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CHAPTER XXIII.

MORAL HABITS.

Habits. HABITS differ from principles, or constitutional desires, in that they are adventitious. Every habit is acquired by repeated acts. The human constitution possesses a wonderful susceptibility of forming habits of every kind. Indeed, we cannot prevent the formation of habits of some kind or other. Still, a man has much in his power as it regards the kind of habits which he forms, and is highly accountable for the exercise of this power. A man’s happiness and usefulness depend very much on the character of his habits. Yea, a man’s moral character derives its complexion, in a great degree, from his habits. In this place, it is not necessary to go into the philosophy of the formation of habits. 156Our object is to consider habits and habitual actions as they partake of a moral character, or as they are the object of moral approbation, or disapprobation. If we should remove from the list of moral actions all those which are prompted by habit, we should cut off the larger number of those which men have agreed in judging to be of a moral nature.

Accountability for habits. That there are virtuous habits and vicious habits, will scarcely be denied by any considerate person. A habit of lying, of swearing, of slandering, of cheating, of irreverence, of indolence, of vainglory, with many others, are, alas, too common. There are also virtuous habits, such as of industry, temperance, kindness, veracity, diligence, honesty, & c. To be sure, these virtues commonly flow from principle, but the practice of them is greatly facilitated by correct habits. Two considerations will show that men are properly accountable for those actions which proceed from habit. The first is, that in the formation of his habits, man is voluntary. The acts by which they are formed are free acts, and 157the agent is responsible for all their consequences. The other consideration is, that habits may be counteracted and even changed by the force of virtuous resolutions and perseverance. Where habit has become inveterate, it may be difficult to oppose or eradicate it; but the strength of moral principle has often been found sufficient to counteract the most confirmed habits. When it is asserted that men long enslaved by evil habits cannot make a change, it is on the ground, that no principle of sufficient power exists in the mind of the agent; but for that deficiency, the man is responsible. Yet a power from without may introduce a new principle potent enough, to overcome evil habits. The importance of possessing good habits, is admitted by all moralists. Aristotle makes the essence of virtue to consist in “practical habits, voluntary in their origin,” and agreeable to right reason. Dr. Thomas Reid, in his “Essay on the Active Powers,” defines virtue to be “the fixed purpose to act according to a sense of duty,” which definition Dugald Stewart modifies, by observing, “It is the fixed purpose to do what 158is right, which evidently constitutes what we call a virtuous disposition. But it appears to me that virtue, considered as an attribute of character, is more properly defined by the habit which the fixed purpose gradually forms than by the fixed purpose itself.” Dr. Paley lays it down as an aphorism, that “mankind act more from habit than reflection.” “We are,” says he, “for the most part, determined at once, and by an impulse which has the effect and energy of a pre-established habit.” To the objection, “If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits, where is the exercise of virtue, or the guilt of vice?” he answers, “in the forming and contracting of these habits.” “And hence,” says he, “results a rule of considerable importance, viz, that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit.”

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