither accompanied nor followed by a real change of heart. They may be often renewed, and yet those who are their subjects return to their normal state of unconcern and worldliness.
No strictness of inward scrutiny, no microscopic examination or delicacy of analysis, can enable an observer, and rarely the man himself, to distinguish these religious exercises from those of the truly regenerated. The words by which they are described both in the Scriptures and in ordinary Christian discourse, are the same. Unrenewed men in the Bible are said to repent, to believe, to be partakers of the Holy Ghost, and to taste the good Word of God, and the powers of the world to come. Human language is not adequate to express all the soul’s experiences. The same word must always represent in one case, or in one man’s experience, what it does not in the experience of another. That there is a specific difference between the exercises due to common grace, and those experienced by the true children of God, is certain. But that difference does not reveal itself to the consciousness, or at least, certainly not to the eye of an observer. “By their fruits ye shall know them.” This is the test given by our Lord. It is only when these experiences issue in a holy life, that their distinctive character is known.
As to the nature of the Spirit’s work, which He exercises,
in a greater or less degree, on the minds of all men, the words of our Lord admonish
us to speak with caution. “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the
sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is
every one that is born of the Spirit.” (
§ 4. Efficacious Grace.
Besides those operations of the Spirit, which in a greater or less degree are common to all men, the Scriptures teach that the covenant of redemption secures the Spirit’s certainly efficacious influence for all those who have been given to the Son as his inheritance.
Why called Efficacious.
This grace is called efficacious not simply ab eventu.
According to one view the same influence at one time, or exerted on one person,
produces a saving effect; and at other times, or upon other persons, fails of such
effect. In the one case it is called efficacious, and in the other not. This is
not what Augustinians mean by the term. By the Semi-Pelagians, the Romanists, and
the Arminians, that influence of the Spirit which is exerted on the minds of all
men is called “sufficient grace.” By the two former it is held to be sufficient
to enable the sinner to do that which will either merit or secure larger degrees
of grace which, if duly improved, will issue in salvation. The Arminians admit that
the fall of our race has rendered all men utterly unable, of themselves, to do anything
truly acceptable in the sight of God. But they hold that this inability, arising
out of the present state of human nature, is removed by the influence of the Spirit
given to all. This is called “gracious ability”; that is, an ability due to the
grace, or the supernatural influence of the Spirit granted to all men. On both these
points the language of the Remonstrant Declaration or Confession is explicit. It
is there said, “Man has not saving faith from himself, neither is he regenerated
or converted by the force of his own free will; since, in the state of sin, he is
not able of and by himself to think, will, or do any good thing, any good thing
that is saving in its nature, particularly conversion and saving faith. But it is
necessary that he be regenerated, and wholly renewed by God in Christ, through the
truth of the gospel and the added energy of the Holy Spirit, — in intellect, affections,
will, and all his faculties, — so that he may be able rightly to perceive, meditate
upon, will, and accomplish that which is a saving good.”
Augustinians of course admit that common grace is in one sense
sufficient. It is sufficient to render men inexcusable for their impenitence
Congruity.
Another erroneous view on this subject is that the influence
of the Spirit in conversion owes its efficacy to its congruity. By this is sometimes
meant its adaptation to the state of mind of him who is its subject. When a man
is in one state, the same influence, both as to kind and degree, may fail to produce
any serious impression; when in a different and more favourable frame of mind, it
may issue in his true conversion. In this view the doctrine of congruity does not
differ from the view already considered. It supposes that the subject of the Spirit’s
influence, in one state of
Sometimes, however, more is meant than that the grace is congruous
to the state of mind of its subject. Cardinal Bellarmin objects to the view above
stated that it assumes that the reason why one man believes and another disbelieves,
is to be found in the free will of the subject. This, he says, is directly contrary
to what the Apostle says in
Neither the Symbols of the Romish Church, nor the majority
of its theologians adopt this doctrine of Bellarmin. They make the difference between
sufficient and efficacious grace to be determined simply by the event. One man coöperates
with the grace he receives, and it becomes efficacious; another does not coöperate,
and it remains without saving effect. On this point the Council of Trent
Augustinian Doctrine of Efficacious Grace.
According to the Augustinian doctrine the efficacy of divine
grace in regeneration depends neither upon its congruity nor upon the active coöperation,
nor upon the passive non-resistance of its subject, but upon its nature and the
purpose of God. It is the exercise of “the mighty power of God,” who speaks and
it is done. This is admitted to be the doctrine of Augustine himself. He says, “Non
lege atque doctrina insonante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili
potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas
etiam voluntates.”
The Jansenists, the faithful disciples of Augustine, endeavoured
to revive his doctrine in the Roman Church. Among the propositions selected from
their writings and condemned by Pope Clement XI. in the famous Bull, Unigenitus,
are the following: “
It is not a matter of doubt or dispute that the Reformed Church
adopted the Augustinian doctrine on this subject. In the “Second Helvetic Confession,”
it is said, “Quantum ad bonum et ad virtutes, intellectus hominis, non recte judicat
de divinis ex semetipso. . . . . Constat vero mentem vel intellectum, ducem esse voluntatis,
cum autem cœcus sit dux, claret, quousque et voluntas pertingat. Proinde nullum
est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum nondum renato, vires nullæ ad perficiendum
bonum. . . . . In regeneratione . . . . voluntas non tantum mutatur per Spiritum, sed
etiam instruitur facultatibus, ut sponte velit et possit bonum. . . . . Observandum
est — regeneratos in boni electione et operatione, non tantum agere passive, sed
active. Aguntur enim a Deo, ut agant ipsi, quod agunt.”
The Synod of Dort,
The following proposition contains one of the positions assume
by Remonstrants on which the Synod was called to decide. “Operatio gratiæ in prima
conversione indifferens est et resistibilis, ut per eam possit homo converti vel
non converti: nec sequatur ejus conversio nisi libero assensu ad eam se determinet,
et converti velit.” On this proposition the Theologians of the Palatinate in their
“Judicium,” after referring to the Remonstrant idea that regeneration is effected
by moral suasion, say, “Scriptura vero,
The “Westminster Confession”
“II. This effectual call is of God’s free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it.
“III. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, where, and how He pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word.”
In the “Larger Catechism,”
The Main Principle involved.
These authoritative declarations of the faith of the Reformed
Church agree as to the one simple, clear, and comprehensive statement,
Efficacious Grace Mysterious and Peculiar.
If this one point be determined, namely, that efficacious grace is the almighty power of God, it decides all questions in controversy on this subject.
1. It is altogether mysterious in its operations. Its effects
are not to be explained rationally, i.e., by the laws which govern our intellectual
and moral exercises. To this aspect of the case our Lord refers in
2. Another equally obvious corollary of the above proposition is, that there is a specific difference between not only the providential efficiency of God and efficacious grace, but also between the latter and what is called common, or sufficient grace. It is not a difference in degree, or in circumstances, or in congruity, but the operations are of an entirely different kind. There is no analogy between an influence securing or promoting mental development, or the formation of moral character, and the efficiency exerted in raining the dead.
Not Moral Suasion.
3. It is no less clear that efficacious grace is not of the nature of “moral suasion.” By moral suasion is meant the influence exerted by one mind over the acts and states of another mind, by the presentation of truth and motives, by expostulations, entreaty, appeals, etc. Under the influence of this kind of moral power, the mind yields or refuses. Its decision is purely its own, and within its own power. There is nothing of all this in the exercise of omnipotence. Healing the sick by a word, is an essentially different process from healing him by medicine. A living man may be persuaded not to commit suicide; but a dead man cannot be persuaded into life. If regeneration be effected by the volition, the command, the almighty power of God, it certainly is not produced by a process of argument or persuasion.
Efficacious Grace Acts Immediately.
4. It is a no less obvious conclusion that the influence of
the Spirit acts immediately on the soul. All effects in the ordinary dealings of
God with his creatures are produced through the agency of second causes. It is only
in miracles and in the work of regeneration that all second causes are excluded.
When Christ said to the leper, “I will; be thou clean,” nothing intervened between
his volition and the effect. And when He put clay in the eyes of the blind man,
and bade him wash in the pool of Siloam, there was nothing in the properties of
the clay or of the water that coöperated in the restoration of his sight. In like
manner nothing intervenes between the volition of the Spirit and the regeneration
of the soul. Truth may accompany or attend the work of the Spirit, but it has no
coöperation in the production of the effect. It may attend it, as the application
of the clay attended the miracle of restoring sight to the blind man; or as Naaman’s
bathing in the Jordan attended the healing of his leprosy. It is however to be remembered
that the word regeneration (or its equivalents) is used, sometimes in a limited,
and sometimes in a comprehensive sense. The translation of a soul from the kingdom
of darkness into the kingdom of God’s dear Son, is a great event. It involves a
varied and comprehensive experience. There is much that usually precedes and attends
the work of regeneration in the limited sense of the word; and there is much that
of necessity and (in the case of adults) immediately succeeds it. In all that thus
precedes and follows, the truth has an important, in some
The Use of the Word Physical.
This idea is often expressed by the word physical.
The Schoolmen spoke of “a physical influence of the Spirit.” The Pope condemned
Jansenius for teaching, “Gratia de se efficax vere, realiter et physice præmovens
et prædeterminans, immutabiliter, infallibiliter insuperabiliter, et indeclinabiliter
necessaria est,” etc. Thus also Turrettin says:
Owen, in his work on the Spirit, strenuously insists on the
necessity of this physical operation. He uses the words conversion and regeneration
interchangeably, as including all that Turrettin understands by them. And hence
he says that in the work of conversion there is both a physical and moral influence
exerted by the Spirit. Speaking of moral suasion, he says, “That the Holy Spirit
doth make use of it in the regeneration or conversion of all that are adult, and
that either immediately in and by the preaching of it, or by some other application
of light and truth unto the mind derived from the Word; for by the reasons, motives,
and persuasive arguments which the Word affords, are our minds affected, and our
souls wrought upon in our conversion unto God, whence it becomes our reasonable
obedience. And there are none ordinarily converted, but they are able to give some
account by what considerations they were prevailed on thereunto. But, we say that
the whole work, or the whole of the work of the Holy Ghost in our conversion, doth
not consist herein; but there is a real, physical work, whereby He infuseth a gracious
principle of spiritual life into all that are effectually converted, and really
regenerated, and without which there is no deliverance from the
It is too obvious to need remark that the word physical is used antithetically to moral. Any influence of the Spirit that is not simply moral by the way of argument and persuasion, is called physical. The word, perhaps, is as appropriate as any other; if there be a necessity for any discriminating epithet in the case. All that is important is, on the one hand, the negation that the work of regeneration is effected by the moral power of the truth in the hands of the Spirit; and, upon the other, the affirmation that there is a direct exercise of almighty power in giving a new principle of life to the soul.
This doctrine both in what it denies and in what it affirms,
is not peculiar to the older theologians. The modern German divines, each in the
language of his peculiar philosophy, recognize that apart from the change in the
state of the soul which takes place in the sphere of consciousness, and which is
produced by God through the truth, there is a communication by his direct efficiency
of a new form of life. This is sometimes called the life of Christ; sometimes the
person of Christ; sometimes his substance; sometimes his divine-human nature, etc.
They teach that man is passive in regeneration, but active in repentance.
Efficacious Grace Irresistible.
5. It will of course be admitted that, if efficacious grace
is the exercise of almighty power it is irresistible. That common grace, or that
influence of the Spirit which is granted more or less to all men is often effectually
resisted, is of course admitted. That the true believer often grieves and quenches
the Holy Spirit, is also no doubt true. And in short that all those influences which
are in their nature moral, exerted through the truth, are capable of
The Soul passive in Regeneration.
6. It follows, further, from the same premises, that the soul is passive in regeneration. It is the subject, and not the agent of the change. The soul coöperates, or, is active in what precedes and in what follows the change, but the change itself is something experienced, and not something done. The blind and the lame who came to Christ, may have undergone much labour in getting into his presence, and they joyfully exerted the new power imparted to them, but they were entirely passive in the moment of healing. They in no way coöperated in the production of that effect. The same must be true in regeneration, if regeneration be the effect of almighty power as much as the opening the eyes of the blind or the unstopping by a word the ears of the deaf.
Regeneration Instantaneous.
7. Regeneration, according to this view of the case, must be instantaneous. There is no middle state between life and death. If regeneration be a making alive those before dead, then it must be as instantaneous as the quickening of Lazarus. Those who regard it as a protracted process, either include in it all the states and exercises which attend upon conversion; or they adopt the theory that regeneration is the result of moral suasion. If the work of omnipotence, an effect of a mere volition on the part of God, it is of necessity instantaneous. God bids the sinner live; and he is alive, instinct with a new and a divine life.
An Act of Sovereign Grace.
8. It follows, also, that regeneration is an act of sovereign
grace. If a tree must be made good before the fruit is good; the goodness of the
fruit cannot be the reason which determines him who has the power to change the
tree from bad to good. So if works spiritually good are the fruits of regeneration,
then they cannot be the ground on which God exerts his life-giving power. If, therefore,
the Scriptures teach the doctrine of efficacious grace in the Augustinian sense
of those terms, then they teach that regeneration is a sovereign gift. It cannot
be granted on the sight or foresight
§ 5. Proof of the Doctrine.
Common Consent.
1. The first argument in proof of the Augustinian doctrine
of efficacious grace, is drawn from common consent. All the great truths of the
Bible are impressed on the convictions of the people of God; and find expression
in unmistakable language. This is done in despite of the theologians, who often
ignore or reject these truths in their formal teachings. There are in fact but two
views on this subject. According to the one, regeneration is the effect of the mighty
power of God; according to the other, it is the result of moral suasion. This latter
may be understood to be nothing more than what the moral truths of the Bible are
in virtue of their nature adapted to produce on the minds of men. Or, it may characterize
the nature of the Spirit’s influence as analogous to that by which one man convinces
or persuades another. It is from its nature one which may be effectually resisted.
All those, therefore, who hold to this theory of moral suasion, in either of its
forms, teach that this influence is effectual or not, according to the determination
of the subject. One chooses to yield, and another chooses to refuse. Every man may
do either. Now, infants are confessedly incapable of moral suasion. Infants, therefore,
cannot be the subjects of regeneration, if regeneration be effected by a process
of rational persuasion and conviction. But, according to the faith of the Church
Universal, infants may be renewed by the Holy Ghost, and must be thus born of the
Spirit, in order to enter the kingdom of God. It therefore follows that the faith,
the in-wrought conviction of the Church, the aggregate body of God’s true and professing
people, is against the doctrine of moral suasion, and in favour of the doctrine
that regeneration is effected by the immediate almighty power of the Spirit. There
is no possibility of its operating, in the case of infants, mediately through the
truth as apprehended by the reason. It is hard to see how this argument is to be
evaded. Those who are consistent and sufficiently independent, admit its force,
and rather than give up their theory, deny the possibility of infant regeneration.
But even this does not much
Argument from Analogy.
2. A second argument, although most weighty, is nevertheless
very difficult adequately to present. Happily its force does not
Such being the state of the case; such being the intimate
relation and analogy between the material and spiritual, and such being the consequent
law of thought and language which is universal among men, and which is recognized
in Scripture, we are not at liberty to explain the language of the Bible when speaking
of the sinful state of men, or of the method of recovery from that state, as purely
metaphorical, and make it mean much or little according to our good pleasure. Spiritual
death is as real as corporeal death. The dead body is not more insensible and powerless
in relation to the objects of sense, than the soul, when spiritually dead, is to
the things of the Spirit. This insensibility and helplessness are precisely what
the word dead in both cases is meant to express. It is
There is another view of the subject. As the Bible recognizes
and teaches this analogy between the material and spiritual worlds, so it constantly
assumes a like analogy between the relation which God sustains to the one and the
relation which He sustains to the other. He has given to his creatures, the aggregate
of whom constitutes nature, their properties, attributes, and powers. These are
not inert. They act constantly and each according to its own laws. What we regard
as the operations of nature, especially in the external world, are the effects of
these agencies, that is, of the efficiency of second causes, which God has ordained,
and which act with uniformity and certainty, so that like causes always produce
like effects. God, however, is everywhere present with his creatures, not only upholding,
but guiding, so that the effects produced, in the infinite diversity of vegetable
and animal forms, are indicative of an everywhere present and everywhere active
In strict analogy to this relation of God to the external
world, is, according to the Scriptures, his relation to his rational and moral creatures.
They have their essential attributes and faculties. Those faculties act according
to established laws; for there are laws of mind as well as laws of matter, and the
one are as uniform and as imperative as the other. Mental action, not in accordance
with the laws of mind, is insanity. God is in all his rational creatures, sustaining
them and all their faculties. He is, moreover, over them and out of them, controlling
and guiding them at his pleasure, in perfect consistency with their free agency.
He restrains the wrath of men. He puts it into the hearts of the wicked to be favourable
to his people. He conducts all the progress of history, overruling the minds of
men, with unerring certainty and infinite wisdom. All this is mediate government;
a rule exercised
There are men who deny the providential intervention of God in nature and in the government of the world. To them the world is a great mechanism, which, admitting it to have been framed by an intelligent first cause, does not need the constant supervision and intervention of its Maker to keep it in successful operation. There are others who acknowledge the necessity of such providential intervention for the preservation of second causes in their activity, but deny anything beyond this potentia ordinata of God. They deny any special providence. Events in the natural world and among the nations of the earth, are not determined by his control, but by natural causes and the uncontrolled free agency of men. And there are others, who admit not only the general concursus or coöperation of the first, with all second causes, but also the special providence of God, and yet who insist that He always operates through means; He never intervenes by the immediate exercise of his power; there can be no such thing as a miracle, in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. In like manner in reference to the relation of God to moral and rational creatures, there are those who deny that He is anything more than their creator. Having made them, He leaves them entirely to their own control. He neither positively upholds them in being; nor does He control them by an operation on their minds by truth and motives presented and urged by his Spirit. There are others who admit the universal agency of God in sustaining rational creatures, and who are willing to concede that He operates on them according to the laws of mental action, as one mind may influence other minds; but they deny any more than this. They deny any miracles in the sphere of grace, any effects produced by the immediate exertion of the omnipotence of God.
It is a strong argument in favour of the Augustinian doctrine
of efficacious grace, which teaches that regeneration is an act of almighty power,
or, in its subjective sense, an effect produced in
Argument from
3. A third argument on this subject is founded on
But if this be, as seems so clear, the meaning of the Apostle,
what does the passage teach? What is it that Paul desired that the Ephesians should
understand, when he says, that their regeneration, or spiritual resurrection was
effected by the mighty power of God? (1.) In the first place it is very clear that
he meant them to understand that it was not their own work. They had not by their
own power, by the efficiency of their own will, raised themselves from the dead.
(2.) It is no less clear that he does not mean to teach that there was any special
difficulty in the case, as it regards God. To Him all things are easy. He speaks
and it is done. He upholds all things by the word of his power. It is not the difficulty,
but the nature of the work, he would have them to understand. (3.) And, therefore,
the precise truth which the passage teaches is that regeneration belongs to that
class of events which are brought about by the immediate agency, or almighty power
of God. They are not the effect of natural causes. They are not due to the power
of God acting through second causes. This is the definite meaning of the words.
There can be no reason for saying that the Ephesians had experienced the effects
of the mighty power of God, if they were subjects of no other influence than that
of moral suasion, which all more or less experience, ano which all may resist. The
language would be incongruous to express that idea. Besides, the very point of the
illustration would then be lost. The Ephesians had been quickened by the very power
which wrought in Christ when God raised Him from the dead. This was the immediate
power of God. It was not exercised through second causes. It was not a natural process
aided by divine efficiency; much less was it the result of any form of
This was in the view of the Apostle a most important truth. It determines the whole nature of religion. It raises it from the sphere of the natural, into that of the supernatural. If regeneration is a change effected by the man’s own will; if it be due to the mere force of truth and motives, it is a small affair. But if it be the effect of the mighty power of God, it is as to its nature and consequences supernatural and divine. The whole nature of Christianity turns on this point. The conflict of ages concerns the question, Whether our religion is natural or supernatural; whether the regeneration, sanctification, and salvation promised and effected under the gospel, are natural effects, produced by second causes, aided and guided, it may be, by the coöperation of God, as He aids and guides the forces of nature in the production of their wonderful effects; or whether they are something entirely above nature, due to the supernatural intervention and constant operation of the Holy Spirit. Which of these views is Scriptural, can hardly be a question among unsophisticated Christians. And if the latter be the true view, it goes far to decide the question, Whether regeneration be due to moral suasion, or to the almighty power of the Spirit.
Argument from the General Teaching of Scripture.
4. This introduces the fourth argument on this subject. It
is drawn from the general account given in the Scriptures of subjective Christianity,
or the nature of the divine life in the soul. It is the tendency of all anti-Augustinian
systems, as just remarked, to represent all inward religion as a rational affair,
that is, something to be accounted for and explained on rational principles; the
result of moral culture, of the right exercise of our free agency, and the favourable
influence of circumstances. Such is not the view given in the Bible. When our Lord
said, “I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him,
the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing” (
The Scriptures, therefore, plainly teach that there is a vital
union between Christ and his people; that they have a common life analogous to that
which exists between the vine and its branches, and between the head and members
of the body. The believer is truly partaker of the life of Christ. This great truth
is presented under another aspect. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are
one God. Wherever, therefore, the Father is, there is the Son, and where the Son
is, there is the Spirit. Hence if Christ dwells in the believer, the Father does
and the Spirit also does. In answer to the question of the disciples, “Lord, how
is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?” our Lord
answered, “If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him,
and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him.” (
These representations of Scripture concerning the union between Christ and his people, are neither to be explained nor explained away. Both attempts have often been made. Numerous theories have been adopted and urged as divine truth, which in fact are only philosophical speculations. Some say that it is “the substance of Christ’s person” that dwells in the believer. Others say that it is his divine nature, the Logos, who becomes incarnate in the Church; others that it is the humanity of Christ, his soul and body; others that it is the theanthropic nature; others that it is generic humanity raised by its union with the divine nature to the power of divinity. All this is darkening counsel by words without wisdom. It is, however, far better than the opposite extreme, which explains everything away. The one method admits the vital fact, however unauthorized may be the explanations given of it. The other denies the fact, and substitutes something easily intelligible for the great Scriptural mystery. It is enough for us to know that Christ and his people are really one. They are as truly one as the head and members of the same body, and for the same reason; they are pervaded and animated by the same Spirit. It is not merely a union of sentiment, of feeling, and of interests. These are only the consequences of the vital union on which the Scriptures lay so much stress.
Now if the whole nature of religion, of the life of God in
the soul, is, according to the Scriptures, thus something supernatural aid divine;
something mysterious; something which is not to be explained by the ordinary laws
of mental action or moral culture, then assuredly regeneration, or the commencement
of this divine life in the soul, is no simple process, the rationale of which can
be made intelligible to a child. It is no unassisted act of the man himself yielding
to the force of truth and motives; nor is it an act to which he is determined by
the persuasion of the Spirit, giving
Argument from the Nature of Regeneration.
5. The Scriptures not only teach that regeneration is the
work of the immediate omnipotent agency of the Spirit, but they give such an account
of its nature as admits of no other explanation of its cause. It is a kind of work
which nothing but almighty power can accomplish. It is a ζωοποίησις,
a making alive. Originating life is from its nature an act of God, for He
alone can give life. It is also an act of immediate power. It precludes the intervention
of second causes as much as creation does. Christ was raised from the dead by the
power of God. So was Lazarus. So are the regenerated. Spiritual resurrection is
just as really and as literally an act of making alive as calling a dead body to
life. The one occurs in the sphere of the outward, the other in the sphere of the
spiritual world. But the one is just as real a communication of life as the other.
When the principle of life is communicated to a dead body, all the chemical properties
which belong to it are controlled by the vital force, so as to make them work for
its preservation and increase, instead of for its disintegration. And when the principle
of spiritual life is imparted to the soul, it controls all its mental and moral
energies, so that they work to its spiritual
The Bible teaches the same truth when it declares believers to be new creatures, and says that they are created anew in Christ Jesus. Creation is the work of God, and it is an immediate work It precludes the intervention of means. It is of necessity the work of almighty power, and therefore the Scriptures so often claim it as the peculiar prerogative of God. It is true that the Greek and Hebrew words which we translate by the English word create, are often used in the sense of to make, to fashion out of preexistent materials. They occur, also, in a secondary or figurative sense, and express in such cases only the idea of a great, and generally a favourable change, no matter how produced. It would not, therefore, be sufficient to establish the Augustinian doctrine of regeneration, that it is called a creation, if in other parts of Scripture it were spoken of as a change produced by second causes, and if the means and the mode were described. In that case it would be natural to take the word in a figurative sense. But the contrary of all this is true. If the Bible taught the eternity of matter, or that the world is an emanation from God, or a mode of God’s existence, we should be forced to give a figurative sense to the words, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” But as the Scriptures tell us that God alone is eternal, and that all else owes its existence to his will, we are authorized and bound to retain these words in their simple and sublime significance. Now, as regeneration is always declared to be God’s work, his peculiar work, and a work of his mighty power, analogous to that which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead; as it is declared to be a making alive, an opening of the eyes, and an unstopping the ears; then, when it is also called a new creation, we are bound to understand that term as containing a new assertion that it is a work of almighty power.
Another common Scriptural representation leads to the same
conclusion. Believers are the children of God, not merely as his rational creatures,
but as the subjects of a new birth. They are born of God. They are born of the Spirit.
They are begotten of God.
This argument is not invalidated by the fact that Paul says
to the Corinthians, “I have begotten you through the gospel.” All words are used
literally and figuratively; and no man is misled (or need be) by this change of
meaning. We are accustomed to speak of one man as the spiritual father of another
man, without any fear of being misunderstood. When the historian tells us that the
monk Augustine converted the Britons, or the American missionaries the Sandwich
Islanders, we are in no danger of mistaking his meaning; any more than when it is
said that Moses divided the Red Sea, or brought water out of the rock, or gave the
people manna out of heaven. The same Paul who told the Corinthians that he had “begotten
them through the gospel,” told them in another place, “I have planted, Apollos watered:
but God gave the increase. So then, neither is he that planteth anything, neither
he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase.” (
In
The fact then that the Bible represents regeneration as a
spiritual resurrection, as a new creation, and as a new birth, proves it to be the
work of God’s immediate agency. There is another familiar mode of speaking on this
subject which leads to the same conclusion. In
Argument from related Doctrines.
6. Another decisive argument in favour of the Augustinian
doctrine of efficacious grace, is derived from its necessary connection
There is the same intimate connection between the doctrines of God’s sovereignty in election and efficacious grace. If it were true that men make themselves to differ; that election is founded on the foresight of good works; that some who hear the Gospel and feel the influence of the Spirit, allow themselves to be persuaded, that others refuse, and that the former are therefore chosen and the latter rejected, then it would be consistent to represent the grace exercised in the vocation of men as an influence to be submitted to or rejected. But if God has mercy on whom He will have mercy; if it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; if it be of God, and not of ourselves, that we are in Christ Jesus; if God hides these things from the wise and prudent and reveals them unto babes as seems good in his sight; then the influence by which He carries his purpose into effect must be efficacious from its own nature, and not owe its success to the determination of its subjects.
The same conclusion follows from what the Scriptures teach
of the covenant of redemption. If in that covenant God gave to the Son his people
as the reward of his obedience and death, then all those thus given to Him must
come unto Him; and the influence which secures their coming must be certainly efficacious.
Thus this doctrine is implicated with all the other great doctrines of grace. It
is an essential, or, at least, an inseparable element of that system which God has
revealed for the salvation of men; a system the grand design of which is the manifestation
of the riches of divine grace, i.e., of his unmerited, mysterious love to the unworthy;
and which, therefore, is so devised and so administered that he that glories must
glory in the Lord; he must be constrained to say, and rejoice in saying, “Not unto
us, O Lord; not unto us, but unto thy name give glory.” (
Argument from Experience.
7. Appeal on this subject may safely be made to the experience
of the individual believer, and to the history of the Church. All the phenomena
of the Christian life are in accordance with the
Five thousand persons were converted on the day of Pentecost.
Most of them had seen the person and works of Christ. They had heard his instructions.
They had hitherto resisted all the influences flowing from the exhibition of his
character and the truth of his doctrines. They had remained obdurate and unbelieving
under all the strivings of the Spirit who never fails to enforce truth on the reason
and the conscience. Their conversion was sudden, apparently instantaneous. It was
radical, affecting their whole character and determining their whole subsequent
life. That this was not a natural change, effected by the influence of truth on
the mind, or produced by a process of moral suasion, in primâ facie certain
from the whole narrative and from the nature of the case. The Holy Ghost was poured
out abundantly, as the Apostle tells, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel. Three
classes of effects immediately followed. First, miracles; that is, external manifestations
of the immediate power of God. Secondly, the immediate illumination of the minds
of the Apostles, by which they were raised from the darkness, prejudices, ignorance,
and mistakes of their Jewish state, into the clear comprehension of the Gospel in
all its spirituality and catholicity. Thirdly, the instantaneous conversion of five
thousand of those who with wicked hands had crucified the Lord of glory, into his
broken-hearted, adoring, devoted worshippers and servants. This third class of effects
is as directly referred to the Spirit as either of the others. They all belong to
the same general category. They were all supernatural, that is, produced by the
immediate agency or volition of the Spirit of God. The Rationalist admits that they
are all of the same general class. But he explains them all as natural effects,
discarding all supernatural intervention. He has the advantage, so far as consistency
is concerned, over those who admit the gift of tongues and the illumination of the
Apostles to be the effects of the immediate agency of the Spirit, but insist on
explaining the conversions as the consequents of argument and persuasion. This explanation
is not only inconsistent with the narrative, but with the Scriptural method of accounting
for these wonderful effects. The Bible says they are produced by “the exceeding
greatness of” the power of God; that He raises those spiritually dead to a new life:
that He creates a new heart in them; that He takes from them the heart of stone
and gives them a heart of flesh; that He opens their eyes, and commands light to
shine into their hearts, as in the
The scenes of the day of Pentecost do not stand alone in the history of the Church. Similar manifestations of the power of the Spirit have occurred, and are still occurring, in every part of the world. They all bear as unmistakably the impress of divine agency, as the miracles of the apostolic age did. We are justified, therefore, in saying that all the phenomena of Christian experience in the individual believer and in the Church collectively, bear out the Augustinian doctrine of Efficacious Grace, and are inconsistent with every other doctrine on the subject.
§ 6. Objections.
There are no specific objections against the doctrine of efficacious grace which need to be considered. Those which are commonly urged are pressed with equal force against other allied doctrines, and have already come under review. Thus, —
1. It is urged that this doctrine destroys human responsibility. If we need a change which nothing but almighty power can effect before we can do anything spiritually good, we cease to be responsible. This is the old objection that inability and responsibility are incompatible. This difficulty has been presented thousands of times in the history of the Church, and has been a thousand times answered. It assumes unwarrantably that an inability which arises from character, and constitutes character, is incompatible with character.
2. It is objected that if nothing but the creative power of
God can enable us to repent and believe, we must patiently wait until that power
is exerted. It is thus doubtless that those reason who are in love with sin and
do not really desire to be delivered from it. Some leper, when Christ was upon earth,
might have been so unreasonable as to argue that because he could not heal himself,
he must wait until Christ came to heal him. The natural effect, however, of a conviction
of utter helplessness is to impel to earnest application to the source whence alone
help can come. And to all who feel their sinfulness and their inability to deliver
themselves, there is the promise, “Come unto me . . . . and I will give you rest.”
“Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be
opened unto you.” It will be time enough for any man to complain when he fails to
experience Christ’s healing
3. It is objected that a doctrine which supposes the intervention of the immediate agency of the Great First Cause in the development of history, or regular series of events, is contrary to all true philosophy, and inconsistent with the relation of God to the world. This is a point, however, as to which philosophy and the Bible, and not the Bible only, but also natural religion, are at variance. The Scriptures teach the doctrines of creation, of a particular providence, of supernatural revelation, of inspiration, of the incarnation, of miracles, and of a future resurrection, all of which are founded on the assumption of the supernatural and immediate agency of God. If the Scriptures be true, the philosophy which denies the possibility of such immediate intervention, must be false. There every Christian is willing to leave the question.
§ 7. History of the Doctrine of Grace.
The doctrines of sin and grace are so intimately related,
that the one cannot be stated without involving a statement of the other. Hence
the views of different parties in the Church in reference to the work of the Spirit
in the salvation of men, have already been incidentally presented in the chapter
on Sin. With regard to the period antecedent to the Pelagian controversy, it may
be sufficient to remark, (1.) As there was no general discussion of these subjects,
there were no defined parties whose opinions were clearly announced and generally
known. (2.) It is therefore, not the creeds adopted by the Church, but the opinions
of individual writers, to which reference can be made as characteristic of this
period. (3.) That the statements of a few ecclesiastical writers are very insufficient
data on which to found a judgment as to the faith of the people. The convictions
of believers are not determined by the writings of theologians, but by the Scriptures,
the services of the Church, and the inward teaching of the Spirit, that is, by the
unction from the Holy One of which the Apostle speaks,
Pelagian Doctrine.
The Pelagian doctrine has already repeatedly been presented.
It is only in reference to the views of Pelagius and his followers on the subject
of grace that anything need now be said. As the Pelagians insisted so strenuously
upon the plenary ability of man to avoid all sin, and to fulfil all duty, it was
obvious to object that they ignored the necessity of divine grace of which the Scriptures
so frequently and so plainly speak. This objection, however, Pelagius resented as
an injury. He insisted that he fully recognized the necessity of divine grace for
everything good, and magnified its office on every occasion.
We have already seen that Augustine, holding as he did that man since the fall is in a state of spiritual death, utterly disabled and opposite to all good, taught that his restoration to spiritual life was an act of God’s almighty power; and being an act of omnipotence was instantaneous, immediate, and irresistible. This point is sufficiently well known and already established.
Semi-Pelagianism.
The doctrine of Pelagius had been condemned in the provincial
Synod of Carthage, A.D. 412; in the Council of Jerusalem, 413; and in the Third
General Council at Ephesus, 431. The opposite doctrine of Augustine was declared
to be Scriptural and the doctrine of the Church. It was one of the inevitable consequences
of Augustine’s doctrine of efficacious grace, that God is sovereign in election
and reprobation. If the sinner cannot convert himself, nor prepare himself for that
work, nor coöperate in effecting it, then it can neither be out of regard to such
preparation or coöperation, nor because of the foresight thereof that God makes
one, and not another the subject of his saving grace. This Augustine freely admitted,
and taught, in accordance with the plain teachings of the Scriptures, that God has
mercy on whom He will have mercy. It was this inevitable consequence of the doctrine
rather than the doctrine itself, whether of total depravity and helplessness, or
of irresistible grace, that led to the strenuous opposition which continued to be
made to the Augustinian system notwithstanding the decision of councils in its favour.
So prominent was the doctrine of predestination in these controversies, and so strong
was the antipathy to that doctrine, that the Augustinians were called by their opponents
Prædestinati. To avoid the dreaded conclusion that fallen men lie at the
mercy of God, and that He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, the Semi-Pelagians
denied that the grace of God was irresistible. If not irresistible, then it depends
On some of these points the original leaders of the Semi-Pelagian party differed among themselves, but this is a correct exhibition of the system as known in history as a form of doctrine. The characteristic principle of the Semi-Pelagian theory, by which it is distinguished from the doctrine afterwards adopted in the Romish Church, and by the Remonstrants and others, is that the sinner begins the work of conversion. The Semi-Pelagians denied “preventing grace.” God helps those only who begin to help themselves. He is found only of those who seek Him.
The historical details of the rise of Semi-Pelagianism are
given above in the section on Original Sin. The most obscure point in the system
is the meaning to be attached to the word “grace.” It was used, as before remarked,
in a sense so wide as to include all divine help, whether afforded externally in
the revelation of the truth, the institutions of the Church, or the circumstances
of life,
Scholastic Period.
All conceivable forms of doctrine concerning sin and grace
were ventilated successively by the subtle intellects of the schoolmen of the Middle
Ages. Some of the theologians of that period were really pantheistic in their philosophy;
others, while recognizing a personal God, merge all the efficiency of second causes
in his omnipresent
Anselm in the eleventh century was essentially Augustinian
in his views of sin and grace. He held that man is born in a state of sin, with
a will enslaved to evil, free only in sinning. From this state of helplessness,
he can be freed only by the grace of the Holy Spirit, not by his own power, and
not by an influence which owes its success to the coöperation of an enslaved will.
The two great contending powers in the Latin Church for two
centuries before the Council of Trent, were the Dominicans and Franciscans, the
Thomists and Scotists, the former the followers of Thomas Aquinas, and the latter
of Duns Scotus. As Aquinas adopted very nearly the doctrine of Augustine concerning
original sin, he approached more nearly to Augustinianism in his views concerning
grace and predestination than the majority of the
1. That a gratia preveniens, a divine influence which
precedes any good effort on the part of the sinner is granted to men, by which they
are excited, encouraged, and aided. If this influence be improved, it secures the
merit of congruity, “Quia congruum est, ut dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus
secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur.”
2 To this preventing grace when improved, is added the “gratia gratum faciens,” renewing grace, called also “gratia operans;” and, in reference to its effects, “gratia habitualis,” by which is meant, “infusio gratiæ.”
3. To this succeeds the constant “gratia cooperans.” “Gratia,”
he says, “dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad
bene volendum et agendum. Alio modo habituale donum.” Again, “Gratia dividitur in
operantem et cooperantem, secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in prævenientem
et subsequentem, qualitercunque gratia accipiatur. Sunt autem quinque effectus gratiæ
in nobis, quorum primus est, ut anima sanetur: secundus, ut bonum velit; tertius
est, ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur: quartus est, ut in bono perseveret:
quintus est, ut ad gloriam perveniat.”
Duns Scotus, in his philosophy and theology, was indeed devoted
to the Church, but antagonistic to the views of her most distinguished teachers.
This antagonism was most pronounced against Thomas Aquinas, whose opinions he took
every opportunity of opposing. Scotus endeavoured, as far as possible, to obliterate
the distinction between the supernatural and the natural. Admitting the operations
of divine grace, and their necessity, he endeavoured to reduce them to the category
of the natural or established agency of God in coöperation with second causes. He
held the doctrine of “absolute power,” according to which everything, the moral
law, the method of salvation, everything but absolute contradictions, are subject
to the arbitrary will of God. God can, as Scotus taught, make right wrong and wrong
right, love a crime and malice a virtue. Nothing has any value or merit in itself.
It depend. simply on the good pleasure of God, what it avails. There is no
The Tridentine Doctrine.
The Council of Trent had a very difficult task to perform
in framing a statement of the doctrines of sin and grace which, while it condemned
the Protestant doctrine, should not obviously infringe against either the acknowledged
doctrines of the Latin Church, or the cherished views of one or other of the conflicting
parties within its pale. This, indeed, was not merely a difficult, but an impossible
task. It was impossible to condemn the Protestant doctrine on these subjects without
condemning the doctrine of Augustine, which the Church had already sanctioned. The
Council availed itself of generalities as far as possible, and strove so to frame
its canons as to secure the assent of the greatest number. On the subject of grace
it, (1.) Expressly condemned the Pelagian doctrine of free-will or plenary ability.
“Si quis dixerit hominem suis operibus, quæ vel per humanæ naturæ vires, vel
per legis doctrinam fiant, absque divina per Jesum Christum gratia posse justificari
(become holy) coram Deo; anathema sit.” “Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum gratiam per
Jesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo justi vivere, ac vitam æternam promereni
possit; quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrumque, sed ægre tamen, et difficiliter
possit; anathema sit.” (2.) It condemned with equal distinctness the Semi-Pelagian
doctrine that man begins the work of conversion: “Si quis dixerit, sine prævenienti
Spiritus Sancti inspiratione, atque ejus adjutorio, hominem credere, sperare, diligere
There is of course confusion and misapprehension in all these
statements. The Protestants did not deny that men coöperate in their own conversion,
taking that word in the sense in which the Romanists used the term (and the still
broader term justificatio), as including the whole work of turning unto God.
No one denies that the man in the synagogue coöperated in stretching out his withered
arm or that the impotent one at the pool was active in obeying the command of Christ,
“Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house.” But the question is, Did they
coöperate in the communication of vital power to their impotent limbs? So Protestants
do not deny that the soul is active in conversion, that the “arbitrium a Deo motum”
freely assents; but they do deny that the sinner is active and coöperating in the
production of the new life in the exercise of which the sinner turns to God. Moehler,
the ablest and most plausible of the modern defenders of Romanism, uses the word
“new-birth” as including the life-long process of sanctification, in which the soul
is abundantly coöperative. He recognizes, however, the radical difference between
the Tridentine doctrine and that of the Protestants. He insists that in the whole
work, in regeneration in its limited sense, as well as in conversion, the soul coöperates
with the Spirit, and that it depends on this coöperation, whether the sinner receives
the new life or not. The power of the Spirit in all its inward operations may be
resisted or assented to as the free-will of the subjects of his influence may decide.
“According to Catholic principles,” as before quoted, he says, “there are two agencies
combined in the work of the new birth, the human and the divine, so that it is a
divine-human work. The divine influence goes first, exciting, awakening and vivifying,
without any agency of the man in meriting,
The Synergistic Controversy.
The Lutherans from the beginning held the doctrine of original
sin in its most extreme form. In the Augsburg Confession, in the Apology for that
Confession, in the Smalcald Articles, and finally, in the Form of Concord, that
doctrine is stated in stronger terms than in any other Christian Symbol. If men
are since the fall in a state of condemnation, if the hereditary corruption derived
from Adam is not only truly sin, but the deepest and greatest of all sins; if the
soul is not merely morally sick and enfeebled, but spiritually dead, as taught in
those Symbols, then it follows: (1.) That man since the fall has no ability to anything
spiritually good (2.) That in order to his return to God he needs the life giving
power of the Spirit of God. (3.) That the sinner can in no way prepare himself to
be the subject of this grace, he cannot merit it, nor can he coöperate with it.
Regeneration is exclusively the work of the Spirit, in which man is the subject
and not the agent. (4.) That, therefore, it depends on God, and not on man, who
are, and who are not, to be made partakers of eternal life. (5.) That consequently
God acts as a sovereign, according to his good pleasure, and according to the counsel
of his own will, in saving some and in passing by others, who are left to the just
recompense of their sins. All these inferences are, as Augustinians believe, drawn
in Scripture, and were freely accepted by Luther and, at first, by the Lutheran
Church. Before the death of the Reformer, and more openly after that event, many
of the Lutheran theologians adopted the later views of Melancthon, who taught, “Concurrunt
tres causæ bonæ actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus Sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens
nec repugnans verbo Dei. Posset enim excutere, ut excutit Saul sua sponte.”
As to original sin, and the consequent utter inability of
man to any spiritual good, the doctrine of Luther was retained in its integrity.
Luther had said in his book, “De Servo Arbitrio,”
If original sin involves spiritual death, and spiritual death
implies
But if the reason why any man is regenerated is not that he
yields of his own will to the grace of God, or that he coöperates with it, but simply
that God gives him a new heart, then it would seem to follow that God saves some
and not others of the fallen race of men, of his own good pleasure. In other words,
it follows that election to eternal life is not founded in anything in us, but solely
in the will or purpose of God. This conclusion the “Form of Concord” admits, so
far as the saved are concerned. It teaches (1) That predestination has reference
only to the saved. That God predestinates no one either to sin or to eternal death.
(2.) That the election of some persons to salvation is not for anything good in
them, but solely of the mercy or grace of God. (3.) That predestination to life
is the cause of salvation. That is, it is because God from eternity purposed to
save certain individuals of the human family, that they are saved. (4.) That this
predestination or election renders the salvation of the elect certain. Should they
for a time fall away, their election secures their restoration to a state of grace.
The following passages contain the avowal of these several principles. “Prædestinatio,
seu æterna Dei electio, tantum ad bonos et dilectos filios Dei pertinet; et hæc
est causa ipsorum salutis. Etenim eorum salutem procurat, et ea, quæ ad ipsam pertinent,
disponit. Super hanc Dei prædestinationem salus nostra ita fundata est, ut inferorum
portæ eam evertere nequeant.”
As to the perseverance of the saints, it is said, “Cum etiam
electio nostra ad vitam æternam non virtutibus aut justitia nostra, sed solo Christi
merito, et benigna cœlestis Patris voluntate nitatur, qui seipsum negare non potest
(cum in voluntate et essentia sua sit immutabilis), eam ob causam, quando filii
ipsius obedientiam non præstant, sed in peccata labuntur, per verbum eos ad pœnitentiam
revocat, et Spiritus Sanctus per verbum vult in iis efficax esse, ut in viam redeant,
et vitam emendent.”
But if all men since the fall are in a state of spiritual
death, utterly unable to do anything to secure the grace of God, or to give that
grace, when offered, a saving effect; if election is not a mere general purpose
to save those who believe, but a purpose to save particular individuals; if that
purpose is of God’s mere good pleasure, and not founded upon anything actual or
foreseen in its objects; if, moreover, it is the cause of salvation, and renders
the salvation of its objects certain; then it would seem inevitably to follow, that
although the judicial reason why the non-elect fail of salvation is their own sin,
yet the reason why they, and not others equally guilty are left to suffer the penalty
of their sins, is to be found in the sovereignty of God. “Even so, Father; for so
it seemed good in thy sight.” This, however, the Lutherans of that day could not
admit; and therefore, with what Guericke calls
Reformed Church.
The experience of the Reformed Church conformed to that of
the Lutheran, in so far as that the same defection from the original confessional
doctrines occurred in both. As the followers of Melancthon adopted the theory of
synergism, or of the coöperation of the sinner in his own regeneration, on which
coöperation his fate depended, substantially the same view was adopted by the Remonstrants
or Arminians within the pale of the Reformed Church. The departure of the Remonstrants
from the principles of the Reformation, as to original sin, grace, ability, the
satisfaction of Christ, justification and faith, was far more serious than that
which occurred among the Lutherans. Another marked difference between the two cases
is, that the synergistic controversy resulted in a modification of the Lutheran
scheme of doctrine which became general and permanent; whereas the Remonstrants
or Arminians formed a distinct ecclesiastical organization outside of the Reformed
churches which adhered to the Reformed faith. The peculiar doctrines of the Remonstrants,
both as to sin and as to grace, were stated above;
Hypothetical Universalism.
A class of theologians in the Reformed Church who did not
agree with the Remonstrants against whom the decisions of the Synod of Dort, sustained
by all branches of the Reformed body, were directed, were still unable to side with
the great mass of their brethren. The most distinguished of these theologians were
Amyraut, La Place, and Cappellus. Their views have already been briefly stated in
the sections treating of mediate imputation; and of the order of decrees and of
the design of redemption. These departures from the accepted doctrines of the Reformed
Church produced protracted agitation, not in France only but also in Holland
This system necessitates a thorough change in the related
doctrines of the gospel. If fallen men have power to repent and believe, then original
sin (subjectively considered) does not involve absolute spiritual death. If this
be so, then mankind are not subject to the death threatened to Adam. Therefore,
there is no immediate imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity. As they derive
a polluted nature from him, which is the ground of the displeasure of God, they
may so far be said to share in his sin. This is mediate imputation. Again, if the
death of Christ does not render certain the salvation of his people, then it was
not vicarious in the proper sense of that word; nor did He die as a substitute.
His satisfaction assumes of necessity the character of a general display, a didactic
exhibition of truth. At least this is the logical tendency, and the actual historical
consequence of the theory. Moreover, if Christ did not act as the substitute and
representativc of his people, there is no ground for the imputation of his righteousness
to them. The French theologians, therefore, denied that his active obedience is
thus imputed to believers. The merit of his death may be said to be thus imputed
as it is the ground of the forgiveness of sin. This of course destroys the idea
of justification by merging it into an executive act of pardon. Moreover, the principles
on which this theory is founded, require that as every
Supernaturalism and Rationalism.
The departure from the doctrines of the church standards of the Protestant churches began early, with the decline of vital godliness. The only stable foundation for truth is either the external authority of the Church tolerating no dissent, or the inward testimony of the Spirit, the unction of the Holy One which both teaches and convinces. The former from its nature can secure only apparent conformity or the assent of indifference. Living faith can come only from a life-giving source.
The first great change was effected by the introduction of
the Wolf-Leibnitzian method into theology. Wolf assumed that all the truths of religion,
even its highest mysteries, were truths of the reason, and capable of being demonstrated
to the reason. This was a complete revolution. It changed the foundation of faith
from the testimony of God in his Word and by his Spirit, to the testimony of our
own feeble, insignificant reason. No wonder that a building resting on such a foundation,
first tottered, and then fell. If the demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity
from the truths of the reason failed to convince, the doctrine was rejected. So
of all the other great doctrines of revelation, and so especially
The Supernaturalists, although united against the Rationalists,
differed very much among themselves. Some stood on the dividing line, admitting
supernatural intervention on the part of God, in revelation and in grace, not because
asserted in the Scriptures, but because consistent with reason, and because probable
and desirable. Thus Bretschneider says in reference to grace, “Reason finds the
immediate operation of God on the souls of men for their illumination and improvement,
not only possible, but probable. As God stands in connection with the external world,
and in virtue of his infinitely perfect life constantly operates therein; so must
He also stand in connection with the moral world, or there could be no moral government.
But as his working in the natural world appears as natural, so that we never apprehend
his supernatural efficiency; thus his operation in the moral world is also natural
conformed to psychological laws, so that we are never conscious of his operation.”
Morus
J. L. Z. Junkheim
Michaelis
To this state of extreme attenuation was the theology of the
Reformers reduced, when the introduction of the speculative, transcendental, or
pantheistic philosophy effected an entire revolution, which even such writers as
Dorner are accustomed to call “the
The change introduced by the new philosophy was pervading.
Even those who did not adopt it in its anti-christian or anti-theistic results,
had all their modes of thought and expression modified by its influence. The views
thus induced, of the nature of God, of his relation to the world, of the nature
or constitution of man, of the person of Christ, and of the method of redemption,
were so diverse from those previously adopted, that the new theology, whether designated
as mystic or speculative, has few points of contact with the systems previously
adopted. Its whole nomenclature is changed, so that the productions of the writers
of this class cannot be understood without some previous training. Of course it
is out of the question to class these theologians, who differ greatly among themselves,
under the old categories. To say that they were Pelagian, Semi-Pelagian, Tridentine,
Lutheran, Reformed, or Arminian, would be absurd. Schleiermacher, Ullmann, Nitzsch,
Twesten, Martensen, Lange, Liebner, Dorner, Schoeberlein, Delitzsch, and many others,
are believers in the divine origin of Christianity; and are able, learned, and zealous
in the support of the truth as they apprehend it; and yet, in their theological
discussions, their whole mode of thinking, and their method of presenting the doctrines
of Scripture, are so controlled by their philosophy, that to a great degree, and
to a degree much greater in some cases than in others, their writings have the aspect
of philosophical disquisitions, and not of exhibitions of Scriptural doctrines.
All the topics connected with the great doctrines of sin and grace have been frequently and earnestly debated by the theological writers of our own country. But into these debates no new questions have entered. The principles involved in these controversies are the same as those involved in the earlier conflicts in the Church. Even the system of Dr. Emmons, which has most appearance of originality, is the doctrine of a continued creation pushed to its legitimate consequences, combined with certain incongruous elements derived from other sources. With Dr. Emmons God is the only cause; second causes (so called), whether material or mental, have no efficiency. God creates everything at every moment; all volitions or mental states, as well as all things external. He denied all substance out of God; identity consists in a sameness and continuity of phenomena or effects connected by the will or constitution of God. The moral and religious convictions of this distinguished man were too strong to allow him to draw the legitimate conclusions from his theory of divine efficiency. He therefore maintained that men’s volitions are free, although created by God; and that they are morally good or evil, determining character and involving responsibility, although they are the acts of God, or the product of his creative power. This is very different from the Church doctrine of original or concreated righteousness, and of infused grace. The Bible does indeed teach that God created man in his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness. But this holiness was a permanent state of mind the character of a person, a suppositum, or individual subsistence; and not the character of an act which is good or bad according to the motives by which it is determined. If God creates holy acts, He is a Holy Being, but the acts have no moral character apart from their efficient cause or author. Faith and repentance are due to the power of God, they are his gifts; but they are truly our acts, and not God’s. They are his gifts, because it is under his gracious influence we are induced to repent and believe. There can be no moral character pertaining to an act which does not belong to the agent.
Genesis
1:26 1:26-27 1:27 2:7 2:7 3:1 3:6 3:15 3:15 3:19 3:22 3:22 6:3 6:5 6:5-6 8:21 8:21 10:15-18 15:18 17:13 21:27 37:35 46:15 46:18 46:22 46:25
Exodus
4:16 7:1 10:17 30:12-16 30:15 31:3-4 32:30 32:32 34:6-7 34:7
Leviticus
4:2 4:3 4:20 4:26 5:1 5:6-7 5:16 5:16 5:17 7:1 7:18 16:6 17:10 17:11 17:16 19:8 20:17 22:9
Numbers
6:11 9:1-23 9:13 10:1-36 11:17 14:33 14:34 16:22 18:22 18:32 19:1-22 21:1-36 24:1-25 24:17 27:18 35:31
Deuteronomy
1:39 8:18 10:16 18:18-19 30:6 30:6
Joshua
Judges
1 Samuel
2:7 16:13 16:14 17:34 18:3 20:16
2 Samuel
1 Kings
Job
1:21 11:12 14:4 15:14 15:14-16
Psalms
2:1-12 3:2 7:8 8:1-9 8:1-9 8:6 11:1 16:1-11 16:10 18:5 18:5 22:1-31 22:9 30:4 30:4 32:5 35:7 40:1-17 40:12 45:1-17 45:1-17 50 51:1-19 51:5 51:7 51:10 51:11 58:3 68:1-35 68:1-35 72:1-20 72:1-20 75:7 79:9 81:11-12 85:3 86:5 110:1-7 110:1-7 110:2 112:1 115:1 116:3 116:3 119:18 130:3 143:2 147:10
Proverbs
Ecclesiastes
Isaiah
2:2-3 7:16 9:6-7 9:67 10:18 32:15 42:5 44:3 44:23 53:1-12 53:1-12 53:1-12 53:6 53:10 53:11 53:12 53:12 55:1 63:10 64:6 65:12
Jeremiah
Ezekiel
4:4-5 11:19 18:20 33:11 33:11 36:26 39:29 44:7 45:17
Daniel
Joel
Micah
Zechariah
Matthew
1:8 1:11 1:20-23 3:2 3:9 5:20 6:25 7:13-14 7:16-19 7:18 7:21 9:13 10:28 10:37 10:39 11:25 11:25 11:27 11:28 12:32 12:33 12:33 12:34-35 13:11 18:3 18:17 20:28 22:30 26:28 27:43 28:18 28:18
Mark
1:14 10:45 12:38 13:32 16:16 16:19
Luke
1:31-33 1:35 1:43 1:46-47 2:49 7:7 10:27 11:13 14:26 16:31 20:46 21:15 21:28 23:34 24:19 24:26 24:31 24:36 24:36 24:39 24:50-51 100
John
1:1-14 1:1-14 1:13 2:19 3:3 3:5 3:5 3:6 3:6 3:8 3:8 3:13 3:18 3:18 3:19 5:19 5:21 5:23 5:25 5:26 5:26 6:37 6:37 6:38 6:39 6:44 6:44 6:44 6:45 6:48 6:56 6:58 6:62 6:62 6:65 7:39 8:44 10:15 10:17 10:27-29 11:25 11:52 14:1 14:2 14:2-3 14:16 14:16 14:19 14:22-23 14:24 15:4-5 15:5 15:13 15:13 15:26 16:7 16:7 17:2 17:2 17:2 17:3 17:4 17:9 17:9 17:9 17:18 17:19 17:20 17:22-23 17:24 18 19:30 20:15 20:19 20:28 21:7
Acts
1:9-11 2:21 2:24 2:27-31 2:32 2:32-33 2:38 7:51 7:51 8:37 13:7 13:30 13:32-33 13:34-35 13:48 16:14 20:28 20:28 20:28 20:28 20:28 23:6 24:15 26:6 28:20
Romans
1:2-5 1:2-5 1:3 1:6 1:20-21 1:24 1:25-28 1:26 1:28 1:32 2:6 2:7 2:28 2:28 3:19 3:21 3:22-23 3:25 3:25 3:25 3:25 3:25 3:25-26 3:28 4:20-21 5:1-1 5:8 5:9 5:10 5:10 5:10 5:10 5:11 5:12 5:12 5:12 5:12 5:12-20 5:12-20 5:12-20 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:12-21 5:15 5:16-17 5:18 5:18-19 5:18-19 5:19 6:1-23 6:4 6:4 6:9 6:14 6:23 7:1-25 7:4 7:4-6 7:32 7:32 8:1-13 8:1-39 8:3 8:7 8:9-1 8:11 8:11 8:11 8:23 8:28 8:29-30 8:29-30 8:29-30 8:30 8:30 8:30 8:32 8:34 8:34 8:35-39 9:1-33 9:1-33 9:5 9:5 9:6 9:9-21 9:11 9:11 9:15-16 9:19 9:22 9:24 10:13 10:14 10:17 11:2 11:5-6 11:6 14:1 14:4 14:4 16:20 50 50
1 Corinthians
1:2 1:9 1:17-31 1:23-26 1:24 1:26 1:26-27 1:30 2:4 2:8-11 2:10-15 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 3:6-7 4:7 4:15 5:11 6:9 6:19-20 6:20 11:7 12:3 12:4 12:11 12:11 12:13 12:29 15:14 15:17 15:19-20 15:21-22 15:21-22 15:22 15:22 15:24 15:25-28 15:27 15:27 15:27 15:27 15:27 15:27 15:42-44 15:42-44 15:42-50 15:44 15:45 15:47-49 15:50 15:50-53 15:56 16:22
2 Corinthians
3:3 3:5 3:6-18 4:4 4:4 4:6 5:1 5:18 5:18-20 5:18-20 5:21 5:21 5:21 8:1-24 11:3 11:14 13:4 13:5
Galatians
1:4 1:6 1:8 1:15 1:15 1:15-16 2:20 2:20 2:21 2:21 2:21 3:10 3:13 3:13 3:13-28 3:14 3:14 3:16 3:21 3:21 3:21 3:22 4:4 4:4 4:4-5 4:4-5 4:5 5:6 5:19-21 5:19-21 5:21
Ephesians
1:3-6 1:3-6 1:4-5 1:5 1:10 1:10 1:12 1:12 1:14 1:17-10 1:17-19 1:17-19 1:18 1:19-20 1:20-22 1:20-22 1:22 2:1 2:3 2:5 2:6 2:6-7 2:12 2:12 2:16 2:16 2:16 3:9 3:9-10 3:17 3:19 4:1 4:4 4:8 4:9 4:10 4:16 4:17-18 4:18 4:22 4:24 4:24 4:24 4:24 4:24 5:2 5:25 5:25 6:12
Philippians
1:23-24 1:27 2:6-8 2:6-8 2:6-11 2:6-11 2:6-11 2:7 2:7-8 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:9-10 2:13 3:8 3:20 3:20 3:21
Colossians
1:9-11 1:16 1:17-18 1:20 1:20-21 2:12 2:15 2:16 2:18 3:3-4 3:10 3:10 8 1871
1 Thessalonians
2 Thessalonians
1 Timothy
2:3-4 2:4 2:4 2:5 2:5 3:16 3:16 3:16
2 Timothy
Titus
Hebrews
1:2 1:3 1:13 1:13 2:4 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:9 2:10 2:11-14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14 2:14-16 2:15 3:1 3:5 4:12 4:12 4:15 5:1 5:1-14 5:8 5:14 6:4 7:16 7:22 7:25 7:26 8:8-11 9:9 9:12 9:13-14 9:14 9:15 9:15 9:24 9:28 9:28 9:28 10:5 10:6 10:8 10:10 10:10 10:10 10:11 10:14 10:26 10:26 11:1-40 11:6 11:10 11:16 12:9 13:21
James
1 Peter
1:2 1:3 1:9 1:18-19 1:18-19 1:23 2:8 2:9 2:22 2:24 2:24 2:24 3:18-19 3:19 3:21 3:22 5:10
2 Peter
1 John
1:1-3 1:1-3 1:7 1:8 1:10 2:1 2:1 2:2 2:2 2:2 2:20 2:20 2:27 3:4 3:16 3:17 3:24 4:9 4:10 4:10 4:10 5:1 5:1-18 5:10 5:12 5:19
Jude
Revelation
1:5 2:7 5:9 6:9 12:9 13:8 16:10-11 17:14 20:2 20:4 22:2 22:14 22:17
Wisdom of Solomon
2 Maccabees
i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 321 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 597 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 619 621 622 623 324 525 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 333 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732