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          Title: The Theology of Schleiermacher: A Condensed Presentation of His
                 Chief Work, "The Christian Faith"
     Creator(s): Cross, George, (1862-1929)
    Print Basis: The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois (1911)
  CCEL Subjects: All; Theology
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                                THE THEOLOGY OF
                                 SCHLEIERMACHER

  A CONDENSED PRESENTATION
  OF HIS CHIEF WORK, "THE
  CHRISTIAN FAITH"

BY

GEORGE CROSS, PH.D., D.D

   Professor of Christian Theology in the
   Newton Theological Institution
   Newton Center, Mass.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

  CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE UNIVERSITY OP CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Agents

THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY

NEW YORK
     __________________________________________________________________

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON AND EDINBURGH

COPYRIGHT 1911 BY
THE UNIVERSITY or CHICAGO
     __________________________________________________________________

All Rights Reserved
     __________________________________________________________________

Published May 1911

    Composed and Printed By
    The University of Chicago Press
    Chicago. Illinois, U.S.A.
     __________________________________________________________________

DEDICATED TO
THE RISING CHRISTIAN MINISTRY
OF
MY NATIVE COUNTRY
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PREFACE

   More than three-quarters of a century ago Friedrich Daniel Ernst
   Schleiermacher gave to the world his Christian Faith. This great
   theological treatise was the work of a man who, to the natural
   endowment of a rich emotional temperament and an intellect of unusual
   power, had added the culture that comes from a comprehensive
   acquaintance with the world's leading thinkers and a varied experience
   in literary, political, and religious affairs. His Glaubenslehre, as
   the work is commonly called, represents his mature thought on the most
   important of subjects. No modern treatment of the questions raised by
   the religious life has surpassed it, or perhaps even equaled it, in
   respect to influence exercised on the course of religious thought.

   Schleiermacher was the first Protestant theologian to grasp clearly the
   significance of the new situation created by the evangelical revival of
   the eighteenth century and the contemporary movement of thought that
   came to violent expression in the French Revolution. He represents a
   turning-point in the history of Christendom. Modern theological
   reconstruction begins with him.

   Theology has usually been slow to acknowledge the impact of new forces
   in the spiritual life. This may partly account for the comparative
   neglect of Schleiermacher by English-speaking theologians. German
   theologians of all shades of opinion have long been quarrying materials
   for their own structures from the bedrock of his thought. But his
   influence has been mainly mediated to other countries through the
   Ritschlian school. There is very little first-hand knowledge of him
   among us. Excepting Bishop Thirwall's translation of his Luke (now out
   of print, I think), Farrer's translation of his Outlines of the Study
   of Theology, Oman's translation of the Discourses (Reden), and W.
   Robertson Nicoll's Selected Sermons, all that we have about him for the
   English reader is a few cyclopaedia and magazine articles. Der
   christliche Glaube has never been translated, though a desire for a
   translation has often been expressed.

   The present work is a modest attempt to remedy to some extent this
   want. It makes no claim to a mastery of the great thinker's whole
   system of thought, but represents the standpoint of an interested
   student and admirer. Its purpose is twofold: first, by indicating the
   historical setting of Schleiermacher's theology, to cast some light on
   the origin of certain urgent problems of the present day; in the next
   place, by exhibiting Schleiermacher's views of the traditional
   Christian doctrines and his constructive method, to suggest lines of
   reflection that may be of value to the rising generation of students of
   theology.

   The sketch of his life offered in the Introduction is drawn mainly from
   his published correspondence and directs attention to the experiential
   basis of his doctrine--indispensable to a clear grasp of it. The
   outline of the course of Protestant life and thought from the
   Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century sets forth the
   religious and intellectual conditions that constituted Schleiermacher's
   problem and summoned him to his task.

   The central portion of the book is a careful condensation of the
   Christian Faith. I used the edition of 1889 (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas
   Perthes). Some of the difficulties attendant on an effort of this kind
   may be gathered from the fact that the original work in the German
   covers about 1,200 pages. The ramifications of Schleiermacher's
   discussions are very extended and apt to confuse the reader and the
   more so since many of his sentences are of inordinate length. I have
   tried to follow closely the main thread of his argument without, on the
   one hand, reducing it to the limits of a mere outline or, on the other
   hand, failing to exhibit the full sweep of his thought. I believe my
   statement is in accord with the spirit of Schleiermacher's work and
   will place the careful reader in possession of a clear understanding of
   its contents.

   The brief estimate which closes this work is in tended to suggest lines
   of criticism and to point out the direction which, in the writer's
   judgment, a constructive theology must now take if it is to meet the
   needs of our times.

   I wish to express my sense of obligation to Rev. E. P. Tuller, Ph.D.,
   for his kindness in reading the proof of this work and for many
   valuable suggestions.

   GEORGE CROSS

   NEWTON CENTRE, MASS.

   March 15, 1911
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

   PAGE
   I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION                                         3-113

   A. A Sketch of Schleiermacher's Life
                                                                      3-66

   B. Schleiermacher's Relation to Earlier Protestantism
                                                                      67-113

   II. PRESENTATION OF "THE CHRISTIAN FAITH"
                                                                      117-293

   Introduction (1-31)
                                                                      117

   Chapter I: Explanation of Dogmatics (§§2-19)
                                                                      118-143

   Chapter II: The Method of Dogmatics (§§20-31)
                                                                      144-293

   I. Unfolding of the Religious Self-Consciousness(§§32-61)
                                                                      153-174

   II. The Antithesis in the Religious Self-Consciousness (§§62-169)
                                                                      174-293

   1. Unfolding of the Consciousness of Sin (§§65-84)
                                                                      177-193

   2. Unfolding of the Consciousness of Grace (§§86-169)
                                                                      194-293

   III. AN ESTIMATE
                                                                      297-334

   WORKS OF REFERENCE
                                                                      335-337

   INDEX
                                                                      341~344
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                           I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
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I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

A. A SKETCH OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S LIFE

   Friedrich Daniel. Ernst Schleiermacher was born at Breslau, in Upper
   Lusatia, Prussia, on November 21, 1763, and died in Berlin on February
   12, 1834. His life coincides with a period that is the most eventful in
   European history excepting, possibly, the age of the Protestant
   Reformation. It was a time of popular convulsions and general unrest.
   Revolution was in progress in economics, politics, society, and
   religion. The inevitable temporary and partial reaction followed. Next
   to France, of all the countries in Europe, Prussia was the most deeply
   affected by these movements. Allowing for brief intervals of absence,
   Schleiermacher's whole life was spent within the borders of his native
   country and the greater part of his public career was occupied in her
   service at the capital, Berlin, in connection with its new and now
   famous university. His sensitive temperament and his broad sympathy
   enabled him to feel every pulse-beat of the life around him. His wide
   knowledge and liberal education fitted him to become one of the best
   interpreters of the European world of that day. As a religious man and
   a thinker he becomes a sort of reflex of its most potent ideas.

  PARENTS AND FAMILY

   Schleiermacher belonged to a family of preachers on both sides of the
   house, His father was chaplain, of the Reformed church (the name given
   to the Calvinistic Protestants of the continent) to a Prussian regiment
   of soldiers. His mother was a daughter of Royal Chaplain Stubenrauch
   and sister to Professor Stubenrauch, of the University of Halle. The
   family were poor, but intelligent and pious. The father's early
   theological studies led him in his twenty-fourth year to inward
   renunciation of Calvinism, though, perhaps for prudential reasons, he
   made no outward sign of it. In a letter written to his son many years
   later he admits having preached orthodoxy without actually believing
   it. He was a Freemason and a keen student of philosophy in his young
   manhood, and in respect to religious opinions he was only one out of a
   multitude of preachers in Protestant Europe who at that time conformed
   in their public ministrations to established doctrine but in their
   hearts held a rationalistic view that true religion and essential
   Christianity consisted in the belief in God, virtue, arid immortality.
   Strangely enough his experience was partly duplicated for a time in his
   son.

   The mother was a noble-minded woman, of an ardent temperament, devoted
   to the care of her three children, strict and even severe in
   discipline, and prayerful. In the father's continual absence from home
   the burden of their training fell to her lot. She took a great interest
   in their studies, observed the development of their mental
   characteristics and their moral tendencies with much solicitude, and
   exercised a close supervision of their reading. So far as spiritual
   preferences are concerned she seemed to hold with her husband that a
   straight morality is the one important thing.

   But in 1778 the father, being then fifty-one years of age, experienced
   an inward change. His regiment was quartered at that time at Gnadenfrei
   in Silesia. There he came into contact with the Moravian Brethren. This
   much-persecuted sect, whose origin dates back to the times of John
   Huss, had long maintained a precarious existence in Bohemia and
   Moravia, and at length a portion of them, under the leadership of
   Christian David, sought a refuge in Saxony. Count Zinzendorf gave them
   an asylum on his estate at Berthelsdorf and later became a prominent
   leader. This new home they named Herrnhut ("Watch of the Lord"). [1]
   From this center they spread into other communities. At the time above
   referred to Gnadenfrei was one of their chief centers. Through one of
   the Brethren, named von Bruiningk, Chaplain Schleiermacher became a
   convert to their views and believed himself a subject of that
   supernatural grace on which they laid so much stress. Henceforth all
   was changed. He became anxious for the conversion of his wife and
   children. His efforts were rewarded by the wife's finally hearty,
   though at first hesitating, response to her husband's new attitude of
   mind. Henceforward both endeavored to instil the same religious
   experience into the minds of their children, all three of whom
   ultimately entered the community of the Brethren. It is worth noting
   here that the father never became a member of the Brethren's church,
   and years later, when the elder son renounced his father's views, the
   latter himself gradually receded from the Herrnhuterite position,
   though he retained to the end of his life their faith in Christ and a
   deep regard for those who had mediated that faith to him.

  HIS BOYHOOD

   We now turn more particularly to the career of his more famous son.
   Friedrich, or Fritz as he was usually called at home, was the junior of
   his sister Lotte and the senior of his brother Carl. He was an
   unusually bright child, and in his early school days made such rapid
   progress in his studies and showed such a disposition to pry into
   difficult subjects that his mother became alarmed at what seemed his
   pride and conceit. When only ten years of age, according to his own
   testimony, his mind was greatly distressed with the thought of the
   eternal happiness and woe of men, and many sleepless nights were spent
   in seeking some solution of the relation of the sufferings of Christ to
   the punishment of human sin. The attempt to indoctrinate the boy in
   such matters evidently brought only confusion and pain to his sensitive
   nature. The mother's conversion to Moravianism introduced a new and
   powerful religious influence into the home, but this only increased his
   unhappiness The attempt to reproduce in himself that sense of utter
   sinfulness and that experience of miraculous change which was demanded
   as the inward response to the orthodox teachings, was for a long time
   fruitless. The Moravian profession of a conscious soul-inter course
   with Jesus prompted him to longings and strivings which for years
   remained unsatisfied. The mother saw in all this an answer to her
   prayers, but when he besought her for help she could only tell him to
   pray to Jesus for the gift he sought. It is evident that the boy's mind
   was overwrought and his spiritual development abnormal, but at the same
   time it is clear that he was possessed of a nature wonder fully endowed
   and capable of high religious attainment.

   The family moved to Pless in Upper Alsatia in the year 1778 and the
   year after to Anhalt, where they remained till the summer of 1780. That
   year Fritz attended a boarding-school at Pless. While there he came
   under the influence of Ernesti, the famous exegete and advocate of the
   grammatico-historical method of Scripture-interpretation, whose
   enthusiasm awakened in the boy the desire for a scholastic career and a
   love for the ancient classics. The rich fruit of this appeared in later
   years in Schleiermacher's splendid translation of Plato's Dialogues and
   his deep acquaintance with Greek philosophy. During those years there
   came over him "a strange skepticism," as he calls it. It consisted in a
   suspicion that the whole of what was contained in ancient history was
   unreal, because he knew nothing of the proofs of the genuineness of the
   events mentioned in the literature of those far-off times and because
   the accounts themselves seemed disjointed and fanciful. Though much
   troubled by these doubts he kept them to himself. The death of Ernesti
   in 1781 led to his return to his father's house. Here with no
   experienced teacher to direct his studies he developed that tendency,
   after ward deplored by him, to follow his own choice of books and
   subjects rather than those more regular academic courses which are
   based on long scholastic experience.

   At the same time these were days of spiritual profit. At Anhalt and at
   Gnadenfrei, whither the family soon removed, he saw a good deal of his
   father and they often talked together of religious matters. Long
   afterward, in 1802, when on a visit at Gnadenfrei, he wrote his friend
   Reimer of those happy days. [2] He recalls a walk in company with his
   father when there came to him the feeling that he was a subject of
   divine grace and he began to entertain the hope that he had entered on
   a higher life:

   Here it was that there came to me for the first time the consciousness
   of man's relation to a higher world . . . . Here it was that mystical
   temperament was developed which has been of so much worth to me and
   which through all the storms of skepticism has supported and preserved
   me. Then it was only in germ, now it has attained to full development,
   and I can say that, after all that I have passed through, I have become
   a Herrnhuter again--only of a higher order [italics mine].

   He is not unmindful of certain dangers attendant on such an experience:

   Here were laid the germs of an imaginativeness in matters of religion,
   which, had I been of a more ardent temperament, would probably have
   made me a visionary, but to which I am nevertheless indebted for many a
   precious experience, and which is the reason that, while in most people
   the disposition of the mind is formed unconsciously by theory and
   observation, in my case, it bears the impress, and is the conscious
   product, of my own mental history. [3]

   In those days, however, he was still tossed about by the fear lest all
   these experiences might be only from himself, and his young soul was
   still harassed by the questionings which had troubled him before. He
   began to share his father's dread of the effect of a contact with the
   dangerous tendencies toward irreligion and immorality in the larger
   schools then open to him, and when the father proposed to seek
   admission for him to a school of the Brethren at Niesky, known as the
   Paedagogium, he eagerly assented; for by this time he had made up his
   mind to join the Moravian society, cost what it might.

   Application was duly made in May, 1783. It was not easy to obtain
   admission, for first of all the casting of the lot, which the Brethren
   regarded as indicating, immediately the Savior's will, must result
   favorably, and the directors at Barby, which was at that time their
   educational headquarters, must approve. After a few weeks of waiting
   his desire was granted and he entered the Paedagogium in June. With
   this step the home life was brought to an end. He never saw his parents
   again, for his devoted mother died in the following December, and his
   father's path and his own began to run apart.

  HIS STUDENT LIFE

   The Paedagogium at Niesky was of the nature of a gymnasium or
   preparatory college for young men who wished to enter the Christian
   ministry, particularly the Moravian. At that time it enjoyed a wide,
   reputation. Among the students were members of aristocratic German
   families, children of absent missionaries, representatives of eastern
   German provinces, and youths from Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and
   England. It was a student-cloister unlike any other, whether Protestant
   or Catholic. The entering students became members of a new family. The
   teachers held a sort of graded parental relation to them, and brotherly
   affection was the dominant feature of the mutual relations of all the
   inmates. The organization and administration of the institution were on
   the same lines as those of its prototype at Halle, where Zinzendorf was
   educated. Connection with the out side world was severed. The refining
   and ennobling influences of female society were excluded. A strict
   supervision was exercised over correspondence with relatives or
   friends. Incoming and outgoing letters were subjected to censorship.
   This may partly account for the fewness of Schleiermacher's letters
   which are preserved from this portion of his life.

   The instruction given to students was fairly broad. It aimed at breadth
   rather than learnedness in a single field, at a many-sided intellectual
   activity with some love for science, a keen appreciation of Latin and
   Greek literature, and some taste for the fine arts. Schleiermacher
   relates how he and his room-mate von Albertini--who held afterward for
   a long time a first place among the Brethren as scholar, preacher, and
   poet--ranged at will over the field of classic literature, and even
   tried to work up a knowledge of Semitics. At the same time the aim of
   the institution was mainly heart-culture. Coldness, hard-heartedness,
   lack of feeling were regarded as the worst faults, There was an attempt
   to play on the heart strings in a thousand ways. A developed phantasy,
   a powerful soul-life was the presupposition of religiosity. The
   culmination of the education given was found in soul-intercourse with
   the Savior, and to that end it was supposed to be necessary to exercise
   one's self in world-denial, to avoid the society of women, and any
   thing that might stimulate the lower affections.

   This meant, of course, that the works of many contemporary writers were
   sternly proscribed as being out of harmony with the views of the
   Brethren. Moreover, the greatest care was taken to impress students
   with the unquestionableness of Protestant orthodoxy, especially the
   doctrines of Christ's deity and his substitutionary sacrifice, of human
   depravity, miraculous grace, and future punishment. No effort was
   spared to give the students an inward attestation of the truth of these
   doctrines by the cultivation of a religious experience corresponding
   with the doctrinal teaching. This artificial devotion to mysticism
   stimulated doubts of the worth of this religious intercourse in the
   minds of some young men who hesitated to submit themselves to a
   compulsory divine service.

   At the same time the relations between teachers and students and of
   students with one another were characterized by a happy and wholesome
   intimacy. With hard study were combined the cultivation of an
   acquaintance with poetry and music and the enjoyment of birthday
   parties and other festivals. Religious meetings recurred with great
   frequency. The hymn-singing for which the Brethren were famous was a
   notable feature of these gatherings. In later years in -connection with
   his own conduct of public worship Schleiermacher used to contrast the
   dull monotonous liturgy of the state church with the lively, inspiring
   worship in Moravian congregations, and to express his thankfulness for
   what he had learned on this subject when he was among them.

   There can be no doubt as to the intentions of Schleiermacher's godly
   parents in sending him to this school. They admired the religious life
   of the Herrnhuters and they feared the rationalistic tendencies of the
   times. They were not unaware of the strength of the great movement of
   thought which was sweeping over Europe. European society was then
   stirred to its depths over many questions. Ideas and institutions hoary
   with age were subjected to the keenest and most unrelenting criticism,
   and particularly in the ecclesiastical and religious realm. The
   skepticism of Bolingbroke and Hume in England, of Voltaire and the
   Encyclopaedists in France, of Fredrick the Great and the "Illuminants"
   in Prussia, had delivered a fearful polemic against current orthodoxy
   and the church. Science and philosophy seemed to corroborate its
   arguments. Political institutions traditionally associated with
   established religion were threatened with a general overturn. The very
   codes of morality were being torn to shreds. The ominous rumblings of
   the approaching revolution in France were heard all over western and
   central Europe. The foundations of the great deep were breaking up, To
   Schleiermacher's parents the institutions of the Moravians seemed an
   ark of safety for their children, and especially for their gifted son.
   Mainly, perhaps, they were in the right. His sympathetic, sensitive
   spirit, united with a keen intelligence, might not have withstood at
   that time the unmediated shock of a fierce onset of rationalism. With
   his habit of introspection he might have been driven to a moody
   mysticism, or with his penetrating intellect to a blank skepticism.

   The immediate outcome was gratifying. At Niesky he yielded himself
   heartily to the surrounding religious influences. At the end of three
   months he was admitted by lot to membership in the society, to the
   great joy of his parents and his sister Lotte, who took a similar step
   about the same time. A period of religious, elevation ensued. His
   mother writes, in October, 1783, "Let us therefore, my dear son, cling
   firmly to him alone who is the faithful shepherd of our souls; let us
   give up our hearts entirely to him; let us pour out all our gifts to
   him; let us speak to his heart and pray daily to him to cast out and
   take away everything that tends to separate us from him." His eager
   participation in these sentiments appears in a letter to Lotte just
   then: "When I find that I do not love the Savior enough, that I do not
   sufficiently honor him; when the daily intercourse with him does not go
   on uninterruptedly, then I am distressed." And later: "The heart may
   feel the peace and love of Jesus, as I can assert from my own
   experience, thanks be to his mercy." By the advice of his spiritual
   guardian he became, in February, 1784, a candidate for admission to the
   Supper--for actual entrance within the circle of the reborn. The way in
   which he speaks of the prospect brings out his warmth of feeling, but
   at the same time the superstitious regard for the Supper, which
   Lutheranism and Moravianism inherited from Catholicism. "On
   Maundy-Thursday I am to partake of the Savior's flesh and blood in the
   Holy Supper." [4] The very sight of the celebration fills him with holy
   reverence. At this time he voices his feelings to his sister in such
   utterances as, "Ah, did but the love of Jesus fill our hearts day and
   night!" "Think of me and love thy Jesus." He speaks also of longings
   for the world beyond. There is nothing in his correspondence at this
   time to suggest that it is from the hand of a youth of sixteen. It is
   altogether unnatural and one is tempted to treat it as nothing better
   than mere sentimentalism. But it was very pleasing to his father and
   the Brethren. His Uncle Stubenrauch alone seems to have had some
   misgivings, and in a letter he gently cautions his nephew against the
   spirit of intolerance which the Moravians, with all their warmth of
   religious passion, shared with most Christians at the time. The letter
   includes an admonition against overlooking "the great amount of evil
   that has resulted through many centuries from the early established
   principle, Outside of the church, no salvation.'"

   His stay at the Paedagogium lasted two and a quarter years. In the
   autumn of 1785 he was promoted to the theological seminary at Barby.
   The conditions there were much the same as at Niesky. Every thing was
   arranged with a view to the promotion of religious development in the
   pietistic sense. The twenty-two students, divided into two equal
   sections, lived in the "choir-house" of the single brethren under one
   roof with their spiritual censor. Three religious meetings were held
   daily, and all must attend. No intercourse was allowed with outside
   families, the town pastors, or the town church. "Useless" and light
   reading material was supposed to be kept out. Modern philosophical and
   theological works--even Kant and Lavater--were banned. Yet there were
   fewer restrictions on liberty than at Niesky. Students found it quite
   possible to evade the rules about reading. Copies of leading liberal
   periodicals and of the works of such writers as Lessing, Kant, and
   Herder were surreptitiously obtained without difficulty by those who
   desired them. An acquaintance with a wider world of thought was sure to
   arouse in independent-minded young men doubts of the trustworthiness of
   what they had been taught. There was soon a rapid falling away. Some of
   the older students went so far as to play the part of free-thinkers
   among their young comrades. Schleiermacher soon came distinctly under
   the influence of this new spiritual atmosphere and the consequences
   were as might have been expected.

  A PERIOD OF SKEPTICISM

   When he first went to Barby he gave himself mostly to exegetical
   studies and followed the Herrnhuterite methods, He held distinctly to
   the Moravian faith and hoped to become one of the society's accepted
   laborers, though how or where he could not tell. But he soon turned to
   the study of philosophy. A philosophical club was formed among the
   students and he became an active member of it along with Albertini, his
   room-mate. The progress of his thought, at first glance, seems to have
   been startlingly rapid. Ernesti's influence was not dead. Those fine
   intellectual powers that showed their presence so early in life, and
   that had been so long subordinated to a sup posed religious interest,
   were now revived. That inquiring spirit, exhibited in the questionings
   of his schoolboy days, reasserted its claims. A change came over him.
   The rational understanding began to take precedence of the religious
   feeling. He felt suspicious of an orthodoxy that shunned an open battle
   with its foes. Suspicion developed into doubt and doubt into
   skepticism. He awoke as if from a dream. By the end of the second
   semester he had definitely rejected the orthodox system. The strain of
   this new situation soon became unbearable. He decided, though with much
   hesitancy, to unburden his mind to his father. The letters that passed
   between the father and the son on the subject have been so interesting
   to the present writer that extracts from them are given herewith in the
   hope that similarly they may interest the reader.

   The first intimation that a change was in progress was given in a
   letter to his father in July, 1786. He complains that his desire for a
   thorough study of theology has not been met by his teachers. Students
   are "kept within too narrow limits in point of reading. Except what we
   see in the scientific periodicals, we learn nothing about the
   objections, arguments, and discussions raised at the present day in
   regard to exegesis and dogmatics." A suspicion has been aroused in his
   mind that the objections of the "innovators" must be difficult to
   refute. In reply the father assures him that ignorance of the
   objections and criticisms of the innovators is no loss. "Keep out of
   the way of this tree of knowledge and of that dangerous love of
   profundity which would lure you to it. . . . . Besides, you do not
   intend to be a vain theologian but are preparing to equip yourself to
   bring souls to the Savior, and for that purpose you do not need all
   that vain knowledge." Then, as if half-divining the purpose so soon to
   be formed in the son's mind, he adds, "You cannot sufficiently thank
   your Savior for having brought you into the community of the Brethren
   where you can do so well without it." In lieu of modern scientific and
   philosophic studies he urges the young man to content himself with the
   Bible and certain edifying books whose theme is "the martyrdom of God
   . . . . who died on the cross for us."

   In January, 1787, six months after his first intimation of the intense
   struggle that had begun within him, he wrote that letter which
   announced to his astonished and bewildered parent the disappointment of
   all the hopes of former days. That faith which his father believed to
   be essential to salvation in the next world and tranquillity in this,
   is now lost to him. Here are his words:

   I cannot believe that he who called himself the Son of Man was. the
   true eternal God; I cannot believe that his death was a vicarious
   atonement because he never expressly said so him self; and I cannot
   believe it to have been necessary, because God, who evidently did not
   create men for perfection, but for the pursuit of it, cannot possibly
   intend to punish them eternally because they have not attained to it.

   He declares that it pains him to the depth of his soul to write as he
   has done; indeed, he has shrunk from it and has brought himself to do
   it at last only at the command of his superiors at college, to whom he
   had evidently communicated his thoughts. He has not abandoned utterly
   the hope of returning to the views of the Brethren, but that can never
   be if he remains at the seminary. He pleads to be permitted to go to
   Halle, where he could live under the guardianship of his uncle,
   Professor Stubenrauch, and pursue his investigations unhindered. He
   concludes: "In sorrow, dear father, I kiss your hands, and entreat you
   to look at everything from the most favorable side, and to consider
   well, and to bestow upon me in future also, as far as it is possible,
   that fatherly affection which is so indescribably valued by your
   distressed and most dutiful son."

   This letter gives evidence in every sentence of the clearest sincerity
   of purpose and earnestness of soul. Further, we must not do young
   Schleiermacher the injustice of charging him with youthful precipitancy
   in expressing himself as he did. He was only eighteen at the time, but
   he was far beyond most men of his years in maturity of judgment. In
   order to understand his radical expressions of doctrinal dissent we
   must keep in mind that the views of Zinzendorf were at that time
   generally accepted by the Brethren, and to them Jesus was virtually
   identical with God the Father (although they denied the charge of
   patripassionism), or perhaps we might say that Jesus had displaced God
   the Father in their minds. The substitutionary death of God on the
   cross--with a good deal of emphasis on the physical--was the very
   essence of the gospel. Schleiermacher knew that from his father's point
   of view, and from his own up to that time (and as yet he appeared to
   have found nothing to take its place), the rejection of that doctrine
   meant the renunciation of Christianity itself. But the letters which
   followed this first fateful message make it quite evident that the
   young man had not renounced his religion but was unable to make quite
   clear to himself or to others the distinction between religious faith
   and belief in a doctrine of religion. At this point I may be permitted
   to quote the words of W. Robertson Nicoll in reference to this event:
   [5]

   The letter . . . . is the farthest possible from resembling the
   utterance of some callow theologian who imagines that because an idea
   is new to him it is new to everybody else . . . . On the contrary its
   tone is throughout humble, self-distrustful, full of deepest regret for
   his lost faith and for the conclusions to which he felt, in the
   meantime, compelled to come; and full, even more, of reverential
   tenderness toward his father and bitterest sorrow for the pain which he
   is so unwillingly inflicting and which he tries to soften by the hope
   of a change by-and-by.

   The distracted father's reply is extremely painful reading. Pleading,
   rebuke, warning, counsel, and denunciation mingle. He breaks out: "O,
   thou insensate son! Who has deluded thee, that thou no longer obeyest
   the truth, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was pictured, and who now
   crucifiest him?" He charges the son's error to love of the world's
   honors, to wickedness, conceit, and pride of heart. Then he turns to
   answer the son's arguments, which he thinks a child could refute. At
   length, in exasperation, he goes so far as to declare, "With
   heart-rending grief I discard thee, for discard thee I must." But this
   is hardly intended literally, for the letter closes with an outburst of
   affection and the desired permission to go to Halle.

   One cannot help admiring the depth of affection and unswerving loyalty
   to his father and the unruffled patience which Schleiermacher exhibited
   in those trying weeks of excitement and suspense. In all his letters he
   addresses the disappointed parent, as "Tenderly beloved and best of
   fathers," or in similar terms. Ere the father's first reply can reach
   him, he writes another letter to mollify the wound his first letter
   made:

   Oh! how often have 1 wished that I had been less honest, and that I had
   not disclosed my thoughts to anyone, or at least that I had not sent
   off the letter to you. I should then have spared my good father all the
   pain and troublous consequences of this matter, the end of which God
   only knows. But it had to be done some time and now I am glad that I
   took courage.

   Most respectfully and yet most firmly in a later communication he
   defends his own sincerity throughout, and beseeches his father, "Do not
   look at every thing from the worst side; do not seek in my views
   everything exactly the reverse of what you think." And then, after
   modestly traversing the father's arguments, he quietly asserts that the
   father's refutation of his doubts has not convinced him. Still later he
   even attempts to revive the father's drooping faith in the persistent
   goodness and faithfulness of God: "Oh! that I could now already send
   you the joyful tidings of my conversion, instead of referring you to
   the future, begging you not to give up all hope. God, who is the Father
   of all, will watch over and guard me, and will direct everything for
   the best." He meekly receives the father's rebukes as to his faults,
   and says, "You have at once, dear father, put your finger on my most
   dangerous enemy--pride." A softening of the father's bitter feeling was
   one result and before long the tone of reproach in his letters dies
   away.

   The permission to go to Halle was granted none too soon, for the
   officials at Barby could not tolerate, such a heretic in their midst.
   He knew he "could reckon upon no pity, no mercy here, nor hope to be
   allowed to remain here." They had decided to turn him adrift.

   It is worth while in passing to notice that this great change in
   Schleiermacher had a lasting effect on the mind of the father himself.
   As he followed his son's career with fatherly interest and concern, his
   own earlier interest in philosophical and theological studies began to
   return and, whether for better or for worse, his Moravian sympathies
   were weakened and broader views found a place in his convictions.

   It can scarcely be disputed that the influence of Moravianism on the
   mind of Schleiermacher was permanently beneficial. To that, more than
   to any other single element in his character, he owes the peculiar,
   place he has won in the world. His experiences at Niesky and Barby may
   be regarded as having set for Schleiermacher the problem of his whole
   life, which, Lücke says, [6] was the "union without compromise of free
   science and Christian piety." If we may anticipate at this point the
   backward survey which naturally occurs when his whole career has been
   described, we can say that he was above all else a religious man and
   his religion was characterized by the warmth of feeling, love of
   brotherly fellowship, vivid realization of the nearness of God, and
   peculiar regard for the person of the Savior which is associated with
   Moravianism. At the same time it cannot be doubted that his separation
   from them was a distinct gain. Had he remained with them he could never
   have attained to that breadth of human sympathy, deep insight into the
   relation between the religious life and the common things of the world,
   and that intellectual wealth which made him one of the great forces in
   the modern religious and theological world. It was the defects of
   Moravianism that drove him out. The union of Herrnhuterite religious
   feeling with Calvinistic theology was rather forced. The correspondence
   effected between experience and the external authority of doctrine was
   artificial. There was, after all, a subtle legalism in it all. When a
   wider knowledge of human thought brought a new world into view, it was
   inevitable that his over-strained spirit should revolt and seek for
   freedom elsewhere.

  STUDIES AT HALLE

   Schleiermacher went to Halle in the spring of 1787 and remained there
   two years. He then accompanied his uncle to Drossen, where the latter
   had accepted a pastorate, and stayed with him a year. These three years
   represent an important period in our young theologian's spiritual
   development, for at this time he began to get his theological bearings.
   It is true that in his own opinion [7] he was seriously handicapped at
   the outset, for, as he says, he knew almost nothing of the outside
   world, was conscious of a great deficiency in suppleness of mind and
   outward polish, had been given a disparaging view of the moral
   character of his future comrades, was shy of company, and enervated by
   depressing circumstances. But on the other hand he was encouraged by
   his loving sister Lotte's unwavering confidence in him, by the many
   evidences of his father's growing desire to promote his studies, and,
   perhaps most of all, by the friendship and wise counsel of his
   considerate uncle. This thoughtful man had observed with interest and
   concern the change that had been taking place in his nephew's mind and
   had written to him letters which were full of sympathy but also
   contained an admonition to beware of precipitancy in his thinking. Now
   he took the young man into his own home and for these three years their
   thoughts freely mingled.

   Moreover, Schleiermacher's desire for an unrestricted study of the
   questions that distressed him was now realized. At Halle he entered
   upon a course of reading, continued for many years, which included in
   its scope almost all that was of high value in ancient philosophy and
   theology and the most famous writers of the age of the Reformation.
   Plato and Aristotle; the neo-Platonists; Origen and Augustine among the
   church Fathers; Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin among the Reformers;
   Spinoza, Descartes, and Locke; and later, Lessing, Kant, Wolff, and
   Herder ultimately became food to the omnivorous appetite of this young;
   student and were made to contribute their quota to the makeup of his
   mature thought later on. His reading at Halle was not well connected
   and his thought was quite unorganized. He chose his own course of
   reading and paid rather indifferent attention to the regular class-work
   of the university. This course of action was regarded with disfavor by
   professors and students and was afterward regretted by himself.
   However, his state of mind at the time may have made inevitable the
   neglect of studies that did not seem to have the solution of his
   problem directly in view. One thing he did pursue with intense
   zeal--the history of human opinion, which is surely essential to a
   thorough grasp of theology.

   We know little of his religious experiences at this time, for the
   subject is rarely mentioned in his letters. He mentions at times the
   kind Providence of God and expressed his trust in the heavenly Father.
   That he felt he had some sort of Christian message to give to men is
   evident from his application in the spring of 1790 for ordination as a
   licentiate in the Reformed church, to his father's great satisfaction.
   In one of the father's letters of that spring, which deprecates on the
   one hand the trend of the new methods of Scripture exegesis and the
   tendency to abolish the Augsburg confession as a standard authority,
   and on the other hand the compulsory acceptance of orthodoxy, we come
   across the curious advice to the son to imitate his own example of an
   earlier unbelieving period of life in not attacking the orthodox faith
   concerning the person of Christ, but utilizing it in the cause of
   morality and of love to God and man. This respect he thought was due to
   the belief which had been a blessing to millions. The son seemed to
   have acquiesced. Their correspondence at this time evinces a deep
   mutual affection and respect and a desire to avoid any occasion of
   difference. But the uncle continues to exercise the greater influence,
   and Schleiermacher ever afterward treasured a grateful memory of those
   days of quiet intercourse with the man who helped him to attain to some
   definiteness and coherency of theological views and to lay hold of a
   purpose in life.

  EXPERIENCES AS TEACHER AND PREACHER

   The examination pro licentia was duly passed and he was ordained by Mr.
   Sack, chaplain in ordinary to the king. The same gentleman secured for
   him a tutorship in the family of Count Dohna of Schlobitten in Prussia.
   Here he remained for three years. The new experience was extremely
   profitable. Participation in the happy home life of a wealthy and
   cultured family brought him a new freedom and polish of manners. The
   work of teaching, visiting the sick people of the community, and, after
   a time, of occasional preaching brought home to him a deeper sense of
   responsibility and the consciousness of a mission. This, he declared,
   more than made up for the want of a library to read and of money to buy
   one.

   His sister Lotte's influence becomes very manifest at this time. Before
   she left her father's roof to live in the Moravian choir-house her
   father noticed what he playfully termed "the miserly idolatry" with
   which she brooded over Fritz's letters. This noble young woman followed
   her gifted brother's career with the most affectionate solicitude for
   his moral and spiritual well-being and proved more than once in times
   of danger a guardian angel to him. That he was conscious of making
   spiritual progress is evident from the occasional modest references he
   makes to his own inner state. For example, in a letter to his father he
   says, "I feel that I am becoming a better man." He has the love of
   preaching and of sermon-making. He writes more sermons than he preaches
   and many sermons that he never preached were delivered several times
   over in thought. Some of the subjects selected are significant, as, "On
   the Duties Imposed by the Certainty of a Resurrection"; "On the History
   of Thomas (the Apostle) and Rational Belief"; "On the Coming of Christ
   as Putting an End to the Nonage of Man." At this time also begins his
   personal acquaintance with the great leaders of German thought. In a
   letter to his father, written May 15, 1791, he speaks of spending at
   Königsburg "a half-hour with Mr. Kant and a few other professors."

   His stay with the Dohna family came to an end through his refusal, on
   account of personal convictions, to conform to the parents' ideas of
   education. He left Schlobitten in May, 1793. After four months again at
   Drossen he went to Berlin to teach in the Kornmesser Orphan Asylum.
   Here he also preached frequently, and a year later his desire to enter
   the regular pastorate was gratified by an appointment to a curacy at
   Landsberg on the Warthe. A letter from his sister in October, 1794,
   brought to him the news of his father's death. At that time he wrote to
   her: "Had I felt when I lost my mother that which I now experience in
   giving up my father, it would have been too much for a human heart."
   Then recalling the painful incident of his leaving Barby he says:

   There was a period, the remembrance of which now often forces itself
   upon me, during which I mistook the heart of our excellent father; when
   I thought he was too hard upon me and judged me falsely, because I was
   not of the same opinion as he. A certain coldness of feeling toward
   him, which arose in consequence, now seems to me the darkest spot in my
   existence. But in secret I have acknowledged my injustice, and he
   forgave me without my asking it.

   In this generous spirit he turns the blame for their trouble entirely
   upon himself. But when we search in this letter for some reference to
   the Christian assurance of immortality we are disappointed at finding
   nothing except "Peace! peace be with his ashes, and may his soul ever
   delight itself in his children!" It may be that he had special reasons
   for reticence on this great subject, especially in a communication to
   such an ardent Herrnhuter as his sister, but it is most likely that he
   conscientiously refrained from anything explicit on a subject on which
   he seems at the time to have had no very settled conviction.

   The next eight years of Schleiermacher's life, from 1796 to 1804,
   represent the period during which he emerged from semi-obscurity to a
   recognized place among the scholars of his native country and began to
   exercise an influence in her affairs. Till 1802 he was chaplain of the
   Charité Hospital in Berlin, and then for two years he was court
   preacher at Stolpe in Pomerania. In 1804 he removed to Halle. For the
   greater portion of this time his life-story may be drawn from his
   correspondence. His letters disappoint us, however, by their very
   scanty references to his work as a preacher, but they relate
   principally to literary efforts and his relations with a brilliant
   circle of friends among whom he found a warm place. His course, though
   mainly controlled by high ideals, was marked at times by a wavering
   moral judgment and would scarcely justify anticipations of that power
   and eminence to which he afterward attained.

  INFLUENCE OF NEW FRIENDSHIPS

   Shortly after coming to Berlin he became acquainted with the family of
   Dr. Marcus Herz. Dr. Herz was a Jewish physician of some distinction
   and a man of learning. His wife, a woman of unusual beauty united with
   splendid intellectual gifts and a fine culture, made their home a
   center of attraction to many men and women of good breeding and high
   literary attainment. The social gatherings at their home were
   characterized by intimate personal inter course and the free, informal
   discussion of those questions of science, philosophy, politics,
   literature, and religion in which educated people are commonly
   interested. Among the members of this social club were Friedrich
   Schlegel, Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt, Moritz, the elder and the
   younger Spalding, Nicolai, Reichhardt the composer, Schadow the
   sculptor, Count Christian Bernsdorff, the Danish-Prussian statesman
   Count Alexander von Schlobitten, eldest son of the Dohna family where
   Schleiermacher had been tutor (later he became minister of state in
   Prussia), Brinkmann, and Fessler. Of these talented men none excelled
   Schleiermacher in sparkling wit, quiet humor, keen penetration into the
   heart of every question, and power of deep reflection. With these
   qualities were united a warmth of personal feeling and a cherished
   regard for the ties of friendship that won for him the firm confidence
   and the admiration of men and women alike and soon made him the center
   of attraction to the company. His nature craved for sympathy and as
   freely gave it out. The unstinted measure in which he poured his
   affectionate regards upon his friends of both sexes sounds rather
   sentimental to the colder-hearted Anglo-Saxon and at times seems
   reprovable, but, as he said himself, such was his nature, there was no
   remedy for it, and if there were he should not wish to employ it. A
   less unselfish man would have been more guarded and sparing in his
   self-expression.

   Such a man was likely to find his most intimate acquaintances among
   women. His refined, delicately constructed, sensitive nature was best
   understood by them. This he was aware of, and at the same time he felt
   that he was a debtor to them principally for the most ennobling
   influences he had experienced. Once he wrote: "It is through the
   knowledge of the feminine heart and mind that I have learnt to know
   what real human worth is." But we are not to regard him as lacking in
   manliness, for the letters to his intimate women friends of those days,
   while not clear of emotional excess and some rather dull moralizing,
   are always characterized by a pure and deep respect for them and by the
   utterance of noble sentiments.

   His sister Lotte, whom he kept closely informed of all his experiences,
   from her cloister at Gnadenfrei viewed these intimacies with misgivings
   and wrote to him rather deprecatingly. In reply he went carefully over
   his whole course and assured her that all was well. But, though he was
   unconscious of it, she was partly right. At Mrs. Herz's he met
   Friedrich Schlegel, the Romanticist, and at once entered into friendly
   relations with him. With his customary exaggeration of a friend's good
   qualities fie was full of admiration for Schlegel's really powerful
   intellect and soon came to confide deeply in him. When at length they
   took up adjoining rooms in one house this intimacy increased. The
   consequences were of a mixed nature. Schlegel was probably the first to
   impart to Schleiermacher an incentive to high literary effort. It began
   in the form of contributions to the Athenaeum, a periodical edited by
   the brothers Schlegel. This was in 1798. During the next year he
   published anonymously the work that first brought him fame, Discourses
   on Religion to the Educated among Its Despisers, of which we shall
   speak again. He and Schlegel next began in collaboration a translation
   of Plato's Dialogues, but Schlegel, rather dishonorably, abandoned the
   work before it had gone far, and Schleiermacher, with his accustomed
   perseverance, completed the undertaking, though it involved many years
   of hard labor. This translation of Plato remains one of
   Schleiermacher's great literary monuments. So much to the credit of
   Schlegel's influence. But, on the other hand, some of Schleiermacher's
   friends viewed with disfavor his friendship for a man whose character
   was so opposite to his own, and not unreasonably; for the latter's
   morality was open to serious objection. Great was the astonishment of
   many when Schleiermacher wrote a defense of Schlegel's Lucinde, a work
   regarded as immoral. He claimed to find in this novel a higher meaning
   than appeared on the surface, but his comment appeared to his friends
   like a good sermon on a bad text. This cost him the loss of the favor
   of Sack, the influential court preacher. Notwithstanding
   Schleiermacher's error of judgment as to Schlegel's faults, we cannot
   but admire his unwillingness to turn away from a man simply because
   others did so. In the Studien und Kritiken of 1850 their correspondence
   on the subject is published and Schleiermacher's reply to Sack's
   reproaches brings out the essential nobility of his own soul. He wrote,
   in part:

   Never will I be the friend of a man of disreputable principles; but
   never either will I, out of fear of the world, with draw the
   consolations of my friendship from anyone who has innocently incurred
   its bann; never will I, on account of my profession, allow myself to be
   guided in my actions by the false appearances which determine others,
   instead of by the true nature of the circumstances. Were this maxim to
   be allowed sway, we ecclesiastics would be outlaws in the domain of
   sociability; for every calumny against a friend, provided it were
   invented with sufficient cleverness to secure belief, would banish us
   from his society. Far from submitting to this, the aim which I propose
   to myself is to lead a life uniformly blameless, that in time I may
   bring it so far, that no unfavorable light shall fall upon men on
   account of any undeserved evil repute in which my friends may stand;
   but that, on the contrary, my friendship may shed a favorable light on
   their reputation [Miss Rowan's translation].

   Yet as time passed Schleiermacher became aware of the incompatibility
   between his temper and Schlegel's. In a letter of June, 1801, he speaks
   of "the utter dissimilarity of our sensitive natures," and adds
   presently, "Ever in my inmost soul [there are] secrets which I cannot
   impart to him." That year he found in a new friend, Pastor Ehrenfried
   von Willich, a man whose heart and mind accorded well with his own. Of
   him Schleiermacher wrote: "Von Willich has not Schlegel's deep
   comprehensive intellect, but he is in many respects nearer to my
   heart." From whatever cause, Schlegel and his influence gradually
   receded and gave place to this higher friendship. Years later Schlegel
   became a Roman Catholic.

   Schleiermacher's doctrinal views flowed so directly from his religious
   life and the latter was so largely affected by his friendships that it
   will be proper to refer at some length to an episode that constituted
   the only moral shadow that passed over his career, and that is fairly
   traceable, in a measure, to his association with Schlegel. The latter
   had married a Mrs. Dorothea Veit, a member of the club referred to
   above after she had secured a divorce from a husband with whom she had
   no fault to find, but whom she did not love. Schleiermacher came very
   near perpetrating a similar wrong, but under different conditions. At
   Mrs. Herz's he met Eleanore Grünow, the ill-matched wife of a Lutheran
   clergyman. Her husband was not only a coarse man, but, as Dilthey
   affirms, immoral. This lady communicated the fact of her unhappiness to
   Schleiermacher though, it seems, without mentioning the charge which
   Dilthey makes. In those days it was a custom in Prussia for parents to
   arrange marriages for their daughters without consulting their wishes.
   The law offered a recompense of equally doubtful character by
   permitting the divorce by mutual consent of persons who were unhappy in
   their union, even if no further cause of complaint existed.
   Schleiermacher's view of the primacy of the affections, perhaps
   unconsciously strengthened by his admiration for the lady, led him to
   view such an unloving union with horror. He considered it immoral in
   itself and properly to be dissolved. He advised Mrs. Grünow to obtain a
   divorce and, to secure her from want, offered to marry her himself. She
   promised, and then changed her mind. Schleiermacher's retirement to
   distant Stolpe in 1802 is said to have been occasioned by his desire to
   leave the matter to Mrs. Grünow herself. The correspondence went on at
   intervals for years and was closed by her decision to remain as she
   was. This experience brought Schleiermacher unspeakable misery and left
   him broken-hearted and broken in health. It was a bitter lesson he
   learned, but its sobering effect appeared in a saner view of ethical
   relations. Long years after his own marriage to a wife more worthy of
   him he met Mrs. Grünow in a large company and, taking her hand, he
   said, "Eleanore, God has been good to us both."

   The reason for adverting to such an unhappy episode in this good man's
   life is that it brings out some of the characteristics of his mind. In
   the first place it indicates a defect in his cast of thought--namely,
   an unsatisfactory view of the nature of the moral law. Not that
   Schleiermacher took an easy view of moral obligation so far as his own
   conduct is concerned, for no man ever forced himself more sternly to
   the doing of duty. But any system of thought which gives the primacy to
   the affectional, rather than the volitional side of human nature, is
   sure to intro duce moral confusion.

   However, except in respect to moral judgment, Schleiermacher appears to
   advantage in this whole affair. His independence of the conventional,
   merely as conventional, his utter transparency of purpose, and his
   uprightness of character appear in his whole correspondence in this
   connection. He mentioned the matter freely to his sister Lotte and to
   his intimate; friends, and made known his intentions to them. He could
   countenance nothing that was surreptitious. When Mrs. Grünow requested,
   after he had gone to Stolpe, that his letters be not addressed directly
   to her house, she promptly received a flat refusal, and the declaration
   that she would receive no more letters from him. When his hopes at
   length were blasted he poured out his grief as openly in letters to his
   friends.

  PUBLICATION OF THE "REDEN"

   A reader of Schleiermacher's letters written during these years would
   never suppose from the almost incidental references in his letters to
   his pastoral and pulpit work and his literary undertakings that he had
   come to be already a powerful force in the intellectual and religious
   life of Prussia and particularly Berlin. Yet such was the case. At the
   same time that he was cultivating those close personal friendships for
   which his nature craved and which he felt to be indispensable to any
   meaningful life for him, he was engaged in the preparation of literary
   works that were to have far-reaching consequences. In 1799 he published
   a book that was to usher in almost a revolution in the religious life
   of Prussia and to constitute a turning-point in the course of
   theological science. I refer to his Discourses on Religion to the
   Educated among Its Despisers. The "despisers" referred to are probably
   in the first instance the skeptical members of the club that met in the
   Herz parlors, but in a general way the whole school of rationalism. The
   argument of the book will be given in another connection in this
   present work. Here we may simply note that it was a defense of religion
   in general rather than of Christianity in particular, and claimed for
   religion a universal and necessary place in human experience, such as
   Kant claimed for the moral law. His words on this subject came to the
   reading public like a message from another world. Men felt in those
   dark days that a new prophet had arisen, and many of them awoke to a
   new interest in a reality which a specious moralism had concealed from
   them. Claus Harms, the great evangelist and missionary organizer,
   received from the Discourses the first impulse to his great movement.
   Neander, the great church historian, was brought by it out of Judaism
   to evangelical Christianity. It is considered to have played a part
   second to none in arousing the patriotism of Prussia for the struggle
   with Napoleon Bonaparte, because by it men apprehended the magnitude of
   the interests at stake. It is still being republished and translated,
   and modern scholars of note are still devoting time to the discussion
   of it. Oman [8] says: "It may be questioned whether, after Kant's
   Critique and Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, any book of the period has had
   such a lasting effect; there is certainly no question that it
   foreshadows the problems chiefly discussed among us today as is done by
   no other book of the time."

   The truth is that Schleiermacher had found no food for his soul in the
   rationalism into which he had passed on leaving the Moravians, and his
   Moravian faith was returning, though as yet it was tinged with
   romanticism. Romanticism with its canonization of the aesthetic
   sentiments is itself a poor substitute for rationalism, at least the
   higher rationalism. For the nobler types of the latter accord a dignity
   to the principles of morality and elevate human life above the play of
   mere feeling or passion. But after all mere ethics is not theology and
   mere morality is not religion. Man is a being possessed of something
   more than thought and will. He has emotions and these are often as safe
   a clue to character as mere will or mere intellect. Rationalism had
   neglected the claims of feeling, which religion cannot ignore.
   Romanticism was at least an assertion that feeling is a non-negligible
   factor in the estimate of human nature. It supplied to Schleiermacher a
   bridge by which he made the transition from a dry and insipid morality
   to a warm, religious experience, like that of his earlier years. The
   changes made in the second edition of the book, in 1806, showed that by
   this time he had come to a warm evangelical faith. But a greater
   influence than that of romanticism was at work within him. Before the
   book appeared there are evidences that his early experience among the
   Moravians was making itself felt. His religious spirit was awaking to
   new vigor and was reasserting its sway. His letters of 1789 seldom make
   mention of religious matters, but in a letter to his sister Lotte in
   August of that year he appears greatly interested and affected by her
   account of a recent visit to Herrnhut. He exclaims: "How often my mind
   reverts to Albertini and our common studies at Niesky!--the depths of
   his heart are still known to me." He had found no solace for his mind
   in that rationalistic view of religion which subordinated it to
   morality. His later antipathy to so-called natural religion comes out
   strongly in a letter written a few weeks before the publication of his
   Discourses. Some one had recommended a work of Hülsen's on religion.
   Schleiermacher objected, "But it is nature-religion, and I doubt,
   therefore, that it will produce much effect on me. My religion is so
   through and through heart-religion, that I have not room for any
   other." This is indeed Schleiermacher's secret. He had seen and felt
   too much of heart- religion to be permanently occupied with the dry
   platitudes of rationalism. He now yielded himself freely to the sway of
   his renewed Christian faith and endeavored to gain for it a rightful
   place in the world of thought. Not only so, but he felt it to be a part
   of his mission to free the church from bondage to a lifeless creed and
   the influence of religionless men. He felt this in the early part of
   his pastoral career, and even while undertaking extensive literary
   labors he found in preaching his loved vocation. He wrote to his
   sister, "Book-writing is a strange kind of activity, without life,
   without face-to-face encounter, without real use. Preaching is better."
   We find him near the close of his voluntary exile at Stolpe saying of a
   new circle of friends there, "How sweetly do we all cleave with the
   same religious feeling to the loving and informing Christ! Never since
   I left the Herrnhut congregation have I so rejoiced in my Christian
   feelings and in my Christian faith, nor have I ever beheld its living
   power so spread around me"; and again a little later, to von Willich,
   speaking of "the sweetest mystery of Christ and the church, how this is
   built up through his love, how it glorifies and exalts him; and how,
   through it, the whole world is born anew and sanctified." We feel that
   in these words it is a Moravian who speaks. But there is a difference.
   To their warm piety and deep religious feeling he united, on the one
   hand, a fearless and thorough pursuit of all that human learning could
   contribute to the solution of life's problems and, on the other, a
   participation in human affairs, from which the Moravians, with their
   semi-monastic piety, shrank. Yes, he was a Moravian again, but truly of
   a higher order.

   In addition to the Discourses he published, in 1800, his Monologues (a
   presentation of his philosophical views), considerable portions of his
   Plato, Two Impartial Judgments on Protestant Ecclesiastical Affairs,
   anonymously, and, in 1803, A Critical Inquiry into Existing Systems of
   Ethics, regarded by scholars as epoch-making. This last was composed
   while he was in wretched health and not expecting to live long. "This
   book," he writes, "is my gravestone." But though suffering much in mind
   and body he went on steadily with it, explaining his action by saying,
   "Just as a man ought to do nothing because of death, so also he ought
   to leave nothing undone because of death." However, the prospect of
   professorial work at the University of Wurzberg or at Halle, and later
   in Berlin, revived his spirits and his health. It was impossible that a
   man of his ability should long remain comparatively hidden, and in 1804
   the government appointed him extraordinary professor at Halle, and
   preacher at the university, with the promise of a future appointment at
   Berlin, should a new university be founded there. It is significant of
   his theological position at the time and of his independence of
   judgment that one of the conditions on which he accepted the new
   position was that the difference between the Lutheran and Reformed
   confessions should be over looked, "lest my hands as a member of the
   Reformed church should be bound."

  PROFESSOR AND PREACHER AT HALLE

   Schleiermacher went to Halle in October, 1804. He did not find
   conditions there very satisfactory. His professorial work was of a
   rather varied nature and indefinite in range. We find him lecturing on
   Plato, philosophical ethics, introduction to the study of theology,
   fundamental Christian doctrines, and dogmatics, and delivering public
   exegetical lectures on the Epistle to the Galatians, and all within a
   single year. The delay and uncertainty as to his appointment to a
   regular professorship vexed him. Moreover, the arrangement for his
   preaching services at Halle were by no means to his liking. The
   stiffness and want of life in the liturgy he could not abide. His
   desires for a change in this respect were quickened by a visit to Barby
   in the spring of 1805, when he witnessed a Moravian Easter service. A
   letter written just after this visit sets forth his feelings at the
   time:

   There is not throughout Christendom in our day a form of public worship
   which expresses more worthily or awakens more thoroughly the spirit of
   true Christian piety than does that of the Herrnhut brotherhood. And
   while absorbed in heavenly faith and love I could not but deeply feel
   how far behind them w are in our church, where the poor sermon is
   everything and e\en this is hampered by meaningless restrictions,
   while, on the other hand, it is subject to every change in the times
   and is rarely animated by a true and living spirit.

   He hoped soon to transplant something of its nature into the services
   at Halle. He experienced on that occasion a renewal of the drawing
   toward the Moravian communion, and goes on to say, rather regretfully:

   They would not have refused me permission to partake of the Lord's
   Supper with the congregation, but I would not ask for what I knew to be
   contrary to rule. . . . . While dwelling on my loneliness in the world
   and my separation from those who, I believe, form the truest Christian
   communion which exists in the outward world, I consoled myself with the
   thought of the secret and scattered church to which we all belong and
   of the common spirit which animates it.

   He felt so dissatisfied with the state of things at Halle that in the
   spring of 1806 he was disposed to accept an invitation to the pastorate
   at Bremen, but by certain concessions was prevailed on to. remain. We
   might trace without difficulty, if space would permit, his struggle
   through the rest of his life against formal ism. A state-controlled
   church was a veritable prison to a liberty-loving spirit like his, that
   longed for a lofty flight. The dread of Separatism helped to keep him
   within it, but to the end of his days he battered his wings against the
   bars of his cage without much avail.

   While at Halle he met Goethe once or twice, but about the only thing he
   said of their interview was that they conversed together like old
   acquaintances. It is more important to note that he found there a
   kindred spirit in a Norwegian member of the faculty, Steffens by name.
   A warm friendship soon sprang up between them and continued through the
   vicissitudes through which central Europe was then passing. When the
   war with France broke out he and Steffens shared the same dangers,
   suffered the same losses, occupied portions of the same lodgings, and
   partook of the same scanty supply of food. Their friendship was based
   on religious sympathies. This is incidentally brought to our knowledge
   in a note Steffens makes of a little time they spent together in an inn
   at Ostrow: "Never did the deep religiosity of his nature strike me more
   favorably. The Savior was with us as he promised to be where two or
   three are gathered.'" The excellent opportunity Steffens enjoyed of
   observing Schleiermacher under a great variety of circumstances makes
   the following pen-portrait he gives of Schleiermacher in those days
   especially valuable: [9]

   Schleiermacher was small of stature and slightly deformed, but so
   slightly as hardly to be disfigured by it. His movements were quick and
   animated, his features highly expressive. A certain sharpness in his
   eye acted, perhaps, repulsively at times. He seemed, indeed, to look
   through everyone. . . . . His face was long, his features sharply
   defined, his lips firmly and severely closed, his chin prominent, his
   look always earnest, collected, and self-possessed. I saw him under
   various circumstances in life--deeply meditative and sportive, mild and
   fired with anger, moved by sorrow and joy--but ever an unalterable
   composure greater, mightier than every passing emotion, seemed to
   dominate his being. A slight expression of irony played round his
   features; the sincerest sympathy ever animated his heart; and an almost
   childish goodness shone through the outward calm. His constant presence
   of mind had sharpened his features in a remarkable degree. Even while
   engaged in the most animated conversation nothing escaped him. He saw
   everything that was passing around him and heard everything, even the
   most low-toned conversation.

  PATRIOTIC SERVICES

   But the progress of events was now opening for him a sphere of wider
   influence. Prussia was entering on her life-and-death struggle with
   Napoleon Bona parte, and in the storm and stress of those bitter days
   the preacher and lecturer became the Christian patriot. Prussia, led by
   her king and oligarchy, had played of late a rather unworthy part in
   the affairs of Europe. Her government had fawned on Napoleon, hoping to
   enjoy his favor and in alliance with him to hold her territory intact
   or make fresh accessions without cost to herself. That shrewd man,
   great in diplomacy as in the battlefield, had utilized her friendship
   temporarily for his own ends, but the time had now come to despoil her.
   His heavy exactions and the clamors of the people forced the Prussian
   government at length to declare war. But Napoleon crushed her like a
   snuffbox. At Auerstadt and Jena her power was broken, and from her
   surrendered capital the conqueror issued to the world his famous
   "Berlin decrees" against England.

   Schleiermacher had been by no means unobservant of European affairs or
   unconscious of the mean spirit of the Prussian government. He clearly
   foresaw the approaching troubles of -his country and a strong patriotic
   spirit rose within him. He felt that Prussian sentiments, mental
   culture, and religion were at stake. In the early stages of the French
   Revolution he had sympathized with the Democratic party in France, and
   when Louis XVI was beheaded he did not share in the common feeling of
   horror. But the infant French democracy had soon given place to a
   virtual autocracy; his own deep love of liberty and his intense
   national sentiment aroused in him a determination to fight for the
   salvation of his fatherland. At the same time he perceived that Prussia
   was ill-prepared to defend herself, principally on account of the chasm
   between her government and her people. With the eye of a true statesman
   he saw that a war for freedom must be carried on by king and nation
   together, "not by kings and their hired armies." Aware that the
   struggle on which the government was at length about to enter with
   Napoleon must ultimately promote the cause of freedom, he exclaims, "I
   exult in the war against the tyrant, which I think is now unavoidable."

   When disaster fell upon the Prussian arms and Halle was taken, his
   house was plundered by French soldiers. He and his half-sister Nanni,
   who had come to live with him, and the Steffens family were reduced to
   destitution. Only by the kindness of a French officer were they able to
   secure enough firewood to keep from freezing in the winter of 1806-7.
   The times were serious enough for him, but he writes jocosely of his
   experiences and his "potatoes and salt" diet. Napoleon closed for the
   time being the University of Halle, lest it should nourish patriotic
   feeling, and threatened to remove it. Its future was uncertain. If
   Halle should be turned over to Saxony, Schleiermacher would not remain
   in it, for the Saxons were such stiff Lutherans that he knew a member
   of the Reformed church could not be happy in the university. "If the
   town fall to the share of a French prince," he said, "I, for my part,
   will not abandon it, so long as there is anywhere a Prussian hole to
   which I can retire." He declined a second invitation to Bremen until he
   should be sure that the university was definitely closed. The upshot
   was that he severed his connection with the University of Halle,
   because it came under the authority of Jerome Bonaparte, the new king
   of Westphalia, and because he could not conscientiously obey the order
   to offer public prayer for the new king and queen or put himself in
   opposition to the German spirit. In the end of 1807 we find him
   delivering lectures in Berlin, whither he had removed in consequence of
   the Prussian government's declaration of its intention to found a
   university to take the place of Halle. His name was being talked of in
   connection with a professorship there. What his purpose was we may
   gather from a letter written to a friend about that time:

   One determination only I hold fast and that is, to follow the fortunes
   of my immediate fatherland, Prussia, as long as it continues to exist
   and does not prove itself quite unworthy of this resolve. Should it
   entirely succumb, then I will, as long as it is possible, seek the
   German fatherland wherever a Protestant can live and a German governs.

   It was this spirit animating the breasts of patriots like himself,
   which saved Prussia and ultimately raised her to the headship of modern
   Germany.

  THE DOMESTIC CIRCLE

   Before we follow farther the career of Schleiermacher during the
   Napoleonic wars, we must turn aside to notice certain domestic events.
   The friendship between him and Ehrenfried von Willich has already been
   mentioned. Begun in the summer of 1801, it deepened with time. When the
   young pastor married, his home became Schleiermacher's chief resort for
   the inspirations and consolations of human fellowship. Von Willich
   looked upon him as an elder brother, and the wife regarded him as a
   spiritual father. When their "Schleier," as they familiarly called him,
   came to see them, there was always a free mutual outpouring of joys and
   sorrows. The love of friends like these he described as "my highest
   good, without which neither the world nor anything in it would have the
   smallest value in my eyes." (We shall remember this when we come to the
   vital place he assigns to the Christian communion in his
   Glaubenslehre.) On the outbreak of the war von Willich was pastor at
   Stralsund. When the place was attacked he remained with his flock. A
   fever that became epidemic during the siege seized him and, in the be
   ginning of March, 1807, he died. The young widow, left with two infant
   children, writes a pathetic letter to Schleiermacher telling him the
   awful news. In her distress she beseeches him to give her some word of
   assurance that her husband was not lost to her altogether. The
   correspondence throws light on the state of Schleiermacher's mind at
   the time. She urges him to tell her his inmost convictions on the
   question of the future state and adds, instinctively, that she is not
   without consolation, that in the midst of her anguish she has the
   rapture of feeling that "love is eternal and that God cannot possibly
   destroy it, because God himself is love." She goes on to say, "I
   implore you, by all that you love and hold sacred, if you can, give me
   the certainty that I shall see him again, that I shall recognize him.
   . . . . Alas! it will be annihilation to me to lose this faith." It
   would seem that she had been led to fear that Schleiermacher held to
   some sort of pantheism, for she asks, "Do you know when I feel my grief
   most poignantly? When I think that in the future life there will be
   nothing left of the old, . . . . and when I think that his soul is
   merged in the great all . . . . that the past will not be
   recognized--that all is over--Oh, Schleier! this I can not bear."
   Schleiermacher's reply, though gentle and tender, is without the
   certainty of possessing definite information on the point that
   concerned her most. There is even a tone of rebuke, which we find
   echoed in his Glaubenslehre, because of the emphasis she had placed on
   physical existence and her desire that the future life should be, in a
   degree at least, a reduplication of the conditions of the present. He
   says a good deal about the "eternal order of things and the necessity
   of submitting tranquilly to it, but confesses that he cannot undertake
   to settle her doubts by confirming the certainty of the images of the
   phantasy, which, he thought, would be to prefer our own desires to
   God's own order. Yet, "There is the greatest certainty--and nothing
   would be certain if it were not so--that 1 for the soul there is no
   such thing as annihilation." But immediately upon this follows the
   disappointing assertion, "Personal life is not the essence of spiritual
   being; it is only an outward presentment thereof. How this is repeated
   we know not--we can form no conception of it, we can only form poetic
   visions." His idea of a merging in the great all was that it was not an
   unconscious condition, but "a living commingling--as the highest life."
   He seems to have in mind a future life of fellowship without the
   personal separateness and mutual exclusiveness of the present. The
   poetic visions we have of the future life he held to be of value
   because they are anticipations of reality, but he seemed to think that
   the precise nature of that future reality is nowhere disclosed to men.
   Mrs. von Willich thanked him for his helpful words, but it seems to the
   writer that her consolations were mainly drawn from her own spiritual
   intuitions.

   The correspondence continued. He finally visited Mrs. von Willich at
   her home on the island of Rügen and the personal interview resulted in
   a betrothal. In the year 1809, notwithstanding the extremely unsettled
   state of Prussia and the precariousness of Schleiermacher's means of
   livelihood, they were married. He took as much care of her children as
   if they were his own. To them in course of time five others were
   added--two girls and a boy of his, and two adopted children. He reveled
   in the love and joys of the home life and found in his wife a companion
   who, though much his junior, entered heartily into his deepest
   religious experiences and his many trying labors.

  PROFESSOR, PREACHER, AND PATRIOT IN BERLIN

   The much-talked-of university to be established in Berlin at last
   became a fact. Schleiermacher is considered to have had a powerful
   influence in its formation. Fichte was its rector, but Schleiermacher
   stood at the head of the faculty of theology, as Savigny at the head of
   that of jurisprudence, arid the organization of the theological studies
   and the spirit he introduced into them ushered in a new epoch. His
   Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, which was published at
   this time, exhibits his view of the nature and relations of the various
   theological sciences. This little book was a pathmaker in the proper
   apprehension of the subject, and an evidence of its great value is seen
   in the fact that it is still being studied and republished. For the
   first time the various theological disciplines were comprehended in
   their integrity by the determination of their organic relation to a
   single principle. Schleiermacher's views on the subject have been much
   criticized, but his great merit is beyond dispute. But Schleiermacher's
   activities in Berlin were by no means confined to the duties of his
   professorial position. He was incessant n\ multiform labors for the
   public good. Preaching, lecturing, writing, philanthropic work,
   participation in ecclesiastical and political affairs, his efforts in
   the reorganization of state educational institutions, and the
   instruction of youths went on together. Add to this his wide social
   relations, for his home be came one of the chief social centers in
   Berlin, and we get some idea of the extent of his capacity for work. At
   the same time we find here an explanation of the fact that his
   university lectures were never given that completeness and perfection
   of form which is desirable in order to a thorough knowledge of his
   views.

   To enter extensively into Schleiermacher's connection with the history
   of Prussia during the later Napoleonic wars would lead us very far
   afield. We must here content ourselves with a few brief references. The
   regeneration of Prussia was owing in no small degree to him. From a
   very early period in this great struggle he apprehended the immensity
   of the interests at stake and at the same time perceived the incapacity
   of the Prussian government. He saw that the power of the French
   movement lay in its popular basis, and felt that the hope of his own
   country lay in her people. They must be aroused to a realization of
   their rights and responsibilities. As he saw it, the safety of the
   German fatherland lay in German. Protestantism; the cause of
   Christianity and the cause of Protestantism were one. To him,
   therefore, the conflict with Napoleon was at bottom for the interests
   of true religion, and on that account, unlike Fichte, he flung himself
   into it with all his might. He was in close touch with the political
   leaders throughout and co-operated with them. After the peace of
   Tilsit, which left Prussia clinging to the skirts of Napoleon, the
   nation, stirred to indignation over its humiliation and the partition
   of its territories, began to rouse itself to action. A reformation was
   soon in progress. Schleiermacher boldly denounced the selfishness, the
   cowardice, and the want of faith in God which were the root of his
   country's shame, and summoned the people to repentance. While patriots
   like Stein and Scharnhorst aimed at placing the civil and military
   affairs of Prussia on a truly national basis, he wrought for the
   reawakening of the church.

   The French were not slow to recognize in him a dangerous man, and as
   early as 1808 one of his letters intimates that he had been arrested
   and brought before Marshal Davoust and had been rebuked by that officer
   as a hot-head and provoker of disorder. But his perfect composure
   during the interview thwarted the marshal's intention to keep him under
   restraint. He continued the good work of preparing his countrymen for
   that desperate grapple with the tyrant which he felt could not long be
   delayed. His sermons and his lectures pointed that way. His house
   became a resort for Prussian patriots. In one of his letters he notes
   incidentally that at the close of a lecture there was a meeting of the
   Defense Committee at his house. We find him in the autumn of 1811
   traveling in Silesia on a political mission, evidently of a dangerous
   kind, but the exact nature of which is not clear. Between the years
   1810 and 1813 his letters frequently express alarm over the country's
   prospects and a deep distrust of the character and ability of the royal
   government. After Napoleon's retreat from Moscow he urged strenuously
   that Prussia should identify herself with the common interests of
   Europe, and great was the rejoicing when her government broke the
   alliance with Napoleon and declared against him. We find a fine
   expression of his feelings in a sermon [10] on "A Nation's Duty in a
   War for Freedom," preached on March 28, 1813, from Jer. 17:5-8 and
   18:7-10, on the occasion of the king's summons to the people to unite
   in the cause of the fatherland. He hails the change of policy as an
   evidence of a revived trust in God after a disgraceful submission to a
   foreign foe and as a renewal of their devotion to the divine purpose in
   the nation's life. He warned the people against personal ambition and
   selfishness and urged all classes to perform their part.

   On the calling out of the Landwehr ("militia") he was one of the first
   to enrol himself in a regiment and submitted to several hours' military
   drill daily. The nature of his influence at the time is vividly
   represented in Bishop Eilert's description (quoted by Lücke in Studien
   und Kritiken, 1850, and transl. by Miss Rowan) of a special occasion
   when a portion of the Landwehr made up of students of the university
   and the Gymnasium as a body requested Schleiermacher to preach and
   administer the sacrament to them just before their departure. At eight
   o'clock on the evening of May 13, 1813, they assembled in Holy Trinity
   Church, having piled their arms in and around the building.

   After having pronounced a short prayer, full of unction, Schleiermacher
   went up into the pulpit. There, in this holy place and at this solemn
   hour, stood the physically so small and insignificant man, his noble
   countenance beaming with intellect, and his clear, sonorous,
   penetrating voice ringing through the overflowing church. Speaking from
   his heart with pious enthusiasm his every word penetrated to the heart,
   and the clear, full, mighty stream of his eloquence carried everyone
   along with it. His bold, frank declaration of the causes of our fall,
   his severe denunciation of our actual defects, as evinced in the
   narrow-hearted spirit of caste, of proud aristocracy, and in the dead
   forms of bureaucratism, struck down like thunder and lightning, and the
   subsequent elevation of the heart to God on the wings of solemn
   devotion was like harp-tones from a higher world. The discourse
   proceeded in an uninterrupted stream, and every word was from the times
   and for the times. And when, at last, with the full fire of enthusiasm
   he addressed the noble youths already equipped for battle, and next
   turning to their mothers, the greater number of whom were present, he
   concluded with the words: "Blessed is she who has borne such a son;
   blessed is the bosom that has nourished such a babe," a thrill of deep
   emotion ran through the assembly, and, amid loud sobs and weeping,
   Schleiermacher pronounced the concluding Amen.

   Notwithstanding the suspense and terrible anxieties of those days, his
   life was a happy one because of the character of his family life and
   enrichment of his spiritual nature. For a time, during the war, he sent
   his family into Silesia, thinking it a safer place for them than Berlin
   was likely to be. Great was his alarm when that country itself became
   the theater of war, but happily they escaped all injury. During this
   time the letters between him and his wife are full of expressions of
   tender regard for each other and their children and at the same time of
   a calm trust in the grace and goodness of God. More and more we are
   impressed, as we study his career, that in the simple relations of
   everyday life more than anywhere else is to be seen the true greatness
   of this wonderful man. We shall see a reflection of this later in the
   theological view of the identity of the spheres of the natural and the
   supernatural.

  RELIGIOUS REACTION IN PRUSSIA

   At the conclusion of the war, notwithstanding his invaluable services
   to the cause of the country, Schleiermacher found himself in a
   difficult position. The overthrow of Napoleon was followed by a
   vigorous conservative reaction. As it has been said of the restored
   Bourbon house in France, they came back "having learned nothing and
   having forgotten nothing," so also it might almost be said of Frederick
   William of Prussia. His attitude is indicated by his participation with
   the emperors of Russia and Austria in the so-called Holy Alliance,
   which was simply a determined attempt to prevent the rise of freedom
   for the individual and of democracy in government. The king attempted
   to play the part of a Constantine or a Charlemagne by trying to bring
   the church as well as the state under direct royal control.
   Schleiermacher was by no means persona grata to him, for he could see
   that individualism in religion spells democracy in ecclesiastical and
   state affairs. He had promised a commission for the regulation of
   ecclesiastical matters, but, instead, he proceeded to trample under
   foot the spirit of religious liberty and the rights of the Reformed
   church by establishing a strict Lutheranism, even going so far as to
   issue a new liturgy, mostly of his own composition, compulsorily to be
   used. Schleiermacher spoke out manfully in opposition. He affirmed that
   if all that the Reformation did was to transfer the pope's power to the
   prince, then there was need of a new Reformation. In his Reflections
   (Gutachten über die für die Protestantische Kirche des Preussischen
   Staates einzurichtende Synodal-Verfassung), issued in 1817, he took the
   ground that just as in a free state constitution the power of the
   executive reposes on the active and willing co-operation of the
   citizens, so "the Protestant church consists, in truth, of the totality
   of the Protestant communities, and the clergy are only their servants."
   He advocated a church constitution based on congregational
   representation, with presbyteries and synods for the regulation of all
   matters of order and discipline. While he was an advocate of the
   (rather abortive) union of the Lutheran and Reformed churches of
   Prussia which took place in 1817, he opposed the proposal to issue a
   new creed, foreseeing that it must limit the freedom of the teacher and
   preacher and become a barrier to the progressive apprehension of
   evangelical truth. He held that the teacher must be fettered by no
   formulae, but only when he so departs from the spirit and truth of
   Christianity as to alienate from him the congregation to which he
   ministers is he to be dealt with by the church authorities. He
   perceived also that the king's policy must prove detrimental to
   Christianity by preventing the free critical study of the Scriptures,
   saying, "Purest faith and sharpest testing are one and the same, for no
   one that would believe what is divine should wish to believe
   deceptions, old or new, his own or other people's." Moreover his
   ingrained Moravianism appears in his determination to maintain freedom
   and spontaneity of public worship, in which the sermon and
   congregational singing should have a large place.

   The religious struggles of those times are reflected in his
   Glaubenslehre, or, to use the longer title, A Systematic Exposition of
   the Christian Faith according to the Principles of the Evangelical
   Church (Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätsen der evangelischen
   Kirche in Zusammenhange dargestellt), which the present work is
   intended to expound. It was published in 1821 and 1822. Throughout this
   great book we may perceive the working of his profound conviction that
   creeds and all formal doctrines are only approximate and temporary
   expressions of religious experiences and must ever be subordinated
   thereto. He endeavors, on the one hand, to do justice to traditional
   and current dogmatical statements by bringing into relief the religious
   reality that lies be hind them and, on the other, to indicate the
   limitations of their worth.

   His differences with the civil authorities brought Schleiermacher into
   considerable controversy. His advocacy of congregational rights and of
   the freedom of the church from dictation by the state led the king to
   regard him as a secret republican and rendered his position insecure.
   His friend and brother-in-law, Arndt, was dismissed in 1817, and
   Schleiermacher's letters for many years later indicate that for a long
   time he expected the same treatment. But his immense hold on the public
   esteem proved a secure protection, and he was left undisturbed. His
   increasing years and his chronic poor health unfitted him to become
   leader of a popular movement for the liberation of the church, and at
   last, so far as the liturgy was concerned, a compromise was reached,
   Schleiermacher being left free to use it or not to use it as his
   conscience might decide. While the propagation of his views had,
   doubtless, been working for the liberation of the church in Germany,
   his compromise with the authorities postponed it.

  CHARACTERISTICS AS PROFESSOR AND PREACHER

   During all these years and up to the close of his life, Schleiermacher
   was carrying concurrently the work of his professorial chair and of his
   pulpit in Holy Trinity. Though continually accusing himself of laziness
   he was more abundant in labors than al most any other man of his day.
   At one point in the war, about the time of the battle of Leipsic, when
   all Berlin was full of excitement, he was the only professor who kept
   up his lectures. There have been more popular and able lecturers but
   his students were always numerous and enthusiastic. That his lectures
   were not written out in complete form need cause no surprise when we
   remember that he treated at one time or another every subject in the
   theological curriculum. However, what his lectures lacked in form and
   system was compensated for by their richness and suggestiveness. It
   will be generally acknowledged that Schleiermacher's pre-eminence as a
   theologian is principally due to the rich veins of thought which he
   only tapped and opened up for other and less comprehensive thinkers to
   explore.

   As a preacher he has had few, if any, superiors in Germany. Old Trinity
   church has become famous as the place where thousands felt the thrill
   of his warm, attractive personality and those stirring appeals that
   found their way into so many hearts. W. Robertson Nicoll quotes a
   German writer as saying that "thousands were won by him to the Savior."
   Many others received through him a deeper spiritual life. The
   subject-matter of his sermons and his theological writings were
   substantially the same, but of course the methods differed. The topics
   chosen were of very wide range, but those relating to personal
   experience predominated. His sermons were prepared in rather an
   extraordinary way. They were never written but were composed while his
   other work was in progress, or even in the midst of those social
   festivities which were such a common feature of his home life. He was
   often observed on a Saturday evening, when his home was filled with
   guests, to step aside from the company into some corner of the room and
   there, in a few moments, write some notes on the subject on which he
   had been ruminating, and this "brief" he carried into the pulpit on the
   following day. The final form of the discourse depended largely on the
   inspiration of the occasion. A striking characteristic of his delivery
   was the frequent occurrence of long, involved sentences which would
   fill a page or more of common octavo, but, though they were composed on
   the instant, his hearers never detected in them an instance of
   incorrect or defective grammatical construction. We are indebted to
   Miss Rowan for a translation of the following portion of Lücke's
   description ("Erinnerungen," etc., Stndien und Kritiken, 1834) of his
   delivery:

   Those who knew the secret [of his method of preparation] could follow
   the artistic structure of his discourse. They perceived how, at first,
   he spoke slowly and deliberately, somewhat in the ordinary tone of
   conversation, as if gathering and marshaling his thoughts; then, after
   a while, when he had, as it were, spread out and again drawn together
   the entire net of his thoughts, his words flowed faster, the discourse
   became more animated, and the nearer he drew to the encouraging or ad
   monishing peroration, the fuller and richer the stream. . . . . He had
   modes of expression peculiar to himself and also a sphere of thought
   peculiar to himself. But the richness of his mind and the fulness of
   Christian life in him never allowed any of the ordinary defects of
   extemporaneous preaching to be apparent in his sermons and caused one
   to contemplate with unalloyed pleasure his wonderful mastery of the
   homiletical art and the rich fruits it bore. . . . . It is true that he
   expected a good deal from his hearers, yet in reality no more than
   attention and familiarity with the Scriptures; and as he knew how to
   rivet the attention of the less educated by the freshness and vivacity
   of his mode of delivery and by the constant application of even the
   deepest ideas to practical life and to the actual conditions of the
   church, of family life, and of the fatherland, this explains how it was
   that, although his congregation mostly belonged to the educated
   classes, persons of the lower ranks and even be longing to other
   congregations were constantly seen in his church. I believe that this
   portion of his congregation steadily increased, for just as his whole
   system of theology was ever in living progression, so also the fervor
   and Christian simplicity of his mode of preaching increased year by
   year in proportion as his experience was enlarged and his inner life
   expanded.

   Considering his immense popularity it is astonishing to find how seldom
   in his correspondence he makes reference to this part of his work or
   gives us a hint of his influence. But we find a very interesting
   incidental remark in one of his letters to his wife: "Today I preached
   in the Cathedral with great fire and to my own satisfaction, which is
   by no means always the case." He also took great interest in improving
   the liturgical part of the service, especially the singing--thanks to
   his Moravian training--and, quite in harmony with his view of the
   nature of religion, favored a form of worship of high aesthetic
   quality.

  CLOSING YEARS

   One word more must be added concerning his family life. He paid the
   greatest attention to the education of his children, stepchildren, and
   adopted children. He shared their pranks and frolics and their holiday
   making and imparted his own freedom and spontaneity to their studies.
   In 1820 he was greatly elated over the birth of a son, and on that
   occasion writes, "My first prayer to God was to be inspired with wisdom
   and power from above to educate this child to his glory." This child
   inherited the religious precocity of his father and exhibited very
   early the influence of the peculiar Moravian attitude to Jesus of which
   deep traces still remained in Schleiermacher. It is related by Auberlen
   (Studien und Kritiken, 1860) that on one occasion when the boy was only
   four years old his father asked him: "Nathaniel, dost thou love me?"
   and the child replied, "Yes, I love thee, but I love the Savior still
   better." But his death when only nine years of age was so deeply felt
   by his father that he said it drove the nails into his own coffin. He
   himself pronounced the funeral oration and went on with his regular
   work that very day, but with a sore heart. He wrote to a friend
   wearily, "Life goes on in its old grooves, but more slowly and more
   heavily." It is said that from the time of this bereavement there was a
   greater depth of sympathy in his preaching, and that he spoke more
   persistently of the love of God in Christ. The death in 1831 of his
   elder sister, the faithful Lotte, who had come to live in his home
   after Nanni's marriage, was an added sorrow. He was not to survive her
   many years.

   In 1828 he made his first and only visit to England and preached at the
   opening of a German church at the Savoy. He noticed with wonderment the
   commerce and wealth of London. On a visit to St. Paul's he was
   disappointed with the worship and criticized the indifference with
   which the officiating minister conducted a funeral service which he
   attended.

   In 1831 evidence was given of the reconciliation between him and the
   king in the tardy recognition of his services to the nation by
   conferring on him the decoration of the Order of the Red Eagle. Two
   years later he visited Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. His fame had
   preceded him, and ovations met him everywhere, especially at the
   schools of learning. But long-continued suffering had undermined his
   strength and the end was near. A slight cold contracted in the middle
   of the winter of the next year developed into pneumonia and after a few
   days of suffering it terminated fatally. He died at his home in Berlin
   on February 12, 1834. The friends who were present often spoke of the
   deathbed scenes. Some of his utterances may be recorded here. At one
   time, just after recovering from the effects of laudanum, calling his
   wife to his bedside, he said, "I am, in fact, in a state between
   consciousness and unconsciousness, but inwardly I enjoy heavenly
   moments. I feel constrained to think the profoundest speculative
   thoughts and they are to me identical with the deepest religious
   feelings." Near the last, he said, "I have never clung to the dead
   letter, and we have the atoning death of Jesus Christ, his body, and
   his blood. I have ever believed, and still believe, that the Lord Jesus
   gave the communion in water and in wine." (The physician had forbidden
   him to use wine.) After receiving the assent of the friends present he
   added, "Then let us take the communion: the wine for you, the water for
   me. . . . . Let no one take offense at the form." Then he calmly gave
   to each the bread and wine with the usual words and, taking the bread
   and water for himself, said soliloquizingly: "On these words of the
   Scripture I rely; they are the foundation of my faith." After
   pronouncing the benediction he said to his wife, "In this love and
   communion we are and ever will remain united," and in a few moments
   expired. It is significant of his attitude in religion that his deep
   regard for the Supper and for the communion of believers appears at the
   very close of his life.

   The news of his death caused profound sorrow everywhere and was
   regarded as a national calamity. He was buried like a Prince of the
   country. Thirty-six of his students shared among them the honor of
   bearing his body to the cemetery. The carriages of the king and the
   crown prince led the long procession of mourners, shop-windows were
   closed, and thou sands of Berlin's weeping citizens lined the march.
   The sight was a tribute to his own simple greatness and at the same
   time a proof of that deep spiritual sympathy of the German people that
   has made so many of her university professors the teachers of the
   world.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [1] These people have accepted various designations: The Unit as
   Fratrum or Unity of the Brethren, the Unity, the Bohemian Brethren, the
   Brethren, the Brethren's church, Moravian Brethren, the Moravian
   church. Many German writers use the name Herrnhuters. For a
   comprehensive history of the body to the year 1722 see The History of
   the Church Known as the Unitas Fratrum, by Edmund de Schweinitz.

   [2] See Meyer, Schleiermachers und C. S. von Brinkmanns Gang durch die
   Brudergemeine, 61; also Rowan, The Life and Letters of Schleiermacher,
   I, 6.

   [3] It will help us to understand Schleiermacher's theology if we
   remember that he believed he learned much of the nature of religion by
   observing attentively and calmly the process of his own inner life, and
   that he considered that from his earliest remembered religious
   experience to the end there was no internal revolution, but a
   development.

   [4] Meyer, 141.

   [5] Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher (biographical sketch), 6.

   [6] Erinnerungen von Schleiermacher: Studien und Kritiken 1834, 754.

   [7] Rowan, Autobiography, I, 12.

   [8] Discourses on Religion,' Introd., x.

   [9] Rowan, II, 27.

   [10] Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher, 67-82 (Biblical Library,
   edited by W. Robertson Nicoll; transl. by Mary F. Wilson).
     __________________________________________________________________

B. SCHLEIERMACHER'S RELATION TO EARLIER PROTESTANTISM

   Schleiermacher takes his stand as a theologian avowedly within the
   position of Protestantism. A subject of religious experiences on which
   the Protestant spirit is nourished, he was profoundly convinced that
   the hope of Christendom lay in the Protestant faith. His Glaubenslehre
   was intended to set forth the inner meaning and wealth of Protestant
   Christianity. A true apprehension of the nature of the Reformation and
   the modifications through which it had passed in three centuries is
   therefore essential to a due appreciation of Schleiermacher's views. A
   movement so complicated in its ramifications and so far-reaching in its
   effects cannot be adequately described in a mere sketch, and we shall
   attempt to outline only its chief features so far as they are related
   to our present study.

  CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANTISM

   Protestantism, like all other impressive phenomena in history, sprang
   out of the concurrent operation of many forms of human activity.
   Political, ecclesiastical, social, economic, moral, and religious
   influences combined to produce it; but, after allowing due weight to
   all these forces, the secret of the great revolution it wrought is to
   be found in a revival of the religious spirit. It had been quietly
   gathering momentum for four centuries. The rediscovery of the gospel
   and the Christ who gave it through multiplied translations of the
   Scriptures long current among the common people, the cultivation of the
   spirit of piety by dissenters, monks, and mystics, and the awakening of
   the modern conscience produced a powerful revulsion against the
   government, and the worship and the doctrines of the church of Rome. It
   was a spiritual revolution and, like all revolutions, it swept on by
   its own inherent force and wrought such results as astonished, and even
   alarmed, the very men who were at its head. Luther, Melanchthon,
   Zwingli, Cranmer, Calvin, Knox helped to make the Reformation, but even
   more they were made by it. They and their many fellow-laborers who
   organized it and gave it equipment for active resistance to the church
   of Rome secured a relative permanence to the forms which it then
   assumed, but it is now clear that in so doing they overlooked or even
   suppressed many of its most important elements. The Reformation as a
   religious movement was not produced by theologians and statesmen but by
   the idealist prophets and preachers who awakened the spiritual
   aptitudes of the people and stirred their wills to action. Such men
   were full of zeal, but they lacked the worldly wisdom that knows how to
   use human preferences and even selfishness in the interest of a higher
   end. In their very spirituality lay the chief danger to the cause they
   served. For the church of Rome, though somewhat inert at the time, was
   sure to arouse herself in time to crush the new movement unless it were
   supported from without. Moreover, radicalism was as much of a bugbear
   then as it is now, and radicals were plentiful in the days of the
   Reformation. Officialism was suspicious of the new movement as
   officialism always is of things new. The "governing classes" thought
   they discerned in it a kinship with certain social revolts that had
   often threatened the stability of existing authorities, and they were
   unwilling to countenance it except in so far as they saw in it a means
   of strengthening their own opposition to the claims of Rome. When the
   Reformers looked to them for support it was inevitable that the
   religious principles of the Reformation should be compromised.

   In every country where the Reformation was finally established it was
   done by means of the sup port of the state but it had to take such a
   form as the state was willing to tolerate, namely, a modified
   Catholicism. This is true in respect to ecclesiastical organization and
   ritual and not less in respect to doctrine.

   A glance at the creeds and confessions of faith put forth by the
   churches of the Reformation is sufficient to convince anyone of the
   importance attached to doctrinal statement by the Protestant parties.
   That correct doctrine is traditionally a matter of greater importance
   to Protestantism than to Catholicism needs no proof. To the latter,
   doctrine is indeed a matter of great concern, but it stands in a
   tributary relation to the higher interest, that of the church. To the
   Protestant truth is of supreme value. Its worth is in itself. The force
   of the Protestant polemic against the Roman church lay in its
   recognition of the absolute value of truth and righteousness in
   contrast with the shifty use of doctrine and ethics by Rome. The vigor
   of Protestantism is owing in no small degree to the profound conviction
   that salvation is dependent on the belief of true doctrine, but at the
   same time we are bound to say that its bigotry and intolerance are
   partly traceable to the same root. Under the circumstances it was
   natural that every Protestant state should have its formal creed and
   that an acceptance of it should be enforced on all its citizens.

   The true significance of the Protestant confessions is not to be
   apprehended apart from a comparison with the doctrines of the Catholic
   church on the one hand, and the views of the radicals, the Anabaptists,
   on the other. The additions made to the Catholic doctrines are rather
   meager. The substance, and some times the very statements, of the
   ancient Catholic creed, as set forth in the so-called Apostles' Creed,
   the Nicene Symbol, and the Chalcedonian Formula, are reaffirmed with
   vigor and their force is revived. Not only were the doctrines of the
   Trinity and the duality of natures in the person of Christ maintained
   against the Mariolatry and saint-worship of the Roman church, but they
   were used as the foundation of the doctrines of atonement and
   justification by faith. Thus the doctrines of the ancient Catholic
   church be came the base of the attack upon the teachings and practices
   of the mediaeval church. These doctrines were supported by references
   to the best of the earlier Catholic theologians and were drawn from the
   Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments by the methods of exegesis
   then in vogue. The whole Protestant doctrinal movement bore the
   appearance of a protest in the interest of conservatism against the
   corruptions of the early faith by the Roman church. All the more,
   therefore, was it necessary to take up a firm and uncompromising
   attitude toward the innovations of the Anabaptists.

   Still more important, perhaps, was the Catholic habit of mind which was
   carried over into Protestant theology. The idea that Christianity is at
   bottom doctrine, that revelation consists in the external communication
   of doctrine, that it reposes on authority and miraculous attestation,
   that the Scriptures are an authoritative (the Protestants said, the
   only authoritative) legislation in matters of belief and practice; all
   these, as well as the method and the world-view of Catholic
   theologians, were taken over into Protestant orthodoxy. In saying this
   we do not aim to minimize the achievements of the early Protestant
   thinkers or the spiritual value of the great movement which they
   carried out. In their exegesis of Scripture they were greatly superior
   to their Catholic opponents; and in the deliverance of multitudes from
   moral thraldom by their impressive preaching of the atonement of Christ
   and the free justification of believers they were the ministers of a
   service of unspeakable worth to mankind; their devotion to their cause
   was of the heroic type; and yet the consciousness of the debt we owe to
   them must not blind us to the fact that much of their theological
   thinking was unmistakably of the Catholic type.

  PROTESTANTS AND ANABAPTISTS

   Their hatred of Romanism was not less marked than their dread of the
   radicals who were grouped together under the common appellation of
   Anabaptists. The opposition between them and the radicals shaded from a
   moderate difference of views of doctrine to the bitterest antagonism.
   They were as unsparing in their denunciation of the Anabaptists and as
   ready to subject them to imprisonment and death as were the Roman
   Catholics. Whether or not their fury may have been embittered by the
   latent feeling that the Anabaptists were carrying out their own
   principles to a logical conclusion we may not be sure, but it is clear
   that many of the Anabaptist contentions have been widely accepted by
   Protestant theologians in recent times. The term Anabaptist was given
   to these people by their opponents because they "rebaptized" those who
   came to them from the Catholic and Protestant churches. It covered
   bodies of "heretics" extremely diverse in character and opinions but at
   one in their belief of the worthlessness of the Catholic baptism. When
   we remember that Catholics universally, and Protestants generally,
   admitted that regeneration was effected in baptism and that the
   Protestants did not deny the validity of the Catholic baptism, we can
   understand how both of them saw in Anabaptism a radical rejection of
   the whole traditional system.

   This is the point of chief importance. For whether these people were
   mystics--such as Caspar Schwenkfeldt, the precursor of Quakerism--who
   subordinated the "outer word" of the Scriptures to the "inner word" of
   the heart; or children of the Renaissance--such as the Socini, the
   precursors of the eighteenth-century Rationalism--who emphasized the
   intellectual side of religion and rejected all mysticism; or men of the
   central group--such as Balthazar Hubmaier and his followers, the
   forerunners of the modern Baptists--who united with the recognition of
   the inwardness of true religion as a heart-experience a deep reverence
   for the Scriptures, especially the New Testament: their common
   rejection of infant baptism carried with it the renunciation of the
   whole Catholic system and, of course, that portion of it which was
   retained as authoritative by the Protestants. This was the head and
   front of their offending. Their demands were for a complete abandonment
   of Catholicism and a reinstitution of the churches of the primitive
   Christian times. Inasmuch as all the states of western Europe were
   professedly Christian, the Catholic baptism having been accepted
   everywhere, the radicalism of the Anabaptists was somewhat naturally
   interpreted as involving the disruption of all existing Christian
   governments. Nay, by their insistence on the prerogative of the
   individual, they often appeared to others in the light of anarchists.

   We see, therefore, that the practice of rebaptism which gave the
   Anabaptists their name was in itself a comparatively unimportant thing
   with them; its importance lies in its signification of deeper things.
   They held to the prerogative of the individual with God; the immediacy
   of the relation of the soul to God; the apprehension and ministration
   of the Christian gospel by the common man; personal obedience as the
   essence of Christian faith; Christian churches as free associations on
   the basis of a common spiritual experience; the spiritual equality and
   freedom of all believers. The practical issue of these views was the
   rejection of the entire Catholic conception of the church--apostolic
   succession a worthless figment, priestly mediation a vain pretense, the
   sacraments impotent and useless. Along with these went the negation of
   the church's authority, of the blindingness of its creed or its canon
   of Scripture, and of its right to call in the secular arm to support
   its teachings. It is plain that the Anabaptist principles were opposed
   not only to the Catholic church but to the program of the Reformers as
   well, and that they could be tolerated as little by one as by the
   other. In consequence these people were ruthlessly suppressed by both
   of these opposing parties and were finally almost exterminated. And
   yet, I have no doubt, they were the nearest representatives of the
   revived religious spirit that made the Reformation a possibility, and
   in the end Protestantism had to pay a heavy penalty for their
   suppression.

   Instead, then, of a radical reconstruction of the forms of Christian
   self-expression we see in Protestantism, as then established, a
   conservative reform. The idea of the Catholic church was retained,
   separatism was condemned, and the one church was supposedly continued
   in the various Protestant state churches. The church's sacraments were
   still maintained as necessary to salvation but they were reduced to two
   in number. Submission to external authority in religion was
   compulsorily enforced with respect both to creed and ritual. The
   Catholic canon of Scripture was adopted and exalted above the authority
   of the church that made it.

   Established Protestantism was a compromise. It represents an
   inconsistent combination of Catholicism with Christian radicalism. In
   nothing is this more evident than with respect to doctrine. The
   consciousness of the immediacy of human relationships with God, of the
   spiritual character of that relationship, and of the freedom that
   springs from it, was the moving impulse of the Reformation, but it was
   fettered by being bound to creeds that reposed on outworn scientific,
   philosophical, and ecclesiastical assumptions. Time brought the
   inevitable nemesis. The course of events by which the Protestant
   systems, and particularly the doctrinal systems, were undermined cannot
   be described here at length; the main facts alone can be mentioned.

  RESULTS OF THE COMPROMISE

   The identification of formal doctrine with Christian faith soon bore
   its natural fruit. The warm evangelicism of the early days of the
   Reformation gave place to theological controversy that was mostly
   barren of good. The effort to reach a minute determination of the
   limits of truth led to theological hair splitting and fruitless
   logomachies that threatened to tear both the Lutheran and the Calvinist
   churches to pieces. Controversies over the relation of faith to good
   works and of justification to sanctification, free will and the
   irresistibility of grace, election and reprobation, the nature and
   efficacy of the sacraments, have left their monuments in such documents
   as the Formula of Concord, the Lambeth Articles, and the Articles of
   the Synod of Dort. Lutheranism degenerated into Antinomianism,
   Arminianism sprang up as a reaction against Calvinism, while
   Socinianism alarmed orthodoxy in general. For generations the bitter
   strife went on. The evil condition of the churches was aggravated by
   the connection of church and state. Theological terms became the
   watchwords of political parties, and political discord was intensified
   by religious strife. We have only to recall the legislation in England
   against non-conformity and dissent from the time of Elizabeth to James
   II--and it was by no means a dead letter--and the civil wars of the
   Stuart days in order to understand the demoralizing effect of the
   Protestant establishment of religion by law. The attempt to make the
   boundaries of the church coextensive with the state was blighting, not
   merely in that it subjected ecclesiastical offices to party exigencies,
   but it became a serious bar to missionary effort abroad. While Catholic
   missions to the heathen were stretching over vast regions, Protestant
   foreign missions were virtually non-existent for three hundred years.
   The very assumption that all the in habitants of a country, having been
   baptized, were regenerated, benumbed the spirit of piety. Protestant
   ism enjoyed a good measure of success politically, but judged by
   religious standards it must be pronounced at that time largely a
   failure.

  THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLT IN ENGLAND

   We are here concerned mostly with the undermining of Protestant
   orthodoxy through the operation of forces resident within itself.
   Protestantism was, in part, an affirmation of the right of the human
   mind to freedom of thought. Its main polemic was naturally directed
   against the usurped authority of the Roman church and the papacy, but
   it was equally op posed in principle to many ideas and usages which it
   had inherited from the distant past but which were not discontinued by
   its leaders. It owes its very existence to the sense of the
   imperishable worth of the individual human spirit and its unimpeachable
   freedom of action. It was natural that the Reformation should let loose
   the pent-up energies of the western European mind. The buoyant
   consciousness of freedom that led men to explore new realms of earth
   and sky and to defy traditional ideas of geography and astronomy need
   not be expected to bow in submission to inherited ideas of religion. To
   bring to the bar of reason all the claims of church, creed, and
   scripture was more than a privilege--it was a duty.

   An inkling of what was in store for orthodoxy was given by the
   Socinians. Developing Calvin's view of the capacity of the human mind
   to discover the natural truths of religion for itself and denying the
   original depravity which he charged with vitiating the natural
   processes of the mind in matters of morality and religion, they
   proceeded to prove in a rationalistic way the divine origin of the
   Scriptures, with special emphasis on the New Testament, and went on to
   disprove the orthodox teachings as to the Trinity, the essential deity
   of Christ, foreordination, penal atonement, and the saving efficacy of
   the sacraments. Socinianism spread far in England and Germany and its
   influence was much felt as late as the eighteenth century. But it was
   superficial. The strength of the attack that shook the foundations of
   accepted doctrine came from developments in science and philosophy that
   were native to Protestantism and that continue in force to the present
   day, but with greatly augmented power.

   Two realms of exploration here call for special attention.
   Protestantism stands for the worth fulness and the sanctity of the
   natural. Nature may therefore be interrogated and may be trusted to
   reveal faith fully her secrets. The human mind may also be trusted not
   to mislead us if we attend to its natural processes. Both of these
   regions invited new exploration. The truth about Nature was to be found
   in Nature and the truth about the human mind was to be found in the
   human mind. Nay, since these are open to all mankind, might it not be
   that the basic truth of all truth was to be found there? The facts of
   objective nature and the facts of inner experience promised great
   rewards to the unprejudiced student. Might not "natural science" and
   "mental science," rather than external miraculous communications, be
   trusted to yield us the truth about the world and man?

   a) Bacon and Locke.--With the publication of Lord Francis Bacon's Novum
   Organum and John Locke's Essay concerning the Human Understanding there
   began in England a new movement that culminated in the attempt to bring
   the whole complex of facts in the universe within a unitary system of
   (natural) laws. The significant thing about both was the method.
   Bacon's work was aimed at displacing the traditional method of reaching
   objective knowledge by the acceptance of universal principles and the
   use of the syllogism, in favor of the method of induction by
   observation and experience. The product of the method as applied to the
   facts of Nature was a natural philosophy and a natural theology which a
   religious mind like Bacon's found to be the noblest utterance of the
   universe. Bacon's regard for Christianity as a revealed religion led
   him to an acknowledgment of a "supernatural theology" to which he
   assigned a separate realm and a different set of forces. If from this
   point we glance forward a hundred years to the time of the great Isaac
   Newton we shall see that with the establishment of his Principia the
   whole of man's being was regarded as under the control of natural laws
   and Nature itself as the revelation of the Supreme Being. The grandeur
   of this conception profoundly impressed noble minds like Newton and
   inspired much of the best thought and the finest preaching of the
   eighteenth century in England. The tendency, however, was to discredit
   the value and the claims of special revelation.

   The purpose of Locke's philosophical inquiry was to test the validity
   of our ideas by an examination of the manner in which we come into
   possession of them. The reality of our knowledge was to be decided by a
   critical examination of the knowing process. The individual mind was
   the realm of exploration and the means of discovery was introspection.
   Locke found that all our ideas arise originally or by combination from
   impression and reflection. This is the simple source of all those
   so-called "innate ideas," such as God and the World, on which the older
   philosophers and theologians had relied for the demonstration of their
   fundamental beliefs. Like Bacon, Locke sought to limit the application
   of his philosophy in the case of Christianity. He claimed that faith is
   distinct from reason and that in addition to natural propositions there
   are also supernatural propositions that supply truth for faith, and yet
   he held that all professed revelations are to be tested by the canons
   of reason. His words in this connection are worth quoting:

   Reason is natural revelation whereby the eternal Father of light and
   fountain of all knowledge communicates to mankind that portion of truth
   which he has laid within reach of their natural faculties; revelation
   is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by
   God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony
   and proofs it gives that they come from God.

   He identified this supernatural religion with true Christianity and
   urged that the original Christianity was in harmony with natural
   religion. In this way Locke supplied to both the assailants and the
   defenders of orthodoxy their weapons.

   b) Deists and Apologists.--Some of the results of the investigations of
   these great thinkers were very different from what they had intended.
   The supreme reverence for the Christian religion that had prevented men
   like Bacon and Locke from drawing from their premises conclusions
   detrimental to Christian faith appears in lessening degree in the long
   line of their inferior successors, till in the later deists it entirely
   disappeared. The earlier deists, beginning with Lord Herbert of
   Cherbury, extolled the worth of "natural religion" and sought to
   identify the true Christianity with it, whereas in the course of the
   struggle the two came to be opposed. Here was the opportunity for the
   friends of Christianity to institute a frank inquiry into its essence,
   but unfortunately, discussion turned rather on the evidences of
   Christianity and the outcome of the long controversy was mostly
   negative.

   The apologists for the accepted forms of Christianity were much to
   blame for this result. They subscribed to natural religion on what
   seemed to them rational grounds, but when they sought to show that
   natural religion had been supplemented by supernatural revelation they
   were driven to say that the existence of sin had rendered natural
   religion insufficient for human need. This meant that revelation, as
   they understood it, was contingent on human conduct, which was
   tantamount to saying that it rested on an inferior basis. Then to prove
   that supplementary revelation had really been given they were forced to
   rely on the evidence of miracle (non-natural occurrence) and prophecy
   (non-natural knowledge), prediction. They were driven to try to prove
   the genuineness of the miracles and predictions in the Scriptures,
   which, in the state of knowledge at the time, they were as little
   capable of doing as their opponents were of the contrary. There was
   little more than mere assertion on the one side, answered by little
   more than mere denial, often accompanied by ridicule, on the other. The
   degeneration of the character of the controversies can be traced in the
   gradually lowered tone of the deistical attacks. There was a good deal
   of buffoonery and ribaldry on both sides. The later deists did not
   hesitate to ascribe the miracles, predictions, and institutions
   peculiar to Judaism or Christianity to superstition, fanaticism, or the
   scheming of interested priests. The issue of Deism is seen at its worst
   in France, where no warm evangelical piety appeared to put to shame the
   scoffing of Voltaire or the coarse materialism of De la Mettrie and
   Denis Diderot.

   The works of the deists were widely circulated in England and Germany
   and even in America. They were in accord with the prevailing temper of
   the times and the impression they made may be gauged by the efforts
   made to meet their arguments. It seems as if al most all the orthodox
   divines were drawn into the controversy. Toland's Christianity not
   Mysterious is said to have called forth one hundred and fifteen
   replies. Among the many famous names that may be mentioned are Samuel
   Clarke, Nathaniel Lardner, Bishop George Berkeley, William Warburton,
   John Leland, and Joseph Butler, bishop of Durham. The last of these is
   commonly regarded as the greatest of the English apologists and his
   Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion is regarded as a masterpiece.
   I do not find in it any thing that had not been said by earlier
   apologists, but the succinctness and clearness of statement and the
   carefulness and orderly manner with which his arguments are marshaled
   have been rarely equaled. It is fair to treat this famous work, as a
   summary of the whole discussion from the orthodox standpoint.

   Natural and revealed religion are made mutually complementary. They
   differ in the mode of their communication of truth and partly also in
   their content. The study of Nature leads to the belief in the existence
   of God, rewards for well-doing and punishments for ill-doing, and a
   future life. While these beliefs cannot be established absolutely for
   our human minds but rest on a high degree of probability, they afford
   none the less a sufficient basis for moral obedience. But the truths of
   natural religion have been obscured and corrupted through moral error.
   Hence the need of a restatement of them that is accompanied by such
   external attestations as shall establish in the human mind a confidence
   in them. By this means also the corruptions of natural religion that
   have accrued in the course of human history are removed. This is what
   is accomplished by those extraordinary divine communications we call
   revelations. Christianity is this revealed religion and its truth is
   attested by miracle and prophecy. But while Christianity is thus a
   republication of the religion of Nature, it is more. It brings to men
   new truths, for example, the doctrines of the Trinity and the
   Incarnation, with the implicated human obligations. The rejection of
   these truths of divine revelation involves a disregard of the
   implicated obligations and, consequently, belief in them is necessary
   in order to a truly moral character. The lack of absolute certainty in
   the case of revealed religion detracts no more from its value than the
   same lack does in the case of natural religion. The certainty is a
   moral certainty and involves moral obligation. As for any antecedent
   doubt touching the reality of prophecy and miracle, it is no greater
   than that which relates to any other definite fact before it is known.
   Thus revealed religion stands on as safe a basis as natural religion.
   Butler's statutory view of the Christian religion was the view commonly
   held; it is a Protestant inheritance from Catholicism and it partly
   accounts for the weakness of the orthodox defense.

   The apologists did not succeed in turning the tide that was running
   against the traditional views. Butler's lament in the opening sentences
   of his Analogy--

   It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, by many persons,
   that Christianity is not so much a subject of inquiry, as that it is
   now, at length, discovered to be fictitious, and accordingly they treat
   it, as if, in the present age, this was an agreed point among all
   people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a
   principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of
   reprisals, for having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world

   is a humiliating admission of the orthodox failure to command the
   confidence of the times and at the same time points to the need of
   deliverance from another quarter. (Thank God! the deliverance came in
   due time. It will be spoken of presently.) It was not that the
   opponents of orthodoxy were abler thinkers or better scholars than its
   advocates. The opposite was mostly the case. But the spirit of the
   times had run on in advance of the accepted canons of theological
   thought. Theologians were repeating the mistake of Catholic apologists
   of an earlier time--trying to bind the growing thoughts of men to the
   formulae that satisfied the spiritual demands of an earlier age but
   obscured the very truths they were intended to preserve when used as an
   established rule of faith. The apologists had not only failed to
   sustain confidence in those great doctrines which the Protestant creeds
   expressed, but the attempt to maintain them by means of external
   evidences had fostered disbelief in revelation itself, And no wonder!
   The defenders of orthodoxy stood on the ground of their opponents. They
   gave to natural religion the primacy--there were some exceptions among
   them--and made revealed religion to rest upon it. According to both
   parties religion reposed ultimately on an intellectual basis. Its
   content was doctrine. In consequence revelation was conceived as the
   external communication of truths to be believed and faith was assent.
   They were also handicapped by a false view of history and a false
   method of studying it. To justify their contention that revelation was
   necessary in order to republish and re-establish the corrupted truths
   of natural religion they had to represent the course of earlier history
   as a gradual corruption of pure religion and morality--an inheritance
   from Calvinism. They had to subject the facts of history to dogmatical
   necessities. Through their statutory view of religion they were led to
   a legalistic treatment of the Old and New Testaments, whose accuracy on
   all subjects touched by those Scriptures they felt called upon to
   defend. For this their opponents punished them severely. The great need
   of the time was not a new apology so much as a renewed Christianity, a
   new experience of religion that should produce a new view of its
   nature.

   The long controversy was by no means altogether in vain. Beginnings
   were made in modern textual criticism of the New Testament and in the
   recognition of a distinction between the literal accuracy of the
   Scriptures and their religious worth. Much light was thrown upon Old
   Testament prophecies and improved methods of exegesis began to appear.
   The appeal to the course of history prepared the way for historical
   criticism and the great achievements of a later time in the field of
   the history of religions.

   c) David Hume.--The chaotic state of religious thought in Great Britain
   at the time is reflected in the writings of the famous philosopher
   David Hume. Hume is often spoken of as a deist. He is better described
   as a skeptic, I think, an unwilling skeptic.

   Hume developed the philosophical principles of Locke to their natural
   conclusions. Locke had traced impressions and ideas to two
   corresponding substances, a material substance and a spiritual
   substance. Bishop Berkeley had shown the untenability of material
   substance on these principles, and now Hume drew the same conclusion in
   reference to spiritual substance. The principle of causation through
   which substances had been posited as the sources of our ideas is
   discovered to be no impression at all to which something real could be
   said to correspond, but only a lively idea of the recurrence of certain
   phenomena which we are in the habit of perceiving in attendance on
   certain other phenomena. It is only a belief. This is all the
   justification we have for arguing from an idea to its cause and the
   only necessity that exists in the connection between cause and effect
   is a propensity of the mind. Hence our ideas give us no knowledge of
   their causes beyond themselves. Accordingly there can be no proof of
   the existence or the attributes of God. All we have is a mere belief, a
   lively feeling.

   Hume's philosophy was fatal to "natural theology" and sounded the
   death-knell of philosophical deism. But not satisfied with this, he
   proceeded to attack the belief in miracles on the ground that a miracle
   would be in conflict with unalterable experience. The testimony to the
   actuality of miraculous occurrences is set aside with the affirmation
   that it must give way before the broader testimony of a firm
   experience. No sys tem of religion, he concludes, can repose on the
   evidence of miracles.

   He next proceeded to demolish the prevailing views of the origin and
   history of religion. So far from arising from the activity of reason it
   sprang from the human emotions of hope, fear, and the like. The course
   of religion was the inverse of what it was commonly supposed to be--not
   from an original purity by corruption to lower forms, but from the
   lower and grosser polytheistic forms to the higher forms. Renouncing
   the current theology, whither orthodox or deistic, he declared that,
   "our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason."

   Here was a bold challenge to Protestant thinkers to furnish a
   theoretical basis of confidence in morality and religion. Kant took up
   the task of answering the former part of the challenge and
   Schleiermacher the latter. Before explaining their apprehension of the
   allotted task we must turn our attention for a short time to the
   concurrent philosophical and theological development on the continent.

  RATIONALISM ON THE CONTINENT

   Our opinion that the discredit into which the traditional beliefs had
   fallen in England was owing to influences that are native to
   Protestantism is confirmed by an examination of contemporary thought in
   Holland and Germany. There, too, Protestantism had accorded to reason
   an unimpeachable right in things natural, while also revealed religion
   was distinguished from natural religion. There was a similar account to
   that given in England of their origin, and revelation was similarly
   discredited. We find on the other hand less of keen analysis but more
   of speculation than in England.

   In Holland the republican spirit favored a tolerance of dissent, and
   though a strict Calvinism triumphed at the Synod of Dort and stern
   measures of repression were sometimes employed, nevertheless the
   tendency to liberal thinking could not be repressed. Arminianism
   spread, the Mennonites and Baptists managed to live, and great thinkers
   like Hugo Grotius, Professor Coccejus of Leyden, and George Calixtus
   toned down the prevalent Calvinism. The first opposed the doctrine of
   penal atonement, the second rejected the doctrine of decrees and
   advocated such an exegesis of the New Testament as would bring out its
   peculiar spirit, the third sought to relate Christianity favorably to
   current culture and to emphasize the great central verities rather than
   the strict terms of the creeds. Their influence was far-felt.

   Greater in importance were the philosophical speculations of the
   philosophers René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza. The former sought to
   satisfy the Protestant quest for certainty by an appeal to the
   individual self-consciousness, all external authority being rejected.
   All possible doubt is justified as a means of arriving at certainty.
   But whatever else I may doubt I cannot doubt that I think.
   Self-conscious thought becomes the basis of all certainty. In my
   thinking I am aware of my own existence. I am thus the (mathematical)
   cause of my thought. From the idea of God he argues to the certainty of
   the existence of God as the necessary cause of the idea. God is
   self-caused. He alone is substance; mind and matter become substance in
   only a secondary sense. Their phenomena are, respectively, modes of
   thought and mode of extension. Mind and matter have their nexus in God,
   the final substance. Spinoza developed this last idea. The infinite
   substance necessarily differentiates itself in an infinity of modes
   (finite existences) which again are ultimately resolved back into their
   original. The world thus becomes the necessary but fluent expression of
   the attributes of God. The infinity of attributes can find expression
   fully only in an infinity of worlds. We err when we attribute reality
   to our own or the world's existence. God alone is real. The
   consequences for morality and religion are evident. Human
   responsibility disappears. All personal qualities of God are negated.

   This attempt to explain all existence by the necessary forms of thought
   inaugurated the philosophical movement which is known as the Aufklärung
   ("Illuminism"). It was more constructive than the parallel movement in
   England. The explanation of all things was sought in the canons of
   reason. The conceptions of substance, attribute, cause, mode, etc.,
   were the implements of discussion. Efforts were made to retain a
   portion of the territory of the super-rational but its boundaries were
   continually narrowed and it disappeared at last. Leibnitz developed the
   conception of substance in an unexpected direction. Instead of one
   all-embracing substance he posited an infinity of substances, mutually
   reflective, of which the one perfect substance is God, mirroring
   perfectly all the others. The knowledge of God, which is the same as
   knowledge with God, God's knowledge, is love, religion. Reason and
   religion coincide as far as the former goes.

   This incentive to develop the whole body of religious truths by a
   process of rational demonstration was carried out by Christian Wolff
   and his successors of the Aufklärung. Man was ultimately made the
   measure of all things and only those doctrines were received as true
   which were essential to man's wellbeing. The Aufklärung resembled the
   deistical movement in England, but it was superior to the latter,
   especially in its positive regard for religion and its more earnest
   effort to understand Christianity by a study of its history and a
   critical examination of its early documents. Reimarus, Wettstein,
   Ernesti, Michaelis, Griesbach, Eichhorn, Semler, are the great names in
   this connection. Textual and historical criticism discovered many
   errors, the human motives and historical circumstances that influenced
   and composition of the biblical books were investigated, and the
   statutory character of the Scriptures was disproved. But along with
   these somewhat negative results there was an impulse given to
   grammatico-historical exegesis; the peculiarly religious character of
   the Scriptures and their supreme value for the religious spirit were
   brought to light. This could not fail to be the case in the end.

   The famous Gotthold Ephraim Lessing inaugurated a more positive study
   of Christianity as the religion of revelation. By insisting that
   Christianity precedes the New Testament and is greater than the
   documents that represent it he maintained the compatibility of faith in
   it with a free critical judgment of its documentary sources. He
   presented a philosophy of revelation that recognized in it a method of
   the divine education of the human race and assigned to it a positive
   relation to human culture and civilization--a lesson that Christians
   have been slow to learn: Revelation is a divine mode of education. It
   may anticipate the discoveries of reason but gives nothing that could
   not ultimately be attained by reason. Though Lessing himself remained
   at bottom a rationalist, he made an important contribution to the
   religious thought of his times by insisting upon a distinction between
   the religious feeling of the books of the Bible and the temporary forms
   in which it is conveyed to us. Gottfried Herder followed this clue
   further and taught men to appreciate the peculiar Hebrew feeling of the
   biblical writers. He pressed home the thought that religion is not
   knowledge but an inward conviction, an awareness of the divine
   operating in our hearts and identical with true humanity everywhere.
   Here we find ourselves at length in the company of Schleiermacher.

  KANT

   Our brief survey of the course of rationalism will be brought to a
   close with a few words on the bearing of the philosophy of Immanuel
   Kant on the questions at issue. As Hume's philosophy signalizes the
   destruction of the English deism of the seventeenth and eighteenth
   centuries, so Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason marks the end of the
   old German rationalism and introduces a new era in philosophy. Its
   effect on the course of theology is equally marked, even to the present
   time. The aim of Kant was positive--to lay a foundation for morality
   and also of religion. His critique was concerned, not directly with the
   various systems of philosophy and theology that reason had striven to
   establish, but with the rational faculty itself. He finds that, while
   the sense-material which is embraced in our knowledge is derived from
   external impressions, the thought- forms by which it is built into
   perceptions and finally into a world of knowledge are supplied directly
   by tire mind itself. This is true even of the idea of cause. Hence the
   validity of our knowledge of the phenomenal world. But when
   thought-forms are divorced from this sense-material, and the pure
   reason uses these bare abstract ideas to build up a system of
   supersensible knowledge, and then goes on to predicate reality of the
   noumenal world which it finds back of the phenomenal world, it indulges
   in a specious fallacy. The airy structures of mere speculation are
   valid only for thought. Kant sees the laboriously constructed systems
   of speculative philosophy and theology fall into ruins at his feet.
   "Rational theology" or "natural theology" is destroyed.

   At the same time the orthodox theology was also undermined, since it
   also professed to supply information concerning the supernatural or the
   super-rational world. The arguments for the existence of God and the
   other objects of religious belief are discovered to be fallacious if
   they are interpreted as giving in formation concerning matters of fact.
   The arguments for the reality of a revelation based on miracles and
   prophecy also fail for the same reason, and theoretical agnosticism in
   regard to these things takes their place.

   But when we turn to his Critique of the Practical Reason a different
   result appears. What Kant takes away with the left hand he gives back
   with the right. He finds that the mind is self-legislative in matters
   of conduct. There is an unexceptionable law, a "categorical
   imperative," an all-embracing ought, without which human conduct would
   be unmeaning. The authority of this law depends not on some external
   super natural communication, but lies in the very nature of the
   practical reason itself. Given responsibility, and freedom is also
   therewith given. "I ought, therefore I can." Rewards and punishments
   are inevitable. God is therewith also given, else the law could not be
   sure of vindication. Immortality follows or else justice fails.

   In this way Kant makes a place for religion, such a religion as
   satisfies the demands of morality, a religion that depends for its
   worth on the value of moral demands. This is not the place to estimate
   Kant's arguments for religion. Whatever else this religion of his may
   be, it is not a religion of redemption and therefore falls short of the
   Christian religion. The importance of Kant's philosophy for our present
   purposes lies in the suggestion which his discovery of the categorical
   imperative gave to Schleiermacher in his vindication of religion and
   his exposition of the nature of the Christian faith.

  THE OUTCOME

   With Hume and Kant a former era of Protestant theology comes to an end
   and a new era shortly begins. Let us now briefly sum up the theological
   situation at the time.

   Roman Catholicism trained the peoples of Europe to depend, in religious
   matters, on authority--the authority of the church. When the Protestant
   Reformation led to a renunciation of that authority by many, they were
   compelled to substitute for it another ground of certainty in religious
   matters. The influence of mysticism, of new religious aspiration, and
   of the new intellectual awakening drew in one direction; traditional
   belief and the established methods of theology, as well as the instinct
   of order, drew in another. The resultant compromise gave to Protestant
   theology a double basis, the Bible as an external authority in some
   matters, and the individual human reason in others. But it was
   inevitable that a strife should arise and that one of these should
   encroach on the domains of the other. The trend of thought gave the
   advantage to the second of these. The intelligibility of the universe
   and the competency of the human mind to discover its secrets were
   axioms that seemed to promise that the human mind out of its own native
   energy might possess itself ultimately of the whole of the truth
   concerning God and our relations to him which it is necessary to know.
   Natural theology was to displace revealed theology and to appropriate
   its territory. The attack was first directed against the claim that
   there was need of a special revelation and next against the "evidences"
   of it. Protestant orthodoxy received a defeat if we may judge by its
   failure to hold the general confidence of the people.

   But "natural theology" fell at the same time. The work of Hume and Kant
   showed that its structures were flimsy and that its so-called rational
   theology was a mere cobweb of the human intellect. If reason had
   destroyed revelation it had also apparently destroyed itself, at least
   so far forth as religious knowledge is concerned, and if religious
   knowledge turns out to be delusive, what is the good of any knowledge?
   Kant's attempt to save morality from the maelstrom, even if successful,
   could hardly as yet be said to have saved religion, unless religion is
   to be viewed as subsidiary to morality.

   Shall we say, then, that the Protestant confidence in the capacity of
   the human mind was misplaced? that in religion we must fall back on an
   authority that defies reason, or else admit that there can be no
   religious knowledge? Or is there a better way out of the difficulty?
   Might it not be that the nature of the human mind was too narrowly
   conceived--that the rationalists had erred by regarding it exclusively
   as intellect? Might it not be that the orthodox had also erred by
   conceiving religion and revelation too narrowly in making out
   revelation to be information and religion to be the knowledge and
   belief of it? Might there not be a view of religion that would remove
   it out of the religion of that old, bitter controversy? The way to a
   new apprehension of the whole matter was prepared by the great
   evangelical revival of the eighteenth century.

  THE SAVING REVIVAL

   The cloud of unbelief that hung over Protestant Christian lands was
   dispelled by the gracious outpouring of a new spiritual faith in
   England which has continued to send out its beneficent influence into
   all spheres of human activity and promises to spread over all the
   world. The names of the Wesleys and of Whitefield are inseparably
   associated with this revival, but its source is to be discovered far
   back. In the preceding pages of the present work it is affirmed that
   the religious life that burst out so vigorously in Europe during the
   Reformation was hampered in its freedom and narrowed in its operation
   by its artificial connection with civil governments and with
   ecclesiastical and doctrinal forms that were inadequate to express its
   nature. It is not intended by this statement to convey the idea that
   the stream of life had been swallowed up in the sands. Within the
   established churches there were many notable examples of a vigorous
   spirituality superior to the temporary forms that were meant to control
   it. If too commonly the churchman was more in evidence than the
   Christian, we have many reasons for believing that in multitudes of in
   stances the case was the reverse. It is, however, rather in the
   religious societies that sprang up spontaneously, in the fellowship of
   the free churches of Protestantism, that we are to look for the natural
   channels for the propagation of the Christian faith. The history of
   religion among Protestants is a study of thrilling interest. Luther's
   faith consisted essentially in a firm assurance of the gracious
   relation of God to him in Christ as revealed in the gospel. The
   Anabaptist piety was of a similar type. The same deep feeling was
   cherished by many of their successors as the dearest possession of
   their hearts. This was one of the potent factors of the Puritan
   struggle in England on behalf of a simple worship and a high morality.
   It comes to vigorous life in Independency, in the Baptist churches, and
   the Quaker societies. It is strikingly exhibited in the career of
   Cromwell who combined with it the Israelites faith in Jehovah. It
   expresses itself in that wonderful creation of his genius, the New
   Model army. It finds beautiful utterance in Bunyan's immortal allegory.
   It is glorified in the sufferings of the persecuted dissenters and
   nonconformists during the degenerate days of the last two Stuart kings.
   But it met with eclipse amid the comparative safety and the material
   prosperity of the times that followed, until Moravianism revived it in
   the work of the preachers of the revival.

   a) The Pietists.--The story of religion in Ger many for the same period
   is not very different. Here we see the rise and spread of Pietism.
   State-churchism and formal orthodoxy left religion, like the German
   land at the close of the Thirty Years' War, in a condition of
   desolation. In those days John Arndt summoned men to a living faith
   that should be marked inwardly by an assurance of Christ's indwelling
   and outwardly by good works. Long afterward Philip Jacob Spener heard
   Arndt's call to a higher life and responded with all the warmth of a
   soul that was remarkably endowed by divine grace. He sought to draw men
   away from theological strife and a mere external compliance with the
   forms of religion, by holding informal assemblies of the people where
   the Scriptures were studied with a view to edification rather than for
   doctrinal purposes; freedom of question and answer was allowed, and the
   spontaneous utterance of prayer and praise was encouraged, Laymen and
   clergymen alike were urged to cultivate a devout spirit, holy living,
   and the practice of family prayer. His well-known work, Pia Desideria
   (Pious Desires for a Reform of the True Evangelical Church), seems to
   have given to Pietism its name. He found many willing listeners. The
   desire for a new reform spread rapidly over most parts of Germany and
   into other countries. Its influence was particularly marked in the
   universities where bands of students began to conduct independent
   courses of biblical studies among themselves. Hundreds and even
   thousands of them became zealous missionaries of the new cause. When
   the authorities interfered a new university was organized at Halle,
   which forth with became the headquarters of the movement. We remember
   that Schleiermacher was a student and later a professor there. Many
   forms of beneficence appeared, orphanages and Bible societies being the
   most noteworthy. The names of exegetes like Bengel have perpetuated the
   fame of its biblical learning to the present. All open opposition was
   finally overcome and Pietism became the dominant element in theological
   circles.

   At this point its failure begins. Success begot spiritual
   self-contentment and finally arrogant intolerance. Its sympathy with
   humanity in the broad fields of enterprise and culture was small
   throughout, and its view of life was narrow. Its connection with the
   state church was a fatal defect. On that account it shrank from a
   reformation of the doctrinal standards or the organization of
   independent bodies of Christians. Spener and his followers were careful
   to guard against any tendency toward Separatism. Here was a fatal
   error. Lacking the boldness of Free-churchism in England, Pietism fell
   back into the old forms of Lutheranism and Calvinism and, while the
   latter received from it a valuable spiritual impulse, its reabsorption
   was a loss to the world. The phenomenon of Pietism stands as a
   testimony to the fact that there was a spirit in German Protestantism
   which could find no fitting embodiment in the established forms of
   organization and doctrine.

   b) The Moravians and the Methodists.--When Pietism began to wane the
   smoldering flame of religious fervor was already being rekindled by the
   Moravian Brethren.

   Moravianism was characterized by spontaneity and initiative, Puritanic
   moral conviction, deep emotional experience, missionary zeal, and a
   capacity for organization. Hymn-singing, extempore prayer, and fervent
   utterance were marked features of their meetings. We have seen how
   profoundly these things impressed Schleiermacher. In middle life he
   used to look back longingly to their meetings for worship and felt how
   bare and poor was the official service in the German church. Their
   doctrines were in general agreement with Protestantism, but the central
   place was given to the person of Jesus, to personal communion with him,
   and to his atonement by death. Charles Wesley's hymn, "Jesus, Lover of
   My Soul," echoes their adoration of the loving, human-divine Savior.
   Zinzendorf and others went so far in this direction that God the Father
   was almost lost sight of, the Father was displaced by the Son, and God
   was said to have died on the cross. They did not give to their
   organization the name of a church but called it a society (cf. the
   early Methodists). Yet they were in reality quite independent of the
   state church. John Wesley seems to have got the clue to many of his
   organizations and methods from them. They gave an unmistakable impulse
   to the organization of free churches.

   This is not the most important fact in the present connection. They
   were the true founders of the Wesleyan evangelism. To their preachers,
   Spangenberg and Boehler, Wesley owed that assured confidence in the
   inner testimony of the Spirit, which was such a mighty force in the
   Revival and has come to us in our day as a factor of indisputable value
   in the determination of Christian truth. Our present confidence in the
   testimony of the Christian consciousness is an in heritance from the
   Revival. It has come down to us from the old Anabaptists through the
   double channel of English and German religionists.

   We need not repeat here the story of the great revival--how it spread
   throughout the British Isles, how it crossed over into America, how it
   flowed back like a refreshing stream to Germany. Unhappily the terrible
   wars, through which Germany passed in the struggles with Austria and
   France, filled the minds of men there with other thoughts.
   Nevertheless, Ger many shared in the blessing the Revival brought. The
   fruits of the movement are now to be seen in many lands. The free
   churches have been multiplied in numbers and power many hundredfold.
   Missionary work in heathen lands, long shamefully neglected by
   Protestants, has come to the chief place in the thoughts of Christian
   leaders; philanthropic agencies have been multiplied everywhere; evils
   so deeply seated in human society that they seemed native to it have
   been attacked with a boldness and persistency that repose on a
   confidence in the power of the gospel to renovate social life
   everywhere.

   It may not be possible to describe the fundamental nature of this great
   revival of Christian faith in a word. There is, however, one
   outstanding conviction that seems to have wrought itself by means of
   the Revival into the fiber of our thinking--the unimpeachable worth of
   the individual man. We see how nearly identical it is with the motive
   power of the Reformation. It is working a like revolution in our
   thinking.

   The effect on prevailing apprehensions of the nature of religion has
   been immeasurably great. In the first place men have come to see that
   religion is a universal, though distinctive phenomenon of human life,
   not to be identified with any of the doctrinal formulae, established
   organizations, or forms of worship formerly regarded as indispensable
   to it. In the next place, it is implicitly admitted to be a matter of
   individual concern and every man is understood to be capable of a
   conscious enjoyment of it and of an immediate certainty of its divine
   character. It is further seen to be a matter of experience, and this
   experience has been acknowledged in ever-widening circles to be a
   prerequisite to personal participation in Christian activities. And
   finally, as admittedly a matter of inward experience, there has been an
   increasing recognition of the value of the emotions in religion.

   The Revival was a restoration, a reinforcement, and an enrichment of
   the religious life that awoke to vigor in the early days of the
   Reformation and that had made an ineffectual attempt to find embodiment
   in those days. That life had never obtained a reasoned theological
   expression suited to its nature. If the new movement was not to
   degenerate into fanaticism on the one hand or into formalism on the
   other, then it must receive a coherent theoretical expression in
   doctrine. In those early religious experiences which formed the basis
   of his whole religious life Schleiermacher was a spiritual child of
   Moravianism. He was the first thinker of note to undertake the task of
   reconstructing the traditional doctrinal system from the standpoint of
   evangelical religious experience. The rejuvenescence of Protestant
   theology begins with him.

  SCHLEIERMACHER

   It has been shown that at the close of the eighteenth century the state
   of theological science was very unsatisfactory. The traditional creeds
   had been under mined and their defenders had propped them up with very
   shaky supports. Deism was itself dying of inanity. In the light of
   Kant's Critique the great speculative systems now appeared as castles
   in the air. Kant's own attempt to save belief in the three essentials
   of rational theology by making them postulates of the practical reason
   had subordinated religion to morality and theology to ethics. Theology
   was discredited both as to content and as to method.

   Schleiermacher heard within himself the summons to a vindication,
   first, of religion, and second, of theological science. He was
   peculiarly fitted for the task. Though still a young man, he was well
   acquainted with the best ancient and modern works on philosophy. His
   Moravian training had called forth the powers of his deep religious
   nature and left an ineffaceable impression on his sensitive and ardent
   mind. He had passed through a period of doubt when rationalism swept
   away the doctrinal beliefs which he once received on authority. He knew
   that a shallow illuminism had no correspondence with the deepest
   longings of the human heart. Romanticism with all its dangers was
   preferable to intellectualism. That the canonization of human impulses
   bad and good, to which Romanticism with its aesthetic pride gravitated,
   had led him dangerously near to a confusion of moral distinctions we
   have already seen, but it had also helped him to regain and hold fast
   the assurance of the unimpeachable right and dignity of the inner life
   of the human spirit. The outcome of his reflections on the subject
   appeared in the publication in 1799 of his Discourses on Religion to
   the Educated among Its Despisers.

   The treatise was timely. It obtained at once a wide reading in literary
   and learned circles. The redundancy and floridness of its style make it
   a little tedious to present-day readers^ but these qualities were an
   advantage to it at the time. Even its obscurities were a recommendation
   to it in contrast with the platitudes of the Aufklärung. Many who read
   it awoke as from a dream. Pastor Harms, a theological opponent of
   Schleiermacher's at a later date, confessed that he sat up all night
   long to finish the book at a single reading. The Discourses proved a
   turning-point in the study of theology. To establish their value it is
   only necessary to refer to the discussions on this work which still
   continue to appear from the pens of German scholars.

   Schleiermacher aims at laying a foundation for theological science by
   first of all expounding the nature of religion. He finds religion, as
   Kant had found the fundamental moral law, in the human consciousness as
   such--it is a necessary and inalienable constituent element of human
   experience in its highest interpretation. It cannot therefore be a
   product of thought (it is not to be identified with a doctrine or sum
   of doctrines or to be viewed as the effect of such); or of moral action
   (it is not an inference from moral principles or a belief involved in
   the subjection to a universal moral law); but it is an original human
   endowment. Indeed, in human experience it is antecedent to all
   knowledge and action, for it appears in that rudimentary consciousness
   in which the distinction of subject and object, self and not-self, had
   not yet appeared. In this priority religion is exhibited as superior to
   knowledge and morality. Here the soul is the subject of the action of
   the universe; it is wedded to infinity.

   The question as to the form of consciousness in which religion appears
   is answered by saying it consists in feeling. In the first edition of
   the Discourses Schleiermacher added "and intuition," but in the later
   editions [11] he makes it to consist specifically in feeling, thereby
   weakening its claim to supreme worth, though bringing it into closer
   harmony with his whole system of theology. By feeling he means, of
   course, much more than mere sensation; it is that sense of oneness with
   the whole of existence which is peace and blessedness. It comes into
   vivid consciousness in those deep emotions which are aroused by, or
   expressed in, elevated discourse or poetry or song. It does not submit
   itself to minute analysis or theological process. It is an immediate
   possession.

   As for the philosophical explanation of such an experience, it is the
   universe, infinity, expressing itself in the human consciousness.
   Therefore it occurs in and with man's relationship to the world. In one
   aspect it may be designated as the human self-consciousness itself in
   its highest interpretation, and in another aspect as a function of the
   universe, the universe coming to self-consciousness in man.

   Therefore it pertains to the individual, and at the same time to the
   universal, consciousness. Accordingly it may be said that there are as
   many religions as there are men. Each man's religion is his own. It
   cannot be given to or borrowed from another; it cannot be imposed on
   men from without or taken from them; no man's religion is in itself
   false, for it is not false to him. But at the same time it may be said
   that after all there is only one religion, for in its essence religion
   is the same in all though varied in different people according to the
   stage or direction of their development.

   The undeniable symptoms of a pantheistic trend in the Discourses drew
   upon Schleiermacher much criticism. For example, his relative Sack,
   court-preacher, accused him of Spinozism and a veiled pantheism. But in
   his reply Schleiermacher vigorously repelled the charge. While he had
   not set forth the doctrine of a personal God, he had said nothing
   against belief in a personal God; he had only said that religion did
   not depend on whether, in abstract thought, a man predicated
   personality of the supersensuous cause of the world or not, and he had
   mentioned Spinoza as one instance. His aim was, in the present storm of
   philosophical ideas, to establish the freedom of religion from any sort
   of metaphysics and from dependence on morality, but he had no desire to
   cover any heresy by means of a reservatio mentalis. [12]

   The defectiveness of this view of religion, notwithstanding its warmth
   and suggestiveness, is apparent. It is as far from an apprehensible
   relation to any historical religion as Kant's moral ideal is from
   relation to any historical morality. But the author rendered an
   invaluable service to the cause of religion and theology by exhibiting
   the originality, freedom, and universality of the former and its basic
   relation to the latter. In this view theology becomes a living and
   progressive science, ever drawing its main impulse from the growing
   religious life of humanity.

   At a later time, when Schleiermacher had passed beyond the Romantic
   stage and found himself plunged into the great contest with the
   currents of thought that flowed through Germany along with the
   Napoleonic invasions, he aimed to bring his theory of religion into
   closer relation to ecclesiastical and national life. How this was done
   we shall see when we turn to his presentation of The Christian Faith.

   Schleiermacher saw at once the need of correcting the impression that
   he had little regard for ethics, and in the next year (1800) he
   published his Monologues. The theory is complimentary to his view of
   religion and represents the ego in its consciousness of freedom
   spontaneously determining its own inner development and striving to
   represent in its own person the whole of society, of the nation, and,
   ultimately, of humanity. This view reappears in his system of theology
   where the two parallel presentations are unified.

   Among the many works of Schleiermacher of more or less note which
   appeared before his whole system was elaborated, we may mention just
   one, his Outline of Theological Science (Kurze Darstellung des
   theologischen Studiums), 1806, which presents his conception of the
   integration of the whole body of theological sciences. Editions of this
   compact little treatise still continue to appear.

   The crowning work of Schleiermacher's services as a theologian is his
   Glaubenslehre, The Christian Faith. The occasion of its publication was
   the attempt of the Prussian king, Frederick William III, to unite the
   Lutheran and Reformed churches of Prussia in a new body, to be known as
   the Evangelical church. The three-hundredth anniversary of the
   beginnings of the Reformation seemed to offer a suitable opportunity
   for such an effort. The weakness of Prussia in the earlier part of the
   struggle with Napoleon had been partly a consequence of religious
   decline and division. Religious unity seemed necessary to political
   unity and strength. Schleiermacher's religious convictions and his
   patriotism combined to make him a supporter of the movement. But he saw
   the dangers that threatened the vitality of Protestantism. A strong
   conservative reaction had set in at the close of the Napoleonic wars.
   Pastor Harms led a party that demanded a return to the older rigid
   Lutheran orthodoxy. The king himself was not only a rank conservative
   but aimed at bringing the church more directly under state (and this
   meant for him, royal) control. A heated controversy arose between
   conservatives and radicals, or Supernaturalists and Rationalists, as
   they were called. It was at this time (1821) that the first edition of
   The Christian Faith appeared. Hurst [13] remarks: "The book was a
   surprise to all parties. It was a stroke of genius destined alike to
   recast existing theology and to create a new public sentiment for the
   future." Schleiermacher, by a broad treatment of the great topics of
   Christian theology, aimed at stemming the current running toward a
   narrow and intolerant orthodoxy, and at the same time, by bringing into
   relief the religious reality which underlies the different confessions
   of Protestantism, he hoped to deepen the consciousness of the unity and
   worth of the Christian faith.

   But the purpose of Schleiermacher's work went far beyond the needs of a
   temporary and local crisis. This his greatest achievement obtained a
   permanent place among the world's most notable attempts to solve the
   problems of the inquiring religious spirit, because it treated those
   problems in a spirit which recognized their seriousness and breadth. It
   was the work of a writer who had set himself diligently to apprehend
   the meaning of religion, and especially of Christianity, in a universe
   of things that lay open to human experience and investigation; who had
   held his mind open to receive whatever he might find nourishing to a
   hungry spirit in all realms of study and the philosophies of all
   schools.

   The task which confronted the genius of Schleiermacher may be set forth
   briefly as follows: to describe the inner nature of religion, and
   particularly of Christianity, so as to exhibit its basis in an original
   human enduement and its freedom from dependence, on the one hand, on a
   body of objective knowledge--whether that knowledge be externally
   communicated or be the product of rational thought--or on a form of
   morality, on the other hand; to relate Christianity as a historical
   magnitude to other historical religions so as to bring into relief its
   pre-eminence among the various forms of religious faith; to indicate
   the place of the religious experience in the entire realm of human
   consciousness so as to vindicate the claim that it supplies the highest
   interpretation of the universe; to restate the interpretations of the
   Christian faith which have appeared in the great historic confessional
   and creedal symbols so as to bring out their religious content, and at
   the same time to clear away those traditional philosophical and
   superstitious excrescences which have obscured the truth of
   Christianity; to effectuate the demand that no form of doctrine may be
   admitted to be Christian except in so far as it is an expression of the
   Christian religious consciousness--a present conscious religious faith;
   to furnish to aggressive Protestant Christianity an instrument for its
   advancement, in the form of a reasoned systematic statement of its own
   inherent nature.

   Did space permit, we might show how upon a foundation of Christian
   religious faith he built the product of the rich speculative genius of
   Plato, the sin-consciousness of Paul and Augustine, Luther's and the
   Anabaptists immediacy of fellowship with God, Calvin's all-embracing
   divine purpose, Spinoza's self-differentiating substance transmuted
   into the principle of causality, Leibnitz mirroring of the universe in
   the individual, Lessing's philosophy of the revelation which, at the
   same time, is education, with Kant's conviction of the incompetency of
   pure reason to establish religious truth running through it all. How
   all these elements, shot through with the Moravian warm love for Jesus
   Christ and the fellowship of grace, were recast in the crucible of
   Schleiermacher's own thinking and were built up into a massive system,
   the following exposition will make an effort to show.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [11] A second edition appeared in 1806, and a third in 1821.

   [12] See the whole correspondence In Studien und Kritiken (1834).

   [13] History of Rationalism, 241.
     __________________________________________________________________
     __________________________________________________________________

II. THE CHRISTIAN FAITH
     __________________________________________________________________

II. THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

A SYSTEMATIC EXPOSITION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH
     __________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION (§§ 1-31 [14] )

   At the outset of this undertaking it is necessary to explain the
   meaning that is here attached to the term dogmatics and to set forth
   the method and the arrangement appropriate to it. For, while Christian
   communions generally make use of dogmatical (doctrinal) statements both
   in their own internal economy and in their intercourse with other
   religious bodies, an examination of the theological writings best known
   among them will discover great diversity and confusion in the
   articulation of the different theological disciplines and in the
   application of them to the purposes of the societies concerned. Of
   dogmatics this is true in an eminent degree.

   The greatest differences in the orderly development of the subject will
   occur, of course, in those works which represent thoroughly different
   conceptions of dogmatics, but minor differences appear even in works
   which repose on a similar basis. In any case the method and order of
   treatment are best justified by results and, in order to the best
   results, should be set forth for the reader at the beginning.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [14] The paragraph references are to the corresponding portions of the
   original work.
     __________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER I

EXPLANATION OF DOGMATICS (§§ 2-19)

   Dogmatics is a theological discipline. Its sole use is to serve the
   interest of the Christian church. This consideration determines for us
   its peculiar task. Since it presupposes the Christian church, a right
   apprehension of the church in general and of the character of the
   Christian church in particular becomes its basis and the touchstone of
   all that claims a place in it. This being the case, we are not obliged,
   for example, to derive a doctrine of God, of man, and of last things
   from universal principles of reason, because these principles have no
   more relation to the Christian church than to any other form of
   association among men; but there are three auxiliary sciences whose aid
   we do need as an introduction to dogmatics: first, ethics, because the
   idea of the church pertains to this realm, since it denotes a
   fellowship or association which originates and continues only through
   free human activities. Second, philosophy of religion, because in
   defining the term church it is necessary to distinguish the essential
   and permanent elements, subsisting in religious communions through all
   the stages of their development, from the individual historical forms
   in which their common principle may temporarily be embodied, so as to
   exhibit those elements as constituting the entire manifestation of
   religion in human nature. (Compare the philosophy of law as an
   analogous critical discipline.) Third, apologetics, attaching itself to
   the philosophy of religion in order to describe the peculiar essence of
   Christianity and its relations to other religious communions. Availing
   itself of propositions borrowed from these sciences, dogmatics then
   proceeds to its own peculiar task, though it is to be remembered that
   the value of the dogmatic does not depend on the correctness of the
   processes or conclusions adopted in all or any of these three auxiliary
   sciences (§ 2).
     __________________________________________________________________

  I. THE CHURCH

   (Ethics)

   An ecclesiastical communion is to be distinguished from all other
   associations of men, such as the family, the state, the school, in that
   it is based upon piety, religion (Frömmigkeit). Religion is an
   immediate, or original, experience of the self-consciousness in the
   form of feeling. It is immediate, in that it is not derived from any
   other experience or exercise of the mind, but is inseparable from
   self-consciousness; and it is feeling, in that it is subjective
   experience and not objective idea, and in this respect it is identical
   with the self-consciousness, (a) Religion is not an act of knowledge
   nor the result of a process of knowing. If it were the former, its
   source would lie in human activity. If it were the latter, its content
   would be doctrine, dependent upon prior processes of the intellect, and
   subject to all the uncertainties which pertain to scientific
   investigation. The measure of knowledge would be the measure of piety;
   religion would be a mere acquirement or possession and no essential
   element of human nature, (b) Neither does religion consist in action.
   This would make it identical with morality. But actions which are bad
   in moral content as well as those which are good, proceed from
   religion. The only respect in which an action partakes of a religious
   character is in the motive which prompts it, and this, in the last
   analysis, is feeling. This conclusion is confirmed by the universal
   admission that there are states of feeling such as regret, contrition,
   assurance, joy in God, which are in themselves of a pious (or
   religious) nature apart from all expected results in knowledge or
   action. To make religion consist in the end attained would be to
   identify it with successful results, (c) Nor, again, is religion a
   condition compounded of knowledge, action, and feeling, for of such a
   fourth state of consciousness we are not aware in experience. While
   feeling is connected with both knowledge and action, it is not
   dependent upon them for its religious character, but imparts this to
   them.

   Religion, then, as consisting in feeling, denotes a state of our being,
   and hence in religion man is not primarily active but receptive. It
   must be so, for though in all consciousness there is a double element,
   namely, the self-consciousness, or ego, and a determination of the
   self-consciousness, or experience, it is impossible that the latter
   should be produced by the former; because the ego is ever
   self-identical, but experience is variable. Nor could we ever have a
   separate consciousness of the ever-identical self, because such a
   consciousness would be destitute of all determinateness or of quality;
   and consequently consciousness of self is dependent upon experience.
   But this is just to say that all consciousness, our objective
   self-consciousness included, is dependent upon a prior influence
   exerted upon our receptivity. We are compelled therefore to seek the
   common source of our being and experience in an Other.

   Now, as we actually find ourselves in this world, we experience a
   double relation, a relation of freedom and a relation of dependence,
   expressing respectively spontaneity and receptivity in the same
   subject. As a part of that divided and articulated whole which we call
   the world we stand toward it in a position of reciprocal activity. We
   affect it and are affected by it. And therefore our feeling in relation
   to the world is of relative freedom and relative dependence. But yet,
   while it is impossible for us to have, as a part of the world, a
   feeling of absolute freedom toward it, we do have in and with the
   world, even in the experience of freedom toward it, a feeling of
   absolute dependence; and since we have no self-consciousness
   independently of our place in the world-whole, the consciousness of
   absolute dependence for ourselves involves the absolute dependence of
   the whole world, The ground of our being and of the being of the world
   is in a source beyond our being and the being of the world. This
   feeling of absolute dependence is religion. In religion we feel
   ourselves absolutely dependent upon God. This feeling, as has been
   already pointed out, is immediate. That is to say, in religion we find
   ourselves in immediate relation with God.

   But though the term God is here used, it is not to be understood that
   religion avails itself of any idea of God previously obtained by
   information or theophany. For such an idea of God would be intellectual
   and sensuous and would spring from a source outside the religious
   experience, and therefore no place can be assigned to it in a body of
   Christian doctrine. In saying we are in immediate relation with God,
   the latter term is used only to designate the Whence of our spontaneous
   and receptive life, of which we be come aware in our feeling of
   absolute dependence. This Whence, co-posited in our consciousness, is
   the truly original meaning of the term God. We do not indeed reason
   from this feeling to the objective existence of God, but God is
   immediately given in the feeling of absolute dependence. Feeling,
   self-consciousness, properly interpreted, involves the
   God-consciousness. We do not hereby dispute a supposed original
   knowledge of the existence of God obtained in some other way, but we
   only assert that with such knowledge we have nothing to do in Christian
   doctrine.

   This feeling of absolute dependence constitutes the highest of the
   three stages of human consciousness: the first, the animalistic,
   prevailing in infancy and dreams, in which the antithesis of subject
   and object has not yet arisen because the mental functions are in a
   confused condition; the second, the sensuous, in which the antithesis
   is distinct; the third, the religious consciousness, in which the
   antithesis between self and not-self disappears and all is comprehended
   as identical with the subject. There is no other condition of
   consciousness parallel to this absolute feeling, for in all knowledge
   and action the antithesis of subject and object remains. But this
   highest stage never occurs in separation from the second. For being
   entirely simple (unvarying), self-identical in nature, and present in
   all activities, it could never possess the clearness and definiteness
   necessary to experience; and also, if it constituted by itself at any
   time the whole of our experience (which is the same as saying that
   thought and action might be unconnected with self-consciousness), the
   coherency of our being would be destroyed. It could not arise in the
   animalistic stage, because self-consciousness has not then arisen. But
   when the human soul breaks loose from the confusedness of that lower
   stage and recognizes the antitheses which present themselves in
   experience; and yet along with its sense of partial freedom and partial
   dependence recognizes also its absolute dependence, so that every
   potency of the sensuous consciousness is related to that higher
   consciousness, then we have the self-consciousness at the point of
   perfection. The more fully every element of the determinate self
   -consciousness is shot through with the feeling of absolute dependence,
   the more fully religious the man is. The second and third stages always
   coexist. In other words, the feeling of absolute dependence is always
   conjoined with sensuous experiences, and the degree of a man's piety
   depends upon the extent to which his sensuous experience is pervaded by
   the pious feeling. Or, to state it again differently, the measure of
   piety is the extent to which a man feels himself absolutely dependent,
   even in the midst of his relations to objects toward which he is
   relatively free, and the extent to which he can unite them all with him
   as absolutely dependent. Of course the ideal life, the blessedness of
   finite beings, would consist in an evenness of condition in which the
   religious feeling maintains itself in unbroken perfection, but in
   actual life sensuous experience introduces influences favorable and
   unfavorable to the feeling of absolute dependence, producing joy or
   grief, elevation or repression of the religious life, so that in
   consequence it comes to be expressed in a series, more or less
   interrupted, of pious impulses, instead of being constant and
   unvarying.

   This feeling of absolute dependence, the God-consciousness, being the
   highest stage of the immediate self-consciousness, is an essential
   element of human nature. (The absence of this feeling in the case of
   any man or association of men could not prove that it is only
   contingently related to human nature, unless it could be shown that it
   is of no higher worth than sensuous feeling, or that there are other
   feelings be sides of equal value with it.) Now, every essential element
   of human nature forms a basis of communion. For, on the one hand, the
   race-consciousness within us produces an impulse to overstep the
   boundaries of our own personality and combine with others, and therein
   it finds its satisfaction; and, on the other hand, this impulse to
   communicate to others our inner experience is rendered possible of
   fulfilment by the constant connection of the religious feeling with
   sensuous experience (above noted). Word, act, tone, facial expression
   become channels for communicating to others and (through the
   race-consciousness) of stimulating in them our own experience. The
   issue is, the formation of an association or communion based upon that
   experience and composed of those who are capable of appropriating it.
   Thus religion produces religious communions. These will vary in
   character, on the one hand, according to likeness or unlikeness of
   disposition in different people (that is to say, according to the
   region of the self-consciousness with which the God-consciousness can
   most easily be united), and, on the other hand, according to the
   external circum stances (e.g., household or territorial relations)
   which shape their lives. Thus the religious feeling produces, in
   connection with these relative mutual attractions and repulsions,
   churches varying in character according to the influences just
   described. And as individuals or families vary in respect to the power
   of communicating the religious impulse, one being related to it
   actively, and another, or others, rather receptively, so arises
   priesthood.

   NOTE.--If the religious nature is essentially social and expresses
   itself in the formation of churches, then it is confusing to speak of
   "natural religion"; because there is no natural church in existence in
   which the elements of such "natural religion" may be sought. It were
   better to speak of the religious disposition or religiosity (§§ 3-6).
     __________________________________________________________________

  II. DISTINCTIONS AMONG RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
  IN GENERAL

   (Philosophy of Religion)

   The idea of history presupposes development. In the political sphere
   the human race exhibits development in the progress of society through
   unions and amalgamations to the tribe and the nation; in art and
   science from rudeness to culture; similarly in respect to religion.
   From its original home in the household it spreads out into widely
   extended religious communions. But religious progress is not
   necessarily parallel with the other forms. For while certain species of
   religion are incompatible with a low form of civilization or culture,
   yet the development of piety to the highest perfection is possible
   while other spiritual functions remain far behind. Nor does it follow
   that, because two communities or peoples have passed through the same
   number of stages of religious development, their religion will be of
   the same character. Religions differ in kind as well as in their stage
   of development, as may be seen in the case of widely separated
   communities on the lowest stage. These distinctions have not received
   much attention in the past because the critical study of the history of
   religion has had regard to the individual rather than to the community.

   This twofold distinction--kinds and stages--will serve to indicate the
   relation of Christianity to other communions or modes of faith. The
   admission that Christianity may occupy a stage of development similar
   to that of other religions is not prejudicial to its pre-eminence or
   finality, but it is incompatible with the view that Christianity stands
   related to other religions as the true to the false. Were other
   religions mere errors or absolutely false, how could Christianity
   contain so much in common with them and how could any man make the
   transition to it from the others? For error never exists in and for
   itself; it is a perversion of the truth and can be understood only
   through its connection with the truth. (See Rom. 1:21 ff.; Acts
   17:27-30.)

   The lowest stage of religious development is occupied by idolatry or
   fetichism, from which monolatry is not generically distinct. In this,
   worship is paid to a god whose interest and influence are confined to a
   limited sphere, because the worshipers are at that stage of mental
   development in which the sense of totality has not yet been awakened.
   The addition of several idols or fetiches is contingent on the
   discovery of the incapacity of the first to meet all needs but in no
   wise indicates higher religious aspiration. The religious subject has
   not yet passed beyond that confused animalistic condition in which the
   distinction between the higher and the lower consciousness has not
   appeared; and accordingly the feeling of absolute dependence is
   reflected from an individual object sensuously apprehended.

   The union of several objects of worship in such a way that a plurality
   of idols represents one essence inhering in a manifold, introduces the
   next stage, when idolatry passes over into polytheism proper. Here the
   local relations of the different deities entirely recede and the gods
   form an articulated, coherent, manifold exhausting the whole sphere of
   deity. This corresponds to a sense for plurality, multiplicity, of
   being, in which a One-All is presupposed and sought for. The
   self-consciousness is now able to make the clear distinction between
   subject and object--the religious feeling is accordingly reflected from
   various affections of the sensuous self-consciousness, so that it is
   impossible as yet to refer the feeling of absolute dependence to a
   unity rising above all sensuous apprehension. Polytheism is an
   intermediate stage partaking of the nature of the other two.

   As the conception of the inherence of this plurality of beings in one
   Being rises more and more into consciousness and the higher self
   -consciousness be comes fully distinguished from the lower sensuous
   consciousness, monotheism appears. It is based on the unity of a
   Supreme. The self-consciousness has now been extended so as to take in
   the whole world of which we are a part; the world is apprehended as a
   unity; the religious feeling is capable of connection with every
   sensuous affection; hence the feeling of absolute dependence can be
   referred to the Supreme Being. This is the highest stage of religious
   development.

   So soon as religion has in some place been developed up to the stage of
   faith in one God, it can be foreseen that all mankind is destined to
   attain to it; for this faith contains within itself the impulse to
   unlimited expansion and the power to appeal to the receptivity of all
   men. From this two conclusions follow: it is impossible to conceive the
   original condition of mankind as mere brutality, and it is impossible
   for any man to pass from a higher to a lower stage of religion. There
   is also no historical instance of either case.

   On this highest stage history shows only three great communions: the
   Jewish, the Christian, and the Mohammedan--the first in process of
   extinction, the other two struggling for the mastery of the human race.
   Judaism, by its limitation of Jehovah's love to the stock of Abraham,
   is akin to fetichism. This appeared in that tendency to idol-worship
   which was not eradicated till after the exile. Mohammedanism betrays by
   its passionate character and the strongly sensuous content of its
   religious ideas its affinity to polytheism. Christianity has neither of
   these defects; from it there can be no relapse to either of the others.

   NOTE.--Since pantheism has never appeared as the confession of a
   historical religious communion, it does not come into consideration
   here, except with reference to the question whether a pantheism which
   has arisen from speculative thought be compatible with religion,
   supposing, of course, that the so-called pantheism is not a disguised
   negation of theism. If, in pantheism, God denotes the unity of the
   world, the question may be answered in the affirmative, since God and
   the world would then be distinguished, at least as to function. A man
   who reckons himself one with the world may at the same time feel
   himself, with this all, dependent on that which is the unity thereto.

   These three communions in the monotheistic stage represent three kinds
   or species, because their development is on different lines. The
   fundamental, as contrasted with a merely empirical, distinction between
   them is not to be found in a different quality of the feeling of
   absolute dependence (which is absolutely simple and therefore admits of
   no modifications), but in the different ways in which the religious
   feeling stands related to the sensuous experiences with which it must
   be united in order to constitute a moment of experience, an activity of
   life. Considering now the whole of life as made up of action and
   passion in their reciprocal operation, the relation of these to each
   other as means and end gives two general types of piety. When passion
   is a means to action, when it becomes only the occasion of some
   activity, springing from the God-consciousness, i.e., where the union
   of the God-consciousness with the receptive experiences which we
   receive from contact with the world becomes a means of promoting
   personal activity in the kingdom of God, the type of piety is
   teleological. Here it is the dominant attitude to an ethical task that
   constitutes the ground type of the religious state of mind. When action
   is a means to passion, i.e., when the union of the God-consciousness
   with active states of the individual becomes a means to the harmonious
   effect of contact with the world upon our receptive (i.e., feeling)
   nature, the type of piety is aesthetic. In teleological types of
   religion the sensuous is subordinated to the ethical; in the aesthetic
   types the ethical is subordinated to the sensuous. The former tends to
   the expansion, the latter to the contraction, of our
   self-consciousness. Christian and Hellenic piety are, respectively, the
   best examples of these.

   Confining our attention now to those religions which represent the
   highest stage we discover the grand distinction between the three
   monotheistic religions. In Christianity everything is comprehended
   under the conception of the kingdom of God; in it all joy and pain and
   all impulses springing from passive conditions partake of a religious
   character only in so far as they promote activity in this kingdom. In
   Juda ism, although the expectation of divine punishments and rewards
   indicates on one side the prominence of the sensuous element, yet the
   prevailing form of its God-consciousness is that of a Governing Will
   and hence passive states are ultimately subordinate to the active. But
   Mohammedanism is fatalistic and subjects the ethical to the natural in
   that it seeks as its end, even in its activities, the ease which
   results from a favorable relation to the divine decrees. Hence, while
   Christianity is wholly teleological and Judaism less perfectly so,
   Mohammedanism is unmistakably of the aesthetic type.

   Every religious community is a unit in two respects. (Compare the
   twofold distinction of stages and kinds, as above.) Externally, it
   possesses historical continuity from a definite point of beginning;
   internally, it puts its own characteristic stamp upon everything it
   possesses, even if other communions possess the same in some form. Thus
   as Mohammedanism arose with the Prophet, and Judaism with Moses, so
   Christianity began with Christ and possesses unbroken continuity to the
   present. Also the whole inward character of each is peculiarly its own.
   Christianity is not an offshoot of Judaism or a supplement to it. The
   sphere of religious experience in the case of these two religions is
   fundamentally different. In the case of the Christian religion faith in
   Christ must modify all pious feelings, must impart a new character to
   all the previously existent religious impulses, even to the
   God-consciousness in all the relations in which it is already present.
   Else Christ would be only an individual object capable of making
   certain impressions upon us, but no proper object of faith.

   NOTE.--Positive and revealed religion: "Natural religion," like
   "natural right," can only denote that which by a process of mental
   abstraction is seen to comprehend the elements common to all cases,
   and, like "natural right," has never been and never can be the basis of
   a communion. Such natural religion would not be so much religion as
   doctrine. If "positive" is taken to refer to the individualizing of
   this common possession, for example in Judaism in the form of
   commandment, in Christianity in the form of doctrine; then it can be
   shown that either commandment or doctrine has actual, acknowledged
   validity only within a definite communion, and must therefore rest
   ultimately upon the original religious fact (e.g., in Christianity, the
   person of Christ) which gave rise to this religious communion. The term
   "positive" must refer properly to the sum-total of pious life-energies
   within a communion which as a coherent historical phenomenon has issued
   from this original fact.

   Though the terms "revealed" and "revelation" have been subjected to
   much confusion of thought, it may be said that they always imply the
   fact of a divine communication and announcement which gave rise to a
   union of individuals. Only, this original fact constitutive of a basis
   of communion cannot be regarded as operative on man regarded merely as
   a knowing being, for in that case the revelation would be originally
   and essentially doctrine. But no super natural energy is necessary to
   the production of a combination of sentences which can be understood
   from their connection with one another. Doctrines therefore can be
   considered of supernatural origin only as parts of a larger whole, as
   descriptions of the life-energies of a thinking Being who, as a
   personal existence, works in an original way upon our
   self-consciousness by his advent into our sphere of life and by the
   total impression of his person. This is the original fact upon which
   the Christian communion is founded. Revelation is only to be assumed
   where not a single activity but a whole Existence is deter mined by
   such a divine communication, and what is then announced of such, that
   is to be considered as revealed. There is revelation, therefore, in all
   religious communions. None can claim that its own possession of divine
   communication is full and perfect truth and all others are false,
   because an announcement of God, if it is to be operative upon us,
   cannot be of him as he is in himself, but only of him in his relation
   to us. All original formations of piety, however imperfect they may be,
   rest upon revelation (§§ 7-10).
     __________________________________________________________________

  III. THE PECULIAR NATURE OF CHRISTIANITY

   (Apologetics)

   It is the first duty of the apologist to discover and define the
   peculiar essence of that faith which he defends. The difficulty of
   doing this is very great in the case of Christianity because the
   Christian communion is split up into so many relatively separate
   communions. The apologist has to indicate not only the essence of
   Christianity in general but also that of the particular communion to
   which he adheres. This difficulty is accentuated by the variant forms
   of single doctrines, the diverse attitudes with which they are
   approached, and the many controversies which await settlement--to say
   nothing of the present wretched state of the science of apologetics. On
   this account we must content ourselves at present with the rather
   meager assumptions which follow.

   All Christians are agreed on two points: (1) in referring the origin of
   their communion to Jesus of Nazareth; (2) in the description of his
   work as redemption, though the term is not used by all, nor always
   occurs in the same sense. Its implications are two: passively, a
   transition out of a bad state into a better; actively, deliverance
   supplied by another. Restoration to a higher state preceding the bad is
   not necessarily involved in it. Since, in the Christian religion, piety
   is of a teleological character, this bad state is to be viewed as one
   in which the higher self-consciousness, the God-consciousness, is so
   repressed that it is difficult to unite it with the determinate
   sensuous experiences of life. We may call it godlessness or
   god-forgetfulness--not a condition in which there is an entire loss of
   God-consciousness, for the lack of something lying entirely outside the
   nature could not be felt as a want, but a state in which the religious
   feeling is under bondage. The two states are not thus absolutely
   antithetical; the opposition is one of degree. In the bad state the
   sensuous consciousness dominates the God-consciousness; by redemption
   the relation is reversed.

   The penances and purifications found in all religious communions are
   expressions of a universal consciousness of this need of redemption,
   but Christianity is distinct from all other religions by regarding all
   its religious impulses as dependent upon the redemption effected by
   Jesus of Nazareth, and also in that this redemption is considered as
   perfected and complete. The degree in which these two elements are felt
   by different Christians of course varies, but neither is ever entirely
   wanting. Other religions express the need of redemption; Christianity
   presents its actualization; in others the redemption is derivative and
   dependent on doctrines or forms; in Christianity redemption is the
   central point and rests on the person of its Founder. The communication
   and extension of his redemptive activity is the matter of supreme
   concern. In this relation between the members of the Christian
   communion and its founder lies the pre eminent distinction of
   Christianity. In Judaism, for example, and in Mohammedanism, the person
   of the founder bears no necessary relation to the communion; another
   might have founded it as well; he himself stood in need of the
   deliverance he brought. In these respects Christ stands distinct from
   all others. From this two conclusions follow: (1) Christianity is
   essentially different from all other religions and cannot be a mere
   perfecting of that which lay potentially in them; (2) Christianity can
   never progress beyond Christ.

   Christianity stands in a special historical connection with Judaism,
   for Christ was of the Jewish race, and indeed it seems that a universal
   Redeemer could not have arisen except from a monotheistic people. But
   its relation to Judaism and heathenism were much more alike than is
   commonly held. For in the time of Christ Judaism had become permeated
   with many non-Jewish elements and many of the messianic promises had
   been given up or misunderstood; while, on the other hand, both Greeks
   and Romans had monotheistic leanings and expectations similar to the
   Jewish messianic hope. The demands which Christianity made on both were
   such that the cost of becoming a Christian was nearly equal in the two
   cases. But the leap from heathenism to Christianity seemed greater than
   from Judaism because monotheism already was universal among the Jews,
   whereas heathens had to receive it directly from Christianity without
   passing through Judaism. Christianity was no transformation of Juda ism
   or a renewing propagation of it. Christ is no more a development of
   Judaism than of heathen philosophy, for the self-consciousness
   underlying Christianity is different. Christianity is indeed a
   fulfilment of Old Testament promises, not, however, in regard to the
   self-consciousness of those to whom the promises came, but in regard to
   the divine counsel. It cannot be admitted that there is an identity
   between Christianity and either the earlier or the later Judaism, nor
   that Judaism without the introduction of a new element could develop by
   a natural progression into Christianity, nor again that Christ himself
   lay in this progression in such a way that the life of new communion
   did not begin with him.

   The appearing of the Redeemer was not a something absolutely
   supernatural. While Christ cannot be considered as a product of the
   circumstances and spiritual environment in which he appeared, yet he
   was conditioned by them. His appearance must have been in accordance
   with the laws of human nature in its higher meaning. That is, the
   advent of such a life as his may be regarded as the work of a power of
   development inherent in human nature from the first, and externalizing
   itself in certain men at certain points of time, and thence spreading
   out, according to laws divinely ordered but, perhaps, concealed from
   us. Hence the appearance from time to time of religious geniuses prior
   to Christ. But these earlier revelations are worthy of the name only
   because they are destined to lose themselves in him who is to give
   gradually a higher life to the entire race. The incarnation in this
   sense is something natural. Since Christ was a man, in human nature
   there must be, in the original purpose of God, the capacity for the
   implanting of the divine in it. That is, the implanting of the divine
   in human nature is an eternal act. Otherwise the incarnation in Jesus
   would be an arbitrary act of God.

   Neither was the appearing of the Redeemer some thing absolutely
   super-rational. If the life-energies of Christ by which he wrought the
   redemption could be explained from the common reason dwelling in all
   men, then any other could work the redemption as well as he. That the
   super-rational is to be posited in the Redeemer and in the redeemed,
   and consequently in the whole range of the operations of Christianity,
   has been acknowledged almost universally by its confessors. Yet the
   redemption is dependent upon reason in that the state of the heart
   which Christ conveys to men in it could not be bestowed upon an
   irrational soul. If there were a total separation between the work of
   the Holy Spirit and the highest elevation of human reason, a
   consciousness of the need of redemption could never rise and never be
   satisfied.

   NOTE.--The doctrinal presentation of redemption is an entirely rational
   procedure, and doctrines are not to be divided into rational and
   super-rational, but they are all to constitute together a unitary
   system. In one reference all Christian doctrines are above reason in
   the inner experience to which they refer hence a proper appreciation of
   Christian doctrine cannot result from a purely scientific process. But
   in another reference all Christian doctrines are rational, in that all
   doctrinal constructions must follow the same laws of thought as
   propositions dealing with other matters. A distinction between rational
   theology and a theology which is above reason is inadmissible.

   Entrance into the Christian communion is solely, therefore, through
   faith in Christ as Redeemer. The expression "faith in Christ" like
   "faith in God" means the reference of our religious condition as effect
   to Christ as cause. Like the feeling of absolute dependence, it is an
   inner certainty which accompanies a condition of the higher
   self-consciousness. That condition is one of freedom from the need of
   redemption and it begets in the subject an effort to draw others into
   the same inner experience, an effort to extend the communion of faith
   by an exposition of the religious life in which Christ's own activity
   is present. That is to say, the representation of Christ in the
   Christian communion of faith is Christ's own self-presentation. The
   Christian message is, thus, at bottom, a testimony to an inner
   experience which is referred to the activity of Christ himself, because
   in that presentation of his historical career and his character which
   the testimony involves, the impression made on the minds of those who
   believe is the same as Christ himself made on his contemporaries. Thus
   faith and the participation in the Christian communion from which
   proceeds the testimony which awakens faith are inseparable. This faith
   is a certainty, equal to that which accompanies objective perception,
   that in the Christian communion founded by Christ the religious feeling
   is in the position of control, that through the operation of Christ on
   men the feeling of absolute dependence is established in their
   consciousness and dominates their experience in the world. Such
   certainty is not to be confounded with objective certainty based on
   demonstration. All so-called demonstrations of the need of redemption
   and of Christ's ability to effect it, whether by reference to miracles,
   prophetic promises, or other "evidences," presuppose the very thing
   they seek to prove. Faith does not result from such demonstrations, but
   it is the outcome, on the one hand, of an awakening to a more perfect
   self-consciousness and, on the other hand, of the reception of the
   total impression of his person (§§ 11-14).
     __________________________________________________________________

  IV. THE RELATION OF DOGMATICS TO CHRISTIAN PIETY

   Like all other modifications of the self-consciousness, pious
   excitations have a tendency toward external expression, as in look,
   movement, tone, gesture. This is the source of systems of sacred signs
   and symbolic actions. It is inevitable that in the higher stages of
   mental development there should be an attempt to apprehend religious
   experiences in the form of idea and to retain them in the forms of
   thought. The connection and combination of these ideas in such a manner
   as to express the religious consciousness in a definite way and thus to
   give range to its circulation constitutes a religious doctrine, a
   declaration of faith. Christianity throughout the whole course of its
   progress from the Redeemer's personal teaching to the present has been
   characterized by this method of propagation, that is, it has been
   spread abroad by preaching. Every statement of Christian doctrine is a
   part of the preaching, for it aims at communicating the inner certainty
   of blessedness bestowed by the Redeemer. The form of the preaching is
   threefold--poetical, oratorical, and didactic. The last is of special
   importance when the other two forms of utterance fall into apparent
   contradictions because of their abundant use of figures. In those
   communions, particularly, which possess a high degree of culture and
   scientific knowledge, there is a felt necessity of connecting religious
   knowledge organically with the whole body of knowledge; there is a need
   of dogmatics.

   Dogmatics, then, arises primarily out of the demands of the religious
   consciousness. As to subject-matter, it is a description of subjective
   states of mind and it claims no validity beyond that of the inner
   certainty which is the Christian's possession. It is a necessary
   expression of the Christian consciousness, for it appears in obedience
   to the impulse of religion universally to exhibit itself and, in the
   case of Christianity particularly, to the impulse to extend the
   redeeming activity of Christ. On its own account the Christian
   communion requires a clear expression of its own peculiar possession;
   without such a description of the common faith piety in its membership
   could not reach the highest development nor could it be propagated
   effectively in the world.

   Tributary to the religious interest there is also a scientific interest
   to be satisfied. The human mind craves for unity, coherence, system,
   and the religious consciousness itself must remain unsatisfied until it
   has perceived the relation which faith bears to the other activities of
   the mind. A truly dogmatical statement must serve both of these
   interests, and its ecclesiastical worth is determined by its perfect
   correspondence with both. The same interests involve the combination of
   single dogmatical utterances into an interrelated and integrated whole,
   so that every potency of the religious consciousness in its full range
   may find an adequate expression.

   Dogmatics stands in a derivative relation to the Christian religious
   experience and not the reverse. As to its content it is not made up of
   a series or system of propositions unfolded from some objective truth
   obtained by a speculative process, nor is it a combination of doctrines
   supernaturally revealed; because in neither of these cases would
   Christian dogmatics stand in any necessary relation to Christian piety,
   nor would it possess any necessary validity for the Christian
   communion. Besides, since in both its origin would lie in a source
   external to the Christian consciousness as such, dogmatics would be
   dependent for its substance upon the products of philosophy and
   historical criticism and be subject to all the changes and
   uncertainties which pertain to these sciences. A dogmatic which
   consisted of such supposedly objective truths could not minister to
   religious needs.

   Christian piety expresses itself in the world in a multiplicity of
   ways, varying with the conditions of human progress in various places
   and ages. Its nature will, accordingly, be understood with growing
   perfection, as its expression in the many forms of Christian activity
   becomes ever more complete. Thus while dogmatics may gather its
   statement of doctrines from all this ever-varying and ever-growing
   material, it must itself ever remain incomplete, ever capable of fuller
   and more accurate expression, and ever in need of new scientific
   treatment. Dogmatic theology may be defined as "the science of the
   combination of the doctrines which are valid in a Christian
   church-communion at a given time." From this, three conclusions may be
   drawn: (1) No statement of doctrines can be final but Christian
   dogmatics must be ever progressive; (2) Yet there is a standard for the
   testing of dogmatical expression the fundamental Christian
   self-consciousness; (3) The teacher of dogmatics must be in personal
   possession of the definite Christian consciousness pervading a
   Christian Church-communion (§§ 15-19).
     __________________________________________________________________

CHAPTER II

THE METHOD OF DOGMATICS (§§ 20-31)

   In a statement of the doctrines of the Christian faith, as has been
   already pointed out, we cannot begin with some principle externally
   given and then develop from it by a dialectical process a system of
   doctrines; but since Christianity is a modification of the
   self-consciousness, Christian doctrine will be the expression of that
   self-consciousness and all alleged doctrines of Christianity must be
   tested by the same. In the course of history a great number of these in
   a more or less systematic form have already appeared, It is necessary,
   therefore, to find a rule for the testing of them and then a principle
   according to which they may be arranged and combined in an articulated
   system.

  I. SELECTION OF THE DOGMATICAL MATERIAL

   The Christian religion is historical in character, Christian piety
   arises in no individual independently, but is propagated in the
   Christian communion and through it. This communion, comprehending many
   individuals, is, by virtue of its common inner character, a truly
   unitary life; it is one moral person existing under conditions of
   spiritual sickness or health. The fundamental basis of this communion
   is the peculiar essence of Christianity, and this once ascertained, we
   may then distinguish from it that which springs from an alien source;
   that is, what is heretical may be separated from what is of the church.
   Now, since the peculiar nature of Christianity consists in this, that
   all pious impulses are referred to the redemption which comes from
   Jesus of Nazareth, the rule is herewith supplied for the detection of
   heresy in doctrine: to wit, by ascertaining the different ways in which
   the essence of Christianity may be contradicted while the appearance of
   it is retained. We hereby obtain at the same time a rule for the
   detection of error or defect in our own apprehension of it.

   There are two ways of annulling the essence of Christianity while
   accepting the reference of the impulses of religion to Jesus redemptive
   activity as its basis, namely, by a wrong view cither of human nature
   or of the nature of the Redeemer. The result is that in neither is
   there implicated a participation in true Christianity. In the former
   case heresy arises when the redemption is accepted, but cither man's
   need of it or his capacity to receive it is implicitly denied. Of those
   heresies which arise from a defective view of man's nature,
   Pelagianism, implicitly denying man's need of redemption, while
   admitting the full capacity of his nature; and Manichaeism, implicitly
   denying man's capacity for redemption while admitting his need, are
   respectively the types embracing all.

   The second class of heresies arises when the redemption is accepted but
   Christ's ability to effect it is implicitly denied. This also occurs in
   a twofold manner, either by a denial of Christ's pre-eminence over all
   other men, or by a denial of his essential likeness to them, If Christ
   is the Redeemer, i.e., if he is the definite point of commencement of a
   constant and living, and therefore unhindered, activity of the
   God-consciousness in such a way that all others have part therein only
   through him, he must have an exclusive and peculiar dignity among men,
   and at the same time must possess an essential likeness to them. When
   the former is so exclusively emphasized that the latter seems a mere
   appearance, the heresy is of the docetic type; when the case is the
   reverse, the heresy is of the ebionitic type. Opposition to the essence
   of Christianity in any other form is not heretical but antichristian.

   NOTE.--Supernaturalism is often akin to Manichaeism and Docetism, and
   Rationalism to Pelagianism and Ebonitism.

   The evangelical dogmatician must assume the additional task of
   developing the antithesis between Protestantism and Catholicism into
   clear consciousness and of establishing it in a formula. For, just as
   the peculiar nature of Christianity is not to be found in an abstract
   conception of religion and religious communion, so also, since the
   religion of the individual and his relation to Christ does not arise or
   continue in him independently of the Christian communion, the peculiar
   nature of Protestantism is not to be discovered in a general conception
   of Christianity. For the Reformation was no mere reform of abuses; it
   was a point from which proceeded a peculiar formation of the Christian
   communion, a communion antithetical to Catholicism. To state the same
   thing somewhat differently: Just as Christianity is a phenomenon in
   history, an empirical fact, and its existence and character cannot be
   deduced from abstract conceptions of religion in general; so also
   Protestantism is a historical phenomenon and likewise is not to be
   deduced from the abstract conception of Christianity. The historical
   facts cannot be made to correspond with dialectical processes. The
   central point of opposition between the two communions can best be
   discovered by inquiring for those qualities in the one church which are
   the chief ground of objection in the other. The principal Roman
   Catholic accusation against Protestantism is that it is destructive of
   the ancient historic church and is incapable of building up an unbroken
   and enduring communion, but is ever fluctuating and ever tending to
   dissolve into mere individualism. On the other hand, Protestantism
   makes its chief objection to Catholicism that it robs Christ of his
   honor by laying all stress on the idea of the church and referring
   every thing to it, and that thereby Christ is subordinated to the
   church. Each accuses the other of slighting the Christian principle,
   but in an opposite way. The antithesis is capable of being stated
   briefly, thus: Protestantism makes the relation of the individual to
   the church dependent on his relation to Christ; Catholicism makes the
   relation of the individual to Christ dependent on his relation to the
   church. In Protestant dogmatics, therefore, the conception of the
   relation of the individual to Christ is primary and fundamental.

   NOTE.--There is no sufficient obstacle to the union of the Lutheran and
   Reformed churches since their doctrinal disharmonies do not rest on a
   fundamental difference in the religious frame of mind or a difference
   in morality and ethics, but they are solely an affair of the schools.

   From the inherence of Christian piety in a communion it follows also
   that a statement of doctrine is not the mere independent opinion of an
   individual, but is an expression of the peculiar religious
   consciousness of the Christian communion in which he lives and upon
   which he also reacts. Thus there comes to light a characteristic of
   Protestantism dogmatics: it is not an inventory of doctrines finally
   determined; but the free play of the individual factor in religious
   life and reflection is combined and interrelated with the common life
   and doctrine of the ecclesiastical body in which he inheres and which
   has itself come into existence by this very activity of individuals.
   Protestant dogmatics possesses both an ecclesiastical character and
   individual peculiarity and originality, and consequently not only is
   but ever is becoming. The process of the transformation and development
   of doctrine which began at the Reformation is to go on, unhindered,
   indefinitely.

   NOTE.--The terms orthodox and heterodox have no validity in Protestant
   dogmatics.

   Christian dogmatics and Christian ethics are best treated separately,
   because, while both are expressions of a Christian religious frame of
   mind, and while in their combination they present the whole reality of
   the Christian life, the former represents a static modification of
   human nature, the latter represents its activity (§§ 21-26).

  II. THE FORMATION OF DOGMATICAL STATEMENTS

   There already exists in ecclesiastical creeds, confessions, and
   doctrinal formularies a mass of professedly Christian doctrines, (a)
   Each one of these separate doctrinal propositions admits of a critical
   test; then the consistency one with another of all these is to be
   tested in order to unite all the truly Christian doctrines into one
   integral system. Every doctrine must conform to the following
   conditions: (1) It must be confessionally true, i.e., it must be a true
   expression of the Christian consciousness in some given church
   communion; (2) it must be scripturally true, i.e., it must be a genuine
   expression of that piety which appears in the New Testament; (3) it
   must be scientifically true, i.e., it must be logically consistent with
   other true expressions of the Christian faith and also with the facts
   of the objective consciousness; the terminology of dogmatics must be
   strictly scientific. These three tests are to be applied in the order
   named. Or, to put it in a word, Christian dogma must be the
   self-consistent expression, dialectically exact and in systematic form,
   of the common continuous Christian consciousness and in harmony with
   the unity of human nature. That conformity with some Protestant
   confession is made a test prior to conformity with the New Testament is
   not prejudicial to the latter, because, in addition to the fact that
   the Protestant church symbols themselves are professedly based on the
   Scriptures and the necessity of going back from the creeds to the
   Scriptures would arise only in case their interpretations of the latter
   are suspected, there is the further consideration that no individual
   opinion, purporting to be Christian, which does not possess apparent
   homogeneity with the expressed consciousness of a historic communion
   can be considered worthy of being called a dogma.

   That dogmas must be based on the New Testament rather than the whole
   Bible follows from what has been said of the relation between
   Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, if a doctrinal statement can be
   shown to rest on the New Testament no additional weight can be given it
   by a further reference to the Old; while, if it be supported by the Old
   Testament alone, it cannot claim to be Christian. Further, it is quite
   inappropriate and misleading to import the very expressions of
   Scripture into a doctrinal system, for this is to overlook the
   difference between scientific language and the free, popular, and
   rhetorical usage in the Scriptures. Isolated texts are to be used only
   when they evidently issue from the same body of pious excitations as
   those which are expressed in the dogmatical propositions.

   (b) The range of Christian dogmatics is deter mined by the
   consciousness of redemption. Within this consciousness lies a
   fundamental antithesis. On the one side is the need of redemption, a
   repression and limitation of the God-consciousness, a felt inability to
   erect the feeling of absolute dependence into a position of supremacy
   over all the activities of life. On the other side is the certainty of
   redemption through Jesus Christ, i.e., the God-consciousness is now put
   into a commanding position in all the energies of life, and this power
   to hold all in subjection to the religious feeling is referred to
   Christ. This does not imply that the consciousness of the need of
   redemption has disappeared; it may indeed be more vivid; but it is now
   specifically Christian.

   Consequently, all professedly Christian doctrines must conform to the
   demand that they have their source in the Christian consciousness of
   redemption. Thus it is impossible for Christian dogmatics to take over
   from so-called "natural theology" descriptions of a religious
   consciousness common to all men, or the results of speculative
   theology, however true these may be in themselves. Nor can this be done
   with doctrines of the person of the Redeemer, relating to a time
   anterior or posterior to, or apart from, his redemptive activity, or
   with doctrines of a state of humanity in which men no longer feel the
   antithesis implied in redemption, since those doctrines are not
   expressions of the Christian consciousness, whatever else they may be.
   Nor again can the discoveries of science in any field whatever or the
   products of meta physical speculation, all of which may be independent
   of the higher self-consciousness, be accepted as elements of a
   Christian doctrinal system until they have been reinterpreted from the
   standpoint of the Christian religious experience. According to this
   view no assertions of mere historic fact or of speculation about this
   Redeemer himself are entitled to a place in Christian doctrine.

   Since all Christian piety rests upon the appearing of the Redeemer,
   nothing that concerns him can be set forth as distinctly Christian
   doctrine which does not stand in connection with his redeeming
   causality and is not capable of being referred back to the original
   impression which his existence made.

   (c) As regards the framework in which dogma is to be exhibited: Since
   religion is in the last analysis the feeling of absolute dependence,
   and since that higher consciousness comes into actual supremacy over
   the sensuous consciousness in the Christian experience of redemption,
   Christian dogmatics will naturally commence with a description of the
   distinctively Christian consciousness. But since, as has been shown,
   the feeling of absolute dependence is inseparable from a
   world-consciousness over against which a God-consciousness stands,
   Christian dogmatics will also present a doctrine of the world and a
   doctrine of God from the standpoint of redemption.

   We shall treat the historic confessional statements under these three
   heads and in the order indicated. This order of discussion differs from
   that which has been the rule among dogmaticians. They have given the
   question of the being and nature of God the first place in the order of
   topics, but our method is more in harmony with the requirements of
   science and the needs of the religious spirit (§§ 27-31).
     __________________________________________________________________

  I. UNFOLDING OF THE RELIGIOUS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (§§ 32-61)

   The Christian consciousness presupposes and involves the consciousness
   of absolute dependence on God. But in that peculiar modification of the
   religious consciousness which is experienced in Christianity the
   exaltation of the God-consciousness from a condition of repression to a
   position of dominancy over all the sensuous impulses is referred to
   Christ, so that there can be no reference (relation) to Christ in which
   there is not also a reference to God. The pain which is felt at being
   unable to realize the supremacy of the God-consciousness is attributed
   to a want of communion with the Redeemer, while the satisfaction
   experienced in the opposite state is contemplated as an impartation
   which has come to us out of this communion; so that there is no
   religious activity or potency within the Christian communion in which a
   reference to Christ is not involved.

   It has been pointed out already that the religious feeling is never
   experienced in isolation from other experiences but always in
   connection with a world-consciousness; and that the perfection of the
   God-consciousness is dependent upon the perfection of the
   world-consciousness. In other words, we find ourselves, as part of a
   world-whole, relatively free and relatively dependent. But over against
   this unity of a world organized and possessed of perfect interrelations
   in which we have our own definite place, there stands a higher unity
   upon which we feel ourselves and the world-unity absolutely dependent.
   The obliteration of the distinction between these separate unities
   annuls either the feeling of absolute dependence or the feeling of
   freedom, and contradicts human experience. Both of these two
   antithetical unities are therefore involved in the Christian
   consciousness.

   The experience of this feeling of absolute dependence is not contingent
   on any peculiar circum stance in human life, as though it were
   accidental and not absolutely constituent of human nature, nor does it
   vary in its character in different men, but is the same in all. The
   difference in degrees of perfection among men does not consist in a
   distinction in the quality of this feeling but is to be referred to the
   degree of development of the intellectual functions. (See above.)
   Supposed instances of a human self-consciousness which is destitute of
   the God-consciousness disappear on close analysis, except in those
   individuals whose intelligence is entirely undeveloped.

   But even if our contention that the feeling of absolute dependence and
   the God-consciousness involved in it constitute a potency essential to
   human nature were successfully impugned, we should be under no
   compulsion to formulate in our dogmatics a proof of God's existence,
   for such "proofs" would only issue in an objective consciousness of
   God's existence which could have no place in a system which is based on
   immediate inner certainty. Moreover, experience has shown of how little
   avail are such demonstrations in the face of theoretical atheism. It is
   not the business of dogmatics to secure an admission of the
   God-consciousness but to develop its content.

   To resume: Since the Christian religious consciousness is connected
   with a consciousness of unity with the world on the one hand and
   involves the feeling of absolute dependence on God on the other,
   Christian dogmatics will naturally begin with a description of the
   religious consciousness so far as the relation between God and the
   world is expressed in it; it will proceed further to describe the
   qualities of the world and the attributes of God so far as these are
   involved in that relation. It may be repeated also that such a doctrine
   of God and of the world is not supplementary to, or to be supplemented
   by, a scientific or philosophical doctrine of God and the world.
   Christian dogmatics rests upon its own basis, namely, the Christian
   religious consciousness, and it is complete in itself. Whatever cannot
   be evolved from the religious consciousness cannot be admitted to a
   place in dogmatics, because it lies outside the sphere of religion.

   Section I. Description of the Religious Consciousness, so Far as the
   Relation between God and the World Is Expressed in It

   Only when we feel ourselves to have a place in that organic whole we
   call Nature, or, as otherwise expressed, only when we are conscious of
   belonging to that unity which we call the world, with its division into
   parts universally related to one another, do we recognize our absolute
   dependence upon that higher infinite unity we call God. Our absolute
   dependence on God involves the absolute dependence of the world also.
   Hence the doctrine of the world from the view point of religion is
   summed up in the proposition: The totality of finite being exists
   solely by dependence on the Infinite,

   The creeds express this doctrine in the twofold form of the creation
   and the preservation of the world by God. Were not the use of these
   terms already established it would suffice to designate the whole
   relation of the world to God by either of them. If creation, instead of
   denoting a divine activity which began and ended at a definite point,
   were used to designate the continuous and uninterrupted activity of God
   in the world, it would include the idea of preservation. Or if, for
   example, we think of the species in connection with the individual
   existences embraced in it, the creation of the individuals is just the
   preservation of the species and the latter would include the former. In
   this way they become fairly interchangeable. The only distinction
   between these two conceptions is that the former adds to the latter the
   conception of a beginning of the relation of dependence. However, we
   have no consciousness of a beginning of existence, but only of a
   continuous existence, and therefore Christian dogmatics can produce no
   special doctrine of creation, but has only a negative interest in it.
   That is, dogmatics supplies the rule that no doctrine of creation can
   be accepted as Christian which is inconsistent with the world's
   complete and continuous dependence on God, as, e.g., the doctrine of a
   pre-existent material which was the subject of God's formative
   activity, or the doctrine of a commencement of divine activity at
   creation, both of which limit the dependence of the world to a
   circumscribed period, And, on the other hand, our discipline occupies a
   position of freedom in relation to scientific investigation. For
   example, for dogmatical purposes it is immaterial whether the account
   of creation given in Genesis be in accordance with the facts or not, or
   whether we have in this book an inspired account of the manner in which
   the world came to be; for in any case these an; questions of cosmology
   or of a doctrine of the Bible. Dogmatics is only concerned with those
   matters in so far as they stand related to religious feeling. The pious
   self-consciousness underlying the doctrine of creation is satisfied
   with that doctrine, (1) as expressing the idea of the world's
   origination through God, so long as God is not thereby brought into the
   relation of antithesis or limitation; (2) as referring the world's
   origin to divine activity, so long as it is not viewed as similar to
   human activity; (3) when it views the origin of the world as
   time-filling and conditioning all change, with out the divine activity
   itself being made thereby temporal.

   The doctrine of preservation more suitably sets forth the fundamental
   religious consciousness. It has been pointed out already that the
   highest development of the self-consciousness involves a consciousness
   of our being a part of the articulated world-whole, and this again is a
   condition of the highest development of the God-consciousness. Hence
   the highest knowledge of the world and the highest knowledge of God are
   interdependent, being a twofold expression of one and the same
   self-consciousness. Scientific and religious conceptions of the world
   are not antagonistic but complementary. The divine preservation of the
   world and universal natural causality are one and the same thing viewed
   from different standpoints. The affirmation of our religious
   consciousness that all that affects us exists in a relation of absolute
   dependence on God falls into line with the intuition that all is
   conditioned and determined by the world-order. If the common idea were
   true that the religious and the scientific view of things are mutually
   exclusive and that when the religious consciousness is more lively the
   scientific activity will be correspondingly weaker, and conversely,
   then the growth of scientific knowledge would result in the gradual
   extinction of piety, and the interests of religion would be opposed to
   all research and further extension of knowledge--altogether in
   contradiction with the truth that the impulse to world-knowledge and
   the impulse to seek God are both essential to the human soul. Now, it
   is quite true that the unusual and stupendous events in nature
   stimulate the religious feeling most thoroughly, but that is not
   because of the obscurity of their relations with other phenomena, but
   just because they manifest the most clearly the subjection of all human
   existence and activity to universal potencies and by this stimulate our
   sense of dependence. But this itself is just the most perfect admission
   of the universality of the world-order. Apart from this admission the
   religious consciousness could not be connected with every natural
   event.

   NOTE.--The distinction between general and special preservation is
   opposed to the universal interests of religion, and so also is the
   distinction between preservation and co-operation, for they imply the
   operation of forces which do not proceed from God. To add to these the
   idea of divine government is to make further confusion, for it
   introduces the antithesis of means and end to God, which implies a
   difference in the degrees of the immediacy of the relation of things to
   God.

   Because of the prominence which is given to the subject, particularly
   in apologetic writings, it is pertinent to apply the principles here
   enunciated to the subject of miracles. It is commonly supposed that an
   event which lies outside the fixed order of nature and which cannot,
   therefore, be accounted for by natural causality, has a special
   religious value because the divine causality is demanded for its
   explanation. But this is to suppose that the religious sphere lies
   outside of the universal order of relations, making the religious
   synonymous with the arbitrary and exalting the quality of arbitrariness
   to the rank of a divine at tribute. Nay, it does more: it separates God
   from the world and makes a religious view of the world impossible. It
   is destructive of science and of religion too.

   If it be urged that the Christian belief in the hearing of prayer and
   the new birth demands a belief in miracles it may be replied here
   (though these subjects are to be treated later) that our view relates
   prayer to the divine preservation so that the prayer and its fulfilment
   or non-fulfilment are only parts of the one original divine order of
   things. As to the new birth--if the revelation of God in Christ is not
   something absolutely supernatural then Christian piety cannot require
   that anything which coheres with that revelation, and issues from it,
   be absolutely supernatural. Yet it is to be noted that our knowledge of
   the relations of the physical and spiritual is too limited to warrant a
   denial of the historicity of certain remark able events related in the
   New Testament. But this is a question for scientific investigation and
   not for dogmatics.

   The operation of influences which constitute limitations upon our life
   is not to be denied. There is a difficulty in connecting them with God.
   for it seems to make him the source of evil, including the morally bad.
   While dogmatics has nothing to do with the origin and continuance of
   evil as an existence, but has only to show how it consists with
   universal dependence, a reference to the difficulty just mentioned is
   justifiable. If we divide these life-limiting forces into two classes:
   natural evil, by which human existence is partly annulled, and the bad,
   by which human activity is partly overcome in a conflict with others,
   the one class of opposing forces representing the totality of the
   powers of nature and the other class the entire combination of human
   activities; then it may be pointed out that the very forces of Nature
   which further individual human existence up to a certain point are also
   those which limit and extinguish it. The same double effect is seen in
   the operation of social influences. It will appear, then, that the
   furthering and the limiting of life are mutually conditioned. The
   personal existence of the individual is conditioned by the very
   influences which limit him. Accordingly it becomes plain that evil and
   good do not occupy two separate spheres, but both taken together
   constitute the world as it is. That is to say, evil is not for itself
   as such ordained by God, because it never exists by itself but only in
   relation to the good, of which it is a condition. All this is true,
   whether we speak of the "mechanism of nature" or of "free causes." Both
   belong to the universal order of nature, the cosmos.

    APPENDIX: DOCTRINE OF ANGELS AND OF A DEVIL

   The idea of these spiritual existences is brought over from the Old
   Testament into the New Testament and occurs in the popular discourses
   of Jesus and the Apostles. But whatever may have been their attitude
   toward the prevalent belief in such beings, it is to be observed that
   they give us no didactic utterance on the subject. Also, the creeds,
   while referring to such beings, for the most part elaborate no doctrine
   of angels or of a devil. And this is natural. For while there is
   nothing impossible in the idea, dogmatics as such has no positive
   concern with it. Our discipline is only interested to prevent an injury
   to the religious feeling through the direction of faith to an activity
   other than God's, or through the idea that the fixed order of Nature
   may be interfered with or abrogated by other beings, and thus the
   absolute relation of God to the world be compromised.

   As to bad angels, every attempted doctrinal representation of them is
   full of self-contradictions. As to the doctrine of a supreme bad spirit
   called the devil, whatever may be the source of the idea--whether in
   the belief in a servant of God who announces the evil doings of men, or
   in oriental dualism with its doctrine of absolute evil, or in the
   Jewish view of the angel of death--it can have no place in
   Glaubenslehre (a doctrine of faith). For if there is a personal actual
   existence absolutely opposed to God, a religious view of the world is
   impossible and faith in the Redeemer is compromised. For if the devil
   be a part of the world-whole, then God as absolute causality is not
   present to the whole of existence, the totality of experience cannot be
   referred to God, and religion ceases to be fundamental to human nature
   as a part of the totality of being. And if, on the other hand, the
   devil be not a part of that articulated totality we call the world,
   then the unity of the universe in relation to God is destroyed, our
   dependence on God ceases to be absolute, God is no longer absolutely
   God. Hence also, the redemption by Christ is compromised. For if the
   devil be not included within its sphere, our redemption is not
   complete, for the totality of being ceases to be subordinate to Christ.
   He becomes only a help against a power from which he does not afford
   absolute protection. A belief in the devil can be by no means a
   condition of faith in God or in Christ; nor may we discuss his
   influence within the kingdom of God. The doctrine of angels or of a
   devil is a question of cosmology, and not of theology. Such a doctrine
   cannot be a Christian dogma, because it cannot be an expression of the
   Christian consciousness. Moreover it is sure to fall into contradiction
   with growing scientific knowledge. Yet as long as men are conscious of
   the influence of inexplicable evil forces it is proper and necessary
   that the idea be utilized in religious communications of a practical
   and liturgical character (§§ 32-49).

   Section 2. Doctrine of God. The Divine Attributes Which Are Implicated
   in the Religious Self-Consciousness so Far as It Expresses the Relation
   between God and the World

   If, as has been pointed out, the feeling of absolute dependence, which
   is the essence of religion, is implicated in the specifically Christian
   consciousness, and if this consciousness of immediate relation with God
   arises only in connection with the consciousness of having a place in
   that universally interrelated whole which we call the world, then
   Christian dogmatics involves a doctrine of God and a doctrine of the
   world which arise from that fundamental religious feeling, apart from
   those doctrines which express the experience of redemption, which is
   specifically and exclusively Christian.

   Such a doctrine of God is not to be viewed as a description of God in
   himself, for we possess no objective knowledge of God; and even if such
   were possible, it could not become a part of our discipline; because,
   as it does not spring out of the religious feeling but stands in an
   external relation to it, such knowledge, if introduced into dogmatics,
   would constitute an alien element destroying its unity. The usual
   method followed in the discussion of this subject has produced
   confusion and a contradiction of the religious feeling. The various
   experiences of the religious spirit which have been expressed in poetry
   or popular discourse have been handled by the dogmaticians in a
   speculative way, as if they constituted a sum of knowledge about God.
   The necessity of divesting such expressions of their figurative and
   anthropomorphic form by a critical process before they can be utilized
   as material for a scientific statement has produced a skepticism in
   regard to religion, because it has become plain that in those ways no
   actual scientific knowledge of God was furnished. And when by a
   speculative process (e.g., via eminentiae, negationis et causalitatis)
   various classes of divine attributes are set forth (e.g., the natural
   or metaphysical and the moral, or the active and static, or the
   absolute and relative, or the original and derivative), it is made to
   appear that our knowledge of God is made up of a composite of mutually
   independent attributes, and hence that the object himself of this
   knowledge is a composite being. In this way the unity of the religious
   life in mankind is destroyed because the nature of the religion each
   individual enjoyed is made to depend upon that special attribute of the
   divine nature to which he subjects himself.

   Instead of such "natural" or "rational" theology, we must found our
   science upon the simple fundamental feeling of absolute dependence
   which (since man is receptive in this experience) furnishes us with the
   divine causality as the principle of dogmatics. Hence the attributes
   that may be ascribed to God will be those which express the various
   ways in which the feeling of absolute dependence is referred to God as
   the absolute causality. We necessarily posit absolute causality in God
   as that from which the feeling of absolute dependence is the reflection
   in our self-consciousness. There are various modifications of this
   feeling, that is, it is referred to God in various ways; and hence
   arises the necessity of positing in God attributes which correspond to
   the various ways of referring the fundamental religious feeling to God.
   Now these modifications arise from our relation to the universally
   interrelated totality of Nature in which we are. The range of our
   experience (or of the consciousness of our relations) is limited to
   this world, and hence the feeling of absolute dependence is experienced
   only within the world-whole (world-order) and through it. That is to
   say, for us the absolute divine causality finds its full expression in
   the totality of the forces of Nature. But since, on the other hand, our
   interrelations with the world-whole itself furnish us the feeling of
   relative freedom and relative dependence toward it, whereas along with
   the world we are absolutely dependent on God, our relation to God is
   the antithesis of our relation to the world; that is to say, the
   infinite, divine causality and finite, natural causality are
   antithetical. Hence the divine causality as corresponding in range to
   the totality of natural causality may be called the divine Omnipotence,
   but as the antithesis of finite and natural causality, the divine
   Eternity. But as these are mutually involved, it were better perhaps to
   say, God is the Eternal Omnipotence, or the Omnipotent Eternal. The
   attributes of omnipresence, and omniscience are simply another way of
   saying the same thing, through a comparison with the finite.

   To carry out more fully the comparison with the finite, we may
   represent the absolute divine causality from the religious standpoint
   as follows:

   1. God is eternal--that is: because no moment of time can be
   disconnected with God, the religious consciousness relates the world to
   God as the power which, itself out of time, conditions all that is
   temporal and time itself. This is more than to say that God is without
   beginning and without end. "Immortability" adds nothing to this
   conception and is objectionable.

   2. God is omnipresent--that is: the religious spirit, because it admits
   no place in the whole world to be destitute of a religious stimulus,
   declares that the causality of God is absolutely unspatial but
   conditions all that is spatial and space itself. It cannot be said that
   there is a difference in the degree of his presence in different
   places, as, e.g., the spirit of man compared with dead forces; the only
   difference is in the receptivity of various existences. "Immensity" is
   objectionable, for it imports spatiality into the being of God.

   3. God is almighty--that is: the articulated totality of nature with
   its universal connection of causes and effects is grounded in the
   infinite causality of God and is a perfect expression of it, and
   consequently all actually happens to which there exists a causality in
   God. What has not happened could not have happened. To make a
   distinction between the actual and the possible, or between God's power
   and God's will is to create confusion.

   4. God is omniscient--that is: the divine omnipotence is to be
   conceived as absolute spirituality. We cannot speak of the divine
   perception, experience, comprehension, or vision, for these involve a
   sensuous element and therefore put God within antithesis. To ascribe
   contemplation, memory, foreknowledge, mediate and immediate knowledge,
   or pure thought to God in doctrinal statement is open to the same
   objection: they transfer human activities to God and implicate him in
   human imperfection. His causality is living, absolutely spiritual. He
   relates himself to the object of knowledge in an eternal omnipresent
   way. As God knows every individual in the whole, so he knows the whole
   in every individual thing.

    APPENDIX

   Unity, infinity, and simplicity are commonly classed with the four
   above-named attributes of God, but they can be admitted only if they
   possess dogmatical content.

   a) As to unity.--Numerical unity is an attribute of nothing; the unity
   of existence and essence, like that of the individuals and the species,
   belongs to speculative thought. For the religious consciousness the
   expression "unity of God" signifies that the unity of all pious
   excitations is given with the same certainty as these excitations
   themselves. Accordingly unity is not so much a single attribute as it
   is the mono theistic canon which underlies all investigation into the
   divine attributes and is as little capable of proof as the divine
   existence itself.

   b) As to infinity.--This means negation of limitation. To predicate
   infinity of God amounts to a precaution against attributing anything to
   God which can be thought under limitation, and thus it is only
   mediately an attribute of all divine attributes.

   c) As to simplicity.--It is used to negate materiality in God, to
   exclude the idea of parts or combination in him, in short, divine
   participation in anything whereby we designate the finite as such. As
   infinity is an attribute of all attributes, so simplicity expresses
   only the unseparated and inseparable mutual involution of all divine
   attributes and activities. As infinity guards against the predication
   of anything in God that is thought within limits, so simplicity is a
   precaution against attributing to God anything which essentially
   pertains to the sphere of antithesis (§§ 50-56).

   Section 3. Doctrine of the World. The Nature of the World, Which Is
   Implied in the Religious Self-
   Consciousness, so Far as It Expresses
   the Universal Relation between
   God and the World

   Since the religious consciousness expresses a relation between God arid
   the world, it implies a religious view of the world-constitution. The
   doctrinal statement which describes that view will be the answer to the
   following question: If the consciousness of absolute dependence on God
   arises only in connection with the world, how must the religious
   self-consciousness view the world which excites this experience?
   Consequently, such a doctrine of the world is not to be confounded with
   a scientific account of it or to be considered as a rival thereto,
   since the latter proceeds by objective perception and ratiocination.

   The religious principle is an essential and universal element in human
   nature, but this principle never comes into consciousness except under
   the influence of impressions received from the world, of which human
   nature is an integral part. Further, that the God-consciousness be
   connected with every experience is a demand upon our nature;
   consequently every world-impression must be capable of exciting the
   religious feeling. Otherwise the God-consciousness would be only a
   contingent feature of human existence, and God's eternal, living
   omnipotence would be unable to obtain expression in the world. That is
   to say, if all finite being as it affects our consciousness is refer
   able to the eternal almighty Causality, the world must be such a world
   that every impression it makes upon us tends to produce in us the
   religious feeling. In other words, the religious consciousness
   presupposes the original (i.e., independent of special circum stances)
   perfection of the world. This is not to be understood as the equivalent
   of a doctrine of a definite condition of the world, past, present, or
   future, but it refers to the permanent ever self-identical relations
   which underlie all historical events. Such a perfection is ideal, never
   provable, and never demonstrably realized, but for our consciousness it
   is necessarily postulated as the presupposition of all world-history.
   The world-history is the developing, but ever incomplete, manifestation
   of that perfection.

   But the self-consciousness is not exhausted in that identity with the
   world of which we are aware in our consciousness of dependence, along
   with the world, on God; for in self-consciousness we also recognize the
   antithesis between ourselves and the world. Hence a religious view of
   the world involves, besides a doctrine of the original perfection of
   the world, a doctrine of the original perfection of man.

   1. The Original Perfection of the World

   Since this original perfection of the world is a postulate of the
   self-consciousness, it can be a doctrine of the world, not as it is in
   itself, but only as related to man, the religious being. The relations
   between man and the world are twofold--each acts upon, and is acted
   upon by, the other. The perfection of the world in relation to man is
   therefore likewise twofold: (1) By means of the human physical frame,
   which both unites him to the world and becomes the organ of his spirit
   in relation to the world, it affects him on the real side; and on the
   ideal side it presents itself as knowable by him, and thus furnishes to
   him every where and at all times incitements to activity; it both
   supplies to him sensation and stimulates his powers of knowledge. (2)
   As receptive of man's activity and through the physical organism which
   is operated by his activity, the world offers itself to man as the
   organ of his self-expression; and as he thus extends his dominion over
   it more and more, it awakens in him the consciousness of the divine
   causality as that of which his own is an image.

   NOTE.--This doctrine of the original perfection of the world is to be
   distinguished from that doctrine of the world which represents the
   present world as the best out of many possible worlds, and as well from
   that of a former condition of the world which has passed away and has
   been changed into the present imperfect world. The former is the
   product of rationalistic speculation; since the time of Leibnitz
   particularly, it has been assigned a place in so-called natural or
   rational theology. It is not a product of the religious consciousness,
   and it at tributes to God such anthropomorphic conceptions as mediate
   knowledge and alternative choice. The latter doctrine has sprung from
   the narrative in Genesis and the legendary lore of many peoples; it
   appears in the story of a prehistoric golden age. On the one hand, as
   bare history, it could have no dogmatical importance; and, on the other
   hand, it destroys the entirety of the divine control and preservation
   of the world, and so is prejudicial against the religious feeling.

   2. The Original Perfection of Man

   As the original perfection of the world is perceived only in reference
   to man, so the original perfection of man is here considered only in
   reference to God. The God-consciousness appears in the feeling of
   absolute dependence. This feeling of absolute dependence, as has been
   said before, occurs always in connection with the sensuous
   consciousness; the tendency to the God-consciousness thus appears as a
   condition in separable from human nature, because this tendency is
   experienced in the character of a demand upon human nature to rise to
   that state in which the human soul is conscious of communion with God.
   Now piety (religion) consists in this, that we are conscious of this
   tendency as a living impulse issuing from our very nature and
   constitutive of it in the sense that the destruction of this impulse
   would be the destruction of our nature. Therefore those states which
   condition and are involved in the appearing of the God-consciousness
   throughout the whole life of man after the spiritual (mental) functions
   are developed, must be essentially involved in human nature. Hence it
   must be possible for man so to govern the world and appropriate it to
   the aim of his life that all the impressions he receives from it,
   whether they offer hindrances or helps to his life, whether they are
   transformed into intellectual cognitions or merely affect his sensuous
   nature in feeling, may be so brought into connection with the
   God-consciousness that it dominates them all.

   But besides this inner impulse to arrive at the realization of the
   God-consciousness, and inseparable from it, there is an impulse to
   externalize this religious feeling, that is, to communicate to others
   that same religious feeling; and this is the same as to establish a
   communion (association) among men based upon that religious feeling.
   With this impulse is involved the adaptability of human nature to
   circulate and appropriate the religious consciousness. In short, the
   self-consciousness, which is fundamentally religious, by development
   necessarily becomes a race-consciousness, and the possibility of this
   is grounded in human nature itself. Out of this original perfection of
   human nature proceeds the possibility of the propagation of a specific
   religious experience, i.e., the possibility of founding a religious
   communion.

   But as to the degree in which the religious consciousness has been
   developed in particular men, that is a matter for the historian and not
   for the dogmatician. Accordingly all that dogmatics may predicate of
   primitive man is: since religion is a necessary and universal element
   of human nature, it must have existed in primitive man to the extent
   that he was able to communicate it to posterity. Religion must be as
   old as the human race. When, however, men speak of an "original
   righteousness" in Adam, they make the mistake of taking as a type of
   righteousness a mere original capacity for development out of which no
   positive gain came to mankind since, according to the common view, that
   "righteousness" was lost; whereas, the true manifestation of
   righteousness is to be sought in Christ, in whom it came as a gain to
   all mankind. Summarily then, original perfection pertains to human
   nature, in that man possesses the original capacity of connecting all
   his experiences with God, that he is capable of propagating that same
   religious attitude to all men, and that all men are consequently
   capable of receiving it (§§ 57-61).
     __________________________________________________________________

  II. THE ANTITHESIS IN THE RELIGIOUS SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (§§ 62-169)

   Introductory

   There is no self-conscious human existence from which the
   God-consciousness is entirely absent, yet there is no human existence
   in which this religious feeling constitutes the whole of experience.
   The sensuous consciousness and the God-consciousness are always
   combined in some relation to each other. In one case they are so
   related as to produce an experience of pain, in the other so as to
   produce pleasure. The former is the pre-Christian state. In it
   religious feeling has not attained an ascendancy in the activities of
   life; the God-consciousness is not extinct, but repressed, not entirely
   wanting, but dominated by sensuous experience. In relation to the
   God-consciousness our condition is that of dissatisfaction or pain.

   In the Christian religion, as teleological in character, all experience
   is judged by its relation to the activities of life. Accordingly, when
   the Christian looks back to his former state, just described, he
   regards the repression of the God-consciousness in himself ^s
   proceeding from his own act and not from an external source; from his
   present point of view religious feeling in him was subjected to
   sensuous experience by his own act of alienation from God; that is, he
   is conscious of it as sin.

   But now in relation to the God-consciousness his experience is one of
   enjoyment, pleasure, satisfaction. The God-consciousness has now come
   to its rightful position of supremacy in the activities of life, and
   sensuous experiences are subjected to it. He has entered into communion
   with God. And this turning to God it is impossible for him to refer to
   his own activity, for alienation from God is his own original act, and
   if the turning to God were to be referred to the same, then the
   repression of the religious feeling would be only occasional, and the
   consciousness of the need of redemption would be only contingent. But
   it is a fact of Christian experience that the dominancy of the
   God-consciousness is ascribed to a source outside of one's self, it is
   a redemption; and this redemption is viewed as an arrangement by the
   will of God, so that faith in it is a harmony with God's will.
   Communion with God is the effect of a communication proceeding from
   Jesus Christ. He is Redeemer in that the control of the activities of
   life by the God-consciousness is referred to his act. There is no
   universal God-consciousness without a reference to Christ, nor a
   relation to Christ which is not referred to the God-consciousness. This
   is what is meant by the Christian consciousness of Grace--communion
   with God dependent on a communication from the Redeemer.

   Consequently, redemption involves the consciousness of sin and the
   consciousness of grace. These two essential elements of Christian
   experience are to be understood only in relation to one another. This
   antithesis in experience never disappears though it is true that the
   former element, by means of the latter, continually diminishes. As in
   the pre-Christian state the God-consciousness was not extinct but
   subjected to sensuous control, so now in the state of grace the
   consciousness of sin is not extinct but is steadily diminished as the
   energies of life become increasingly pervaded by the religious
   consciousness. Doctrines which are specifically Christian must be drawn
   from the Christian religious consciousness, from the inner experience
   of Christians. Dogmatics has to do only with this Christian view of sin
   and grace and does not attempt to construe them in a cosmological,
   historical, or speculative way. With sin as a world-element, or with
   conditions antecedent to the appearing of sin or subsequent to its
   disappearance, or with sin as a metaphysical principle our discipline
   has nothing to do, because these lie outside the sphere of the
   religious self-consciousness. Our doctrine of sin must be of sin in
   relation to grace, and our doctrine of the world, of men, and of God in
   relation to sin, must be determined by the Christian consciousness of
   the relation between sin and grace (§§ 62-64).

   The framework in which the doctrines of sin and grace are to be
   exhibited will be the same as in Part I, and for a similar reason.
     __________________________________________________________________

    I. FIRST SIDE OF THE ANTITHESIS: UNFOLDING OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SIN (§§
    65-84)

   If it be attempted to set forth a doctrine of sin in and for itself,
   such a doctrine could not form a consistent whole with that, already
   exhibited, of the religious consciousness in general. First, as man's
   own act it would appear contradictory to the tendency to the
   development of the God-consciousness as a living impulse in man, and
   inconsistent with the original perfection of human nature. Second,
   since in the state of sin a man exists in his place within the
   world-whole, then sin, as not proceeding from the divine causality,
   would destroy the unity and integrity of Nature, because it would be an
   entity existing in opposition to the divine omnipotence. Third, if it
   be referred to the divine causality, then, that attribute which
   represents the divine causality in relation to sin must be out of
   harmony with other divine attributes, and so the unity of the divine
   nature would be destroyed. Finally, if sin has developed in man on
   occasion of receiving impressions from the world, the perfection of the
   world in relation to man is destroyed. If, therefore, we are to avoid
   both the Manichaean and Pelagian heresies, which in opposite ways
   denied the reference of sin to the divine causality, the Christian
   consciousness must be viewed in its unity, and sin must be considered
   only in reference to redemption, and only so can it have a place in
   dogmatics.

   Section 1. Sin as the State of Man (§§ 66-74)

   The method adopted in this work requires that sin be treated from the
   standpoint of the personal consciousness. Sin and the consciousness of
   sin are not to be separated. It is an experience of the
   God-consciousness being hindered by sensuousness from controlling the
   activities of life and it is expressed in a feeling of pain,
   dissatisfaction. But no activities of life, not even those which are
   governed by the impulses of religion, are without the appearing of sin
   in consciousness, at least in germ, in some way--warning, presentiment,
   self-reproof, regret. Ami so we may say that in all the stages of human
   development, if we except the states of innocency and obduracy, a
   strife exists between the lower impulses and the higher--a struggle of
   flesh and spirit against each other.

   Thus sin is a historical phenomenon in human consciousness and pertains
   to all peoples and ages. Its appearance indeed is the outcome of the
   perpetuation in some degree of an earlier sensuous state in which the
   higher functions of human nature had not yet been differentiated. Now,
   were the development of the capacities of human nature regular and
   unbroken, there would be no consciousness of the repression of the
   higher spiritual nature by the lower and sensuous; if the normal
   unfolding of the judgment were always accompanied by a parallel
   development of the powers of will, then there would be no consciousness
   of the control of spirit by flesh, no consciousness of sin, or, to
   state it in equivalent terms, no sin. But as a matter of fact judgment
   and will power are unevenly developed. Of that we are conscious as sin,
   and this very sin-consciousness is conditioned by the presence of the
   higher, the religious, consciousness. Therefore sin does not annul the
   original perfection of man. But for that original perfection there
   could be no sin. Sin is conditioned by the very capacity for the
   development of the God-consciousness: a bad conscience would be an
   impossibility but for the persistent consciousness of a something
   better. Yet it is the outcome of his former undeveloped sensuous state
   before the God-consciousness appeared.

   But, on the other hand, sin is not conformable with that original
   perfection of human nature. Were it so, i.e., were it only a
   consciousness which we have of good, yet lacking when individual acts
   and states are held in mind, sin would be unavoidable. But this would
   be incompatible with the redemption, for we may feel the need of
   redemption and may be capable of receiving it only in case sin is
   unavoidable. There fore the defect of will-power in comparison with the
   judgment must be viewed as a confusion and damage produced in our
   nature. And since it is the Christian redemption which gives validity
   to the consciousness of sin (for sin is only in relation to
   redemption), the clear and full consciousness of sin cannot arise out
   of the precepts of the law, but from the appearing in history of a
   God-consciousness which developed to an absolute strength, i.e., from
   the manifestation in history of a sinlessly developed human perfection,
   which is seen in the person of the Redeemer. If this had not appeared
   in him, there could be no hope that it could ever appear in us.

   While, however, it is true that we come to a consciousness of sin in
   connection with personal activities and as our own act, when the
   self-consciousness widens itself from the individual to the family,
   from the family to the state, and from the state to the race (for the
   self-consciousness in its widest range is a race-consciousness), the
   race-consciousness is seen to involve a sin-consciousness. Hence the
   final ground of sin is to be found, beyond the individual personal
   consciousness, in the race. Accordingly sin is to be considered first,
   as hereditary, and second, as empirical or actual.

   1. Hereditary Sin

   There is, then, a sinfulness already present in every man before he
   commits acts of sin, and coming from a source beyond his own individual
   existence. But in what does this sinfulness consist? It must consist in
   a relation to the possession of the God-consciousness as the good of
   man. It is not, there fore, something of positive nature in itself, but
   a defect consisting in a total inability to bring the activities of
   one's nature under the control of the religious feeling, Not that a
   total incapacity in relation thereto, and so a total absence of all
   good, is thereby presupposed, for the redemption and the preaching of
   it imply such a capacity as the indispensable condition of its
   effectuation, and without it salvation would be such a total remaking
   of human nature as would render redemption unmeaning; or, were it
   impossible to remove that inability entirely, sin would be some thing
   infinite in itself and the redemption impossible. That capacity to
   receive the God-consciousness is, then, not: a good in itself, but a
   good in relation to the redemption and, as we shall see, the product of
   it; and so it cannot be reckoned in any sense as personal
   righteousness. That good in human nature is, however, only receptive,
   and human activity cannot supply to that capacity a positive good.

   But can there be personal guilt in relation to that which comes from
   beyond the individual himself? Not if this original sin fulness be
   sundered from connection with the actual sins in which it appears and
   be viewed as a something existing in itself. But that would remove it
   beyond the range of Christian piety (which is ever teleological), and
   therefore beyond the range of dogmatics. The guilt of sin is the
   individual's because the act of sin is his, but the guilt is not the
   isolated individual's, for the individual cannot be isolated. The
   self-consciousness in its full significance is a race-consciousness.
   The whole race is a unity, the constituent members of which propagate
   their activity everywhere and at all times. Every individual act of sin
   is, on the one hand, caused by other sins and, on the other hand,
   causative of other sins, it is both propagated by antecedent sin
   fulness and propagates sinfulness. The consciousness of sinfulness is a
   common, universal consciousness. The individual thus represents the
   whole race both in space and time; his act is the act of the race and
   his guilt a race guilt. (This is the truth which is relatively
   described in the common theological terms, reatus, corruptio naturae,
   vitium originis, morbus originis, etc.)

   From the standpoint of the self-consciousness widened to a
   race-consciousness, the race-consciousness is a sin-consciousness. Yet
   the tendency to the God-consciousness is never wanting and the effort
   to realize it never vanishes. In this effort conjoined with a sense of
   helpfulness against the power of the flesh, there arises an
   anticipation of help coming from without--of redemption. As the guilt
   is a race-guilt, so we shall see the redemption is a race-redemption.

   But the common doctrine that universal sin fulness in the race is the
   product of an alteration of human nature effected by an act of our
   first parents cannot be accepted. For if Adam's nature before the fall
   were different from his nature afterward and from universal human
   nature now; then, in the first place, the unity of the race would be
   destroyed and there could be no race-consciousness; and, in the second
   place, it involves the impossible assumption that an individual can so
   operate upon his own nature and that of all succeeding generations as
   to destroy it. The impossibility of accounting in this way for the
   change appears in the attempts of theologians to account for the first
   sin by attributing it to unbelief, pride, lust, ambition, etc., all of
   which presuppose it. And this failure is inevitable since no individual
   can act from outside his own nature, but only within it. Or else such
   attempts involve the assumption of a hopelessly bad being, the devil,
   and so lead to Manichaeism. We cannot accept the unity of the race
   except on the ground of a common consciousness. Consequently Adam's
   nature was related to his own sin in the same way as our nature to our
   sin. The derivation of our sinfulness from a first individual act of
   sin committed by our first parents can never be an element of our
   redemption- faith, and a natural and unprejudiced exegesis of those
   passages of Scripture which are supposed to support that view will
   yield no such result. (See Rom. 5:12-21; I Cor. 15:21, 22; II Cor. ii
   13.) The same is true of the Traducianist and the Covenant theory. The
   Mosaic narrative cannot be viewed as a historical account of the first
   act of sin; its value lies in its universally representative character.
   Wherefore the inborn sinfulness must have existed in the race from the
   very commencement. Apart from this there could be no universal capacity
   for redemption. "Sin in general and especially original sin' is the
   joint act and the joint-guilt of the whole race" (§§ 70-72).

   2. Actual Sin

   That hereditary sin is ever breaking forth in actual sin is an
   expression of the Christian consciousness. For first, the clearness
   with which we perceive that we are never free from sin is proportioned
   to the clearness with which the Redeemer is presented to our
   self-consciousness; and second, our consciousness of sin is not
   empirical or contingent, but universal and necessary. That is, it is
   not as isolated individuals we are conscious of sinning, but as a
   constituent part of the totality of mankind, and hence we are as
   certain that others constantly commit sin as we are of our own sinning.
   Thus the consciousness of universal sinfulness and of universal sinning
   are the same viewed from different points; were they really separable,
   our tendency to sin would be nothing actual, and our sinning would be
   traceable to external influences. Consequently, within the whole range
   of sinful humanity no activity is ever exerted in which the
   God-consciousness is pure and unopposed, and there is no form of sin
   which any man in himself is incapable of committing.

   Apart from their relation to the redemption, there are no distinctions
   of worthiness among men in respect to sin, all appearances to the
   contrary notwithstanding. When, for example, one man appears better
   than another on the ground of possessing a more powerful religious
   consciousness, on the other hand he must appear worse, so soon as we
   consider that the actual sins he does commit indicate a stronger
   opposition to the spirit on the part of the flesh. The disposition to
   separate ourselves as better than others disappears with a vivid
   conception of the person of the Redeemer, for with it we become vividly
   conscious of our implication in the universal sinfulness and equally
   conscious that the Redeemer stands out of connection with it. But there
   is a distinction between men according as they partake of the
   Redeemer's God-consciousness or are destitute of it. In all men the
   God-consciousness and the sin-consciousness so exist, only in the case
   of the redeemed the God-consciousness gradually prevails over the
   sin-consciousness, rendering all the activities of the nature good;
   while in the case of the unredeemed the case is the reverse. Hence the
   sins of the redeemed are pardonable because they are the reaction from
   a sinful state whose power is diminishing and finally to disappear, and
   therefore they tend not to multiply or to reproduce themselves in other
   people; while with the sins of the unredeemed the case is the reverse.
   With the former good works are prevalent, while their sins are, as it
   were, the shadows of the sins of their earlier state; but with the
   latter sinful works are prevalent, while their good deeds are the still
   remaining, but gradually diminishing, anticipations of a better state,
   the reflection only of what is a living power in others (§§ 73-75).

   Section 2. The Nature of the World in Relation to Sin: Doctrine of Evil
   (§§ 75-78)

   Since a doctrine of the world has a place in dogmatics only in so far
   as regards the world's relations to man, there can be no discussion
   here of sin as affecting the constituent elements of the world, but
   only of the relations which exist between man and the world on account
   of sin. Those relations may be comprehended in the two statements: that
   on account of sin the world appears different to man, and that the
   effect of sin is to destroy the original harmony between man and the
   world. According to the doctrine, al ready set forth, of the original
   perfection of man and of the world, human life is not opposed or
   hindered in the exercise of its energies by the forces of nature, but
   all that is in the world in its operation upon human nature, even when
   it produces weakness, sickness, and death, must be promotive of the
   higher consciousness, the religious life. But whenever in experience
   the flesh prevails over the spirit (i.e., when sin enters into the
   life) then these things appear as opposed to the development of human
   energies, that is, they appear as evil. In this respect we may speak of
   natural evil in the world. But evil is also social (a preferable
   expression to "moral" evil, which includes the bad) in that the
   operations of sin in one individual become productive of evil to
   others. Thus sin and evil are correlated. The human race is the locus
   of sin; sin is, in its totality, the act of the race. Correspondingly,
   the whole world in relation to men is the locus of evil and evil in its
   totality constitutes the suffering of the entire race.

   Sin and evil are therefore related to each other as cause and effect.
   To reverse this relation and make evil the cause of sin is to
   contradict the teleological nature of Christianity, to turn ethic into
   aesthetic, and to deny the Christian conception of God. Evil is the
   effect, and, as referred to the divine causality (for it cannot be
   referred to the operation of any being or force outside of God), the
   punishment of sin--social evil, immediately, on account of the
   directness of men's relations to one another, and natural evil,
   mediately. But this is incapable of application to the individual in
   his isolation from the rest of mankind. For as sin, properly
   understood, is the act of the race in its entirety, and as the guilt is
   a race-guilt, so also evil in its totality is the punishment of the
   race in its unity. Otherwise the true conception of the relation
   between sin and evil would be found in that of heathenism, and, in a
   degree, of Judaism--namely, that magical view which represents
   suffering and misfortune as punishment for the individual's sins--which
   would make vicarious suffering an impossibility.

   Section 3. The Attributes of God Which are Related to the Consciousness
   of Sin (§§ 70-85)

   In the religious consciousness all experience is referred to the
   absolute causality of God; therefore sin and evil as elements of that
   consciousness imply divine attributes which are comprehended in the
   divine causality or omnipotence. For us sin exists as a universal fact
   of consciousness. Therefore there is a sense in which God is the author
   of sin; but, on the other hand, in the Christian consciousness sin and
   grace are antithetical, and therefore, if there is not an antithesis
   within the divine nature, God cannot be the author of sin in the same
   sense in which he is the author of grace.

   Now it has been shown that neither sin nor grace exists in and for
   itself but each only in relation to the other; both are implicated in
   redemption. The solution of the difficulty in connection with the
   reference of sin to God cannot, therefore, be found by making a
   distinction between God's permission and God's decree, for these are
   equivalent to his preservation and creation, which for the religious
   consciousness are the same. But the solution is found thus: In
   redemption there is the consciousness of special divine communication
   in regard to sin--a communication of power to overcome it. But with the
   reception of this communication the sin-consciousness does not
   disappear instantaneously, but only gradually, and therefore to our
   actual experience never entirely. It is, therefore, God's will that sin
   should gradually be banished through grace, but this is to say that it
   is God's will that sin should exist (for us, not for him), else the
   redemption could not occur. So that the conclusion of the matter is:
   God is the author of sin, but the author of sin only in the sense that
   it should exist as gradually disappearing in the presence of grace.

   The Pelagian attempts at a solution by attributing sin and grace, as
   regards the exertion of energy in them, to man alone, abandons a
   practical (ethico-religious) interest, which postulates the impartation
   of a perfectly pure moral impulse, in the divine omnipotence to a
   theoretical interest, which advocates a similar relation to God on the
   part of all forms of living activity; for the denial of the operation
   of divine causality in redemption makes the redemption a mere seeming.
   The Manichaeans, on the contrary, sacrifice the theoretical interest to
   the practical by confining the exercise of divine causality to grace
   and denying it to sin (which supposes the operation of another will
   independently of the divine and limiting its operation), so that the
   feeling of absolute dependence, and with it, the absolute divine
   causality, is lost.

   Hence if we are not, with the Manichaeans, to ascribe to sin an
   existence in itself, independent and op posed to God; or, with the
   Pelagians, to minimize and gradually annul the antithesis of sin and
   grace, the ecclesiastical doctrine that God is not the author of sin
   but that it is founded in human freedom, needs amendment. For while it
   is true that every act of sin is the definite act of the individual
   himself and is neither to be charged to a nature which is common to all
   men nor to other individuals, yet human freedom, to be real, must be
   grounded in the divine causality, and consequently human sin, if it be
   mere appearance, must have the same ground. The consciousness of sin,
   and therefore sin itself, pertains to the truth of our existence--but
   only in relation to redemption. The consciousness of sin is the
   consciousness of an opposition to the divine will that is to be
   removed. These conditions, namely, that the God-consciousness is to be
   developed in men through the gradual annulling of an opposition in man
   to the divine will, have themselves been appointed by God. For an
   absolute contradiction to the will of God, i.e., absolute obduracy,
   does not pertain to human existence. That is, God has ordered sin as
   that which makes the redemption necessary. Sin is ordered of God
   because otherwise the redemption also could not be ordered of him, and,
   therefore, not sin in-and-for-itself, but sin in reference to the
   redemption. . . . . It is ordered of God that natural imperfections
   should be apprehended by us as evil in the measure in which the
   God-consciousness is not yet dominant in us (82:2). Or, if we may
   distinguish between God's commanding will which requires the absolute
   control of all energies by the religious feeling, and God's producing
   will, in accordance with which the power of the God-consciousness is
   only gradually realized and therefore always defective in actuality,
   then we may say, God has ordered that that defect in the lordship of
   the spirit over the flesh should be sin to us, i.e., that it should
   produce in us a consciousness of the need of redemption.

   From this the doctrine of evil follows naturally. Sin being the joint
   guilt of the race, evil is its joint punishment. Evil is thus produced
   by human freedom, but is grounded ultimately in the divine causality.
   But evil is not in-and-for-itself, but only in reference to sin, as sin
   also is only in reference to the redemption. Consequently evil becomes
   a source of a stimulus to the consciousness of the need of redemption.
   Other wise evil would seem to be joined to sin by arbitrary divine
   determination.

   Since all divine attributes must be viewed as modes of the divine
   causality, and sin and evil are ultimately grounded in the divine
   causality, the divine attributes which correspond with sin and evil
   will be the divine holiness and righteousness.

   1. God is Holy

   Those actions which flow from the God-consciousness possess such a
   worth in our self-consciousness that every deviation from them in
   action is apprehended as a limitation of life, i.e., as sin. The
   activity of the self-consciousness as the apprehension of this
   inequality of judgment and will is what we mean by conscience. Without
   this inequality there would not be conscience, and without conscience
   the acts which result from this inequality would not be sin. Sin
   therefore, as the universal human state of the need of redemption,
   implies the activity of conscience in all mankind. This is the purely
   Christian expression of the need of redemption, but it is in nowise to
   be under stood as if we would admit the existence of conscience only
   when the need of redemption is acknowledged. To put it differently:
   implicated in the consciousness of sin by conscience is the
   apprehension of the divine causality as legislative for all mankind;
   this legislative divine causality is what we mean by holiness; holiness
   in God Is that attribute whose reflection is conscience in man. The
   usual and popular definition of holiness in the liturgical and
   homiletical field to the effect that it is the divine pleasure in the
   good and displeasure with the bad, assuming as it does that "good" and
   "bad" are to be understood as the actions of finite free beings, is
   open to the objection that it implies passivity in God, and since a
   state of God is thus determined by human actions he is placed in a
   relation of reciprocity with men. Such a static attribute of God is no
   predicate of our religious consciousness (§ 83).

   2. God is Righteous

   Similarly the righteousness of God is that attribute which corresponds
   to our consciousness of the connection between actual sins and evil.
   Evil is indeed the effect of the universal sin fulness, as has been
   shown; but evil is apprehended as evil, i.e., as punishment of sin,
   only in and with the consciousness of actual sin. But with this
   consciousness of actual sin is involved the universal sin fulness of
   man and hence universal desert of punishment in man. Hence the divine
   righteousness is the divine causality apprehended as producing in the
   human soul the consciousness of the desert of punishment. And as the
   idea of desert of punishment, or the idea of evil as necessarily
   connected with sin, has meaning only in reference to the redemption, so
   also it is only in reference to the redemption that the divine
   righteousness is fully to be understood. If it be objected that this
   definition makes no room in the idea of righteousness for the reward of
   well doing, among other things we may say in reply that the Christian
   consciousness admits no actual rewards but regards all rewards as
   undeserved and therefore referable to the divine grace.

   Our exposition brings out the truth that the divine holiness and
   righteousness cohere but at the same time are differentiated (§§ 84,
   85).
     __________________________________________________________________

    II. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ANTITHESIS: UNFOLDING OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF
    GRACE ( 86-169)

   Introductory

   While the consciousness of sin is a personal experience, it relates not
   merely to the individual but embraces the collective life of mankind.
   It is as a member of the body of humanity, as a participant in its
   common life, that he is conscious of sin and unblessedness. To this
   universal condition testify the confessions, offerings, purifications,
   and penances in all religions. While these are usually aimed at the
   avoidance of punishment rather than the extinction of sin their
   inevitable failure to remove unhappiness amounts to an expression of an
   inclination toward Christianity as that religion in which is found a
   Redeemer in whom appears the substance instead of the shadow. Moral
   development of the peoples tends in the same direction, because with
   moral progress there is a sharpening and intensification of the
   dissatisfaction connected with moral failure. And although for the
   distinctively Christian consciousness there is an acknowledgment of the
   unavoidability of sin and an assurance of its gradual disappearance,
   these convictions are the outcome of the growing power of the
   God-consciousness and are consequently accompanied by a more painful
   sense of the need of redemption and of the hopelessness of its removal
   by the personal efforts of men, because these efforts must partake of
   the sinful character of that common life of humanity from which they
   issue. Hence in Christianity the pre-eminent worth of redemption and
   the supreme place of the Redeemer.

   The Christian experience of a growing dominancy of the
   God-consciousness and, in the same degree, of a growing blessedness, is
   not owing to any definite form of activity or of conditions, such as
   devout meditation or ascetic practices (for these have content of
   happiness only in so far as they contribute to the performance of those
   activities which one's vocation calls for), but it is owing to
   participation in a new community which springs from the divine
   operation. That is to say, the Kingdom of God has come and the
   collective life of this new community constitutes it. This new life in
   men is by faith referred to Jesus Christ as its author, which is the
   same as to say that in him the kingdom of God appears. This Christian
   experience has indeed its source in Christ, but it never exists apart
   from the Christian community. The acceptance of the former with a
   denial of the latter involves separatism and fanaticism and is
   destructive of the essence of Christianity, because, in supposing that
   an individual could have, as it were, Christ for himself alone, it
   annuls the definite historical continuity of Christianity and renders
   an actual propagation of the activity of Christ impossible. The reverse
   attitude, i.e., the acceptance of the communal character of
   Christianity, with a denial of the necessity of a reference to Christ
   personally, makes his historical appearance only a link in a chain of
   prophets, supposes that the new community could arise out of the old
   sinful collective life of humanity, and involves a denial of the
   universality of sin. It is to say, as does the Roman Catholic church in
   effect, that Christ is Redeemer because the church has constituted him
   such.

   If we ask: In what way specifically is the redemption wrought by
   Christ? the answer is: By an impartation of his sinless perfection
   through the communion founded by him. The affirmation that Jesus
   possessed sinless perfection does not admit of proof in the ordinary
   sense. The Scripture proof fails because, uncertainties of meaning
   aside, all it can show is that this was the original form of Christian
   faith. The proof by reference to miracles and prophecies fails because
   it could only show how the primitive Christian faith arose and,
   besides, it is purely external. Our proposition is not to be understood
   as equivalent to an assertion that at a time when the consciousness of
   sin both as personal and collective was powerful in many men, all that
   was necessary was that a moral pre-eminence should fitly exhibit itself
   in a public life in order to bring about an ascription to such an.
   individual of the desired sinless perfection as the only possible
   succor of men. For this is as if it were said that faith had
   constituted Jesus the Redeemer. It would involve a gradual diminution
   of the certainty of his value as we become farther removed from the
   original impression of his person, and it would make room for the
   expectation of another to whom that perfection might be ascribed more
   worthily. But our meaning is that the acknowledgment of that perfection
   is the work of Jesus himself and that out of that acknowledgment arises
   the new collective life which is therefore founded by Jesus; the action
   of this new communion reproduces the same faith and is itself therefore
   just the operation within the communion of that personal perfection of
   Jesus. If it be objected that an impartation of sinless perfection
   through a body, in every member of which there are manifestations of
   the universal sinfulness, is impossible, the answer is: these
   manifestations are the still remaining expression of that collective
   life which was controlled by sin before the new life appeared in the
   midst of it, and the impartation of the absolutely powerful
   God-consciousness in Christ (in the historical Christian communion) is
   as yet inner experience received by an impression from without. In
   regard to this experience there are two statements to be made: (1) from
   the image of Christ, which subsists in that Christian society with
   which the individual comes into contact, as its collective act and its
   collective possession, he receives an impression of the sinless
   perfection of Christ which, on the one hand, gives rise to a perfect
   consciousness of sin in himself, and, on the other hand, removes his
   unblessedness; (2) within this Christian society, in spite of all its
   errors and sinful manifestations, there is an ever-working inner
   impulse toward the true and good; this is from Christ, and in spite of
   all reactions will ever increasingly manifest itself outwardly. These
   two elements constitute a true impartation of the perfection of Christ.

   The existence of this illimitable power of the God-consciousness in
   Christ and its operation within the human race may be regarded as
   supernatural or as natural, according to the point of view taken. In
   view of the human race constituting a collective life which naturally
   propagates sin, this communication coming from a power without it is a
   supernatural work. But in relation to the Redeemer himself the
   existence of this new collective life is no miracle but the normal
   working of that supernatural power in its assumption of natural ethical
   forms and in its appropriation to itself of the material surrounding
   it. Similarly of the individual's transition from the old collective
   life into the new; in relation to his former life the change is of
   supernatural origin, because it arises from a source beyond that old
   life; but in respect to the new life it is a natural event because it
   is its normal mode of activity. In the initiative divine activity is
   the supernatural, but by virtue of the living human receptivity the
   supernatural takes on historical, natural form. But the perfect
   connection between the old stage of human existence and the new stage
   brought in by the advent of the Redeemer lies only in the unity of the
   divine thought.

   Now sin, in and for itself, is non-existent for God and no object of
   his counsel; so also a redemption merely in reference to sin can be no
   object of the divine counsel. But since sin consists in the inability
   to realize the God-consciousness, therefore the sin-consciousness
   (which has been shown already to be one with sin) as a necessary
   condition of the receptivity of the God-consciousness is a good in
   relation to the highest development of human nature. Without it there
   would have been no living receptivity for the impartation of Jesus
   gift. Without it that full development of man which appears in the
   perfect ascendancy of the God-consciousness in the self-consciousness
   would not take place; and hence, redemption from sin may be designated
   as the completion of the creation of human nature. But this means that
   Christ, by virtue of that absolutely powerful God-consciousness which
   is his original endowment, enters with creative power into the course
   of human history to stimulate human nature to a perfect consciousness
   of its sinfulness and to an assimilation of his own perfection. With
   the bringing of his activity under the law of human development there
   is assured its gradual extension over the whole race. And since to the
   religious consciousness creation and preservation are at bottom
   equivalents, we conclude that the whole race of man has been ordered
   and preserved with reference to the impartation of the sinless
   perfection of Christ--the whole race from the beginning has a relation
   to the Redeemer.

   The unfolding of the consciousness of grace in the same framework as
   was used for the unfolding of the consciousness of sin will accordingly
   complete the dogmatic (§§ 86-90).

   Section I. The State of the Christian so Far as He Is Conscious of
   Divine Grace (§§ 91-112)

   In all the various forms of Christianity the fundamental element of
   every Christian's consciousness of grace is that of fellowship with God
   only in a life-fellowship with Christ of such a sort that in our need
   of redemption we are freely receptive to his free self-originated
   activity in the communication of his absolutely sinless perfection and
   blessedness. These two elements, Christ's activity and our receptivity
   thereto, will yield for us a discussion of the manner in which the
   Redeemer and the redeemed appear in the Christian consciousness of
   grace, in two divisions. In the first division will appear those
   propositions concerning Christ which are immediate expressions of this
   consciousness of grace; and in the second, those propositions which
   describe the relation between grace and the state of sin in the human
   soul, as that relation is mediated by Christ.

  FIRST DIVISION: DOCTRINE OF CHRIST (§§ 92-105)

   In the doctrine of Christ we may take our starting-point either from
   his person or from his activity. These are inseparable and each finds
   in the other its full expression. It is in respect of his work that we
   treat him as Redeemer; we set him over against all other men in such a
   way that their conscious blessed relation to God is ascribed solely to
   him as the author of it and not in any degree to themselves or others.
   But this is to ascribe an exclusive and absolute dignity to his person.
   Or, if we regard him as the one in whom the creation of human nature is
   perfected, we then ascribe to him a quality which is not the product of
   his environment, or which he owes to the developed insight of those who
   so regard him, but which, on the contrary, is itself the secret of
   their personal development. But this is to assign an absolute and
   exclusive value to his activity. Thus his person and his work
   correspond in value. We are not to conceive of a dignity of his person
   which is not fully exhibited in his activity, nor of an exhibition of
   activity which has its spring in any degree outside of himself.
   However, in deference to current ecclesiastical formulae, we may treat
   of his person and of his work separately. Our method will be to exhibit
   these, first, as related to the individual, and then, as related to the
   church, which must be the perfect revelation of the worth of the
   Redeemer, just as the universe is a perfect revelation of the
   attributes of God.

   1. The Person of Christ

   The Christian communion as a union of men produced through
   participation in a common religious life, as a union moreover into
   which all other religious associations are destined to pass, finds that
   life entirely in Christ, and owes the exercise of all its activities to
   him as their source. Accordingly the worth of the Redeemer must be so
   conceived as to account for this effect. This religious energy, i.e.,
   the power of the God-consciousness, must have existed in him in a
   perfect archetypal form and must have determined the character of all
   the activities of his life, none of them being destitute of it or
   possessing it imperfectly, and thus the communion-forming activity of
   Christ is manifested, not in special acts, but in the entire course of
   his career. Since it is in the Christian communion the activity of
   Christ is exercised, that communion must be a perfect embodiment of the
   energy resident in him.

   If it be objected that in the Christian communion the religious
   condition is never absolutely perfect, but is ever in need of
   development, and that, therefore, it is not necessary to attribute to
   the Redeemer such an archetypal character, but only such a character as
   served for the prefiguration of the end which the communion ever
   strives to attain; and hence that such ascriptions of dignity to Christ
   are only the hyperbole of believers, we reply: If this were the case,
   with the widening of the personal self-consciousness to a
   race-consciousness, i.e., so as to include the whole race, there must
   arise a hope and expectation of some time surpassing Christ, at least
   in the case of the noblest of its members; but as a matter of fact such
   a hope never has arisen and never could arise without destroying that
   very communion whose development is sup posed to produce the hope; and
   further, if this absolutely perfect religious energy did not exist in
   Christ, it would be impossible to account for the possession of such an
   archetype by the Christian communion. It can have arisen within the
   religious consciousness in no other way than through the exhibition of
   it in a historical, personal life.

   If it be further objected that the imperfect human conditions, the
   unperfected state of language, of science, etc., in which Christ's life
   was lived, rendered the appearing of such an archetype impossible and
   that he must constitute only a link, though an important one, in that
   gradual, continuous religious evolution which can be traced from early
   Jewish life, we may reply; At that rate Christ would be only a more or
   less original and revolutionary reformer of Jewish law and such a new
   communion as has actually arisen would be impossible; and further,
   since in such a case his life could only have been the product of that
   general sinful life of which men universally partake, the experience of
   redemption through him could never have occurred and the claim of
   Christianity finally to draw all other religions to itself and to
   develop out of itself ever-increasing perfection and blessedness could
   never have arisen.

   The only possible explanation of the appearing of Christ in the sphere
   of human life is that it was a miraculous manifestation; his personal
   spiritual life sprang by a creative divine act from the universal
   fountain of spiritual life, so that the idea of man, as the subject of
   the God-consciousness found in him historically an absolute
   realization. Or to state it differently: From his birth onward, along
   with the gradual unfolding of his natural powers, the God-consciousness
   possessed absolute control over the energies of his being. On the one
   hand, this makes it impossible that there should ever have arisen
   within him the slightest trace of a sin-consciousness or an inner moral
   conflict or uncertainty. On the other hand, his physical and mental
   equipment must have been conditioned by the age and the environment,
   otherwise we must attribute to him an empirical omniscience and
   omnipotence which would be fatal to the historical character of his
   life. Hence the appearing of Christ in the world was both absolutely
   miraculous and perfectly natural.

   The Redeemer, then, possessed sameness of nature with all other men.
   His freedom from sin does not annul his perfect identity with the race,
   since, as we have seen, sin does not pertain to the essence (Wesen) of
   man, but is rather a destruction of his nature, as is implied in the
   very consciousness of sin as guilt. Yet his activity, or the peculiar
   personal worth which conditioned it, is not thereby compromised or made
   attributable to other men. Faith in Christ implies that he held such a
   relation to the human race as none other could have, i.e., owing to the
   absolute power of the God-consciousness in him, his person was
   archetypal, which is the same as to say that God was present in him as
   a person.

   We cannot speak with truth of the presence of God in any individual
   thing or in man but only of his presence in the world. Not in any
   individual thing, for this would imply division in God. Not in man, for
   neither man's activity nor his rational thought in its attempts to
   present a pure and true conception of God, is free from sensuousness.
   Consequently we are not able to sec in unconscious nature or conscious
   rational life a revelation of God unless we have first seen it in
   Christ, in whom the God-consciousness was present as his own personal
   being and innermost self. And since it is only through him that the
   God-consciousness comes to possess others, and since, further, it is
   only in reference to man that the world can be said to contain a
   revelation of God, we can say that all revelation of God in man and in
   the world is mediated through Christ.

   But if, on the other hand, he shared in common with us the whole
   process of natural human development, yet without being involved in
   human sin, the beginning of his life must be regarded as an original
   act of human nature, i.e., an act of human nature as not affected by
   sin. And thence onward to the completion of his life there must have
   been such a filling of his nature with the God-consciousness as
   completely exhausted human receptivity. Therefore we may regard the
   beginning of Christ's life as the perfected creation of human nature.
   As the creation of the first Adam constituted the self-propagating
   physical nature of man, so the appearing of the second Adam constituted
   for the same human nature its new self-propagating spiritual life. Both
   rest on one indivisible, eternal, divine decree, and they form in the
   higher sense one and the same (though beyond the grasp of our thought)
   coherent unitary Nature.

   Proceeding from this standpoint, the current doctrinal formulae, which
   in large measure have arisen from speculative, apologetic, and polemic
   interests, may be subjected to critical treatment and restatement.

   1. "In Jesus Christ the divine nature and human nature were united in
   one person." The aim of those passages in the historic creeds which so
   describe the Redeemer is doubtless to inculcate the possibility of a
   communion between him and us in the new common life which he
   originated, and at the same time to express the being of God in him;
   from which follows that in our relation to him unlimited veneration for
   him and brotherly fellowship with him are combined. But the terms of
   the creedal statement are open to criticism: First, the name Jesus
   Christ is used to designate not only the subject of the union of the
   two natures but also the divine nature of the Redeemer before its union
   with the human; so that the union appears no longer as a moment
   (potency) constituting the person Jesus Christ, but rather as the act
   of this person himself. Whereas, in the New Testament the name Jesus
   Christ is used only of the subject of this union. Second, the use of
   the term nature in reference to both the divine and the human is
   confusing. Besides, the terms God and nature represent opposite
   conceptions in our thought. Nature properly denotes the sum of finite
   existences, the manifold phenomenal world in contrast with the
   unconditional and the absolutely simple. We cannot use the term natural
   properly of God. The creeds betray here the play of heathen ideas.
   Third, the creedal statement implies a relation between nature and
   person opposed to general usage. For while usage allows the ascription
   of the same nature to several individuals or persons, here one person
   has two entirely different natures. Now person properly denotes a
   life-unity and nature the general content of his modes of action, or
   the law of the interaction of the conditions of life within a definite
   realm. But how can there be a unity of life with a duality of natures,
   especially since one has a large sphere and the other a small? Between
   them the self-identical ego is lost. It is impossible for the mind to
   construe the figure of such a person. The outcome is either the melting
   of the two natures into a third, which is neither divine nor human, for
   the sake of maintaining the unity of the person; or the separation of
   the natures at the cost of neglecting the person; or the subordination
   of one nature to the other. The history of the subject exhibits all
   these results. Fourth, the question whether Christ had two wills is
   inevitably raised. If he had only the human will, then the divine
   nature is abbreviated, or if only the divine, then the human nature is
   abbreviated. But if he had two wills, the unity of the person would be
   unreal; and, further, since understanding and will cannot be conceived
   as independent, the question of the duality of the under standing is
   involved. Fifth, the formula quoted does not harmonize with the same
   creedal statement of the doctrine of the Trinity which abandons the
   unity of person for the sake of unity of "essence." And when we ask how
   the divine "nature" in Christ relates itself to the divine "essence,"
   no answer is possible.

   It is evident that the creedal statement carries us far away from the
   religious interest into hair-splitting and speculation. Its practical
   use in the church is small indeed. There is here offered as a
   substitute for it the following: The Redeemer is like all men in the
   possession of the same human nature, but distinguished from all men
   through the absolute power of the God-consciousness which constituted a
   personal existence of God in him. In him the human was the perfect
   organ for the reception and presentation of the divine. All that was
   human in him came forth from the divine. In this sense may be justified
   the statement: In the Redeemer God became man.

   2. "In the uniting of the divine nature with the human, the divine
   alone was active or self-communicative and the human only passive or
   receptive, but during the continuance of the union every activity was
   common to both." The object in making special mention of a beginning of
   Christ's existence was to exclude the idea of a something subsequently
   added to him--which would be an injury to faith in his person. But
   since we are not immediately affected by the beginning of his existence
   the formula involves a work of supererogation. Further, the beginning
   and the continuance of Christ's existence constitute a unity. The
   beginning of his personal existence is the beginning of his activity
   and every moment (potency) in his activity, so far as it can be
   regarded apart, is at the same time a new becoming of his peculiar
   personality.

   The idea that the divine nature took up the human into the unity of its
   person is objectionable, not only because of the impropriety of the
   expression, "divine nature," but particularly because it makes the
   personality of Christ entirely independent of the personality of the
   second person of the Trinity, with which it is nevertheless regarded as
   identical. The view is not distinct from Sabellianism, and it is unfair
   to all those views which approach Sabellianism to connect this formula
   with the doctrine of three persons in one essence. Historically a
   knowledge of the doctrine of the Trinity had no connection with that
   original impression of the personality of Christ which produced the
   first disciples faith or with their apprehension of him in thought.
   Moreover, since human nature can become a person only in the same sense
   in which persons exist in the Trinity, then the three persons in the
   divine essence must be, like human persons, separate self-existences,
   or else the human personality of Christ becomes unreal. The Docetism of
   the formula also appears in the putting of the human into a passive
   condition in the beginning of Christ's personal existence, which is yet
   not the case with the beginning of any other personal existence. But if
   he was a perfect human person, the formation of this person must have
   been an act of human nature. The contradictions inherent in this
   formula have given rise to the scholastic doctrine of the impersonality
   of the human nature of Christ previous to its union with the divine,
   and the doctrine of the supernatural generation of Christ. The former,
   while aimed at refuting the view of those who held that the Word was
   united with Christ after he had become a human personality, is guilty
   of making the human in Christ less perfect than it is in us. The latter
   is entangled in the difficulties arising from the varying
   representations in the New Testament Scriptures and falls back upon a
   doctrine of the Scriptures. Its dogmatic value could be only in
   relation to the question of hereditary sin and the implanting of the
   divine in human nature. Christ's freedom from the universal state of
   sin would not be secured by the exclusion of the male from the act of
   procreation; it would also necessitate absolute purity in all the
   woman's progenitors, and so annul the universal sinfulness. The
   doctrine is connected with asceticism.

   That part of the creedal statement .which draws a distinction between
   the divine activity in the act of union and the subsequent divine
   activities treats divine activity as temporal and so brings God into
   the sphere of antithesis. All that is meant to be gained in the above
   statement and in the doctrine that the union was personal is secured by
   our statement that the person of Christ was the product of an original
   divine creative act the separate momenta of which appeared in his human
   development. In Christ the creation of humanity was perfected.

   3. "Christ was distinct from all other men through his essential
   sinlessness and his absolute perfection." By essential is to be
   understood that which has its ground in the inner character of his
   personality, namely, the conjunction of the divine and the human in his
   person. Inasmuch as liability to temptation and error seems to be
   hereby denied, it is difficult to construe the statement in relation to
   his feelings and thoughts without annulling his sameness of nature with
   us. With this doctrine the idea of the natural immortality of Christ is
   connected; it is not, however, embodied in any of the symbols of the
   faith or grounded in any biblical passage, but it rests upon the
   opinion that death is the penalty of sin. But, in accordance with the
   view of evil already presented, we can accept this idea no farther than
   to say that for Christ death was no evil. His immortality is given him
   in his resurrection. Natural inability to die denies natural capacity
   to suffer. If this doctrine is meant to conserve the view of Christ's
   death as proceeding from his own free will, it necessitates a miracle
   on Christ's part so as to make himself mortal in order to be killed,
   and so virtually makes him a suicide. The predicate of absolute
   perfection adds nothing which may not be referred to the union of the
   divine with human nature. We may say only this, that just as the
   Redeemer could appear first only at a certain time and only from a
   certain people; so also the divine activity would not have laid hold on
   human nature to constitute a human personality by any such act as could
   involve in any way a malformation. In regard to his body all that can
   be posited is that it must have been a suitable organ of that union of
   the divine and the human.

   The events of Christ's resurrection and ascension, as well as the
   promise of his return to judgment, are to be excluded from forming a
   part of the doctrine of his person, because they do not come into
   direct relation to faith in him nor could such visible events have any
   connection with his elevation to spiritual lordship or with his
   redeeming power; but they depend upon a doctrine of the records.
   Therefore they cannot be an expression of the religious consciousness
   of redemption or represented as constitutive of his redeeming activity.
   Christ's promised continual presence and his continuous influence upon
   his disciples are not mediated by these events, for their faith in him
   was prior to any expectation of such occurrences; so also with many
   Christians since. The ascension served only contingently for the
   accomplishment of the seating at God's right hand, and this, again, is
   only an expression of the peculiar and incomparable worth of Christ;
   and the promise of the return served in like manner for the
   satisfaction of the longing to be united with Christ. But the important
   point is: Faith in Jesus has not arisen from particular statements
   about Christ or acts of his, but from the total impression of his
   person; from which follows only this, that no individual events appear
   which could prevent that faith (§§ 93-99).

   2. The Work of Christ

   It has been pointed out that the dignity of the person of Christ and
   the value of his work are religiously equivalents. The worth of his
   person consists in the absolute power of the God-consciousness in him,
   as an original possession. However, it possesses that worth for us, not
   as a mere object of our contemplation, but because this consciousness
   is self-communicating, and so passes to us. The expression and
   impartation of this God-consciousness is rendered possible by the
   original perfection of man and of the world. His work, then, is summed
   up in his self-communication, and it may be regarded either from the
   point of view of the Redeemer's activity, or from that of the
   experience (reception) of it by the redeemed. The latter will be dealt
   with in the section which treats of the manner in which communion with
   the Redeemer is expressed in the soul of the individual. The former
   will be treated here.

   A. The possession by Christ of the God-consciousness to the degree that
   it had absolute control of all his energies involves his sinless
   perfection and blessedness. By the impartation of that
   God-consciousness to men, they obtain a communion with him in that
   perfection and blessedness. That is to say, they obtain redemption and
   reconciliation.

   1) Redemption.--The personal consciousness of the individual is a
   consciousness of sin and imperfection, and all his activities bear that
   stamp; but when through our relation to Christ we have a participation
   in his consciousness, sin is regarded by us, just as it was by him in
   his sympathy with us, not as constituting our fundamental character,
   but as an alien element to be overcome. Thus Christ has taken us up
   into a participation in his activity which constitutes the state of
   grace, and henceforward all our activities are to be regarded as his
   activity in us. Or, to state it conversely, the advancement of our
   higher life is the act of the Redeemer, now become our personal act.
   This expresses the Christian consciousness- of grace. The impartation
   of his God-consciousness to us is an act of self-revelation, and our
   conscious need and acceptance thereof is effected in us by his working
   upon us. Now, if the personality of the Redeemer is owing to an
   original creative act of God, so that we may say that God was
   personally present in him and that all his activities proceeded from
   the being of God in him, then the penetration of our nature by the
   activity of the Redeemer must likewise constitute the being of Christ
   in us and form us into a new personality (cf. Gal. 2:20; Rom. 8:10;
   John 17:23; II Cor. 13:6; Rom. 6:2, 6, 11; I Pet. 2:24; Col. 3:10; Eph.
   4:22, 24). Thenceforth all impressions upon us are received
   differently, our personal self-consciousness is new, the man is a new
   man. And though the new man may still be conscious of imperfection and
   sin, these no longer pertain to his inner personality, which has become
   one with Christ; but they pertain to the outer relations of his being,
   so that he counts them alien and opposed to his nature.

   And further, since the divine creation had reference, not to
   individuals as such, but to a world and only to individuals as related,
   constituent parts of the whole, then the activity of the Redeemer must
   be world-forming, and its object human nature universally, and not
   individuals as such. Thus the whole act of Christ in redemption
   consists in the implanting of the governing God-consciousness, in the
   propagation of the creative divine activity, as a new principle of
   life, in the whole of human nature, and all the energies of human
   nature become the organs for the propagation of the God-consciousness
   in those who come into spiritual contact with the communion in which
   that consciousness is operating, i.e., with the new organism which
   Christ has formed for himself. The calling of Christ is his work of
   bringing individuals to an acceptance of this new life- fellowship with
   himself through the activity of the communion in which it now dwells;
   and his animating activity refers to his relation to the common life as
   the cause of its continuance in the church and in the individual. This
   mystical apprehension of redemption stands mid-way between two other
   modes of representing the Redeemer's work, which may be designated as
   the magical, and the empirical The first is that which attributes to
   Christ a redeeming activity independently of the founding of the
   Christian communion as the means of its propagation--some say, through
   the medium of the written word, others say, without it; and the second
   attributes all to his example and doctrine, and thus renders his
   personal appearing in the world unnecessary. But the proof of the
   superiority of our view is found only in experience.

   2) Reconciliation.--If God was in Christ in such a way that the
   God-consciousness was his whole personal consciousness, perfect
   blessedness as well as sin less perfection is involved; that is to say,
   nothing in the world, in human existence, or in his own experience,
   became an evil to him through repressing or limiting that inner life,
   but rather a means for its exercise. Therefore his self-revelation to
   men as an act of self-communication brings them into the communion of
   that blessedness. Thus his reconciling work comes to expression as the
   result of his redemption. Hence, for the believer as for Christ, evil
   is excluded. Pain, sickness, sorrow, death are no longer evils to him;
   they do not limit his religious life, but serve rather for its guidance
   and progress. Through the possession of a common life with Christ the
   connection between sin and evil ceases for him. The old man has ceased
   to be. Sin is forgiven, punishment is ended. This is the common
   consciousness of all believers.

   As in redemption, so in reconciliation, this mystical apprehension
   stands in contrast to the prevailing magi cal and empirical views, the
   former annulling the naturalness of Christ's continuous efficacy, and
   the latter its supernatural beginning and distinctive peculiarity. For
   the former makes the communication of Christ's blessedness independent
   of our reception into a life-communion with him, by making the
   forgiveness of sins an external and arbitrary result of Christ's
   sufferings, and blessedness a reward externally and arbitrarily
   conferred on account of these sufferings. On this supposition there
   would be no more assurance of blessedness within the Christian
   communion than without it. The latter, by making our blessedness
   dependent upon our wavering development in religious life, fails to
   establish a constant assurance in the heart and places Christ in the
   same relation to us as it places other men.

   While our view of redemption and reconciliation does not accord to the
   sufferings of Christ themselves a primary relation to our salvation,
   this is justifiable on the ground that the opposite view would exclude
   a perfect acceptance into life-fellowship with Christ prior to his
   death. His sufferings constitute an element of the second rank,
   immediately in relation to reconciliation and only mediately in
   relation to redemption. As concerns redemption: the perfection of
   Christ's saving activity could be manifested only in case it yielded to
   no opposition, not even to that involving his death. This perfection
   does not He in his sufferings but in his submission to them. But when
   leaving out of sight the founding of the new communion, the climax of
   his career is isolated from the rest of his life and his submission to
   sufferings for the sake of those sufferings themselves is looked upon
   as the sum of his redemptive activity, we have a magical view, a
   caricature of the doctrine of redemption. As concerns reconciliation:
   reception into the fellowship of Christ's blessedness depends on a
   longing for it on the part of those who, conscious of their unblest
   state, have received an impression of the blessedness of Christ. The
   blessedness of Christ could perfectly appear only as it proved itself
   superior to the fulness of sufferings, and so much the more as these
   sufferings resulted from the opposition of sin. Here the Redeemer's
   sympathy for the unblest enters on its highest phase. On this side,
   then, it is not his submission to sufferings but the sufferings
   themselves which become the highest sanction of faith in his
   blessedness. But surely that view is a caricature which, entirely
   overlooking the necessity for immovable blessedness in Christ and
   isolating a single element in his activity (and that too sometimes, his
   physical sufferings) as the ground of salvation, posits the reconciling
   power of his sufferings directly in this, that he freely gave up his
   own blessedness and actually, even if only temporarily, became unblest.

   Our view, on the contrary, keeps in mind that salvation for men is
   found in their reception into a life-fellowship with Christ; that such
   is nothing else than a continuation of that creative divine act whose
   manifestation in time began in the constitution of the person of
   Christ; that every intensive exaltation of this new life in its
   relation to the disappearance of the collective life of sin is itself a
   continuation of that divine activity, and that in this new life is
   attained the original destiny of humanity, beyond which for a nature
   like ours there is nothing to be conceived or to strive for.

   B. The common division of Christ's activity into the prophetic, the
   priestly, and the kingly is not arbitrary, but corresponds to the three
   factors operating in the development of the theocracy among the Jews.
   It was therefore a natural form of early Christian teaching in which a
   comparison with Judaism necessarily appeared, and in which there was
   ascribed to Christ a relation to God and men that exhausted the sphere
   of the divine economy of salvation.

   1) The prophetic activity of Christ, as of the Jewish prophets,
   appeared in doctrine, prophecy, and miracle. The source of his doctrine
   was the pure original revelation of God in him, and, so far as the
   inner production of his thought is concerned, it was independent of the
   Jewish law. The essential content of it was his self-presentation, the
   setting forth in discourse of the creative God-consciousness as it
   stamped itself on his mental faculties so as to bring men into
   communion with himself. It may be divided into three inseparable
   portions: (1) the doctrine of his person which again on its outer side
   is (2) the doctrine of his calling or of the impartation of eternal
   life in the Kingdom of God, and on its inner side is (3) the doctrine
   of his own relation to God as the Father to be revealed through him.
   His doctrine is therefore summed up in the presentation of his person
   as the original revelation of God. The sufficiency and
   inexhaustibleness of this renders Christ the climax and end of all
   prophecy.

   His prophecies, as did the Jewish (we refer not to special and
   hypothetical predictions but to their broad universal character),
   referred to the consummation of the Kingdom of God. Since this is given
   in himself, all prediction is completed and ended in him. We are
   speaking not of isolated predictions, but of the one all-embracing
   prediction of the historical unfolding of the revelation of God in
   himself, involving, of course, a foretelling of the downfall of the
   temporary, and, at the time, opposing, Jewish theocracy. Apostolic
   predictions are to be received as an exposition or an echo of Christ.
   All supposed predictions or anticipations of future events falling
   outside this field are to be subjected to natural psychic research.

   His miracles at the time of their performance possessed value for those
   who beheld in them an exhibition of his person, but in themselves no
   longer possess validity for our consciousness because of our separation
   from these occurrences in time and space. They are subjects for
   scientific investigation and pass beyond the range of dogmatics. In
   place of them we have today the knowledge of the quality, range, and
   continuance of the spiritual workings of Christ. For us all miracles
   are comprehended and therefore ended in the one great spiritual miracle
   of his appearing. The miracles pertained to his prophetic office
   because they were a setting forth of the being of God in him.

   2) The high-priestly office of Christ is not so suitable a description
   of his work because of the many contrasts between him and the Jewish
   high priest. As self-presentative, his priestly work is prophetic; and
   as supplying his people's needs, his intercession is a kingly office.
   Yet the prophetic and priestly offices may be distinguished thus: In
   his prophetic work Christ's self-presentation regards men as in
   antithesis to himself, and aims at making them receptive of union with
   him, which union is ever incomplete; his high-priestly work accepts our
   union with him as consummated in that, by a life-communion with him by
   which we participate in his perfection, his pure will to fulfil God's
   will is actively present in us, if not in performance, at least as
   motive. Though our manifestation of this oneness with him is ever
   incomplete, it is acknowledged by God as absolute and eternal, and is
   so posited in our faith. Accordingly it may be said that he represents
   us as the principle of our new life, that his righteousness is reckoned
   to us, and that we become objects of the divine good pleasure--not in
   any external sense, but as one with him in inner life. But we cannot
   ascribe to him a fulfilment of the law for us nor a fulfilment of God's
   will in our behalf in any other sense.

   Turning now to what is commonly designated as the passive obedience of
   Christ in contrast with his active obedience, which has just been
   discussed (though we must remember that these are merely distinctions
   of convenience), we may describe it as follows: Christ suffered for our
   sins, not as punishment, but by his coming into contact with human sin
   and misery. But for him nothing, not even death, was evil, and hence
   could be no punishment for sin. Similarly also for the redeemed;
   because the consciousness of guilt is removed by our union with him,
   the connection between evil and our sins, i.e., punishment, ceases for
   us. Herein, then, we see the redemptive value of Christ's sufferings:
   In his suffering unto death there is manifested to us an absolutely
   self-denying love, and thus is presented in perfect clearness the
   manner in which God was in Christ to reconcile the world to himself. In
   his sufferings perfect holiness and perfect blessedness stand before
   us. Just as the active obedience of Christ has its high-priestly worth
   pre-eminently in this, that God sees us in Christ as associates in his
   obedience; so the high-priestly worth of his passive obedience consists
   pre-eminently in this, that we see God in Christ and Christ as the most
   immediate participant in the eternal love which sent and equipped him.

   From this point of view we may correct two prevailing
   misinterpretations of his death. The first is the almost antiquated
   so-called "wounds-theology," which thinks to find the worth of Christ's
   sufferings in an emotional contemplation of them in detail. But this
   doctrine of salvation by contemplation annuls Christ's activity and
   destroys his priesthood. The second of these misinterpretations is that
   view which understands the doctrine that Christ's death removes our
   punishment, in the sense that he bore in his death as the sum of all
   evils that measure of punishment demanded by the sins of the human race
   and thereby satisfied the divine righteousness. But apart from the
   implication that the divine nature must have participated in the
   sufferings of Christ, the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction wrongly
   makes God the arbitrary author of Christ's sufferings, removes
   punishment from its natural connection with the morally bad, and so
   ignores the unity of nature. So far as Christ's work is
   satisfying--i.e., in that through the one entire act of his life, he
   became the eternally inexhaustible source of all life that is spiritual
   and blessed--in that respect it is not vicarious; because we are still
   under the necessity of exhibiting that same activity of life in
   communion with him. And in the respect in which he is our
   representative--i.e., in his feeling the sinfulness of others badness
   just in that respect he did not offer satisfaction, because those not
   yet in communion with him must feel their own unblessedness before they
   can enter into his communion, and because they will afterward share his
   sympathy for others. But he is our satisfying representative in that he
   presents human nature in perfection by the manifestation of his
   archetypal worth in his redemptive activity, so that God regards in him
   the totality of believers and sees in his free devotion to death such a
   perfection of redeeming power as is sufficient to bring the whole race
   within his communion.

   Finally, Christ's intercession refers, not to single petitions for
   individual men, but to his relation to the totality of the redeemed in
   such a way that in our prayers to God his co-operation appears in the
   purified and perfect God-consciousness of the Christian communion. In
   this sense it is only through him that our prayers are well-pleasing to
   God and efficacious.

   Thus Christ is the climax of all priesthood, because he exhausts its
   significance, and he is the end of all priesthood because he is the
   perfect mediator between God and the human race for all time. At the
   same time, his priesthood has passed over to the communion of believers
   in that his whole redeeming activity is exhibited in them. They stand
   toward the rest of humanity in a similar relation to that of the Jewish
   priesthood toward the people. This annuls all special priesthood and
   the meritoriousness of all individual actions or sufferings.

   3) The kingly office of Christ relates to his living union with
   believers in a communion; it refers not to a special relation to
   individuals but only to them as members of his community. Since the
   communion arises out of the impartation of his consciousness, he is the
   continuous and inexhaustible source of supply for all its needs; the
   kingdom of God begins, subsists, and is perfected in his person. He is
   the animating principle of that communion, the power that draws men
   into it, the source of all legislation in it, and hence absolutely and
   exclusively lord over it. His personal consciousness produces the laws
   of its life, and these are accordingly eternal; all legislation
   proceeding from another source is alien to his kingdom.

   The question may be propounded: How does this kingdom stand related to
   the universal divine government? This question proceeds on theoretical
   grounds and produces only a theoretical difficulty. Faith is directed
   to Christ simply as source of grace and of the spiritual power and
   glory which flow from it, and when anything is said of his possession
   of a power over the natural world, as if he shared the lordship over it
   with God (which is contradicted by his prayers to God), this leads us
   beyond the sphere of faith. In the sphere in which Christ's power is
   exercised it is of course infinite, but that sphere is the communion
   founded by him, and therefore he has power over the world only in the
   sense that through the communion of believers--by their presentation of
   his person in word and deed--his redeeming activity is exerted upon men
   in drawing them to himself.

   Accordingly also Christ is the climax and end of all spiritual
   kingship. All other sorts of spiritual authority, as that of the
   teacher over his scholars, the exemplar over his imitators, the
   legislator over his subjects, are only partial and belong to a lower
   and subordinate grade. In this respect he stands contrasted with all
   other founders of religions. All other kinds of kingship end in his
   because they are only an imitation of his. This involves a separation
   of his kingdom from all political and civil powers, which effectuate
   their decrees through the use of material force. Christianity is
   neither a political religion nor a religious state or theocracy. By the
   purely spiritual authority of his God-consciousness he puts an end to
   both. The farther his reign is extended and established the more
   clearly will church and state be separated and therefore the more
   harmoniously will they co-exist.

   NOTE.--Christ's humiliation and exaltation: These expressions must be
   excluded from a doctrinal statement of Christ's person and work, since
   the conditions so designated have no bearing on his person in itself or
   his work in itself, or the relation of his person to his work. The
   supposition of an earlier condition of Christ's which was higher than
   his earthly, or of a later higher condition, is inconsistent with the
   unity of his person and militates against faith in his person as he was
   manifested on earth. It implies also impossible changes in the divine
   nature, as that to the absolutely extreme and eternal, and, there fore,
   self-identical, a humiliation may be ascribed; or self-contradictory
   conceptions of the relations of the divine and human in him, as that
   the attributes of one or another are alternately subject to limitation
   or quiescence. It is contradicted by Christ's own statements concerning
   his own relations to the Father while on earth, which do not regard his
   sitting at God's right hand as an exaltation (cf. John 1:51; 4:34;
   5:17, 20 ff.; 6:57; 8:29; 10:30, 36). The idea has arisen from Phil.
   2:6-9, a rhetorical passage of an ascetical character, which has been
   interpreted didactically. The whole doctrine destroys the unity of
   Christ's person and the reality of his earthly life, and is fatal to
   faith in his redemption (§§ 100-105).

  SECOND DIVISION: THE MANNER IN WHICH COMMUNION WITH THE PERFECTION AND
  BLESSEDNESS OF THE REDEEMER IS EXPRESSED IN THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL (§§ 106-12)

   The personal self-consciousness, properly under stood, is a
   race-consciousness, from which the consciousness of sin is inseparable.
   The individual identifies himself with a collective life which is
   sinful, and that collective sinful life is expressed in the soul of the
   individual as personal guilt and ill-desert. The experience of a
   repression of the God-consciousness is connected with external events
   in such a way. that they become evils, i.e., punishment of our sins,
   which is the experience of unblessedness. In this state of the
   individual previous to his entering into a life-communion with Christ
   the God-consciousness is not constant and dominant, but appears only in
   intermittent flashes.

   But by the working of Christ, through the word and the activities of
   the communion which has its life-source in him, this relation of the
   individual states and activities to the God-consciousness is changed,
   for these are now continuously controlled by it as the governing force
   of the personal life. Or, as otherwise stated, the self-consciousness
   of the individual is fundamentally altered because it is identified
   with a new collective life which originates in the God-consciousness of
   Christ. But the man, though a new personality, is still, as regards the
   unity of his psychical life, the same. The new state is grafted on the
   old, as it were. The change forms a turning-point from which onward the
   new life is in a condition of becoming. This turning-point is
   regeneration, and the progressive development of the life there from is
   sanctification.

   These terms have a reference to the race. The entrance of Christ into
   the sphere of human existence was potentially a new creation of the
   entire race. The beginning; of that new creation of the race is its
   regeneration; the gradual extension of that creative act throughout all
   the members of the race is its sanctification. The relation of the
   person of Christ to the rest of humanity is in analogy to the relation
   between the divine in him and his human nature; only that in the latter
   case at the very first a pure personality arose and the extension of
   the God-consciousness in his human nature was uninterrupted, whereas in
   the former case, on account of the identity of the subject in the old
   and the new states, elements from the old state of sinfulness interfere
   with the regularity of the development. Now, the regeneration of the
   race actually appears only in the regeneration of the individuals; and
   since the communion of believers consists of the totality of the
   sanctified energies of all who have been received into a fellowship of
   life with Christ, so also the sanctification of the individual involves
   in itself the operation of all those forces by which the communion is
   formed, held together, and extended.

   1. Regeneration

   Regeneration may be regarded in two ways: (1) Reception into communion
   with Christ may be regarded as a settled permanent relation of man to
   God; formerly his relation to the divine holiness and righteousness
   appeared in the consciousness of guilt and desert of punishment, but
   with entrance into communion with Christ that disappears. (2) Reception
   into this communion may be regarded as a change in the form of life: in
   all the energies of life the will was formerly controlled by
   sensuousness and those impulses which sprang from the God-consciousness
   only coursed through the life without determining it, but now the
   relation is reversed. That is, in the first of these aspects
   regeneration is justification; in the second it is conversion. These
   are inseparably held together in the experience of fellowship, a
   fellowship which involves both a participation in Christ's perfection
   and a participation in his blessedness.

   1) Conversion.--In the beginning of the new life of communion with
   Christ there are for the individual experience two elements--repentance
   and faith. Both are the outcome in the individual of Christ's
   self-presenting (prophetic), self-communicating (kingly) activity as
   exercised in that communion with which he comes into contact, by word
   and deed. Repentance is related to the past life in its totality (and
   not to separate acts merely, as it would be if produced through the
   law), and manifests itself in the form of regret for the sinfulness of
   the past and a change of mind as to the aim and purpose of life. It is
   a transition from activity in the old life to a subjection to the
   energy of the new; accordingly it implies faith. Faith is an act
   receptive of the Redeemer as presented in the Christian communion. It
   is no mere static condition, for human life is essentially active, and
   Christian piety is teleological. Even in its receptivity of the divine
   grace human nature is active. And if we go back from effectual divine
   grace which actually brings a man into communion with Christ, to that
   prevenient grace which shows itself, according to the laws of our
   nature, in the indistinct, often fitful, longing for redemption, we
   shall find that this is that original divine impartation which was
   bestowed at the creation of the race and which constitutes human
   nature, and that this impartation itself was bestowed in relation to
   the full redemptive activity of Christ which was yet to appear, so that
   a man's co-operation in his own conversion is not independent of grace.
   Here appears the parallel between the divine redemption of the race as
   it is actualized in the individuals comprising the race, and that
   divine creative act which consisted in the formation of Christ's person
   and the permeating of his being with the God-consciousness.

   The contention of many teachers both in the English and in the German
   church that children born in the bosom of the Christian church are to
   be received as children into its fellowship because they are already
   members of the body of Christ and have already been regenerated in
   their baptism, is to be rejected. For in all, whether born in the
   church or out of it, those forces which cause the rise of sin are at
   work and in all there is the tendency to degrade the divine to the
   sensuous. Infant baptism does not affect this power of sin in them, so
   that all are equally in need of conversion. The only actual distinction
   is that those who are born in the church stand in a natural and ordered
   connection with the operations of divine grace and are therefore
   already subjects of the gospel call, while the others stand in a
   contingent relation to that call. Indeed, our creeds connect only the
   original baptism of adults and those who ask for it with the new birth
   and extend it to infant baptism only, as it were, by permission. They
   mean to say no more than Calvin when he said that "the seeds of
   repentance and faith" were in these children. To bind together the
   sacrament of baptism and the new birth is to fall into a view of them
   as magical. Faith and conversion must ever and everywhere arise in the
   same way as with the first disciples, namely, through the whole
   prophetic activity of Christ; only that now the self-presentation of
   Christ is mediated through those who preach him, who are the organs of
   his activity.

   But to say, that to some Christ is immediately and inwardly revealed
   without the word, is to make the redemption flow from the bare idea of
   the Redeemer and renders the actual appearing of Christ unnecessary.
   And to leave the operations of divine grace in conversion without
   actual historical connection with the personal efficacious work of
   Christ is to abandon all certainty of the identity of this inner Christ
   with the historical. If now, on the contrary, the true view is that all
   that operation upon the mind from the first impression of the preaching
   of Christ up to its establishment in converting faith is to be ascribed
   to the activity of Christ, then all these operations of divine grace
   are supernatural; but since they are in |a natural historical
   connection with the personal life of Jesus and continue it historically
   they are also natural.

   2) Justification.--Justification implies forgiveness of sins and
   acknowledgment of sonship with God, and it depends upon faith in the
   Redeemer, as has just been shown. The divine act of justification is
   not to be sundered from the working of Christ in conversion.
   Justification for the self-consciousness which rests in contemplation
   is the same as is conversion for the consciousness which passes over
   into stimulus of the will. Corresponding with the two sides of
   conversion, repentance finds its issue in the forgiveness of sins, just
   as faith becomes for thought the consciousness of sonship with God as
   that which is the same as the consciousness of fellowship with Christ.
   Not that forgiveness precedes faith, but that it declares the end of
   the old state just as does repentance, and sonship with God expresses
   the character of the new state just as does faith. Both depend on the
   whole activity of Christ just as in the case of conversion, but
   immediately and in themselves they denote only that relation of man to
   God which supervenes upon the consciousness of guilt and desert of
   punishment.

   Justification and conversion are synchronous. The converted man is a
   new man. For in this new life-fellowship with Christ sin is no longer
   active, but it is an afterworking or reaction of the old man. He no
   longer appropriates it to himself but reacts against it as an alien
   force, and accordingly the consciousness of guilt is removed. In him
   the consciousness of sin always becomes, on account of faith, the
   consciousness of forgiveness of sins.

   But justification is not an isolated act or pronouncement dependent
   upon some empirical activity or event, for this is to make the divine
   activity temporal and dependent in its nature, which would destroy the
   feeling of absolute dependence on God. Rather, there is one eternal and
   universal decree to justify men for Christ's sake. This decree, again,
   is one with the decree to send Christ; were it not so the sending of
   Christ might be without effect. And the decree to send Christ is one
   with that for the creation of the human race so far as human nature is
   first perfected in Christ. And since in God thought and will, will and
   deed are inseparable, therefore all these constitute one divine act for
   the alteration of our relation to God. The manifestation in time of the
   divine act takes its beginning in the incarnation of Christ, from which
   the total new creation of mankind proceeds, and it continues in the
   union of individual men with Christ. We have therefore to assume only
   one divine act of justification gradually realizing itself in time (§§
   106-9).

   2. Sanctification

   The idea of holiness in men has been brought over into the New
   Testament from the Old, where it is apprehended as an attribute of God.
   But for Christians, not holiness, but sanctification, i.e., movement
   toward holiness, is the appropriate term because of their increasing
   separation from the pre-regenerate state and their gradual approach to
   that of Christ. The state of sanctification is, accordingly, not to be
   compared with the state in which the man was governed by sin but with
   that state in which he came under the power of prevenient grace. That
   grace affected him from without by stimulating thoughts and feelings
   which tend toward repentance and faith and also by prompting to actions
   which by repetition become habits. Such actions while they do not
   spring from individual regeneration are to be viewed as specifically
   the actions of the Christian collective life which exercises a power
   over the individuals who come within the sphere of its operations, like
   that of native citizens over the foreigners resident among them. The
   state of regeneration is to be distinguished from the new birth, not by
   the number of individual actions or a whole series of them, but by
   this, that the will to be no longer in that former sin-producing
   collective life has become a power of repulsion of sin, which power is
   itself an outflow from the submission to Christ's operation and becomes
   established as a steady willingness to be controlled by Christ. In the
   new collective life within which the regenerate man has fellowship with
   Christ, his natural powers are taken up and appropriated by Christ's
   activity, whereas formerly they were exercised entirely within the
   sinful collective life. The regenerate man's life possesses therefore
   an affinity to Christ's in respect to both sides of it, his sinless
   perfection and his blessedness. Since the activities of the regenerate
   are now exercised within this new collective life, their energies are
   exerted reciprocally, producing in each member of this new body a
   gradual religious development.

   The development must be gradual. For since the God-consciousness has
   come into a relation of control over the energies of human life only
   through a direct communication, after being regularly repressed by the
   sin-consciousness, it must be regarded as sustaining continually the
   opposition of this lower principle now gradually disappearing. Though
   this development is gradual, it is not perfectly regular for
   experience, because it occurs in the midst of a conflict, and there are
   times when the power of sin is exhibited in actions which obscure for
   the time the presence of the new spiritual power, just as in the former
   condition of life there occurred at times actions proceeding from the
   prevenient grace of God which obscured for a little while the presence
   of sin. In this respect Christ's development onward from his birth and
   the development of the regenerate are not strictly parallel. Yet the
   occasional recurrence of the consciousness of sin does not annul the
   connection with Christ so as to negative regeneration as a divine act
   of union with human nature, or sanctification as the state of that
   union.

   To express the same in another manner: In the activities of the
   regenerate there are two elements, the permanent and the variable. The
   permanent element is that ever self-renewing will (power) of the
   kingdom of God which wrought in Christ, and this is that participation
   in the sinless perfection and blessedness of Christ already spoken of;
   for all the power of good is within the kingdom of God and all the
   power of sin lies without it. The variable element appears in the
   isolated acts of sin which burst out in the life of the regenerate
   producing pain and unhappiness.

   The sins of the regenerate are not destructive of the state of grace
   because such never occur without the forth-putting on their part of
   effort (though in sufficient) against sin; likewise the good deeds of
   the regenerate are never unopposed by sinful tendencies or untainted
   with sin. The conflict with sin exists always; the difference in the
   character of the acts in the two cases is one of degree. The sinful
   deed proceeds from the old sinful collective life from which he has
   been personally separated and consequently no new form of sin arises in
   the regenerate man, and, so soon as he acknowledges the act as his own
   (i.e., repents), with the return of his consciousness of identification
   with the new collective life the consciousness of forgiveness arises.
   Hence we may say the sins of the regenerate are always accompanied by
   forgiveness.

   The good deeds of the regenerate are objects of the divine good
   pleasure, not as isolated empirical deeds of the individual concerned,
   for no single act is unmixed with sin, but in so far as they are the
   product of the new collective life with which he now identifies
   himself. That is to say, the good deeds of the regenerate are the
   product of their union with Christ, and the merit they possess is
   Christ's, so that, strictly speaking, it is only the person and that
   too only as God sees him in Christ--that is the object of the divine
   good pleasure, and his works only for the sake of the person.
   Consequently the regenerate claim no personal reward (§§ 110-12).

   Section 2. The Nature of the World in Relation to Redemption. Doctrine
   of the Church (§§ 113-63)

   The redemptive energy of Christ originally lay simply in himself. In
   the exercise of it he created a new spiritual organism through which it
   is historically propagated in the world. All the redemptive energy of
   Christ is accordingly comprehended within this new body, which is the
   communion of believers in him. Now, the consciousness of redemption
   involves a consciousness of participation in the communion of the
   regenerate, for this communion has not first to be established by an
   act of the regenerate, but in regeneration they already find themselves
   within it, and they trace the workings of grace through which they
   become participators in the redemption, to its activity.

   This activity was exerted upon them prior to their consciousness of
   redemption, their felt need of redemption being an effect of it.
   Consequently, there is no absolute leap out of one sphere into the
   other, else conversion would be an unhistorical occurrence, effected by
   some incomprehensible influence operating outside the universe of
   causes and effects. But just as there already existed prior to the
   advent of Christ, through the work of prevenient grace, a circle of
   individuals prepared to receive the redemption as it was to be
   ministered by the personal work of Christ himself, so now also there is
   in the world an outer circle of individuals upon whom the activity of
   the inner circle which consists of the communion of believers is
   exerted; and since in regeneration there is a consciousness of being
   already within that communion outside of which no redeeming activity is
   exerted, these people must have been already before regeneration within
   the outer circle of that communion. The world, then, as the field in
   which the church's work is to be done, stands in an antithetical
   relation to the church, but on the other hand is destined to pass over
   into it. Here we find the explanation of the Christian's conscious
   sympathetic relation to all things human. For while the world,
   notwithstanding its original perfection, is for men, apart from the
   redemption, the locus of sin and evil, through the advent of Christ a
   new element has entered into it, namely, Christ's own self-imparting
   perfection and blessedness. Through him, then, the world becomes to us
   the locus of perfection and blessing.

   We perceive, then, that the law of self-organization, as it appears in
   the naturalization of the super natural in Christ, finds its parallel
   in the communion founded by him. For the incarnation of Christ in
   relation to human nature in general corresponds to the regeneration of
   the individual in relation to the whole nature of the individual; so
   also to sanctification, as the progressive appropriation by Christ of
   individual functions, corresponds the work of the Christian communion
   as an organic body which progressively organizes itself and
   appropriates to itself the mass (i.e., the world) which lies over
   against it. Three stages in this process may be defined: (1) the origin
   of the church, or the manner in which the church is builded out of the
   world; (2) the present existence of the church in antithesis to the
   world; (3) the removal of this antithesis in the perfection of the
   church. Though the second is alone present immediately to experience,
   and therefore constitutes the kernel of this whole section, it will be
   better to discuss these stages in the historical order.

  FIRST DIVISION: THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH (§§ 115-25)

   The character common to all the regenerate is the governing will of the
   kingdom of God. That will is exerted in two forms, (1) in gaining other
   individuals and receiving them into the kingdom, (2) in the process of
   perfecting the work of the kingdom in ourselves and the other members
   by mutual and complementary activity. But this spatial extension of the
   kingdom and this co-operative and mutual influence are subject to those
   circumstances of time and place in which the members of the kingdom
   find themselves placed. Accordingly, on the one hand, the origin of the
   church must be viewed in its relation to the divine world-government,
   because the individuals composing the church are called out of the
   world; and on the other hand, in relation to the moving, unifying
   principle which constitutes all the members of the church one moral
   person. These will be treated under the titles Election, and
   Communication of the Holy Spirit.

   1. Election

   The consciousness of redemption in Christ is so related to the
   consciousness of unity with the race, that the incarnation of Christ is
   viewed as potentially the regeneration of the human race. Hence the
   desire to communicate the gospel to the world. The actual spread of the
   gospel is gradual--from the individual to the mass, from nation to
   nation, and from generation to generation--being subject to these
   conditions which determine all human activity. That is to say,
   participation in redemption is subjected to the laws of the divine
   world-government. This must be true in reference even to the mysterious
   fact of the rejection of the gospel by some and its acceptance by
   others. Just as in Christ the supernatural becomes natural, so the
   church as the possessor of that super natural which was in Christ
   appears in its course in the world as a natural historical phenomenon.

   The final ground of the divine government of the world is the divine
   good-pleasure, and in the last analysis it is to this we must refer the
   facts of the gospel's earlier and later reception in different places,
   its acceptance and rejection by different individuals while living, and
   its failure to reach the ears of others before they die. We have,
   therefore, to face the problem of defining this divine will with
   clearness and without inner contradiction. Now, it is not an offense to
   Christian sympathy that some are received earlier than others into the
   communion of redemption, nor is it ever supposed that the sum of final
   blessedness is thereby lessened. It is as vain to hold the opposite
   view, that it would have been better if the regeneration of the
   individual had occurred earlier, as to contend that it would have been
   better for the totality of mankind if Christ had come before he did, or
   to lament the fact that the world was not created earlier. But when it
   is supposed that those who die without participation in the redemption
   are forever excluded from it, there is created, on the contrary, a
   discord in Christian sympathy with the race. Not only is it a violation
   of the unity of the race, but it imparts arbitrariness and
   particularism into the divine will. To reply by saying that these
   opposite destinies are ordained for the sake of manifesting in the one
   case the divine mercy and in the other case the divine righteousness is
   to overlook the truth that the divine righteousness is adequately
   exhibited in the reward given to Christ and the punishment of men as
   long as they adhere to the old life of sin, And further, to separate in
   this manner the divine attributes is to describe God as an unlimited
   being with limited attributes and to overlook the mutual inclusiveness
   of all his attributes. The antithesis between the church and the world
   must be regarded, therefore, not as final, but as temporary; not as
   absolute, but as relative, and as destined to disappear by the ultimate
   absorption of all into the church. The gradual progress of
   sanctification in the individual and the gradual transition of those
   who are in the outer circle of the workings of grace into the inner
   circle are analogous. This is simply the natural form which the divine
   activity necessarily assumes in its historical manifestation, the
   inevitable condition of all temporal effectiveness of the word that
   "became flesh."

   1. The doctrine of fore-ordination is a consequence. The
   self-consciousness of the regenerate and the feeling of absolute
   dependence are one, since our activity in the kingdom of God is
   referred by consciousness to the sending of Christ and is recognized as
   dependent on our place in human relations; so that the order in which
   the redemption is actualized in each man is one with the carrying out
   of the divine world-order in relation to him. Thus the time and manner
   of the individual's entrance into the communion of Christ are only a
   result of the determination of the manifestation of the justifying
   divine activity by the universal order of the world, and they are a
   part of the same. Hence the kingdom of grace, or the kingdom of the
   Son, is absolutely one with the kingdom of the Omniscient Omnipotent
   One, or of the Father; and to say that the state of those to whom grace
   has been given is a work of that divine grace which was in Christ is
   one and the same thing as to say that it is a result of the divine
   foreordination.

   And further, since the Christian consciousness recognizes only one
   foreordination--namely, that to participation in the blessedness of
   Christ--the unity of the race-consciousness and the universality of the
   world-order can be in harmony with the Christian consciousness of
   redemption only by the acknowledgment of the foreordination of all
   mankind to an ultimate reception into the kingdom of grace.

   2. From the above doctrine of election may be deduced also the doctrine
   of the determining grounds of election.

   Of free existences, why are some chosen and others not? The peculiar
   condition of each individual in the human race is due to his place in
   the development of the divine world-government. If, then, we seek the
   determining grounds of the election of an individual absolutely in the
   beginning of all things, we shall find these in the divine
   good-pleasure; but if we seek the grounds of election in the final
   results attained in the end, we posit the divine foreknowledge. Divine
   good-pleasure and divine foreknowledge are one and the same principle
   viewed from opposite standpoints.

   If, therefore, regeneration be viewed as the actualization of the union
   of the divine and human nature, and the justifying divine grace as the
   temporal and individual continuation of that universal act of union
   which began in the incarnation of Christ, then the rule of the divine
   procedure must be the same in both cases. That is, the time and place
   which was chosen must have been absolutely the best and the results
   must have reached the maximum of efficiency. That moment in the life of
   the individual must have been the time when he would exercise faith.
   From this point of view therefore the election of the individual is
   grounded in his foreseen faith. But this again is itself determined by
   the divine causality operating in the world's course, which causality
   rests in the divine good-pleasure, which is concerned with no
   individual in and for himself, but with the world-whole.

   NOTE.--But if while we trace the origin of the Christian church to the
   divine good-pleasure, we admit that a part of the human race is forever
   lost, the contemplation of that good-pleasure affects our
   race-consciousness and our personal consciousness in opposite ways, one
   painfully and the other pleasurably, and hence admits of no pure
   impartation of the blessedness of Christ to us. It becomes necessary
   therefore that we conceive the divine foreordination to salvation as
   embracing ultimately the whole human race (§§ 117-20).

   2. The Communication of the Spirit

   All those who are in the state of sanctification are conscious of
   participation in the perfection and blessedness of Christ, which is
   dependent on the indwelling of God in him. This possession of the
   perfection and blessedness that were in Christ belongs to the believer
   in the form of that absolutely constant will of the kingdom of God as
   the inner impulse of life. It is not as isolated individuals standing
   in independent personal relation to Christ that Christians are
   conscious of this possession, but only in their relation to the
   Christian communion as members of it. This spirit, which constitutes
   the will of the kingdom of God, is the common spirit of the Christian
   communion. It is this spirit that furnishes the life-unity of the
   communion, and makes the members of the communion a moral person. The
   impulse felt by all the members of the communion to assemble together,
   to combine in an effort for the extension of the kingdom among those
   who are not yet consciously within it, and to effect that mutual
   working which produces the harmonious development of all their various,
   but now unified, energies, is just the expression of the life of that
   one spirit dwelling in them all. This is the indwelling of the divine
   in the church, conditioned by the indwelling of the divine in Christ.

   This common spirit of all the sanctified is thus the Spirit of Christ,
   which is the Spirit of God, and the bestowal of that Spirit by Christ
   is what is meant by the Communication of the Holy Spirit. The Holy
   Spirit is therefore just the common spirit of all those who are
   sanctified, who together form one moral person, having the one aim,
   common to all, of furthering the whole, and possessing peculiar love to
   one another. If it be objected that our use of the term does not
   coincide with common usage, we may reply that it is in harmony with the
   New Testament where the Holy Spirit is not regarded as our individual
   enduement apart from his connection with the totality of believers, or
   as a peculiar quality of separate personalities, but as the unitary
   possession of them all (cf. John 16:7 ff.; Acts 1:4, 5; John 20:22, 23;
   Acts 2:4; I Cor. 12:4; Rom. 8:9; Acts 10:47; 19:2; 2:38). On this point
   the expression of the Christian consciousness may be treated as
   twofold. First, in analogy with that unity which constitutes a nation,
   where the common and self-same national character inheres in each
   citizen but is modified by his original disposition, the Christian
   church is one through this common spirit, but its activity in each
   individual is conditioned by the state in which the new birth found
   him. Second, this common spirit is one because in all it is from one
   and the same source, namely, Christ, since the communication of it
   coincides with the rise of faith in him and the recognition of that
   faith in others.

   It may be said further in objection: If, as has been stated, all
   peoples are destined to pass over into the Christian communion by
   virtue of the unity of the race, then, since there cannot be two
   life-unities for one and the same whole, the common spirit of the
   Christian church is simply the common spirit of the human race. The
   answer is: It is just in the possession and communication of the Holy
   Spirit that the unity of the members of the human family--now, alas!
   torn asunder by mutual jealousies and animosities--becomes an
   accomplished fact. Through Christ as Founder there is realized a union
   which by faith and in love embraces all men, so that the
   race-consciousness and the God-consciousness become one and
   inseparable. But on this very account we can say that the Holy. Spirit
   is no natural principle developing itself in man outside of Christ.

   The believer is conscious of possessing this spirit with the act of
   faith in Christ, which arises through that representation of Christ
   which is given in the preaching of him. But this gift is no longer
   received direct from Christ personally, as was the case with his first
   disciples. Up to the time of Christ's separation from them they were
   only in the state of a developing receptivity in relation to his
   spirit. The transition from receptivity to self-activity took place for
   them in the days of the resurrection. Up to the time of Christ's
   separation from them, their relation to him was that of a household to
   its head or of a school to its teacher--upon the death of the leader
   dissolution was the result. But with the separation of Christ from his
   disciples they became conscious of their possession of his Spirit as
   their common spirit; they ceased to be a school and became a church;
   they ceased to be merely receptive of his teachings and nature, and
   became spontaneous and communicative in relation thereto. The Holy
   Spirit was thus communicated to them as their common possession, and
   was thenceforth communicated by them to those who were in the stage of
   preparatory grace in which they themselves had once been. Whenever
   these also, apprehending Christ by faith, are transformed from a merely
   receptive to an active condition in their place within this new
   collective life founded by Christ, it may he said that they have
   received the Holy Spirit.

   Consequently, the life and activity of the church proceeds
   historically--not in some secret, magical, or mysterious way--from
   Christ. His incarnation was the naturalization of the supernatural, the
   union of the divine with human nature. So the communication of the Holy
   Spirit constitutes the union of the Divine Being with human nature in
   the form of a common spirit animating the collective life of believers
   which Christ founded. The operations of the Holy Spirit are not to be
   found in something outside the Christian church or in some superhuman
   nature or in some divine power affecting human nature from without; but
   the Holy Spirit is an actual spiritual force in the souls of believers
   and must be conceived of as united with the human nature in them, so as
   to become one with it. Each believer participates in this common
   spirit, not in his personal self-consciousness regarded by itself
   alone, but only in so far as he is conscious of his existence in this
   whole, personal peculiarities being no element in this common
   consciousness. If then we regard the union of the divine with Christ's
   human personality as an endowment of human nature in its collective
   capacity, participation in the Holy Spirit and fellowship of life with
   Christ are one and the same, reversely contemplated. The Christian
   church animated by the Holy Spirit is in its purity and perfection the
   perfect image of the Redeemer, and every regenerated individual is a
   complementary constituent part of this communion, That is to say that
   in the Christian church as a collective life, as a moral person, the
   modes of apprehension and of action are the same as those of the
   Redeemer because the same human powers are united with the same divine
   principle. This image, however, appears in its perfection only when we
   view the human race (with which the church is destined to be identical)
   apart from sin, and is to be progressively realized. Accordingly, if we
   contemplate the church's gradual realization of its ideal according to
   the divine order of its extension and development in the world, we
   shall see that in its entirety it is at every instant at v the highest
   stage of perfection possible to it and carries in itself the ground of
   a highest perfection yet to be attained. This, however, is
   apprehensible only to faith and is not demonstrable by experience (§§
   121-25).

  SECOND DIVISION: THE CHURCH IN ITS COEXISTENCE WITH THE WORLD (§§ 126-59)

   The church is the creation by the Spirit of Christ, out of individuals
   in the world, of a communion whose common spirit is the same Holy
   Spirit. Its state of existence in the world must, then, be in analogy
   with that of the person of Christ. In him the supernatural, the divine,
   as the abiding self-identical element of his person, united to itself
   the natural, the human, which was the variable element of his person.
   So also in its common spirit the church possesses an ever
   self-identical element, which makes its appearance in a variable
   element, the world. The church and the world are not to be described as
   two mutually exclusive entities, as if it sufficed to say that just as
   the world is not the church, so the church is not the world. Such a
   view tends to separation and legal righteousness. A better and more
   adequate statement would be the following: The world is excluded from
   participation in the church because in itself it is mere nullity and
   negation--not a self-contained unity, but a manifold of elements
   temporarily, oppositely, and contingently related. That alone which is
   permanent in the world is the feeling of the need of help which itself
   is a product of the Holy Spirit's self-exertion upon the world and is
   the basis of the church's title to the world.

   Since the aim of the church is ever the same, namely, the realization
   within itself of the image of Christ, the mode of the existence of the
   divine in the human must remain the same as it was in him. The variable
   element in the church, as in Christ, is due to the human nature in and
   through which the Holy Spirit works. Now, human nature as undetermined
   by the Holy Spirit is the world, and therefore all that is variable in
   the church is due, not to its common spirit, but to the world, and the
   manner of the Spirit's work among men depends on peculiarities of
   temperament and circumstances of individuals and, on a larger scale, of
   nations.

   All in the church which is not wrought by the Holy Spirit is of the
   world and constitutes its attack upon the church. To this pertain the
   sins of the regenerate and all error and perversion, which are destined
   to disappear from the church and yet re-enter into it with each new
   convert. The differences within a Christian society arise from the same
   causes.

   All this discussion amounts to saying that Christianity is a power
   developing itself historically in the world. A treatment of it as such
   involves a discussion of its permanent, self-identical elements and its
   variable elements (§ 126).

   1. The Essential and Permanent Features of the Church (§§ 127-47)

   If our Christianity is to be the same as that of the first disciples,
   it must arise like theirs from the influence of Christ. But since his
   influence is no longer an immediate, personal one, we are in need of a
   demonstration of the identity of our Christianity with that which
   appears in their presentation of the personality of Christ. For this we
   are dependent on the Scriptures of the New Testament. They show that
   from the influence of Christ himself and from his disciples testimony
   about him there actually proceeded the church-forming activity promised
   by him. They also complement the immediate utterances of Christ,
   because we can refer the ordinances and acts of his first disciples to
   the teachings and expressed will of Christ as their source. They are
   thus the work of the Spirit of Christ which is the common spirit of the
   church. With the loss of the original oral testimony the Scriptures
   remain the only original authority. But they would become a dead
   inheritance, did we possess these only and were the ever self-renewing
   activity of the church wanting. Thus the living testimony of the church
   and the Scriptures are the two elements indispensable for the
   historical identity and the truth of faith. Moreover, since the
   immediate personal influence of Christ is wanting, the institution and
   renewal of life-fellowship with Christ must issue from the church and
   be referred to its acts--that is, such acts as can be referred to
   Christ himself. For, on the one hand, the church is his organism and
   all her essential activities are the image of Christ's activities, and,
   on the other hand, all that is effected by them is the progressive
   actualization of redemption in the world, and therefore her activities
   are just the continuation of the activities of Christ.

   It is true that there are many Christian churches mutually opposed in
   varying degrees. Their differences concern not the reality of a common
   life-fellowship with Christ, but the relations between the outer forms
   which represent it and the inner fellowship implied in them. The most
   important question as to all these differences is, whether they are
   grounded in these spatial and temporal differences which appear in the
   spiritual nature of men and are therefore unavoidable, or whether they
   are grounded in the world's attack upon the church and are therefore
   defects. But amid all the divisions of the Christian communion its
   universal self-identity appears in a triple manner: the testimony of
   Christ, the formation and preservation of life-fellowship with Christ,
   and the reciprocal relation of influence between the individual and the
   whole. The first of these is exhibited in the Scriptures and the
   ministry of the Divine Word, and these, as constituting the church's
   immediate presentation of Christ, are an image of his prophetic
   activity. The second is furnished in baptism and the Supper, and these
   represent his high-priestly activity. The third appears in the office
   of the keys and in prayer in the name of Jesus, and these represent
   Christ's kingly activity (§ 127).

   1. Holy Scripture.--The Scripture of the New Testament is a work of the
   Holy Spirit as the common spirit of the church, and forms only a
   particular instance of the universal testimony of the church in its
   presentation of the image of Christ to men. The written word possesses,
   however, a superiority over the original word which was merely spoken,
   not in its higher authoritativeness, but in that it furnished a means
   of testing our present testimony of Christ by that which was originally
   given. Yet this word is to be viewed as no dead possession (legal
   conception), but as an ever self-renewing activity of the church in its
   work of awakening faith in Christ by its presentation of him to the
   world.

   It is faith in Christ which gives rise to reverence for the Scriptures,
   and not the converse. For, if faith in Christ is to be made to repose
   on the authority of the Scriptures, then that authority itself can be
   established only by an appeal to the reason common to all men. That is
   to say, faith is made dependent on a scientific demonstration of the
   authenticity, accuracy, and truth of the Scriptures, and those who are
   in capable of making the necessary investigation are dependent on
   external authority. Faith is subordinated and proportioned to
   intelligence or ability. Believers are graded in two classes as in the
   Romish church. Moreover, on these terms a man might become a Christian
   without a felt need of redemption--without repentance and a change of
   mind. Such a faith could never issue in a life- fellowship with Christ.
   Even the apostles proceeded not from the interpretation of the Old
   Testament to faith in Christ, but first, stimulated by the Baptist's
   testimony, rose to faith in Christ by witnessing his words and deeds
   and then proceeded to interpret the Old Testament in this new light.
   Accordingly, while it is proper to refer to the Scriptures for the sake
   of showing that an article of faith is an original element of Christian
   piety, yet a doctrine does not necessarily pertain to Christianity
   because it is taught in the New Testament, but rather owes its place in
   the New Testament to its relation to Christianity. The opposite view
   would make dogmatic theology a collection of individual propositions
   without inner connection. Herein lies the justification of our bringing
   forward a doctrine of the Scriptures at this point.

   It is Christ's Spirit as the common spirit of the communion which gives
   utterance to itself in the historical and epistolary writings of the
   New Testament, and each one of these writings is an utterance of that
   Spirit, so far as it represents the common spirit in which all the
   writers participated. Thus it comes that the Spirit of Christ as a
   living presence in the Christian communion is the source of a decision
   between canonical and apocryphal works and is also the ground for a
   continuous and never-ending adjudication upon the character of the
   various contents of these same works. At the same time these
   Scriptures, as the first members of the series of presentations of
   Christ, are the norm of all subsequent presentations of him, inasmuch
   as they stand as the presentation of the person of Christ by those who,
   of all those whose writings we possess, stood nearest to Christ, and
   who were thus protected by the purifying influence of the living
   remembrance of the whole church from those dangers to their faith which
   arose out of their earlier Jewish forms of thought and life. But the
   peculiar spiritual endowment which came in this way to these apostolic
   men does not involve a distinction between the spiritual quality of
   their acts and that of their writings, as if they were animated and
   impelled by the Spirit in a lesser degree in the one case than in the
   other. Neither are the sacred books to be regarded, on account of the
   apostolic endowment, as demanding an exegetical and critical treatment
   peculiar to themselves. For just as in the doctrine of the person of
   Christ, so also in regard to the Scriptures, the activity of that
   spirit which operates in the church exhibits itself as an inner (the
   divine) expressing itself organically through an outer (the human).
   Similarly the narrative and epistolary portions of the Scriptures stand
   in a common relation to the apostolic office.

   The selection of the individual books for the Canon is to be regarded
   as proceeding analogously with the selection and combination of the
   historical elements. We are not to conceive of a definite and final
   decision given by apostolic authority, but of the gradual adjudication
   upon extant works, professedly Christian, by the Spirit which was
   common to the whole church. While, therefore, the Scriptures are to be
   subject to the freest investigation, the self-recognizing activity of
   the Holy Spirit in the church warrants the statement that the various
   books of the New Testament were given by that Spirit, and the
   collection of the same has been made under his guidance.

   The Scriptures of the Old Testament cannot be allowed to claim the same
   dignity. The spirit of the Old Testament is not the spirit of the New,
   because it is the spirit of law. Its place in our Bible and the
   customary use of it in Christian teaching are owing partly to the
   manner in which Christ and his apostles and the early Christians in
   general made reference to it when as yet the Canon of the New Testament
   had not been formed, and partly to the historical connection between
   the Christian church and the Jewish synagogue (§§ 128-32).

   2. The ministry of the Divine Word.--The preaching of Christ was a
   presentation of himself. The preaching of the Christian communion is
   the presentation of Christ. But since this communion is the image of
   Christ, its preaching is also self-presentation. Self-presentation is
   self-communication to those who are receptive of it, and therefore we
   may say that the common spirit of the communion, which is just that
   which constitutes it a communion, communicates itself as the Spirit of
   Christ to those who assume a receptive attitude toward it. This Spirit
   which Christ him self communicated is the Holy Spirit which gave the
   Scriptures, and thus the self-communication of the Christian communion
   is a supplying of the Divine Word and must always submit to the test of
   conformity with the Scriptures.

   Now each member of the communion, in his participation, to some degree,
   in this work of self-communication, seeks to present only that in
   himself which is of Christ, and to that degree he is an organ of the
   divine word. The influence of the members is mutually exercised and it
   is exerted through all the various activities of life without any
   definite plan or conscious arrangement. But owing to difference of
   temperament, talent, outer circumstances, and breadth of Christian
   experience, these activities of the members, both upon one another and
   upon the world, vary in degree and extent, some members being
   prevailingly active and others prevailingly receptive. And inasmuch as
   the common spirit of the communion must find expression in the orderly
   public assembly and the organized work of the Christian society, it
   becomes necessary, so as to secure an orderly and regular ministry, to
   set some individuals formally apart to the public service of the Divine
   Word. They can perform this only when they represent the communion as
   organs of its common spirit. And therefore they are to be designated to
   their office by the act of each several communion in which they inhere.
   Yet, of course, the occupants of church offices are not to be
   considered as exhausting its spiritual activities so as to preclude the
   spontaneous exercise of his gift on the part of each member of the
   formation of religious associations within the church. If the whole of
   the Christian communion could express itself in the doctrines and rules
   which the church sets forth and which these ministers as organs of its
   spirit declare, then these doctrines and rules and the public preaching
   of them would be free from error. But spatial and temporal relations
   render this impossible. Hence the necessity of binding the public
   ministry of the word to the Holy Scriptures (§§ 133-35).

   3. Baptism.--Baptism is an act of the church by which it signifies its
   will to receive an individual into its communion. The common spirit of
   the communion being Christ's spirit, its act of reception succeeds
   upon, and takes the place of, Christ's personal act of choosing
   individuals for his fellowship during his ministry, and it occurs as an
   act of faith in his promise, which is attached to the baptismal act.
   Therefore, since communion with Christ, regeneration, and justification
   are fundamentally one, the act of baptism is to be regarded as
   indicating the exercise of God's justifying .activity upon the
   individual baptized and as conveying the assurance of this possession.
   Were the whole church present and represented in the act, because of
   the activity of the Holy Spirit in all its fulness within the church,
   the highest canonical authority would attach to its decree: the
   baptismal act and the new birth would absolutely coincide. This, of
   course, is not demonstrably the case, and therefore there is no
   absolute coincidence between the administration of baptism and the
   extension of Christian fellowship.

   The act of baptism has an inner and an outer side. The inner side is
   the spiritual intention to receive the baptized into the communion from
   which issue all the operations of the Spirit which effect the new
   birth, and the outer side is the physical act through which the
   intention is conveyed. Hence it is not correct to say that the baptism
   is conditioned by the new birth, because that is to presuppose an
   activity in the church prior to being received in it, which is ab surd.
   On the contrary, then, we must say that the new birth is conditioned by
   baptism, that is, when baptism is taken to be the final act in that
   series in which the church expresses its will to extend itself, which
   it can do only by receiving new members. Accordingly it is through
   baptism rather than through the fluctuating experience of
   sanctification that we become personally assured of possessing the new
   birth. But of course this assertion is to be understood not in
   reference to the mere external act but the motives which underlie it.
   This assertion of the validity of the act in view of the intention is
   not to be understood as referring to the definite consciousness of the
   administrator, but as referring to the church, whose act it is. Hence
   its validity for the entire church, even though it be administered by
   one of the relatively opposed societies into which the church is
   divided. For in all of these the ordinance is referred back to Christ's
   own institution (Matt. 28:19, 20; Mark 16:16). The baptized accepts the
   church's intention, and hence his faith is necessary to the fulfilment
   of that intention. His faith is the individual act of
   self-appropriation of the perfection of Christ, but with it there is
   also the appropriation of the blessedness of Christ which is enjoyed
   only in the communion of believers. He who believes will enter this
   fellowship. This is done in baptism, which is properly called the seal
   of divine grace. Yet the absence of faith at the time on the part of
   the person baptized does not in validate the act or render necessary
   the repetition of it on the rise of faith; but the reception into the
   communion remains incomplete, just as it does also when faith exists
   but baptism has not been performed. In the former case the baptism
   looks forward to a faith yet to be exercised; in the latter case it
   looks back. Therefore it is true, in both cases, that baptism as the
   act of receiving the individual into the communion conveys the title to
   participation in the perfection and blessedness of Christ which is the
   essence of the Christian communion.

   Thus infant baptism is valid, but only when respect is had to a
   confession of faith, to be made consequent upon perfected instruction,
   as the final act pertaining to that instruction. Though there are no
   traces of infant baptism in the New Testament, it is justifiable on the
   grounds of the necessities of the church and the demands of the
   parental feelings of those who are members thereof (§§ 136-38).

   4. The Supper.--Beginning with a baptism properly administered the
   Christian has an experience of blessedness in Christ. But the
   development of this consciousness is not steady and uninterrupted;
   hence arises the necessity that our consciousness of blessedness should
   be confirmed and strengthened. Christian blessedness, outwardly
   regarded, is a communion with other believers; inwardly regarded, it is
   a communion with Christ, a personal (individual) attitude toward him.
   These are coincident and reciprocally operative. Against both of these
   two sides of the Christian life, the repressive influence of the world
   is continually at work. Hence arises the necessity for private
   meditation on the one hand--for hereby the believer excludes the
   influences of the world by presenting Christ to himself out of the
   Scriptures--and for public divine service on the other for the mutual
   fellowship of believers is strengthened and stimulated by the
   exhibition of a common Christian love. And this at the same time both
   expresses and comprises the fellowship of each one of them with Christ.
   To this latter, the public divine service, the Supper belongs.

   Christians do experience in the Supper a peculiar strengthening of
   their spiritual life, and have done so ever since the time of its
   institution by Christ. In it Christ is presented to them. In the public
   gathering of the church as such, he supplies a participation in his
   flesh and blood. In this connection two questions arise: (1) How does
   the Supper as a supplying of the flesh and blood of Christ relate
   itself to that purely spiritual participation which he himself declared
   to be necessary? (2) How docs the Supper as a constituent part of
   public divine service distinguish itself from other parts of the same?

   To begin with the latter: The Supper is distinguished from all other
   kinds of public worship in that, while in other forms of worship the
   degree in which the different members of the communion are actively or
   receptively related to one another varies according to their gifts and
   their place in the communion, in the Supper all the members are
   similarly placed in a receptive relation to the blessedness of Christ.
   The administrator is nothing more than the organ of Christ's
   institution. The inworking of this blessedness in the case of each
   believer proceeds solely and immediately from Christ himself, through
   the word of institution in which the redeeming and communion-forming
   love of Christ is presented and ever operates as a stimulus to piety.
   The peculiarity of the Supper is this individual and exclusive
   immediacy of presentation of Christ, this independence, in its working,
   of all changing personal conditions and relations.

   In regard to the former question: In that discourse of Christ where he
   speaks of the necessity of eating his flesh and drinking his blood he
   had neither the Supper nor another definite action in mind, but he
   referred to the periodic renewal of our fellowship with him. The Supper
   lends itself naturally to such a description, In the Supper each member
   is conscious of a sympathy with all the others, so that as he knows
   that the others more closely unite themselves to Christ in it, he feels
   that he also is more closely united there by to them all. Thus each
   member represents to the others the whole society, and indeed the whole
   Christian communion. But this spiritual benefit is dependent on the
   definite observance of the rite which has been blessed and sanctified
   through the word of Christ. In and for itself there is nothing
   incomprehensible in the ordinance.

   Consequently the teaching of the Roman Catholic church is false when it
   affirms both that the union of the elements with the body and blood of
   Christ is accomplished and that the spiritual benefit is attached to
   the elements of the Supper through contemplation and veneration of
   them, apart from the act of participation; for this is to make its
   effect of a magical character. Those sacramentarians are also in error
   who see in the elements only a representative image of spiritual
   participation. We hold, on the contrary, that the response to Christ's
   invitation to spiritual eating and drinking of himself is so actualized
   in the Supper through the word of institution, that believers find
   spiritual participation assured to them in the sacramental act which,
   when rightly administered, is an unfailing means of access to it.
   Similarly we reject the view of those who deny the connection between
   the Supper and spiritual participation in Christ and regard it as a
   command of Christ to be observed for all time in the church, simply as
   a testimony or confession. For in the first place this view robs the
   Supper of its pre-eminence as a public service; and in the next place
   it destroys its identity at all times. For in its original institution
   there were none present to whom the disciples could give their
   testimony, and there have always been other means by which the members
   of the church recognize their mutual faith. Any view of the Supper is
   defective which fails to see in it a renewal of the assurance of the
   forgiveness of sins, that is, of fellowship with Christ, which is
   subject to interruptions by the consciousness of sin. Thus as baptism
   by uniting us with the body of Christ introduces the consciousness of
   regeneration (the certainty of forgiveness), so this repeated
   presentation of Christ in the Supper by the whole society of believers
   confirms the certainty of forgiveness by strengthening and restoring
   the interrupted consciousness of regeneration. This is ministered in
   the Supper by the assembled community of faith, for union with Christ
   (which is forgiveness) is not to be thought of apart from the union
   with believers (§§ 139-42).

   5. The office of the keys.--If the church were a perfect whole with
   nothing of the world in it, so that every individual within it would be
   a perfect organ of the common spirit, then the will of the whole church
   would be the will of every individual member. But since this is not the
   case, and since there arises in every individual some opposition to the
   will of the common spirit of Christ, that will comes to him as law.
   Where the individual member is definitely not subjected to it, then the
   church counts him as not truly a member. This legislative and judicial
   activity of the church is simply the perpetuation of the legislative
   and administrative power of Christ, which inheres in the church by
   virtue of its possession of his spirit; it is an exhibition of his
   kingly activity.

   Every new subjection of an individual life to this activity of the
   church is a new acquisition achieved by its common spirit. Then the
   church, by extending to the individual the God-consciousness which is
   to supply to him the law of his spiritual life, first affords to him an
   entrance into the communion and afterward as signs to him his definite
   and proper place within it.

   The church, then, according to Christ's own utterances, has the power
   of binding: that is, it deter mines through command and prohibition
   what may or may not be done; and of loosing: that is, of leaving
   certain matters to be determined by the individual. The limit of this
   power of the church is assigned by the necessity of preserving the
   common mind or feeling; as when, for example, some individual member
   does that which, if left unreproved, would damage the well-being of the
   others, or when some individual places the persons of others in
   contempt by setting himself above them so as to try to make his
   personal act or thought the will of the common spirit.

   But just because this kingly activity of Christ in the church is living
   and abiding, there can be no decree which is final and valid for all
   time, but these must ever be subject to amendment. Hence also, there
   can be no ban of final exclusion from the church or abandonment of
   effort to bring the individual within its communion (§§ 144, 145).

   6. Prayer in the name of Jesus.--The church's historical progress in
   the world is opposed by obstacles without and within: without, by the
   opposition of that part of the world which the church has not yet taken
   possession of and assimilated; within, by the worldly elements
   remaining in each of its members. Hence the church's common
   consciousness is of its imperfection. Now the longing to realize the
   aim of Christ's mission being a living and abiding element of the
   church's life, this, conjoined with the consciousness of imperfection,
   implies on the one side a sense of need and on the other side a
   presentiment of what is necessary to the fulfilment of that aim. All
   progress in this direction is ascribed through the God-consciousness to
   the divine world-government, and is expressed in thankfulness or
   resignation according as it is realized in some particular or not. But
   so far as the matter appears undecided it is expressed in prayer, i.e.,
   an inner connection between the God-consciousness and the wish directed
   toward the best end.

   It is inevitable that the thinking subject should outline in many forms
   the manner in which the fulfilment of its aim appears possible. Hence
   the particular petitions in prayer. The judgment of each individual as
   to what particular occurrences would contribute to the end in view is,
   of course, defective and of uncertain value. Those of them who possess
   a gift analogous to the prophetic are therefore adapted to exercise a
   special influence on the whole body in the direction of its petitions.
   Beginning with Christ himself there have appeared from the earliest
   times individuals in whom the personal motives have been excluded and
   who possessed that foresight which qualified them in an eminent degree
   as organs of the common will of the church in respect to prayer.

   True prayer, which is always united to an interest in the kingdom of
   God as the church's end, is the expression of the common spirit of the
   church in respect to its needs; i.e., it is an activity of the Holy
   Spirit in the form of anticipation and desire.

   To pray in the name of Jesus is to pray in the matters which concern
   him (Angelegenheiten), or (which is the sane) in his mind or spirit.
   That prayer is therefore a prayer in the name of Jesus in which those
   who pray occupy his relation to the kingdom of God, i.e., they pray in
   accordance with his government of his church. The whole church being a
   perfect reflection of Christ, that only is a prayer in the name of
   Jesus which has underlying it the total consciousness of the church,
   i.e., a prayer whose content has reference to the whole state of the
   church. This is the common prayer of the church on all occasions. Such
   prayer is always heard. This is the prayer of faith--not a separate
   faith that the prayer will be heard--but faith in the permanence and
   supreme worth of the kingdom of God which Christ founded. Every
   particular petition is heard so far as it agrees with this norm.

   Consequently, prayer is not the exercise of an influence upon God. Such
   a view of prayer postulates a reciprocation between the creature and
   the Creator, represents its effect as empirical (akin to magical), and
   contradicts the fundamental thesis of this work. Prayer and its
   fulfilment have a common basis in the character of the kingdom of God.
   For prayer is that Christian anticipation which is developed out of the
   whole activity of the divine spirit, and its fulfilment is an
   expression of the governing activity of Christ in relation to the same
   object. In this sense we may say that neither one can be without the
   other, for both grow out of the same divinely ordered conditions. Thus
   true piety and true prayer always go together (§§ 146,147).

   2. The Variable Elements of the Church Owing to Its Coexistence with
   the World (§§ 148-56)

   If everyone who receives the spirit of Christianity retained no longer
   any of the characteristics of his former life, but became receptive
   solely of the common spirit of the church, then the separation between
   church and world would be absolute and their influence be merely that
   of reciprocal opposition and enmity. But though the true ego of the
   regenerate man is that of delight in the divine will, his new birth is
   no instantaneous transformation of his whole being. Worldly elements
   inhere in all those who constitute the church; so that church and world
   are not spatially and temporally separated. At every empirical
   manifestation of human life both appear. Where faith and a communion in
   faith are found, there also are sin and a communion in universal sin
   fulness. Only by abstraction can the church be isolated. The workings
   of the church, which consist in the union of the Holy Spirit with human
   nature, constitute a coherent and co-operative whole, but Invisible,
   because never in empirical separation from the world. The totality of
   the connected operations of the Spirit constitutes the Invisible
   Church. These same operations as connected with reactionary elements of
   sin which appear in the lives of the regenerate constitute the Visible
   Church. Within the visible church, church and world coexist.

   Hence, while the whole truth of redemption be comes the believer's
   possession through the communication of Christ's perfection to him, and
   while a present guidance into the truth is assured by the consciousness
   of sonship with God in a life- fellowship with Christ, the reaction of
   his former state affects his conceptions of life and his activity of
   will, so that there is, on the one hand, only a gradual transformation
   of his ideas, and this involves inevitably a degree of falsity in all
   external expressions of this inner truth; and, on the other hand, only
   a gradual change in the direction of his life-energies occurs, and this
   involves a certain degree of impurity of motive. This, of course,
   pertains to the communion as well as to the individual. Hence the
   twofold contrast between the invisible church arid its empirical
   manifestation in the visible church, the contrast in thought and in
   action: to wit (to mention these features in the reverse order), while
   the invisible church is one, the visible church is divided: and while
   the invisible church is infallible, the visible church is subject to
   error. The invisible church must be one, for the spirit is one, and
   since the communion of the Spirit is just the self-recognition of the
   Spirit, the invisible church must be wherever this self-same Spirit is,
   i.e., throughout all Christendom. The universal impulse to externalize
   the common consciousness in determinate forms results in variety,
   difference, and separation, as a consequence of the antitheses
   antecedently existent among men, such as arise from difference of
   speech, nationality, political and geographical relations,
   civilization, and many other inner and outer conditions. In this way
   arise different church societies (communions). But these in no wise
   involve a destruction of communion with other Christians. Particular
   separations may arise through the workings of the Spirit as they lead
   to a perception and rejection of worldly elements which appear in the
   church, or they may arise from the opposite cause. In the former case
   the separations are only apparent. For the Spirit is always a principle
   of unity. It is the mind of the flesh that separates in reality.

   But at the same time, owing to the unlimited power of attraction
   possessed by the love of Christ in those persons in whom the Spirit
   dwells, there can never arise in one communion the desire that another
   communion may be annihilated; but there must ever arise efforts to
   express the oneness of spirit in attempted unions. There is always the
   implicit acknowledgment that all these separated communions form,
   potentially, according to divine arrangement, a larger communion
   capable of including all Christians when the necessary conditions are
   present. If two professedly Christian communions have nothing in
   common, then one or both is un-Christian. But such a total annulling of
   this communion is impossible so long as both hold to their historical
   connection with the revelation proclaimed in the Gospel and no other
   revelation is acknowledged as the basis of their origin. Hence even
   heretics are in the church after all. Present differences and divisions
   in the Christian church are only relative and destined to disappear in
   the final realization of unity.

   The invisible church is infallible, but the visible church is liable to
   error. Here we consider truth and error only in the religious sphere.
   In the activity of the pious consciousness truth and error are always
   mingled, because the persistence of sensuousness renders our conception
   of the aim of the church and our relation to it more or less impure and
   false. Every one finds the source of error in himself, and therefore
   believes it is always present in some degree in all. But, on the other
   hand, with the confession of Christ the truth is ever present. Hence
   there can be no church-communion which is entirely destitute of it.

   The same must have been true of the early church and of the apostles as
   individuals; but the whole church and the whole truth being in the
   common spirit, the false tendencies of the individuals naturally annul
   one another, and hence the church invisible possesses the whole truth
   and is infallible. This allows, how ever, that every partial-church can
   err even in its official presentations. Nor would an individual church
   at any one point of time possess the whole truth, for every period has
   its one-sidedness, which a later time corrects. Therefore no doctrinal
   statements, even if unanimously offered, would express final and
   perfect truth. Everyone must test them for himself and acknowledge them
   as Christian in so far as they harmonize with his personal religious
   consciousness or with Scripture. The improvement of public doctrine
   becomes not only a personal duty but also a right in the exercise of
   which he is to suffer no limitation.

   The gradual improvement of the church's doctrine will be a consequence.

   Now the error existing in every part of the church being an error in
   relation to the truth which it possesses, the degree of error must be
   gradually diminished, the more the Holy Spirit in the church
   appropriates the organism of thought in its members. This is wrought
   out through the influence of the whole church upon the individual
   members in its public services, and through the influence of all those
   who are specially endowed with a clear Christian consciousness. We may
   conclude, therefore, that all error is finally to be banished.

  THIRD DIVISION: THE PERFECTING OF THE CHURCH (§§ 157-63)

   The sufficient ground of the perfecting of the church lies in the Holy
   Spirit as its common life-principle. That perfection implies, on the
   one hand, the expansion of Christianity over the whole earth and the
   disappearance of all other religious communions with their opposing and
   contaminating influences; and, on the other hand, it implies that the
   church ceases to take the world into itself. That is to say, that the
   present increasing conflict with sin which is characteristic of the
   church militant--owing to the consciousness of sin which is
   continuously being renewed by the propagation of the race--gives place
   to that condition in which the church has assimilated the world, that
   is, the church triumphant.

   But our Christian consciousness is unable to set forth as its immediate
   self-expression the condition of the perfected church because it is
   without analogy in our experience and would exist under conditions
   entirely unknown to us. Strictly speaking, therefore, there can be no
   doctrine of that state. Yet the biblical prefigurations of the future
   life have received so much attention in the church that we are under
   the necessity of inquiring as to their source. None of the New
   Testament utterances on this subject can become to us articles of faith
   to be received on authoritative testimony because, surpassing our
   powers of apprehension, they constitute no description of our actual
   self-consciousness, and consequently they may have a place in a
   doctrinal system (Glaubenslehre) only in so far as they concern the
   person of the Redeemer and our relation to him.

   Now, although faith in the persistence of the human personality after
   death, or, to use the common expression, in the immortality of the
   soul, is found universally and prevailed in the time of Christ and his
   apostles, it is not on that account entitled to a place in Christian
   doctrine. How, then, came this faith to be united with our Christian
   religious conscience? There are two possible ways: either it was
   discovered by intellectual processes and became objective truth, or it
   was originally given in and with the immediate self-consciousness with
   or without connection with the fundamental God-consciousness. If in the
   former way, then the doctrine pertains to the sphere of the higher
   natural science and depends on scientific investigation. But scientific
   study on the contrary often gives rise to opposition to the belief in
   immortality, The so-called rational proofs of immortality are nothing
   more than attempts to relate this belief to the body of scientific
   knowledge. To give these arguments a place in our Christian doctrine is
   to base dogmatics on philosophy. As to the other possibility, while
   there is a denial of immortality which is connected with atheism, on
   the other hand there may be a renunciation of personal continuance
   which springs from a view of Spirit as creative and self-expressive. On
   this view individual souls may be a product of the transitory action of
   Spirit and there fore themselves transitory. This is quite compatible
   with the supremacy of the God-consciousness, the purest ethics, and the
   highest spirituality. Conversely, immortality may be postulated out of
   a selfish interest in the sensuous life where morality and religion are
   only a means to enjoyment. It is evident therefore that faith in
   personal continuance is not essentially connected with the
   God-consciousness.

   The true Christian ground of the assurance of immortality lies in faith
   in the Redeemer himself. His confidence in his own personal continuance
   is seen in his promises of a reunion with his followers. He could say
   these things only as a human person, and on account of the sameness of
   human nature in him and in us the same confidence is valid in our case.
   Faith in the Redeemer demands the immutability of our connection with
   him. In that life-union with him lies the true Christian assurance of
   personal continuance. In this way we see that he became the mediator of
   immortality, not only to those who believe in him, but to all without
   exception. For if immortality had not pertained to human nature, then a
   union of the divine being with human nature constituting such a
   personality as that of the Redeemer would not have been possible.

   Faith in the continuance of our personality is naturally accompanied by
   an effort to represent that state in some of the forms of the
   imagination. The attempted solution of the problem how to represent the
   church in its perfection and at the same time the state of the souls of
   men in the future life, appears in the ecclesiastical doctrine of "last
   things." But it is impossible to combine the two in one harmonious
   representation. The perfection of the church, i.e., an end of
   development (which comports with the idea of retribution), supposes a
   state of the individual soul entirely unlike the present; on the other
   hand, the supposition of a state of the individual soul like the
   present, i.e., a state of progressive development (which harmonizes
   with the idea of personal continuance), annuls the perfection of the
   church.

   Accordingly, the doctrines relating to this point are of less value as
   dogmatic than those already treated. They rest upon our power of
   anticipation, which is incompetent to construct a harmonious
   representation of the future state. On that account we cannot ascribe
   to the confessional articles on this question the same dignity as to
   those already treated. They may be designated Prophetical Articles.
   Continuance of personal existence as the abolition of death appears
   under the representation of the resurrection of the body. The
   perfection of the church, as conditioned on the one hand by the
   exclusion of the unbelieving from further influence upon the church,
   appears under the representation of the final judgment, separation of
   believers and unbelievers. As contrasted on the other hand with the
   "church militant," and implying the exclusion of imperfection in
   believers, it is presented as eternal blessedness. The condemnation of
   unbelievers not being a matter of Christian experience is no separate
   article of faith. Finally the comprehension and necessary condition of
   the whole is presented under the representation of Christ's return (§§
   157-59).

   FIRST PROPHETICAL ARTICLE: CHRIST'S RETURN

   The Synoptists report sayings of Christ before his death to the effect
   that he will come again at the fall of Jerusalem. Though he is not
   represented as repeating such promises personally to his disciples in
   his resurrection communications with them, they were unable to conceive
   that those promises had been fulfilled. Similarly, after the
   destruction of the city the literal interpretation of his words was
   inconsistently retained, and even though in later times Chiliasm has
   been mostly abandoned, still the view that he will return in person at
   the end of the present condition of the earth has continued almost
   universal to the present time. Apart from this literal interpretation
   we have no biblical guarantee of his personal return or of a universal
   separation of the good and the bad; and yet no representation of these
   events is possible, for every attempted definite image of the event
   dissolves, and in lieu of a physical presence we are able to retain
   only his powerful activity in relation to world-affairs.

   It is evident, then, that the Christian consciousness of union with
   Christ is not satisfied with his spiritual presence in the church in
   the midst of our present condition of growth and change. In order to
   the realization of our personal continuance in union with him and, at
   the same time, of the perfection of the church, there is predicated an
   exercise of the sovereign power of Christ that puts an end to the
   propagation of the race and to the mingling of the good and the bad, so
   that by one sudden leap the church, heretofore subject to a wavering
   growth, becomes perfect. Accordingly the second coming of Christ is
   conceived as a return to judgment, and the permanence of the union of
   the divine essence with human nature in Christ becomes the guarantee
   that this nature will not be subject to that dissolution which would
   result from cosmic forces. Thus the imagery of the doctrine results
   from the interest in personal continuance, but its certainty rests on
   the perfection of the church (§ 160).

  SECOND PROPHETICAL ARTICLE: THE RESURRECTION
  OF THE BODY

   The consciousness of the union of the body and soul in our personality
   renders it impossible for us to represent to ourselves the immortality
   of the soul apart from a bodily existence, without giving up the
   identity of our personal life before death and after. The continuity of
   self-consciousness seems impossible apart from memory, which, like
   other mental functions, appears dependent on bodily relations, so that
   the existence of the soul under entirely different physical relations
   would be inconsistent with its continuous self-identity. But the
   conception of the similarity of the present and the future life is, on
   the other hand, inconsistent with the perfection of the church. So that
   on this ground we are under the opposite necessity of conceiving the
   nature of the future world as different from the present, the body
   being conceived as immortal and sexual distinctions as lost; other wise
   the conflict between flesh and spirit, and there fore sin fulness,
   would remain.

   The incompatibility of the representation of future personal
   continuance with the representation of the perfected church further
   appears in the abortive at tempts to offer a representation of the
   intermediate state and to adjust its relation to the resurrection state
   and to the general judgment. We conclude that it is impossible to
   present a definite and consistent representation of the connection
   between the present and the future life.

   There remains as the essential content of this article: (1) the
   ascension of the risen Redeemer is only possible if there lies before
   all human individuals in the future life a renewal of organic life
   connected with our present state; (2) the unfolding of a future state
   is conditioned on the divine power of Christ and on cosmical changes
   effected through the universal divine world-government, though the
   representation of these changes is a problem never perfectly to be
   solved by men (§ 161).

  THIRD PROPHETICAL ARTICLE: THE FINAL JUDGMENT

   The fundamental idea underlying Christ's representation of the Final
   Judgment is the total separation of the church from the world so far as
   the perfection of the former excludes all influence of the latter. But
   to suppose that this means a total separation between believers and
   unbelievers is to conceive wrongly the distinction of the visible and
   the invisible church, inasmuch as it overlooks the fact that the
   influence of the world upon the church consists mainly in the fleshly
   character which inheres in believers even till death. Besides, a
   sanctification effected by such a sudden deliverance destroys the
   continuous nature of personal consciousness and introduces a magical
   element into sanctification, thereby compromising the value of
   life-fellowship with Christ. Further, such a separation of believers
   from unbelievers seems intended to secure the happiness of believers
   rather than their perfection, inasmuch as it is only by the contact of
   believers with unbelievers that many perfections of the former come to
   manifestation. Yet even that happiness would be destroyed by the pain
   which arises from sympathy with the lost. Finally, the contemplation of
   the righteousness of God, as exhibited in the final rejection of
   unbelievers, could afford no counterbalancing satisfaction, because the
   element of arbitrariness is thereby introduced into the idea of God.

   That which is of value in the idea of the final judgment is: (1) that
   perfect fellowship with Christ renders all evil non-existent for us,
   even in the presence of wickedness; (2) that if we are to conceive of
   the church as perfect while a portion of the human race remains
   excluded from the workings of its spirit, this is because that portion
   of the race is proof against it and consequently continues out of all
   contact with it (§ 162).

  FOURTH PROPHETICAL ARTICLE: ETERNAL BLESSEDNESS

   The condition of believers after their restoration to life may be
   conceived under two forms: (1) a sudden, but unchanging possession of
   the Most High; (2) a gradual elevation to the Most High but, like the
   development of Christ, without retrogression or conflict. But the
   attempt to give a representation of the two states introduces peculiar
   difficulties. The former annuls the connection with the present life
   and implies, in the equally perfect state of all believers, the want of
   that mutual influence which is involved in a perfect life and necessary
   to its externalization. The second would involve disharmonies and
   waverings with the consequent dissatisfaction and consciousness of
   imperfection, which in a free existence is consciousness of guilt.
   Indeed the outcome is a view of the future life as in all essential
   features a repetition of the present. The problem therefore remains
   unsolved.

   What, then, is that which we receive in that future life? The common
   answer is, that eternal life consists in the vision of God. But wherein
   does that consciousness of God differ from the present? In its
   immediacy in contrast with the mediate character of the present? But
   this is hardly consistent with the preservation of the personality. So
   that, from which ever side the problem is approached, it seems that we
   must remain uncertain as to the manner in which the state which is the
   highest perfection of the church can be obtained and possessed by an
   immortal personality (§ 163).

  APPENDIX: ETERNAL CONDEMNATION

   It has usually been assumed that the figurative discourses of Christ
   which are supposed to refer to those who die out of fellowship with him
   represent them as in a state of permanent unhappiness. (See Matt.
   25:46; Mark 9:44; John 5:29. ) But an examination of the connections
   (Matt. 24:30-34; John 5:24, 25) and of passages with an opposite
   representation (I Cor. 15:25, 26) throws doubt upon this view.
   Moreover, eternal condemnation cannot be conceived apart from such a
   condition as either implies spiritual progress on the part of the
   damned or unhappiness on the part of the blessed. Accordingly, the
   milder doctrine that through the power of the redemption at some time
   there will be a universal restoration of all human souls possesses an
   equal right.

   NOTE.--All attempts to develop the idea of the individual future life
   and its relations to the present life out of the idea of the perfection
   of the church and its relation to the unperfected church, or to make a
   place for the perfected church by means of the idea of the future life,
   turn to myths, i.e., a historical presentation of the super-historical,
   or to visions, i.e., an earthly presentation of the super-earthly.
   "These were every where the forms of the prophetical, which in its
   higher meaning made no claim to produce a knowledge in the proper
   sense, but is only determined to shape principles already acknowledged
   into motives of action."

   Section 3. Those Attributes of God Which Are Related to Redemption (§§
   164-69)

   For the Christian consciousness everything in the universe is viewed in
   relation to the redemption, either as organic to the self-expression of
   the awakened God-consciousness, or as material to be manipulated by it.
   From this same point of view the divine world-government requires to be
   described. But we are here to be on our guard against falling into the
   error of treating this divine government of the world as supervening
   upon the creation in the way of something additional or supplementary.
   They are at bottom the same thing. The Christian faith that all things
   were made with a view to the self-revelation of God in the flesh and
   the establishment of the kingdom of God by the extension of that
   revelation to the whole range of human nature, requires therefore that
   the divine world-government consist in no mere isolated acts of
   influence upon a world which pursues its own course in general
   independently of such interference; but rather the divine
   world-government and the course of Nature, the natural world and the
   kingdom of grace, fill the same sphere. That is to say, the whole
   ordering of Nature from the beginning would have been other than it is
   had not the redemption through Christ been determined for the sinning
   race. As for intelligences other than human, we have no such knowledge
   of their relation to us as would enable us to include more than our own
   human world--that realm in which redemption is effected--in our survey
   of the divine government.

   Since, as has been already shown (§ 46, note), that element of our
   self-consciousness which we call the consciousness of sin cannot be
   referred immediately to the divine causality, but mediately only
   through the consciousness of grace, the latter element must be the
   determining one. We may say, then, that the nature of things and all
   the complexity of their relations have come to be what they are on
   account of the revelation of God in Christ which redeems men, or
   develops the human spirit to perfection. Consequently the whole course
   of human affairs and of natural events would have been other than it
   is, had not God decreed the union of the divine essence with human
   nature in Christ and with the communion of believers through the Holy
   Spirit.

   Accordingly from the unity of the divine causality it follows that the
   church or the kingdom of God, in its whole extension and in the full
   effect of its development, is the one object of the divine
   world-government, and every individual object of the divine government
   is such only in relation to this one object and for this alone. Hence
   the absurdity of a division of God's providence into general and
   special, and the inconsistency of eternal damnation with the divine
   world-government.

   A distinction of attributes can appear in the divine world-government
   only by viewing the divine causality from human standpoints. As in our
   apprehension of human causality we distinguish inner intention from the
   mode of its execution, so also divine causality on its inner side as a
   unity may be described as will; but on its outer side in relation to
   its object as a manifold, it may be regarded as understanding. The
   redemption and the founding of the kingdom of God, in which there is a
   union of the divine essence with human nature, being the focal point of
   the divine world-government, the inner thought (disposition) exhibited
   in this is divine love, which is just the will to unite with and dwell
   in another. And the skill by which the totality of existences is
   subjected to this end of realizing the divine love is divine wisdom,
   which is just the perfect correspondence of processes with the end
   conceived in all its relations. But while in man will and understanding
   never perfectly correspond, in God they are one,

   1. The Divine Love

   The divine love, as the attribute by virtue of which the divine nature
   communicates itself, is made known in the work of redemption. If it be
   objected, on the one hand, that this view is mystical and overlooks the
   love of God in those courses of Nature and of human affairs that
   conserve and elevate the life; and, on the other hand, that it is too
   narrow because it fails to recognize that all spiritual development
   depends on the possession of reason which is the image of God in man,
   it may be replied to the first objection, that the highest elevation of
   life is in the God-consciousness, which is suppressed outside the
   sphere of the Christian redemption; and to the second, that while all
   men have the capacity for the God-consciousness, yet fear and not love
   pervades their minds before receiving Christ's redemption, and no human
   good of any kind which is not brought into connection with the
   God-consciousness can relate itself properly to the divine love.

   When we assert that "God is love," meaning there by that love is the
   sole attribute which can be equated with the being or essence of God,
   we are not to be understood as accepting any conception of God which
   has been obtained in a speculative way, but we have only to show why
   this attribute of God is thus differentiated from the others which have
   been presented already.

   While, as has been said already, the divine omnipotence is that
   attribute by virtue of which all finite things exist, this entire
   divine act is thereby posited without motive. The same is true of the
   other divine attributes treated above. None of these can be by
   themselves original expressions of the divine essence. Righteousness
   and holiness imply the antithesis between Good and Bad which cannot
   exist for God in himself. These attributes act in a limited sphere and
   they are subordinate to love and wisdom, that is, in the work of
   redemption they are to be reckoned as preparatory.

   Again, while both love and wisdom express the very essence of God, we
   cannot say that God is wisdom as we say that God is love, because we
   have the immediate consciousness of love only in the consciousness of
   redemption and it is the ground of the representation of all the other
   divine attributes. It is when we extend our personal and our
   race-consciousness to the whole complex of forces in the universe that
   we see that wisdom is the perfection of love. Where almighty love is,
   there must absolute wisdom be (§§ 166, 167).

   2. The Divine Wisdom

   According to our position in an earlier portion of this work, wisdom
   and omniscience in God are the same, only the former corresponds to the
   antecedent view of his operations and the latter to the consequent
   view. Wisdom is the divine work regarded as producing such a world as
   if it were an absolutely coherent divine work of art; that is, such a
   work as, after the analogy of the human, constitutes a simple and
   originally perfect self-presentation or, rather, communication of the
   Supreme Being. The development of our consciousness of the wisdom of
   God consists in this, that this communication in its temporal progress
   becomes to us ever increasingly a perfect presentation of the almighty
   love of God.

   We do not thereby admit the antithesis of end and means in the world,
   except in the sense that the means is embraced in the end, as a part in
   the whole.

   To the Christian the redemption is the key to the understanding of the
   divine wisdom, and the whole divine economy is interpreted in the light
   of the revelation of God in Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this by no
   means implies a desire to find in individual occurrences a particular
   relation to the kingdom of God. This would degenerate into an
   opposition to scientific investigation. Nay, such occurrences as,
   presumably, are unconnected with the world-system and yet can not be
   separated from human concerns, must turn to the damage of the progress
   of the redemption and must also be excluded from the provisions of the
   divine wisdom. All things in the world that can be ascribed to the
   divine wisdom must also be referable to the redeeming new-creating
   revelation of God. Thus the peculiar work of the wisdom of God is just
   the extension of the redemption. This means, of course, that the most
   minute investigation of the facts of nature and the effort to penetrate
   into the hidden depths of the divine purpose are to be commended (§§
   168, 169).

   Conclusion: The Divine Trinity (§§ 170-72)

   Our whole apprehension of Christianity stands or falls with the union
   of the Divine Being with human nature, This union appears first in the
   person of Christ, and by virtue of it the idea of redemption is
   concentrated in his person. It appears also in the common spirit of the
   church, and by virtue of this, the church bears and propagates the
   redemption through Christ. These are the essential elements of the
   church doctrine of the Trinity. The defense of the doctrine has been
   moved by the religious interest--the concern to conserve the absolute
   character of the redemption by rejecting the idea of subordinate
   divinities in Christ and the Holy Spirit. This is confirmed by the fact
   that those parties in the church which have denied the Trinity have
   held an entirely different view of the redemption on all sides of it.

   The doctrine of the Trinity is the keystone of the whole structure of
   Christian doctrine with respect to this essential point: the
   equivalence of the divine nature in Christ and in the spirit of the
   church with the divine nature in itself.

   But to the further elaboration of this dogma in the creeds and
   confessions the same value cannot be as signed. In these the union of
   the divine with the human in Christ and in the Spirit of the church is
   referred back to an eternal separation within the Supreme Being in
   dependently of these two acts of union. Then the member of this
   separated Being who was designated to the union with Jesus is named
   Son; and the same process taking place in reference to the Holy Spirit,
   the other member is called Father. In this way arose the description of
   God as a unity of essence with a trio- of persons. But such a
   separation within the Supreme Being is no expression of a religious
   consciousness and never could be.

   Such a doctrine of the Trinity cannot be made to rest upon the
   Logos-doctrine of John's Gospel, for this logology has seemed to afford
   support to the Arian and Athanasian formulae alike, and its
   interpretation is not settled. If such a doctrine was in John's mind,
   why did he not set forth a similar statement concerning the Holy
   Spirit, especially since he mentions the Spirit so frequently in his
   gospel, and why did he offer no caution against polyolatry?

   Nor can this doctrine be framed from the statements of Christ and his
   apostles as a combination of authoritative testimonies concerning a
   supersensuous fact. That would be just as little a doctrine of faith
   (Glaubenslehre) in the original and proper sense of the word as are the
   doctrines of the resurrection and the ascension. Moreover this
   supposedly transcendental fact does not affect our faith in Christ or
   our fellowship with him.

   NOTE.--A doctrine of the Trinity derived from universal conceptions, or
   a priori, could have no place in Christian doctrine, even if there were
   a verbal coincidence, and could render no service to it. Such a
   doctrine in itself would not be of a religious character for its source
   is different.

   The difficulty of conceiving each of three persons as equal to two
   others and to the divine essence is beyond the compass of thought. If
   the Godhead of all three DC less than the one supreme Essence, then our
   life-fellowship with Christ and our participation in the Holy Spirit
   are no fellowship with God, and all that is most valuable in
   Christianity is altered. If each be equal to the others, the difficulty
   is to find the rule for the distinction of the persons without the
   introduction of some elements that involves inequality. This is
   manifest in the Catholic statements of the doctrine. Similar
   contradictions appear in the canons which have been offered for the
   representation of the relation of the triplicity of persons to the
   unity of the Essence. If we assume triplicity we do not reach the
   unity, and if we assume the unity there is no room for triplicity. We
   possess no analogies whereon to base such a representation. The
   ecclesiastical doctrine, therefore, can furnish no support to the
   fundamental truth of Christianity.

   The same difficulty arises when we attempt to relate each and all of
   the three persons to the divine causality. The dogmaticians have felt
   this, for they all assume the divinity of the Father and attempt to
   prove that of the Son and the Spirit, which shows that notwithstanding
   formal orthodoxy they actually follow Origen in holding that the Father
   alone is absolutely God and that Son and Spirit are God only by
   participation.

   The traditional trinitarian formulae come to us from a time when the
   great mass of Christians were recently recruited from heathenism. It
   was a very easy matter for echoes of heathen thought to steal in when
   the question of plurality or distinction in God was discussed, and it
   is just as natural to find that the definitions presented in those
   earlier times should be quite unsuited to later times when a mingling
   of heathen elements is no longer to be feared. If the value of the
   doctrine lies in the affirmation that God is in Christ and in the
   common spirit of the church, then there arises the problem how to
   relate the peculiar existence of God in another to his existence in and
   for himself and in relation to the world in general. But there is no
   prospect of obtaining a formula which will be sufficient for all time
   inasmuch as, since we have to do only with that God-consciousness which
   is given in our self-consciousness and with the world-consciousness, we
   have no available formula for the expression of the existence of God in
   himself as distinct from his existence in the world, and we are driven
   to borrow the desired formula from speculation; but that is to be
   untrue to the nature of dogmatics. And inasmuch as all our dogmatical
   expressions for the relation of God to the world are unavoidably
   anthropomorphic, how can we expect to avoid the same defect when we
   approach the complicated problem of distinguishing the peculiar
   (personal) existence of God in Christ as an individual and his
   existence in the church as a historical whole from the omnipotent
   presence of God in the world in general, of which the other two are yet
   only parts?

   It is evident that the solution of the problem of the Trinity can be
   only approximate and progressive. Interest in it must rise ever afresh.
   We can expect no final statement. It will remain a problem. The
   customary placing of the doctrine of the Trinity at the head of the
   dogmatical system gives the misleading impression which, nevertheless,
   the history of the church contradicts, that the acceptance of this
   doctrine is the indispensable condition of faith in the redemption and
   in the founding of the kingdom of God in Christ and in the Holy Spirit.
   Such a procedure results in making speculation rather than the
   Christian consciousness the basis of Christian doctrine.
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                                III. AN ESTIMATE

   A clear apprehension of the value of Schleiermacher's theological
   system is not to be obtained apart from an examination of the manner in
   which the treatment of religious questions by the Christian scholars of
   modern times has been affected by his views, and a consideration of the
   extent to which his doctrinal discussions supply a solution of the
   difficulties that confront faith at the present. The amount of
   attention that is now being given by German students to this subject is
   significant of the large place he has secured among his countrymen, and
   a broad survey of the direction of religious thought in the world at
   large indicates the prophetical character of his insight into the
   religious needs of our own day. All that will be attempted in the
   present connection is to offer a few suggestions respecting the worth
   of his system that may be of some use to the reader whose acquaintance
   with recent theological speculation is limited.

   There were some among Schleiermacher's contemporaries who saw that the
   publication of his mature views in Der christliche Glaube constituted a
   notable landmark in Christian thought. His friend Gass wrote (see the
   entire letter in Schleiermachers Briefwechsel wit Gass, Berlin, 1852,
   pp. 193 ff.) in November, 1822: "On this point no man shall dispute me,
   that with thy dogmatics a new epoch will begin not only in this
   discipline but in the whole of theological science." The truth of this
   prediction soon began to appear. A succession of notable German
   theologians received their theological impulse from him, and while
   scarcely any one of them can be called a mere disciple of his, for he
   founded no school of thought strictly speaking, an important part of
   their contributions to theology consists in the development of the
   fruitful ideas found in germ on almost every page of his great work.
   Men like Nitsch, Twesten, Schweizer, Hofmann, Julius Müller, the famous
   present-day thinkers of the Ritschlian school, such as Harnack, Kaftan,
   and Herrmann, gladly admit their indebtedness to him, while Albrecht
   Ritschl, who gave to this school its name, owes a large portion of the
   fabric of his system to Schleiermacher. Even during his lifetime
   Schleiermacher's influence was powerfully felt in Germany. No doubt the
   peculiar charm of his personality had something to do with it, but the
   warmth of his piety and the vigor of his thinking are the chief
   reasons. For the impression made by his views has increased with the
   passage of time and the interest in them continues unabated to the
   present. No school of religious thought in that country is without
   elements of theology derived from him, not even the school that seems
   the most opposed to him, the Hegelian. By his recognition of the
   originality of the religious endowment and his insistence on its basic
   relation to all the forms of religious expression, by his admission of
   the full right of biblical criticism and at the same time his demand
   for a religious interpretation of Scripture, and by his tendency toward
   free-churchism as opposed to state-control he became the head of a
   liberal movement which adopted his free attitude toward the creeds. On
   the other hand, by taking his stand distinctly within Protestantism and
   seeking to find in the accepted creeds and confessions an inner
   connection with the Christian religion in the wide sweep of its
   implications, he imparted a stimulus to those conservative
   "confessional" theologians who aimed at maintaining the authority of
   the standards of the Lutheran and Reformed churches. At the same time
   the school of mediating theologians found a fore runner in him. The
   general dependence on Schleiermacher is evident in the attempts of men
   of all schools to solve the problems of theology along the lines
   suggested by him and to clear his system of what seemed to them
   defects. What is true of Germany is true in an appreciable degree of
   England and America. Modern theology is in no small degree a
   development of the ideas of Schleiermacher.

  I. HIS INFLUENCE ON THE CONCEPTION AND METHOD OF THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE

   In his Outlines of Theological Science (Kurze Darstellung des
   theologischen Stadiums), to which reference has been made in an earlier
   part of this work, Schleiermacher had presented a scheme of the
   treatment of the science of theology as a whole, exhibiting its various
   disciplines as expressive severally of a fundamental religious
   principle and as; constituting in their mutual relations and their
   inner unity an organism of the Christian consciousness. In his
   Glaubenslehre (the systematic presentation of the Christian faith,
   which has been set forth in the body of this work) this conception of
   theology was carried out more in detail and at great length in the
   section on dogmatics. Instead of the haphazard treatment of the common
   theological disciplines which, unfortunately, is still very general
   among theologians and in which the arrangement and method of treatment
   are determined largely by empirical considerations, with the result
   that each of these disciplines holds a purely contingent place in our
   religious reflection, their very existence and their integration in a
   system are made dependent on their fundamental relation to a
   determinate mode of faith. For example, apologetics, church history,
   practical theology, are not to be brought to the service of
   Christianity from without or borrowed from philosophy or science, but
   they spring out of the very nature of the Christian spirit as it seeks
   to express and propagate itself. Accordingly their value is always to
   find its main test in their faithfulness to the religious attitude of
   mind out of which they spring. In consequence theology is pre served
   from degenerating into a cast-iron system of doctrine or a system of
   mechanical rules which cramp and paralyze the spirit. Instead, there
   arises the necessity of the free development of theology pari passu
   with the free activity of the spirit of religion. In this way
   Schleiermacher helped to save Protestant theology from the withering
   effects of an orthodox despotism and a dry scholasticism and made it
   live again. Notwithstanding his inadequate apprehension of the nature
   of religion in general and his defective view that theology arises out
   of church needs and finds its aim in church guidance, it is to his
   lasting credit that he pointed out that the value of theological
   science and the direction of its development must al ways be determined
   by its relation to practical religious needs--in the case of
   Christianity to the imperative propagation of the Christian faith. That
   is, Christian theology serves its end only when it becomes a support
   and a guide to Christian evangelism.

   Closely allied to this service is another of like kind. Before his time
   an assumption common to the orthodox and the rationalists was that
   theology presents to our minds a sum of objective facts or truths,
   whether the knowledge of them came by external communication or
   sensible observation or by philosophical reflection aided and
   supplemented by inference. Religious faith was a consequence of
   receiving this objective knowledge. It requires only a little
   reflection to see that in any instance the theory makes the scientist,
   the philosopher, or the theologian an authority in religion to which
   the consciousness of the common man is subject. When, as is sure to
   happen with progress, portions of this supposed knowledge turn out to
   be unreliable or even bogus, faith is shaken or shattered and the
   spirit is kept in terror of losing its hold on reality by the discovery
   of new facts that contradict the system of knowledge out of which its
   religion came. Schleiermacher's insistence on the original relation of
   the religious experience to theology and doctrine elevates the life of
   the common man, curbs the proud spirit of the intellectual aristocrat,
   and gives to faith its rightful place as the root rather than the
   product of the progress of knowledge.

   Schleiermacher's influence contributed to introduce a new treatment of
   several of the theological disciplines, particularly the Philosophy of
   Religion, Apologetics, Church History, and Dogmatics.

   (1) PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

   The earlier sporadic attempts at a philosophy of religion proceeded
   according to a wrong method and on false assumptions. The opponents of
   orthodoxy attempted to adjust the facts of religion to an abstract
   doctrine of the world or of human nature arrived at independently of an
   analysis of the religious consciousness or of its actual history. The
   orthodox theory, in turn, was rather a philosophy of revelation or of
   the "plan of salvation." Both sides proceeded in ignorance of the facts
   when they assumed that the history of religion was a history of the
   increasing corruption of the original pure religion. Schleiermacher
   compelled theologians to approach the matter from a new viewpoint:
   First, by emphasizing the historical character of Christianity and
   placing it in a definite relation to the progress of religion in
   general, he drew attention to the basis of fact, without which a
   philosophy of religion is a worthless speculation, and gave a profound
   significance to it. By thus supplying an impulse to the comparative
   study of religions he forced the abandonment of the customary contrast
   between Christianity as the exclusively true religion and all other
   religions as exclusively false, which, as Professor Brown (Essence of
   Christianity, p. 175) points out, had been characteristic of Christian
   thought on the subject from Barnabas to Kant. While the state of the
   knowledge of the history of religions at the time rendered his own
   philosophy of religion of little lasting worth his conception of the
   subject anticipated modern methods.

   Second, holding religion to be an essential element of our
   self-conscious existence and viewing man whether in the individual or
   in the race as a unity, he pointed out that the unfolding of the
   religious life is bound up with the whole of our symmetrical human
   progress from the lower plane of the flesh to the higher plane of the
   spirit. There are inklings of this view in Lessing and Hume, but
   Schleiermacher was the first to present it in a well-thought-out form.
   In no other way can we attain to a philosophy of religion worthy of the
   name. A fine statement of his service in this field is given by Bender
   (Schleiermacher's Theologie mit ihren philosophischen Grundlagen,
   Vorwort, iv): "Schleiermacher's greatest service is the fruitful
   application of the analytical method to the investigation of the
   religious process in itself and in its relation to the whole spiritual
   (intelligent) life; and as a complement to this ever one-sided
   subjective method he emphatically postulated the comparative
   investigation of positive religions: that has been the firm
   starting-point and central viewpoint of all succeeding theology."

   (2) APOLOGETICS

   Apologetics has been recast. The age that closed with Hume and Kant was
   prolific in apologies for Christianity, but they all were cumbered with
   the false assumption that was held in common by the orthodox and the
   rationalists, that religion consists of doctrines to be believed. The
   difference between them was in the quantum of the credenda. Dependence
   on external authority turned apologetics into a collection of
   "evidences." With his usual keen discernment of the problems of his
   time Schleiermacher saw that the first need of the apologist was a new
   definition of that which was to receive its theoretical justification,
   a new statement of the essence of Christianity. Herein he recognized
   the historical relation of apologetics to dogmatics: it is the prius of
   dogmatics.

   There were two contentions urged by him: first, that religion is an
   integral and necessary element of our self-consciousness and hence our
   recognition of this fact must be distinguished from our estimate of its
   value; second, that Christian faith is related fundamentally to the
   person of Jesus Christ. It is to be admitted, of course, that he did
   not himself realize fully the value of a historical study of our
   religion. His own view of Christ was speculative rather than
   historical. In this he shared the defects of his time, and yet it
   remains to his credit that, as Brown says (op. cit. p. 176):
   "Schleiermacher was the first modern theologian to write a definition
   of Christianity in which the name of its founder occupies the central
   place." Here again he prepared the way for modern developments. The
   Life-of-Jesus movement is a part of the new tendency he inaugurated.

   The battle on behalf of Christianity has been fought on side-issues too
   long. The scattered and ill-ordered defense which till very recent
   times has been characteristic of English and American apologetics must
   at length make way for an analysis of its fundamental nature, a
   valuation of its traditional elements and a philosophy of its beliefs,
   if the needs of our times are to be met.

   (3) CHURCH HISTORY

   Apart from the consideration that Schleiermacher's view of the
   teleological nature of the Christian religion and his emphasis on the
   cardinal relation of its Founder toward it strengthened the new
   interest in church history, this department of theology was influenced
   by him in a special way. It was mainly through reading the Discourses
   (Reden) that the great Neander was led from Judaism to a warm Christian
   faith. The peculiar stamp of his great teacher can be detected in
   Neander's treatment of church history as history of the Christian
   religion. In our times the value of Schleiermacher's insight into the
   relation of religion to the origin and life of the religious community
   appears in the gradual displacement of ecclesiastical history by the
   history of religions.

   (4) DOGMATICS

   It is most of all in the department of dogmatics that Schleiermacher's
   theological influence has been manifest. His principles lead to the
   annihilation of dogma in the old sense of a formal doctrine necessary
   to salvation. Dogma in that sense is promulgated by authority. Its
   truth is independent, and it is to be received independently, of
   experience; it is a law to faith rather than an utterance of faith.
   Christian dogmas were a determination of the course the Christian
   religion in man must take, rather than a description of the course it
   actually does take. The Christian religion was at the bottom statutory
   and its experiential character a matter of secondary importance. The
   whole Roman Catholic system rests on this assumption, and Protestant
   theology unfortunately followed, the difference between them being in
   degree. The difference that was most in evidence was in the authority
   obeyed. Hence traditional Protestantism held to certain doctrines as
   authoritatively revealed truths. When their unification was not
   accomplished the doctrines of the faith appeared as so many membra
   disjecta. This was the form in which theology appeared in Melanchthon's
   Loci Communes and which German dogmaticians inherited from him.

   By exhibiting Christian doctrine as the expression of a distinct type
   of religious life Schleiermacher inaugurated a revolution in the
   conception and method of Christian theology. He elevated the conscious
   inner life above formal doctrine and subjected the latter to the test
   of conformity to the former. He made theology a descriptive rather than
   a normative science. Doctrinal forms become fluent rather than static.
   They become symbols of a progressive religious life and at the same
   time a means of its further development, which again reacts upon the
   doctrinal statements, so that they become in time evidently inadequate
   and must submit to reconstruction.

   His position involved a radical change in the common view of the source
   and authority of Christian doctrine. The Bible was regarded as a body
   of divine legislation or pronouncements. The proof-text method of
   handling the Scriptures was a consequence. The violence thereby done to
   the Scriptures and to Christianity itself is plain to us today.

   Schleiermacher saw that within and behind and beyond the Bible there
   was a power of spiritual life of which our Christian doctrines become
   such interpretations as the human mind at any stage of its progress is
   capable of giving to this vital reality. The various doctrines arise
   out of the manifold relations of the spirit of Christianity to the
   world of experience which itself is ever changing. This interpretation
   of the place of doctrine connects Schleiermacher with the Anabaptists
   and the early utterances of Luther rather than with the confessional
   booths.

   We may claim, therefore, that Schleiermacher has not only liberalized
   Protestant theology and paved the way for a new basis and a new method
   of treatment, but he has also spiritualized and Christianized it. For
   the liberalism of Schleiermacher was not the liberalism of the
   rationalists and the "free-thinkers" who have reduced the content of
   religion to the limits of their boasted "reason"; but it was a
   liberalism that grew out of the consciousness of a life in communion
   with God which is unutterably rich and cannot submit to limitation by
   the forms of thought or worship or organization that have arisen at any
   period of its history. Me has Christianized theology. For by positing
   the essence of Christianity as the basic principle of any system that
   can claim to exhibit Christian truth, and by finding in the person of
   Christ in his redemptive relation to us the root of all that is
   Christian, he pointed out the means of differentiating the truly
   Christian from the pseudo-Christian doctrines.

   Many objections have been made to the general principles of his
   dogmatics. Of these objections we may notice three: First, it is said
   that his conception of theology is subversive of the authority of all
   doctrine. It is true that the separate authority of all doctrinal
   formulae is destroyed. Authority is transferred to the religious
   spirit--let us say, the Spirit of God, Authority, nevertheless,
   remains, not legal, but dynamic.

   Second, it is said that Schleiermacher's view makes religion
   individualistic and subjective and does away with its normative
   character. There is no space here to answer this objection at length,
   but this may be said in reply: Religion that is not a matter of
   subjective experience is not religion at all, and doctrine that does
   not express subjective conviction is meaning less or worse; while it is
   also true that every man must be his own theologian, whatever the
   consequences. At the same time Schleiermacher has indicated a way of
   escape from mere subjectivism by emphasizing the communion-forming
   power of Christian faith. Through the continuity and development of the
   Christian communion a continuous and normal and therefore normative
   character is secured.

   Third, objection is made to his classification of dogmatics under the
   head of historical theology, and with reason. For the aim of dogmatics
   is to set forth the doctrines that are essential to Christianity, that
   is, to arrive at a final and complete statement of Christian truth. Yet
   it is to be remembered that final truth or truths can only
   approximately be known by us, All dogmas indicate simply stages in our
   approach to this goal and must be arranged in an order of succession
   upon earlier attempts to do the same thing. Our dogmas may have final
   value for ourselves, but for coming generations their value will be
   historical.

   We conclude this part of our estimate by saying that Schleiermacher has
   rendered a priceless service to theological science by compelling the
   Christian thinker to recognize the vital relation of the inner life to
   all fundamental doctrinal formulation and the necessity of testing the
   value of it by the worth of its ministry to that life.

   II. CRITICAL COMMENTS ON IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF HIS SYSTEM

   It is in the actual working out of his theological scheme that
   Schleiermacher's defects as well as his virtues as a theologian become
   most evident. A few of the most important elements of his system are
   here selected for comment with the aim of suggesting lines of criticism
   that may be carried out through the body of his theology.

   (1) THE NATURE OF RELIGION

   The first thing to notice in Schleiermacher's definition of religion is
   his method of reaching it. True to the tendency of those times to seek
   for an explanation of the nature of all the forms of human knowledge in
   psychology, Schleiermacher discovers religion to be an ultimate element
   of the self-consciousness. Accepting the common division of ultimate
   psychic facts into feeling, thought, and will, he finds that religion
   is a universal human experience in the form of feeling. This he regards
   as no inference but an immediate result of introspection. The analysis
   of individual experience is supplemented and confirmed by a survey of
   the inner nature of historical religions of all grades.

   This union of the results of an examination of personal experience and
   of historic fact is certainly necessary in order to obtain an adequate
   view of the nature of religion, but on both sides of his investigation
   Schleiermacher was cumbered by doubtful pre suppositions.

   In the first place, he assumes that religion is an elemental fact and
   the discovery of the form of the elemental experience in which it is
   seen establishes its universality; whereas it is certain that the
   religious experience is very complex and is interwoven with all our
   human experience. Besides, the nature of religion is not more truly
   ascertained by an examination of our inner experiences than it is by
   the survey of the activities which it brings into effect.
   Schleiermacher's method as carried out by him seems to make religion
   itself an effect.

   In the next place, objection must be made to his method of using the
   historical material. To seek for the common element in all the.
   religions as constitutive of their essence is to treat the lower forms
   as if for purposes of definition they were as valuable as the higher.
   The true method is to discover the inner character of the highest
   religion and to interpret the lower forms in the light of it, to wit:
   that it is to be understood as the final expression of that which can
   now be seen in the lower in germinal form. For it is only in so far as
   the spirit of the higher form can be discovered operating in the lower
   forms that they are really of any value for the purposes of definition.

   We notice, next, the definition itself. Religion is described as a form
   of feeling rather than of thought or will. I think the reasons for his
   attempt to find religion in feeling are not difficult to discover.
   There was the reaction in his mind against the traditional orthodoxy
   and the rationalism that made religion a matter fundamentally of the
   intellect and disparaged emotion, with the consequence that religion
   became dry doctrine or abstract morality with a dependence on
   authority. There was also a reaction in his mind against Kant's theory
   that religion is tributary to the demands of the categorical
   imperative, its source being in will. On the positive side, however,
   his definition of religion is a result of his own deep emotional
   experience in the devotional meetings of the Moravians, which never
   lost their worth to him, combined with the influence of the Romanticism
   that helped to banish the alien rationalism from his mind.

   His more complete determination of the nature of religion as the
   feeling of absolute dependence indicates to us the source of the
   definition. In the religious experience there is a rich and varied play
   of emotion. Why select the feeling of absolute dependence as
   fundamental and solely constitutive? The answer is that this definition
   of it coincided with his world-view and is an inference from it.
   Spinoza's self-differentiating Substance expressing itself in an
   infinity of forms, Calvin's God the absolute Will, Leibnitz' monads
   each mirroring the universe in its individuality, the scientific
   principle of Causality as the final explanation of all phenomena,
   combined to impress on his mind the conception of religion as the
   expression of the unity of the universe in the human soul or, as
   otherwise expressed, the effect of which God alone can be predicated as
   the Cause. Here God is Causality, or, as he says in one place, God is
   the Whence of our religious experience. Schleiermacher thinks God is
   given in and with the feeling of absolute dependence, but if so it is
   only as Causality he is given--he is no Personal Being. I think it is
   plain that his definition of religion is an inference from his
   conception of the world. He appears to have fallen into the common
   fault of the theologian, that of drawing his religious doctrines from
   his metaphysics instead of evolving a world-view that is a product of
   religious faith.

   His account of religion is also too meager. For religion embraces all
   the activities of the human spirit. It is at the root of the noblest,
   most elevated, most refined feeling and also of the purest morality and
   the keenest and most comprehensive mental action. Schleiermacher
   vindicates a place for religion alongside of intelligence and morality,
   whereas it is superior to them, since it supplies the impulse to the
   cultivation of them and therefore in the best sense embraces them. His
   definition of religion makes it aesthetic and destitute of moral
   quality, and seems logically to make progress in religion itself
   impossible.

   Notwithstanding, he has rendered valuable service to theology in this
   definition of religion by insisting on the worth of the emotions, so
   much disregarded by the theologians of the day. For it is certain that
   there has never been a far-reaching revival of faith apart from deep
   emotional experience.

   More than this, Schleiermacher has himself supplied the corrective of
   his own defective view in his declaration that Christianity, the
   highest religion, is teleological in character. Religion is to be
   defined from the point of view of the end that it seeks. This is to
   deny that religion is essentially feeling, for the latter sort of
   religion would be aesthetic in character and not teleological.

   (2) RELIGION, KNOWLEDGE, AND REVELATION

   Any theory of religion that finds it in a simple psychological
   experience will meet with difficulty when it tries to relate this
   experience to other fundamental activities of our nature. It is
   incumbent on the theologian to show that his view of religion issues in
   a view of the world and in a morality that satisfy the claims of our
   intelligence and our conscience. The first of these is our present
   concern. If religion does not bring us into a knowledge of reality not
   otherwise attainable its professions remain unvindicated.

   The great question is whether in the religious experience we come to
   know that God exists. If that experience be simply feeling, it can
   surely lead us nowhere beyond itself. But Schleiermacher affirms that
   in the feeling of absolute dependence God is immediately given to the
   religious man. This feeling being original and fundamental to human
   nature, religion is freed from a dependence on a knowledge of God
   obtained beforehand by purely intellectual processes and from seeking
   its justification in the acceptance of a God whose existence is a
   postulate of the practical reason. He is not to be understood as
   declaring that the speculations that arrive at a predication of God's
   existence are useless or invalid, but that the knowledge so obtained is
   not religious knowledge and that it can constitute no part of
   dogmatics. We do not proceed from a knowledge of God to a religious
   experience, nor do we reason from the religious experience to the
   knowledge of God, for the religious experience and the
   God-consciousness are one and the same. It is not to be assumed that
   the God given in religious feeling is identical with the God whose
   existence is predicated as the outcome of speculative processes. That
   remains a problem to be solved. Thus far his position is sound.

   When Schleiermacher goes on to say that we are aware of God as the
   Whence (Cause) of our religious self-consciousness, it is difficult to
   see in what respect this statement differs from the affirmation that
   the being of God is for us an inference from the experience of
   dependence. If this be so it is not clear why an inference from the
   other forms of our experience may not be equally valuable for our
   needs. If religion is independent of science it must surely be
   unprogressive, for there is no impulse to knowledge in an unqualified
   feeling. If, however, the religious experience be more comprehensively
   stated and is made to embrace the moral and the intellectual, the
   defect indicated may be overcome and the statement may still hold good
   that it is in the religious experience that we are truly aware of God.

   If this be not granted, then we are shut up to one of two alternatives.
   Either we have only the experience of a unique feeling or at least an
   idea which we objectify and project into a realm beyond all phenomenal
   existence, so that God becomes only a name for a certain reflection of
   our consciousness; or else for our knowledge of the existence of God we
   are ultimately dependent on the information which a competent authority
   communicates to us.

   With regard to the second of these, even if it be true that we first
   came to believe in the existence of God through the affirmation of some
   trusted human friend and to that extent we obtained a knowledge of
   God's existence as a supposed fact in the same manner in which many
   other facts are made known to us, still the competency of any person or
   body of persons to witness to the existence of God as an objective fact
   cannot be admitted. Mere "information" can only avail to place his
   existence among the complex of observable facts, but a God whose
   existence can be so described is no God. The statement, "There is a
   God," can have meaning to anyone only on the condition that it appeals
   to some want of his nature and makes him aware of himself in relation
   to his higher destiny.

   Turn to the other alternative. According to Schleiermacher's account,
   the predication of the existence of God may be nothing more than a
   psycho logical function. This is to leave us without any adequate
   explanation of the invincible tendency of the human mind to attach
   universal validity to its idea of the existence of God and at the same
   time to attach to it infinite worth. The difficulty arises out of his
   defective view of the religious consciousness. It does remain true that
   it is in the religious experience God is given. We become aware of him
   then. The existence of God is a dogma of religious faith.

   God is an object of religious knowledge; not that herein we have a
   positive addition to the sum of our knowledge, any more than in the
   affirmation of a moral judgment we introduce the knowledge of an
   additional collection of facts. Moral reality is given in and with
   moral experience. The certainty that we have moral knowledge is found
   in the moral experience. Just so is it with religious knowledge. It
   springs out of religious experience and is implicated in it. That there
   is a specifically religious experience Schleiermacher abundantly
   established.

   The question is, Wherein does this religious knowledge consist? I
   apprehend that it is unnecessary to assert that knowledge about the
   objects of sense-perception, whether one's own or another's, cannot be
   called religious knowledge. The knowledge of events recorded in the
   Scriptures, the knowledge of ante-mundane or post-mundane facts, the
   knowledge of facts which angels or inspired persons are supposed to
   communicate to us, the knowledge of the state of departed spirits which
   the Society for Psychical Research may announce--none of these things,
   vary as they may from the absolutely sure and sublime to the absolutely
   ridiculous, can be designated as religious knowledge for us unless they
   have their source in a religious experience. We may be made neither
   more nor less religious by getting this information. Neither is
   knowledge of a moral law and its operations in itself religious
   knowledge. Thus far Schleiermacher's contention must be granted.

   But in his description of the nature of religion he misses the
   essential point. The religious experience is governed by the
   consciousness of personality. In it the man conies to true
   self-consciousness. He knows in it his own worth because in it he comes
   to know another personality in whom he finds the fulfilment of his
   longings and the end of his being. It is this recognition of and
   self-commitment to a personality in whom the desires of his soul find
   satisfaction that constitute his religion. Some of its forms are very
   crude but it is universal. In many people it may appear first in
   absolute trust and devotion to a father or mother, or it may reach its
   climax in faith in Christ, but everywhere it consists in a
   personal--thinking, willing, feeling--relation to a dominant
   personality.

   In this religious experience there is religious knowledge. It is the
   knowledge of personality. In religion I become aware that there is a
   personality to whom I may yield myself absolutely, to whom,
   accordingly, I owe everything. This personality we call God. The
   relations in which I find myself with him are most fitly described in
   the terms of human, personal relation ship. From this point onward we
   enter upon the task of reinterpreting the world of sensibility and the
   world of moral conduct in terms of this personality. This is to give a
   religious interpretation of the world. In the knowledge of God there is
   given, therefore, a knowledge of the world; not that new facts are
   added, but all facts are made new. In the capacity of religious
   experience to furnish this new interpretation of the world the claim
   that we know God finds its final vindication.

   It is plain that Schleiermacher's view of religion in relation to
   knowledge involves a new construction of the idea of revelation. Kaftan
   (Dogmatik, §4) complains, and rightly, of the obscure place he allows
   it. From his apprehension of religion as subjective condition rather
   than objective truth this is to be expected. At the same time here also
   he has offered suggestions that go far beyond his own views. One of
   these is that, for the Christian, revelation is not to be considered
   apart from the person of Christ. An other is that it inheres in his
   personality. A third is that it affects us not merely as knowing
   subjects but practically, that is, it is inseparable from the
   experience of salvation. This means, substantially, that revelation is
   religious in its nature, not merely that it concerns religious matters,
   but it is not to be posited in any case where the religious
   consciousness is not an element in the communication of that which is
   revealed. Revelation can occur to any man only in so far forth as he is
   religious. Revelation is saving. To say that we have a revelation from
   God is to say that we have come into a consciousness of blessedness in
   relation to him.

   This seems to carry with it the acceptance of Schleiermacher's
   contention that revelation is to be posited of a personality and the
   impression he makes on our minds. For the Christian, therefore, Christ
   is revelation, not merely a revealer. What he said and did constitute
   revelation to us only in that his deeds and words are the manifestation
   to us of a personality whose advent into the sphere of our activity
   effects a change in our relations with God. If all our relations
   Godward find their determination in him, then he is the whole of
   revelation to us. That which is said about him is revelation in a
   secondary sense, No statement of objective fact can itself be
   revelation, for revelation is never mere information.

   The bearing of this conception of revelation on the import of the
   predictive clement of the Scriptures is obvious. The references in the
   New Testament, for example, to the things to come appear less in the
   character of descriptions of events and conditions yet future, than as
   utterances of the assurance of faith. That is, our future relations to
   God and the course of affairs cannot be in opposition to our present
   state of blessedness. On such an interpretation a discovery that an
   apostolic writer was mistaken in regard to actual matters of fact in
   the present or the future would give no shock to faith. It seems even
   to imply that inspired men have no knowledge of the future in the same
   sense in which we have a knowledge of any fact. This is the view that
   is brought out in Schleiermacher's Prophetical Articles. All
   eschatological representations become symbols of a spiritual hope, not
   forestatements of events. Their value consists not in any positive
   knowledge they convey but in the inspiration they give to faith and
   hope. For the times when Schleiermacher wrote this was a revolutionary
   interpretation of prophecy, and even in our own day it makes progress
   slowly, but it underlies the whole of the new movement in biblical
   interpretation.

   At the same time it must be maintained that there is a knowledge of the
   future given to faith. For the believer the gospel of Christ brings a
   guarantee of the ultimate character of future events--they can bring
   him nothing but good. A forecast of the future issues out of faith. It
   is impossible for the Christian to believe that he will be abandoned by
   God, The future cannot bring his Blessed relation to God to an end. The
   Christian knowledge of the future is a faith-knowledge. It is knowledge
   of a higher order than that which sense-perception or a philosophy of
   being can produce. It is a knowledge of our eternal relations with God
   without which all other knowledge evaporates in phantasy. Without this
   knowledge all thought of the future is bound to end in despair. It is
   the only knowledge that enables us to say that for men there is any
   future whatsoever. This is what gives a deep solemnity to the forecast
   of the future found in the New Testament. That forecast is based on the
   confidence that "whether we live or die we are the Lord's." Had we
   nothing more than this we might well rest content.

   (3) CHRISTIANITY, CHRIST, JESUS

   The order in which the above words occur is indicative of the method of
   Schleiermacher's approach to the theological treatment of history. The
   merit of having been the first of modern theologians to frame a
   definition of Christianity in which the name of its Founder appears
   central is subject to qualification. The governing principle of his
   theological construction does not readily make room for the activity of
   a historical personage as a factor in religion. His whole system is
   rooted in a conception of religion rather than in an apprehension of
   personality. In keeping with this viewpoint he proceeds from a
   conception of the nature of Christianity to such a representation of
   the person of Christ as shall be in harmony with it. Consequently one
   of his chief problems is how to relate Christ to Christianity. The
   difficulty of the problem increases in ratio with the growth of the
   historical spirit and our progress in the knowledge of the actual
   events of Jesus life. The modern aptitude for historical study had been
   so far aroused in his time that he felt the seriousness of the problem
   and tried to point the direction of its solution. In an examination of
   his speculations on the subject we are to keep in mind that,
   consistently with his mystical habit of mind and his relative
   depreciation of personality, Christ (i.e., Jesus) could scarcely be to
   him a basis of theology but rather a problem for theology. If some of
   his statements may be taken to represent an opposite view they are in
   consistent with his more fundamental doctrine or they must be
   interpreted in the light of the latter. It is significant that he says
   it is open to the theologian to choose without disparagement either one
   of two courses: either to proceed from a doctrine of the person of
   Christ to a doctrine of his work or from a doctrine of his work to a
   doctrine of his person.

   Schleiermacher's representation of the manner in which Christ relates
   himself to the Christian is two fold. At one time he says that
   everything in Christianity is to be referred to the historical fact of
   Christ's advent into the sphere of our activity and the original
   impression his person made. That impression, he says, is retained in
   the Christian communion and perpetuated in the world through being
   communicated by this communion to those persons who come within it.

   His other statement on the subject is to the effect that Jesus
   possessed a unique God-consciousness and that his God-consciousness,
   being communicated to believers, becomes redemption to them. The former
   view is connected with the idea that faith is a personal act directed
   toward a personal object. The latter view is more consistent with the
   idea that Christ is simply the first in an unbroken succession. In the
   one case Jesus seems to hold the God-relation to believers; in the
   other case he seems to stand in an archetypal relation to them. In the
   one case Christianity is an attitude toward Christ; in the other Christ
   is Christianity.

   Again, it is noteworthy that our theologian continually uses the name
   Christ instead of the name Jesus. This is not accidental. It indicates
   the point of view from which he construes the extant materials relating
   to the historical career of Jesus. It is well known also that he makes
   the Gospel of John rather than the Synoptics the main scriptural source
   of his doctrine of the person of Christ. This preference for John's
   Gospel is similarly significant of his method of determining what
   elements of the gospels are of value for the dogmatician. The
   narratives are evaluated on the basis of a standard derived from
   another source. Only those portions are esteemed to have interest for
   the dogmatician which serve to set forth the character of Jesus as
   Redeemer. He goes even farther and decides on the same basis what sort
   of affirmations may be made concerning his mental and physical life:
   for example, that his physical, mental, and moral growth must have been
   normal. He makes the perpetuation of Christ's own self-presentation in
   the consciousness of the historical Christian communion the ground for
   the affirmation of a historical personal life corresponds to it, for
   otherwise, he says, this consciousness could never have arisen.

   In keeping with this method of construing history he dismisses the
   accounts of the resurrection on the ground that faith in Christ is
   independent of them. Hereby he exposes himself to the charge which
   Schweitzer (Von Reimarus zu Wrede, (1-66) against him: "Schleiermacher
   did not seek the Jesus of history but the Jesus Christ of his
   Glaubenslehre, that is, the historic personality who is fitted to the
   self-consciousness of the Redeemer which he presents. The empirical
   reality simply does not exist for him. . . . . Historical questions
   relating to the life of Jesus are for him only momenta in his
   dialectic."

   The point is well taken, though overstated. It finds illustration in
   his classification of the heresies relating to the person of Christ.
   They are described, not according to their use of material alien to the
   character of Jesus as it is depicted in the narratives of the
   evangelists or according to their neglect of essential facts in his
   career, but according to the manner in which they annul the redemption
   as Schleiermacher conceives it. That is to say, his conception of
   Christianity determines his doctrine of the person of the Christ and
   this again becomes the criterion of the worth and, to some extent, of
   the trustworthiness of the New Testament accounts of Jesus. But in this
   respect Schleiermacher was not a "sinner above all the other
   Galileans." Both Catholic and Protestant theologians have been led to
   substitute a metaphysical concept, a hypothetical personage, for a
   historical personality. Not until the Life-of-Jesus movement began in
   modern times was the loss realized. Hegelianism with its Christ was
   just another case of the substitution of an abstract idea for a
   concrete person. Transcendental philosophy gave us an intellectual
   concept christened with the Redeemer's name, but left us to discover
   that in place of Jesus we had only an abstraction, stone instead of
   bread.

   The criticism that Schleiermacher failed to avoid the a priori method
   of construing the personality of Jesus is to be modified, however, by
   reference to the emphasis he placed on the religious experience as a
   source of knowledge. He said that the Christian consciousness is a
   continuation of the God-consciousness of Jesus. This should lead to an
   examination of the self-consciousness of Jesus, but Schleiermacher
   failed here to follow his own clue and fell back on the dogmatical
   reconstruction of the person of Christ.

   The error is a serious one from the point of view of history as well as
   religion. Our conception of Christ and of the salvation he brought must
   ever submit to the test of historical research if either he or his
   salvation is to be a factor in the lives of men. To express the same
   idea, in axiomatic form, the Christ of theology must agree with the
   Jesus of the gospels. Nay more, that conception of salvation which is
   truly Christian, if Jesus of Nazareth is the founder of Christianity,
   must always represent such a salvation as could arise out of the deeds
   and words, the personal character, of Jesus. The inner certainty of a
   moral renewal coming to us in connection with our objective examination
   of the historic facts is an indispensable factor in our estimate of
   him, but it stands in the second rank. Otherwise we should never be.
   certain that the being we call our Christ is the same with Jesus of
   Nazareth, and we might have to seek the historical origin of our
   religion in another direction.

   (4) PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICISM

   Schleiermacher's distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism has
   become famous: "Protestantism makes the relation of the individual to
   the church dependent on his relation to Christ; Catholicism makes the
   relation of the individual to Christ dependent on his relation to the
   church." It has been severely criticized by Ritschl. He says:

   This formula, however, is inconsistent with the very principle with
   which Schleiermacher enters upon the doctrine of redemption, namely,
   that the consciousness of redemption through Christ is referred to the
   mediation of his religious fellowship. It was only because
   Schleiermacher was unable to develop this idea that he lapsed into the
   opposite formula in his Glaubenslehre. This formula, however, is false.
   For even the evangelical church's right relation to Christ is both
   historically and logically conditioned by the fellowship of believers;
   historically, because a man always finds the community already existing
   when he arrives at faith, nor does he attain this end without the
   action of the community upon him; logically, because no action of
   Christ upon men can be conceived except in accordance with the standard
   of Christ's antecedent purpose to found a community. This position,
   however, is distinguished from the Catholic view by the fact that it
   pays no attention to a legal organization of the community of
   believers. . . . . Schleiermacher's formula, moreover, is merely the
   reflection of the pietistic disintegration of the idea of the church.
   [15]

   On the question of Schleiermacher's consistency Ritschl is undoubtedly
   in the right. The basis of Schleiermacher's theology is non-churchly.
   So also is every system of thought which regards the religious
   experience as the expression of immediate relationship with God, or,
   transferring it to the Christian realm, with Christ. Now if there is
   any single force whose creative influence in the Reformation is more
   marked than others it is the spirit of individualism. It is true that
   this principle was imperfectly grasped and only partially recognized by
   the Protestant thinkers who erected the Protestant church systems and
   the Protestant creeds. The full admission of its claims would have
   clothed the specter of Separatism (a sort of nightmare to Ritschl
   himself) with flesh and blood and apparently have allowed free play to
   the combination of revolutionary forces known as "Anabaptism." The
   spirit of religious freedom consequently was confined within very
   narrow limits, and whenever it be came too self-assertive it was
   crushed. But individualism revived in the eighteenth century, and now
   at length it has won on all sides a recognition of its surpassing moral
   vigor, evangelistic zeal, and social firmness. The future seems to be
   its own.

   Though Schleiermacher belonged to this modern movement his theological
   position was compromised by the necessity he felt of avoiding a breach
   in church relations. The attempt he made to mediate between
   individualism and churchism is in some respects admirable. But it
   forced him to use the word church in a double sense, the religious
   sense and the corporate sense. The most signal instance of this is seen
   in his treatment of the doctrine of baptism, where he views the
   baptismal act as the exercise of the church's will to receive the
   baptized into that communion from which all the operations which affect
   the new birth issue, so that the act is to be considered as in some
   sense the communication of the Holy Spirit. Baptism becomes the final
   act in the series in which the church expresses its will to extend
   itself, which it does by receiving new members. That is to say, the act
   of baptism becomes efficacious, not because of the will of the
   recipient, but by virtue of the will of the church which to all intents
   and purposes is to be regarded as identical with the will of Christ.
   Plainly the term church can refer here only to the corporate
   organization whose officials administer the "sacrament."

   This position is substantially the same as the Roman Catholic. When
   Ritschl tries to clear away the non-churchly features of
   Schleiermacher's theology at this point he only succeeds in making it
   more Roman Catholic in tone. [16]

   So far then as concerns the issue between these two theologians we must
   takes sides with Schleiermacher. The two mutually contradictory
   attitudes represent the two inconsistent momenta in Luther's movement,
   the churchly and the evangelical.

   Schleiermacher's statement is nevertheless open to serious objection.
   In the first place, his method of arriving at the distinction is
   defective, namely, by ascertaining the principal grounds urged by each
   for rejecting the other's view. The basis of attack in controversies is
   sure to reflect the prevailing ideas of the time, but after all it may
   indicate a mere side-position, because the parties to the strife may
   have failed to apprehend the full significance of what is attacked or
   defended. A better method of reaching the bottom principles of the two
   movements would be to trace historically the process of their
   differentiation from a common beginning.

   In the next place, the form of Schleiermacher's statement is open to
   objection because in saying that, for the Protestant, the relation of
   the man to the church is dependent on his relation to Christ the church
   is apparently treated as the end to which Christ is the means. It is
   difficult here again to tell what he means by the church, whether the
   spiritual fellowship of the saved or the ecclesiastical organization.
   .If it be the latter, then the statement is not true to the practice of
   those Protestant churches that admit to member ship many who are:
   confessedly without conscious relation to Christ. If by church he means
   the spiritual fellowship of the saved, his statement is substantially
   true, but it is still exposed to the criticism that it makes this
   fellowship of a higher character than the relation to Christ which is a
   means to it. These two relations ought to be regarded as one in
   principle.

   The trouble with this whole attempt is that it introduces into
   dogmatics an artificial factor. The starting-point of theological
   activity is not the consciousness of an ecclesiastical body but the
   consciousness of the individual. The fact is that the great doctrinal
   systems have sprung from this source and have afterward been adopted by
   some church as an approximate expression of common convictions.
   Otherwise theological freedom would be crushed at the beginning. The.
   unsuccessful efforts of Schleiermacher to make out an inner connection
   between his views and the creeds show how he was hampered by this
   artificial rule. He, as well as Ritschl, was afraid of Separatism.

   His opposition to the idea that each man holds a personal relation to
   Christ was reinforced by his philosophy: the universe is a unity; the
   creative will of God had reference to the world, not to individuals;
   the redemption has to be interpreted as the purification of human
   nature universally, not as individual purification. According to this
   we may well ask, How can there be any recognition of the individual
   whatever? Can he be anything more than a temporary eddy in the
   ceaseless stream of personal life? The whole work of redemption becomes
   the transmutation of the universal sin-life into a new life-whole. It
   seems then that it is not the man who is lost or saved but human
   nature, and ultimately salvation becomes a world-process.

   Naturally enough, when Schleiermacher tries to justify the Protestant
   practice of infant baptism he falls back into the realism of the
   Catholics: the children are within the church and stand in an ordered
   relation to the operation of divine grace; the church extends salvation
   to the individual by propagating its religious consciousness in him, by
   extending its fellowship to him. The radical defect in Schleiermacher's
   theology is found in his essentially erroneous views of human
   personality.

   We are not precluded hereby from a recognition of the value of his
   contention that the religious life is a community life. It is true that
   there is a necessary connection between faith and the communion of the
   faith. A church, as an association of believers, is the organism in
   which faith seeks its full expression, The isolated believer cannot
   rise to the full assurance of the objective truth of his faith, or
   propagate it, or realize its ethical character, without the community,

   But while the believer and the community of faith are mutually
   involved, the primacy belongs to the former. Faith is an attitude
   Godward of the personal, individual consciousness. It is an act in
   which the man, in response to the self-revelation of God, devoted
   himself to the end of his being. The opposite view would render true
   human progress impossible. It would make each man, so far forth as he
   is religious, merely a product of the community life. Personal
   initiative, the prime factor in all great revivals of religion, would
   fall away. For in all ages the impulse to religious progress lies in a
   new consciousness of personal Nation with God. Thus the man is truly
   greater than the church. Roman Catholicism must yield to the spirit of
   the true Protestantism.

   CONCLUSION

   By the application of his powerful dialectic to the varied spiritual
   material at his command Schleiermacher succeeded in producing a system
   which for religious warmth and inspiration has never been surpassed in
   the history of theology. But this system is superior to the fundamental
   conception of religion that he placed at its base. For the feeling of
   absolute dependence comes short of a constructive principle of theology
   and has no meaning apart from the theory of the world and of man from
   which it originates. Some of his followers have endeavored to discard
   the aid of philosophy and metaphysics in the unfolding of a doctrinal
   system, with no greater success than he.

   Notwithstanding, it remains the imperishable honor of Schleiermacher
   that he grasped the whole problem of theology in a new way and
   compelled theologians of all schools to follow him. He vindicated for
   the religious life the claim to utter supremacy in any theory of the
   relations of God, man, and the world, lie has gradually forced modern
   theology to attempt the radical reconsideration of every traditional
   doctrine. The truth is that he has revived and enforced the standpoint
   of many of the Anabaptists of the Reformation period and prepared the
   way for the rejection of the mediaeval scholasticism and the ancient
   Catholicism which the Reformers dared not abandon. Moreover, his whole
   treatment of the problems of theology is so rich in suggestion that
   every theologian of the present day is his debtor and many of his most
   stimulating ideas are still awaiting development.
     __________________________________________________________________

   [15] Justification and Reconciliation, 549 (2d ed., English transl.).

   [16] Ritschl's views on the subject are strongly brought out in his
   Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, par. 89.
     __________________________________________________________________

WORKS OF REFERENCE

   Among the works which may be consulted in a study of Schleiermacher and
   his place in Protestant theology are the following:

  I. HIS OWN PUBLISHED WRITINGS

   Der christliche Glaube. 4 vols. Gotha, 1889.

   Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums. Halle: Otto Hendel. (A
   translation, Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, including Lücke's
   Reminiscences, by W. Farrer, was published in Edinburgh, 1850.)

   Monologen. Halle: Otto Hendel.

   Platons Werke, 1804, 1817, 1828.

   Gundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, Berlin, 1803.

   Discourses on Religion. Transl. by John Oman. London, 1893.

   Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher. Ed. W. Robert son Nicoll.

   Sämmtliche Werke. Berlin, 1840.

  II. STUDIES OF SCHLEIERMACHER

   Schleiermachers Briefwechsel mit Gass. Berlin, 1852.

   The Life and Letters of Schleiermacher. Translated by Miss Rowan.

   Erinnerungen von Schleiermacher. Lücke.

   Schleiermachers und C. S. von Brinkmans Gang durch die Brudergemeine.
   Leipzig, 1905.

   Schleiermachers Theologie mit ihren philosophischen Grundlagen. By W.
   Bender. Nordlingen, 1878.

   Schleiermachers Reden über Religion. By A. Ritschl. Bonn, 1874.

   Die Entwicklung des Religionsbegriffs bei Schleiermacher. By E. Huber.
   Leipzig, 1901.

   Schleiermachers "Glaubenslehre" in ihrer Bedeutung für Vergangenheit
   und Zukunft. By C. Clemen. Giessen, 1905.

   Die Grundlagen der Christologie Schleiermachers. By H. Bleek. Freiburg,
   1898.

   Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl. D. F. Kattenbusch. Giessen.

   Schleiermachers Vermächtnis an unsere Zeit. Kalthoff. Leipzig.

   Christentum und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre. By H.
   Scholz. Berlin, 1909.

   La philosophie religieuse de Schleiermacher. By Edmond Cramaussel.
   Paris, 1909.

   Numerous small pamphlets.

  III. FOR THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT DURING THE PERIOD UNDER SURVEY

   History of the Christian Philosophy of Religion. By Pünjer; transl. by
   Hastie. Edinburgh, 1887.

   History of Protestant Theology in Germany. By I. A. Dorner; transl. by
   Robson and Taylor. Edinburgh, 1871.

   History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century. By Lichtenberger;
   transl. by Hastie. Edinburgh, 1889.

   The Development of Theology. By O. Pfieiderer; transl. by Smith. New
   York, 1893.

   Das Bild des Christentums bei den grossen deutschen Idealisten. By
   Lülman. Berlin, 1901.

   Critical History of Free Thought in Relation to Religion. By A. S.
   Farrar, New York, 1863.

   Leland's View of the Deistical Writers, London, 1837.

   Religious Thought in England. By J. Hunt, London, 1870 ff.

   Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century. By J. Hunt. 1896.

   History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. By Sir L.
   Stephen. New York, 1902.

   Rational Theology and Christian Thought in England in the Seventeenth
   Century. By J. Tulloch. Edinburgh, 1872.

   Manual of Religious Thought in Britain in the Nineteenth Century. By J.
   Tulloch. New York, 1885.

   The Problem of Faith and Freedom. By John Oman. London, 1906.

   Von Reimarus zu Wrede. By A. Schweitzer. Tübingen, 1906.

   Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus. By O. Ritschl. Vol. I. Leipzig,
   1908.
     __________________________________________________________________

INDEX

INDEX

   Agnosticism, 94

   Albertini, 11, 17, 39.

   Anabaptists, 70, 72, 73 ff., 98, 102, 119, 328, 334.

   Analogy (Butler's), 85 ff.

   Angels, 161 ff.

   Antinomianism, 76.

   Apologetics, 134 ff., 304 f.

   Apostles' Creed (mentioned), 70.

   Aristotle, 25.

   Arminianism, 76, 89.

   Arianism, 290.

   Arndt, John, 59, 99.

   Asceticism, 195.

   Athanasian Creed, 290.

   Atonement, 19, 20, 70, 71, 78, 89.

   Aufklärung. See Illuminism.

   Augustine, 25, 113.

   Authority (in religion), 26, 74 f., 95 f., 225, 253 f., 308 f.

   Bacon, 79.

   Baptism, 72 f., 73, 230, 253, 258 f., 264, 329; infant, 73, 230 f., 260
   f., 333.

   Baptists, 73, 89, 99.

   Barby, 10, 15, 16, 23.

   Bengel, 100.

   Berkeley, Bishop, 83, 87.

   Bible, 71, 86, 150, 157, 196, 252 ff., 257 ff., 307.

   Boehler, 102.

   Bunyan, 99.

   Butler, 83 ff.

   Calvin, 25, 68, 113, 231, 312.

   Calvinism, 4, 76, 86.

   Canon of Scripture, 255 ff.

   Categorical Imperative, 95.

   Catholicism, 70 f., 146 f., 327 f., 333.

   Chalcedonian Formula (mentioned), 70.

   Chiliasm, 227.

   Christ: humiliation of, 226; incarnation of, 84, 137 f., 233, 248;
   person of, 11, 26, 70, 132 f , 136 ff., 145, 152 ff., 174, 176, 180,
   186, 199, 228, 322 ff.; resurrection and ascension, 212, 226;
   sufferings of, 224; supernatural origin of, 198 f., 206 ff., 216; work
   of, 134 f., 200 ff., 213 ff., 220, 224.

   Christianity, definition of, 132, 133 ff., 305, 322 f.

   Church: definition of, 117, 237 ff., 329 ff.; Calvinist or Reformed, 4,
   26, 42, 57 f., 76, 148; invisible and visible, 132, 133 ff., 305, 322
   f.; Lutheran, 57 f., 76, 148; Roman, see Catholicism; origin of, 239
   ff.; perfecting of, 273 ff., 283; permanent features of, 251 ff.

   Churches: 270 f.; free, 101, 299.

   Church and state, 57 ff., 76, 225 f.

   Church and world, 249 ff., 269 ff.

   Communion: religious, 125, 133, 173 f.; Christian, 134, 139 f., 153,
   195, 197, 201 f., 215, 224, 228 f. See also Church.

   Conversion, 229 ff.

   Cosmology, 157, 163.

   Covenant theology, 184.

   Creation, 156 f., 199, 210, 214 f., 218, 233.

   Creeds and confessions, 69 f., 75, 149 ff., 156, 206 f., 289.

   Critique of Pure Reason, 93 f., 105.

   Critique of the Practical Reason, 94 f.

   Cromwell, Oliver, 99.

   Decrees of God, 233.

   Deism, 81 ff., 93, 105.

   Democracy, 46, 57.

   Dependence, absolute, 121, 124, 163.

   Descartes, 25, 90.

   Devil, 161 ff., 183.

   Diderot, 83.

   Discourses on Religion, Pref. viii., 32, 37 f., 38, 39, 106 ff., 305 f.

   Dissenters, 76, 99.

   Docetism, 146, 209.

   Dogma, Christian, 149 ff., 151.

   Dogmatics: materials of, 149 ff.; meaning of, 116 ff., 143, 306; origin
   of, 141 ff.; method of, 144 ff., 151 f., 157, 164, 176.

   Dort, Synod of (mentioned), 76, 89.

   Ebionitism, 146.

   Election, doctrine of, 240 ff., 244.

   Encyclopaedists, 13.

   Ernesti, 8, 92.

   Ethics, 119 ff.

   Evangelical revival of the eighteenth century, 97 ff.

   Evil: kinds of, 87, 161, natural, 187; source of, 161, 227; relation to
   sin, 87, 191.

   Evolution, 123 f.

   Faith, 195, 196, 225. 229, 238, 301.

   Fetichism, 127, 329.

   Forgiveness, 232 f.

   Foreknowledge, divine, 343 f.

   Foreordination. See election.

   Formula of Concord, 76.

   Freedom, 121, 153 f., 190.

   Future punishment, 12, 19, 277, 282 f.

   Future state, 49 f., 241 f., 244, 275 ff., 281 ff., 321 f.;
   intermediate, 279.

   Gnadenfrei, 8, 32.

   God: meaning of, 122 f., 206 ff., 313, 318 f.; attributes, 90, 163 ff.,
   166 ff., 191 ff., 201, 283 ff.; proofs of existence, 90, 155, 315 ff.

   God-consciousness, 122, 130, 135, 153, 174, 176, 186, 201 f.

   Grace, 176; 189 f., 194 ff., 200 ff., 229 f., 284.

   Grotius, Hugo, 89.

   Guilt, 182 f., 227, 232; of the race, 187 f. See also Sin.

   Halle, 4, 11, 19. 24 f., 29, 47, 100.

   Harms, Pastor, 106, 110.

   Hegelianism, 298, 326.

   Herbert of Cherbury, Lord, 81.

   Herder, 16, 35, 93.

   Heresy, 145 ff., 325.

   Holiness, 192.

   Holy Spirit, 138, 245 ff., 255 f., 257, 267, 273.

   Human depravity, 13, 178 ff., 183. See also Sin.

   Hume, David, 13, 87 ff., 95 ff., 303, 304.

   Illuminism, 13, 91, 106.

   Immortality, 95. See also Future State.

   Incarnation. See Person of Christ.

   Infallibility, 272 f.

   Judaism, 82, 129, 131 f., 136, 188.

   Judgment, final, 280 f.

   Justification, 71, 229, 232 ff.

   Kant, 16, 25, 28, 37, 93 ff., 312.

   Keys, office of, 253, 265 f.

   Kingdom of God, 195, 219 f., 224 f., 235 f., 239 f., 267, 268, 284,
   286, 288.

   Knox, John, 68.

   Kurze Darstellung, etc., 51, 110, 299.

   Lambeth Articles (mentioned), 76.

   Lavater, 16.

   Leibnitz, 9:, 113, 313.

   Lessing, 16, 25, 92, 113, 303.

   Locke, 25, 79, 80 f.

   Logos, doctrine of, 290.

   Luther, 25, 68, 98, 113.

   Lutheranism, 15, 76. See also Church.

   Manichaeism, 145, 178, 183, 189, 190.

   Melanchthon, 25, 68, 307.

   Methodism, 101 ff.

   Ministry, Christian, 253, 256 ff.

   Miracles, 82, 84, 94, 160, 220.

   Mohammedanism, 129, 131 f., 136.

   Monologues, 109 f.

   Monotheism, 128 ff., 136 f.

   Moravian Brethren, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 19,43.

   Moravianism, 15, 23, 101 ff., 312.

   Mysticism, 14, 96.

   Neander, 305 f .

   New Birth. See Regeneration.

   Nicene Symbol (mentioned), 70.

   Niesky, 9, 14, 15 f.

   Nonconformists, 76.

   Obduracy, 190.

   Origen, 25, 292.

   Pantheism, 108, 129 f.

   Pelagianism, 145, 178, 189, 190.

   Perfection: of Christ, 196 ff.; of man, 172 ff., 177, 179, 187, 205; of
   the world, 170 ff., 187.

   Philosophy of religion, I26 ff., 302 ff.

   Pietism, 15, 99 ff.

   Piety. See Religion.

   Plato, 8, 25, 32, 42, 113.

   Polytheism, 128.

   Prayer, 160, 253, 266 ff.

   Preservation, 156 ff., 109.

   Priesthood, 125.

   Primitive man, 174, 183, 205.

   Protestantism, 53, 67 ff., 75, 77 ff., 146 ff., 306, 327 f., 333.

   Providence, 26, 285.

   Punishment, 227, 232. See also Future Punishment.

   Puritanism, 99.

   Quakers, 73, 99.

   Race-consciousness, 173, 180 f., 182 f., 201, 226, 246.

   Rationalism, 4, 37, 38 ff., 73, 89, 93 f., 97, 146, 304.

   Reason, 253 f.

   Reconciliation, 216 ff.

   Redeemer. See Christ.

   Redemption, 134 f., 176, 190; consciousness of, 151; how wrought, 196
   ff., 213 f.

   Reden. See Discourses.

   Regeneration, 160, 227 ff., 234, 259, 269 f.

   Religion: definition of, 106 ff., 119 ff., 154 f., 172 f.; nature of,
   320 ff.; kinds and stages of, 126 ff.; natural, 40, 82, 83 ff., 132 f.;
   positive, 132; revealed, 79, 83 ff., 132 f.; supernatural, 79, 81; true
   and false, 127.

   Renaissance, 73.

   Repentance, 229, 232.

   Resurrection, the, 277, 279 f.

   Revelation, 81 f., 86, 92, 96 f., 133 f., 201, 205, 314 ff., 319 ff.

   Revival, evangelical, 97 f.

   Righteousness, 193.

   Ritschl, Albrecht, 298, 327 f.

   Roman Catholicism, 95, 307, 327. See also Catholicism.

   Romanticism, 38, 105, 312.

   Sabellianism, 209.

   Sack, 27, 33, 108.

   Sanctification, 227 f., 233 ff., 280.

   Skepticism, 13, 14, 16.

   Schlegel, F. R., 36, 32 f.

   Schwenkfeldt, Caspar, 73.

   Scholasticism, 209.

   Scriptures. See Bible.

   Second Coming of Christ, 277 f.

   Separatism, 43, 101, 195, 328, 331.

   Sin: consciousness of, 175, 178 f., 184. 186, 187, 190, 235, 284;
   doctrine of, 177 ff.; hereditary, 181 f., 187, 210; actual, 184 f.;
   God's relation to, 188 ff., 198 f.; punishments of, 100, 193 f., 201,
   2l6, 222.

   Socinianism, 76, 78.

   Spangenberg, 102.

   Spener, 99 f.

   Spinoza, 25, 90, 113, 312.

   Spirit of Christ. See Holy Spirit.

   Spirit of God. See Holy Spirit.

   State churches, 99. See also Church and State.

   Supernatural and natural, 231 f., 240, 248.

   Supper, Lord's, 14 f., 65, 253, 261 ff.

   Testament: Old, 137, 150, 2<4, 256; New, 151, 161, 251 f., 254 i.

   Theology, natural, 79, 88, 96, 139, 165. See also Rationalism;
   Revelation.

   Traducianism, 207, 209.

   Trinity, 70, 84, 207, 209, 289 ff.

   Voltaire, 13, 83.

   Wesley, John, 98-102.

   Wesley, Charles, 102.

   Whitefield, 98.

   Will, the, 179 ff.

   Wolff, 25, 91.

   Zinsendorf, 11, 20.

   Zwingli, 68,
     __________________________________________________________________

                                    Indexes
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Scripture References

   Jeremiah

   [1]17:5-8   [2]18:7-10

   Matthew

   [3]24:30-34   [4]25:46   [5]28:19   [6]28:20

   Mark

   [7]9:44   [8]16:16

   John

   [9]1:51   [10]4:34   [11]5:17   [12]5:20   [13]5:21   [14]5:24
   [15]5:25   [16]5:29   [17]6:57   [18]8:29   [19]10:30   [20]10:36
   [21]16:7   [22]17:23   [23]20:22   [24]20:23

   Acts

   [25]1:4   [26]1:5   [27]2:4   [28]2:38   [29]10:47   [30]17:27-30
   [31]19:2

   Romans

   [32]1:21   [33]5:12-21   [34]6:2   [35]6:6   [36]6:11   [37]8:9
   [38]8:10

   1 Corinthians

   [39]12:4   [40]15:21-22   [41]15:25-26

   2 Corinthians

   [42]11:3   [43]13:6

   Galatians

   [44]2:20

   Ephesians

   [45]4:22   [46]4:24

   Philippians

   [47]2:6-9

   Colossians

   [48]3:10

   1 Peter

   [49]2:24
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Latin Words and Phrases

     * Unitas Fratrum: [50]1
     * credenda: [51]1
     * locus: [52]1 [53]2 [54]3 [55]4
     * membra : [56]1
     * momenta: [57]1 [58]2 [59]3
     * pari : [60]1
     * persona grata: [61]1
     * prius: [62]1
     * pro licentia: [63]1
     * quantum: [64]1
     * reatus, corruptio naturae, vitium originis, morbus originis: [65]1
     * reservatio mentalis: [66]1
     * via eminentiae, negationis et causalitatis: [67]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of German Words and Phrases

     * Angelegenheiten: [68]1
     * Aufklärung: [69]1 [70]2 [71]3 [72]4
     * Frömmigkeit: [73]1
     * Glaubenslehre: [74]1 [75]2 [76]3 [77]4 [78]5 [79]6 [80]7 [81]8
       [82]9 [83]10 [84]11 [85]12
     * Landwehr: [86]1
     * Reden: [87]1 [88]2
     * Wesen: [89]1
     __________________________________________________________________

Index of Pages of the Print Edition

   [90]i  [91]ii  [92]iii  [93]iv  [94]v  [95]vi  [96]vii  [97]viii
   [98]ix  [99]x  [100]xi  [101]xii  [102]1  [103]2  [104]3  [105]4
   [106]5  [107]6  [108]7  [109]8  [110]9  [111]10  [112]11  [113]12
   [114]13  [115]14  [116]16  [117]17  [118]18  [119]19  [120]20  [121]21
   [122]22  [123]23  [124]24  [125]25  [126]26  [127]27  [128]28  [129]29
   [130]30  [131]31  [132]32  [133]33  [134]34  [135]35  [136]36  [137]37
   [138]38  [139]39  [140]40  [141]41  [142]42  [143]43  [144]44  [145]45
   [146]46  [147]47  [148]48  [149]49  [150]50  [151]51  [152]52  [153]53
   [154]54  [155]55  [156]56  [157]57  [158]58  [159]59  [160]60  [161]61
   [162]62  [163]63  [164]64  [165]65  [166]66  [167]67  [168]68  [169]69
   [170]70  [171]71  [172]72  [173]73  [174]74  [175]75  [176]76  [177]77
   [178]78  [179]79  [180]80  [181]81  [182]82  [183]83  [184]84  [185]85
   [186]86  [187]87  [188]88  [189]89  [190]90  [191]91  [192]92  [193]93
   [194]94  [195]95  [196]96  [197]97  [198]98  [199]99  [200]100
   [201]101  [202]102  [203]103  [204]104  [205]105  [206]106  [207]107
   [208]108  [209]109  [210]110  [211]111  [212]112  [213]113  [214]114
   [215]115  [216]116  [217]117  [218]118  [219]119  [220]120  [221]121
   [222]122  [223]123  [224]124  [225]125  [226]126  [227]127  [228]128
   [229]129  [230]130  [231]131  [232]132  [233]133  [234]134  [235]135
   [236]136  [237]137  [238]138  [239]139  [240]140  [241]141  [242]142
   [243]143  [244]144  [245]145  [246]146  [247]147  [248]148  [249]149
   [250]150  [251]151  [252]152  [253]153  [254]154  [255]155  [256]156
   [257]157  [258]158  [259]159  [260]160  [261]161  [262]162  [263]163
   [264]164  [265]165  [266]166  [267]167  [268]168  [269]169  [270]170
   [271]171  [272]172  [273]173  [274]174  [275]175  [276]176  [277]177
   [278]178  [279]179  [280]180  [281]181  [282]182  [283]183  [284]184
   [285]185  [286]l86  [287]187  [288]188  [289]189  [290]190  [291]191
   [292]192  [293]193  [294]194  [295]195  [296]196  [297]197  [298]198
   [299]199  [300]200  [301]201  [302]202  [303]203  [304]204  [305]205
   [306]206  [307]207  [308]208  [309]209  [310]210  [311]211  [312]212
   [313]213  [314]214  [315]215  [316]2i6  [317]217  [318]218  [319]219
   [320]220  [321]221  [322]222  [323]223  [324]224  [325]225  [326]226
   [327]227  [328]228  [329]229  [330]230  [331]231  [332]232  [333]233
   [334]234  [335]235  [336]236  [337]237  [338]238  [339]239  [340]240
   [341]241  [342]242  [343]243  [344]244  [345]245  [346]246  [347]247
   [348]248  [349]249  [350]250  [351]251  [352]252  [353]253  [354]254
   [355]255  [356]256  [357]257  [358]258  [359]259  [360]260  [361]261
   [362]262  [363]263  [364]264  [365]265  [366]266  [367]267  [368]268
   [369]269  [370]270  [371]271  [372]272  [373]273  [374]274  [375]275
   [376]276  [377]277  [378]278  [379]279  [380]280  [381]281  [382]282
   [383]283  [384]284  [385]285  [386]286  [387]287  [388]288  [389]289
   [390]290  [391]291  [392]292  [393]293  [394]294  [395]295  [396]296
   [397]297  [398]298  [399]299  [400]300  [401]301  [402]302  [403]303
   [404]304  [405]305  [406]306  [407]307  [408]308  [409]309  [410]310
   [411]311  [412]312  [413]313  [414]314  [415]315  [416]316  [417]317
   [418]318  [419]319  [420]320  [421]321  [422]322  [423]323  [424]324
   [425]325  [426]326  [427]327  [428]328  [429]329  [430]330  [431]331
   [432]332  [433]333  [434]334  [435]335  [436]336  [437]337  [438]338
   [439]339  [440]340  [441]341  [442]342  [443]343  [444]344
     __________________________________________________________________

            This document is from the Christian Classics Ethereal
               Library at Calvin College, http://www.ccel.org,
                   generated on demand from ThML source.

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