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SECT. XIX. And of there being so much wickedness.

SOME men are apt to doubt of a Divine Providence, because they see so much wickedness practised, that the world is in a manner overwhelmed with it, like a deluge: which, they contend, should be the business of Divine Providence, if there were any, to hinder or suppress. But the 70answer to such is very easy. When God made man a free agent, and at liberty to do well or ill, (reserving to himself alone a necessary and immutable goodness), it was not fit that he should put such a restraint upon evil actions as was inconsistent with this liberty.161161   Thus Tertullian against Marcian, ii. “An entire liberty of the will is granted him either way, that he may always appear to be the master of himself, by doing of his own accord that which is good, and avoiding of his own accord that which is evil. Because man, who is in other respects subject to the determination of God, ought to do that which is just, out of the good pleasure of his own free will. But, neither the wages of that which is good or evil can justly be paid to him who is found to be good or evil out of necessity, and not out of choice. And for this reason was the law appointed, not to exclude, but to prove liberty, by voluntarily performing obedience to it, or by voluntarily transgressing it; so that, in either event, the liberty of the will is manifest.” And again afterwards; “Then the consequence would have been, that God would have withdrawn that liberty which was once granted to man; that is, would have retained within himself his fore-knowledge and exceeding power, whereby he might have interposed, to hinder man front falling into danger, by trying to make an ill use of his liberty. For, if he had interposed, he would then have taken away that liberty which his reason and goodness had given them.” Origen, in his fourth book against Celsus, handles this matter, as he uses to do others, very learnedly; where, amongst other things, he says, “That you destroy the nature of virtue, if you take away liberty.” But whatever means of hindering them were not repugnant to such liberty; as, establishing and promulging a law, external and internal warnings, together with threatenings and promises; none of these were neglected by God: neither would he suffer the effects of wickedness to spread to the furthest; so that government was never utterly subverted, nor the knowledge of the divine laws entirely extinguished. And even those crimes that were permitted, as we hinted before, were not without their advantages, when made use of either to punish those who were equally wicked, or to chastise those who were slipped out of the way of virtue, or else to procure some eminent example of patience and constancy, in those 71who had made a great progress in virtue. Lastly, even they themselves, whose crimes seemed to be overlooked for a time, were for the most part punished with a proportionable punishment, that the will of God might be executed against them who acted contrary to his will.162162   Concerning this whole matter, see the note at sect. viii.


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