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Cambribge:
PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
Pages | ||
PREFACE | ii-vii | |
INTRODUCTION | ix-xxxiii | |
Value of the Epistle | ix ff. | |
Authorship | xi-xxii | |
The Readers | xxii ff. | |
Circumstances and Date | xxiv f. | |
Reception | xxv—xxxi. | |
Purpose and Contents | xxxi ff. | |
Style | xxxiii | |
TEXT AND NOTES | 1—101 | |
ADDITIONAL NOTES. | ||
I. On “Brother” improperly used | 102 f. | |
II. On τῆς δόξης | 103 f. | |
III. On ὕλην | 104 ff. | |
IV. On τόν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως | 106 f. | |
V. On ἐσπαταλήσατε | 107 ff. | |
VI. Peculiarities of vocabulary in the Codex Corbeiensis of St James |
109 ff. | |
INDEXES | 113-119 |
THE circumstances connected with the origin of this book have already been related by Dr Westcott in the preface to the companion edition of Dr Hort’s Commentary on St Peter i.-ii. 17, published in 1898. It was designed to take its place in a Commentary on the whole N.T. planned by the three friends, Westcott, Lightfoot, and Hort in 1860.
Dr Hort’s share included the Synoptic Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles of St
James, St Peter, and St Jude. After a brief period of work on the Gospels, of
which only a few unimportant fragments remain, Dr Hort set to work on St James.
If we may judge from the condition of the MS. the Commentary on Chapter I was
complete when he came back to Cambridge, as a Fellow of Emmanuel College, in
1871. His notes were, however, worked over and written out afresh when he chose
St James as the subject for his first three courses of Lectures as Hulsean
Professor in 1880, 1881. It is idle now to regret that his attention was called
away to lecture in 1882 on Tatian’s Apology, leaving the Commentary incomplete,
but within sight of the end. When at length he returned to the Epistle in the
Summer Term of 1889, he dealt mainly with questions of Introduction. The
introductory matter printed in this volume was prepared for that course of
Lectures. It was
The Introduction and Commentary have been printed substantially as they stand in the MS., except that for the sake of uniformity English renderings have in some cases been supplied at the head of the notes. This however has only been done in cases where the note itself gave clear indication of the rendering which Dr Hort would himself have proposed.
No one who reads this book with the attention that it requires and deserves will
feel that any apology is needed for its publication, in spite of its
incompleteness. In the Introduction no doubt the scholarship appears to a
certain extent in what Dr Sanday, in the Preface to Dr Hort’s notes on
In regard to the evidence to be derived from the language in which the Epistle
is written it is clear that Dr Hort worked habitually on an hypothesis, the
possibility of which many modern critics either ignore or deny. Everything here
turns on the extent to which a knowledge of Greek may be presupposed among the
Jewish inhabitants of Palestine in the First Century A.D. Jülicher, for
example, regards the excellence of the Greek of the Epistle as in itself
conclusive against the traditional attribution. This seems arbitrary in the case
of a man whose father according to an early tradition (St
The Commentary itself, as far as it goes, is finished work in every line. Each word and phrase and sentence has been examined in the light of the whole available evidence with characteristic freshness, and with a singularly delicate sense both of the meaning of words, and of subtle variations of grammatical structure. At times, no doubt, in Dr Hort’s work as in Dr Westcott’s, the investigation of a particular word or form of thought seems to be carried beyond the limits strictly necessary for the interpretation of the passage immediately, under discussion. It is however only fair to recal the fact that each separate Commentary was meant to form part of an inclusive scheme. Both scholars combined a keen sense of the variety of the several parts of the N.T. with a deep conviction of the fundamental unity of the whole. Their field of view was never limited by the particular passage on which they might happen to be commenting. No single fragment, they felt, could be fully understood out of relation to the whole Revelation of which it formed a part. Conciseness and, as regards the rapid apprehension of the salient points in individual books, something of sharpness of focus were sacrificed in consequence. But for students of the N.T. as a whole, the result is pure gain. The labour entailed in following out the suggested lines of thought is amply repaid by a growing sense of depth beyond depth of Wisdom hidden under familiar and seemingly commonplace forms of expression. And even the several books stand out in the end in more clearly defined individuality.
This characteristic of Dr Hort’s method minimizes the disadvantages arising from
the fragmentariness of the finished work. The discussion of representative
sections of different writers has given him wider scope for the treatment of the
various departments of N.T. Theology than would have been
In spite therefore of its apparent fragmentariness Dr Hort’s work is marked by a real unity, and possesses a permanent value for all serious students of N.T. In details no doubt both of vocabulary and syntax his results will need to be carefully checked in the fresh light which is coming from the Papyri. But in work so broadly based, fresh evidence we may well believe will confirm far more than it will upset.
But, some one may say, granted all this, what is meant by the permanent value of a Commentary? Are not Commentaries like all scientific text-books, only written to be superseded? In every other department of study, however gifted a scholar may be, he must be content that his particular contribution to the advancement of knowledge shall be merged and lost in the general sum. Is there any reason to think that the case is different in Theology? Strangely enough there is.
The subject-matter of the science of Theology is provided by the Bible. ‘That
standard interpretation
The fact is that just as in the original communication of the Divine Revelation the personality of the writer is an integral part of the message which he was chosen to convey, so the personality of each interpreter of these ‘living oracles’ is a vital element in all the fresh light that he is able to perceive in them. Any contribution that he makes to their fuller understanding remains to the end of time recognisably his, for those who have eyes to see. Here, as in the case of all other builders on the one foundation, the fire tries, and the day will declare each man’s work of what sort it is: though it is only the few here and there who are called out by, and exercise a dominant influence in, the successive crises in the development of Christian thought, whose names survive upon the mouths of men, and whose work is studied for its own sake in later generations.
Now Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort have not left behind them a body of systematic Theology. The treatise on Christian Doctrine which was to have been the crown of Dr Westcott’s work was never completed. They founded no school marked by common adherence to any characteristic tenets. Their message to their age lay rather in the attitude and method than in any specific results of their work. The crisis in Christian thought which they were called to face affected primarily the Authority, the Inspiration, and the Interpretation of the Bible. And it is impossible to over-estimate the debt which English Christianity has owed in this perilous period of transition to the steadying influence exerted over the minds of their contemporaries by the simple fact of their lifelong devotion to the study of the sacred text, their fearless faith in Truth, their ‘guileless workmanship,’ and their reverent humility. At the same time it is hard not to believe that the actual results of work done in such a spirit will . be found to possess a value in the eyes of other generations besides that which witnessed its production.
It only remains for me to express my heartiest thanks to my colleague, the Rev. P. H. L. Brereton, Fellow of St Augustine’s College, without whose scholarly and ungrudging assistance I should have found it impossible in the pressure of multifarious distractions to see this book through the press and verify the references: to Professor Burkitt for his kind help in the note on the Latin renderings of ἐριθία: and to the printers and proof-readers of the University Press for their patience and thoroughness.
J. O. F. MURRAY.
ST AUGUSTINE’S COLLEGE,
CANTERBURY.
St Peter’s Day, 1909.
THE Epistle of St James is among the less read and less studied books of the N.T.; and this for obvious reasons. With one partial exception it has not supplied material for great theological controversies. But moreover it is a book that very few Christians on consideration would place among the most important books. No one wishing to refer to the written records which best set forth what Christian belief and even Christian practice is would turn to it as they would turn to the Gospels or to some, at least, of St Paul’s Epistles. Nay, as we all know, even distinctively Christian language in one sense of the phrase, i.e. such language as no one but a Christian could use, is used in it very sparingly. Thus no wonder that it has been comparatively little valued by Christian readers, and comparatively little examined and illustrated by Christian commentators.
Yet on the other hand it has an important place and office of its own in the
Scriptures of the N.T. Its very unlikeness to other books is of the greatest
value to us, as shewing through Apostolic example the manysidedness of Christian
truth. Our faith rests first on the Gospel itself, the revelation of God and His
redemption in His Only begotten Son, and secondly on the interpretation of that
primary Gospel by the Apostles and Apostolic men to whom was Divinely committed
the task of applying the revelation of Christ to the thoughts and deeds of their
own time. That standard interpretation of theirs was ordained to be for the
guidance of the Church in all after ages, in combination with the living
guidance of the Spirit. But it could not have discharged this office if it had
been of one
That special type of Christianity which is represented by St James had a high
intrinsic value apart from its testimony to the various because partial
character of Divine truth as apprehended by men. One of the most serious dangers
to Christian faith in the early ages, perhaps we may say, in all ages, was the
temptation to think of Christ as the founder of a new religion, to invert His
words “I came not to destroy, but to fulfil.” St Paul himself was entirely free
from such a view of Christianity: but the part which he had to take in
vindicating Gentile freedom against Jewish encroachments made him easily appear
to be the herald of a new religion. The Divine judgement of the fall of
Jerusalem and the Jewish State, and also the bitter hatred with which the Jews
long pursued Christians, would all tend to produce the same impression. Thus
many influences prepared the way for the influence of Marcion in the second
century and long afterwards, and made him seem a true champion of the purity of
the Gospel. When he cast off the worship of the Creator, of Jehovah the Lord of
Israel, the merely just God of the O.T., as he said, and set up the God of the
N.T. as a new God, alone in the strict sense good, alone to be worshipped by
Christians, he could not but seem to many to be delivering the faith from an
antiquated bondage. And so again and again the wild dream of a “Christianity
without Judaism” has risen up with attractive power. But the Epistle of St James
marks in the most decisive way the continuity of the two Testaments. In some
obvious aspects it is like a piece of the O.T. appearing in the midst of the
N.T.; and yet not out of place, or out of date, for it is most truly of the
N.T. too. It as it were carries on the line of intermediate
This distinctive value of St James’ Epistle is closely related to the distinctive value of the first three Gospels. The relation is not merely of affinity, but almost of direct descent. The Epistle is saturated with the matter of those Gospels (or narratives akin to them). No other book so uses them. And though the completeness of Christianity would be maimed if the teaching of the Gospel of St John were away, yet the three Gospels give in their own way a true picture. Many perversions of Christianity could not have arisen if they had in practice as well as theory been taken with the Gospel of St John; and so the combination of St James with St Paul is a safeguard against much error.
Besides this general value of the Epistle as a whole, its details are full of matter of high interest and importance, often by no means lying on the surface. It is also far from being an easy Epistle. Many verses of it are easy, but many are difficult enough, and even in the easier parts the train of thought is often difficult to catch. Much, though not all, of the difficulty comes from the energetic abruptness of style, reminding us of the older prophets. Thus for various reasons the Epistle is one that will repay close examination and illustration.
Authorship.
Two questions arise: (1) What James is intended by Ἰάκωβος in i. 1. (2) Whether the James so intended did really write the Epistle: is it authentic or supposititious?
There is no need to spend much time on this second question, which is almost
entirely distinct from the general question of the date of important N.T. books.
Some critics of ability still uphold a late date, but on very slight and
intangible grounds. One has urged similarity to Hom. Clem., a late book: but
such little similarity
A somewhat more tangible ground is the supposed reference to Hebrews and
Apocalypse, books apparently (Apoc. certainly) written after St James’ death. In
ii. 25 there is a reference to
Ῥαὰβ ἡ πόρνη as with Abraham an example of
justification by works. It is urged that as Abraham is taken from St Paul, so
Rahab is taken from the Pauline
A striking fact is that Kern, who initiated the more vigorous criticism of the Epistle in modern times by his essay of 1835, then placed it late: yet himself wrote a commentary in 1838 in which he retracted the former view, and acknowledged that he had been over hasty.
It is not necessary at present to say more on authenticity, which will come under notice incidentally. But how as to the James intended? Practically two only come into consideration: James the son of Zebedee and James the Lord’s brother. Who James the Lord’s brother was is another question.
Was it the son of Zebedee? For this there is hardly any external evidence Syr. often cited, on account of a Syriac note common to the three Epistles: Of the Holy Apostles But this is now understood to be due to Widmanstadt.
James Peter John
Spectators of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ
The several Epistles
printed in the Syriac tongue and characters.
Another probable trace of this tradition in the West is in Isid. Hisp.
de ortu et obitu patrum 71: Jacobus filius Zebedaei, frater Joannis, quartus in ordine, duodecim tribubus quae
sunt in dispersion, gentium scripsit atque Hispaniae et occidentalium locorum gentibus evangelium praedicavit etc. It has been suggested that “scripsit” is an interpolation.
Apparently the only reason is because (in some MSS (?) not noticed by Vallarsi) Jerome
de vir. illust.
We come therefore as a matter of course to James the Lord’s brother. About him a
large literature has been written: it is worth while here only to take the more
important points. To take first what is clear and accepted on all hands, he was
the James of all but the earliest years of the Apostolic age. Three times he
appears in the Acts, all memorable occasions:—(i)
Now as regards St Paul’s Epistles:—(1)
We now come to matters of question and debate. Was he one of the Twelve? i.e.
Was he the son of Alphaeus? Why was he called the Lord’s brother? Without
attempting to trace out all the intricacies of the scriptural argument
First
Next what did he mean by an apostle? Was it necessarily one
In Acts (from
St Paul emphasizes his own apostleship in salutations etc., and the energy with
which he asserts his own claim as connected with a special mission from Christ
Himself on the way to Damascus is really incompatible with looseness of usage.
The Twelve were confessedly apostles: so was he: but this was not worth saying
if the title might be given to others not having as definite an authority. This
comes out clearly when we consider the passages in which he acknowledges the
priority of the Twelve in time (
Thus far we find St Paul’s use not vague at all, but limited to (I) the Twelve,
(2) himself, (3) envoys of churches, but in this case only with other words
(defining genitives) added. Yet it does not follow that he would refuse it to St
James unless he were of the
“seen of Cephas, then of the Twelve,
seen of James, then of all the apostles.”
The use of all implies the Twelve and something more, and it is not unlikely that the relations correspond of single names and bodies.
Whether St James was the only additional apostle, we cannot tell: but probably
he was. His early and peculiar authority would be accounted for if he had some
exceptional Divine authorisation analogous to St Paul’s. Not to speak of
confused traditions about this, St Paul’s mention of Christ’s appearance to him
(
Thus
The details of the “brotherhood” question must be left to the books on the subject. Speaking generally there are four theories:
(1) Helvidian: brothers strictly, sons of Joseph and Mary.
(2) Palestinian or Epiphanian: brothers strictly in scriptural sense, though not the modern sense, sons of Joseph but not Mary.
(3) Chrysostom (confusedly) and Theodoret: cousins, as children of Clopas.
(q.) Hieronymian: cousins, as children of Alphaeus.
The third is of no great historical importance or intrinsic interest: it is
apparently founded on a putting together of
The Hieronymian, largely accepted in the Western Church, and with rare
exceptions in England before Lightfoot, is probably, as
On the whole the biblical evidence, which alone is decisive, is definitely
unfavourable to the cousinhood theory; and, as far as I can see, it leaves open
the choice between the Helvidian and the Palestinian. Some might say that “brethren,” if less inapplicable than to cousins, would still be unlikely on the Epiphanian view. But the language of Mt. and Lk. is decisive against this
predisposition. Joseph was our Lord’s not genitor but pater.
On the other hand the traditional authority is by no means undecided. For the Helvidian we have only the guess of the erratic Tertullian and obscure Latin writers of century iv. For the Epiphanian we have in the earlier times some obscure writings probably connected with Palestine as the Protevangelium Jacobi, the Alexandrian Fathers, Clement and Origen (sic), and various important writers of the fourth century. It was of course possible that such a tradition should grow up, before Jerome’s solution was thought of, by those who desired to maintain the perpetual virginity of Mary. But still the absence of any trace of the other, even among Ebionites, is remarkable, and the tradition itself has various and good attestation. The evidence is not such as one would like to rest anything important upon. But there is a decided preponderance of reason for thinking the Epiphanian view to be right.
Hence the writer of the Epistle was James the Just, bishop or head of Jerusalem, brother of the Lord as being son of Joseph by a former wife, not one of the Twelve, a disbeliever in our Lord’s Messiahship during His lifetime, but a believer in Him shortly afterwards, probably in connexion with a special appearance vouchsafed to him.
Before we leave the person of James, we must speak of his death and the time of
it. According to Josephus (Ant. xx. 9. I) the high priest Ananus the younger, “a
man of peculiarly bold and audacious character” (θρασὺς τ. τρόπον καὶ τολμητὴς διαφερόντως), a Sadducee, and accordingly, Josephus says, specially given to judicial cruelty,
took advantage of the interregnum between Festus and Albinus to gather a
συνέδριον κριτῶν, at which “James the brother of Jesus, who is (or, was) called
Christ, and some others” were condemned to be stoned to death as transgressors
of the law. He adds that the best men of the city were indignant, some wrote to
King Agrippa, others met Albinus on the way to point out the illegality of the
act, and the result was that Ananus was deposed. An interpolation has been
supposed here; but the whole story
Hegesippus’ account is much more elaborate (see Ltft. Gal.10 366 f.). Dr Plumptre makes a good fight for some of the particulars, on the ground that St James was apparently a Nazarite. But on the whole Lightfoot seems right in suspecting that the picture is drawn from an Ebionite romantic glorification of him, the Ἀναβαθμοὶ Ἰακώβου, part of which is probably preserved in the Clementine Recognitions. Hegesippus ends with the words καὶ εὐθὺς Οὐεσπασιανὸς πολιορκεῖ αὐτούς, which is commonly understood to mean that St James suffered only just before the siege, say in 68 or 69. If so, no doubt this must be taken as an error as compared with Josephus. But a writer of a century later might very well speak of the judgement as immediate even if eight years intervened. At all events we must hold to 62 as the date.
The Readers.
These are distinctly described as the Twelve Tribes in the Dispersion. Nothing is apparently clearer. Some say to the Church at large, as referring to the true Israel. But this comes in very strangely at the head of a letter with no indication of a spiritual sense, and coupled with ἐν τ. διασπορᾷ; and especially so from St James. If Gentile Christians are intended at all, then they are considered as proselytes to Jewish Christians. This however is not likely. Gentile Christians were very numerous, and are not likely to be included in so artificial a way. Nor do the warnings of the Epistle contain anything applicable to them distinctively.
On the other hand with much more plausibility the Readers have been taken as
either Jews alone, or Jews plus Jewish Christians. That Jewish Christians were
at least chiefly meant seems proved by “the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ” (ii.
1), probably also by “the good
The only question therefore is whether he meant to include unbelieving Jews. If the story in Hegesippus is true, he was honoured by all the people, and even Josephus’ account shews that his death might cause offence to men who were not Christians. Still the Epistle contains no evidence that he had them in view (neither the δώδεκα φυλαῖς, nor the slightness of definitely Christian teaching prove anything), and it is fairly certain that he wrote to Christian Jews and to them alone. [Yet see on iv. 4.]
Next to what Christian Jews? “Those in the dispersion.” Cf.
Circumstances and Date.
These must be inferred from the contents, and do not admit of certainty. The two points which have attracted most attention are the paucity of Christian language and the passage about justification.
The first seems to me to afford nothing tangible. The character and position of St James make it quite conceivable that a state of feeling and language, which with the other leaders of the Church would naturally belong only to an early stage of growth, would with him be comparatively permanent. The amplest recognition of St Paul’s work and of Gentile Christianity would be consistent with a preservation of a less developed type of Christian doctrine than St Paul’s. Hence the immature doctrine must be treated as affording no evidence one way or the other.
Next as to the justification passage. This has given rise to endless debate. (1) Was it written independently of St Paul? If so, probably before St Paul wrote on the subject, and therefore at a very early date. Or (2) was it written to correct St Paul? Or (3) to correct a perverse misunderstanding of St Paul? (2) and (3) of course imply a date subsequent to Galatians and Romans, i.e. after 58.
(2) may be set aside as highly improbable. Apart from the language of the Acts,
the Epistle itself cannot be so understood. Laying side by side St Paul’s
Epistles on this matter and St James, in spite of resemblances and contrasts it
is difficult to believe that one was aimed at the other. A real antagonist would
have followed
For (i) there is much to be said (see Plumptre). Its great difficulty is to shew how language so similar in form about δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως could spring up independently in the two sources. It is not a question of a mere phrase, but a controversy. There is no substantial evidence as yet that it was a Jewish controversy, and St Paul’s language does not look as if it was.
For (3) may be urged the facts which throw doubt on (1) and (2). There is a similarity of phrase such as makes indirect derivation of one from the other probable, and the error which St James combats was not at all unlikely to arise from a misuse and misapplication of St Paul. More will be said when we come to the passage. If (3) be true then the Epistle must belong to the concluding years of St James’ life, and this is probable for other reasons. The Epistle implies not only a spread of Christianity among the Diaspora, but its having taken root there some time. The faults marked are those of lukewarmness, of what would arise after a time in settled communities that were losing their early freshness and vigour. The persecutions to which it refers might doubtless have occurred early without our knowing anything about them. But the tone of St James on this head reminds us of 1 Pet. and Heb. No year can be fixed with any certainty: but 60 or a little after seems not far wrong. The essential point is not the year but the period, later than the more important part of St Paul’s ministry and writings.
Reception.
Two things are to be distinguished, use and canonical authority. The earliest
Bible of the Christian Church was the O.T. The books of the N.T. were only added
by degrees, and variously in different places; sometimes also with various
degrees of authority. The Catholic Epistles came more slowly to their position,
1 Pet. and 1 Jn. being the earliest. The first traces of St James, now
recognised almost on all hands, are in 1 Clement about 95. He apparently
Next Irenaeus, towards the end of the second century, representing partly Asia,
partly Rome. His use of James has been often denied, and quite rightly as
regards authoritative use; but I feel sure he knew the book, though only as an
ancient theological writing. He never cites it, but uses phrases from it, which
taken singly are uncertain, but they confirm each other. Thus it is nothing in
itself that he says (iv. 13. 4) that Abraham “amicus factus est Dei.” But it is
something that it occurs in a passage contrasting the Law of Moses and the Word
of Christ as an enlargement and fulfilment of the Law, speaking of “superextendi decreta libertatis, et augeri subjectionem quae est ad regem,”
which looks very like the
νόμον τελεῖτε βασιλικόν of
ii. 8 and
νόμον τέλειον τὸν τ. ἐλευθερίας
of i. 25. And this becomes certainty when not long afterwards
(iv. 16. 2) we get the consecutive words about Abraham “credidit Deo et reputatum est illi ad justitiam, et amicus Dei vocatus est”; i.e. the
justification from Genesis is instantly followed by the “Friend” clause,
exactly as in
Crossing the Mediterranean to the Latin Church of North Africa, we find no trace of the Epistle in Tertullian or Cyprian. One allusion to “unde Abraham amicus Dei deputatus” (Tert., adv. Jud. 2) proves nothing. The early or African old Latin version omitted it.
Moving eastward to the learned Church of Alexandria, Clem. Alex. is difficult. Certainly he did not use the book as Scripture; but I feel sure that he knew it, though he does not name it. In Strom. vi. p. 825 (Potter): “except your righteousness multiply beyond the Scribes and Pharisees, who are justified by abstinence from evil, together with your being able along with perfection in these things to love and benefit your neighbour, οὐκ ἔσεσθε βασιλικοί, for intensification (ἐπίτασις) of the righteousness according to the Law shews the Gnostic.” Here βασιλικός is coupled with love to neighbour just as in ii. 8, and the tone of the passage is quite in St James’ strain. In Strom. v. p. 650 we have the peculiar phrase τὴν πίστιν τοίνυν οὐκ ἀργὴν καὶ μόνην, agreeing with the true reading of ii. 20. There are several allusions to Abraham as the “Friend.” τό ναί occurs three times as in v. 12, but perhaps from Evangelical tradition. Other passages may come from 1 Pet. Cassiodorus, late in cent. vi., says (de instit. div. litt. viii.) that Clement wrote notes on the Canonical ( = Catholic) Epistles, i.e. 1 Pet., 1 and 2 Jn., Jam. What is certainly a form of these notes still exists in Latin, but there are none on Jam., while there are on Jude. So that evidently there is a slip of author or scribes, and practically this is additional evidence against Clement using Jam. as Scripture.
It is somewhat otherwise with his disciple Origen, who very rarely, but still
occasionally, cites Jam., speaking of it as “the current Epistle of St James,”
and again referring to it as if some of his readers might demur to its
authority. In the Latin works there are more copious references, but these are
uncertain. On the whole a vacillating and intermediate position. Origen’s
disciple Dionysius
These are all the strictly Antenicene references. But there is one weighty fact beside them: Jam, is present in the Syriac Version which excluded some others. The present state of this version comes from the end of cent. III or early IV, and Jam. may have been added then: but it is more likely that it had been in the Syriac from the first, i.e. in the Old Syriac. The early history of the Egyptian versions is too uncertain to shew anything.
Eusebius places it among the Antilegomena, practically accepted in some churches, not in others. In speaking of Jam. (ii. 23. 25), he says that “the first of what are named the Catholic Epistles is his. Now it should be known that it is treated [by some] as spurious (νοθεύεται μέν); and indeed not many of the old writers mentioned it, as neither did they what is called that of Jude, which itself also is one of what are called the seven Catholic Epistles; yet we know that these two with the rest have been in public use (δεδημοσιευμένας) in very many churches.” Thus Eusebius, cautious as always in letting nothing drop that had authority, is yet careful not to commit himself.
From this time forward the book had a firm place in the Greek Churches. It was
used very freely by Didymus and Cyril Alex.; and the Antiochene Fathers (like
Chrysostom), who kept to the Syrian Canon and did not use books omitted by it,
did use Jam. The only exception is a peculiar one. Theodore of Mopsuestia was
one of the greatest of all theologians and specially as a critic of the Bible,
whence he became the chosen interpreter of the Mesopotamian Churches. He was
somewhat erratic and rash in his ways, and lies under a kind of ban more easily
to be explained than justified. Most of his works have perished except
fragments, so that we have to depend on the report of a bitter antagonist, Leontius, nearly two centuries later. After noticing his rejection of Job, and
referring to the testimony to Job in Jam., Leontius proceeds (c. Nest. et Eut.
iii. 14): “For which reason methinks he banishes both this
Outside Theodore’s own school we have no further omission of Jam. in the East. Late in cent. VI Cosmas, having had urged against him a passage of 2 Pet., speaks disparagingly of the Catholic Epistles in general, and mentions various facts as to past partial rejections (Top. Christ. vii. p. 292). His language is altogether vague and confused: but he limits himself to urging that “the perfect Christian ought not to be stablished on the strength of questioned books (ἀμφιβαλλόμενα).”
In the West reception was not so rapid. Towards the end of cent.
IV Jam. is
cited by three or four Italian Latin writers, as the Ambrosiast (= Hi1. Rom.) on
The most striking fact is the language of Victorinus Afer, converted at Rome late in life, and seen there by Jerome and Augustine. His Comm. in Gal. i. 13 ff.: “From James Paul could not learn”; James “admixto Judaismo Christum evangelizabat, quod negat id faciendum.” Elaborately on “Jacobum fratrem Dei”: “The Symmachians make James as it were a twelfth apostle, and he is followed by those who to our Lord Jesus Christ add the observance of Judaism.” “When Paul called him brother (of the Lord), he thereby denied him to be an apostle. He had to be seen with honour. Sed neque a Jacobo aliquid discere potuit, quippe cum alia sentiat; ut neque a Petro, vel quod paucis diebus cum Petro moratus est; vel quod Jacobus apostolus non est, et in haeresi sit.” He goes on to account for the mention of the seeing of James. It was to shew that he did not reject the Galatian doctrine from ignorance. “Vidi ergo nominatim quid Jacobus tractet et evangelizet: et tamen quoniam cognita mihi est ista blasphemia, repudiata a me est, sicut et a vobis, o Galatae, repudianda”; and more in the same strain. Something here is probably due to the writer’s late and imperfect Christian education. It is not likely, in the absence of all other evidence, that such language would have been used by ordinary well-instructed Christians anywhere. But neither could it have been possible if the Epistle had in Victorinus’ neighbourhood been received as canonical. It attests a feeling about the book very unlike that after Jerome and Augustine.
To resume, the Epistle of St James was known and used from a very early time, at
least at Rome, but without authority, It was used also, but with rather
indefinite authority, at Alexandria by Clement and Origen and Dionysius. It
formed part of the Syriac Canon, and was probably used in Syrian Churches. There
is no
Purpose and Contents.
The purpose is practical not controversial, mainly to revive a languishing religious state, a lukewarm formality, and correct the corruptions into which it had fallen. Persecution had evidently fallen, and was not being met with courage, patience and faith. This last word Faith occurs at the beginning, near the end, and throughout chap. 2, and expresses much of the purport of the whole. In various forms St James deals with the manner of life proceeding from a trustful sense of God’s presence, founded on a knowledge of His character and purpose.
There are three main divisions:
I. (i.) Introduction, on Religion.
II. (ii. 1-v. 6.) Against (1) Social sins, (2) Presumption before God.
III. (v. 7-end.) Conclusion, on Religion at once personal and social.
(I.)
The Epistle begins with the greeting, which closes with the word χαίρειν.
The next paragraph, i. 2-18, may be called “Religion in feeling: experience
(trial—temptation), God’s character, and the Divine aspects of human life.” It
takes up χαρά from χαίρειν, and deals with
πειρασμοί, the special trials (cf.
First 2-4, on patience (cf.
i. 19-27. Religion in action. The moral results of this faith are (19-21) quickness to hear, slowness to passionate speech. 22-25, Hearing, not however as against doing. 26 f., Freedom from defilement not ceremonial, but temperance of speech, beneficence to others, guilelessness of self.
(II.)
ii. Insolence of wealth (towards fellow men). 1-4, The miscalled Christian faith which dishonours the poor in synagogue. This is a violation of the principle which follows. 5-9, The poor as blessed (cf. Sermon on the Mount), and human respect of persons. 10-13, The integrity or unity of the law as a law of liberty, and its import mercy. What follows is the positive side of 1-13. 14-26, The miscalled faith which dispenses with works.
iii. License of tongue, springing from pride. 1, Not “many teachers.” 2-6, The great power of the tongue, though a small member. 7 f., Its lawlessness and wildness. 9-12, Its capacities of good and evil, 13-14 (in contrast to bitter teaching), Wisdom to be shewn in works (cf. 17 f.) of gentleness. 15-18, The difference of the two wisdoms exhibited in bitterness and peace.
iv. 1-12. Strife springing from love of pleasure
(πόλεμοι contrast to εἰρήνη
iii. 18). 1–3, Wars due to evil desire.
4–6, God and the world as objects of
love. 7–10 (digression), Subjection to God.
11 f., Evil-speaking of others a
breach of a law (cf.
iv. 13-v. 6. Presumption of wealth (towards God). Prophetic warnings to the
confident merchants (iv. 13-17) as to stability of the future; to the rich (v.
1-3) as to impunity, specially (4-6)
(III.)
v. 7-end. Trustful patience towards God and towards man (one aspect of the
inseparableness of the two commandments. Cf.
[St James is full of unities, e.g. the unity of the O.T. and N.T.:
(a) The λόγος ἀληθείας (i. 18) is at once the original gift of reason, and the
voice of God in the Christian conscience enlightened by the Gospel, doubtless
with the intermediate stages of instruction (cf.
(b) The Law is at once the Mosaic (ii. 11), the Deuteronomic (ii. 8, actually Leviticus, but in spirit Deuteronomic; i. 12; ii. 5), and the Evangelic (ii. 5).
(c) The principle of mercy as against judgement (ii. 13).]
Style.
The Greek is generally good; the style very short and epigrammatic, using
questions much. There is great suppressed energy, taking shape in vigorous
images. Much of the old prophetic spirit (Deuteronomic and later Psalms, esp.
1ΙΑΚΩΒΟΥ θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ χαίρειν.
I. 1. Ἰάκωβος] For the person intended see Introd., pp. xi ff. The name is Ἰακώβ in LXX., but has been doubtless Graecised as a modern name, as so many names in Josephus. Probably it was common at this time: three are mentioned by Josephus, and curiously one the brother of a Simon (Ant. xx. 5, 2), another coupled with a John (B. J. iv. 4, 2). The third is an Idumaean (B. J. iv. 9, 6). [James brother of Jesus Christ is also mentioned (Ant. xx. 9, 1) (if the passage be genuine). See pp. xv, xxi f.]
θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. δοῦλος] The combination
θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰ. Χ., though
grammatically possible, is against Scriptural analogy, and would involve a very
improbable want of balance. The absence of the article is due to abbreviation
and compression of phrase. See note on
This coupling of God and Christ in a single phrase covered by
δοῦλος is
significant as to St James’ belief. Without attempting to say how much is meant
by it, we can see that it involves at least some Divineness of nature in our Lord, something other than glorified manhood. This is
peculiarly true as regards a man with Jewish feelings, unable to admit lower
states of deity. It thus shews that he cannot have been an Ebionite. Even St
Paul’s salutations contain no such combination except in their concluding
prayers for grace and peace. An analogous phrase is in
The conception is not of two distinct and co-ordinate powers, so to speak; as
though he were a servant of two lords. But the service of the one at once
involves and is contained in the service of the other. Christ being what He is
as the Son of the Father, to be His servant is impossible without being God’s
servant; and the converse is also true. κυρίου Ἰ. Χ. is the full phrase
illustrated by the early chapters of Acts; esp.
δοῦλος, servant] Probably in the widest sense, answering to
Κύριος, equivalent
to “doing His work in His kingdom, in obedience to His will” (cf.
ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς] . Equivalent to Israel in its fulness and completeness. It
has nothing to do with the return or non-return of the different tribes from
captivity. Josephus believed the ten tribes to have remained in great numbers
beyond the Euphrates, and in
After the return, when Judah and Benjamin apparently alone returned to any very
considerable extent, the reference to tribes, as a practically existing entity,
seems to have come to an end, except as regards the descent of individuals
through recorded genealogies, and the people that had returned was treated as
representing the continuity of the whole nation, Judah and Israel together. (See
Accordingly our Lord Himself chose twelve Apostles, and spoke of them as to sit
on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. And in the
Hence τ. δ. φ. is equivalent to
τὸ δωδεκάφυλον (ἡμῶν),
By keeping up this phrase St James marked that to him the designation of the
Israel which believed in Christ as the only true Israel was no mere
ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ]
The term comes from
From the original seat at Babylon, which still continued a main home of the Dispersion, it spread under Alexander and his successors westward into the Greek world, Syria, Egypt (Alexandria and Cyrene), Armenia, Asia Minor, and at last Rome. It was like a network of tracks along which the Gospel could travel and find soil ready prepared for it in the worship of the true God, and the knowledge and veneration of the ancient Scripture.
χαίρειν] See Otto in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.,
1867, pp. 678 ff. The common
greeting in Greek letters. The Semitic was of course שָׁלוֹם or (Chald.)
שְׁלָם. In letters in the Apocrypha
χαίρειν often occurs, as
also εἰρήνην or εἰρήνη (together, χ.
and εἰρήνην ἀγαθήν,
2Πᾶσαν χαρὰν ἡγήσασθε, ἀδελφοί μου, ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσητε ποικίλοις,
2. πᾶσαν χαράν, all joy] Not “every
(kind of) joy,” as from the variety of trials; nor
yet “joy and nothing but joy” negatively, but simply “all” as expressing
completeness and unreservedness. Hence it includes “very great,” but is not
quantitative, rather expressing the full abandonment of mind to this one
thought. Thus Aristides i. 478 (224), τὸ δὲ μηδ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἑωράκαμεν
ἀξιοῦν πεπαιδεῦσθαι πᾶσα ἂν εἴη σνμφορά;
also Epictetus
(ap. Gebser Ep. of James p. 8) 3, 22 εἰρήνη πᾶσα; 2, 2
πᾶσά σοι ἀσφάλεια, πᾶσά σοι εὐμάρεια;
26 πᾶσα εὔροια; and
χαράν] Joy, from ground of joy, by a natural figure. The χαράν catches up χαίρειν. “I bid you rejoice. And this I say in the most exact sense, though I know how much you have to bear that seems anything but matter of rejoicing. Just circumstances like these should you account occasions of unreserved joy.”
On the sense, see
ὅταν with aor. subj.] Although suggested by present circumstances, the exhortation does not take its form from them. It is not “now that you are encountering,” but “when ye shall,” and probably also, by the common frequentative force of ὅταν, “whensoever ye shall.”
περιπέσητε] Not “fall into”
but “fall
πειρασμοῖς, trials] An important and difficult word, entirely confined to O.T., Apocr., N.T., and literature founded on them; except Diosc. p. 3 B, τοὺς ἐπὶ τ. παθῶν τειρασμούς, experiments, trials made, with drugs in the case of diseases, i.e. to see what their effect will be.
But the word goes back to πειράζω, which is not so closely limited in range of authors. First, “tempt” is at the utmost an accessory and subordinate sense, on which see on v. 13. It is simply to “try,” “make trial of,” and πειρασμός “trial.”
Nor on the other hand does it, except by the circumstances of context, mean “trial” in the vague modern religious and hence popular sense, as when we say that a person has had great trials, meaning misfortunes or anxieties. Nothing in Greek is said πειράζειν or called a πειρασμός except with distinct reference to some kind of probation.
Young birds are said πειράζειν τ. πτέρυγας (Schol. Aristoph. Plutus 575). But more to the point, Plutarch (Cleom. 7 p. 808 a) says that Cleomenes when a dream was told him was at first troubled and suspicious, πειράζεσθαι δοκῶν, supposing himself to be the subject of an experiment to find out what he would say or do. And still more to the point Plutarch Moralia 15 p. 230 a, Namertes being congratulated on the multitude of his friends asked the spokesman εἰ δοκίμιον ἔχει τίνι τρόπῳ πειράζεται ὁ πολύφιλος; and when a desire was expressed to know he said Ἀτυχίᾳ.
The biblical use is substantially the same. In O.T. πειράζω stands almost always
for נַסָּה (also ἐκπειράζω)
and πειρασμός for the derivative
מַסָּה. נַסָּהis used for
various kinds of trying, including that of one human being by another, as
Solomon by the Queen of Sheba, but especially of man by God and God by man. Of
man by God for probation, under the form of God exploring; of God by man always in
an evil sense, “tempting” God, trying as it were how far it is possible to go into disobeying Him without provoking His anger; with this last sense we
are not concerned. The trying or “proving” (A.V.) of man by God is sometimes,
but not always, by suffering. In one chapter (
In Judith, Wisdom and Ecclus. πειράζω similarly has both uses, viz. of God by
man, and man by God; also πειρασμός in Ecclus., not only of Abraham
(
In the N.T. other shades of meaning appear. Besides the ordinary neutral making trial, and God’s trial of man, and man’s evil trial or tempting of God, we have men’s evil making trial of one whom they regarded as only a man, the Scribes and Pharisees “trying” or tempting our Lord, not tempting Him to do evil, but trying to get Him to say something on which they could lay hold.
But further a peculiar sense comes in at what we call our Lord’s temptation (
For ποικίλοις, divers, see note on
3γνώσκοντες ὅτι τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν·
3. γνώσκοντες, taking knowledge, recognising] Not necessarily a new piece of knowledge, but new apprehension of it.
δοκίμιον, test] In N.T. only here and, in similar connexion,
The rather rare word is always the instrument of probation, never the process. Similar places are Herodian ii. 10. 6, δοκίμιον δὲ στρατιωτῶν κάματος: Iamblichus Vita Pythag. 30 p. 185 fin., ταύτην (τ. λήθην) δή μοι θεῶν τις ἐνῆκε, δοκίμιον ἐσομένην τῆς σῆς περὶ συνθήκας εὐσταθείας.
κατεργάζεται, worketh] A favourite word with St Paul.
ὑπομονήν, endurance] The word
ὑπομονή (A.V. patience) is hardly used by
classical writers (an apophthegm in Plutarch Moralia 208 c, and an interpolated
clause in his Crassus 3) to describe a virtue, though frequently for the patient
bearing of any particular hardships. It stands for קָוָה and
its derivatives in the sense of the object of hope or expectation (as
No English word is quite strong enough to express the active courage and
resolution implied in
ὑπομονή (cf. Ellicott on
4ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι, ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι.
4. ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω, have a perfect work or
result] The sense, obscure in the
Greek, is fixed almost certainly by the context. The phrase is suggested by, and
must include the meaning of, κατεργάζεται in
v. 3. Endurance is represented as
having a work to do, a result to accomplish, which must not be suffered to cease
prematurely. Endurance
τέλειοι, perfect] This word in St James, as applied to man, has apparently no
reference, as in St Paul, to maturity, and still less to initiation. It
expresses the simplest idea of complete goodness, disconnected from the
philosophical idea of a τέλος. In the LXX. it chiefly represents
תָּמִים, a variously
translated word, originally expressing completeness, and occurring in several
leading passages as
It regains its full force and simplicity in Christ’s own teaching,
ὁλόκληροι, entire] The principal word τέλειος is reinforced by the almost synonymous ὁλόκληρος, the primary sense of which seems to be freedom from bodily defect either in a victim for sacrifice or in a priest; that is, it is a technical term of Greek ritual. In extant literature we do not find it before Plato, and he may well have introduced it into literature. It soon was applied in a wider manner to all freedom from defect (cf. e.g. the Stoic use in Diogenes Laert. vii. 107) being opposed to πηρός, κολοβός, χωλός. But the original sense was not forgotten, and can be traced in the usage of Josephus and Philo, though not in the LXX.
Thus τέλειος and ὁλόκληρος (which are used together somewhat vaguely at least once by Philo, Quis rerum div. heres? 23 p. 489) denote respectively positive and negative perfection, excellence and complete absence of defect (cf. Trench N.T. Synon. § 22). It is quite probable however that St James uses ὁλόκληρος with a recollection of its original force in Greek religion, and wished his readers to think of perfection and entireness not; merely in the abstract but as the necessary aim of men consecrated to God.!
ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι, coming behind in nothing]
Λειπόμαι with the dative means
not mere deficiency but falling short whether of a standard or of other persons,
the latter when expressed being in the genitive. Essentially it is to be left
behind, as in a race, and it comes to be used for the defeat of an army,
strictly for its ceasing to resist the enemy and throwing up the struggle. There
is thus a suggestion of acquiescence in shortcoming as a thing to be striven
against (cf.
The object of comparison is usually expressed, rarely implied (as Diodorus Sic. iii. 39; Plutarch Nicias 3); but λείπομαι is also used quite absolutely, as here, in Plutarch Brutus 39 (ἐρρωμένους χρήμασιν ὅπλων δὲ καὶ σωμάτων πλήθει λειπομένους); cf. Sophocles Oed. Col. 495 f. Ἐν, commonly omitted, occurs Herodotus vii. 8; Sophocles l.c.; and Polybius xxiv. 7 (legat. 50); see also Herod. vii 168.
This final clause, added in apposition (cf.
i. 6, 8, 14,
17, 22, 25;
ii. 9;
iii. 2, 8, 17), not only reaffirms negatively what has been already said positively, but suggests once more the idea of continual progress (a “race” in
St Paul’s language, as
The spiritual force of this and similar verses cannot be reduced within the limits of “common sense.” An “ideal” interpretation can be excluded only by “frittering away a pure and necessary word of Christ Himself. The perfection in all good, after which every Christian should strive simply as a Christian, is infinite in its nature, like a heavenly ladder the steps of which constantly increase the higher we climb: but woe to him who would make landings in it out of his own invention and on his own behalf” (Ewald, Jahrbücher iii. 259).
5. εi δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται
σοφίας, But if any of you lacketh wisdom] If
any, i.e. whoever. The preceding λείπόμενοι suggests
λείπεται with a somewhat
different sense and construction. Λείπομαι with the genitive meaning to “be
wanting in” is rare, this sense being an extension of the commoner to “be
bereaved of”; it occurs Sophocles Elect. 474 (γνώμας λειπομένα σοφᾶς);
Plato Menex. 19, 246 E; Pseud: Plato Axiochus 366 D (repeating ἄμοιρον);
Libanius Progymn. p. 31 A (λ. τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐνθέου μανίας); besides
σοφίας] The context fixes, without altogether restricting, the sense of
wisdom.
“True perfectness cannot be where wisdom still is wanting; and wisdom, the
inward power to seize and profit by outward trials, cannot be supplied by the
trials themselves: but it may be had of God for the asking; He will send it
direct into the heart.” It is that endowment of heart and mind which is needed
for the right conduct of life. “All salutary wisdom is indeed to be asked of the
Lord; for, as the wise man says (
This human and practical idea of wisdom is inherited from the meditative books
of the O.T. and the later works written on their model. Compare “the fear of the
Lord that is wisdom” (
ἁπλῶς, graciously] The combination with
giveth early led to the assumption
that ἁπλῶς requires here the sense of “abundantly,” but without authority
(cf. Fritzsche
In the best Greek authors the guidance
The transition may be seen in Xenophon Cyropaed. viii. 4, 32 ff., where Cyrus blames alike those who magnify their own fortune (so thinking to appear ἐλευθεριώτεροι) and those who depreciate it, and adds, ἁπλουστάτου δέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ τὴν δύναμιν φανερὰν ποιήσαντα ἐκ ταύτης ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ καλοκἀγαθίας. But the usage became clearer subsequently. Scipio (Polybius, xxxii. 13, 14) resolved πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους τὴν ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἀκρίβειαν (i.e. his strict legal rights) τηρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ συγγενέσι καὶ φίλοις ἁπλῶς χρῆσθαι καὶ γενναίως κατὰ δύναμιν. One of Timon’s friends (Lucian Tim. 56) professed that he was not one of the flatterers, greedy of gold and banquets, who paid their court πρὸς ἄνδρα οἷόν σε ἁπλοῖκὸν καὶ τῶν ὄντων κοινωνικόν. David is said by Josephus (Ant. vii. 13, 4) to have admired Araunah τῆς ἁπλότητος καὶ τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας, when he offered his threshing-floor and oxen. M. Antony’s popularity is attributed by Plutarch (c. 43) to his εὐγένεια, λόγου δύναμις, ἁπλότης, τὸ φιλόδωρον καὶ μεγαλόδωρον, ἡ περὶ τὰς παιδιὰς καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας εὐτραπελία. Brutus, having tempered his character by education and philosophy, seemed to Plutarch (c. 1) ἐμμελέστατα κραθῆναι πρὸς τὸ καλόν, so that after Caesar’s death the friends of the latter attributed to Brutus εἴ τι γενναῖον ἡ πρᾶξις ἤνεγκε, considering Cassius ἁπλοῦν τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ καθαρὸν οὐχ ὁμοίως (cf. Philopoem. 13). The Persians desired Ariaspes for their king, as being πρᾷος καὶ ἁπλοῦς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος (Plutarch Artaxerx. 30). Ὁ μὲν ἁπλούστερος, though opposed to ὁ πανουργότερος, is the high-minded friend who, when admitted indiscreetly to a knowledge of private affairs owing to his too complaisant manners, οὐκ οἴεται δεῖν οὐδ᾽ ἀξιοῖ σύμβουλος εἶναι πραγμάτων τηλικούτων ἀλλ᾽ ὑπουργὸς καὶ διάκονος (Plutarch Moralia 63 B). Wine is said to quench πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν (besides fear) ἀφιλότιμα καὶ ἀγεννῆ), and ἄοινος ἀεὶ μέθη καὶ σκυθρωπὴ ταῖς τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων ἐνοικεῖ ψυχαῖς, ἐπιταραττομένη ὑπὸ ὀργῆς τινος ἢ δυσμενείας ἢ φιλονεικίας ἢ ἀνελευθερίας· ὧν ὁ οἶνος ἀμβλύνων τὰ πολλὰ μᾶλλον ἢ παροξύνων οἰκ ἄφρονας οὐδὲ ἡλιθίους ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦς πεοεῖ καὶ ἀπανούργους, οὐδὲ παρορατικοὺς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ καλοῦ προαιρετικούς (ib. 716 A, B). We are reminded of this passage of St James by the following: “So I think that the gods confer their benefits in secret, it being their nature to delight in the mere practice of bounty and beneficence (αὐτῷ τῷ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν). Whereas the flatterer’s work οὐδὲν ἔχει δίλαιον οὐδ᾽ ἀληθινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἁπλοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἐλευθέριον” (ib. 63 F).
There are traces of a similar extension of meaning in Latin, as Horace
Ep. ii.
2, 193, “quantum simplex hilarisque nepoti Discrepet, et quantum discordet
parcus avaro” (cf. “the cheerful giver” of
Himerius (Ecl. v. 19) affords the nearest verbal parallel to St James:
εἰ δὲ ἁπλῶς διδόντος λαβεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον,
τῶς οὐ πλέον, ὅτε μηδὲ προῖκα κ.τ.λ.
Here however
ἁπλῶς
is not ethical at all, but retains its common classical
In Jewish writings ἁπλοῦς is generalised in a different direction to denote
one who carries piety and openness of heart before God into all his dealings. So
the LXX.:
In St James (as in
καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, and upbraideth not] The opposition is clearly to
graciously, not to giveth: to upbraid is not to refuse, or even to vouchsafe “a
stone for bread,” but to accompany a gift with ungenerous words or deeds.
Ὀνειδίζω often has this sense in classical writers from Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 6.
10; cf. Demosth. de Coron. § 269) onwards (see exx. in Wetstein). In Ecclus. it
is a favourite word (with ὀνειδισμός), and occurs more than once in strictly
parallel passages: “My son, give not reproach with thy good deeds, neither
painful words with every gift. Will not dew assuage the hot wind? So is a word
better than a gift. Lo, is not a word more than a good gift? And both are with a
gracious man (κεχαριτωμένῳ). A fool will upbraid ungraciously
(ἀχαρίστως ὀνειδιεῖ), and a gift of the envious dissolveth the eyes”
(
By this contrast of mean and ignoble benefactors, St James leads on from the naked idea of God as a giver to the more vital idea of His character and mind in giving (cf. i. 13, 17 f.; iv. 6; v. 7), answering by anticipation a superstitious thought which springs up as naturally in the decay of an established faith as in the confused hopes and fears of primitive heathenism. The subject is partly resumed in v. 17.
διδόντος . . . δοθήσεται]
Giveth what? Wisdom doubtless in the first instance;
but, as the immediate occasion of prayer becomes here the text for a universal
lesson, St James’ meaning is best expressed by leaving the object undefined. In
like manner the “holy spirit,” promised in
This verse has much in common with some of Philo’s most cherished and at the
same time most purely biblical thoughts on God as a free giver and on wisdom as
specially the
6. αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν
διακρινόμενος, but let him ask in faith,
nothing wavering] Taken from our Lord’s words in
ἔοικεν κλύδωνι θαλάσσης, is like a rough sea]
Κλύδων appears never (not even Polyb. x. 10. 3) to mean a “wave,” but
always “rough water” (“the rough sea” A.V.
ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ, blown and raised with the wind] This appears to be the nearest approach to the meaning of the Greek allowed by the English idiom. Ἀνεμίζω, occurs nowhere else in Greek literature, and might by its etymology express any kind of action of the wind. The equally rare analogous verb πνευματίζω is used where fanning is intended (Antigonus Caryst. ap. Wetst.). The compound ἐξανεμίζω is preserved only in the Scholia on Homer Il. xx. 440 (ἦκα μάλα ψύξασα, interpreted τῇ κινήσει τῆς χειρὸς ἡρέμα ἐξανεμίσασα: Steph. s.v.), where likewise it denotes the gentle air made by a wave of the hand. The cognate ἀνεμοῦμαι is to “be breathed through (or, swelled out) by the wind” (whence a singular derivative use peculiar to writers on Zoology), except in one passage; and its compound ἐξανεμοῦμαι has the same range, with the further meaning to “be dissolved into wind.” An epigram in the Anthology (A. P. xiii. 12) applies ἡνεμωμένος to the sea, described as roaring (βρόμος δεινός) and causing a shipwreck. With this exception the evidence, such as it is, implies a restriction of ἀνεμίζω to gentler motions of the air: and in St James the improbability of an anticlimax forbids it being taken as a stronger word than ῥιπίζω.
Still more definitely, ῥιπίζω means strictly to fan either a fire or a person.
It is formed not from ῥιπή, a “rushing motion” (as applied to air, a “blast”),
but from the derivative ῥιπίς, a fire-fan; and consequently expresses only the
kind of blast proper to a fan. This restriction appears to be observed in a few
passages of a rather wider range. Thus ῥιπίζομαι is applied to dead bodies
allowed to sway freely (?) in the air (Galen. x. 745 ed. Kahn); to sea foam
carried inland (Dion Cass. lxx. 4); to spacious and airy chambers (ὑπερῷα ῥιπιστά,
The prima facie notion of billows lashed by a storm is therefore supported by hardly any evidence; and indeed the restless swaying to and fro of the surface of the water, blown upon by shifting breezes, is a truer image of a waverer (cf. Dion Cass. lxv. 16, Vitellius ἐμπλήκτως ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐφέρετο, ὥσπερ ἐν κλύδωνι). In the tideless Mediterranean even a slight rufflement would be noticed in contrast with the usually level calm, and the direct influences of disturbing winds are seen free from the cross effects of other agencies.
7μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω ὁ
ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήψεταί
τι παρὰ του κυρίου
7, 8. We have to choose here between three constructions, each marked by a different way of punctuating between the verses. (a) With a colon, making two separate sentences (A.V.); “let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord: a man of two minds is unstable in all his ways.” (b) With a comma making v. 7 a complete sentence, with v. 8 added in apposition (R.V. text); “let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord, a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways.” (c) Without a stop, making v. 7 incomplete without part of v. 8 (R.V. marg.); “let not that man think that a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways, shall receive anything from the Lord.”
In (a) and (b) it is “that man” that is said not to receive from the Lord, and
so that is blamed. Now who is “that man” — “he that wavereth” or “if any of you
etc.”? The whole context excludes him that merely “lacketh wisdom” from blame: blame here attaches not to the absence of wisdom, but to the failure to ask
for it, or to the asking without faith. Therefore the constructions (a) and (b)
require “that man” to mean the waverer. As an independent proof that he is
meant, it is urged that “that man” is itself a reproachful designation.
Undoubtedly it might be so employed; but St James’ usage does not favour the
supposition. He has the same word for man (ἄνθρωπος) in six other places, but
nowhere with a trace of reproach and apparently always in emphatic opposition to
other beings. Thus the opposition is to God’s other “creatures” in
i. 19; to
“the devils” in ii. 20 and probably
24; to “every kind
of beasts etc.” in iii. 8 f.; to beings not “of like passions”
v. 17; and so here to “the Lord.”
Likewise there is no force in a cumbrous reproachful description (ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ἐκεῖνος) thus closely preceding an explicit rebuke: in
On the other hand, if he that “lacketh wisdom” be intended, all difficulty vanishes. The obvious way of setting aside the last person and pointing back to the person mentioned before him would be in Greek the use of the pronoun “that” (ἐκεῖνος); and the insertion of “man” we have already seen to be explained by the opposition to “the Lord.”
Since then “that man” must naturally mean him that merely “lacketh wisdom,” and
so cannot be identified with the subject of rebuke, the constructions (a) and
(b) (of which (b) is certainly the more natural) are excluded, and the two
verses become one unbroken sentence. I am not
Although the man deficient in wisdom is not directly rebuked, the form of the sentence implies that he is concerned in the words spoken of others. Though not assumed to be a waverer, he is virtually warned that he may easily become liable to the reproach, and reminded of the nature of his relation as a “man” to “the Lord” of men.
8. ἀνήρ, man] A different word from that used in v. 7, and wholly without emphasis.
δίψυχος, of two minds] The image of
δίψυχος (lit. “two-souled”) represents
either dissimulation (suggested to modern ears by “double-minded” in A.V.), or
various kinds of distraction and doubt. Here faithless wavering is obviously
meant, the description in verse 6 being made more vivid by an additional figure.
Perhaps, as Calvin suggests, there is an intentional contrast with the manner of
God’s giving; “graciously” (ἀπλῶς) being according to the primitive meaning of
the Greek “simply”: Ita erit tacita antithesis inter Dei simplicitatem, cujus
meminit prius, et duplicem hominis animum. Sicut enim exporrecta manu nobis Deus
largitur, ita vicissim sinum cordis nostri expansum esse decet. Incredulos ergo,
qui recessus habent, dicit esse instabiles etc. There may also be an allusion to
“loving God with all the soul” or “the whole soul,”
ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῃ σου
(
The word itself δίψυχος
δίψυχία, διψυχέω) occurs here and
iv. 8 for the
first time. It is sprinkled over the early Fathers rather freely, and is found
occasionally in later times in the novelist Eustathius (viii. 7; xi. 17 f.), as
well as in ecclesiastical writers. Probably all drew directly or indirectly from
St James (Philo, Fragm. ii. 663 Mangey, uses διχονοῦς ἐπαμφοτερής, where St
John Damascene has the heading περὶ δειλῶν καὶ διψύχων). The
early references are Clem. I. 11, 23; in both cases διστάζοντες is added as if
to explain an unfamiliar word: the latter passage
(ταλαίπωροί εἰσιν οἱ δίψυχοι, οἱ διστάζοντες τῇ ψυχῇ κ.τ.λ.)
seems quoted from an earlier writing (as it is likewise in Ps.-Clem. II. 11); the
reference in this passage is conjectured by Lightfoot to be to the prophecies of Eldad and Medad referred to in Hermas,
ἀκ. ἐν πάσαις τ. ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ] As “a man of two minds” is a slightly varied repetition of “he that wavereth,” in like manner “unstable in all his ways” answers to “like a rough sea etc.” This parallelism is in itself enough to prove that the absence of the conjunction after “two minds” is expressive, and denotes not simple co-ordination but sequence: “a man of two minds and so unstable in all his ways.”
ἀκατάστατος, unstable] Things properly are called
ἀκατάστατα, when they do not
follow an established order of any kind (καθεστηκότα: cf. Aristot.
Probl. xxvi.
13). The word is rarely applied to persons. Polybius (cf. Demosth. de fals.
legat. p. 383) seems to mean by it “fickle” or “easily persuaded” (vii. 4. 6);
he couples the substantive with madness (μανία) a few lines further on. Other
examples are Epictetus (Diss. ii. 1. 12: φοβήσεται, ἀκαταστατήσει, ταραχθήσεται) “in a state of trepidation”; Pollux “fickle” (vi. 121), and also “disorderly,” i.e.
“stirring up disorder” (vi. 129); the translators of the O.T. “staggering” or
“reeling”:
On the whole it can scarcely be doubted that St James intended, or at all events
had in view, the physical meaning of
ἀκατάστατος
employed by the translators of
the O.T.; so that the two leading words of the phrase make up a vigorous
metaphor, “staggering in all his ways.” But the English word “staggering” hardly
suits the tone of the verse; and “unsteady” has other disturbing associations.
“Unstable” (A. V.), though somewhat feebler than the Greek, must therefore be
retained, and has the advantage of covering the alternative meaning “fickle.”
Compare
ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς
αὐτοῦ, in all his ways]
Ὁδοῖς retains its original force
as “roads” or “journeys” more distinctly than the English equivalent. “In all
his ways” is perhaps, as Bede says, in prosperity and adversity alike; whether
suffering trial or not, he has no firm footing. The formula occurs
The last two sentences may be thus paraphrased: “A prayer for wisdom, to be
successful, must be full of trust and without wavering. Wisdom comes not to him
that asks God for it only as a desperate chance, without firm
A passage of Philo deserves to be appended; much of the context is necessarily
omitted. “Whatsoever things nature gives to the soul need a long time to gain
strength; as it is with the communication of arts and the rules of arts by
other men to their pupils. But when God, the fountain of wisdom, communicates
various kinds of knowledge (τὰς ἐπιστήμας) to mankind, He communicates them
without lapse of time (ἀχρόνως); and they, inasmuch as they have become
disciples of the Only Wise, are quick at discovering the things which they
sought. Now one of the first virtues thus introduced is the eager desire of
imitating a perfect teacher, so far as it is possible for an imperfect being to
imitate a perfect. When Moses said (to Pharaoh,
9Καυχάσθω δὲ [ὁ] ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινὸς ἐν τῷ ὕψει αὐτοῦ, 10 ὁ δὲ πλούσιος ἐν τῇ ταπεινώσει αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου παρελεύσεται. 11 ἀνέτειλεν γὰρ ὁ ἥλιος σὺν τῷ καύσωνι καὶ ἐξήρανεν τὸν χὸρτον, καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσεν καὶ ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ ἀπώλετο· οὕτως καὶ ὁ πλούσιος ἐν ταῖς πορείαις αὐτοῦ μαρανθήσεται.
9-11. A return to the original theme of v. 2, bringing in the characteristic
contrast of rich and poor as a special application of the principle of rejoicing
in trials. There is probably a reference to the Beatitudes such as they appear
in St Luke (
9. The order in the Greek is important. ὁ ἀδελφὸς belongs equally to ὁ ταπεινός and ὁ πλούσιος, so that “let the brother boast” is common to both verses. As St James bids his “brethren” count it all joy when they fell in with trials, so he here points out the appropriate grounds of boasting to each member of the brotherhood, the body who might be expected to take a truer view of life than the outer world.
καυχάσθω, glory] In the O.T. and Ecclus. “glorying” or “boasting”
drops altogether its strict sense, and signifies any proud and exulting joy: so
הִתְהַלַּל
(ἐπαινοῦμαι)
ταπεινός, of low estate] Poverty is intended, but poverty in relation to “glorying” and contempt, a state despised by the mass of mankind. Ταπεινός means indifferently “poor” and “poor in spirit” i.e. “meek,” two notions which the later Jews loved to combine: it is often used in both senses in Ecclus.
τῷ ὕψει αὐτοῦ, his height] Not any future elevation in this or the other world, but the present spiritual height conferred by his outward lowness, the blessing pronounced upon the poor, the possession of the Kingdom of God. Continued poverty is one of the “trials” to be rejoiced in.
10. τῇ ταπεινώσει αὐτοῦ, his being brought low] Suffering the loss not of wealth only, but of the consideration
which wealth brings. Ταπείνωσις might mean “low estate,” as in the LXX.(and
ὅτι, since) This introduces not an explanation of
being brought low, but one
reason why the rich brother should glory in it, or more strictly why he should
not be startled at the command to glory in it. Perfection (v. 4) is assumed to
be his aim: our Lord taught that riches are a hindrance in the way of
perfection (
ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου, as the bloom of grass] Taken from the LXX.
rendering of
Grass is frequently used in the poetical books of the O.T. to illustrate the shortness of life, or the swift fall of the wicked. To understand the force of
the image we must forget the perpetual verdure of our meadows and pastures under
a cool and damp climate, and recall only the blades of thin herbage which
rapidly spring up and as rapidly vanish before the Palestine summer has well
begun. By “the flower of the field” the prophet (and the LXX. translator)
doubtless meant the blaze of gorgeous blossoms which accompanies the first
shooting
παρελεύσεται, pass away]
Παρέρχομαι and “pass” answer strictly to each other
in their primary and their metaphorical senses: the Greek word here, as often in
classical writers, means to “pass away,” i.e. pass by and so go out of sight;
it is employed in precisely similar comparison,
Which passes away, the rich man or his riches? Notwithstanding the form of the sentence, we might be tempted by the apparent connexion with v. 9 to say his riches (ὁ πλοῦτος included in ὁ πλούσιος). But in that case the only way to avoid unmeaning tautology is to take the comparison as justifying the mention of impoverishment rather than the exhortation to glorying in impoverishment; “let the rich man glory in his being brought low, for brought low be assuredly will be, sooner or later.” This gives an intelligible sense; but no one having this in his mind would have clothed it in the language of vv. 10, 11. St James must therefore mean to say not that riches leave the rich man but that he leaves his riches. This is the interpretation suggested by the natural grammar of v. 10, and no other will suit the last clause of v. 11.
But a difficulty remains. St James would hardly say that the rich man is more
liable to death than the poor, and the shortness of life common to both is in
itself no reason why the rich should glory in being brought to poverty. Probably
the answer is that St James has in view not death absolutely but death as
separating riches from their possessor, and shewing them to have no essential
connexion with him. “Be not thou afraid when one is made rich, when the glory of
his house is increased; for when he dieth he shall carry nothing away: his
glory shall not descend after him” (
I1. ἀνέτειλεν, riseth] This is the common classical (gnomic) aorist of general
statements founded on repeated experience. There is no clear instance of this
use in the N.T. except here and v. 24. Rapid succession is perhaps also
indicated by the series of aorists, though too strongly expressed in A.V. Not
unlike is
σὺν τῷ καύσωνι, with the scorching wind] A rare word in ordinary Greek, and
there chiefly used for some very inflammatory kind of fever (καύσωνος, θέτμης —
Suid. where Bernhardy refers to Herod. Epim. p. 196); in Athen. iii. p. 73 A
it denotes noontide heat. This seems also to be the meaning in
On the other hand in the O.T.
καύσων
is a frequent translation of
קָדִים (often
also rendered νότος) the east wind of Palestine (the Simoom) destructive alike by
its violence and its dry heat acquired in passing over the desert. This sense
alone occurs in all the chief Greek translations of the O.T., and again
apparently in Ecclus. and Judith. The only trace of it out of the Bible is in
the Schol. to Aristoph. Lysist. 974, where a whirlwind is probably intended. St
Jerome on
ἐξέπεσεν, fadeth away] This is one of the words in this verse derived from
7’) ἡ εὐπρέπεια τοῦ προσώπου
αὐτοῦ, the glory of its pride] Each of the
principal words will bear two renderings.
Εὐπρέπεια might mean “comeliness,”
“grace,” “beauty.”
Πρόσωπον might be simply the ‘face’ of the grass or
flower, by a common metaphor for its outward appearance or ‘fashion.’
Εὐπρέπεια, however (used in O.T. for various Hebrew words), usually includes a
notion of stateliness, or majesty. So
The varied figurative use of פָּנִים (“face”) in the O.T. was closely followed in the
LXX. by πρόσωπον, which brought in with it from prior, though late, Greek
usages the secondary notion of a person in a drama, or a representative. In
late Jewish Greek the old Hebrew idiom to “accept the face” (i.e. “receive with
favour”) obtained
On the whole clause cf.
μαρανθήσεται, wither away]
Μαραίνομαι denoted originally the dying out of a
fire (cf. Aristot. de vita et morte, 5), but came to be used of many kinds of
gradual enfeeblement or decay. In classical Greek there are but slight traces of
its application to plants (Plutarch, Dion, 24; Lucian, de Domo, 9; Themistius,
Or. xiii. p. 164 C,
ἄνθος ἀμυδρὸν ἀρετῆς μαραίνεσθαι). But this is the exact sense in
The idea of gradual passing away, which is characteristic of the classical use, is out of place here, where the rapid disappearance of the grass is dwelt upon. The fitness of the word comes solely from its association with the image just employed: it can mean no more than “die or vanish as the grass does.”
πορείαις, goings] The known evidence for the reading
πορίαις is insufficient;
but in any case it is merely a variation of spelling. There is no authority for
the existence of a word
πορία signifying “gain” (πορισμός), which is a blunder
of Erasmus founded on a false analogy of
ἀπορία and εὐπορία.
Πορεία means a
“journey,” and is very rarely used in any secondary sense, unless by a conscious
metaphor indicated in the context. The only clear cases discoverable are
The addition of the elaborate description in v. 11 to the simple comparison in v. 10 seems to shew how vividly St James’ mind had been impressed by the image when himself looking at the grass: what had kindled his own imagination he uses to breathe life into the moral lesson. In the last clause of the verse he returns, as it were, from the contemplation to his proper subject, and ends with an echo of the last words of v. 8.
“Let God alone be thy boast and thy greatest praise (
12. The parenthesis (vv. 5-11) ended, St James returns to his first theme, trials. He has dealt with them (vv. 3, 4) as to their intended effects on human character, as instruments for training men to varied perfection. He has spoken (vv. 5-8) of the process as one carried on through a wisdom received from God in answer to trustful prayer, depending therefore on a genuine faith, which in its turn depends on a true knowledge of God’s character. He has spoken (vv. 9-11) of the true estimate of poverty and riches, or rather of the contempt and honour which they confer, as characteristic of the right mind towards men, which should accompany and express the right mind towards God. Now he returns to trials, once more in relation to God, but from quite a new point of view, not as to their effects on character, but as to the thoughts which they at the time suggest to one who has no worthy faith in God.
μακάριος, happy] Not “blessed,” but as we say “a happy man.” Cf. its use in the
Psalms (e.g.
ὑπομένει, endureth] Not “has to bear,” but “bears with endurance,” the verb
recalling ὑπομονήν (v. 3). So
δόκιμος, approved] Again this word recalls the
δοκίμιον of
v. 3. It means one
who has been tested, as gold or silver is tested (
τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς, the crown of life] The precise force of this phrase
is not easy to ascertain. One of the most ancient and widely spread of symbols
is a circlet round the head; expressing chiefly joy or honour or sanctity.
There are two principal types, the garland of leaves or flowers (στέφανος) and
the linen fillet (διάδημα, μίτρα). From one or other of these two, or from
combinations of both, are probably derived all the various “crowns” in more
durable or precious materials, sometimes enriched with additional ornaments or
symbols. Each type is represented by a familiar instance. The chaplet with which
the victor was crowned at the Greek games is a well-known illustration as used
by St Paul. A fillet under the name of “diadem” was one of the insignia of
royalty among the Persians, and was adopted by the Greek and Graeco-Asiatic
kingdoms after Alexander. This ancient original of the modern kingly crown is
never called στέφανος in classical Greek; but the same Hebrew word
עֲטָרָה,
which is always rendered στέφανος by the LXX.,
Which then of the various uses of crowns or chaplets has supplied St James with
his image? In such a context we should naturally think first of the victor’s
crown in the games, of which St Paul speaks. On the other hand, the O.T.
contains no instance of that use (it would be impossible to rely on the LXX.
mistranslation of
Life is itself the crown, the genitive being that of apposition. There is no
earlier or contemporary instance of this genitive with
στέφανος, except
ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο, which
He promised] “The Lord” is a natural interpolation. The
subject of the verb is to be inferred from the sense rather than fetched from
v.
5 or 7; it is doubtless God. The analogy of
ii. 5 shews that words of Christ
would be to St James as promises of God; and such sayings as that in
τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν, them that love Him] This phrase is common in the O.T.,
usually joined with “keeping of God’s commandments”; but singularly absent from
the prophets (exc.
Ἀγαπῶσιν in
13. In contrast to him who endures trial, bears it with ὑπομονή, and thereby receives life, the opposite way of meeting trial, yet accompanied with a certain recognition of God, is to yield and play a cowardly and selfish part, and to excuse oneself by throwing the blames on God as the Author of the trial. Of course this, like most of the ways rebuked by St James, is a vice of men whose religion has become corrupt, not of men who have none at all.
As far as the first clause is concerned, the use of language is easy. The πειραζόμενος of v. 13 takes up the πειρασμόν; of 12, and that the πειρασμοῖς of 2. Πειρασμός is still simply “trial,” “trying,” the sense of suffering being, as we saw, probably latent, as in Ecclus., but quite subordinate.
ἀπὸ θεοῦ, from God] Not a confusion of ἀπὸ and
ὑπό, which would be unlike St
James’ exactness of language; the idea is origin not agency: “from God comes
my being tried.” The words in themselves are ambiguous as to their spirit. They
might be used as the justification of faithful endurance: the sense that God
was the Author of the trial and probation would be just what would most sustain
him, as the Psalms shew. But here the true phrase has been corrupted into an
expression of falsehood. The sense of probation, which implies a personal faith
in the Divine Prover, has passed out of the word
πειράζομαι: just as God’s
giving was; thought of nakedly, without reference to His gracious ungrudging
mind in giving, so here His proving is thought of nakedly, without reference to
His wise and gracious purpose in proving. Somewhat similar language occurs in
πειράζομαι, tempted or
tempted by trial] Now comes the difficulty: we have
passed unawares from the idea of trial to that of temptation, by giving what is
apparently a neutral, practically an evil, sense to “trial.” Trial manifestly
may have either result: if it succeeds in its Divinely appointed effect, it
results in perfectness: but it may fail, and the failure is moral evil. If we
think of it only
We are so accustomed to associate the idea of temptation with
πειρασμός, that
we forget how secondary the sense is. It is worth while to see what evidence it
has from usage. We saw that the only O.T. and Apocryphal senses are: (1) trying
of men by God (good); (2) trying of God by men (evil); (3) trying of men by man,
which nay be either neutral as in the case of the Queen of Sheba, or with evil
purpose, but not properly a “temptational” purpose, as those who tried to
entangle our Lord in His words. But the N.T. has another use. Three times in the
Gospels the idea of tempting comes in, not as the sole sense but still
perceptibly; viz. in the Temptation, the Lord’s Prayer, and “Watch and pray,
that ye enter not into temptation” (
Exactly similar is the passage in
So also in the Lord’s Prayer
πειρασμόν doubtless starts from trial, but trial
considered as a source of danger rather than of effectual probation, as seems to be implied by the antithesis of (masc.)
τοῦ πονηροῦ. The Lord’s Prayer virtually rules the sense of
μὴ εἰσέλθητε
(
It is difficult to find traces of Jewish influence going as far as the N.T. goes, but we do find “trial” with an evil sense attached, as the Evening Prayer in Berachoth 60 B, where sin, transgression, trial, disgrace stand in a line (cf. Taylor 141 f.).
ἀπείραστός . . . κακῶν, untried in evil] The meaning of
ἀπείραστός has been much discussed. It appears in this shape in
St James for the first time in Greek literature, though Boeckh has recognised it
in the shortened ἀπείρᾶτος (as
θαυμαστός, θαυμᾶτός, etc.) of Pindar, Olymp. vi. 54. The preceding words at first sight suggest an active
force “incapable of tempting to evil” (so Origen on
The active and passive senses being then excluded by the context, the neuter
remains, if only it can be sustained philologically. Now while
πειράζω belongs
to Epic and to late Greek, and has no middle except once in Hippoc. de Morb. iv.
327 T. ii. (Lob. ap. Buttm. ii. 267)
Similarly his κακά are not, as usual in this phrase, misfortunes, but moral evils. In English the force is best given by the abstract singular, “untried in evil,” i.e. without experience of anything that is evil. The argument doubtless is: — God’s own nature is incapable of contact with evil, and therefore He cannot be thought of as tempting men, and so being to them the cause of evil. Compare M. Aurel. vi. 1 ὁ δὲ ταύτην (τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν) διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει.
αὐτός, Himself] That is, He for His part (not so others). This the proper sense of αὐτός is compatible with a neuter as well as with a passive rendering of ἀπείραστος: the order is not αὐτός δὲ πειράζει.
πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα] This statement cannot possibly be taken in the
original sense of πειράζει. The whole passage rests on the assumption that
πειρασμός as trial does come from God. The word has therefore in this place
acquired a tinge partly from the misuse of it in the mouth of the man excusing
himself, partly from the
At first sight it looks strange, taking this verse with the next, that St James in denying that God tempts is silent about Satan as the tempter, while yet he does in antithesis speak of a man’s own desire as tempting him. The silence cannot possibly arise from any hesitation to refer to Satan or to his temptations: that supposition is historically excluded by the general language of the N.T. St James as a Jew of this time would be more, not less, ready than others to use such language; and it lies on the surface of the early Gospel records on which his belief was mainly founded.
It is striking that the Clementine Homilies, representing a form of Ebionism,
i.e. the exaggeration of St James’ point of view, lean so greatly on the idea of
Satan as the tempter that they say absolutely, what St James here says only with
a qualification, that God does not πειράζειν at all. In contrasting sayings of
Christ with false teaching, it says (iii. 55)
τοῖς δὲ οἰομένοις ὅτι ὁ θεὸς
πειράζει, ὡς αἱ γραφαὶ λέγουσιν, ἔφη,
Ὁ πονηρός ἐστιν ὁ πειράζων· ὁ καὶ
αὐτὸν πειράσας, probably from an apocryphal Gospel. And so on the theory that any doctrine of the O.T. which the
writer thought false must be an interpolation, he calls it a falsehood (iii.
43) to say that the Lord tried Abraham, ἵνα γνῶ εἱ ὑπομένει; and (xvi. 13)
with reference to
This illustrates St James’ caution. He was as anxious as Hom. Clem. to maintain at all hazards the absolute goodness of God, but he entirely believed and upheld the O.T. language. Meanwhile to have spoken here of Satan would have been only substituting one excuse for another. It was as practical unbelief to say, I sin because Satan tempts me, as to say, I sin because God tempts me. In each case it was an external power. What was needed to bring forward was the third factor, that within the man himself, and subject to his own mastery. The whole subject involved two mysteries, that of God as good in relation to evil, that of God as Providence in relation to human responsibility. Explicitly and implicitly St James recognises both sides of each antinomy: he refuses to cut either knot by the sacrifice of a fundamental truth.
14ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος·
14. ἕκαστος δὲ πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας, but each man is tempted by his own desire] Here the particular temptation belonging to the πειρασμοί of persecution is expanded into temptation generally, to doing evil acts, not merely not persisting in good. It is violent to connect ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας exclusively with the following participles: ὑπό goes naturally with a passive transitive verb immediately preceding, unless the sense forbids. There is no need to take either verb or participles quite absolutely: as often happens ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ., standing between both, belongs to both, but especially to the verb as standing first.
ἐπιθυμίας, desire] This must be taken in its widest sense
(cf. iv. 1) without
special reference to sensuality: such desires as would lead to unfaithfulness
under the πειρασμοί of of persecution, to which the Epistle refers at the outset,
are not likely to be excluded. It is not abstract desire, but a man’s own
desire, not merely because the responsibility is his, not God’s, but also
because it substitutes some private and individual end for the will of God:
κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας
The meaning of the Greek words needs nothing beyond themselves to explain them.
But it is likely enough that St James had in mind, when he was writing,
הַיֵצֶר הָּרַע, or “the evil impulse,” often spoken of in Jewish literature,
starting from
The representation of the desire as a personal tempter, probably implied in this verse and clearly expressed in the next, may contain the idea that, not being evil intrinsically, it becomes evil when the man concedes to it a separate voice and will instead of keeping it merged in his own personality, and thus subject to his authority. The story of Eve, with the Jewish allegories on the same subject, can hardly have been absent from St James’ mind: but it does not meet his purpose sufficiently to affect his language. On the other hand he probably pictured to himself the tempter desire as a harlot. Here too a Christian distinction may be latent in the image: the desire tempts not by evil but by misused good (cf. v. 17).
ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος, being enticed and allured (by it)]
Δελεάζω, to
allure by a bait (δέλεαρ), is frequently used metaphorically, as here.
Ἐξέλκω, a rather rare word, is not known to occur in any similar passage.
The sense of Aristotle’s πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς ἐξελκυσθείς
(Pol. V. 10, p. 1311 b 29) is too obscure to supply illustration. Several
commentators cite as from Plut. De sera num. vind. (no ref.),
τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλκειν:
Plutarch’s real words are (p. 554 F),
τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἀδικίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ εὐθὺς ἐξεδήδοκε.
The combination with δελεάζω, has naturally suggested here the image of fish drawn out of the water by a
line (οἱ δὲ ἔλκουσι· ἐπεὰν δὲ ἐξελκύσθῃ ἐς γῆν — Herod. ii. 70,
of the crocodile), in spite of the obvious difficulty that the bait ought to
precede the line: but the whole conception is unsuitable to the passage. The
simple ἕλκω is used for the drawing or attracting operation of a love-charm
(ἴυγξ: so Pind. Nem. iv. 56; Xen. Mem.
iii. 11, 18; Theocrit. ii. 17 ff.; as duco Verg. Ecl. viii. 68); and soon came to be applied to any pleasurable attraction
(Xen. Symp. i. 7; Plat. Rep. v. p. 458 D with πείθειν, but
ἐρωτικαῖς ἀναγκαῖς;
vii 538 D, ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει
μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ᾽
ἑαυτά, πείθει δὲ οὒ τοὺς καὶ ὁπῃοῦν
μετρίοθς; Philostr. Ep. 39,
καλὸς εἶ, κἂν μὴ θέλῃς, καὶ πάντας ἕλκεις τῷ
ἀμελουμένῳ, ὥσπερ οἱ βότρυες καὶ τὰ
μῆλα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο αὐτόματον καλόν; Athan. Or. cont. Gentes 30 on men leaving the way of truth, on which
they have been set διὰ τὰς ἔξωιεμ
αὐτοὺς ἑλκούσας ἡδονὰς τοῦ βίου; Ael. N. A.
vi. 31). It is associated with δέλεαρ, δελεάζω, in Plut.
Moral. 1093 D,
αἱ δ᾽ ἀπὸ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας
καὶ ἁρμονικῆς δριμὺ καὶ ποικίλον
ἔχουσαι τὸ δέλεαρ [ἡδοναὶ] οὐδενὸς τῶν
ἀγωγίμων ἀποδέουσιν, ἕλκουσαι καθάπερ ἴϋγξι τοῖς
διαγράμμασιν. Philo says (i. 512),
ἐπιθυμία μὲν γάρ, ὁλκὸν
ἔχουσα δύναμιν, καὶ ἂν φεύγῃ τὸ
ποθούμενον διώκειν ἀναγκάζει. Such seems to be the sense here,
ἐκ being
prefixed to denote the drawing out of the right place or relation or the drawing
aside out of the right way: cf. ἐκκλίνω, ἐκπίπτω, ἐκστρέφομαι, ἐκτρέπομαι,
and especially (though not in N.T.) ἐξάγω. The present tense of the
participles expresses only the enticing and alluring action of the
15εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν, ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκυεῖ θάνατον.
15. εἶτα, next]
Εἶτα, when historical (in
ἡ ἐπιθυμία, the desire] That is, either his desire generally, as the article in v. 14 suggests, or that particular desire of his which tempted him; not desire in the abstract.
συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει, conceiveth and bringeth forth] The double image
distinguishes the consent of the will (the man) to the desire from the resulting
sinful act, which may follow either instantly or at a future time. On the other
hand the compact phrase adopted from the O.T. (
ἁμαρτίαν, a sin] This might of course be “sin”: but the individual sense suits the passage better; each special desire has a special sin for its illegitimate offspring. The personified sin of this verse is neither momentary thoughts nor momentary deeds, but has a continuous existence and growth, a parasitical life: it is what we call a sinful state, a moral disease which once generated runs its course unless arrested by the physician.
ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία
ἀποτελεσθεῖσα, and the sin, when it is fully formed]
Ἀποτελεσθεῖσα is not exactly “full-grown,” a sense for which there is no
authority, but denotes completeness of parts and functions either accompanying
full growth as opposed to a rudimentary or otherwise incomplete state, e.g. of
the winged insect in contrast to the chrysalis and the grub (Plato Tim. 73 n; Pseud.-Plato
Epinom. 981 C; Aristot. H. A. v. 19, p. 552 a 28; Generat. Animal.
ii. 1, p. 732 a 32; iii/ 11. p. 762 b 4), or possessed by beings of high organisation
(Aristot. H. A. ix. 1, p. 608 b 7, man as compared with other animals
ἔχει τὴν φύσιν ἀποτετελεσμένην).
Similarly it is used of mental or moral
accomplishment (gen. Hipparch. vii. 4; Oecon. xiii. 3; Lucian Hermot. 8,
ὃς ἂν ἀποτελεσθῇ πρὸς ἀρετήν).
In virtue of its morbid life the sin goes on
acquiring new members and faculties (cf.
ἀποκυεῖ θάνατον, giveth birth to death] The precise force of
ἀποκυέω, here and
in v. 18, is not altogether certain. Τίκτω, which St James has just employed, is
the usual literary word for the bearing of a son or daughter by the mother (only
poets employ it of the father): it has reference to parentage, the relation of
mother to child. Ἀποκυέω, as most commonly used, is the medical or physical
word denoting the same fact, but chiefly as the close of pregnancy (κυέω): thus a
person named is very
For other images of the relation of sin to death see
16Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί.
16. μὴ πλανᾶσθε, be not deceived] Occurs similarly
ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, my beloved brethren] So v. 19; ii. 5. The simple ἀδελφοί or ἀδελφοί μου recurs often in the Epistle.
17. The first part of this verse admits several constructions. The commonest
makes ἄνωθεν
the predicate, and καταβαῖνον κ.τ.λ. epexegetic, “every good gift
(or, giving) etc. is from above, descending etc.”:
ἄνωθέν ἐστιν is however a
weak and unlikely phrase; contrast ἐκ τῶν ἄνω εἰμί (
The true construction was pointed out by Mr Thomas Erskine (The unconditional
freeness of the Gospel, Edinburgh, 1829 [ed. 3] pp. 239 ff.). The predicate is ἀγαθή and
τέλειον ἄνωθεν, “every giving is good and every gift perfect from
above (or, from its first source), descending etc.”; paraphrased by Mr Erskine,
“there are no bad gifts, no bad events; every appointment is gracious in its
design, and divinely fitted for that design.”
Ἄνωθεν is more completely
appropriate to
τέλειος than to
ἀγαθός
δόσις . . . δώρημα, giving . . . gift] These cannot possibly be synonyms: rhetorical
repetition of identical sense in other diction is incompatible with the
carefully economised language of all writers of the N.T., and here the words are
emphatically distinguished by means of πᾶσα, πᾶν, and the separate adjectives.
The difference is probably double. Since
δόσις is often not less concrete than
δόμα, and
δωρεά (as always in Acts) than δώρημα, the variety of termination
might have had no significance. But it was easy to use either
δόσις and
δωρεά
or
δόμα and δώρημα; so that the contrast of forma and genders would be
singularly clumsy if it was not intentional Aoalr occurs elsewhere in the N.T.
only in
Another difference, probably here subordinate, is independent of the
termination. In the second passage cited above, and also Leg. Alleg. iii. 70, p.
126, Philo distinguishes the δῶρα and δόματα of the LXX. in
ἀγαθή, good]
Ἀγαθός denotes properly what is good in operation and result to
things outside itself, utility in the utmost generality (
τέλειον, perfect] As ἀγαθός expresses the character of the gifts, derived from the Giver, so τέλειος expresses the completeness of their operation when they are not misused. Philo says θέμις δὲ οὐδὲν ἀτελὲς αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι, ὥσθ᾽ ἁλόκληροι καὶ παντελεῖς αἱ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου δωρεαὶ πᾶσαι (i. 173); χαρίζεται δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἀτελὲς οὐδὲν, πλήρη δὲ καὶ τέλεια πάντα (i. 447).
ἄνωθεν, from the beginning or from their source] The commonest sense “from
above,” found in various similar passages, is harsh here in combination with the
adjectives, though the etymology may have dictated the choice of the word, as
specially appropriate to the subject of the verse. It is rather, as often, “from
the beginning” (so
καταβαῖνον, descending] Sc. “as they do.” This clause is explanatory of ἄνωθεν. They are good and perfect, because their source is good and perfect.
τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, the Father of lights] In Greek literature and in Philo πατήρ is sometimes hardly more than a rhetorical synonym for “Maker,” usually coupled with a more exact word such as ποιητής or δημιουργός: but this lax use finds no precedent in Scripture, and leaves the sense imperfect here. God’s relation to finite things must include authorship; but the authorship required by St James’ argument must be combined with likeness, and a higher perfection in the likeness. Every light is an offspring of the perfect and primal Light, and in some sense bears His image: its character as a light fits it to set forth that character of God to which St James makes appeal. Philo calls God “an archetypal Splendour (αὐγή), sending forth numberless beams” (i. 156); “not only Light, but also [a light] archetypal of every other light, nay rather elder and more original (ἀνώτερον) than an archetype” (i. 632); and “the primary most perfect Good, the perpetual fountain of wisdom and righteousness and every virtue,” “an archetypal exemplar of laws and Sun [? archetypal] of sun, intellectual [Sun] of material [sun], supplying from His invisible fountains streams of visible light to all that we see” (ὁρατὰ φέγγη τῷ βλεπομένῳ) (ii. 254).
The plural φῶτα has various applications, to lamps or torches, to windows, and
to days. In the O.T.
אוֹר, “light,” and
מָאוֹר, “a light” or “a luminary,” are
distinguished (markedly
παρ᾽ ᾧ, with whom] This peculiar use of παρὰ, too lightly treated by
commentators, occurs in two other phrases of the N.T., both repeated more than
once; παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀδύνατον ἀλλ᾽ οὐ παρὰ θεῷ, πάντα γὰρ
δυνατὰ παρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ
(
οὐκ ἔνι, can be no or
there is no room for] Ἔνι is not a contraction of
ἔνεστι, ἔνεισι, but simply
ἐνὶ, the Ionic form
of ἐν, retained in this Attic idiom like
πάρα without the substantive verb: so P. Buttmann
Gr. Gr. ii. 375; Winer-Moulton, p. 96; Lightfoot on
παραλλαγή, variation]
Παραλλάσσω, παράλλαξις, παραλλαγή, are words of
wide range, perhaps starting from the notion of alternation or succession
attached to the adverb παραλλάξ, but in common use applied to all kinds of
variations (different states of a single thing), and then all differences as
between one thing and another; not to speak of several derivative senses. The
various periodic changes of the heavenly bodies are doubtless chiefl intended
here. In the North of Scotland the emperor Severus, says Dion Cassius (lxxvi.13),
τήν τε τοῦ ἡλίον
τροπῆς, change] Though
τροπή often means a solstice and sometimes also an
equinox, this sense is excluded by the combination with “shadow,” which must be
intelligible through obvious phenomena without astronomical lore.
Τροπή is a
favourite word with Philo, usually coupled with μεταβολή, denoting any change
undergone by any object. Some passages approach this verse, as i. 80, “When the
mind has sinned and removed itself far from virtue, it lays the blame on things
divine (τὰ θεῖα), attributing to God its own change (τροπή)”; i. 82, “How
shall a man believe God? If he learn that all other things change (τρέπεται),
but He alone is unchangeable (ἄτρεπτος)”; ii. 322, “It is unlawful that he
[the high priest,
St James may have had chiefly in view either night and day (cf. Bas. Hex. Hom. ii. p. 20 B, καὶ νὺξ σκίασμα γῆς ἀποκρυπτομένου ἡλίου γινόμενον), or the monthly obscurations of the moon, or even the casual vicissitudes of light due to clouds.
ἀποσκίασμα, shadow] Either the shadow cast by an object (more commonly σκίασμα, as several times in Plutarch, τὸ σκίασμα τῆς γῆς, the shadow cast by the earth on the moon in an eclipse), or a faint image or copy of an object. On the strength of this second sense some late writers supposed St James to mean “not a trace (ἴχνος) of change”: but usage gives them no support, and shadow no less than change must form part of the primary image. The genitive doubtless expresses “belonging to change,” “due to change” (“shadowing by turning,” Geneva).
The whole verse may be compared with
A few lines may be quoted from a striking Whitsun Day sermon of Andrewes on the present verse (p.752, ed. 1635). “Yet are there varyings and changes, it cannot be denied; we see them daily. True: but the point is per quem, on whom to lay them. Not on God. Seems there any recess? it is we forsake Him, not He us: it is the ship that moves; though they that be in it think the land goes from them, not they from it. Seems there any variation, as that of the night? it is umbra terrae makes it: the light makes it not. Is there anything resembling a shadow? a vapour rises from us, makes the cloud, which is as a penthouse between, and takes Him from our sight: that vapour is our lust; there is the apud quem. Is any tempted? it is his own lust doth it: that entices him to sin, that brings us to the shadow of death: it is not God; no more than He can be tempted, no more can He tempt any. If we find any change the apud is with us, not Him: we change; He is unchanged. Man walks in a vain shadow: His ways are the truth; He cannot deny Himself.” [iii. p. 374.]
18. The details of this verse are best approached by asking to whom it refers.
Does St James mean by ἡμᾶς “us” men, the recipients of God’s word of reason; or
“us” sons of Israel (Jew
βουληθείς, of set purpose]
Βούλομαι and θέλω, though largely coincident in
sense, and often capable of being interchanged, never really lose the
distinction indicated by Ammonius, De diff. verb. p. 31,
βούλεσθαι μὲν ἐπί μόνου λεκτέον τοῦ λογικοῦ, τὸ δὲ
θέλειν καὶ ἐπὺ ἀλόγου ζῴου,
and again (p.
70), θέλειν καὶ βούλεσθαι ἐὰν λέγῃ τις, δηλώσει ὅτι ἀκουσίως τε καὶ
εὐλόγως ὀρέγεταὶ τινος
(quoted though not accepted by W. Dindorf in Steph.
Thes.). Θέλω expresses the mere fact of volition or desire, neither affirming
nor denying an accompanying mental process:
βούλομαι expresses volition as
guided by choice and purpose. Hence βουλή, “counsel,” agrees exactly in sense
with
βούλομαι, and the derivative
βουλεύομαι differs only by accentuating
deliberation of purpose still further: accordingly
βουλεύομαι is substituted for
βούλομαι in inferior MSS. of
A distinction the inverse of this has been for many years traditional, founded
on a part of Buttmann’s acute but not quite successful exposition of Homeric
usage in the Lexilogus (194 ff. E.T.). He observed that θέλω is applied to “a
desire of something the execution of which is, or at least appears to be, in
one’s own power”; while
βούλομαι expresses “that kind of willingness or
wishing in which the wish and the inclination toward a thing are either the only
thing contained in the expression, or are at least intended to be particularly
marked”: and he assumed purpose or design to be involved in the former kind of
desire. But the observation does not sustain the inference. The cases in which
we naturally speak simply of volition are just those in which action either
follows instantly or is suspended only by another volition of the same agent:
while the separation of wish and inclination from fulfilment exactly corresponds
with the separation of the mental process leading to a volition from the
volition itself, which is not in strictness formed till action becomes
possible. This view is in like manner illustrated by two accessory observations.
In Homer the gods are said βούλεσθαι, not θέλειν, although their action is
unimpeded. Buttmann explains this peculiarity by a respectful
Βουληθείς, like βουλόμενος, might doubtless mean “of His own will,” i.e. spontaneously, without compulsion or suggestion from without: but such a sense is feeble in this context. On the other hand it cannot by itself express graciousness of will, as some have supposed. If we give βούλομαι its proper force, an adequate sense is at once obtained. Man’s evil thoughts of God are inconsistent with a true sense of his own nature and destiny, as determined for him from the beginning by God’s counsel. Thus the words “that we might be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures” would by themselves shew why St James might place the Divine counsel or purpose in the forefront. But there is much reason for thinking that βουληθείς further refers to the peculiarity of man’s creation in the Mosaic narrative, as having been preceded by the deliberative words “Let us make man,” etc. It is morally certain that the rest of the verse is a paraphrase of what had been said about the creation in God’s image: and if so, St James, in recalling God’s purpose concerning man, might naturally point to the mysterious language of Genesis which seemed to invest man’s creation with special glory on this very ground as well as on the other. It is at least certain that the same interpretation was placed on these words of Genesis by several of the gathers (Philo’s explanation is quite different), and that without any apparent dependence on St James. It is probably implied in Tertullian’s remarkable fifth chapter against Praxeas (e.g. Nam etsi Deus nondum Sermonem suum miserat, proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa Ratione intra semetipsum habebat tacite cogitando et disponendo secum quae per Sermonem mox erat dicturus; cum Ratione enim sua cogitans atque disponens Sermonem eam efficiebat quam sermone tractabat). The language of others is quite explicit. Macarius Magnes (Fragm. Ham. in Gen., Duchesne De Macario Magnete, p. 39): καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα κτίσματα ῥήματι μόνῳ παρῆκται. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔσχεν ἐξαίρετόν τι κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν παρὰ ταῦτα. Βουλῆς γὰρ προηγουμένης ἐκτίσθη, ἵνα ἐκ τούτου δειχθῇ ὅτιπερ κτίσμα τίμιον ὐπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν οὐδὲν ἕτερον δείκνυσιν ἢ ὅτι συμβούλῳ ἐχρήσατο ὁ πατὴρ τῷ μονογενεῖ αὐτοῦ τῷ υἱῷ ἐπὶ τῇ τούτου κατασκευῇ κ.τ.λ. ... βουλῆς γὰρ ἐνέργεια τὸ πᾶν [p. 1397 B-D, Migne].
ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς, gave us birth] i.e. at the outset, antecedently to growth. We are His children, made in His likeness. See note on v. 15.
λόγῳ ἀληθείας, by a word of truth] This phrase is evidently capable of various senses, according to context. In
O.T. (
It is at first sight tempting to have recourse to the Jewish conception of the Creation as accomplished by ten Words of God (“And God said”). So Aboth v. 1, “ By ten Sayings the world was created,” and refit in Taylor; Aristob. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiii. p.664 says that “Moses has spoken of the whole creation (γένεσιν) of the world as θεοῦ λόγους.” In this case λόγ. ἀλ. would be the actual words described as spoken. But it is not easy to see how they could be called λόγ. ἀλ., and moreover this sense, while it would suit well with ἔκτισεν or ἐποίησεν, does not harmonise with ἐπεκύησεν.
We must therefore seek the explanation rather in the distinctive feature of
man’s creation in
εἰς τὸ, in order that] It is needless here to consider the debated question whether εἰς τὸ with infinitive following a verb denotes always purpose, or sometimes only result (“so that”). Here Divine purpose is clearly meant (cf. iii. 3): the relation of man to the world is part of God’s plan, and cannot indeed be separated from His purpose respecting man himself.
ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ
(v. ἐαυτοῦ) κτισμάτων, a kind of firstfruits of his
creatures] Here again the phrase has force at all three stages of revelation. It
is manifestly true of Christians (cf.
κτισμάτων]
19. Ἴστε and ἔστω δὲ] So read for Ὥστε and ἔστω without δέ, which is Syrian only, the connexion between the clauses not being perceived.
Ἴστε may be either indicative or imperative. But St James (iv. 4) has the other
form οἴδατε in indicative; and probably
used this shorter and sharper form for distinction, to mark the imperative; this
being also the best sense. The N.T. writers commonly use οἴδατε; but
ἴστε occurs in two other places (
Here St James repeats positively what he has said negatively in v. 16. In vv. 13-15 he was combating error; and then he finally says Μὴ πλανᾶσθε as introductory to his fundamental doctrine of 17, 18. That doctrine being now set forth, he a second time calls attention to it on the positive side, as the basis of what he is going to say. “Know it well, my beloved: brethren (the old address repeated). And on the other hand” (δέ, with tacit reference to the acquiescence in evil hinted at in v. 13).
πᾶς ἄνθρωπος] There is force in iἄνθρωπος with reference to v. 18. The expression is not equivalent to πᾶς, but everyone of the human race, that race which is God’s offspring and endowed by Him with a portion of His own light.
ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι] There are two grounds for this admonition: (1) suggested
by λόγῳ ἀληθείας (see
v. 21); (2) the love of violent and disputatious speech
was to be a special object of attack in the Epistle (
The admonition itself is common enough among moralists (Greek exx. in Wetstein,
Theile, etc.), and especially in Ecclus. as
Then he goes on in a secondary way to βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν, because this arrogance of magisterial speech was closely mixed up with violence of speech, zeal for God being made a cloak for personal animosities.
20ὀργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ οὐκ ἐργάζεται.
20. ὀργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς, for a man’s wrath] Not “the wrath of man.” It is not
exactly the broad distinction of human as against Divine wrath, which would
require ἀνθρώπου or τῶν ἀνθρώπων; but a single man’s anger, the petty
passion, of an individual soul (cf. τ. ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας,
v. 14). Contrast
δικαιοσύνην θεοῦ οὐκ ἐργάζεται, worketh no righteousness of God] Not “the righteousness of God,” but no righteousness which is a true part and vindication of God’s righteousness. The late text has οὐ κατεργάζεται by a natural correction: this would more distinctly express result. Result is of course included in ἐργάζεται, but the main point is that a man’s anger is not a putting in force, a giving operation to, any true righteousness of God, as it professed to be.
21. διό clearly marks the connexion of the verses, shewing that 19 f. must be so understood as to prepare for δέξασθε and the accompanying words.
ῥυπαρίαν καὶ περισσείαν, defilement and excrescence] These illustrate each other, being cognate though not identical images. περισσεία is by no means to be confounded with the semi-medical περισσωμα, as it were the refuse of the body. The proper or usual sense of περισσεία is simply abundance, superfluity; usually in a good sense as overflow; sometimes in a bad sense, as beyond measure.
The special image here is evidently rank and excessive growth. So Philo interprets περιτέμνεσθε τ. σκληροκαρδίας as τ. περιττὰς φύσεις τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῖ which are sown and increased by the unmeasured impulses of the passions (De vict. offer. ii. 258); also βλασται περιτταί . . . τ. βλαβερὰν ἐπίφυριν (De somn. i. 667); and other passages have the idea without the word. For the contrast to the original proper growth see Ps.-Just. De Monarch. i.: τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχὴν συζυγίαν συνέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας λαβούσης εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας θρησκείας τε τῆς εἰς τὸν ἕνα καὶ πάντων δεσπότην, παρεισδῦσα εἰς εἰδωλοποιίας ἐξέτρεψε βασκανία τὸ ὑπέρβαλλον τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγαλειότητος, καὶ πολλῷ χρόνῳ μεῖναν τὸ περισσὸν ἔθος ὡς οἰκείαν καὶ ἀληθῆ τὴν πλάνην τοῖς πολλοῖς παραδίδωσι.
Whether St James has trees particularly in view may be doubted, but he probably means simply “excrescence.” The violent speech was not, as it was supposed to be, a sign of healthy life: it was a mere defilement and excrescence on a man considered in his true character as made in God’s image.
κακίας, malice] It might be quite general, “evil”; but it seems here to have the proper sense of “malice”: what was called “holy anger” was nothing better than spite.
πραΰτητι, meekness] The word is contrasted with
κακίας: the temper full of
harshness and pride towards
τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον, the inborn word] A simple phrase, made difficult by the context. Heisen has 120 pages on it. Its proper meaning is “inborn,” or rather “ingrown,” “congenital,” “natural” (often coupled with φυσικός). It is used in opposition (Heisen 671) to διδακτός, ἐπικτήτος, ἐπείσακτος, etc. This agrees with the derivation. Φύω or φύομαι is to grow, or causatively, to make to grow, as of a living being putting forth fresh growings (growing teeth, beard, etc.), or a higher being creating that which grows, or a parent producing offspring. So ἐμφύοααι almost always is to be inborn in, to grow as part of. Where the causative use occurs (with one peculiar figurative exception Ael. N. A. xiv. 8 of eels fixing their teeth in a bait), it is always said of a higher power (God, nature, fate) who causes some power or impulse to grow up in a man or other living being from birth.
Occasionally there is a secondary ingrowth, a “second nature,” as we say; and
both verb and adjective have this sense too. Thus Clem. Str. vi. 799,
λαμβάνει τοίνυν τροφὴν μὲν
πλείονα ἡ ἐγκεντρισθεῖσα ἐλαία διὰ τὸ
ἀγρίᾳ ἐμφύεσθαι, i.e. “grows into” a
wild olive, not “is grafted into,” which would be mere tautology after
ἐγκεντρισθεῖσα. Also
ἔμφυτος Herod. ix. 94 of Evenius,
καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτίκα ἔμφυτον μαντικὴν εἶχεν, i.e. he had a Divine gift of prophecy, not as a
receiver of prophecies, but as the possessor of a power within himself. Such
passages as these are useless for shewing that the word can mean implanted. So
also passages in which God’s bestowal of the gift is spoken of in the context.
Thus Ps-Ign. Eph. 17,
διὰ τί λογικοὶ ὄντες οὐ γίνομεθα
φρονιμοί; διὰ τί ἔμφυτον τὸ περὶ
θεοῦ παρὰ χριστοῦ λαβόντες κριτήριον
εἰς ἀγνοίαν καταπίπτομεν, ἐξ ἀμελείας
ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ χάρισμα ὁ εἰλήφαμεν
ἀνοήτως ἀπολλύμεθα; Similarly
It is therefore impossible to take τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον as the outward message of
the Gospel. He could never have used in that sense a word which every one who
knew Greek would of necessity understand in the opposite sense. It may be that
the idea of reception (δέξασθε) is transferred from the external word: but in
any case it has an intelligible meaning. The word is there, always sounding
there; but it may be nevertheless received or rejected. This notion of the
reception of a word already within is like κτὴσασθε τὰς ψυχάς (
This sense (Schulthess and as against the wrong sense Heinsius
in loc.) has ancient authority. Oecum. (? e Did. Al.) has
ἔμφυτον λόγον καλεῖ τὸν διακριτικὸν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ
χείρονος, καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμὲν καὶ
καλούμεθα. Cf. Athan. Or. c. Gent. 34,
ἐπιστρέψαι δὲ δύνανταο ἐὰν ὅν ἐνεδύσαντο
ῥύπον πάσης ἐπιθυμίας ἀπόθωνται καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπονίψωνται ἕως
ἂν ἀπόθωνται πᾶν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλότριον
τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μόνην αὐτὴν ὥσπερ
γέγονεν ἀποδείξωσιν, ἵν᾽ οὕτως ἐν αὐτῇ
θεωρῆσαι τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς λόγον, καθ᾽ ὅν
καὶ γεγόνασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δυνηθῶσιν. κατ᾽
εἰκόνα γὰρ θεοῦ πεποίηται καὶ καθ᾽
ὁμοίωσιν γέγονεν . . . ὅθεν καὶ ὅτε πάντα
τὸν ἐπιχυθέντα ῥύπον τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀφ᾽
ἐαυτῆς ἀποτίθεται, καὶ μόνον τὸ κατ᾽
τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς
ὑμῶν] The simplest sense is right. The
contrast is between life and death, the “soul” being the living principle; as
This life-giving power as ascribed to the inborn word becomes intelligible if we
consider it as differing at different ages of the world according to the stages
of experience and of revelation. It is always the testimonium animae naturaliter
Christianae (cf.
22Γίνεσθε δὲ ποιηταὶ λόγου καὶ μὴ ἀκροαταί μόνον παραλογιζόμενοι ἐαυτούς
22. Thus far we have had the relation of hearing to speaking, and hearing has been commended before speaking. But the formalistic spirit of the Jewish Christians could give this too a wrong turn, as though hearing were all that were needed. There remained another antithesis, hearing and doing, and to this St James turns by way of precaution.
γίνεσθε, shew yourselves] i.e. in hearing, to prove that you hear rightly.
ποιηταὶ, doers] Cf.
ποιηταὶ λόγου] Not the Word whether external or internal, but any word that has authority. It is almost adjectival, “word-doers,” as we say “law-abiding,” “law-breakers.”
ἀκροαταί] used in N.T. only in the same passages,
Cf. R. Shimeon son of Gamaliel in Aboth i. 18, “All my days I have grown up
amongst the wise, and have not found aught good for a man but silence: not
learning but doing is the groundwork, and whose multiplies words occasions sin.”
So also v. 20, “There are four characters in college-goers. He that goes and
does not practise, the reward of going is in his hand. He that practises and
does not go, the reward of practice is in his hand. He that goes and practises
is pious. He that goes not and does not practise is wicked.” And again v. 18,
“There are four characters in scholars. Quick to hear and quick to forget, his
gain is cancelled by his loss. Slow to hear and slow to forget, his loss is
cancelled by his gain. Quick to hear and slow to
παραλογιζόμενοι] The word occurs
23. κατανοοῦντι, taking note of] Not merely to see passively, but to perceive:
as Plato (Soph. 233 A) γάρ πω κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον, “I do not catch
the question.” Cf.
τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ, the face of his creation] Not altogether easy. The phrase must be taken with τ. τροχὸν τ. γενέσεως (iii. 6), but I speak only of the simpler case here presented. Here it is often understood as “his natural face” (A.V.), lit the face of his birth, with which he was born, i.e. his bodily face. But if such a meaning were intended, no such circuitous and obscure phrase would have been used; τ. πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ, would have been enough, no other face being mentioned. Also the image so presented has no force: if it is merely a case of hasty looking or intent looking, all that is said in v. 24 is otiose.
The γένεσις is his birth strictly, in antithesis to later degeneracy; but the
face is the invisible face, the reflexion of God’s image in humanity. St James
is still consistently referring to
There is special fitness in the word because it is used in LXX. for
תּוֹלְדוֹת and
מוֹלֶדֶת, and has thus (from
24κατενόησεν γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπελήλυθεν καὶ εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο ὁποῖος ἦν.
24. κατενόησεν, he takes note of ] The verb as before: he sees himself and knows that it is himself that he sees,
the new man κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα. The aorist denotes the instantaneous
ἀπελήλυθεν, is gone away] He went away and remains away: a contrast to παραμείνας. It was a passing glance, not taken up into his life, but relinquished.
εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο, straightway forgetteth] Again the aorist because the forgetting was a single and immediate act.
ὁποῖος ἦν, what manner of man he was]
I.e. his original image antecedent to change and becoming. Cf.
On the whole thought of the verse cf. Origen Hom. in Gen. i. § 13, “Semper ergo intueamur istam imaginem Dei, ut possimus ad ejus similitudinem reformari. Si enim ad imaginem Dei factus homo, contra naturam intuens imaginem diaboli, per peccatum similis ejus effectus est; multo magis intuens imaginem Dei, ad cujus similitudinem factus est a Deo, per verbum et virtutem ejus recipiet formam illam quae data ei fuerat per naturam.” Also Athan. (Or. cont. Gent. ii. p. 3) speaks of man as having nothing to hinder him from attaining to the knowledge concerning the Divinity, for by his own purity (καθαρότητος) he always contemplates the image of the Father, the God-Word, in whose image also he is made, . . . ἱκανὴ δὲ ἡ τ. ψυχῆς καθαρότης ἐστὶ τὸν θεὸν δἰ ἑαυτῆς κατοπτρίζεσθαι, as the Lord also says, Blessed are the pure, etc.” See also the passage cited above on v. 21.
So also virtually (though confusedly) Oecum., but supposing the word to be the Mosaic Law (διὰ τ. νόμου μανθάνοντες οἱοὶ γεγόναμεν) and again speaking of a spiritual (νοητόν) mirror.
25. παρακύψας, looketh into] The notion of a steady gaze has been imported into the word from the context, and
prematurely. It seems never to have any such meaning. Κύπτω and all its
compounds express literally some kind of stretching or straining of the body, as
up, down, or forward. Παρακύπτωis the stretching forward the head to catch a
glimpse, as especially through a window or door, sometimes inwards, oftener
outwards. When used figuratively, as here, it seems always to imply a rapid,
hasty, and cursory glance. So Luc. Pisc. 30,
κᾷπειδὴ μόνον παρέκυψα εἰς τὰ
ὑμέτερα, the speaker says to the philosophers: “As soon as ever I had merely
looked into your world, I began to admire you, etc.”; Bas. Ep. lxxi. § 1,
εἰ δὲ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρτι παρακύψαι φιλοτιμούμενος πρὸς τ. βίον τ. Χριστιανῶν: “If so
and so making it his ambition just now to cast a glance at the life of
Christians, and then thinking that his sojourn with us confers on him some
dignity, invents what he has not heard, and expounds what he has not understood”
: where all turns on the slightness and superficiality of the acquaintance;
Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 8, p. 554,
ποῦ γὰρ τοῖς
ἰδίωταις πρὸ μικροῦ θέμις εἰς ἡγεμονικῆς
(imperial) ψυχῆς παρακύψαι βουλεύματα; Ach. Tat. ii. 35 [cf.
Jacobs, p. 593] of beauty that παρακύψαν μόνον οἴχεται; D. Cass. lxii. 3,
Boadicea of the Romans, ἐξ οὗπερ ἐς τὴν
Βρεταννίαν οὗτοι παρέκυψαν, “from
the time that these men put their heads into Britain”; lxvi. 17, of emperors who
partly reigned together, each of them believed himself to be emperor
ἀφ᾽ οὗ γε καὶ ἐς τοῦτο παρέκυψεν, “from the time that he put his head into this,”
i.e. began at all to reign (lii. to is not quite so clear); Demosth. Phil. i. 24
(p. 46 fin.) auxiliary troops παρακύψαντα
St James could not have used such a word to contain within itself steady
looking, and it must therefore have a meaning analogous to
νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, a perfect law, even that of liberty] Here
the word has become a law, but a perfect law, just as they are interchanged in
τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας] In what sense? Irenaeus thinks of free-will: but that is
not in the context. In LXX.
ἐλευθερία is never used in any such figurative or
ethical sense. The nearest approach in sense is in
καὶ παραμείνας, and there
continueth] The first meaning is to “stay where one
is”: then to “stay with a person loyally”: also absolutely to “persevere,” esp.
in contrast to others who fall away. Diod. Sic. (ii. 29), contrasting the Greeks
with the Chaldaeans and their hereditary lore says:
παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁ
πολὺς ἀπαράσκευος προσιὼν ὀψέ ποτε
τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἅπτεται, καὶ μέχρι τινὸς
φιλοπονήσας ἀπῆλθε, περισπασθεὶς
ὑπὸ βιωτικῆς χρείας, ὀλίγοι δὲ παντελῶς
ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀποδύντες ἐργολαβίας
ἕνεκεν παραμένουσιν ἐν τῷ μαθήματι. The idea then probably is “perseveres
in” the law, not perseveres looking at it, nor abides beside it. So
γενόμενος, shewing himself] As γίνεσθε in v. 22.
ἀκροατὴς ἐπιλησμονῆς
. . . ποιητὴς
ἔργου,
μακάριος] not
εὐλογητός. “Happy” in the sense “to be
envied.” He may have delight in it or he may not: the state itself is good and
desirable: if he is in a right mind, he cannot but delight in it. This μακάριος hardly goes back to
the Sermon on the Mount (it comes nearer
ἐν τῇ ποιήσει, in his doing] Not διὰ τὴν π. Not a reward, but a life. His action is the action that is right and therefore μακαρία. It refers back to ποιητής.
26. δοκεῖ, seemeth] Sc. to himself, as often.
θρησκός, religious] An interesting but extremely rare word. Not known except here and in Lexicographers; Latt. religiosus. The derivation is probably directly from τρέω, and it seems to mean one who stands in awe of the gods, and is tremulously scrupulous in what regards them. The actual renderings in Lexx. are strange: Hesych. ἑτερόδοξος, εὐγενής (?); Et. Nag. and Suid. ἑτερόδοξος; Et. Gud. ὁ ἑτερόδοξος, αἱρετικός. Oecum. (Did.), having previously said that θρησκεία denotes something more than faith, a knowledge of secret things (κρυφίων, interprets θρησκός as “one who knows and exactly keeps the things hidden (ἀπορρήτων) in the Law.” We get more help from other glosses in Hesych. θρέξατο ἐφυλάξατο, ἐσεβάσθη; θρεσκή ἁγνή, πάντα εὐλαβουμέην; θρεσκός περιττός, δεισιδαίμων. None can come from this passage: so that they attest other lost passages, all having the idea of cautious observance of religious restrictions, sometimes spoken of with praise, sometimes with blame. This exactly answers to the proper meaning of religiosus, as of religio which is properly the gathering up of oneself in awe, and consequent scrupulousness. It thus belongs to an early stage of what we now call religion, containing indeed elements which are and must be permanent, but still as a whole narrow and immature, not including faith in God or love of God. Now this was just the; spirit of much of the later Judaism, notwithstanding its opposition to the spirit of the prophets and of much else in the O.T., and it was apparently getting the better of the Jewish Christians. Men prided themselves on a special religiousness because (as in the Gospels) they made clean the outside of the cup and of the platter and tithed mint and cummin. Thus the word, though not here used in an evil sense, is used probably in a limited sense, in the sense which these persons would use for themselves. θρησκός would be the word which they would choose to express their ideal man.
These two concluding verses of c. i. bring together the two points of Christian conduct, which he has been dwelling on since v. 19. From 19 to 21 he taught slowness to speak and so here he teaches the bridling of the tongue. From 22 to 25 he taught doing as against barren hearing: and; so here and in v. 27 he gives illustrations of rightful doing.
χαλιναγωγῶν γλῶσσαν ἑαυτοῦ, bridling his tongue] A very common figure, worked out more fully in iii. 2 ff.
ἀπατῶν καρδίαν ἑαυτοῦ, deceiving his heart] This answers to παραλογιζόμενοι ἑαυτούς in v. 22. He again, as in 20, implies that the unbridledness of tongue aimed at was one which was defended as the speech of uncompromising zeal.
μάταιος, vain, to no purpose] At once unreal in itself and ineffectual.
Cf. ματαία ἡ πίστι ὑμῶν (
θρησκεία, religion] A far commoner word than
θρησκός, and probably of wider
sense, but still a word of very limited history. It occurs twice in Herod. ii.
18, 37, both times with reference to the Egyptians, first about an abstinence
from certain flesh, and the second time (ἄλλας τε θρησκίας ἐπιτελέουσι) about
white robes, circumcision, shaving, frequent washings, etc., all cases of
personal ceremonial (so also θρησκεύω ii. 64). It is apparently absent, as also θρησκεύω, from Attic literature: but like many words found in Herod. came
into use in late days. It is doubtful whether there is any earlier instance than
this, except
27. θρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ἁμίαντος, a pure and undefiled religion] It is not ἡ καθ. καὶ ἀμ. θρ. He does not say or mean that what follows includes all that can be called pure and undefiled religion.
Why these particular words,
καθαρά and
ἁμίαντος, rather than ἀληθινήor
some such word? Because he is still keeping in view the pretension made on
behalf of the vain religion, viz. that it was pure and free from pollution. This
alone would suffice to shew that St James had chiefly in view ceremonial
θρησκεία,
the washings and purifications of late Judaism, multiplying Levitical
ordinances. These terms which you claim, he means, for your vain
θρησκεία do
really belong to something very different (
παρά] In His sight, in His presence, and so in His eyes.
τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ] The two names are probably combined with reference both to what has preceded and to what is going to follow. The false religion spoke much of God, but forgot that He was also Father. A true sense of being His children would lead to a different conception of Him and of the kind of service acceptable to Him. And again, to think of Him as Father was to think of men as brethren; a point of view forgotten in this θρησκεία which set no store on such brotherliness as is involved in the visiting of orphans and widows.
ἐπισκέπτεσθαι, to visit] The word is often used in O.T. of God visiting
individual persons or His people: but no case like this.
The word must doubtless then be taken literally: not the mere bestowal of alms,
but the personal service. The Bible represents God as specially taking thought
for the fatherless and widow, as their “father,”
ἄσπιλον, unstained] Quite a late word, apparently not extant before N.T The force of the word here is that after St James has noticed the acts of brotherly care towards orphans and widows, he returns to the claim of purity, as though to point out that there was indeed a purity and undefiledness in the strictest sense to be pursued, not from fictitious and artificial pollutions, but from a power able to infect and pollute the inward self.
ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, from the world] The use of
κόσμος here is remarkable. The word
can hardly be used neutrally here, as though St James meant only that the
κόσμος contained things that might bring moral defilement. The
κόσμος is evidently
thought of as itself defiling. The same comes out yet more strongly in
iv. 4,
and probably also in the difficult iii. 6. We are used to this language as
conventional. But it needs investigation as to its strict meaning and origin.
There is nothing of the kind in the first three Gospels or in the Acts or
(strange to say) the Apocalypse or Hebrews: very abundant in St John’s Gospel
and first Epistle; and
The conception must be Jewish: can it be traced back to the O.T.? Certainly not
the Greek word from the LXX., for there it has only the “order” or “ornament”
meanings. In the Apocr. it is the world, but not in an evil sense. In the LXX.
its place is apparently taken by οἰκουμένη,
which represents the Heb. תֵּבֵלּ, a curious ancient word, always used without the
article, meaning apparently at first the fruitful soil of the earth, and then as
a virtual synonym of “earth,” but esp. earth as the habitation of men.
Sometimes, like “world,” it is naturally transferred to the collective races of
men. Hence we get an intermediate sense in
To Jewish Christians scattered through the Empire, to the Christians of Ephesus (1 Jn), the contact with the heathen world would be a perpetual source of moral danger, and they would be tempted to all sorts of risks from trying to avoid collisions with it. Its injurious effects would be many; but their prevailing characteristic would be defilement. In St John, and perhaps to some extent here, we have the paradox of the holy people itself becoming the world, by putting on in other forms the maxims and practice of an outer world. At all events the evil is conceived of as residing not in anything physical, but in a corrupt and perverted society of men. This is probably always the true ethical sense of “world.” Thus the two clauses answer to each other in respect of the outward objects of the two forms of pure religion: the one is a duty of communication with men for good, the other a duty of avoiding such evil as comes from communication with men.
The whole verse has doubtless a paradoxical shape, though this is explained by
the latent antithesis to the spurious θρησκεία. But in any case the conception
is that of
It closes the paragraph 19-27 with a general statement as to religion, corresponding to vv. 17, 18, which form a general statement as to theology concluding the first section.
II. 1. ἀδελφοί μου] The preface being ended St James turns to the special points of practice which he had directly in view. He makes no further exordium, but breaks at once in medias res with this personal appeal, putting ἀδ. μου in the forefront. It does not occur again at the beginning of a sentence till the close (v. 19).
In what follows in this verse three points of construction require consideration:
ὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε] This is often, naturally enough, taken as an imperative: but this gives a rather tame sense, and gives no exact sense to ἐν πρ. ἔχετε, and especially to the position of ἐν πρ. as coming before ἔχετε. It is more natural to take it as an interrogative appeal to their consciences: “ Can you really think ἐν προσωποληψίαις that you are having or holding the faith etc.”
The plural -αις probably expresses “in (doing) acts of:” When words having an abstract sense are in the plural, the meaning is either different kinds (as “ambitions” = different kinds of ambition) or different concrete acts or examples. The abstract has no number strictly speaking: but a plural at once implies a number of singulars to make it up, and (apart from kinds) things concrete can alone be numbered.
προσωποληψίαις, acts of partiality] This group of words has a Hebrew origin. נָשָֹא פְנֵי, “to receive the face of,” is
much used in different books of the O.T. for receiving with favour an applicant,
whether in a good or bad sense. The exact force of the phrase is not clear.
נָשָֹא has not the strong sense “accept,” “welcome,” but rather either simply
“take” or “lift up,” and some accordingly adopt “lift up.” Against this Gesen.
Thes. 915 f. (cf. Hupfeld on
ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ κυρίου
ἡμῶν κ.τ.λ.] The two most obvious senses of the
genitive here are the subjective, the faith which our Lord Himself had, and the
objective, the faith in Him. The former is not a likely sense to be meant
without some special indication of it: the latter is not supported by any clear
parallels, and (taken thus nakedly) gives a not very relevant turn to the
sentence. The true sense is doubtless more comprehensive, and answers to an idea
widely spread in the N.T.; “which comes from Him, and depends on Him,” “the
faith which He taught, and makes possible, and bestows”: it is a faith in God,
enlarged and strengthened by the revelation of His Son; the faith in God which
specially arises out of the Gospel and rests on Him of whom the Gospel speaks.
It thus includes a faith in Christ: but this is only the first step on the way
to a surer and better faith in God. “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.”
This is the probable sense always where πίστις is followed by
Ἰησοῦ or
similar words. Even
τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν] It is impossible to determine precisely how much meaning St James put into these words. But they do not differ from St Paul’s formula, and probably to say the least go much beyond what the disciples meant by κύριος in the days of the ministry. They must be taken with i. 1.
τῆς δόξης, who is the Glory] Δόξης is very difficult in this position. Some take it with πίστιν, changing the meaning of πίστιν: Have ye the faith in respect of glory? equivalent to, Do ye take the same view of true glory and dignity? This gives a fair sense; but imports an unnatural force into πίστιν, and leaves the transposition of τ. δόξης inexplicable, besides disturbing the connexion between τ. πίστιν and τ. κυρίου etc. The other interpretations, “faith in the glory,” “glorious faith,” are evidently impossible.
Another favourite way is to take it with τ. κυρίου (so A.V.). The possibility of
two genitives, ἡμῶν and τ. δόξης, cannot be denied:
so in
It is needless to examine the combination with Χριστοῦ, or with the whole phrase τ. κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χ.
There remains the possibility of not taking it as directly dependent on any
preceding words, but in apposition to Ἰ. Χ., “our Lord Jesus Christ,
who is the
Glory”: so Bengel. Several passages of the Epistles give a partial confirmation.
But was there anything to lead to such a representation? The O. T. speaks much of the כָּבוֹד of the Lord. From this and from the late dread of connecting God too closely with lower things arose the Jewish conceptions of the Glory יְקָרָא, and the Shechinah. See Weber 160 on the Glory as in Heaven; 179 ff. on the Glory and the Shechinah, and the relation of the Shechinah to the Word in the Targums (cf. Westcott, Introd.6 152); and 182 ff. the combination of both conceptions (Word and Shechinah) in the Shechinah in Talmud and Midrash. Now the Word of the Targums is the true antecedent of the Logos in St John, much more so than the Logos of Philo; and it would be only natural that the other great conception which linked God to men, that of the Glory, should be transferred to Christ as the true fulfiller of it.
The force then of the title here would probably be that the faith of Christ as
the Glory was peculiarly at variance with this favouritism shewn to the rich:
since He who represented the very majesty of heaven
2. εἰς συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν, into your
(place of) assembly] The word means either the assembly or the building which
held the assembly, and either makes sense: in
Two subjects of historical interest, the thing and the word, demand notice. As
regards the thing synagogue see Plumptre in Smith’s Dict.; Schürer ii. § 27. The
date when the synagogue-system arose is unknown. It is remarkable that there are
no clear traces of it in the Apocrypha; yet probably there is a reference in
The name “synagogue.” The origin is doubtless the LXX., but in a confused way.
There are two chief words in O.T. (cf. Schürer l.c. [and Hort, Christian
Ecclesia]) for kindred meanings, קָהָל, “congregation,” and
עֵדָה, “assembly”:
in this sense
עֵדָה is almost always rendered συναγωγή,
קָהָל ἐκκλησία about
70 times, συναγωγή about half as many, other words very
rarely. Probably ἐκκλησία was, chosen for קָהָל, because both words express the
calling or summoning of a public assembly (convocation) by a herald. Both
עֵדָה and συναγωγή are somewhat more general words. But the difference in usage was
very slight. They stand side by side in
Now, as far as evidence goes, the Christian usage was to adopt ἐκκλησία both for
single congregations and for a whole community. For the building it is not used
in the apostolic age, though it was afterwards. On the other hand the Christian
use of συναγωγή
is very limited: see a long note in Harnack Hermas
χρυσοδακτύλιος] Not known elsewhere. The adjective was doubtless chosen to express that the wearing of gold rings, probably a multitude of them (τῶν δακτυλίων πλῆθος ἔχων, Luc. Nigr. xiii.), was characteristic of the kind of man.
ἐσθῆτι λαμπρᾷ contrasted with ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῆτι] The two words are strictly opposed, as often; practically new glossy clothes and old shabby clothes. Λαμπρός has nothing to do with brilliance of colour, being in fact often used of white robes. Artemidorus (ii. 3 s. fin.), after enumerating the omens from garments of all sorts of colours, concludes ἀεὶ δὲ ἄμεινον καθαρὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ ἱμάτια ἔχειν καὶ πεπλυμένα καλῶς ἢ ῥυπαρὰ καὶ ἄπλυτα, πλὴν τῶν τὰς ῥυπώδεις ἐργασίας ἐργαζομένων.
3. ἐπιβλέψητε δὲ ἐπὶ, and ye look with favour on] Ἐπιβλέπω ἐπί is often used in LXX. of God looking with favour on men; not apparently of men on men. But Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iv. 2, p. 1120 b 6) says (in giving) τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου, to pay no regard to oneself and one’s own interest.
καλῶς, in a good place] Ael. V. H. ii. 13, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν καλῷ τ. θεάτρου ἐκάθητο; xiii. 22, Ptolemy having built a temple for Homer αὐτὸν μὲν καλὸν καλῶς ἐκάθισε, κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς πόλεις περιέστησε τ. ἀγάλματος.
στῆθι ἢ κάθου] It is uncertain whether to read στῆθι ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον (B ff), or στῆθι ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον. Probably the former, notwithstanding the want of verbal balance. Stand anywhere contrasted with sit in a particular humble place.
ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου, below my foot-stool] Ὑπό might be “down against,” i.e. close up to, with the accessory sense of lowness. But more probably “below” in the sense of in a lower place, as Plutarch Artax. v. (i. 1013 E) καθεζομένων τῆς μὲν ὑπ᾽ αὐτόν, τῆς δὲ μητρὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτόν.
4οὐ διεκρίθητε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἐγένεσθε
κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν
4. No καὶ before οὐ; perhaps omit οὐ (B* ff) which gives the same sense, substituting affirmation for question.
διεκρίθητε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, divided in your own minds] As
i. 6; explained by
κριταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν, judges swayed by evil deliberations] The genitive
is not unlike i. 25. The idea seems to be “judges swayed by evil deliberations
or thinkings”: contrast
5. ἀκούσατε, hearken] An imperative like ἴστε
in i. 19, but with a sharper tone,
as of a warning prophet: cf. especially
οὐχ ὁ θεὸς ἐξελέξατο, did not God choose] What choice by God is meant here? In
our Lord’s apocalyptic discourse
St James does not however refer directly to Christians but to the poor. The
reference is doubtless to the special manner in which Christ’s own preaching was
addressed to the poor. The Gospel was not intended to be confined to them; but
they were to be its first and its strictly primary recipients, the recipients
who would
τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ, the poor in the eyes of the world]
Τῷ κόσμῳ might be
taken as “in relation to the world”: but more probably ‘in the eyes of “the
world”’ (cf.
πλουσίους ἐν πίστει, to be
rich in virtue of faith] Not “as being,” but “to
be” expressed more explicitly in
The meaning is not “abounding in faith,” which would weaken
the force of πλουσίους in this connexion, but “rich in virtue of faith”: their faith of
itself constituted them not only powerful, able to move mountains, but rich: see
κληρονόμους τῆς βασιλείας, heirs of the kingdom] The kingdom of heaven is what
in the Sermon on the Mount is especially pronounced to belong to the poor. The
Gospel preached to them is the Gospel of the kingdom. In
ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν
αὐτόν, which He promised to them that love Him]
This corresponds exactly to the use of the same phrase with τὸν στέφανον τ. ζωῆς
in i. 12. Even with that peculiar phrase derivation from the Apocalypse was
seen to be unlikely: much more this commoner phrase from
6. ὑμεῖς δὲ] in the strongest contrast.
ἡτιμάσατε] Sc. in that act. Not merely failed to give him honour, but treated
him with dishonour. So
οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι, do not the rich] What follows shews that rich men not Christians are meant. But this does not force us to take the rich and poor of v. 2 as other than Christians. Within the Christian body there were both classes: but further the whole body was bound to regard itself emphatically as a band of poor men in the face of the wealth and power of the encompassing heathen or even Jewish world. The whole passage reminds us that the name Ebionites for the Jewish Christians of Palestine has nothing to do with an imaginary Ebion, but is simply the Ebionim, the Poor Men.
καταδυναστεύουσιν
ὑμῶν, oppress you] Δυναστεύω is to “be a potentate,” “have” or “exercise mastery,” either absolutely or over some one in particular:
sometimes in a neutral sense, sometimes with a bad sense “lord it over.”
Καταδυναστεύω expresses the same more strongly, violent exercise of mastery,
tyranny. It occurs in Xen. and often in late Greek: much in LXX., chiefly for
יָנָה, to oppress; as the poor
καὶ αὐτοὶ ἕλκουσιν ὑμᾶς,
and are not they the men that drag you] Not “drag you in person,” as is shewn by
v. 7. The pretext of law covered violent
usage: cf. σύρω
εἰς κριτήρια, into courts of justice] Here the meaning can hardly be “suits,” though κριτήρια may mean this. Better, as sometimes, courts of justice, though we should have expected ἐπί rather than εἰς.
It can hardly be doubted that this means judicial persecutions, whether formally on the ground of being Christians, we cannot tell for that time. No definite law against Christians is likely to have then existed. But if they had become objects of dislike, it was easy to find legal pretexts.
7οὐκ αὐτοι βλασφημοῦσιν τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα τὸ ἐπικληθέν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς;
7. οὐκ αὐτοι βλασφημοῦσιν, are not they the men who abuse]
Βλασφημέω
carries with it nothing of our sense of “blaspheme” as containing some extreme
irreverence towards God. It is simply abusive and scurrilous language whether
directed against God or men. Very rare in LXX. It comes here from
τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα, the honourable name] Worthy of admiration, not contempt and contumely. Καλός is what is good as seen, as making a direct impression on those who come in contact with it; contrast ἀγαθός which is good in result.
τὸ ἐπικληθέν ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, by the which ye are called] From the LXX.
of
What name does he mean? Probably Χριστός or
Χριστιανός, as
8. μέντοι, indeed, really] Not an easy use of this particle, which occurs Jn
five times;
τελεῖτε, fulfil]
As
νόμον . . . βασιλικόν, a royal law] The order shews that either
βασιλικόν is
accessory (“a law, a royal law”), or has a special force, a law
which well deserves to be called “royal.” But in what sense royal? Probably not
in the vague figurative sense common in Greek to denote anything specially high
or worthy (sometimes βασιλικὸς καὶ θεῖος); nor again in the Greek application to
laws, perhaps starting from Pindar’s famous
νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς (on which
see Thompson Gorg. 484 B), of which the most interesting for our purpose are in
Xen. Oec. xiv. 6 f. and Ps.-Plat. 317 C. Probably one of two senses, either fit
to guide a king, a law such as a true king would take for his own government as
There is no difficulty in thus applying so wide a term as
νόμος to a single
precept, since the precept itself was so comprehensive. Thus in
κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, according to the Scripture]
Doubtless the O.T. (
καλῶς ποιεῖτε, ye do well] This has no sarcasm, as some suppose: simply “ye do well” (cf.
v. 19;
9εἰ δὲ προσωποληπτεῖτε, ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε, ἐλεγχόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὡς παραβάται.
9. προσωποληπτεῖτε, ye have respect of persons] Apparently ἅπαξ λεγόμενον.
ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε] A strong phrase, which must mean more than “ye commit sin.”
Probably a reminiscence of
ἐλεγχόμενοι, convicted, shewn to be guilty.
τοῦ νόμου] The definite concrete law of Moses.
παραβάται, transgressors] Cf.
10Ὅστις γὰρ ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσῃ, πταίσῃ δὲ ἐν ἑνί, γέγονεν πάντων ἔνοχος.
10. ὅλον τὸν νόμον τηρήσῃ, keep the whole law] The subjunctives
τηρήσῃ . . . πταίσῃ are certainly right according to the best MSS. It is the only quite
certain N. T. example of ὅστις or
ὅς with subjunctive without ἄν, though it
has some good authority in
This is probably said with reference to the plea that the whole Law had been
observed. The verse seems to be a reminiscence of our Lord’s answer,
τηρήσῃ] No longer τελέσῃ. The more formal word is appropriate here.
πταίσῃ, trip or stumble] As
iii. 2 bis. It is
incipient falling (
γέγονεν πάντων, is become (makes himself) guilty of all] Ἔνοχος is used with genitive or dative of crimes, or punishments, or, as here, precepts. Properly speaking it means simply “bound by,” “subject to,” “coming under.”
The force of πάντων is determined by ἑνί: it is all separate points or items that make up the Law.
Various Jewish writings contain sayings like this verse (Schöttg. 1016 ff.); as
Shabbath (R. Jochanan): “If a man do all (of the 39 works prescribed by Moses),
but omit one, he is guilty for all and each.” There is nothing in the O. T.
exactly answering to this: but
11. ὁ γὰρ εἰπών κ.τ.λ.] It is very unlikely that the two commandments are
chosen at random, as though both were unconnected with προσωπολημψία. If
this were the case, there would be no clear and coherent course of thought. It
is quite possible that Μὴ μοιχεύσῃς implies that such sins as adultery were
really avoided and condemned by those who dishonoured the poor; and that they
made their condemnation of fleshly sins an excuse for indulgence towards
spiritual sins. At all events Μὴ φονεύσεις is directly connected with the
matter in hand, because murder is only the extreme outcome of want of love to
neighbours or brethren. Our Lord (
12οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας μέλλοντες κρίνεσθαι.
12. οὕτως λαλεῖτε καὶ οὕτως ποιεῖτε, so speak ye, and so do] The two chief spheres of shewing forth love or its absence. We have had them paired already in i. 19-21 contrasted with 22-25, i. 26 contrasted with 27; and are now going to have them on a larger scale, in inverted order, ii. 14-26 contrasted with iii. 1-12. Both are exemplified in the treatment of the poor in the synagogues, the contemptuous language accompanying the loveless acts.
ὡς διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας, as by a law of liberty] This use of
διὰ with κρίνεσθαι is
singular, though disguised by the ambiguity of “by,” which denotes κατά with
acc., or ὑπό with gen. (cf.
A law of liberty, exactly as i. 25: viz. Christ’s Law, as distinguished from the
Mosaic. The transition from the Mosaic Law in vv. 10,
11 to the Christian Law
here corresponds precisely to the transition in the Sermon on the Mount from the
one jot or tittle, one of these least commandments of
The whole passage implies that under the unity of the external law there lies a much deeper unity of the spiritual law. If the whole external law was broken by the murderous conduct of a man who kept himself clean from adultery, much more was wrong done to the whole spiritual and free law of love by the attempt to keep any part of conduct exempt from it.
13ἡ γὰρ κρίσις ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος· κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεον κρίσεως.
13. ἡ γὰρ κρίσις] To be interpreted by κρίνεσθαι: the Divine judgment: cf. v. 9.
ἀνέλεος τῷ μὴ ποιήσαντι ἔλεος, without mercy to him that
hath shewed no mercy] The requital is in kind, cf.
κατακαυχᾶται, glorieth against] This is the true as well as the common reading: another ancient reading is κατακαυχάσθω, and another, less attested, κατακαυχᾶσθε. The abrupt introduction of this apophthegm gave rise to various conjunctions, δέ the best attested, also (T. R.) καὶ, also quoniam or “for.”
The verb itself recurs iii. 14, and is found
There is a somewhat similar use of
καυχῶμαι (not κατακαυχ.) in
It is however probable that in so far as St James contemplates this sense of the
defying of judgment by mercy, it is only as a particular case of a universal
truth. That is, he may mean that this final triumph of mercy proceeds from the
previous and inherent superiority of mercy to
κρίσις, human as well as Divine,
answering to the superiority of mercy to sacrifice (
Unless this sense is present, it is difficult to account for the absence of δέ. Since there is no conjunction, this clause can hardly be merely antithetical to the preceding, but must supply its foundation: the quoniam gives the truer connexion, though not the whole of it.
14Τί ὄφελος, ἀδελφοί μου, ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις ἔχειν ἔργα δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ; μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν;
14. We now come to the section on faith and works.
ἀδελφοί μου] Marking a fresh appeal, though closely connected with what precedes.
ἐὰν πίστιν λέγῃ τις
ἔχειν, if a man say he
hath faith] We have already had (i. 22 ff.) hearing without doing: here we have believing without doing. We have
also had a spurious θρησκεία: here we have a spurious
πίστις. The profession
of a πίστις has been already presumed in
ii. 1, where St James implies that the
true faith of Jesus Christ was absent or defective. Our Lord in St Luke’s
account of the explanation of the Parable of the Sower (
It is to be observed that here at least St James does not say ἐὰν πίστιν ἔχῃ τις but ἐ. π. λέγῃ τις ἔχειν: it is not faith without works but the profession of faith without works that thus far is pronounced unprofitable.
There is no reason for referring this spurious claim to faith to a Jewish
origin. There is no clear evidence for anything answering to it among the Jews.
It would on the other hand be a natural accompaniment of a slackening Christian
devotion.
ἡ πίστις] Naturally “the faith,” “that faith,” the faith which is compatible with the absence of works. The phrase doubtless implies that there was something to which the name might in some sense be given; though it is not what St James recognises as genuine faith.
σῶσαι] As i. 21.
15ἐὰν ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ γυμνοὶ ὑπάρχωσιν καὶ λειπόμενοι τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς,
15. This verse shews the connexion with what precedes. The examples of deficient works to which St James at once flies are taken from the treatment of the poor, quite as much as all that has been said about places in the synagogues.
ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ] The explicit notice of both sexes brings out two degrees, as it were, in the helplessness which craved the sympathy and support of Christians. The women, as in the special example of the widows in i. 27, would have all the needs and difficulties of the men, and the additional needs and difficulties falling naturally to their sex, especially in ancient times.
The term “brother” “sister,” repeated from
i. 9, calls attention to the special
ties between those who by believing in the Son had acquired a closer and deeper
tie of brotherhood as alike children of the Father. There was a true sense in
which it was applied to all mankind: but in those days when the little
community was surrounded by a more or less hostile population, the specially
Christian sense had peculiar force. Christ too had in this connexion spoken of
His own brethren,
γυμνοί, naked] In the conventional sense of Scripture, as needing clothing, corresponding to the next phrase on the need of food.
ὑπάρχωσιν] Ὑπάρχω denotes not simple being, but being in a state or condition as distinguished from what is temporary or accidental: it is used properly with reference to antecedent states. Often it means what one is by nature: but that specially strong force comes from the context. The prior continuity is the main thing. Hence what is implied here is that not some casual poverty but habitual poverty is meant.
λειπόμενοι, in lack of] With the gen. just as in i. 5. In this sense of outward destitution Just. Mart. uses it absolutely. Ap. i. 67, οἱ ἔχοντες τοῖς λειπομένοις πᾶσιν ἐπικουροῦμεν; and again, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφανοῖς τε καὶ χήραις, καὶ τοῖς διὰ νόσον ἢ δι᾽ ἄλλην αἰτίαν λειπομένοις.
Omit ὦσιν after λειπόμενοι; the participle instead of λείπωνται continues the indication of ὑπάρχωσιν, expressing a habitual condition, not an accidental want of food.
τῆς ἐφημέρου τροφῆς] Simply the food needed day by day, daily food.
16. εἴπῃ δέ τις αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὑμῶν] He first begins indefinitely, “if a man say to them,” and then after
αὐτοῖς adds ἐξ ὑμῶν, implying that such a speech would really be the speech
Ὑπάγετε ἐν ειρήνῃ, Go in peace] A common Jewish farewell (
θερμαίνεσθε καὶ χορτάζεσθε, be ye warmed and filled] These words are usually
taken as imperatives. Plumptre ingeniously suggests that they are indicatives;
the unreal assertion that the poor are warmed and fed being a repetition of the
unreal assertion that they had faith when they shewed such a lack of love. But
it is difficult to get this sense out of the words as actually put into the
mouth of the speaker, not as another’s description of his act. We must therefore
keep to the imperative sense. It is not a mere substitution for the optative, “I
hope you may somehow get warmed and fed,” but an exhortation to go and get for
themselves the means of doing this. It reminds us to a certain extent of “Send
the multitude away that they may buy for themselves victuals” (
θερμαίνω, χορτάζω. Two strong words seem to be purposely chosen. “Warming”
(Heb. and LXX.) is spoken of as an effect of clothes:
χορτάζω, originally of pasturing cattle, is used in late Greek of feeding men: but usually, perhaps always, with the sense of feeding to the full, satisfying.
Thus the warm garments and satisfying food correspond to ἐν εἰρήνῃ.
μὴ δῶτε δὲ, and yet ye give not] Transition to the full plural. Though one alone might be ready to speak the words, the general line of conduct was common to a large number.
τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τοῦ σώματος, the things needful to the body] Ἐπιτήδειος is properly what is convenient or fitting, useful. But τὰ ἐπιτήδ. by usage are ordinary necessaries, sometimes called τὰ ἀνάγκαια ἐπιτήδεια.
τοῦ σώματος has force in relation to the following comparison (οὕτως καὶ). It is an appeal to an example from the obvious realm “of the body.”
17οὕτως καὶ ἡ πίστις, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ ἔργα, νεκρά ἐστιν καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν.
17. οὕτως καὶ, even so] What is the precise comparison? i.e. what is it that in
vv. 15, 16 is compared to faith as being liable to be dead? The result spoken of
is that the body is, as a matter of fact, chilled and starved if it has not
necessaries. Presently, in v. 26, St James says, in a similar comparison about
the deadness of faith without works, that the body without spirit is dead. One
is tempted to assume that he meant the love or beneficence is dead if it
contents itself with words. But there would be no real image there, merely a
repetition of the dead faith in a particular application. Moreover τί ὄφελος
points not to the unreality of the beneficence but to the absence of result in
the way of starvation
ἔχῃ ἔργα, have works] A remarkable phrase, but very expressive of St James’ true meaning. The works are not something added on to the faith, but elements of it, parts of itself.
νεκρά ἐστιν, is dead] Again the same, not merely “useless” or “unacceptable” but “dead.” It is no question of faith v. works, but whether faith is faith if it has no works.
καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, in itself] This brings out the same yet more emphatically, “in and by itself,” not merely in relation to other things, not merely in its utility, so to speak; but in its own very and inherent nature.
18. ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις, But some one will say] An extremely difficult verse, The
natural way of taking ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις is as the words of an objector, and then it
is difficult to see how the next words could be put into an objector’s mouth. It
is then suggested that the τις is virtually St James himself, like “so that a
man shall say etc.” (
Not only the most natural but the only natural way to understand ἀλλ᾽ ἐρεῖ τις
is as introducing an objector, one of the persons rebuked (τις . . . ἐξ ὑμῶν), as in
A very fair and, to say the least, not improbable sense may then be obtained by
taking Σύ to ἔχω alone as put into the objector’s mouth, the rest of the verse
being taken as St James’ own reply; and further by taking
Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις by
itself as a question. Questions of this kind are very common in St James, and
19
is best so interpreted. The sense will then be “Thou, James, hast thou faith,
that thing which thou slightest in me? I for my part as well as thou (κἀγώ)
have works”; that is, “I do not allow
19. σὺ πιστεύεις, thou believest, dost thou not?] The sense is not very different whether we take it as indicative or interrogative: but interrogative is more forcible.
ὅτι εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν, that there is (exists)
one God] MSS. much divided. The best
attested readings are εἶς θεὸς ἔστιν and
εἶς ὁ θεὸς ἔστιν (or, inverted, in the
common form, εἶς ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς). The second (and third) would mean “that God is
one.’ Cf.
καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια πιστεύουσιν, the devils also believe this] Καὶ is of course not “and” but “also,” they as well as thou.
πιστεύουσιν] Sc. this, believe that this is true.
τὰ δαιμόνια] Here as in the Gospels we must not think simply of “powers of
evil,” as such, but of the πνεύματα πονηρά or ἀκάθαρτα by which those called
demoniacs were possessed. The reference is probably to the Gospel narratives,
“What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art thou come to destroy us?
We know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God” (
φρίσσουσιν, shudder] Properly the same as the Latin
horror, the standing of
hair on end with fear. Specially used of awe of a mysterious Divine power, as
often of the adepts in the Greek mysteries. Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 251 A,
πρῶτον μὲν ἔφριξε καὶ τι τῶν τότε
ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν
ὡς θεὸν σέβεται. It is something at once more distant and more prostrate than worship.
Cf. Ast on the above p. 449 and Wytt. on Plut. ii. 26B. An Orphic fragment
quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. v. 724 and Euseb. P.E. xiii. 13 (Hermann pp. 453 f.)
on God:
and a magical invocation (Ὀνειροπομπὸς Ἀγαθοκλεῦς (sic) in A. Dieterich Papyrus magica Mus. Lugd. Bat. p. 800: Lips. 1888), Θώθ, ὅν πᾶς θεὸς προσκυνεῖ καὶ πᾶς δαίμων φρίσσει. There is thus no force of “and yet” in καί before φρ.: it is rather “their belief” is so strong and undeniable that it ends in a kind of strong homage. It is a proof that they believe, not something done in spite of it.
Thus the force of the clause lies on the word δαιμόνια (cf. δαιμονιώδης iii. 15). A belief such as this, even though its contents are so true and important as a belief in One God, cannot be a very Divine thing when it can be shared by the δαιμόνια.
The whole then turns on the real nature of the belief or faith supposed, and Bede seems to have understood it rightly, when, taking up language of Augustine, he says: “Sed nec Deum credere et contremiscere magnum est, si non et in eum credatur, hoc est si non ejus in corde amor teneatur. Aliud est enim credere illi, aliud credere illum, aliud credere in illum. Credere illi est credere vera esse quae loquitur: credere illum credere quod ipse sit Deus: credere in ilium est diligere illum. Credere vera esse quae loquitur multi et mali possunt, credunt enim esse vera, et nolunt ea facere, quia ad operandum pigri sunt. Credere autem ipsum esse Deum, hoc et daemones potuerunt. Credere vero in Deum soli novere qui diligunt Deum, qui non solo nomine sunt Christiani sed et factis et vita.” (For reff. to Aug. see Pearson Creed p. 16.)
20θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων ἀργή ἐστιν;
20. θέλεις δὲ γνῶναι, but wilt thou gain the knowledge] He is now going to prove his point by reference to Scripture. The words are equivalent to “Do you ask me what proof I have that . . .”
ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, O vain man] Ἄνθρωπε probably in contrast to δαιμόνια, a being who shouldest have such a much better faith than δαιμόνια.
Κενός (by itself) is not at all common as applied to men: it denotes
pretentiousness, hollowness accompanying display. Thus Epictet. ii. 19. 8, “But
if I am κενός,
especially at a banquet, I astonish the visitors by enumerating the writers (on
a particular subject)”; iv. 4. 35, κενόν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς οὑ δεῖ ἐπαιρόμενον. Plutarch
Sertor. xxvi. (581 F), “to despise Mallius
ὡς κενοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνος; Moral. 81 B, agriculturalists like to see ears of corn
bending down, but those that are lifted by lightness
κενοὺς ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἀλαζόνας;
and so of youths intending to philosophise, those who are most κενοί
and deficient in βάρος θράσος ἔχουσι, and a gait and walk and countenance full
of scorn and contempt. The use of ἄνδρας κενούς (lit. empty) in
ὅτι ἡ πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων] Probably as before (v. 18) this faith separated from the works belonging to it.
ἀργή, worthless] So best MSS., not
νεκρά, which comes from
v. 26;
ἀργός is
worthless, i.e. either not working, idle,
21Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἀνενέγκας Ἰσαὰκ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ το θυσιαστήριον;
21. St James comes now to his examples to prove his point.
Αβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν] These words stand first,
before οὐκ, in the sense “Take
Abraham our father for instance, was not he,” etc. “Abraham our father” in a
combination of senses, as the father of the old Israel (
οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων] The words do not express whether he means that works had a share in it, or that works alone were concerned: but the former sense alone can be reconciled either with the general argument or with the quotation in v. 23.
ἐδικαιώθη] This word is manifestly to be interpreted in the first instance by
its O.T. usages. The active voice δικαιόω represents the Piel and Hiphil of צָדַק
both causative, to cause to be צַדִּיק (δίκαιος),
just as δικαιόω) as applied
ethically to persons is properly to make δίκαιος.
The passive voice δεκαιοῦσθαι
is one of the representatives of the Kal of the same verb, to be צַדִּיק
or δίκαιος, a word chiefly though not exclusively used in Job (see especially
Leaving then for the present St Paul out of sight, that we may not disturb St James’ argument, we have naturally here the sense “Did not Abraham appear righteous in God’s sight on the ground of works?”
ἀνενέγκας κ.τ.λ.] From a combination of
22βλέπεις ὅτι ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη,
22. βλέπεις, thou perceivest] It is
ἡ πίστις, the faith] Sc. in this case: the faith in antithesis to the works was not separate from them but wrought with them.
συνήργει, worked with] A bold image. The faith not only was followed or accompanied by works — that is expressed in τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ — but itself worked with his works. Not for faith plus works does St James plead, but for faith at work, living, acting in itself, apart from any value in its results; συνήργέω is properly to be a συνήργός: not used in LXX., but twice in Apocr. and in four other places of the N.T.
καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and by the works] Ἐκ as before, in consequence of, by effects proceeding from.
ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη, the faith was made perfect] So long as the faith was not exercised, it was in a manner imperfect. It gained maturity and completeness by being thoroughly acted out. This is the only place where St James uses this verb (common in N.T., especially Jn, 1 Jn, Heb.), but τέλειος, as we have seen, he has five times, and this nearly answers to ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω in i. 4. It is to be observed that the two clauses are exactly complementary to each other. The works received the co-operation of a living power from the faith: the faith received perfecting and consummation from the works into which it grew.
23. καί ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφὴ ἡ λέγουσα, and there was a fulfilment of the Scripture which saith] The usual
phrase, as
The passage
καὶ φίλος θεοῦ
ἐκλήθη, and (so) he was called the friend of God] Probably the meaning is that this was another result of the faith which be shewed
in the sacrifice of Isaac, the first result being the fulfilling of the words
spoken of him with reference to an earlier exhibition of faith. The reference
itself is doubtless mainly, if not wholly, to
It is very doubtful whether the name is etymological, though a writer against the Jews called Molon, cited by Alex. Polyhistor ap. Euseb. P. E. 9. 19, p. 420, says, ὃν δὴ μεθερμηνεύεσθαι Πατρὸς φίλον; and Rönsch argues that ח being changed into ה, רַחַם represents φίλος, though more properly “one on whom God had mercy.”
24ὁρᾶτε ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον.
24. ὁρᾶτε, ye see] St James now turns from the “empty man” to the brethren whom he was previously addressing. Τοίνυν is spurious. Elsewhere in the N.T. ὁρᾶτε is always imperative, but in the sense “see to it,” “beware,” which will not do here. It is not likely to be used in the sense “take note,” “observe,” so that the indic. is the most natural. The sense must be “ye see by this example of Abraham”: otherwise ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ has no force.
ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται] The same phrase as in v. 21: but here the important explanatory clause is added, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον; shewing that with him it was no question of faith contrasted with works, but of faith without works contrasted with faith with works: the faith as a ground of justification is assumed as a starting point.
25. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ] This introduces another example, not needing such full
exposition. Abraham the father of the Jewish people was the first; now St James
cites a heathen, a Canaanitess, as a type of the other branch of Israelites and
of Christians, the proselyte Jews, the Gentile Christians; nay the first of all
proselytes, for her act took place at the very entrance into the Promised Land.
In doing this, St James doubtless was building on a Jewish traditional view.
Setting aside
The precise purpose of adding ἡ πόρνη (added also in Heb.) is not clear. Perhaps her occupation is meant to point to her heathen origin, and as marking the extreme form of a faith which was due to a change or conversion, not part of an orderly and continuous growth, as in Abraham or Samuel.
οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη] The force of this lies in what is implied, that
ὑποδεξαμένη, hospitably entertained.
τοὺς ἀγγέλους] Called
κατασκόπους in Heb., and
τοὺς κατασκοπεύσαντας
ἑτέρᾳ ὁδῷ] Probably no more than “different different from the way by which they came.”
ἐκβαλοῦσα, dismissed them] So probably. The word is a stronger one than we should expect to find used, but the
same thing happens in other places of the N.T., as
26ὥσπερ
26. γὰρ is very doubtful: some authority for δέ: but no conjunction most likely. It is a general summing up, not standing in very near relation to v. 25, but referring alike to the whole passage from v. 14.
χωρὶς πνεύματος, separated from (the) spirit] Not spirit in the higher sense, but simply the breath of life. The body with the breath in it has all the difference from the body out of which the breath has departed that life has from death, although externally the body is nearly the same. So too the same contents of faith, that there is one God, or to go on to all that is contained in ii. 1, the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ the Glory, is a dead thing if it is separated from works, in other words, from active energy. The paradox must be intentional. The opposite is what most would be tempted to say: but it would be only superficially true. True faith is a faith that aims at work and motion; false faith is virtually a corpse. He uses νεκρά here where he had said ἀργή before. The idea is much the same, but νεκρά expresses it by a strong image.
Now as regards the relation of this section to St Paul, the examples cited are certainly not enough to imply that St Paul had already written. St Paul mentions Abraham: but who could do otherwise in speaking of faith? St Paul does not mention Rahab; and though the Pauline author of Heb. does, it is not in connexion with justification or with any controversial purpose but simply as one of a series of examples of faith. It is remarkable that Philo, de nobil. 5 (ii. 442), first speaks strongly of Abraham (διὸ καὶ πιστεῦσαι λέγεται τῷ θεῷ πρῶτος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρῶτος ἀκλινῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἔσχεν ὑπόληψιν, ὡσ ἔστιν ἕν αἴτιον τὸ ἀνωτάτω καὶ προνοεῖ τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ), and then proceeds Ταύτην τὴν εὐγένειαν οὐ μόνον θεοφιλεῖς ἄνδρες ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες ἐζήλωσαν, and then gives as an instance Tamar, who appears in Mt. with Rahab, using language that might be applied at once to Rahab, how she was an inhabitant of Palestine, a woman brought up in a city full of many gods, full of images etc.: and then how out of deep darkness she was able to see a little dawn of light, and how she waxed strong unto piety, little heeding life if she were not to live nobly. Thus both examples might come quite naturally to St James simply from his Jewish education.
But the phrase ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, taken in its juxtaposition
to faith, is very hard to explain without reference to St Paul. There is no real
evidence for any similar Jewish language. Justification is not part of St
James’
III. 1Μὴ πολλοὶ διδάσκαλοι γίνεσθε, ἀδελφοί μου, εἰδότες ὅτι μεῖζον κρίμα ληψόμεθα·
III. 1. St James takes up now a fresh point: wrong speech after wrong action.
μὴ πολλοὶ διδάσκαλοι, not many teachers] There is no need to correct to
πολυδιδάσκαλοι or otherwise. The phrase
is peculiar, but forcible and clear enough as interpreted by the context and by
vv. 13 ff. It is assumed that for the good of the community there should be
teachers, discharging a special function for the rest (
The context would allow
διδάσκαλοι to be used vaguely, as if ordinary social
censoriousness were intended. But it is hardly likely that this word would have
been chosen except with reference to actual public teaching. The sense is
illustrated by the whole of
This precise tendency has no distinct echo in the Gospels, except the warning
against idle words.
ἀδελφοί μου] This again introduces a fresh point, softening off at the outset the sharpness of what St James had to say.
εἰδότες] Not “taking note,” “observing,” but “knowing as ye already do.”
μεῖζον κρίμα ληψόμεθα, shall receive greater judgment] The word of Christ on
idle words (
κρίμα ληψόμεθα] This phrase occurs in a different context
2. πολλὰ γὰρ πταίομεν ἄπαντες, For in many things we all stumble] Πταίω as before (ii. 10).
πολλὰ] Lies between πολύ
and πολλάκις: it is “much” with the idea of
plurality and repetition introduced: so
ἄπαντες] “one and all.”
εἴ τις ἐν λόγῳ οὐ πταίει, If any stumbleth not in speech]
Not μή but οὐ, =
“succeeds in escaping stumbling,” the two words being taken together. For the
phrase cf.
The previous sentence spoke of moral stumbling of any kind. Here it becomes narrowed to speech: stumbling in speech is peculiarly easy and common: but the misuse of speech in pride and bitterness of teachership is something much worse than ordinary stumbling in speech. Here then St James drops for a while the subject begun in v. 1, to be taken up again in 13-18. The vicious teachership suggested to him the vicious use of the tongue in general, and so he launches out into this wider subject.
τέλειος ἀνήρ, a perfect man] The adjective as before,
consecrated by
δυνατὸς χαλιναγωγῆσαι καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, able to bridle the whole body also] The force of καὶ is that his stumbling not in speech arises from his bridling his tongue; and that a man who can bridle his tongue can also bridle his whole body. This may be in two senses, that the tongue is so difficult to bridle that it is an easier thing to bridle the whole body, and that in the bridling of the tongue the bridling of the body is virtually accomplished at the same time. The comparison to the horses’ bridle in v. 3 and to the rudder in v. 4 and the whole language of 6 prevent the exclusion of the second sense, while the form of this sentence rather suggests the first. Probably St James meant both senses to be included.
The bridling of the tongue (already named i. 26) is naturally one of the
commonest of images in various languages: but it is especially associated with
μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐν γλώσσῃ
in
3. εἰ δὲ] True reading, not ἰδέ
(or
τῶν ἵππων] Put first because horses are the direct subjects of comparison with τέλειος ἀνήρ: it thus is equivalent to “in the case of horses” though of course governed not only by τα στόματα but also by τοὺς χαλινοὺς: the mouths are the part of the horses into which we put the bits by which we mean to restrain them. This accounts for the two articles.
εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι (not πρός), to make them obey us] St James doubtless means to express not merely result but purpose. The reason why the phrase is introduced is probably because St James is thinking how far control of the tongue goes towards producing control of the whole body.
μετάγομεν, we turn about] Μετάγω as commonly used means to “transfer” or “transport” in a strong sense, as prisoners to a strange land, or the power of government from one class to another. It is also used of turning men to a better mind (still transference) Plut. ii. 225 F; Epict. Ench. xxxiii. 3. Apparently here simply in the sense of leading not from one place to another but from one direction to another, though it is not satisfactory to have no clear authority for it. Lexicons and commentaries pass the point over.
4. The example of the ships and rudders comes in by way of addition, apparently as suggested by the last words of v. 3.
τηλικαῦτα ὄντα καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνέμων σκληρῶν ἐλαυνόμενα, though they are so great, and though they are driven by rough winds] This is the most natural construction according to the form of the sentence. On the other hand it is somewhat singular that the size and the driving by winds, which would not be always rough, are coupled together; and it is possible that καὶ means not “and” but “even,” “the ships, great as they are, even when they are being driven by rough winds, are turned about,” etc.
πηδαλίου, rudder] From the Odyssey onwards.
ὁρμή, impulse] This might be either the impulse in the mind of the steersman or the impulse which his hand communicates to the helm: but the whole phrase would be rather feeble if referred to the mind only: moreover there would be almost a contradiction between the “impulsiveness “and the purpose (βουλή).
τοῦ εὐθύνοντος, the steersman] Εὐθύνω, first to make straight, is then used of any kind of guidance, shepherd of sheep, charioteer of chariot, steersman of ship (Plato etc.); and of the rudder itself (Luc. Dial. Mort. x. 10, εὔθυνε, ὦ πορθμεύ, τὸ πηδάλιον; Eur. Cyc. 15,
ἐν πρύμνῃ δ᾽ ἄκρᾳ
αὐτὸς λαβὼν ηὔθυνον ἀμφῆρες δόρυ).
βούληται, willeth] By a
bold figure the deliberation and decision is transferred to the last point at which the
steersman’s action passes into that of
5οὔτως καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα μικρὸν μέλος ἐστὶν καὶ μεγάλα αὐχεῖ. ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον πῦρ ἡλίκην ὕλην ἀνάπτει·
5. Apparently a direct comparison with v. 4. What is not easy is μεγάλα αὐχεῖ (so better than μεγάλαυχεῖ).
μεγάλα αὐχεῖ, hath great things whereof to boast] Αὐχέω is properly to stretch the neck and hold up the head in pride, and hence to speak with proud confidence. Μεγάλαυχέω seems always to be used in a disparaging sense, to denote “boastfulness.” The difficulty is that the comparison seems to require not great pretension but great performance to be ascribed to the tongue. Oecumenius has μεγάλα ἐργάζεται by way of paraphrase, and something like this is doubtless what we should expect. It does not help much to say that the pretension comes first, the performance next, viz. in the following verses. The true solution lies probably in the wider use of αὐχέω than of μεγάλαυχέω. Though αὐχέω never loses the sense of boast, it frequently, both in early and late Greek, is used without sense of unreality in the boast, and virtually as equivalent to “having cause to boast.” The only question then is as to the use of μεγάλα, which prima facie has an adverbial force, “greatly.” Now αὐχεῖ used absolutely without reference to any object could refer only to boastfulness, pretence; and μεγάλα as an adverb would only accentuate this force, by the association with μεγάλαυχέω. But in late Greek αὐχέω is not infrequently used with the accusative of things boasted of, where the classical usage would be with dative with or without ἐπί. Thus Aristid. i. 103, μόνοις δ᾽ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει καθαρὰν εὐγένειάν τε καὶ πολιτείαν αὐχῆσαι: just as we use the verb “boast” transitively: “that country boasts many great cities.” So here μ. αὐχεῖ doubtless means “hath great things whereof to boast,” or shortly “great are its boasts” (i.e. the concrete subjects for boasting, αὐχήματα, not the boastings, αὐχήσεις). This sense is supported by the analogy of κατακαυχᾶται in ii. 13, where the glorying of mercy against judgment is no mere vain boasting, but a true position proudly held. It is thus quite doubtful whether there is even an indirect reference to arrogance of tongue. What follows gives examples of the “great things.”
ἰδοὺ ἡλίκον (not ὀλέγον) πῦρ ἡλίκην ὕλην ἀνάπτει, Behold how much wood is kindled by how small a fire] Ἡλίκος expresses magnitude in either direction, quantus or quantillus (Luc. Hermot. 5): the antithesis explains that with πῦρ it means “how little,” with ὕλην “how great.” This is a good example of St James’ pregnant enigmatic style, leaving much to the reader’s intelligence.
ὕλην] Etymologically = silva, and answers fairly to both the English words “wood”
and “timber.” It is used either of dead wood or living, and either will make
sense here. But it never means a wood, a forest. As applied to living wood it is
either woodland as opposed to mountains and cultivated plains, specially the
rough bushy skirts of the hills, or brushwood. Thus Plat. Polit. 272 A says,
καρπούς τε ἀφθόνους εἶχον ἀπό τε
δένδρων καὶ πολλῆς ὕλης ἄκκης.
A spark setting fire to the brush might suggest the image, or it may be (as
The image was probably taken from the Hebrew Proverbs of Ben Sira (trans]. in
Drusius ap. Crit. Sacr. viii. p. 1899) cf.
6. A very difficult verse. Οὕτως is spurious before ἡ γλῶσσα καθίσταται, and misleading also. It is impossible Greek to take ἡ σπιλοῦσα as predicate to the sentence ἡ γλῶσσα καθίστ. as though it were τὸ σπιλοῦν. The best punctuation is to take καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ as a separate clause, “the tongue also is a fire,’ introductory to what follows. Then ὁ κ. τ. ἀδ. ἡ γλ. καθίστ. ἐν τ. μέλ. ἡμ.; then ἡ σπιλοῦσα . . .γεέννης, in which last clause references to fire appear again. Hence ἡ γλῶσσα (the 2nd) must be the subject, ὁ κόσμος τ. ἀδ. the predicate; and the reason why ὁ κόσμος τ. ἀδ. is put first is because ἡ γλῶσσα must be put last in order to connect it distinctly with the following participles. Thus the arrangement of words is exactly analogous to that of i. 7, 8.
καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, The tongue also is a fire] Cf.
ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, the unrighteous world] Certainly a difficult phrase. The article must of course have its full force, “a world of iniquity” cannot be right. Some take κόσμος as “ornament”: understanding it to mean that the tongue gives a specious and seductive colour or gloss to what is evil by means of plausible words. But though words might by a rather bold figure be called the adornment of iniquity, the tongue that utters them could not: nor has that sense any special force here. The commonest interpretation is to take it as “world” in the sense of universe, “that world of iniquity.” The article here acquires a possible sense with the other construction, in apposition with πῦρ; but not as the predicate after καθίσταται. The sense itself too is at once exaggerated and vague. It is not the comprehensiveness of the tongue within itself that the context refers to, but its power of acting upon what is without it.
There remains the “evil” sense of κόσμος, found already
i. 27, and recurring iv.
4. To repeat very briefly. This sense of something called the κόσμος as not
only containing evil elements but itself in some sense evil is chiefly found in Jn and 1 Jn, also 2 Pet.; perhaps not elsewhere
(
καθίσταται, is constituted, shews itself, makes itself, acts the part of] The exact force is shewn by iv. 4. Καθίστασθαι εἰς is to come into a certain state, or καθ. with nominative to become (contrast καθέστηκα to have become, to be). Thus Plut. ii. 2 E, trees if neglected στρεβλὰ φύεται καὶ ἄκαρπα καθίσταται, τυχόντα δὲ ὀρθῆς παιδαγωγίας ἔγκαρπα γίνεται καὶ τελεσφόρα (cf. 6 F).
ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, among our members] Apparently not merely with reference to its action on the other members; but as being that one among the members which has this special power.
ἡ σπιλοῦσα, that stainer of] The article has the effect of giving a
substantive force to the participle, as it were, the tongue that stainer of the
body. The use of this word agrees with the interpretation just given of
κόσμος,
when compared with ἄσπιλος . . . ἀπὸ τ. κόσμου in
i. 27. The image however is
difficult: in what sense can the tongue be said to stain the body? Apparently
with reference to the idea that runs through chap. i. that there is a Divine
image received by man at creation, a true ideal form derived from likeness to
God, and that all moral evil is to be regarded in relation to this as (i. 21) a
ῥυπαρία or defilement and a περισσεία or excrescence (unnatural growth). Still
why “the body,” for St James certainly regarded the Divine image as (at least in
the first instance) inward and spiritual? Probably because he regarded the body
as the outward expression of the inward mind; and the, external deformities of
passion as true types as well as results of the invisible deformities from which
they spring. Moreover the action of the tongue might be regarded as staining the
action of the whole body, the total conduct of which the body is the organ. Cf.
also
καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως, and it setteth on fire the wheel of man’s creation] Here we reach one of the hardest phrases in the Bible. To discuss it fully would take too long. We must be content to deal with the leading points. At the outset Grotius’ suggestion that τροχόν should be read τρόχον, a running or course, must be set aside. The word, chiefly poetic, is never used figuratively; and at all events φλογίζουσα points to some physical image. The suggestion comes from too prosaic a dealing with the imagery of a prophet. Φλ. τ. τροχόη must mean “setting on fire the wheel.”
But then what is τ. γενέσεως, and what wheel is meant? Attention was called
eight years ago by Hilgenfeld (ZWT. 1873. 20; cf. Einl. 539 f.) to the
certainly curious fact that Simplicius on Arist. de caelo ii. p. 91 B in
allegorising Ixion’s wheel says, “and he hath been bound by God
τῷ τῆς μοίρας τροχῷ καὶ τῆς γενέσεως, ὃν
ἀδύνατον μεταλλάξαι κατ᾽ Ὀρφέα (what follows is
hopelessly corrupt, but ends with τὰς ἀνθρωπινὰς ψυχάς), clearly referring to
an Orphic doctrine. The sense comes out more clearly, but with κύκλος for
τροχός, in Procl. Tim. v. 330 A (on Plato’s words
τῇ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιόδῳ, “This is the one salvation of the soul which is held forth by the
Creator, delivering it τοῦ
Κύκλου τ᾽ αὖ λῆξαι καὶ ἀναπνεύσαι κακότητος.
There is somewhat similar language in Procl. Tim. i. 32 E and Theol. Pl. vi. 3 p. 351; cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 748, Hos omnes ubi mille rotam volvere per annos. For γενέσεως we have ἀνάγκης in the statement of Diog. Laert. viii. 14, Vit. Pyth., “They say that he was the first to declare the soul κύκλον ἀνάγκης ἀμείβουσαν ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώοις. So more vaguely, without reference to any one in particular, Chrys. Mt. lxxv. 728 C, περιφορὰν καὶ γένεσιν λέγοντες. Also Philo de Somn. ii. 6, p. 664 of Pharaoh’s gold chain round Joseph’s neck, ἀγχόνην ἐπιφανῆ, κύκλον καὶ τροχὸν ἀνάγκης ἀτελευτήτου, . . . οὐκ ἀκολουθίαν καὶ τὸ ἑξῆς ἐν βίῳ καὶ τὸν εἱρμὸν τῶν τῆς φύσεως πραγμάτων, ὡς ἡ Θάμαρ, οὐ γὰρ κλοιὸς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρμίσκος αὐτῆς ὁ κόσμος (cf. de mut. nom. 23 p. 598). In the first places cited the reference is certainly to the Orphic or Pythagorean doctrine of a cycle of metempsychosis: Chrys. and Philo are ambiguous. Another passage of Simplicius (Comm. in Epict. Ench. p. 177 C) gives it a distinctly wider sense, “The dissolution of compounds and the change of simples one into another is good for the whole; since the destruction of one is the origin (γένεσις) of another; and this is the cause why τὸν τῆς γενέσεως κύκλον remains imperishable (ἀνέκλειπτον).
But it is most improbable that St James should use a phrase of this origin to convey a doctrine with which he can have had no sympathy. The Orphic doctrine would be entirely alien to him (notwithstanding Hilgenfeld’s references to θρησκός), and the vaguer doctrine hardly less. Γένεσις in this connexion was the word used in late Greek philosophy to express natural necessity; the necessary chain of causation; and it was especially opposed to any religious view of the world.
An equal improbability lies in the mode of use: this setting on fire of the τροχὸν τ. γενέσεως is evidently spoken of as an evil thing; but to a believer in God this interruption of the wheel of earthbound destiny would be no subject for regret. The interpretation thus just inverts the purport of the sentence.
Moreover it is difficult to think that τῆς γενέσεως should recur in two places of the Epistle (here and i. 23) in very peculiar phrases, yet be entirely different in sense: for whatever sense we give to γενέσεως with τὸ πρόσωπον, it cannot possibly be destiny.
Another simpler image occurs in various classical writers, partly again in connexion with Ixion, that of human life as a wheel rolling down hill over all sorts of inequalities: thus Sil. Ital. vi. 120. But here too there is no special force in the setting fire, and τ. γενέσεως remains inexplicable. The same may be said of the vaguer senses “course of life,” “course of nature.”
The true clue is doubtless to be found in
τ. γενέσεως which we saw (on i. 23)
to refer to the original creation of man. It is not in classical but in biblical
language that we should naturally expect to find the explanation. Not the
heathen godless genesis but the genesis of revelation, the origin of the world
in the will and purpose of God, is denoted by the word for St James. It is the תלדת or
מלדת (see
What then is meant by the wheel? It can hardly be the detached wheel rolling
uselessly along, as in the classical image. It must be the chariot wheel of man
as he advances on the way of life, fulfilling his appointed course. Probably, I
do not say more, but probably there is an allusion to the wheel in the vision of
Ezekiel (
καὶ φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεέννης, and is set on fire by hell] The fire is not a fire from above but from beneath. This
seems to be the true force of the reference to Gehenna, which usually in the
N.T. appears simply as the place of punishment for evil (whether we mean by
punishment retribution only, or retribution combined with purification), not
excepting perhaps
7. γὰρ, For] The purpose of γὰρ seems to be to introduce an explanation and justification of the strong language just used. From the word “bridle” in v. 2 St James has been led to the idea of a small agency exercising great power, and especially to the image of fire as representing the tongue: and now he proceeds to explain this, pointing first to its unbridledness, and then to its strange inconsistency of action.
πᾶσα γὰρ φύσις, every nature]
Φύσις is often used periphrastically with the
genitive, so that this might mean simply “all beasts and birds,” etc. And it is
also sometimes used for “kind.” Thus Diod. Sic. i. 10,
ἡ γῆ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς καινὰς ἤνεγκε τῶν ζώων φύσεις; Plut. ii. 636
E,
ζώων δὲ πολλὰς
φύσεις τοῦ κόσμου περιέχοντος, οὐδέν,
ὡς εἰπεῖν, γένος ἄμοιρόν ἐστι τῆς ἐξ ᾤου
γενέσεως. But even in such places the original sense is latent, “many kinds”
as dependent on “many natures.” Here, at all events, the strict sense is
required by τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπινῃ; for
although ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις is
occasionally, though very rarely, equivalent to “mankind,” the periphrasis would
have a rhetorical unnaturalness here, especially in the resolved form τῇ φ. τῇ ἀνθ. (not τῇ ἀνθ. φ.). The meaning doubtless is that the inherent nature of man, that nature which proceeds
from the Divine image, has proved its kingship over the natures of different
classes of animals, probably with reference to
θηρίων τε καὶ πετεινῶν ἑρπετῶν τε καὶ ἐναλίων,
of beasts and birds, of
creeping things and things in the sea] These classes are exactly and almost verbally taken from
In the second pair ἐρπετῶν answers to θηρίων in the first, and doubtless was intended especially to include serpents, with especial reference to the tongue (see v. 8). The allusion may be to the sacred tame serpents which were kept in different temples, for instance in those of Asclepius. Tame fish, sacred and other, were also known to the ancients (see Ael. Nat. An. viii. 4; xii. 30). Ἐνάλια answer to ἰχθύες. A poetic word, used in prose in this general manner in late writers only, as Ps.-Arist. de mundo 5, οὗτος ἐναλίων ζῴων καὶ πεζῶν καὶ ἀερίων φύσεις ἐχώρισεν; Plut. ii. 911 D, τὸ τῶν ἐναλίων γένος contrasted with τὰ χερσαῖα; also 729 E, ἐφείδοντο μάλιστα τῶν ἐναλίων.
δαμάζεται καὶ δεδάμασται τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, is tamed and hath been tamed into subjection to the nature that is human] First comes the general statement that they are tamed: then the thought occurs that there are domestic races which have been tamed long ago; and so the present acquires a more precise sense.
There is a long-established conquest by the human race transmitted by hereditary instinct, and it is being perpetually renewed. Δαμάζω is sometimes applied to the mere crushing of a foe: its proper sense is taming, subduing not for destruction but for orderly use, as with horses and oxen. There is no clear indication that use is contemplated here: but rather the general notion of taming, involving obedience and restraint. There is probably a reminiscence of what has been said above of the bridling of horses.
The taming is part of the lordship of the earth bestowed in
8τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων· ἀκατάστατον κακόν, μεστὴ ἰοῦ θανατηφόρου.
8. τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν οὐδεὶς
δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων,
but the tongue can no
one, even of men, tame] By a vivid image the tongue is projected, as it were,
out of human nature and spoken of as though it had a separate life of its
The position of ἀνθρώπων is at once secondary and emphatic; it might be “the tongue no one can tame, — no one, that is, of men”; but is rather “no one, even of men,” even of those beings so highly endowed, of whom he has been just speaking.
ἀκατάστατον κακόν, a disorderly evil] This is the true reading, not
ἀκατάσχετον, which would be merely a
feeble repetition of οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται. St James has used the word already in
i. 8, and ἀκατάστασία in
iii. 16, where it is coupled with πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα. To his mind it expressed the
utmost evil, the disorder which is the entire opposite of God’s perfect purpose
and man’s single-minded surrender to God’s purpose. Cf.
Not ἀκατάστατον only, but ἀκ. κακόν. It is startling to hear the tongue called “an evil,” rather than its misuse. But (1) the adjective explains how it becomes an evil; and (2) its evil arises from the very fact of its independence, i.e. from its isolation from the integrity of humanity. There is just the same abnormal and morbid independence as in the case of a desire which in like manner can be conceived of as something distinct from the man in whom it arises (i. 14 f.).
μεστή, full of]
Not μεστόν: it cannot therefore agree with
κακόν, but goes back to ἡ γλῶσσα. The tongue not merely contains deadly
venom, it is charged with it: cf.
9. ἐν αὐτῇ (bis), therein] The phrase is remarkable. The purely instrumental
use of ἐν is Hebraistic, and found only in such writers of the N.T. as admit a
certain (not very large) amount of Hebraism. It does not agree with the general
colour of St James’ language. Nor does this passage come well under the rather
vague “causal” use of ἐν (Jelf 246 f.; Kühner ii. 403 f.). But St James’
purpose is probably to identify ourselves with the tongue. If he had said δι᾽ αὐτῆς, it would have expressed a pure instrumentality:
we should have appeared
solely as the speakers, the tongue as our organ merely. Now the whole passage
implies a kind of independent power over us exerted by the faculty of utterance;
so that St James intentionally makes the tongue an actual speaker as well as an
organ of speech: in the tongue we bless God, almost in the sense “in the person
of the tongue.” The nearest parallel is in
εὐλογοῦμεν, we bless] This is the highest function of speech. As man’s relation
to God is the supreme fact of his nature which alone puts all others into their
right place, so blessing God for His goodness and His benefits is
τὸν κύριον (not θεόν) καὶ πατέρα, the Lord and Father] The less common phrase is the true reading. The κύριον expresses God’s majesty and His rule over all His creatures, and especially over men who have the privilege of being able to render conscious obedience. Πατέρα expresses both rule and love, and also all the associations connected with the human word, in reference (i. 18) to the first origin of man as not merely owing his existence to God’s fiat but a partaker of the Divine nature as being made in God’s image.
καταρώμεθα, we curse] Καταρῶμαι originally took the accusative of the thing, the dative of the person: “imprecate this or that against a man,” the thing imprecated being sometimes omitted. But in late writers (Plutarch, Lucian) it succumbs to the general tendency to pure transitiveness. The first person καταρώμεθα (as well as εὐλογοῦμεν) is singular, because St James does not seem to be speaking directly of a universal human shortcoming (πολλὰ πταίομν ἅπαντες v. 2).
As far as this verse goes, the meaning might be only that blessing and cursing
are both utterances of the tongue: but v. 10 shews that St James meant to say
that they come from the very same tongue, and that he is in fact attacking not
merely a vice of the tongue but a false kind of religion. He is dealing with a
tendency, close akin to that which he combated at the end of chapter i., to a
loveless religiosity, the combination of professed devotion to God with
indifference and even hatred to men. He implies that the utterance of blessing
must be spurious if it does not include men as its objects as well as God: cf.
It is to be observed that τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα here repeats the τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρίof i. 27.
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, men] Not simply individual men, but mankind: the curse
uttered against the hated or despised individual persons was in effect a wrong
done to mankind, and sprang from an evil spirit as towards mankind, a disregard
of the second law, the law of love to neighbours. It was the temper of the
Pharisees in
τοὺς καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν θεοῦ γεγονότας, which are made after the likeness of God] Here the latent doctrine of the Epistle breaks out into plain words. The connexion between the two supreme forms of love which together make up the sum of human duty is not accidental: the love of man is founded on the love of God. The tenderness and mercy shewn to the lower animals form but a small part in that true love of men which attaches itself to the Godlike in them, hidden as the image may often be; so that the cursing of them is a cursing of that which bears the stamp of the Creator’s own nature.
St James chooses not the κατ᾽ εἰκόνα,
but the second phrase καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν, not
elsewhere found in the N.T. On these words it is worth while to refer to
Delitzsch New Comm. on Genes. E.T. i. pp. 99 f., on the words
צֶלֶם εἰκών, and
דְּמוּת ὁμοίωσις. In image, he says, the representation
of the primitive form or model predominates, in likeness the representation of
the pattern or ideal. He accordingly treats the
Γεγονότας with
καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν expresses at once the primitive origin and the
present continuance of the state which it introduced: in St James’ eyes mankind
are still in the likeness of God for all their sin and evil. Beresh. Rabb. 24
fin. (on
10ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος ἐξέρχεται εὐλογία καὶ κατάρα. οὐ χρή, ἀδελφοί μου, ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι.
10. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος, from the same mouth] This merely states clearly and emphatically what was implied in v. 9. It excludes the notion of different tongues blessing and cursing: it is not “from the same source,” but definitely “from the same mouth.”
Cf.
οὐ χρή, ἀδελφοί μου, ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι, It is not fitting, my brethren, that these things should so be] Here St James turns from his statement to direct expostulation, intermitted since v. 1; so that the division of verses is very awkward, though modern editions of the A.V. have partially mended it by putting a full stop in the middle.
Ἀδελφοί μου marks the sudden turn of language, kept up by the repetition in v. 12.
χρή occurs here alone in the N.T., not at all in the LXX. or Apocrypha. Though St James does not use δεῖ, χρή is not a synonym. It is a somewhat vague word, apparently starting from the sense “there is need.” In ethical applications it comes nearer to πρέπει or καθήκει than to δεῖ, meaning rather “fitting,” “congruous to a law or rather standard.” Hence St James probably does not mean “ this conduct of yours is wrong,” but “this doubleness in the use of the tongue is an unnatural monstrous thing.” Then ταῦτα has probably the definite sense, the blessing on the one hand and the cursing on the other: it is a monstrous state to be in that this blessing and this cursing should be constantly arising on this footing of identical origin, from the same tongue, the organ of the same mind. Thus, there is no redundance in the two words ταῦτα οὕτως; and the present γίνεσθαι has also its force, for he is speaking not of casual sins but of a settled and deliberate habit.
11μήτι ἡ πηγὴ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπῆς βρύει τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν;
11. μήτι, Can it be that] The
τι added to μή strengthens it, suggesting
impossibility. Two similar uses of it in the N.T. are
ἡ πηγή, the fountain] The force of the article is not obvious: συκῆ has
none, and a fountain, as such, has no
ὀπῆς, crevice] Ὀπή is properly a chink in a wall for looking through. It
then comes to be applied to holes and burrows in the ground, as those of ants
and of hibernating animals, or somewhat larger clefts in the rock (
βρύει, sends forth] Βρύω is chiefly used of the fresh and vigorous putting forth of herbage by the earth, or of leaves, flowers, or fruits by plants and trees; but also sometimes of the shooting forth of water by a source (cf. Clem. Alex. Paed. i. 6. 45; iii. 7. 39). Usually also it occurs with a dative, but occasionally in late writers, as here, with an accusative.
τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, that which is sweet and that which is bitter] The articles are not easy. If we supply nothing, and understand merely “that which is sweet,” etc., the articles are quite justified, and on the whole this is best, the most general abstract opposites being used here in the first instance, and then ἁλυκόν afterwards substituted. The mere omission of ὕδωρ would create no difficulty: but a generalisation of water “the sweet water,” “the bitter water” does not seem natural here.
St James would be familiar with bitter springs from those of Tiberias (see Reland Palest. 301 ff., 1039 f.; Robinson Bibl. Res. ii. 384).
12μὴ δύναται, ἀδελφοί μου, συκῆ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι ἢ ἄμπελος σῦκα; οὔτε ἁλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ.
12. Not only a new image comes in here, but a new point of view, prepared for
by part of v. 11. In 9-11 St James has dwelt on the inconsistency of the two
kinds of speech as coming forth from the same tongue, as though bitter and sweet
came alike from the same spring. But ἡ πηγή has carried us back from the
springs to the inner reservoirs, from the mouth to the heart; and so now a
comparison between the heart and its utterance, rather than between two
utterances, comes into view. The image is formed by examples of our Lord’s
words,
οὔτε ἁλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ, neither can salt water yield sweet] So we
must read for οὕτως and
οὐδεμία πηγὴ ἀλ. καὶ γλυκύ, a vapid repetition of
v.
11. Οὔτε is hard and some good MSS. naturally substitute
οὐδέ, but by a manifest
grammatical
ἁλυκόν] Simply “salt” as an adjective: doubtless ὕδωρ, kept to the end, goes with both ἀλ. and γλυκύ. Ποιῆσαι is borrowed from above, being used of natural producing. As applied to ὕδωρ it means to rain, and this is a rare use. Doubtless St James purposely retained the same word as an image in the sense, out of a reservoir of salt water springs forth no fountain of sweet water. Thus he distinctly implies, though he still leaves the rebuke to implication, that not the verbal blessing of God but the cursing of men was a true index to what lay within. It is no longer merely a difference of kinds placed on a level, but one is evil, the other good. Thus this sentence is no mere repetition of v. 11, but goes far beyond it.
13Τίς σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐν ὑμῖν; δειξάτω ἐκ τῆς καλῆς ἀναστροφῆς τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας.
13. Here the long digression on the tongue ends, and St James returns with full recollection of what he has
said in the interval, to the interrupted warning of v.
1 against being “many teachers.” The excuse for this ambitious teachership was the possession of wisdom, and so he goes on now to consider the
true and the false wisdom. Speech and wisdom, as good things liable to grievous
abuse, appear in like manner in 1 Corinthians (
Τίς is by no means equivalent to ὅς. The only passage in the N.T. where this can
be, and this at best is doubtful, is
σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων, wise and understanding]
As
δειξάτω, let him shew] Cf. ii. 18 bis; ἐκ also as there.
καλῆς, good] As directly
beheld and contemplated, as distinguished from ἀγαθός
good in fruit or result. Thus here it manifestly refers to a goodness which can
be seen and recognised. This comes out strongly in the parallel but more limited
passage
ἀναστροφῆς, behaviour] Ἀναστροφή is “manner of life.” Perhaps “behaviour” is the most exact rendering. Ἀναστρέφεσθαι (=versari) is first used of externals, to have your employment in a place, be going to and fro in it. Then in later Greek as Polybius it is used ethically: the verb, not the substantive, occurs once or twice in this sense in LXX., but the substantive in Apocr. In the N.T. in the Epistles generally (not Evv., Act., Apoc.), and doubtless widely used at that time. Chiefly, and perhaps wholly, it means in the N.T. acts performed towards others, social conduct, whether as towards fellow Christians or towards the world at large.
τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, his works]
This is no tautology: his works are not simply his
acts, but the utterance and
ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας, in meekness of wisdom] Here comes in the controlling
spirit, the mention of which indicates what it was that vitiated the supposed
wisdom. It was pride and bitterness, exaltation of self and not contempt only
but hatred of others. Both of these characteristics are negatived together by
“meekness,” including at once humility towards self, and gentleness and
forbearance towards others (contrast with v. 14). The word itself stands twice
in the Gospels as spoken by Christ,
At first sight ἐν πραΰτητι σοφίας is a paradox. The arrogant disputer is ready to praise meekness as a fitting virtue for the weak and foolish; but thinks it out of place for himself St James lays down on the other hand that it is a fruit and mark of wisdom. He who is wise in a true sense of the word, he means, cannot but be meek. By meekness of behaviour wisdom will be displayed rather than disguised. St James leaves untouched the question whether the possession of wisdom is a sufficient ground for assuming the responsibilities of teaching. He implies that the καλὴ ἀναστροφή must come first, and then much at least of the ostentatious teaching will disappear.
14. ζῆλον, jealousy] A word that oscillates between a good and an evil sense, both occurring in the N.T. Arist. (Rhet. ii. 11. 1) distinguishes it from φθόνος, as emulation from envy; he says, καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων, etc.; and classical writers generally incline to an at least not distinctly evil sense, which they express rather by φθόνος or ζηλοτυπία. But in the Acts ζῆλος is distinctly evil, and so in at least St Paul and St James. St James, however, though in v. 16 he uses ζῆλος absolutely as St Paul does, here precludes mistake by adding πικρὸν.
ἐριθίαν, ambition, rivalry]
Combined with
ζῆλος likewise in
What sense the earlier Greek Fathers attached to it in St Paul does not appear.
Chrys. on
Most of these renderings suggest the
erroneous association with ἔρις (also “contention” syr vg): but aemulatio (Tert
Hil) may have another force. Some of the N.T. places are ambiguous: but
wherever the context has a defining force, it is in favour of the sense found in
Polyb. etc. The difficult
ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν, in your heart] Here what answers to the πηγή is at last distinctly expressed.
μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε, boast not] The imperative is not the most obvious mood: we should rather have expected some statement of the natural consequences of having bitter jealousy in the heart, viz. “how can ye do other than boast, etc.?” Μὴ with a question cannot mean “Do ye not?” so that the imperative is unquestionable. The meaning seems to be this, “Do not set up for teachers, for then your teaching will be a boasting, etc.” It is thus in antithesis to δειξάτω in v. 13. He asks “Who is wise etc.?” The possession of wisdom was made a claim to teachership. He deals with it first positively. There is a right way to show forth wisdom. But, he goes on, if when searching your hearts you find bitter jealousy and ambition there, do not speak and teach, for in shewing forth what you regard as your wisdom you will be boasting etc.
κατακαυχᾶσθε] As in ii. 13 (cf. 1. 9; iv. 16), but here followed by an additional κατά. This one word exactly expresses the true spirit and purpose of the ambitious teachership. It was boasting against other men, partly against the multitude, still more against rival teachers. But St James unexpectedly puts in another object. The boasting directed against other men would in effect be a boasting against the truth itself which was supposed to be spoken. Nay it would be more, it would turn to falsehood uttered against the truth.
καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ, and lie not against] If necessary the κατά might be repeated in sense from κατακαυχᾶσθε (Kühner ii. 1073 f.): but a better sense is given by the words as they stand: the adverse boast turns to simple falsehood, and the truth suffers from both.
τῆς ἀληθείας, the truth] For somewhat
similar contexts of ἡ ἀληθεία see
15οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία ἄνωφεν κατερχοµένη, ἀλλὰ ἐπίγειος, ψυχικὴ, δαιµονιώδης
15. οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία, This wisdom is not] These words are enough to confirm the interpretation of v. 14 just given. No evil wisdom has been directly spoken of. But it is implied in κατακαυχᾶσθε etc.: the speech there spoken of is the speech which claims to be the speech of wisdom: now therefore St James will say what the wisdom is. Wisdom as such is what he specially prized (i. 5; iii. 17), which made him all the more hostile to its counterfeit.
ἄνωφεν κατερχοµένη, a wisdom that
cometh down from above] ἔστιν . . . κατερχοµένη is not equivalent to
οὐ κατέρχεται. The participle is qualitative,
i.e. in effect an adjective: “is not one that cometh down,” “is not of
ἀλλὰ ἐπίγειος, but is earthly] Opposed to
ἐπουράνιος. It belongs to the earthly sphere. However it may discourse about heavenly things, it derives
its aims and its measures from a mere transfer of things earthly to a higher
sphere: it has none of the large vision which belongs to the spirit. Compare
τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες of
ψυχικὴ, of the mind] A remarkable word, not known in this sense before the
N.T.
It occurs in four passages:
δαιμονιώδης, demon-like] The word requires care.
-ώδης properly denotes (1)
fullness, (2) similarity. The word itself, a rare word, in all the known
examples means “demon-like,” except in two very late writers, where (like
δαιμόνιος) it means “supernaturally sent.” The interpretation “inspired by
demons” is not unnaturally suggested by κάτωθεν ἐρχομένη and
v. 6 φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γεάννης;
cf.
16ὅπου γὰρ ζῆλος καὶ ἐριθία, ἐκεῖ ἀκαταστασία καὶ πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.
16. ὅπου γάρ, For where] A necessary justification of what has just been said : St James has just used strong language respecting the professed wisdom of these teachers, and the reasonableness of his language did not lie on the surface, but had to be explained. Ὅπου and ἐκεῖ express presence. Though wisdom is God’s gift, it is also an energy of the human mind and heart, and therefore takes its colour from the condition of the human heart and mind. If jealousy and rivalry are present there, these other things inconsistent with a truly Divine wisdom must be present there likewise.
ἀκαταστασία, disorder] A Stoic word. Cf.
ἀκαταστατος
i. 8; iii. 8. In
καὶ πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, and every worthless matter]
Πρᾶγμα is a vague word, properly an act, a thing performed,
but often used only as “a matter.” Cf.
Φαῦλος expresses not so much moral evil as worthlessness; it is applied to what
is poor, paltry, worthless (four times in N.T. of acts and mostly contrasted
with τὰ ἀγαθά:
17. ἡ δὲ ἄνωθεν σοφία, But the wisdom that is from above] That there is such a wisdom is not only implied in v. 15, but stated in i. 5.
πρῶτον μὲν, ἔπειτα] Apparently express first the purely inward personal character, second the social character of the true wisdom, the conduct which it inspires towards others.
ἀγνή, pure] The word answers very nearly to “pure,” καθαρός being rather “clean.” It is an ancient word of Greek religion, denoting freedom from any kind of defilement, whether of sensuality or of things supposed to be of a defiling nature. Cf. Plut. Qu. Rom. i. (ii. 263 E), Διὰ τί τὴν γαμουμένην ἅπτεσθαι πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος κελεύουσιν; . . . ἢ ὅτι τὸ πῦρ καθαίρει καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἁγνίζει, δεῖ δὲ καθαρὰν καὶ ἁγνὴν διαμένειν τὴν γαμηθεῖσαν; It thus expresses religious purity, combining καθαρός and ἄγιος. But in due time it acquired an ethical sense. Theoph. (Bernays 68) and Clem. Alex. 652 quote an inscription from the temple at Epidaurus,
ἀγμὸν χρὴ ναοῖο θυώδεος ἐντὸς ἰόντα ἔμμεναι· ἁγνείη δ᾽ ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὅσια.
Cf. Clem. 629 with reference to washings,
εὐ γοῦν κἀκεῖνο εἴρηται Ἴσθι μὴ
λουτρῷ ἀλλὰ νοῷ καθαρός. ἁγνεία
γὰρ, οἶμαι, τελεία ἡ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῶν
ἔργων καὶ τῶν διανοημάτων, πρὸς δὲ καὶ
τῶν λόγων εἰλικρίνεια (“Let all thy
converse be sincere”).
εἰρηνική, peaceable] The most general exhibition of wisdom inspired by love.
The true purpose of wisdom is not to gain victories over others, which in an
unchristian state of society is implicitly the purpose of speech, but to promote
peace:
ἐπιεικής, forbearing] Originally “fitting,” “appropriate”: then “fair” or “reasonable,” “justly just”; see Aristot. Rhet. i. 13. 13, τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον . . . (17) καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές (cf. Eth. Nic. v. 14). Cf. Plato passim. It may thus be sometimes rendered by gentleness; but expresses rather forbearance, unwillingness to exact strict claims.
εὐπειθής, compliant] This word is tolerably common in the sense “compliant,” “obedient,” especially as towards laws or morality. It is apparently confined to action, not extended to belief in the sense “docile.” The precise force here is probably to be gathered by antithesis. The false wisdom would be domineering and imperious: the true wisdom shews itself in willing deference within lawful limits.
μεστὴ ἐλέους, full of mercy] Perhaps in contrast to μεστὴ ἰοῦ θανατηφόρου (iii. 8); at all events the two passages illustrate each other. Filled with mercy and good fruits, so that they break forth in overflow.
On ἔλεος see
ii. 13 (cf.
ἀδιάκριτος, without dividings of mind]
This word usually takes its sense from
the active διακρίνω to “distinguish,” and means (passive or neuter) “without
distinction,” “promiscuous,” or (active) “without making distinctions”; in
which sense it is usually employed as a term of blame, though rarely by some
Fathers as a term of praise (implicit obedience). But no such senses are
possible here; and we may fairly take it as negativing any sense of either
διακρίνω or -ομαι. This being the case, the meaning is virtually fixed by
i. 6 bis, ii. 4, founded on
ἀνυπόκριτος, without hypocrisy or feigning] This word expresses the relation to men. The true wisdom requires not only singleness before God but truthfulness towards men, and is incompatible with all playing of parts. We may recognise here a warning against the pharisaic leaven still lingering among Jewish Christians.
18καρπὸς δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἐν εἰρήνῃ σπείρεται τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην.
18. καρπὸς δὲ δικαιοσύνης, But the fruit which is righteousness] For the whole
verse cf.
ἐν εἰρήνῃ, in peace] It might be doubted whether this goes with
καρπὸς δικ. or
σπείρεται or both. It is difficult to see any clear force in connexion with
σπείρεται, and the order rather suggests at least a primary connexion with
δικαιοσύνης. The righteousness which thus springs up is a righteousness in
peace. Righteousness and peace are connected
τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην, for them that make peace] Only
a resolved form of οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί
(
IV. 1. The true reading has πόθεν twice.
πόλεμοι] This of course is suggested
by the preceding εἰρήνην. A new paragraph begins here, the last of the middle or principal part of the book, its subject being strife as proceeding
from the inward strife of desire. Till v. 11 the tongue is not mentioned again: St James is now about to deal more directly with the inward
nature, as he has already spoken of action and of speech. The word πόλεμοι is
the simplest and
καὶ πόθεν μάχαι] Battles bear the same relation to wars that single conflicts do to standing animosities and hostile states. Thus if πόλεμοι are here the factions and antagonisms among Christians, the μάχαι are their casual quarrels. μάχη in late Greek is often applied to philosophical disputes, and even to contradictions or inconsistencies in logic. But the context does not point to doctrinal disputes; rather to more ordinary quarrels and factiousnesses.
ἐν ὑμῖν] This might be either “among you” or “within you”: but what follows fixes the sense to “among you.”
οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν] Probably only preparatory to what follows: “from this source, viz.”
ἐκ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑμῶν] It is not easy to seize the precise force; it is not
likely to mean simply “desires,” which is expressed by ἐπιθυμία in
i. 14 f. Nor
can it be concrete pleasures, i.e. pleasant things, for they could hardly be
said στρατεύεσθαι. Apparently it means “indulgence of desires,” “indulged
desires.” There is no limitation to sensual “pleasures,” which only supply as it
were imagery for the rest. Possessions and places of dignity or fame (v. 2) may
be as sweet (ἡδονή) to the soul as anything else; and in
i. 14 f. there is a
similar description of all kinds of desires in terms specially applicable to
desires belonging to the senses. So also St Paul (e.g.
τῶν στρατευομένων,
that war] Στρατεύομαι like στρατεύω is used either of
the general or of the soldiers who serve under him: chiefly the latter. But it
is difficult here to see either command or service implied with ἐν following.
Further against whom? The somewhat parallel passage,
The answer to both questions is found by taking
στρατευομένων ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν
strictly together. The pleasures are represented as making war in the members,
i.e. as invading them as a territory. Though εἰς would be the preposition
generally used of invading a territory, ἐν is quite suitable here where the
invading power does not come from an extraneous region. It is not that the war
is made against the members: properly war is not said to be made against the
territory invaded, but against its owners. So here the war is against the true
lord of the members, i.e. the human spirit acknowledging and obeying the will of
God, since the true nature of man is formed to do God’s will. Cf.
ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑμῶν, in your members] In contrast to ἐν ὐμῖν. The outer strife is only a product of an inner strife. The very reference to “members” implies the compositeness of human nature, and the need of acting with reference to the relation of the parts to each other and to the whole. Reflexly it calls attention to the fact that in the larger body, the body corporate in which the πόλεμοι and μάχαι arise, we are strictly “members one of another.”
2. ἐπιθυμεῖτε, ye covet] “Desire” in the widest sense. But in reference to
dealings with others it becomes limited to “coveting,” i.e. desiring what is
another’s. Compare St Paul’s reference to Commandment X. in
καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε, and have not] The order quite excludes that prior want which leads to desire. The words must mark the intermediate stage. First comes the desire, next the desire finds no satisfaction.
φονεύετε, ye commit murder] This has long been recognised as a serious difficulty, because it is a strange word to couple with ζηλοῦτε, more especially as preceding it. Jealousy or envy would be the cause, not the result, of murder. Moreover “murder” is a kind of crime that we should hardly look for among any early Christians. Accordingly Erasmus and many after him have proposed to read φθονεῖτε. There is absolutely no MS. authority for this; and though it is possible that slight errors occur here and there in all MSS., and there are some passages where this does appear to be the case, it must not be accepted in any single instance without clear evidence. Now though φθονεῖτε is certainly possible here, it would not really be as natural a word as it appears at first sight. St James has already used ζηλοῦτε in a very strong sense, strong enough for his purpose, so that φθονέω is not wanted; and if it were to be used, being the more clearly disparaging word, it ought to stand after ζηλοῦτε, not before it. Cf. Plat. Menex. 242 A: “From prosperity,” he says, “there came upon the city πρῶτον μὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου δὲ φθόνος.” Plut. ii. 796 A says of φθόνος that “this passion, which befits no time of life, yet among the young is rich in specious names, being called competition (ἅμιλλα) and ζῆλος and ambition (φιλοτιμὶα).”
Thus
φθονεῖτε followed by ζηλοῦτε makes an anticlimax, though not so startling
an anticlimax as φονεύετε ζηλοῦτε. The true solution seems to lie in a change
of punctuation. St James’ style is abrupt and condensed: and apparently he
intended φονεύετε to be taken by itself as
the single consequent to ἐπιθυμεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε,
and καὶ ζηλοῦτε to be the beginning of a fresh series, not part
of the conclusion of the first. This view is also taken by Hofmann. It has, I
think, but two difficulties worth consideration. (1) The presence of
καί before ζηλοῦτε, where a sharper antithesis would have seemed to be given by the absence
of a conjunction: but ζηλοῦτε to say the least contains a fresh element not in
ἐπιθυμεῖτε, and really expresses a different idea, and Hebrew precedent is
favourable to either presence or absence of the conjunction. (2) The reference
to murder remains. This difficulty must remain if φονεύετε is genuine, whatever
be the punctuation; and it is hardly greater than what μοιχαλίδες in
v. 4
presents, if taken literally, as it doubtless must be. Murder and adultery were
both contemplated as fast approaching those to whom the Epistle was written, if
not, as the strictest interpretation of the words would imply, actually among
them.
As positive evidence for this punctuation independent of φονεύετε, may be noted its throwing καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν into exact analogy with καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε, and its giving μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε force by making them correspond to φονεύετε. The whole verse should, I believe, be read thus: “Ye covet, and have not: ye commit murder. And ye envy, and cannot attain: ye fight and war.” The usual punctuation gives the whole verse a loose and apparently inconsequent structure.
καὶ ζηλοῦτε, and ye envy] The verb like the substantive has both a good and an evil sense. The evil is clearly
meant here, as
καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν, and cannot attain] Ἐπιτυγχάνω does not properly mean to “obtain,” i.e. get possession, but to “attain,” i.e. either fall in with or hit the mark, and is specially used absolutely of being successful. Here then it will be “succeed in attaining” the position of the rivals.
μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε, ye fight and war] These words stand in exactly the same relation to καὶ ζηλοῦτε . . . ἐπιτυχεῖν as φονεύετε to ἐπιθυμεῖτε . . . ἔξετε. The words are repeated from v. i, here naturally in inverse order, because the single and casual μάχαι are a step to the settled and continuous πόλεμοι.
οὐκ ἔχετε, ye have not] St James goes back to the former οὐκ ἔχετε. The desire, in so far as it included no coveting towards others, was not (or need not be) in itself evil. Men have various wants, and it is by Divine appointment that they have desires that these wants should be supplied. And so it is also of Divine appointment that these wants should be carried before God in prayer, and desires take the form of petitions. Except by prayer, men stand in this, as in all things, in a false relation to God and therefore to all things.
διὰ τό μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ὐμᾶς,
because ye ask not] It is remarkable that the middle is used here and in the next line, but
the active between. αἰτέω is properly to ask a person, what is asked for being
often added in a second accusative; it is as it were to “petition.” αἰτοῦμαι is
properly to ask for a thing: the person asked is sometimes also inserted, but
rarely. Thus the two forms approach each other from different sides, and it is
often difficult to distinguish them. Thus compare
3αἰτεῖτε καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε, διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε.
3. Then the intermediate αἰτεῖτε is probably due to an intentional reference to
our Lord’s words in their Greek form (
διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, because ye ask in evil wise] Not all asking from God is prayer. Asking is but the external form of prayer, and no asking from God which takes place in a wrong frame of mind towards Him or towards the object asked has anything to do with prayer. It is an evil asking.
ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε, that ye may consume what ye desire in your pleasures] The usual preposition with δαπανάω is εἰς, and no other example of ἐν seems to be known: but it is difficult to take δαπανήσητε alone as the primary predicate, and doubtless ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς δαπ. must be taken together, not precisely in the sense “consume upon your pleasures,” but literally “consume in your pleasures,” i.e. by using for your pleasures. Throughout “what ye desire” is to be understood as the object. There is force in δαπανήσητε; not simply spend, but consume, expend, dissipate. This force is explained by ἐν ταῖς ἡδ. ὑμῶν, which as before must be taken in the widest sense, not limited to pleasures of the senses. God’s gifts, when rightly used, are not dissipated in the using: they are transmuted as it were to some fresh form of energy, which lives on, and turns to fresh use. But the use which consists in nothing more than individual gratification, not tending in any way to improve and enlarge the person gratified, is pure waste, dissipation, destruction. God bestows not gifts only, but the enjoyment of them: but the enjoyment which contributes to nothing beyond itself is not what He gives in answer to prayer; and petitions to Him which have no better end in view are not prayers.
4. μοιχαλίδες, ye adulteresses] Μοιχοὶ καὶ is spurious (Syrian). The first
question here is whether the word is used literally or figuratively. It is a
common late word for “adulteress.” It is usually taken figuratively for these
reasons, that adulterers are omitted, that friendship with the world seems too
slight and too inappropriate a charge to bring against adultery, and that
adultery was not a kind of offence likely to be found in early Christian
societies. Hence it is assumed that μοιχαλίδες is to be interpreted with
reference to the O.T. language, in which all sin and apostasy are spoken of as
adultery, in reference to such language as “thy Maker is thy husband.” On that
view the reference may either be to whole communities (backsliding Israel) or to
individuals (adulterous souls). The difficulty of μοιχαλίδες
is undeniable. But it is hardly credible that this figurative view should have
been brought in by a single word, without any mark of its figurative intention;
and moreover φονεύετε and μοιχαλίδες in a literal sense confirm each other, and both stand
on
The mention of adulteresses alone may be founded on, and is at least illustrated
by
οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι ἡ φιλία] Here we reach the remaining difficulty, the connexion
between literal adultery and love of the world. The difficulty is greatly
diminished when we remember that both in the Bible and in actual fact adultery
includes much more than impurity. The broken bond and the price paid for the breach
of the bond are doubtless here contemplated. The price might be gifts, or pride,
or distinction, or other such things: they would at all events often belong to
the world even more than to the flesh. (Cf.
ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου, the friendship of the world]
To be compared with
Both φιλία and ἔχθρα doubtless denote here rather states than feelings. To be on terms of friendship with the world involves living on terms of enmity with God. It is neither simply hatred of God nor the being hated by God; but being on a footing of hostility. This explains the genitive.
ὃς ἐὰν οὖν βουληθῇ, whosoever therefore chooses] Here we pass from the footing to the state of mind. There might be much thoughtless and as it were casual love of the world of which St James might hesitate to use this language. But he wishes the contradiction to be recognised and faced. The relation between the two states as such being what he has described, any one who deliberately chooses the one makes himself to belong to the other. Βούλομαι implies purpose, intention, not mere will, but will with premeditation as i. 18. καθίσταταιvirtually “makes himself” as iii. 6.
5ἢ δοκεῖτε ὅτι κενῶς ἡ γραφὴ λέγει, Πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα ὃ κατῴκισεν ἐν ἡμῖν;
5. δοκεῖτε ὅτι, think ye that]
With a different subject, as
κενῶς, in vain] Cf. ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ ii. 20; and κενός is often used with λόγος and ῥῆμα, a word void of meaning.
ἡ γραφὴ λέγει] These words and those that follow stand almost on a level with iii. 6 for difficulty, and the number of solutions proposed is great (see Theile). It is impossible here to examine them in detail. As regards the general construction, πρὸς φθόνον κ.τ.λ. may be joined to what precedes, as the quotation referred to, or it may be taken as a separate sentence affirmative or interrogative: and further τὸ πνεῦμα may be taken either as the subject to ἐπιποθεῖ or as governed by it, and πρὸς φθόνον may be variously understood.
At the outset κατῴκισεν, not -ησεν,
is the reading: so that the verse contains a distinct reference to God, “which
He caused to dwell in us.” This of itself makes it highly probable that
ἐπιποθεῖ has the same subject, making τὸ πνεῦμα accusative, “He longs for the
spirit which He caused to dwell.” The reference here is certainly, as in other
parts of the Epistle, to God’s breathing into man’s nostrils the breath of life
; probably also to
πρὸς φθόνον, jealously] This makes another step. Apparently it can only mean “jealously,” in the same way that πρὸς ὀργήν means “angrily,” πρὸς ἀλήθειαν “truly” etc. This is the only place in the N.T. where πρὸς is so used: but there can be no real doubt about it here.
Is then φθόνον used in a good or
Lastly, are these words independent or a quotation? No one probably would doubt that the form of language suggests a quotation. ὅτι κενῶς ἡ γραφὴ λέγει certainly does not sound as if it were meant to stand absolutely, and there are no words of the O.T. which could readily occur to any one as so clearly expressing the substance of v. 4 as not to need quotation. Also πρὸς φθόνον κ.τ.λ. comes in abruptly as St James’ own words; though fitly enough if they belonged originally to another context.
The difficulty is that no such words can be found. The passages already cited contain however their substantial purport; so that our O.T. Scripture does in a manner furnish them. But it is likely enough that they come directly from some intermediate source now lost to us. There are other reasons for supposing the N.T. writers to have used Greek paraphrases of the O.T. resembling the Hebrew Targums, and the words may have come literally from one of these. In their vocabulary such paraphrases would certainly not always follow the same limitation as the LXX.; and though the LXX. sedulously uses ζῆλος etc. only (there is no trace of φθόνος as a rendering of קִנְאָה in Hexapla), and avoids φθόνος in speaking of God, it by no means follows that a Palestinian paraphrase would do the same.
6μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν· διὸ λέγει, Ὁ θεὸς ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν.
6. Before examining the first six words of the verse, it will be well to
consider the quotation which follows, from which the words
δίδωσιν χάριν are
derived. The form in which St James quotes
ὑπερηφάνοις, scorners]
ὑπερήφανος belongs to all periods of Greek in the
sense “insolent,” being especially used of such evil effects as follow from
The original of
ὑπερήφανοι is לֵצִים, the scorners or scoffers, a word much used
in Proverbs and occasionally elsewhere: see especially Hupfeld on
ἀντιτάσσεται, withstands]
Possibly for יִתְיַצֵּב, ”withstands,” stands in the way.”
But the words in Prov. are הוּא יָלִיץ, “himself sheweth scorn,” of which ἀντιτάσσεται cannot be a direct
translation, but may perhaps be a paraphrase, in the sense “To the scorners God
sets himself face to face,” i.e. meets scorn with scorn (cf. the probable
meaning of μὴ ἀντιστῆναι τῷ πονηρῷ in
ταπεινοῖς δὲ, but to those of low estate]
The K’thibh here has עֲנָיִים, the Q’ri
עֲנָוִים. It is usually said (the case is well stated by Delitzsch on
δίδωσιν χάριν, giveth grace or acceptance] Not to be interpreted as referring to
“grace” in the traditional theological sense. Still less can the phrase
δίδ. χάριν bear here the meaning found in classical writers (Eur.
Suppl. 414; Plat.
Leg. 702 C; 877 A; and later authors), to gratify, do a pleasure or favour to
(gratificor). In the LXX.
χάρις almost always represents חֵן, the primary force
of which is seen in the phrase “find grace in the eyes of,” common in the
historical books. The same books four times have “give grace,” but always with
the same adjunct “in the eyes of,” the giver of the grace or favourable
estimation being thus distinct from the person whose favourable estimation is
given. Of a phrase “give grace” in a sense directly correlative to that of
“finding grace” i.e. “shew favour,” there is no example with
חֵן in the O.T.,
though it finds place in the solitary instance of the cognate
חֲנִינָה (LXX. with a change of person
δώσουσιν ἔλεος)
This the original sense of Proverbs, illustrated by an almost immediately
preceding verse,
The introductory words μείζονα
δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν can now hardly have any other
meaning than this, “But He giveth a greater grace or acceptance than the world
or its friendship can give”: that is, their connexion is with
v. 4, v. 5 being
parenthetic. To connect them directly with v. 5, in the sense “He gives a
(spiritual) grace to aid men to cleave to Him, proportionate to the jealousy
with which He yearns after His spirit within them,” renders the whole of the
quotation irrelevant except the two words already cited, besides involving a
διό, wherefore] The employment of διό in the introductory formula of a quotation
is elsewhere found only in
λέγει, the Scripture saith] Λέγει may have as a
subject ἡ γραφή from
v. 5, or
the implied subject of δίδωσιν, that is, God; or again it may be virtually
impersonal, as in
7Ὑποτάγητε οὖν τῷ θεῷ· ἀντίστητε δὲ τῷ διαβόλῳ, καὶ φεύξεται ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν·
7. From vv. 7 to 10 we have a hortatory digression, starting from the suggestions of v. 6.
ὑποτάγητε οὖν τῷ θεῷ,
Submit yourselves therefore to God] It is hardly
credible that St James should use this phrase without a conscious reference to
its associations in the Psalm from which (LXX.) it virtually comes, and that
Yet doubtless St James’ primary meaning was the simple Greek meaning “submit
yourselves.” In
The aorist imperative (used in this verb by
ἀντίστητε δὲ τῷ διαβόλῳ, but resist the devil] Δέ is omitted in the Rec. Text after the later Syrian text, doubtless because the following initial imperatives have no connecting particles.
The name ὁ διάβολος is used much in the N.T., somewhat more than the transliterated original ὁ Σατανᾶς. Both names occur in Mt., Lk., Jn, Acts, St Paul and Apoc. Apparently in most if not all cases the use of the Greek διάβολος involves a distinct reference to the etymology.
The precise force of the Hebrew name is not free from doubt. Apparently the verb
שָֹטָן (also
שָֹטָם) meant originally to “lie in ambush for,” and so to “bear a
chronic grudge against” or “be a treacherous enemy to.” The subst.
שָֹטָן stands in
Numbers for the angel waylaying Balaam, and in Samuel and Kings for (apparently
secret) enemies, as it were thorns in the side. In the later books it becomes a
proper name for the evil spirit, as an accuser (
There can be little doubt that the writers of the N.T. adopted the term διάβολος directly or indirectly from the LXX.; and this consideration seems to set aside the tempting interpretation suggested by abundant Greek usage as regards the verb, the “severer,” “putter at variance,” in opposition to a “reconciler.” For the equally tempting interpretation “perverter,” that is, “one who turns good to evil,” there is no Greek evidence beyond the occasional sense of διά in composition (as it were, one who casts awry). The biblical origin of the name fixes upon it the sense “malicious accuser,” “of God to men, and of us to God, and again of ourselves to each other” (Chrys. 2 Cor. p. 438 D). There is a special fitness in the word, because it is oftener applied in ordinary Greek to suggested disparagement, whether open or secret, to words or acts intended to produce an unfavourable impression (see Aristotle’s account of διαβολή as a department of forensic rhetoric, Rhet. iii. 15. 1, with Cope’s note), than to formal and definite accusation.
This the proper biblical sense of ὁ διάβολος, of which the sense in which he is called ὁ πειράζων is only another aspect, agrees well with the context here. Trustful submission to God involves resistance to him who tempts men to faithlessness by insinuating disparagement of God’s power or His goodness, backed up with suggestion of the safer and pleasanter friendship of “the world.”
8ἐγγίσατε
τῷ θεῷ, καὶ θγγίσει ὑμῖν. καθαρίσατε χεῖρας, ἀμαρτωλοί,
καὶ ἁγνίσατε καρδίας, δίψυχοι. 9
ταλαιπωρήσατε
καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε· ὁ γέλως ὑμῶν εἰς πένθος
μεταστραπήτω
13
Αγε νῦν οἱ λέγοντες
Σήμερον ἢ αὔριον πορευσόμεθα
εἰς τήνδε τὴν πόλιν καὶ
ποιήσωμεν ἐκεῖ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ
ἐμπορευόωμεθα καὶ κερδήσωμεν·
14 οἵτινες οὐκ ἐπίστασθε
τῆς αὔριον ποία ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν·
ἀτμίς γάρ ἐστε
16
νῦν δὲ καυχᾶσθε ἐν ταῖς ἀλαζονίαις ὑμῶν·
πᾶσα καύχησις τοιαύτη πονηρά ἐστιν. 17
εἰδότι οὖν καλὸν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστίν. V.
1 Αγε νῦν οἱ πλούσιοι, κλαύσατε ὀλολύζοντες ἐπί ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις ὑμῶν ταῖς ἐπερχομ͓ναις.
2 ὁ πλοῦτος ὑμῶν σέσηπεν, καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ὑμῶν σητόβρωτα
γέγονεν, 3
ὁ χρυσὸς ὑμῶν καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος κατίωται,
καὶ ὁ ἰὸς αὐτῶν εἰς μαρτύριον ὑμῖν ἔσται καὶ φάγεται
τὰς σάρκας ὑμῶν·
ὡς πῦρ
7
Μακροθυμήσατε οὖν, ἀδελφοί, ἕως τῆς παρουσίας
τοῦ κυρίου. ἰδοὺ ὁ γεωργὸς ἐκδέχεται τὸν τίμιον καρπὸν
τῆς γῆς, μακροθυμῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἕως λάβῃ πρόϊμον καὶ
ὄψιμον 8
μακροθυμήσατε καὶ ὑμεῖς, στηρίξατε τὰς καρδίας
ὑμῶν, ὅτι ἡ παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου ἤγγικεν 9
μὴ
στενάζετε, ἀδελφοί, κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε·
ἰδοὺ ὁ κριτὴς πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἕστηκεν. 10
ὑπόδειγμα
λάβετε, ἀδελφοί, τῆς κακοπαθίας καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας
τοὺς προφήτας, ὃι ἐλάλησαν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Κυρίου.
11 ἰδοὺ
μακαρίζομεν τοὺς ὑπομείναντας· τὴν ὑπομονὴν Ἰὼβ
ἡκούσατε, καὶ τὸ τέλος Κυρίου εἴδετε, ὅτι
πολύσπλαγχνός
ἐστιν ὁ κύριος
Note on “Brother” improperly used (see p. xx).
Persons or things in pairs,
Fellow-descendants of Israel,
Cf. Tobit passim.
Similarly “sister.”
(
Note on τῆς δόξης (see ii. 1).
[The following is a note by Dr Hort on
Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ is best taken as in apposition to τῆς δόξης, not to τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν. The obvious difficulties of the latter in reference to St Paul’s usage are much increased by μεγάλου, partly by its sense, partly as an adjective merely.
By its sense: cf.
As an adjective, because it compels
θεοῦ to be a pure substantive, and thus
individualises it. It to say the least suggests “division” of “substance,” a
separate Deity, the Deity of Tritheism, not the equally perfect Deity of a
Person of the One Godhead
St Paul does not elsewhere categorically call our Lord the glory of the Father;
but various phrases of his have the same effect. In
Note on ὕλην (iii. 5).
[The following represents Dr Hort’s notes from his letter to Dean Scott of January 28, 1878, written in answer to the Dean’s list of passages intended to show that ὕλη may mean “a forest.”]
In St James “how great a forest” might be tolerated as a paraphrase of “how much woodland,” but not as a literal rendering. Hence a reference to living wood seems rather unlikely, as often fire is connected with ὕλη meaning “cut wood.”
Odyss. v. 63 f.,
ὕλη δὲ σπέος ἀμφιπεφύκει τηλεθόωσα,
κλήθρη τ᾽, αἴγειρός τε, καὶ εὐώδης κυπάρισσος.
Rather “luxuriant tree-age” (like herbage) about the cave: so Il. vi. 147 f.,
φύλλα τὰ μέν τ᾽ ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δέ θ᾽ ὕλη τηλεθόωσα φύει.
Il. xi. 155 ff., wood and a wood equally pertinent:
ὡς δ᾽ ίτε πῦρ ἀΐδηλον ἐν ἀξύλῳ ἐμπέσῃ ὕλῃ,
πάντῃ τ᾽ εἰλυφόων ἄνεμος φέρει, οἱ δέ τε θάμνοι
πρόρριζοι πίπτουσιν ἐπειγόμενοι πυρὸς ὁρμῇ.
Hes. op. 506 ff.,
μέμυκε δὲ γαῖα καὶ ὕλη·
πολλὰς δὲ δρῦς ὑψικόμους ἐλάτας τε παχείας
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃς πιλνᾷ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ
ἐμπίπτων, καὶ πᾶσα βοᾷ τότε νήριτος ὕλη.
“Woodland” (the forest region) is more coordinate with γαῖα than “a forest” would be: cf. also νήριτος, 509.
Thuc. ii. 77. If the sentence,
ἤδη γὰρ ἐν ὄρεσιν ὕλη τριφθεῖσα ὑπ᾽ ἀνέμων
πρὸς αὑτὴν ἀπὸ ταὑτομάτου πῦρ καὶ φλόγα ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνῆκεν,
stood alone, it
would be Il. xi. 155 over again. But just before
ὕλη twice means “wood”
indefinitely (cut wood): hence there is a presumption that here again
ὕλη is
“wood” indefinitely. The same thing is spoken of in two states, cut and living:
a transition from cut wood to a forest would be much more violent.
At saepe in magnis fit montibus, inquis, ut altis
Arboribus vicina cacumina summa terantur
Inter se, validis facere id cogentibus austris,
Donec flammai fulserunt flore coorto.
Aristot. H. A. ix. 11. 3 (615 a 15), ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ κατοικοῦσιν, is distinctly in favour of the indefinite use. He coordinates τοῖς ὄρεσι with τῇ ὕλῃ (the forest region). So still more c. 32 (618 b 21), οὗτος (sc. the white-tailed eagle) κατὰ τὰ πεδία καὶ τὰ ἄλση καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις γίνεται . . . πέτεται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὄρη καὶ εἰς τὴν ὕλην διὰ τὸ θάρσος, where τὰ ἄλση bears the same relation to τὰ πεδία that ἡ ὕλη does to τὰ ὄρη.
Theocr. xxii. 36,
παντοίην δ᾽ ἐν ὄρει θηεύμενοι ἄγριον ὕλην.
Παντοίην favours the same use.
Soph. O. T. 476 ff.,
The sing. ὕλαν with plur. ἄντρα: ὑπό irrelevant, whether as “seeking the covert of,” or simply “under the covert of.”
Eur. Hipp. 215,
πέμπετέ μ᾽ εἰς ὄρος· εἶμι πρὸς ὕλαν
καὶ παρὰ πεύκας,
forest region, like “the (collective) mountain.” Cf. Scott, Lady of the Lake, iii 16,
“He is gone on the mountain,
He is lost to the forest.”
On the other hand, Herodian’s use, vii. 2. 4 (λίθων μὲν γὰρ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς (sc. the Germans) ἢ πλίνθων ὀπτῶν σπάνις, ὗλαι δ᾽ εὔδενδροι), 5 (οἱ δὲ Γερμανοὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν πεδίων καὶ εἴτινες ἦσαν χῶραι ἄδενδροι ἀνακεχωρήκεσαν· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὕλαις ἐκρύπτοντο, περί τετὰ ἕλη διέτριβον), also viii. 1. 2 (ἐν κοιλάσιν ὀρῶν ἢ λόχμαις ὕλαις τε), is at first sight individual, and may be so. But in the absence of other clear evidence, I suspect that it is collective. Thus Plutarch Pyrrh. 25, δασεῖαν ὕλαις ὁδόν; while also Aratus 32, πόπον ὕλης γέμοντα. Aristotle just after the above place has (618 b 28) οὗτος οἰκεῖ ὄρη καὶ ὕλας, though the evidence already given makes a strictly individual sense improbable.
Aristotle’s collective sense of the singular with the article is well
illustrated by Xenoph. Cyn. vi. 12 (δήσαντα δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης τὰς κύνας); ix. 2
(τὰς μὲν κύνας δῆσαι ἄποθεν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης),
19 (^ἰς δικρόας τῆς ὕλης); x. 7 (ἐπιβάλλοντας τοὺς βρόχους ἐπί ἀποσχαλιδώματα τῆς ὕλης δίκρα); Plato
Crit. 107 C (γῆν μὲν καὶ ὄρη καὶ ποταμοὺς
καὶ ὕλην οὐρανόν τε ξύμπαντα);
Polit. 272 A (καρποὺς δὲ ἀφθόνους εἶχον ἀπό τε δένδρων καὶ πολλῆς ὕλης ἄλλης. No doubt forest trees were included, but the predominating and
sometimes exclusive meaning
Note on τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως (iii. 6).
[The following references in further illustration of this phrase have been taken from the marginal notes in Dr Hort’s Greek Testament and from his other MSS.]
On the wheel or circle of human affairs (their reverses) see a large collection of passages in Gataker on Marcus Aurelius ix. 28.
On the Orphic and Pythagorean wheel or circle of Genesis (metempsychosis) see Lobeck, Aglaophamus, 797-800.
On the general cycle of growth and decay see Simplicius Comm. in Epict. Ench. p. 94 B, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε τῇ ψυχῆ κακόν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ σώματος νόσος, εἴπερ ἰατρεία οὖσα τῆς ψυχῆς δέδεικται καὶ φαίνεται πολλαχοῦ ἐναργῶς αὐτή. καὶ εἰ ἐπιβλαβὴς δὲ τῷ μερικῷ σώματι ἡ νόσος ἦν καὶ ἡ φθορὰ αὐτῆς, ὡφέλιμος δὲ οὖσα ἐφαίνετο τῇ τε τοῦ χρωμένου ψυχῇ, καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς συστάσει τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ στοιχείων, καὶ τῷ ἀπεράντῳ τῆς γενέσεως κύκλῳ, διὰ τοῦτο ἐπ᾽ ἄπειρον προϊόντι, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἄλλου φθορὰν ἄλλου γένεσιν εἶναι. So ὁ τῆς γενέσεως ποταμός, Plutarch, de consolat. (ii. 106 F).
Plato, Leg. x. p. 898 (Jowett’s translation), “Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre like globes (μίμημά τι κύκλων) made in a lathe, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind (τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ). . . . In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the motion of a globe (σφαίρας ἐντόρνου ἀπεικασμένα φοραῖς), we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to our ingenuity. . . . Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round (ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα), either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven” (τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἐναντίαν).
Iamblichus de myster. viii. 6, λέγεις τοίνυν ὡς Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ολείους, καὶ τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων ἀνῆψεν κινήσεως. τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχει δεῖ δίχα πλειόνων ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑρραϊκῶν σοι νοημάτων διερμηνεῦσαι. δύο γὰρ ἔχει ψυχὰς, ὡς ταῦτά φησι τὰ γράμματα, ὁ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ ἡ μέν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοητοῦ μετέχουσα καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ, ἐνδιδομένη ἐκ τῆς τῶν οὐρανίων περιφορᾶς, εἰς ἣν ἐπεισέρπει ἡ θεοπτικὴ ψυχή. τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν κόσμων εἰς ἡμᾶς καθήκουσα ψυχὴ, ταῖς περιόδοις συνακολουθεῖ τῶν κόσμων· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ νοητῶς παροῦσα, τῆς γενεσιουργοῦ κινήσεως ὑπερέχει, καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν ἥ τε λύσις γίνεται τῆς εἱμαρμένγς, καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς νοητοὺς θεοὺς ἄνοδος, θεουργία τε, ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον ἀνάγεται, κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἀποτελεῖται..
Clement Strom. v. 8 (pp. 672 f.), ἀλλὰ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ Θρᾷξ ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς ἐμφάσεως περὶ τοῦ τῶν τροχίσκων συμβόλου φησὶ κατὰ λέξιν· ἐσήμαινον γοῦν οὐ διὰ λέξεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων ἔνιοι τὰς πράξεις, διὰ λέξεως μὲν ὡς ἔχει τὰ λεγόμενα Δελφικὰ παραγγέλματα, τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια, διὰ δὲ συμβόλων ὡς ὅ τε τροχὸς ὁ στρεφόμενος ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν τεμένεσιν εἱλκυσμένος παρὰ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ τὸ τῶν θαλλῶν τῶν διδομένων τοῖς προσκυνοῦσι. φησὶ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς ὁ Θρᾴκιος·
θαλλῶν δ᾽ ὅσσα βροτοῖσιν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἔργα μέμηλεν,
οὑδὲν ἔχει μίαν αἶσαν ἐπὶ φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ κυκλεῖται,
πάντα πέριξ, στῆναι δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν μέρος οὐ θέμις ἐστίν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει, ὡς ἤρξαντο, δρόμου
μέρος ἶσον ἕκαστος.
Cf. Plutarch Numa 14 (i. 69 f.) τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις τρόχοις αἰνίττεταί τι.
Nilus Sentent. 193 (Orelli Opusc. Sent. i. 344) [1245 A, B, Migne], Γέλα μὲν τοῦ βίου τὸν τροχόν, ἀτάκτως κυλιόμενον· φυλάττου δὲ τὸν βόθρον [τροχὸν, Migne] εἰς ὃν κυλίει τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ νυστάζοντας. Cf. 122, p. 334 [1260 D], Σκιᾷ καὶ τροχῷ τὰ λυπηρὰ τοῦ βίου καὶ τὰ φαιδρὰ παράβαλλε· ὡς γὰρ σκιὰ οὐ μένει, καὶ ὡς τροχὸς κυλίεται; and 140, p. 338 [1240 C], Εἰ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν ὄντως ποθεῖς, προσδέχου ἀεὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον θάνατον, καὶ μίσει τὸν παρόντα βίον· ὁρᾷς γὰρ τὸν τροχὸν ἀτάκτως κυλιόμενον.
On the whole passage cf. Andrewes, Sermons 603 f. [Library Ang. Grath. Th. iii.
p. 122], “The tongue is the substantive and subject of all the rest. It is so;
and God can send from Heaven no better thing, nor the devil from hell no worse
thing than it. ‘The best member we have,’ saith the Prophet [
“The best, if it be of God’s cleaving; if it be of His lightening with the fire of Heaven; if it be one that will sit still, if cause be. The worst, if it come from the devil’s hands. For he, as in many other, so in the sending of tongues, striveth to be like God; as knowing well they are every way as fit instruments to work mischief by, as to do good with.”
Note on ἐσπαταλήσατε (v. 5).
Ps.-Theano Ep. 1 [p. 741] (Gale Opusc. mythol. 86), εἰδυῖα ὅτι τὰ σπαταλῶντα τῶν παιδίων, ὅταν ἀκμάσῃ πρὸς ἄνδρας, ἀνδράποδα γίνεται, τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς ἀφαίρει. The epistle is all about luxurious and indulgent education.
Nilus Sentent. 319 (Orelli i. 368) ὁ δὲ ἐμπλατύνων ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ διὰ σπατάλης καὶ μέθης καὶ δόξης ἀπανθούσης κ.τ.λ.
Anthologia Palatina xi. 402 σπατάλη bis, κατασπαταλᾷς, with reference to luxurious eating; ix. 642, σπατάλημα, of luxurious food.
Gloss ap. Steph., σπαταλάω delicias ago.
Polybius excerpta Vaticana p. 451 [xxxvii. 4, 6 ed. Didot] πλουσίους το͛τους καταλιπεῖν (τ. παῖδας) καὶ σπαταλῶντας θρέψαι.
Clement Strom. iii. 7 (p. 538): We must practise ἐγκράτεια not only περὶ τὰ ἀφροbίσια, but also περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα σπαταλῶσα ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἀρκουμένη τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, περιεπγαζομένη δὲ τὴν χλιδήν.
Eustathius bis ap. Steph., τῶν σπαταλώντων μνηστήρων.
Anth. Pal. v. 18: τοῖς σπατάλοις κλέμμασι, . . . ἐκ σπατάλης, of the ointments and other luxurious equipments of rich ladies (τῶν σοβαρῶν).
Ib. v. 27. 6,
καὶ σοβαρῶν ταρσῶν χρυσοφόρος σπατάλη
νῦν πενιχρὴ κ.τ.λ.
ταῦτα τὰ τῶν σπαταλῶν τέρματα παλλακίδων.
Ib. vii. 206. 6 (on a cat killed for eating a partridge),
οἱ δὲ μύες νῦν
ὀρχοῦνται τῆς σῆς δραξάμενοι σπατάλης.
Ib. vi. 74. 8,
παρρίψασα δὲ κισσὸν
χεῖρα περισφίγξω χρυσοδέτῳ σπατάλῃ.
Ib. v. 271. 2,
τὴν χρυσοκροτάλῳ σειομένην σπατάλῃ.
Epiphanius i. 812 A, εἰ ἑώρα τινὰ ἐν τρυφῇ καὶ σπατάλῃ.
“Bardesanes” ap. Euseb. Prep. En. vi. 10 (p. 276 A): From the conjunction of Ares and Paphia in Crius of οἱ Χαλδαίζοντες say are born τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ σπατάλους. Cureton says the corresponding Syriac word is unknown to him: dissolutos is the Latin of Rufinus.
Philo de sept. spect. i. 5, σπάταλον καὶ βασιλικὸν τὸ φιλοτέχνημα (the Hanging Gardens).
Chrysostom (on
Hermas
Ps.-Chrysost. de poen. (ix. 777 E), ὁ σπαταλιστὴς ἐκεῖνος, sc. Dives in the parable.
N.T. latt. (1)
delicata est Cyp Tert 171
in deliciis agit d pp
” ” est vg pp
” ” vivit pp g1
deliciosa ” g2
All the biblical passages and some of the others suggest simply luxurious and self-indulgent living. The leading idea is probably luxurious feeding, as several times in Anth. Pal. and in Chrysostom.
Perhaps “ye lived delicately on the earth and were luxurious”
(
None of the passages bear out the supposed connexion with σπαθάω, to lavish. Rather (as Lobeck) from σπάω, to suck down.
Peculiarities of vocabulary in the Codex Corbeiensis of
St James.
i. | 3 (also 4; v. 11) |
ὑπομονή | suferentia |
|
4 bis (also 25; iii. 2) |
τέλειος | consummatus | ||
7 | οἰέσθω | speret | ||
10 (also 11; ii. 5; v. 1) |
πλούσιος | locuples | ||
11 | εὐπρέπεια | dignitas | ||
πορείαις | actu | |||
13 | ἀπείραστός (ἐστιν) | temptator non (est) | ||
14 | δελεάζεται | elicitor (cod. eliditur) | ||
15 | ἀποκυεῖ |
(?) adquirit | ||
17 | δόσις παραλλαγή |
datio permutatio |
||
τροπή (? ῥοπή) | (?) momentum (cod. modicum) | |||
ἀποσκίασμα | obumbratio | |||
18 | κτισμάτων | conditionum | ||
21 | ἀποτίθεμαι | expono | ||
πραΐτης | clementia | |||
22 | παραλεγιζόμ^νοι (ἑαυτούς) | (?) aliter consiliantes | ||
23 | γένεσις |
natale | ||
24 | εὐθέως | in continenti | ||
25 | ἀκροατής |
audiens | ||
26 | θρησκός | religiosus | ||
26, 27 | θρησκεία | religio | ||
27 | θλίψις | tribulatio | ||
ii. | 1 | προσωπολημψίαις | acceptione personarum | |
9 | προσωπολημπτέω | personas accipio | ||
1 | τῆς δόξης | honoris (cod. honeris) | ||
3 | ὑποπόδιον | scamellum | ||
4 | διακρίνομαι |
dijudicer | ||
5 | ἐπαγγέλλομαι |
expromitto | ||
6 | ἡτιμάσατε | frustrastis (cod. -atis) | ||
καταδυναστεύουσιν ὑμῶν | potentantur in vobis | |||
8 | τελεῖτε | consummamini |
||
9 | ἐλέγχω | traduco | ||
12 | ἐλευθερία |
liberalitas | ||
13 | κατακαυχῶμαι |
superglorior | ||
14 (also i. 21; iv. 12; v. 15, 20 | σώζω | salvo | ||
16 | χορτάζεσθε | estote satulli | ||
22 | συνεργέω | communico | ||
23 | λογίζω | aestimo | ||
25 | πόρνη ἀγγέλους |
fornicaria exploratores |
||
iii. | 3 | πείθομαι | consentio |
|
4 | (ὅπου) | ubicumque |
||
6 | γένεσις |
nativitas | ||
7 | ἐναλίων | natantium | ||
11 | βρύω | bullio (trans.) | ||
12 | πικρόν ἁλυκόν |
} | salmacidum | |
13 | ἐπιστήμων | disciplinosus | ||
14 | (κατα)καυχᾶσθε |
alapamini | ||
15 | ψυχικός δαιμονιώδης |
animalis demonetica |
||
17 | ἐπιεικής | verecundie | ||
εὐπειθής | consentiens |
|||
sine dijudicatione | ||||
(?) | inreprehensibilis | |||
ἀνυπόκριτος | sine hypocrisi | |||
iv. | 2 | ζηλοῦτε | zelatis | |
μάχεσθε | rixatis | |||
3 | ἡδοναί |
libidines | ||
δαπανάω | erogo | |||
4 | μοιχαλίδες | fornicatores | ||
5 | ἐπιποθέω | (?) convalesco | ||
(?) concupisco as vg.) | ||||
8 | ἁγνίζω | sanctifico | ||
11 ter | καταλαλέω | retracto de | ||
12 | νομοθέτης | legum positor | ||
13 (also v. 1) | ἄγε νῦν | jam nunc | ||
14 | ἀτμίς | momentum |
||
πρὸς ὀλίγον | per modica (? per modicú) | |||
ἀφανίζω | extermino | |||
16 | καύχησις |
gloria (? gloriatio for talis follows) | ||
v. | 2 | σητόβρωτα γέγονεν | tiniaverunt | |
3 | κατίωται | aeruginavit | ||
φάγεται | manducabit (of rust) | |||
4 | τῶν θερισάντων | qui araverunt in | ||
5 | σπαταλάω | abutor | ||
τρέφω | cibo | |||
7 | τίμιον καρπόν | honoratum fructum | ||
8 | στηρίζω | conforto | ||
ἐγγίζω | adpropio | |||
10 | ὑπόδειγμα | experimentum | ||
τῆς κακοπαθίας |
de malls passionibus | |||
11 | πολύσπλαγχνος (? -ως) | visceraliter | ||
12 | ἄλλογ τινά | alterutrum | ||
13 | κακοπαθέω |
anxio | ||
ψαλλέτω | psalmum dicat | |||
16 | ἐνεργουμένη | frequens | ||
17 | ὁμοιοπαθής | similis | ||
18 | βλαστάνω | germino (trans.) | ||
19, 20 | ἐπιστρέφω | revoco |
(The references in brackets are to the occurrences in James of annotated words.)
ἀγαθός 29, 52, 86 (i. 17; iii. 17)
ἀγαπάω 21, 51 (i. 12; ii. 5, 8)
ἄγγελος 66 (ii. 25)
ἁγνός 85 f. (iii. 15)
ἀδελφή 58 (ii. 15)
ἀδελφός 14, 27, 45, 57, 58, 67, 78, 102 (i. 2, 9, 16, 19; ii. 1, 5, 14, 15; iii. 1, 10, 12; iv. 11 ter; v. 7, 9, 10, 12, 19)
ἀδιάκριτος 86 f. (iii. 17)
ἀδικία. 71f. (iii. 6)
αἰτέω 90 f. (i. 5, 6; iv. 2, 3 bis)
ἀκαταστασία 85 (iii. 16)
ἀκτάστατος 13, 76 (i. 8; iii. 8)
ἀκούω 50 (i. 19; ii. 5; v. 11)
ἀκροατής 38, 41 f. (i. 22, 23, 25)
ἀλαζών contrasted with ὑπερήφανος 95
ἀλήθεια 33f., 83 (i. 18; iii. 14; v. 19)
ἁλυκὸν 80 (iii. 12)
ἁμαρτία 26, 54 (i. 15 bis; ii. 9; iv. 17; v. 15, 16, 20)
ἀμίαντος 43 f. (i. 27)
Ἀναβαθμοὶ Ἰακώβου xxii
ἀναστροφή 80 (iii. 13)
ἀνατέλλω 16 (i. 11)
ἀναφέρω 63 (ii. 21)
ἀνέλεος 56 (ii. 13)
ἀνεμίζω 10 (i. 6)
ἀνήρ 12, 36, 68 (i. 8, 12, 20, 23; ii. 2; iii. 2)
ἀνθρώπινος 75 (iii. 7)
ἄνθρωπος 35, 62, 77 (i. 7, 19; ii. 20, 24; iii. 8, 9; v. 17)
ἀνυπόκριτος 87 (iii. 17)
ἄνωθεν 29 (i. 17; iii. 15, 17)
ἀπαρχή 35 (i. 18)
ἅπας 68 (iii. 2)
ἀπατάω 43 (i. 26)
ἀπείραστός 22 f. (i. 13)
ἀπέρχομαι 40 (i. 24)
ἁπλῶς 7 ff. (i. 5)
ἀπό c. gen. 21
ἀποσκίασμα 31 (i. 17)
ἀποτελέω 26 (i. 15)
ἀργός 62 f. (ii. 20)
ἀτιμάζω 51 (ii. 6)
αὐτός 23 (i. 13)
αὐχέω 70 (iii. 5)
βασιλικός xxvi f., 53f. (ii. 8)
βλασφημέω 52 (ii. 7)
βλέπω 63f. (ii. 22)
βούλομαι 32 f., 69 f., 93 (i. 18; iii. 4; iv. 4)
βραδύς 36 (i. 19 bis)
βρύω 79 (iii. 11)
γέεννα 74 (iii. 6)
γένεσις 39, 72 ff., 106 f. (i. 23; iii. 6)
γίνομαι 38, 41, 77 f. (i. 12, 22, 25; ii. 4, 10, 11; iii. 1, 9, 10; v. 2)
γινώσκω 5, 62 (i. 3; ii. 20; v. 20)
γλῶσσα 71, 75 f. (i. 26; iii. 5, 6 bis, 8)
γραφή, ἡ 54, 64, 93 f. (ii. 8, 23; iv. 5)
γυμνός 58 (ii. 15)
δαιμόνιον 61 f. (ii. 19)
δαιμονιώδης 84 f. (iii. 15)
δαπανάω 91 (iv. 3)
δεῖ contrasted with χρή 78
δείκνυμι 80 (ii. 18 bis; iii. 13)
δελεάζω 25 (i. 14)
διά c. gen. 55f.
διάβολος 98 f. (iv. 7)
διακρίνομαι l0, 49 (i. 6 bis; ii. 4)
διαλογίζομαι in the Gospels 10
διαλογισμός 50 (ii. 4)
διασπορά xxii. f., 3, 67, 92 (i. 1)
διδάσκαλος 67 (iii. 1)
δίδωμι 9 f., 96 (i. 5 bis; ii. 16; iv. 6 bis; v. 18)
δικαιοσύνη 36, 87 (i. 20; ii. 23; iii. 18)
δικαιόω 63, 65 (ii. 21, 24, 25)
δοκίμιον 5 (i. 3)
δόκιμος 19 (i. 12)
δόξα, ἡ 47 f., 103 f. (ii. 1)
δόσις 28 (i. 17)
δοῦλος 1 f. (i. 1)
δώδεκα xxiii. 2 (i. 1)
δώρημα 28 (i. 17)
εἰκών contrasted with ὁμο̥ωσις 77 f.
εἰρήνη 3, 59, 87 (ii. 16; iii. 18 bis)
εἰρηνικός 86 (iii. 17)
εἰ τό c. infin. 35, 69
εἶτα 26 (i. 15)
ἐκβάλλω 66 (ii. 25)
ἐκκλησία 48 f. (v. 14)
ἐκλέγομαι 50 (ii. 5)
ἐκπίπτω 17 (i. 11)
ἐλέγχω 54 (ii. 9)
ἔλεος 56 f., 86 (ii. 13 bis; iii. 17)
ἐλευθερία 41, 56 (i. 25; ii. 12)
ἕλκω 52 (ii. 6)
ἔμφυτος 37 f. (i. 21)
ἐν 76, 88, 91
ἐνάλιος 75 (iii. 7)
ἔνι 30 (i. 17)
ἔνοχος 55 (ii. 10)
ἐξέλκω 25 f. (i. 14)
ἐπαγγέλλομαι 20 (i. 12; ii. 5)
ἐπιβλέπω ἐπὶ 49 (ii. 3)
ἐπίγειος 84 (iii. 15)
ἐπιεικής 86 (iii. 17)
ἐπιθυμέω 89 (iv. 2)
ἐπικαλοῦμαι 52 (ii. 7)
ἐπιλησμονή 41 f. (i. 25)
ἐπισκέπτομαι 44 (i. 27)
ἐπιστήμων 80 (iii. 13)
ἐπιτήδειος 59 (ii. 16)
ἐπιτυγχάνω 90 (iv. 2)
ἐργάζομαι 36, 54 (i. 20; ii. 9)
ἔργον 5 f., 41 f., 57-67, 80 f. (i. 4, 25; ii. 14, 17, 18 ter, 20, 21, 22 bis, 24, 25, 26; iii. 13)
ἑρπετόν 75 (iii. 7)
ἕτερος 66 (ii. 25)
εὐθύνω 69 (iii. 4)
εὐλογέω 76 f. (iii. 9)
εὐπειθής 86 (iii. 17)
εὐπρέπεια 38 (i. 11)
ἐφήμερος 58 (ii. 15)
ἔχω 46, 89 f. (i. 4; ii. 1, 14, 17, 18; iii. 14; iv. 2 bis)
ζῆλος 81, 89 f., 94 (iii. 14, 16)
ζηλόω 89 f. (iv. 2)
ἡλίκος 70 (iii. 5)
θέλω 32 f., 62 (ii. 20; iv. 15)
θεὸς καὶ πατήρ 44; εἷς θεὸς ἔστιν 61
θερμαίνω 59 (ii. 16)
θηρίον 75 (iii. 7)
θρησκός 42 (i. 26)
Ἰησοῦς Χριστός 1 f., 47 (i. 1; ii. 1)
ἵππος 69 (iii. 3)
καθαρός 43 f. (i. 27)
καθίσταμαι 72, 93 (iii. 6; iv. 4)
κακός, κακῶς 23, 76, 91 (i. 13; iii. 8; iv. 3)
καλός, καλῶς 49. 52, 80 (ii. 3, 7, 8, 19; iii. 13; iv. 17)
καρδία 83 (i. 26; iii. 14; iv. 8; v. 5, 8)
καρπός 87 (iii. 17, 18; v. 7, 18)
καταβαίνω 29 (i. 17)
καταδυναστεύω, 52 (ii. 6)
κατακαυχῶμαι 56 f., 70, 83 (ii. 13, iii. 14)
καταρῶμαι 77 (iii. 9)
κατεργάζομαι 5 (i. 3)
καύσων 16 f. (i. 11)
κενός, κενῶς 62, 93 (ii. 20; iv. 5)
κληρονόμοι τῆς βασιλείας xii. 51 (ii. 5)
κλύδων 10 (i. 6)
κόσμος 44 f., 51, 71 f., 92 f. (i. 27; ii. 5; iii. 6; iv. 4 bis)
κρίμα 67 f. (iii. 1)
κρίσις 56 f. (ii. 13 bis; v. 12)
κριτήρια 52 (ii. 6)
κριτής 50 (ii. 4; iv. 11, 12; v. 9)
κτίσις and γένεσις 39
κτίσμα 35 (i. 18)
κύριος 1 f., 47, 77 (cum art. i. 7; ii. 1; iii. 9; iv. 15; v. 7, 8, [11], [14], 15: sine art. i. 1; iv. 10; v. 4, 10, 11)
λέγει (sc. ἡ γραφή) 97 (iv. 7: cf. ii. 23; iv. 5)
λείπομαι 6 f., 58 (i. 4, 5; ii. 15)
λόγος 33 f., 37 f., 38, 68 (i. 18, 21, 22, 23; iii. 2)
μαραίνομαι 18 (i. 11)
μάταιος 43 (i. 26)
μάχη 88 (iv. 1)
μάχομαι 90 (iv. 2)
μεγαλ9αυχέω 70 (μεγάλα αὐχεῖ, iii. 5)
μέλος 72, 89 (iii. 5, 6; iv. 1)
μέντοι 53 (ii. 8)
μήτι 78 (iii. 11)
μοιχαλίδες 91 f. (iv. 4)
νόμος 41, 53-56 (i. 25; ii. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; iv. 11 quater)
οἶδα 35, 67 (i. 19; iii. 1; iv. 4, 17)
ὁλόκληρος 6 (i. 4)
ὁμοίωσις 77 f. (iii. 9)
ὀνειδίζω 9 (i. 5)
ὄνομα 52 f. (ii. 7; v. 10, 14)
ὀπή 79 (iii. 11)
ὁράω 65 (ii. 24)
ὁρμή 69 (iii. 4)
ὅταν 3 (i. 2)
παρά c. dat. 30, 44 (i. 17, 27)
παρακύπτω 40 f. (i. 25)
παραλλαγή 30 f. (i. 17)
παραλογίζομαι 39 (i. 22)
παραμένω 41 (i. 25)
παρέρχομαι 16 (i. 10)
πᾶς 3, 35, 74 (i. 2, 5, 8, 17 bis, 19, 21; ii. 10; iii. 7, 16; iv. 16; v. 12
πατήρ 29 f., 44, 77 (i. 17, 27; ii. 21; iii. 9)
πειράζω 4 f., 21 ff. (i. 13 ter, 14)
πειρασμός 4 f., 21 f. (i. 2, 12)
περιπίπτω 3 f. (i. 2)
περισσεία 36 (i. 21)
πετεινόν 75 (iii. 7)
πηγή 78 f. (iii. 11)
πηδάλιον 69 f. (iii. 4)
πίστις 10, 46, 57-67 (i. 3, 6; ii. 1, 5, 14 bis, 17, 18 ter, 20, 22 bis, 24, 26; v. 15)
πληρόω 64 (ii. 23)
πλούσιος 51f. (i. 10, 11; ii. 5, 6; v. 1)
ποιέω (as used in iii. 12) 80
ποιῆσις 42 (i. 25)
ποιητής 38, 41 f. (i. 22, 23, 25; iv. 11)
ποικίλος 5 (i. 2)
πολεμέω 90 (iv. 2)
πόλεμος 87 f. (iv. 1)
πορεία 18 (i. 11)
πόρνη 65 (ii. 25)
πρᾶγμα 85 (iii. 16)
πραΰτης 36 f., 81 (i. 21; iii. 13)
προσωπολημπτέω 54 (ii. 9)
προσωπολημψία 46 (ii. 1)
πρόσωπον 17 f., 39 (i. 11, 23)
πταίω 55, 68 (ii. 10; iii. 2 bis)
Ῥαάβ 65 f. (ii. 25)
ῥιπίζω 10 f. (i. 6)
ῥυπαρία 36 (i. 21)
ῥυπαρός 49 (ii. 2)
σοφία 7, 81, 83, 85 (i. 5; iii. 13, 15, 17)
σοφός 80 (iii. 15)
σπαταλάω 107 ff. (v. 5)
σπιλόω 72 (iii. 6)
στέφανος τ. ζωῆς, ὁ xii. 19 f. (i. 12)
στρατεύομαι 88 (iv. 1)
συλλαμβάνω 26 (i. 15)
συναγωγή 48 f. (ii. 2)
συνεργέω 64 (ii. 22)
σώζω 38, 58 (i. 21; ii. 14; iv. 12; v. 15, 20)
ταπεινός 15, 95 f. (i. 9; iv. 6)
ταπείνωσις 15 (i. 10)
ταχύς 35 f. (i. 19)
τέλειος 6, 29, 41, 68 (i. 4 bis, 17, 25; iii. 2)
τελειόω 64 (ii. 22)
τελέω 53 (ii. 8)
τίκτω 26 (i. 15)
τις distinguished from ὅς 80
τροπή 31 (i. 17)
τροχὸν τ. γενέσεως, ὁ xii, 72 ff., 106 f. (iii. 6)
ὑβριστής contrasted with ὑπερήφανος 95
ὕλη 70 f., 104 f. (iii. 5)
ὑπάγω 59 (ii. 16)
ὑπάρχω 58 (ii. 15)
ὑπερήφανος 94 f. (iv. 6)
ὑποδέχομαι 66 (ii. 25)
ὑποτάσσομαι 97 f. (iv. 7)
ὕψος 15 (i. 9)
φαῦλος 85 (iii. 16)
φθονέω 89 (see iv. 2)
φθόνος 93 f. (iv. 5)
φιλία 92 f. (iv. 4)
φλογίζω 72, 74 (iii. 6 bis)
φονεύω 89 (ii. 11 bis; iv. 2; v. 6)
φρίσσω 61 (ii. 19)
φύσις 74 (iii. 7)
χαίρειν 3 (i. 1)
χαλιναγωγέω 43, 68 f. (i. 26; iii. 2)
χάρις 96 (iv. 6 bis)
χορτάζω 59 (ii. 16)
χρή 78 (iii. 10)
Χριστιανός 52 f.
χρυσοδακτύλιος 49 (ii. 2)
ψυχικός 84 (iii. 15)
Aboth 34, 38 f., 41
Abraham xxvi f., 4, 63 ff.
Achilles Tatius 40
Acta Johannis 23
Aelian 25, 37, 49, 75
Alexander Polyhistor 65
Alford (Dean) 93
Ambrose xxx, 35
Ambrosiaster xxix
Ammonius 32
Andrewes (Bp) 31, 107
Anthologia Palatina 10, 108
Antioch xxiii f., 52
aorist tense 16, 39 f.
“apostle,” meaning of xvi ff.
Apostolic Constitutions 12 f.
Aristobulus 34
Artemidorus 49
Arzareth 2
Ast 61
Athanasius 25, 37 f., 40
Athenagoras 23, 29
Augustine xiii, xxix, 34, 48, 62
Bardesanes 108
Barnabas, Epistle of xiii, 12 f., 37, 108
Basil 31, 40
Bassett (F. T.) xiv
Bede 7, 13, 62
Bengel 27, 47
Berachoth 22
Bereshith Rabba 65, 78
Bonnell xiii
Brethren of the Lord xix ff.
“Brother” improperly used 102
Buttmann 32 f.
Calvin 12
Carthage, Council of xiii
Cassiodorus xxvii
Cheyne (Dr) 41, 45, 64
“Christianity without Judaism” x
Chromatius xxix
Chrysostom xix, xxviii, 10, 72, 83, 99, 108, (109)
Clement of Alexandria xxi, xxvii, 29, 37, 79, 85 f., 107, 108
Clement of Rome and Pseudo-Clement xxv f., 2, 5, 12, 43, 64, 90
Clementine Homilies xi, 24, 65
Clementine Recognitions xxii, 65
Clopas xix f.
Codex Corbeiensis xiii, xxx, 109 ff.
Cosmas xxvi, xxix
Creuzer 26
Cyprian xxvii
Cyril of Alexandria xxviii
dative case 75
Delitzsch (Franz) 41, 45, 48, 55, 77 f., 84, 94, 95
Didaché 13
Didymus xxviii, 82
Dindorf (W.) 32 f.
Diodorus Siculus 7, 23, 41, 52, 74
Diogenes Laertius 6, 68, 73
Dion Cassius 10, 11, 29, 30 f., 40
Dionysius of Alexandria xxvii f.
Dioscorides 4
Drusius 71
Ebionism xxi f., 1, 24, 49, 52
Ellicott (Bp) 5
Epictetus 3, 13, 62, 69, 98, 106
Epiphanius xix ff., 49, 108
Erasmus 18, 89
Erskine (Thomas) 27 f.
Eusebius xxviii
Eustathius 12, 39, 68, 108
Ewald xx, 7
Friedländer 93
Fritzsche 5, 7, 17, 81
Galen l0, 23, 59
Gataker 106
Gaudentius xxix
genitive case 42, 50, 72
Gregory of Neocaesarea xxviii
Grotius 60, 72
Harnack 48
Hebrews, Gospel according to the xix
Hegesippus xv, xxii f.
Heinsius 37
Heisen 37
Helvidian theory xix ff.
Herder 18
Hermas xxvi, 12, 48, 85, 109
Herodian (grammarian) 16
Herodian (historian) 5, 27, 105
Hesychius 10, 42, 81 f.
Hilary of Poictiers xxx
Hilgenfeld 72 f.
Himerius 8
Hofmann 89
Holder xiii
Hupfeld 46, 95
Iamblichus 5, 106
Ignatius and Pseudo-Ign. 5, 6, 13, 23, 37, 98
Irenaeus xxvi f., 41, 84
Isidore of Seville xiii
James (St) the son of Zebedee xiii f.
James (St) the son of Alphaeus xiv, xvi
James (St) the Just, the Lord’s brother xiii ff, 1
James (St), The Epistle of, relation to O. and N.T. x f., xxxiii; to St Paul x f., xxiv f., 66 f.; to Synoptic Gospels xi, xxxiii, et al.; authorship xi ff.; readers xxii ff.; circumstances and date xxiv f.; reception xxv ff.; purpose and contents xxxi ff.; style xxxiii
Jerome xiii f., xix ff., xxix, 17, 49
John of Damascus 12
Josephus xv, xxi ff., 1, 2, 6, 8, 23, 48, 84, 93
Jude (St) xv
Junilius xxix
Justin and Pseudo-Just. 36, 58
Kern xii
Lactantius 62
Leontius xxviii
Libanius 7
Liber Jacobi 2
Liber Jubilaeorum 65
Lightfoot (Bp) xv, xix f., xxii, 12, 28, 30, 39, 49, 53, 64, 90
Lobeck 106, 109
Lucian 8, 18, 26, 40, 49, 69, 70
Lucifer of Calaris xxx
Luther xxix
Macarius Magnes 33
Marcion x
Marcus Aurelius 23, 106
Martianay xiv
Mary wife of Clopas xx
Megilla 65
Melito 43
Messiah 1
Midrash on
Muratorian Canon xxvii
mysteries, the Greek 61
Nilus 107, 108
Novatian xiii
Oecumenius 23, 37, 40, 42, 70
Origen xxi, xxvii, 22, 40, 82, 84
Orphic doctrine xii, 61, 72 f., 106 f.
Otto 3
Paul (St) and St James x f., xxiv f., 66 f.
Paul of Nisibis xxix
persecution xxxi
Philaster xiii
Philo Judaeus xxxiii, 6, 9 f., 14, 15, 19, 25, 29, 31, 48, 64, 66, 73, et al.
Philo de sept. spect. 108
Philostratus 25
Phlegon 27
Plumptre (Dean) xiv, xxii, xxv, 48
Plutarch 4, 6, 8, 25, 28, 30 f., 44, 62, 74 f., 85, 89 f., et al.
Pollux 13
Polybius 7, 8, 10, 13, 82, 108
Polycarp, Martyrium 20, 28
Poppaea 92 f.
Proclus 72 f.
Protevangelium Jacobi xxi
Psalmi Solomonis 5, 39, 71
Pythagorean doctrine 106
Reland 79
religio, religiosus 42
Robinson (Dr E.) 79
Rönsch 64 f.
Schiller-Szinessy 2
Schneckenburger 20, 57
Schöttgen 55, 98
Schulthess 37
Schürer 48
Sermon on the Mount xxxi f., 6, 38, 50 f., 54, 79, 90, et al.
Shabbath 55
Shechinah 47, 104
Sibylline Oracles 20, 57
simoom 17
simplex, simplicitas 8
Simplicius 72 f., 106
Stanley (Dean) 79
subjunctive mood 54
Suidas 16, 42, 82
Surenhuis 97
Syriac Canon and versions xiii, xxiv, xxviii, xxx
Taylor (Dr Charles) 22, 34, 41
Tertullian xvii, 33
Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs 2, 5, 9, 44, 51, 78
Theile 35, 93
Themistius 18, 23
Theodore of Mopsuestia xxviii f., xxxi
Theodoret xix, 23, 82
Theophilus of Antioch 61
Trench (Archbp) 6, 90, 95
Victorinus Afer xxx
Weber 25, 47
Weil 65
Westcott (Bp) xxvi, 47
Wetstein 60, 74, et al.
Wünsche xii, 65
Wyttenburg 52, 61
Zeller 20 f.
אֶבְיוֹנִים 96 אָהַב 21 מָאוֹר ,אוֹרִים ,אוֹר 29 f. אֶרֶץ אַחֶרֶת 2 גּוֹלָה 3 דְּמוּת 77 דּוּמִיָה ,דָּמַם 97 הִתְהַלַּל 14 זָרָה and זָרַע 3 חֵן and חֲנִינָה 96 חָצִיר 15 חֵרוּת (for חָרוּת) 41 יָדוֹן (in יָנָה 52 יָצַב 95 יֵצֶר 25 יְקָרָא 47 ישֶׁר 9 כָּבוֹד 47 לִיץ ,לֵצִים 95 מְזִמָּה 50 מַצְרֵף 5 מָשִׁיחַ 1 מִשְׁפָּט 56 נָאַץ 52 נָבֵל 17 מַסָּה ,נִסָּה 4 נָשָֹא פְנֵי 46 |
סָרַח 108 עֵדָה 48 עֲטָרָה 19 עַל־כֵּן יֵאָמַר 97 צֲלִיל 5 עִם forבְּ (of God) 30 עָנֹג 107 עָנָּה 4 עָנִי ,עָנָו 81, 95 פָּנִים 17, 46 צַדִּיק ,צָדַק 63 צִיץ הַשָּׂדֶה 15 צֶלֶם 77 קָדִים 17 קָהָל 48 קָוָה 5 קִנְאָה 94 רֵאשִׁית 35 רָחָב ,רָחַב 41 רַחַם 65 שִׂטְנָה ,שָֹטָן ,שָֹטַן 98 שְׁלָם) שָׁלוֹם) 3 שֶׁקֵט 107 תֵּבֵלּ 45, 71 תּוֹלְדוֹת and מוֹלֶדֶת 39, 73 תָּמִים 6 תֻּמָּה ,תָּם ,תֹּם 9 |
Cambridge
Genesis
1 1:1-31 1:3-5 1:14-16 1:18 1:28 1:28 2:4 2:4 2:7 2:17 4:1 4:12 4:17 5 5:1 5:1 6:3 6:3 6:5 6:9 8:21 9:2 9:2 9:25 10:9 12:5 13:8 13:8 13:11 13:11 14:12 14:14 14:16 15:6 16:12 17:1 18:14 18:17 22:1 22:1 22:2 22:9 24:55 24:60 25:18 25:27 26:31 29:10 29:12 29:15 31:23 31:32 31:32 31:37 31:37 31:40 31:46 31:54 41:6 41:23 41:27 43:33
Exodus
2:11 4:8 8:9 12:6 15:25 19:5-6 22:25 23:2 25:20 26:3 26:5 26:6 26:17 32:16 37:9
Leviticus
Numbers
8:26 12:3 16:10 20:14 21:14 25:18 28:2 35:25
Deuteronomy
1:13 4:6 4:34 6:4 6:5 6:5 7:19 7:25 8:2 10:21 11:26 11:28 11:32 13:3 14:1-2 15:2 16:19 18:13 18:13 27:19 27:26 28:25 28:54 29:3 29:28 30:14 30:15-16 30:19 30:20 32:11
Joshua
Judges
Ruth
1 Samuel
2 Samuel
1 Kings
1:1 9:13 11:31-33 11:34 18:21 20:32
2 Kings
1 Chronicles
2 Chronicles
Ezra
Nehemiah
Esther
Job
1:1 1:1-22 2:1-13 4:6 6:15 9:23 14:2 15:30 15:33 17:14 19:13 24:24 27:3 27:5 27:11 28:28 29:21 30:29 31:20 33:4 34:14 40:15 42:11
Psalms
1:1 1:1 1:1-6 1:2 4:4 5:11 6:8 8:6-8 9:8 9:8 9:12 12:3-5 12:7 16:8-11 19:7 21:3 29:3 31:23 33:5 34:3 34:12 35:14 36:7 36:9 36:10 37:1-40 37:16 38:8 39:1 39:1 40:17 49:16-17 51:15 58:4 58:11 61:2 61:6 64:4 64:11 66:10 68:5 68:24 70:5 72:1-20 72:3 72:7 74:8 82:2 84:11 85:10 89:10 91:11 92:1 96:13 98:9 101:1 102:25-27 103:1 103:4 103:15 103:22 108:1 109:6 119:1 119:1-176 119:1-176 119:1-176 119:1-176 119:32 119:43 119:44-45 119:96 119:142 119:160 120:2 120:4 122:8 129:7 131:2 136:7 140:3 143:2 145:20 149:5
Proverbs
3:4 3:31 3:32 3:33 3:34 3:34 4:9 5:14 7:4 10:9 10:29 11:30 12:5 13:3 13:15 14:21 14:27 16:19 16:27 17:3 18:9 19:1 19:10 19:23 22:1 22:8 22:21 22:22 27:21 29:21 29:23 33:23 43:20
Ecclesiastes
Song of Solomon
Isaiah
1:17 8:11 13:11 14:17 18:3 24:4 24:5 26:9 26:9 26:18 26:18 28:1 28:1-5 28:4 28:16 29:13 32:17 32:17 40:6 40:6-8 40:7 41:8 43:9 43:26 45:25 49:10 51:1 51:4 51:7 52:5 58:3-7 61:1 64:4 66:20
Jeremiah
2:3 4:23 9:24-24 10:3 14:9 15:10 16:13 22:14 93:9
Lamentations
Ezekiel
1:9 1:15-16 1:19-21 3:13 16:46 16:49 17:20 18:4 18:12 20:35-36 22:29 23:5 23:5-6 23:12 23:12 23:14-16 23:31 27:26 35:12 47:13
Daniel
7:18 7:27 9:4 9:6 9:10 12:12 14:7
Hosea
1:6 2:12 6:6 8:6 9:1-2 12:1 12:6
Joel
Amos
Jonah
Micah
Habakkuk
Haggai
Zechariah
1:6 3:1-2 3:2 6:14 7:4-10 7:9 9:9 9:9 10:9 11:13
Malachi
Matthew
1:5 2 3:9 4:1 4:3 5:1-48 5:3 5:3 5:5 5:7 5:9 5:9 5:10 5:18-19 5:18-19 5:20 5:21-26 5:23 5:39 5:48 5:48 5:48 5:48 6:24 7:1 7:1-2 7:3 7:7-8 7:11 7:11 7:16-20 7:17 7:17-19 7:23 7:24 7:24 7:26 9:13 9:13 9:14 9:34 9:38 10:22 10:33 11:19 11:29 11:29 12:4 12:4 12:7 12:7 12:34 12:35 12:36 12:36-37 12:37 12:45 12:46-50 13:52 14:15 14:31 15:5 15:8-9 15:19 16:18 16:25 18:4 18:21-35 18:33 19:21 19:21 19:21-23 19:26 19:29 20:12 20:12 21:5 21:21 21:21 21:21 21:21 22:37 22:37 22:37-39 23:8-10 23:15 23:23 23:23 24:8 24:13 24:13 24:13 24:22 25:34 25:34 25:35-36 25:36 25:40 25:42-43 25:43 26:24 26:28 26:41 26:41 26:53 27:56
Mark
1:13 1:13 1:13 1:24 3:12 3:14 3:31-35 4:1 4:17 4:21 5:10 5:38 5:43 6:30 6:49 7:6-7 7:11 7:21 7:22 7:37 10:21 10:27 11:22 11:23 11:23 11:23 11:23 12:30 12:40 13:13 13:13 15:40
Luke
1:3 1:37 1:48 1:51 1:64 1:74-75 2:27 2:33 2:41 2:43 2:48 4:2 4:2 4:18 4:21 4:25-26 4:26 6:9 6:20 6:23 6:24 6:28 6:39 6:43-44 6:44 6:46 7:29 7:35 7:50 8:12 8:13 8:15 8:19-21 9:62 10:2 10:27 10:29 10:30 11:9-10 11:13 11:13 11:41 12:20 12:32 12:32 12:51 12:55 13:2 14:12-14 16:8 16:9 16:13 16:15 16:15 16:17 18:6 18:14 18:22 18:27 18:29-30 20:47 20:47 21:4 21:9 21:19 21:19 21:19 21:19 21:19 22:31 24:35
John
3:20 3:31 4:10 5:29 6:59 7:35 7:49 7:51 8:23 10:4 13:16 13:17 16:24 18:20 19:11 19:25 19:25
Acts
1:2 2:36 4:29 4:29 5:32 5:33 6:2 7:2 7:2 7:9 7:20 7:31 8:3 9:26 10:20 10:20 10:20 10:33 10:34 11:2 11:20 11:22 11:28-29 12:4 12:17 13:1-4 13:25 13:39 14:1-28 14:4 14:4 14:14 14:14 14:15 15 15:13 15:17 15:23 15:37 16:7 17:6 17:31 21:18 23:8 23:26 24:6 26:5 26:5 26:7 26:21 26:28 27:41
Romans
1:1 1:18 1:19-21 1:20 1:30 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:8 2:11 2:12 2:13 2:13 2:14 2:14-15 2:25 2:27 2:27 2:27 3:62-64 4:11 4:20 4:20 4:20 5:2-3 5:3-4 5:11 5:12 5:15-16 5:17 6:6 6:21 6:23 7:7 7:11 7:13 7:23 8:1-39 8:28 9:4 9:4 9:6 9:11 9:19 10 10:6-8 11:11 11:16 11:18 11:19 12:8 12:14 12:17 12:19 13:8 13:8-9 13:8-10 13:9 14:10 14:13 14:14 14:20 14:23 14:23 14:23 15:6 15:10 16:7
1 Corinthians
1:5 1:5 1:7 1:17 1:18 1:20 1:27-28 2:1-16 2:6 2:8 2:8 2:9 2:11 2:14 2:14 3:19 4:12 5:10 6:2 6:5 6:9 6:9 6:9-10 7:5 7:17 7:31 7:37-38 10:13 11:3 11:7 11:7 11:22 12:1-14:40 12:28 12:29 12:31 13:4 13:8 14:26 14:33 14:33 14:33 15:7 15:7 15:7 15:9 15:17 15:33 15:35 15:39 15:44 15:46 15:50 15:55 15:56
2 Corinthians
1:17 2:10 2:17 3:11 4:2 4:4 4:6 4:6 5:1 5:10 6:5 6:7 6:10 7:10 7:10 8:2 8:9 8:9 8:21 8:23 9:7 9:11 9:13 9:15 10:4 10:17 11:5 12:11 12:12 12:20 12:20 12:20 12:20
Galatians
1:7 1:17 1:19 1:19 1:19 2:9 2:9 2:12 2:16 2:18 3:7-9 3:10 3:18 3:28 4:7 4:9 5:10 5:19 5:20 5:20 5:21 6:1 6:7 6:9
Ephesians
1:3 1:4 1:4 1:4 1:13 1:17 1:17 2:2 3:7 3:17 4:2 4:3 4:7 4:8 4:8 4:15-16 4:24 5:5 5:5 5:5 5:14 5:14 6:9
Philippians
1:1 1:11 1:17 1:17 2:3 2:3 2:5-7 2:25 2:29 2:30 3:14 3:19 4:5 4:7-9 4:15
Colossians
2:4 2:18 2:23 3:2 3:5 3:10 3:11 3:15
1 Thessalonians
2 Thessalonians
1 Timothy
1:11 1:11 2:8 4:1 4:2 5:6 5:6 5:6 6:9 6:15-16 6:15-16
2 Timothy
Titus
Hebrews
1:3 1:3 2:18 3:1 3:6 4:15 6:4 9:11 10:34 11:26 11:31 11:31 11:38 12:3 12:9 12:9 12:11 12:17
James
1:19-20 1:23 1:25 2:1 2:1-26 2:5 2:9 2:15 2:23 3:1-18 3:9 3:14 3:16 4:8 5:5 5:5 5:11 5:11 5:15
1 Peter
1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:6 1:6 1:7 1:7 1:8 1:9 1:12 1:17 1:18 1:22 1:23 2:1 2:4 2:6 2:9 2:11 2:11 2:12 2:13 2:16 2:20 2:24 3:9 4:12 4:14 4:14 4:16 5:4 5:5 5:5
2 Peter
1:1 1:1 1:4 1:8 1:10 1:19 2:5 2:9 2:19 2:20 3:2 3:3 3:6 3:14
1 John
1:5-8 1:6 1:8 2:15 2:15 3:3 3:7 3:15 3:22 5:14-15 5:16
3 John
Jude
1:1 1:1 1:8 1:9 1:16 1:17 1:18 1:19 1:22
Revelation
000 1 1:1 1:6 2:2 2:5 2:9 2:10 2:10 3:10 3:18 4:11 5:10 9:4 9:4 10:7 12 12:10 14:4 18:20 21:10-11 21:11 21:12-14 21:14 21:23
Tobit
Judith
Wisdom of Solomon
1:1 2:4 2:8 2:10 4:2 5:9 5:16 6:7 7:27 7:29 9:2 11:16 14:5 14:16 14:18 14:27 19:20
Baruch
Prayer of Azariah
1 Maccabees
2 Maccabees
3 Maccabees
4 Maccabees
Sirach
1:1 1:5 1:28 2:1 2:1 2:5 2:12 4:10 4:29 5:11-13 6:31 7:35 11:32 12:17 12:22 15:6 15:11-12 17:3 18:15-18 19:16 20:5-7 20:14-15 21:15 21:16 24:1-2 24:16 27:13 28:21-23 29:27 31:7 31:19 33:1 35:11-12 36:1 37:21 39:8 39:33 41:19 42:7 44:20
01 02 03 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi xxvii xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxiii xxxix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120