SECT. VIII. The objection concerning the cause of evil, answered.

NOR ought we to be in the least shaken in what has been said, because we see many evils happen, the original of which cannot be ascribed to God, who, as was affirmed of him, is perfectly good. For when we say, that God is the cause of all things, we mean of all such things as have a real existence; which is no reason why those things themselves should not be the cause of some accidents, such as 13actions are. God created man, and some other intelligences superior to man, with a liberty of acting; which liberty of 14acting is not in itself evil, but may be the cause of something that is evil.¹⁵¹⁵   ”God, indeed, foresaw that free agents would abuse their liberty, and that many natural and moral evils would arise from hence; yet did not this hinder him from permitting such abuse, and the consequences thereof; any more than it hindered his creating beings endued with such liberty. The reason is plain. Because a free agent being the most excellent creature, which discovers the highest power of tile Creator, God was unwilling to prevent those inconveniencies which proceed from the mutability of their nature; because he can amend them as he pleases, to all eternity; in such a manner as is agreeable to his own goodness, though he has not yet revealed it to us. Concerning which we have largely treated in French, in a book wrote against Pet. Bayle, the seeming advocate of the Manichees. Le Clerc. And to make God the author of evils 15of this kind, which are called moral evils, is the highest wickedness. But there are other sorts of evils, such as loss or pain inflicted upon a person, which may be allowed to come from God, suppose for the reformation of the man, or as a punishment which his sins deserve: for here is no inconsistency with goodness; but, on the contrary, these proceed from goodness itself, in the same manner as physic, unpleasant to the taste, does from a good physician.