BUT whilst I am thus arranging my thoughts, I find something of a passion or inclination within me, either drawing me to, or driving me from, every thing 1 think on; so that I cannot so much as think upon a thought, but it is either pleasing or displeasing to me, according to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the object it is placed upon, or to my natural affections, If it comes under the pleasing dress and appearance of good, I readily choose and embrace it; if otherwise, I am as eagerly bent to refuse and reject it. And these two acts of the will are naturally founded in those two reigning passions of the soul, love and hatred, which I cannot but look upon as the grounds of all its other motions and affections. For what are those other passions of desire, hope, joy, and the like, but love in its several postures? and what else can we conceive of fear, grief, abhorrence, &c. but so many different expressions of hatred, according to the several circumstances that the displeasing objects appear to be under. Doth my understanding represent any thing to my will, under the notion of good and pleasant? My will is presently taken and delighted 138with it, and so places its love upon it; and this love, if the object be present., inclines me to embrace it with joy; if absent, it puts forth itself into desire; if easy to be obtained, it comforts itself with hope; if difficult, it arms itself with courage; if impossible, it boils up into anger; if obstructed, it presently falls down into despair.

On the other hand, doth my understanding represent any object to my will, as evil, painful, or deformed? How doth it immediately shrink and gather up itself into a loathing and hatred of it! and this hatred, if the ungrateful object he present, puts on the mournful sables of grief and sorrow: if it be at any distance from it, it boils up into detestation and abhorrence; if ready to fall upon it, it shakes for fear; if difficult to be prevented, it strengthens itself with courage and magnanimity, either to conquer or undergo it. These affections, therefore, being thus the constant attendants of my thoughts, it behoves me as much to look to those as to the other, especially, when I consider, that not only my thoughts, but even my actions too, are generally determined to good or bad, accordingly as they are influenced by them. That my affections, therefore, as well as my thoughts, may be duly regulated,