SECT.  LXV.  As a Superior Being is the Cause of All the Modifications of Creatures, so it is Impossible for Man’s Will to Will Good by Itself or of its own Accord.

Let us still add another reflection.  That First Being is the cause of all the modifications of His creatures.  The operation follows the Being, as the philosophers are used to speak.  A being that is dependent in the essence of his being cannot but be dependent in all his operations, for the accessory follows the principal.  Therefore, the Author of the essence of the being is also the Author of all the modifications or modes of being of creatures.  Thus God is the real and immediate cause of all the configurations, combinations, and motions of all the bodies of the universe.  It is by means or upon occasion of a body He has set in motion that He moves another.  It is He who created everything and who does everything in His creatures or works.  Now, volition is the modification of the will or willing faculty of the soul, just as motion is the modification of bodies.  Shall we affirm that God is the real, immediate, and total cause of the motion of all bodies, and that He is not equally the real and immediate cause of the good-will of men’s wills?  Will this modification, the most excellent of all, be the only one not made by God in His own work, and which the work bestows on itself independently?  Who can entertain such a thought?  Therefore my good-will which I had not yesterday and which I have to-day is not a thing I bestow upon myself, but must come from Him who gave me both the will and the being.

As to will is a greater perfection than barely to be, so to will good is more perfect than to will.  The step from power to a virtuous act is the greatest perfection in man.  Power is only a balance or poise between virtue and vice, or a suspension between good and evil.  The passage or step to the act is a decision or determination for the good, and consequent by the superior good.  The power susceptible of good and evil comes from God, which we have fully evinced.  Now, shall we affirm that the decisive stroke that determines to the greater good either is not at all, or is less owing to Him?  All this evidently proves what the Apostle says, viz., that God “works both to will and to do of His good pleasure.”  Here is man’s dependence; let us look for his liberty.