SECT.  XXVIII.  It is impossible Beasts should have Souls.

If you affirm that beasts have souls different from their machines, I immediately ask you, “Of what nature are those souls entirely different from and united to bodies?  Who is it that knew how to unite them to natures so vastly different?  Who is it that has such absolute command over so opposite natures, as to put and keep them in such a regular and constant a society, and wherein mutual agreement and correspondence are so necessary and so quick?

If, on the contrary, you suppose that the same matter may sometimes think, and sometimes not think, according to the various wrangling and configurations it may receive, I will not tell you in this place that matter cannot think; and that one cannot conceive that the parts of a stone, without adding anything to it, may ever know themselves, whatever degree of motion, whatever figure, you may give them.  I will only ask you now wherein that precise ranging and configuration of parts, which you speak of, consists?  According to your opinion there must be a degree of motion wherein matter does not yet reason, and then another much like it wherein, on a sudden, it begins to reason and know itself.  Now, who is it that knew how to pitch upon that precise degree of motion?  Who is it that has discovered the line in which the parts ought to move?  Who is it that has measured the dimensions so nicely as to find out and state the bigness and figure every part must have to keep all manner of proportions between themselves in the whole?  Who is it that has regulated the outward form by which all those bodies are to be stinted?  In a word, who is it that has found all the combinations wherein matter thinks, and without the least of which matter must immediately cease to think?  If you say it is chance, I answer that you make chance rational to such a degree as to be the source of reason itself.  Strange prejudice and intoxication of some men, not to acknowledge a most intelligent cause, from which we derive all intelligence; and rather choose to affirm that the purest reason is but the effect of the blindest of all causes in such a subject as matter, which of itself is altogether incapable of knowledge!  Certainly there is nothing a man of sense would not admit rather than so extravagant and absurd an opinion.