TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS

First, it presents to the Deity, in the act of election, of non-election, of predestination, and of preterition, man as created, and created of such a character as did not in fact pertain to him, while the first theory presents to the Deity, in the act of predestination and of reprobation, man as to be created, and to be created such as he was, in fact, afterwards created.

ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION

That this difference is not real, we have sufficiently demonstrated in answering the sixth and tenth propositions. The decree has reference to man to be created, considered generally; and its execution to man as created according to his various relations.

REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SECOND

PROPOSITION

I affirmed that the second theory was less probable than the first, and proved it by five reasons. We proceed to a more extended consideration of them, and, in the first place, we examine the first, that is, the one presented in this proposition.

The theory of Calvin regards the Deity, as engaged, in the decree of predestination, with an object identical with the object of the execution of that decree, but the second theory regards the Deity as having reference, in the decree of predestination, to man as he is considered in a purely natural state, which can effect nothing supernatural or divine, while, in its execution, He can not have reference to man in such a condition, since no man ever existed wholly without a participation of supernatural endowments, either by creation or superinfusion. It should be observed that predestination does not intervene between creation and superinfusion, and that superinfusion is not the work of predestination, as was previously demonstrated. The answer which you present does not seem to be relevant. For though the decree was made before the creation of man, yet predestination, explained according to the second theory, had reference only to man considered as created. Creation is not a result of the execution of the decree of predestination, understood in that sense, and though the execution of the decree may, according to this theory, refer only to man as created, yet the question is to be answered—whence did the first act of execution take its origin? Let those things be examined which are said in reply to your answer to the 6th and 8th propositions.