SECT.  LXVII.  Man’s Liberty Consists in that his Will by determining, Modifies Itself.

It is not the same with the modification of my soul which is called will, and by some philosophers volition, as with the modifications of bodies.  A body does not in the least modify itself, but is modified by the sole power of God.  It does not move itself, it is moved; it does not act in anything, it is only acted and actuated.  Thus God is the only real and immediate cause of all the different modifications of bodies.  As for spirits the case is different, for my will determines itself.  Now to determine one’s self to a will is to modify one’s self, and therefore my will modifies itself.  God may prevent my soul, but He does not give it the will in the same manner as He gives motion to bodies.  If it is God who modifies me, I modify myself with Him, and am with Him a real cause of my own will.  My will is so much my own that I am only to blame if I do not will what I ought.  When I will a thing it is in my power not to will it, and when I do not will it it is likewise in my power to will it.  I neither am nor can be compelled in my will; for I cannot will what I actually will in spite of myself, since the will I mean evidently excludes all manner of constraint.  Besides the exemption from all compulsion, I am likewise free from necessity.  I am conscious and sensible that I have, as it were, a two-edged will, which at its own choice may be either for the affirmative or the negative, the yes or the no, and turn itself either towards an object or towards another.  I know no other reason or determination of my will but my will itself.  I will a thing because I am free to will it; and nothing is so much in my power as either to will or not to will it.  Although my will should not be constrained, yet if it were necessitated it would be as strongly and invincibly determined to will as bodies are to move.  An invincible necessity would have as much influence over the will with respect to spirits as it has over motion with respect to bodies; and, in such a case, the will would be no more accountable for willing than a body for moving.  It is true the will would will what it would; but the motion by which a body is moved is the same as the volition by which the willing faculty wills.  If therefore volition be necessitated as motion it deserves neither more nor less praise or blame.  For though a necessitated will may seem to be a will unconstrained, yet it is such a will as one cannot forbear having, and for which he that has it is not accountable.  Nor does previous knowledge establish true liberty, for a will may be preceded by the knowledge of divers objects, and yet have no real election or choice.  Nor is deliberation or the being in suspense any more than a vain trifle, if I deliberate between two counsels when I am under an actual impotency to follow the one and under an actual necessity to pursue the other.  In short, there is no serious and true choice between two objects, unless they be both actually ready within my reach so that I may either leave or take which of the two I please.