CHAPTER I.

CONSCIENCE, OR THE MORAL FACULTY.

As all men, when reason is developed, have a faculty by which they can discern a difference between objects of sight which are beautiful and those which are All men discern moral qualities. deformed, so all men possess the power of discerning a difference between actions, as to their moral quality. The judgment thus formed is immediate, and has no relation to the usefulness or injuriousness to human happiness, of the objects contemplated.

Whatever difference of opinion may exist respecting the origin of this faculty, it is universally admitted that men, in all True in all ages ages and countries, have judged some actions to be good and deserving of approbation, 20while they have judged others to be bad, and of ill desert.

In all languages, we find words expressive of the ideas of moral excellence, and moral evil. In the laws and penalties established in all ages throughout the Agreement of mankind. world, it is evidently implied that some actions ought to be done, and others avoided. In cases of flagrant injustice or ingratitude, all men, of every country and of every age, agree in their judgment of their moral evil. There is, in regard to such actions, no more difference in the judgment of men, than respecting the colour of grass, or the taste of honey. If any man does not perceive grass to be green, or honey to be sweet, we do not thence conclude that men’s bodily senses are not similarly constituted, but that the organs of the individual who does not see and taste as other men do, are defective. or depraved by disease.

Case proposed must be simple. To determine whether all men have one original moral faculty, the case proposed for their moral judgment should be simply good or evil. For a complex 21act, in which there is something good and something evil, or rather where there must be an accurate weighing of motives in order to ascertain the quality of the action, is not a proper test as to the existence of a uniformity of moral judgment in men. Therefore, the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley,¹¹   In the chapter of his Moral Philosophy, under the head “The Moral Sense.” from the history of Valerius Maximus, is not at all suited to his purpose; Case of Toranius irrelative. because the case is very complex, and one on which it is difficult to determine at first view, what the true moral character of the action is. The facts, as related by him, are as follows: The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Triumvirate. Caius Toranius—coming over to the interests of that party—discovered his father’s place of concealment to the officers who were in pursuit of him, and gave them, withal, a description of his person by which they might distinguish him. The old man, more anxious for the safety and fortunes of his son than for the little that might remain of his own life, began 22immediately to inquire of the officers whether his son were well, and whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of the generals. ‘That son (replied one of the officers), so dear to thy affections, has betrayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended, and diest.’ With this, the officer struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, affected not so much by his fate, as by the means to which he owed it.” Now, the question is, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and consequently under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether or not such a one would feel upon the relation any degree of that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius’s conduct which we feel.

Why it affords no criterion. In our judgment, such a case would afford no criterion by which to determine whether men possess constitutionally a moral sense. For, in the first place, the 23trial would be no better than if the question were proposed to a child two years old, in whose mind the moral faculty is not yet developed. A human being, arrived at adult age without instruction or communication with others, would be—as it relates to the mind—in a state differing very little from that of infancy. It is not held that the moral sense will be exercised without the usual means by which human faculties are developed. If an organical defect in the brain should prevent the intellectual faculties from coming into exercise, the unhappy individual thus deprived of reason would prove nothing in regard to the operations of reason where it is developed. So, also, if a human being were brought up from early infancy in a dark dungeon, and if no information were communicated to him, the mental faculties would not be developed, and it would be absurd to have recourse to such a one to ascer tain what faculties belong to the human mind. The same remark will apply to the case of the wild boy, referred to by Dr. Paley; and also, though in an inferior degree, to savages of the most degraded class.

What is meant by an original, universal faculty. Let it then be fairly understood what it is which is asserted in regard to conscience, as an original, universal faculty. It is What is meant by that every human mind, when its faculties have been developed, and have arrived at some degree of maturity, discerns a quality in certain actions which is termed moral; that is, it intuitively perceives that some actions are right and some wrong.

Paley’s instance complex. Another objection to the historical fact adduced by Dr. Paley, is, that it presents to the mind, not a case of simple, unmixed good or evil, but a complex case, in which—before a judgment can be formed of the action of the son—it must be decided whether a man ought to be governed by a regard to the welfare of a parent, or to the public good. If the son believed that the party in pursuit of his father was promoting the public good, he might feel that he ought to be governed by this rather than by filial affection. Here, then, we have presented a complex and difficult case in morals, about which men would be very apt to 25differ; and we are to determine whether all men—even those totally uneducated—would view it in the same light.

A proper case supposed. To render the case a suitable one to be a test of the question under consideration, it should be supposed that the father was acting in conformity with the strictest principles of rectitude; that his life was sought by wicked men, aiming not at the good of the commonwealth but its destruction; and that the son, in betraying the place of his concealment, was actuated by mercenary motives, or by unjust and unnatural dislike to a good parent. If a case like this were presented to a thousand persons. from as many different parts of the world, there would be but one judgment and one feeling, all would judge the conduct of the son to be blamable. Different degrees of moral disapprobation would be felt by those whose moral faculty was in a cultivated state; but there would be no difference in the opinion entertained of his conduct. All would feel disapprobation, accompanied by a desire for the punishment of the 26offender. It is found that savages appear to have but an obscure exercise of conscience, but in proportion as their minds are cultivated, this faculty becomes more manifest, and operates more forcibly.